Policing and Crime Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
The Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims (Mike Penning)
I beg to move amendment 148, in clause 50, page 60, line 18, at end insert—
“(8) In the Criminal Justice Act 2003—
(a) in section 24A(5)(b) (purposes for which person may be kept in police detention) for “section 37D(1)” substitute “section 47(4A)”, and
(b) in section 24B(5) (application of provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984)—
(i) omit paragraph (a), and
(ii) in paragraph (c) at the end insert “except subsections (4D) and (4E)”.”
This amendment is consequential on the changes made in clause 50. It relates to persons who are arrested because they are believed to have failed to comply with conditions attached to a conditional caution.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 3—Release without bail: fingerprinting and samples.
Government new clause 4—Release under section 24A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Government new clause 5—Duty to notify person released under section 34, 37 or 37CA of PACE that not to be prosecuted.
Government new clause 6—Duty to notify person released under any of sections 41 to 44 of PACE that not to be prosecuted.
New clause 48—Scrutiny of investigatory capabilities—
“(1) Police and crime plans produced under Chapter 3 of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, must include an annual assessment of the capability of the police to properly investigate crimes within the 28-day pre-charge bail time limit.
(2) The assessment must consider any—
(a) changes to the number of suspects released without bail,
(b) resource constraints, including staff numbers,
(c) safeguarding requirements of victims, witnesses and suspects, and
(d) issues around multiagency work.”
This new clause would make it mandatory for Police and Crime Commissioners to produce an annual assessment of the capability of police forces and other agencies to meet the mandated 28 day pre-charge bail limit.
New clause 49—Cooperation of relevant agencies in investigations—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations require relevant agencies to cooperate promptly with police in carrying out investigations of suspects.
(2) Relevant agencies may include, but are not limited to—
(a) the Crown Prosecution Service,
(b) forensic examiners,
(c) health authorities, and
(d) banks and financial institutions.
(3) Alongside any additional duty to cooperate, the Home Secretary must carry out an assessment of the relevant agency’s resource capacity to provide relevant information or services within the 28 day limit for cases where suspects are released on pre-charge bail.”
This new clause would allow the Home Secretary to mandate cooperation of relevant agencies with police forces in conducting investigations, and would allow for scrutiny of whether relevant agencies have the necessary capacity and resource to cooperate within the required length of time.
Mike Penning
Briefly, the Government amendments and new clauses in this group are consequential, to ensure that we tidy up any loose ends. I know that the shadow Minister will speak in a moment to new clause 48 and, if I may, I will respond to his concerns when he has done so.
Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)
Let me say at the start that we agree with the principle of what the Government are seeking to achieve. We want to raise issues of practicality that were cited, for example, in the evidence given to the Committee by both the National Police Chiefs Council and the chief superintendents.
New clause 48 would make it mandatory for police and crime commissioners to produce an annual assessment of the capability of police forces and other agencies to meet the mandated 28-day pre-charge bail limit. I stress again, as we said on Second Reading, that reform of police bail is absolutely overdue. The current system has been criticised from both sides, on the grounds that it unfairly leaves people under investigation for long periods before they have even been charged for an offence and that it does not offer the necessary safeguards in the cases of people who pose more of a risk to the public. I will say more on that later.
A more targeted approach is therefore needed that does not unfairly restrict the liberty of people whose guilt is far from proven but that has teeth when it needs to. The case of Paul Gambaccini is a stark example of why the system has to change. We are in complete agreement that we need a common-sense approach to cases in which people have been on bail continuously but no evidence is found. Investigations need to be conducted swiftly and fairly, yet a 2013 BBC freedom of information request, to which 40 police forces responded, found that 71,256 people were on pre-charge bail and 5,480 had been on bail for more than six months. Our concern is that the Government are mandating a 28-day pre-charge bail limit, the aim of which is welcome, but are not addressing the root causes of delays in investigations.
Let us start with the key problem with cases such as that of Paul Gambaccini: individuals who are suspected of a crime but who are not ultimately charged can be under investigation for a long time before a decision not to charge is reached. As we are well aware, that can have a hugely negative impact on the lives of suspects and their families, and in cases where charges are brought and suspects are eventually found guilty, we do not want a system that involves prolonged periods before victims see any kind of justice. We therefore need to tackle why these investigations take so long.
