UK-US Co-operation on Using Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd October 2024 Grand Committee

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[Lord Goldsmith]

That the Grand Committee takes note of the Amendment to the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, laid before the House on 26 July.

Relevant document: 2nd Report from the International Agreements Committee

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to debate the International Agreements Committee’s two reports on the related topics of the UK-US mutual defence agreement and the AUKUS agreement. I thank the Government for making the time available for this debate.

I will start with the MDA, which entered into force in August 1958. I am looking forward to this debate, particularly because it includes some new members of the committee; I am very pleased to welcome them to the committee as well. The MDA has been amended several times since it entered into force in August 1958, most recently in 2014. It provides for the exchange of nuclear materials, technology and information relating to nuclear weapons, although it does not provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons themselves. It underpins the UK’s nuclear weapons programme, and as such is a key part of the special relationship.

Despite the MDA being described as the cornerstone of the defence nuclear relationship between the UK and the US, amendments to the agreement in 1994, 2004 and 2014 were not subject to debate in Parliament or a Select Committee report. External stakeholders such as CND and the Nuclear Information Service have raised concerns about the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of previous amendments to the MDA and have called for a debate on the most recent amendments. I am therefore very pleased that we are having this debate today.

The amending agreement should be considered in the context of key developments to the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The UK is currently in the process of modernising its nuclear capabilities and nuclear-powered submarines, aiming to replace its four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines with the new Dreadnought class from the early 2030s. A programme to replace the UK’s nuclear warhead was also confirmed in February 2020. In March 2024, the previous Government published a new Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, which sets out the long-term approach to investing in and developing the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The United States is also currently modernising its strategic nuclear capabilities.

The amending agreement should also be considered in the context of particular concerns. Some commentators have criticised the MDA as it risks the UK appearing to become overdependent on the US in relation to developing an independent nuclear weapons programme. However, the Ministry of Defence told us that co-operation with the US is based on the understanding that the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent remains independent.

Turning to the committee’s report, we make two main recommendations: two key conclusions, both related to the unsatisfactory arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of the MDA. First, we welcome the expectation that ratification of the amending agreement by the US will be completed within the terms of the current Administration and Congress. But we also observe how the thorough congressional scrutiny processes contrast starkly with the inadequacy of our own arrangements.

The US began its process of ratification earlier than the UK. Under the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear co-operation agreement for two periods totalling 90 days of continuous session. That is 30 days of consultation with relevant committees and 60 days during which Congress has the opportunity to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval. The Ministry of Defence has indicated that the period for congressional review has now concluded. By contrast, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, or CRaG, Parliament has only 21 sitting days in which to scrutinise a treaty, take evidence and report on it, and hold a debate.

Considering the MDA’s role in forming the cornerstone of the UK-US defence and security relationship, the committee particularly regretted the lack of sufficient time to take evidence on this important agreement. This is yet another example of the shortcomings of the CRaG regime. Noble Lords may be interested to know that the committee is currently considering and conducting an inquiry into how parliamentary scrutiny of treaties can be improved in future. We have commented on this in previous reports.

In our second conclusion, the committee drew attention to a specific change in the amending agreement, which will potentially reduce the already scarce opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise the MDA. This concerns Article III bis, which provides for the transfer of non-nuclear parts, enriched uranium, special nuclear material and equipment. Article III bis is time-limited and has been renewed on a 10-year cycle since the 1980s. The requirement to approve revisions to Article III bis has also provided the opportunity for both parties to make further amendments to other parts of the MDA. Article 5 of the amending agreement amends Article III bis so that its provisions are “extended indefinitely”, with no requirement for periodic renewal. Given the strategic importance of UK-US co-operation at this critical time in replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent to maintain the country’s security, the committee is concerned at this reduction in scrutiny opportunities and calls on the Government to commit to providing a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years. That is a critical conclusion and recommendation of this committee.

Having dealt with the MDA, I want to turn now to the committee’s report on the AUKUS agreement relating to co-operation on naval nuclear propulsion, which forms part of the broader trilateral defence and security partnership between the UK, the US and Australia. This agreement has been made under pillar 1. The first phase of the partnership focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Upon its entry into force, it will supersede the current exchange naval nuclear propulsion information agreement, which entered into force in January 2022. That agreement, which I shall call the ENNPI agreement, allowed for the exchange of information to facilitate an 18-month study into the delivery of a conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine capability to Australia. The committee reported on that agreement on 13 January 2022, drawing it to the special attention of the House, and a debate was held in Grand Committee on 17 January.

The new agreement will allow the UK and US to support Australia in acquiring its first conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine fleet from the 2030s. As well as allowing the continued exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information, it will authorise the transfer of material and equipment relating to naval nuclear propulsion, including special nuclear material in complete welded nuclear power units. That will enable UK industry to support Australia in building a trilaterally developed submarine, incorporating technology from the UK, the US and Australia.

The AUKUS nations have released a joint statement detailing the progress made since the announcement of the optimal pathway in March 2023. The specific progress includes: increased education and training of Royal Australian Navy personnel and specialised US and UK schools; increased industry training to build and sustain nuclear-powered submarines; and preparatory activities to build Australia’s capacity ahead of establishing the submarine rotational force-west by 2027—that is, the rotational presence of UK and US nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling.