Alongside the measures contained in this Bill, the Government need to have a careful look at where the system can be improved, where extra capacity is needed and what impact reductions in resources are having. For example, Home Office workforce figures show that 40,000 police jobs were cut between 2010 and 2015, with a 30% cut in police community support officers, 20% fewer police staff jobs and 13% fewer police officers. The police are therefore juggling carrying out investigations with patrols, immediate response to emergency incidents and life-saving preventive work. Resources will inevitably have an impact on how quickly police forces can get things done and how able they feel to prioritise investigative work.
Do the Government have any considered idea of what impact resource reductions are having on the capability of forces to carry out timely investigations? What resources will be required under this clause? For example, as regards a super structure of police superintendents to oversee the changes proposed by the Government, the point has been made very strongly by the chief superintendents that it would take out several of their number whose job it would be to supervise the new arrangements that the Government seek to put in place. Crucially, our amendment would require an assessment of this question by police and crime commissioners themselves.
Similarly, cuts to the Crown Prosecution Service and to other agencies are being seen to have a knock-on effect, and I will come back to that point shortly. We do not want the outcome of these proposals to be simply that more people are released not on bail. Chief Constable Alex Marshall noted in his evidence to the Committee that, according to the College of Policing’s bail pilot, early indications of the data were that 70% of those released on pre-charge bail
“were bailed for more than 28 days.”
This was because officers were waiting, while
“getting professional statements from doctors and others, getting phones and computers analysed, taking detailed statements from vulnerable victims of crime, getting banking information and details, and getting forensics analysed”.
He went on:
“We agree that the time limits should be closely monitored…The onus will rest on many people across the system to respond much more quickly to requests from the police conducting their investigation.”––[Official Report, Policing and Crime Public Bill Committee, 15 March 2016; c. 78, Q45.]
He is absolutely right. We do not want a situation in which, due to factors beyond their control, police have no choice but to release not on bail in order to meet the time limit. Clearly, in cases where bail conditions play a necessary role in safeguarding, this would have serious consequences for victims, witnesses and the general public.
In the Government’s consultation, suggestions from respondents included consideration of the needs of the victims of crime, including safeguarding requirements and special interview requirements. The need to safeguard complex investigations was also raised. Early indications of the College of Policing’s pilot were that, of the 950,000 arrests in a year, about 30% were released on pre-charge bail. If that starts to change dramatically, and many more people are released not on bail due to the proposals in the Bill, the Government will have to reflect on and address that. That is why the part of this amendment that requires an assessment of any changes in the number of people released not on bail is so important. Alex Marshall’s comments relate very closely to new clause 49 and the issue of third-party delays preventing police officers from taking critical decisions within the required timeframe in an investigation.
This amendment would allow the Home Secretary to mandate co-operation of relevant agencies with police forces in conducting investigations, and would allow for scrutiny of whether relevant agencies have the necessary capacity and resource to co-operate within the required length of time. The Crown Prosecution Service, forensic examiners, health authorities, banks and financial institutions, to name but a few, are all third parties that the police rely on in the preparation of a case, so the Government’s proposals in the Bill address only one part of the investigatory process.
In the Government’s own consultation on the proposal, they found that the most commonly raised suggestion was that matters outside police control should be taken into account, such as Crown Prosecution Service timescales, forensic examinations—including digital—and international inquiries.
In the 119 responses—or 40% of those who responded —highlighting the resource implications of each model, the most commonly raised issues were on the need for increased resources, including greater staff numbers. As Committee members will be aware, a number of pieces of existing legislation impose statutory duties on third parties to provide reports or information within a set timeframe, such as the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, the National Health Service Act 2006 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. However, as we have argued with pre-charge bail limits, the Government must not just mandate co-operation by third parties, they must also assess the relevant agencies’ capacity and, crucially, take a proactive approach to ensuring that agencies have the tools at their disposal to provide relevant information or services within the limit. For example, when consulted on the proposals, the Ministry of Justice highlighted concerns that the numbers of cases that would fall to be considered in the Crown court will exceed the available capacity in Crown court centres. Further to that, the Government proposed to have all pre-charge bail hearings dealt with in the magistrates court. I would be interested in the Government’s assessment of the capacity of magistrates courts and the ability of the Ministry of Justice to accommodate the projected costs of the additional hearings.
The Government need to listen on this important issue. In principle, they are doing the right thing in terms of the direction of travel, but they need to listen to the widespread concerns about the practicalities of implementing their proposals; they need to listen to what the police and other agencies are telling them about the major constraints on timely investigation, address those constraints and take a comprehensive approach to scrutinising the role of all agencies in the investigatory process, including, but not limited to, the police. That is what these two new clauses seek to achieve, and I urge the Government to take further action in parallel with their proposals in the Bill.
Mike Penning
May I say at the outset that I acknowledge and understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, even though I disagree on the need for the new clauses? We acknowledge that the new system will put pressures on the forces. We accept that, but at the moment we have a situation where the police can have unlimited police bail. That is unacceptable. We have consulted, listened carefully and 28 days should be the marker going forward. Of course, a superintendent or above can authorise extensions, and magistrates can authorise beyond that. We absolutely accept that the police will need more time in some complex cases and where the crime changes, but they have to explain why, unlike in the present system.
Whether and how the new system is working will be assessed by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary within its police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy reviews. That is a robust system. I do not think there is a PCC or chief constable in the country who would argue that Tom Winsor’s regime is not fair and robust. Sometimes they say to me that it is not fair and robust—but it is independent, it is there, and that is exactly right. We will keep the need for further reporting under review, but I do not want to put further bureaucracy on to the PCCs.
I fully understand the inter-agency point. We need to break down the silos so that we work more closely together. However, the shadow Minister referred to the consultation in his comments; a clear majority—two thirds—of consultation responses were in favour of establishing memorandums of understanding between the agencies rather than a statutory review. That is what the consultation said, and that is why we have gone down this route rather than the statutory one. I say again that we will keep that under review—but if there is a consultation where two thirds respond in favour of one way, and they are then completely ignored in favour of the statutory route, they will argue, “What is the point of a consultation?”.
It is so early in the morning to disagree already, but although I understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, the Government, sadly, do not feel the need for new clauses 48 and 49.
Jack Dromey
First, the Police Minister is right to be frank: this set of proposals will put pressure on not just the police but a whole range of other agencies. I note what he said of Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and its PEEL reports, and I add that the College of Policing and the Home Affairs Committee will keep this matter under review. I also welcome the proposed memorandum of understanding so that we can make the new system work. On that basis, and given those assurances, we will not press our amendments to a vote.
Amendment 148 agreed to.
Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 51 to 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
Restrictions on places that may be used as places of safety
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 157, in clause 60, page 68, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) Before a house, flat or room where a person is living is used as a place of safety the patient must first be offered one of the following locations as an alternative place of safety—
(a) a residential accommodation provided by a local social services authority under Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948 or under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 to the National Health Service Act 1977;
(b) a hospital as defined by the Mental Health Act 1983; or
(c) a mental health care home.”
This amendment would require that a patient was offered a health-based place of safety as an alternative to their, or someone else’s, home being used as a place of safety.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 159, in clause 61, page 69, leave out lines 31 to 38 and insert—
“the point at which the decision is taken to remove a person to a place of safety, or keep them at the current place of safety.”
This amendment would mean that the permitted period of detention started when the decision was taken to remove a person to a place of safety, rather than the point at which they arrived at the place of safety.
Amendment 158, in clause 61, page 69, line 31, leave out “24” and insert “12”.
This amendment reduces the permitted period of detention to 12 hours.
Government new clause 28—Protective searches: individuals removed etc under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
New clause 11—Detention in places of safety: annual reporting—
“(1) Police forces in England and Wales must publish an annual report containing statistics on the usage of the power to detain a person in a place of safety.
(2) This report shall contain, but need not be limited to, information on—
(a) the number of detentions;
(b) the age of detainees;
(c) the length of detention; and
(d) the location of the detention.”
This new clause would require police forces to report annually on the number of detentions in places of safety, including information on the age of the detainee and the location and duration of the detention.
New clause 12—Access to Independent Mental Health Advocates—
“(1) A person detained in a place of safety under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall have the right to an independent mental health advocate (see section 130A of the Mental Health Act 1983).”
This new clause would extend the right to an independent mental health advocate to those detained under sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
New clause 50—Powers under the Mental Health Act 1983: reporting and review—
“(1) One year after section 59, 60 and 61 of this Act come into force the Secretary of State must lay before parliament a report on the impact of the changes to powers under the Mental Health Act 1983 on mental health assessment and outcomes.