The committee welcomes the significant progress made in the delivery of pillar 1 of the AUKUS partnership. Nevertheless, we must also be mindful of some risks, as well as opportunities, highlighted by some defence commentators. For example, Dr Sidharth Kaushal, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, warned against the sale of the Virginia class to Australia appearing as a diversion of capacity from the US Navy and of the need to manage design trade-offs as well as human capital. Similarly, Andrew Dowse, the director of RAND Australia, outlined risks such as public perception challenges in relation to cost, nuclear proliferation and implications for the sovereignty of an Australian submarine fleet.

I will briefly summarise the link between the MDA and AUKUS agreements and why we are debating both reports together today. The AUKUS submarine fleet will incorporate designs and technology from both the UK and US, so the MDA could have a key role in enabling the exchange of nuclear propulsion technology and information sharing between the parties. The AUKUS submarine will be based on the UK’s next-generation nuclear-powered submarine design and will include US technology based largely on the Virginia-class SSN, including nuclear propulsion technology and components, and a common vertical launch system and weapons. The Ministry of Defence, from which we took evidence, acknowledged that although they represent two separate agreements, the MDA added value to the AUKUS trilateral agreement and that, without the MDA, we would not have the ENNPIA or AUKUS pillar 1.

Before I conclude and look forward to the debate, I thank the Ministry of Defence for its co-operation in assisting our scrutiny work. I thank my colleagues on the International Agreements Committee, a number of whom are here, for their hard work and support. I also thank the officials of the committee, who have to work on what I have already identified as a very tight timetable to prepare reports, briefs and drafts for us, a feature to which we must have regard when we look, as I hope we will, at a revision of CRaG. Finally, I thank those who offered us a slot for debate in Grand Committee within the CRaG period. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for participating in this debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, said, it has been an extraordinarily wide-ranging debate. I had not expected so much knowledge to come out about Australian politics. I do not know a lot about it, but now I know much more, thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—but obviously noble Lords spoke about the great geopolitical questions that we are concerned with. To the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, I have to say that, with regards to matters of history, I tend to side with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, but he may persuade me one day.

I want particularly to thank the Minister. He has made two personal commitments today for which I am very grateful. One is how we deal with the renewal question, which I shall come back to. The second is what he said about helping to educate his colleagues about the limitations of the CRaG process, which I hope will help us to pursue the amendments which I and others believe are necessary.

I have talked about this issue in the House before. Once upon a time, of course, Parliament did not have any right to look at treaties, unless a Minister chose to bring them. All treaties were made under the royal prerogative, and there was no process for parliamentary scrutiny as a matter of generality. CRaG has changed that, and that is very good, but it is limited. It is limited in terms of time, as noble Lords have said—and it is extraordinary how difficult it can be. When one says from time to time, “I pay tribute to the work of the committee staff and the officials”, it really is the case here. Our committee staff—and our clerk, Rhiannon Williams, is sitting in the Public Gallery—have to pick up these treaties, often at short notice, and find expert evidence that will help us, because we do not necessarily know all the answers, so finding people who can help the committee is very important.

We then need to get a report done in time to meet the CRaG scrutiny period, which is limited, and we depend on the Government. I do not want to be political about this, but this committee produced an important report on Rwanda, which it was actually quite important for Members in the other place to debate, because they are the ones who have the right under CRaG to say, “Don’t ratify this now”. We did not in a sense have a statutory right. But to do that, they needed to have time for a debate, and that was in the hands of the Government. There are issues about time for debates that are also important. That is why I started by thanking the Government for making time for this debate—and I repeat that thanks now. So we will continue to look at the CRaG process and we will come forward with some proposals for reform. I shall take the Minister up on his promise to talk to his colleagues about that when we have formulated precisely what we think should happen.

The second thing is the commitment that the Minister has made in relation to renewal. This was a matter that exercised the committee. On one hand, taking away the 10-year renewal—or, to use different language, the break clause—adds to our security, because it means that there is an evergreen commitment to do those things that the agreement does, and that is a good thing. But, by a sidewind, it takes away parliamentary scrutiny at the same time, which was what exercised the committee. So our proposal that the Government should none the less come forward to Parliament and tell it every 10 years, taking the same period as was in the previous arrangements, is a good way to ensure that there is still some scrutiny.

We will look at precisely what the Minister’s officials come forward with. He has made an in-principle commitment—I understand entirely why that is so. He will not be surprised to hear me say, using the same words that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, used, that we will hold him, as it were, to account—the Government to account—for making sure that there is a scrutiny which works.

I very much welcome the support for reform that we had from a number of people: the noble Lords, Lord Howell, Lord Hannay and Lord Bilimoria, and others as well, and we will follow that through.

I do not think there is anything more I need to say about this debate. It has been a great privilege. Well, there is one thing I want to say. The noble Lord, Lord Udny- Lister, referred to dealing with this committee as being like herding cats. He said it was a formidable committee, and it is, but that is because of its members’ expertise, talent and experience, not because of any feline qualities that they might have. However, it is a great privilege and a pleasure to chair this committee. It is doing important work, and the fact that we have a debate in which it is not just the members of the committee who came to speak—although it included them—is very welcome. With those words, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name.

Motion agreed.