(2) This report shall contain, but need not be limited to, information on—
(a) length of time taken from commencement of mental health assessment of an individual under sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act, to either the discharge, admittance to hospital or extension of period of detention of these individuals,
(b) availability of trained medical professionals to carry out assessments, and
(c) availability of hospital beds for persons deemed to require inpatient care.
(3) In producing this review the Home Secretary must consult the Secretary of State for Health.”
This new clause would make it mandatory for the Home Secretary to report on the impact of Section 59, 60 and 61 on mental health assessment and outcomes. This would allow for scrutiny of whether the proposals improve the outcomes for those subject to police detention and mental health assessment, and whether health providers have the capacity to carry out timely assessments and provide any necessary inpatient care.
Mr Kevan Jones
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I have said in Committee, and on the Floor of the House, that I recognise that the Government are trying to make progress on ensuring that the way in which people with mental illness are treated by the police is both compassionate and secures them the help that they deserve. The problem that is evident today, and will be as the Bill continues its journey through this House and the other place, is that although the Home Department is trying to improve the situation, the elephant in the room is the resources and activities of the Department of Health. This is an area in which two Departments are intertwined, because the issues are quite clearly not, in essence, a police matter, although the police are left to resolve the problem.
Amendment 157 recognises that the Government have tried to emphasise that a police cell is the worst place for not only a young person but an adult. I commend the Government’s initiative in trying to ensure that few adults, and certainly no children, are detained in a police cell. We have to ask why they are currently detained, which is—I am going to be very political—because of the reduction of beds and facilities by the Department of Health. I have tabled amendment 157 because the Government, quite helpfully, have no objection to a place of safety, under the Mental Health Act 1983, being someone’s flat or home, because that is a place in which those individuals can be supported by mental health services and other agencies. That is important. The problem is that it might become the default position that people are forced to stay in their homes if an alternative is not available. I put it to the Committee that most of us, given the choice between staying at home or being in a police cell, would stay at home. However, that does not guarantee that home is the best place of safety.
James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point and speaks with authority on the subject. Does he recognise that there are some excellent local examples of clinical commissioning groups working well with the police? In Kingston we have a new project where the mental health trusts, the clinical commissioning group and the Met police have come together to provide just the kind of facility we are talking about. Although there is more to do nationally, there are some good local examples of the policy working.
Mr Kevan Jones
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. One of the few good things that came out of the Health and Social Care Bill was that it allowed local providers to develop contracts out of the box, perhaps with the third sector and others, to provide good local services. I am on record as having said that. I have to say that in my own area and nationally that has not happened in practice because unfortunately the default position is that the contracts that have been awarded are so large that a lot of small, good voluntary organisations that could provide those services are not getting a look in.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point about the project in his constituency, but we need to ensure that there is uniformity across the piece. If we have a situation where the only option is for people to go to a police station or stay at home, that is not satisfactory.
Amendment 159 is also probing, aiming to explore and again bring pressure on the Department of Health. With regard to the time limits put in place around the place of safety, it is important that people are assessed quickly. It is no good waiting, in a police cell, hospital or any other facility, for a long time without assessment.
When being removed to a place of safety, it is important that the assessment is made quickly and undue time limits are not in place, for example, if someone has to travel a long distance to access a service. At the point of detention, a decision would start with the removal of the individual, certainly in terms of Lord Crisp’s report for the Commission on Acute Adult Psychiatric Care. That gives examples of people having to travel up to 50 km to access a mental health bed. If that were done in the back of a police car or van, it could take a long time and add to that individual’s distress. Again, I want to get the Minister’s thinking; I do not think for one minute that she wants anyone to be detained for an unduly long time without assessment. We are probing to find out what the Government are thinking in terms of trying to put pressure on the services that provide assessments. Can we get intervention at an earlier stage?
Amendment 158 is linked to the previous amendment and is another probing amendment. I welcome the reduction from 72 to 24 hours, showing again that the Government want to improve the situation. This probing amendment would further reduce the time from 24 to 12 hours. I would like to understand the Government’s rationale for agreeing to 24 hours. Under existing and proposed legislation, if someone is clearly incapable of assessment, that period can be extended. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has a target of three hours for someone to be assessed. I accept that there are difficulties: for example, if someone is intoxicated or has some other issue, with drugs or anything else, an assessment may not be possible for a long time, but I think that 24 hours is too long.
I have tabled these amendments to assist the Minister to press her Health colleagues to push the boundary. I accept what the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton said about some excellent local provision. We do need a uniform service, but it would be completely wrong for individuals to be detained longer than necessary. I would not, for one minute, suggest that any healthcare professional, police officer or the Government, for that matter, want to detain people. Early diagnosis and assessment are in the interest of the individual and help to ensure an efficient use of time.
Let me deal with new clauses 11 and 12. I may push new clause 11 to a vote because it is important. One fear I have is that we have before us a Home Office Bill which deals with the problem faced by police forces up and down the country of people being detained under the Mental Health Act. The right aim of the Home Secretary is to ensure that no one is detained in a police cell. Certainly, her target for young people is welcome and she clearly wants to get to a position whereby no adult is detained in a police cell either. The problem I have with that is that we may achieve the target in terms of the police—a police authority or a police and crime commissioner may be able to stand up and say, “We have nobody in police cells who has been detained under the Mental Health Act”, but unless we have some indication of what has actually happened to those individuals, it could mask a problem. It could move away from the clear spotlight that has been put on this, certainly in terms of young people being detained in police cells.
If the answer to the written question that we ask every year is that nobody is being detained in police cells, that is good, but if people are languishing in the community without support, or are unable to access the treatment that they want, that would let the Department of Health—again, not the Home Office—off the hook in terms of its responsibility to those individuals. It is important that we have reliable statistics, because we need to see where there are pressures, which there certainly are. Having talked to my local police force, I know that forces throughout the country are dealing with a lot of mental illness problems that they are not qualified to deal with. The system has failed when people with such problems turn up in police cells, so we need to address that.
I feel passionately about new clause 12, because, very strangely, the only people who are not allowed advocates under the Mental Health Act are people who are sectioned under section 135 or 136. I am not sure why that was agreed when that Act passed through this place. It may have been to do with cost, and I understand that if we offer everyone who is sectioned an advocate, costs will be incurred, but we are talking about ensuring that people with mental illness are given the right approach and support. If someone is arrested for any other crime, they should have an advocate to speak on their behalf. Many people think that those with mental illness will have family members or others to help them, but there are clearly individuals who do not, so there is no one there to speak on their behalf. There are also individuals who go into crisis whose family members have never experienced anyone with mental illness and so will not know the right questions to ask or the rights of the individual.
The need for an advocate is particularly relevant to the issue I mentioned earlier: the home becoming a place of safety. Is someone really going to object to their home becoming the “place of safety” if they have no one to advocate for them or understand their position? I do not think they would. The default position would be that the easiest option is to stay at home, even though it might not be the best option for some individuals, so advocacy is very important.
As I said on Second Reading, sections 135 and 136 are unique powers that are, quite rightly, not used lightly. They are used to protect either the individual themselves or the people who might be in danger from their actions, but that still leads to people’s liberties being taken away from them. If the default position in this country is that someone who is arrested for a crime is entitled to legal representation, it is not too much to ask in this day and age that people who are detained—we are not talking about a massive number of cases—should at least, within a permitted period, be allowed an advocate to speak on their behalf and advise them. Properly done, that may well save time and money by ensuring that the individual takes the advice they are offered and by allowing the system—the police and health services—to ensure that that person is directed to the help they require.
The Chair
As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman has expressed his intention to press new clause 11 to a Division.
The Chair
It might be helpful to the Committee if I point out that although both new clauses can be debated at this point, any Divisions will come later when we deal with new clauses.
Jack Dromey
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who is a brave and doughty champion of those who have suffered from mental illness. There is no question but that real progress has been made in recent years, and he can take credit for the outstanding role that he has played in that process, which we see the benefits of in our constituencies and across the country.
I have seen non-custodial places of safety at the Oleaster suite in Birmingham and in the form of street triage arrangements around the country, including one team of three outstanding police officers in the east midlands. One of them took me to one side and said, “I’m passionate about what I do because my brother was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic eight years ago. I’ve supported him; I now want to support others like him.” The Home Secretary is absolutely right to say that a police cell is no place for an ill person. I therefore completely support everything that my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has said.
I want to speak only to new clause 50, although we support what has been said in respect of new clauses 11 and 12 and I will briefly refer to them. In our country there is a right to be represented, and that is all the more important in circumstances where there is a vulnerable individual—often one who is going through a terrible trauma in their life—who requires the support and advice that an independent representative or advocate can give. We therefore strongly support what my hon. Friend has said in respect of new clauses 11 and 12.
Returning to new clause 50, I will take this opportunity to repeat the concerns that were expressed across the House on Second Reading—the debate on these issues was excellent—and the concerns of medical professionals and the police. Although we welcome the objective of the proposals, the combination of the changes could put professionals in a difficult position. Assessments of those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 cannot be completed until a bed has been identified. Professionals should not have to choose between breaking the law by exceeding the 24-hour period if a bed cannot be identified and not breaking the law but releasing someone who should be detained. Yet HMIC has found that some of the most common reasons why the police used custody as a place of safety include
“insufficient staff at a health-based place of safety”
and
“the absence of available beds at the health-based place of safety”.
I am sure that the Minister recognises that such problems will not be fixed by the Bill or even by the Home Office. It is therefore essential that, alongside the Bill, the Home Secretary and the Health Secretary work together to ensure that health service commissioners open sufficient beds and train sufficient professionals to deliver these welcome new commitments. New clause 50 would make it mandatory for the Home Secretary to report on the impact of the proposals in the Bill on mental health assessment and outcomes.
The hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) spoke eloquently on Second Reading. He said:
“We cannot make demands on the police to change the way they do things in providing places of safety unless we actually provide places of safety.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 59.]
He is absolutely right. There are not enough beds in this country for mentally ill people who are suffering real crises and, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has said, where beds are made available, long distances sometimes have to be travelled to take the individual in question to a safe place where they can be looked after. We therefore need cast-iron guarantees from the Department of Health that it is in a position to support police officers in treating those suffering from mental health crises with the dignity and support that they deserve.
The mental health crisis care concordat requires NHS commissioners to commission health-based places of safety for that purpose. It states:
“These should be provided at a level that allows for around the clock availability, and that meets the needs of the local population. Arrangements should be in place to handle multiple cases.”
However, there is not a specific statutory duty to commission health-based places of safety. In theory, the Mental Health Act could be amended to introduce a duty for clinical commissioning groups to commission suitable and sufficient health-based places of safety for persons detained under sections 135 or 136. Have the Home Office or the Department of Health considered that? We understand that, strictly speaking, such legislation is outside the scope of the Bill, but in parallel with the provisions here, the Home Office must have assurances from the Department of Health that they are going to make available the necessary capacity. That is why it is crucial to our amendment that the Secretary of State for Health is consulted. The Home Secretary and the Health Secretary should work together to ensure that the proposals improve the outcome for those subject to police detention and mental health assessment, and that health providers have the capacity to carry out timely assessments and provide any necessary in-patient care.
In conclusion, is there welcome progress in the right direction? On that there is absolutely no hesitation. However, on the issues that I have raised, the Government have yet to give assurances. I urge the Minister to act, to give Parliament, the public and the police whatever assurances are possible to ensure that the proposals in the Bill are not only brought forward with worthwhile intentions but implemented in practice, and that we avoid the possibility that in some cases they will do more harm than good.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth, and to be back from Easter recess; I hope you had a pleasant break. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for North Durham, who has campaigned tirelessly on this issue for many years and who is known as a leading advocate for those suffering with mental health conditions, be they crises or long-term conditions. I respect him enormously; I look forward to meeting him soon to discuss the many points he has raised today and to ensuring that the Government take notice of his experience and expertise and that we can work together on these matters.
I also want to make a point about what we are dealing with here. In a section 135 or section 136 detention, we are not dealing with a long-term condition that is being managed; we are dealing with a crisis—with somebody who, for whatever reason, either for their own protection or that of others, needs to be detained under the Mental Health Act. This has to be a short-term detention, and it should be one in which they are treated with dignity and respect. Somebody who breaks their legs does not get taken to a police cell, and nor should somebody having a mental health crisis. They have committed no crime, but for their own safety and that of others, they need a short-term temporary detention. That is not the same as being sectioned long term under the 1983 Act; it is a short-term issue. It might arise, for example, as a result of alcohol or drug abuse, because of some personal issue that has happened, or—let us admit it—because there has been a failure, where something has been identified from a health perspective but without identifying that the individual may go into crisis. It is about the crisis.
I want to pay tribute to my own police and crime commissioner, Matthew Ellis in Staffordshire, who I think was the first police and crime commissioner to identify how much police time was being taken to deal with people in a mental health crisis. He estimated that it was 20%: one in five police days were taken up with dealing people in a mental health crisis. It says a lot about the system that was in place, in which it was easier for police to deal with this than it was for health workers. We know that we are dealing with a problem that has grown up over many years; we are tackling it and ensuring that it is dealt with appropriately.
I want to assure the Committee that this issue is not just dealt with by the Home Office. I work very closely with other Departments: not just the Department of Health, where my right hon. Friend the Minister for Community and Social Care is as absolutely determined as I am to ensure that this matter is dealt with, but the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Education and others. We need to ensure that we are all working together to identify the signs of mental health issues and ensure they are dealt with so they do not lead to a crisis. That is the important point.
The crisis care concordat, a cross-Government initiative, has led to a halving of the number of people being detained in police custody, but that is not good enough. That is why we are taking the steps in the Bill. We want to see this practice as the very rare exception when somebody in a mental health crisis ends up in police custody. We want the vast majority, and certainly those under 18, to be in a health-based place of safety.
The shadow Minister made a point about the east midlands police officer’s family member. Since I took on this brief, a number of people have spoken to me about their personal experiences of mental health in their families. This is something we are all waking up to in many ways. The issue has not been recognised for many years and I am glad we are talking about it and recognising the scale of the problem and ensuring that support is available.
I will turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for North Durham. As he said, amendment 157 seeks to introduce a requirement to offer a health-based place of safety before a private home is used. When a person is in a mental health crisis, it is important that they have access to the appropriate medical care at the earliest stage. I know we all agree on that.
In most section 136 cases people will be taken to a health-based place of safety, as is the case today. Usually, that will be a bespoke facility provided by the NHS that meets the national standards set out by the Royal College of Psychiatrists. The shadow Minister and I and my colleague who previously dealt with mental health have all visited health-based places of safety and been incredibly impressed by the work to provide somewhere safe and secure but also does not feel like a police cell. It feels like a medical setting and is comfortable. I visited one in Sussex—I know I have a Sussex MP behind me—where Katy Bourne, the excellent police and crime commissioner, has done incredible work on ensuring that there are sufficient and appropriate places of safety.
That facility at Crawley hospital has private access; the patient does not walk through the main hospital and A&E. The patient comes through a private door at the back into the mental health unit but in a secure section 136 facility where there is a bed, a private room and a bathroom. That is somewhere where someone can be treated with dignity while they experience the crisis, and can be diagnosed appropriately. Great credit should be paid to the many clinical commissioning groups and police and crime commissioners who are working together to ensure that those places of safety are there.
Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)
I am slightly concerned by Opposition amendments that want to create a national picture. Having a bespoke local model has meant that Sussex has gone from having one of the highest levels of detention of people in crisis to one of the lowest. That is working very well for the police, the health service professionals and, most of all, for the patients.
Karen Bradley
My hon. Friend, who represents her Sussex constituency extremely well, is right. When we looked at the figures, we asked why Sussex has a problem. It has Beachy Head and that is a particular problem. There is no Beachy Head in Staffordshire. There is a particular problem that the police and crime commissioner and the health services in Sussex have to deal with. The work that has been done there should be commended. Katy Bourne has worked not just to provide the health-based places of safety but with the Richmond Fellowship to understand the problems. That includes understanding why people are not always able to go to a health-based place of safety. It is shocking to discover that there are many health-based places of safety that will not take a person under the influence of alcohol.
We know that the majority of crises occur when somebody is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, so it is important to educate and have appropriate facilities. I visited an excellent facility in Merseyside where they are able to cope with somebody under the influence of alcohol, give them time to sober up and recover from the alcohol or drugs, and then assess them appropriately as to their ongoing medical care needs.
Jack Dromey
The Minister speaks with authority and sincerity, and we welcome the progress that has been made. Unusually, what we want to do on this occasion is strengthen the arm of the Home Office because, while it is true that there are excellent examples of good provision all over the country, it is uneven and patchy, and too many people who suffer mental illness are still being let down. The crucial point—she may be coming to this—is how the Home Office addresses the reality that, ultimately, it is the Department of Health that funds this provision. Unless the Department of Health is compelled to work with the Home Office, the Home Office will forever have problems.
Karen Bradley
I know that it will seem odd to the shadow Minister for a Home Office Minister to refuse further powers, but I will at this stage. I will return to that point later.
I will deal first with whether a health-based place of safety is the most suitable place of safety in every case, which goes to the nub of amendment 157. As the hon. Member for North Durham knows, a private home can already be used as a place of safety for a person detained under section 136 of the 1983 Act if the occupier consents. Clause 60 will make it possible to use a private home as a place of safety after a section 135 warrant has been used to enter those premises.
Where consideration is given to using a private home, it should be because it is the most appropriate place of safety for meeting that person’s needs, and not due to a lack of better health-based alternatives. In determining which place of safety to take a person to, those involved will need to consider all the relevant circumstances in the round. However, if the person concerned is particularly frail or likely to be very distressed if away from familiar surroundings, removing them from a home setting may be judged to be, on balance, more harmful than helpful. Conducting the mental health assessment in the home may therefore prove both quicker and a more satisfactory experience for all concerned. Similarly, it may be preferable to take a young person to their family home, rather than detaining them in a strange place where they know no one.
There is no question of a person being taken to a private residence or forced to remain there against their will. The use of a private dwelling as a place of safety will require the active consent of both the person detained and the occupiers of the residence.
The shadow Minister talked of street triage. When I have met street triage teams across the country and seen mental health clinicians working with law enforcement, the best cases have been where the law enforcement officer has allowed the mental health professional to take responsibility for the necessary decisions. I have seen examples of the mental health professional, rather than the police officer, going into the place where the individual in crisis is, assessing them and determining whether they should be arrested or detained, whether at their own home, at somebody else’s home or in a health-based place of safety.
Anybody who has been in a police custody suite—I hasten to add that it was not as an inmate, in my case—will know that it is stark and brightly lit, with no shade and nowhere to hide. It is a horrible environment for somebody who is ill to find themselves in. Going to a health-based place of safety is a much better option, but it may be that some people can be treated better and get the appropriate care in their own home. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are not saying that there is no need for health-based places of safety—absolutely not. We are determined that health-based places of safety will be available as they are needed, but for some people it is better to be treated in their own home. In the majority of cases I genuinely believe that the health-based place of safety is the best place, but for a small number that will not be the case.
The Bill is designed to increase the flexibility that police and medical professionals have to act in the best interests of the person concerned in a wide range of circumstances, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards remain in place to prevent abuses of such a system.
Amendment 159 seeks to provide that the period of detention would commence when a decision to detain was made, rather than on the person’s arrival at a place of safety. As the hon. Member for North Durham will know, sections 135 and 136 enable someone to be removed to a place of safety if that is required. Once they arrive at the place of safety, it is essential that the mental health professionals have sufficient time to conduct the assessment and arrange any further care and treatment that are required. Any individual in such a circumstance must have the opportunity to have a thorough assessment that is not driven by detention deadlines.
Amendment 159 would unfairly penalise both the people in need of care and the health professionals assessing them if the decision to remove them was taken in an isolated place and if getting them to a place of safety would take some time. I know from my constituency that in isolated rural constituencies, things just take more time. As it happens, one also cannot give birth in Staffordshire Moorlands because there is no maternity facility. If one goes into labour, it will take at least half an hour to reach a maternity hospital. That is the reality of isolated rural communities.
Similarly, what about situations in which removal is difficult and risky for all concerned—for example, when someone is threatening to jump off a bridge? An attending police officer would probably make the decision to detain very soon after arriving on the scene, but it might take time to get the individual off the bridge. Would it be reasonable to require the police officer, in that highly pressured situation, to think about the clock ticking towards a time when they would have to release the person, whether or not they had managed to get them to a suitable place for a mental health assessment?
I do not think that that is what the hon. Gentleman intends with his amendment. I think he intends to ensure that the person is transported to a place of safety as quickly as is reasonable. That can be addressed through guidance and the performance management of ambulance response times, rather than through legislation. Front-line professionals need to make the right decisions, taking account of the circumstances and the individual’s best interests.
Amendment 158 seeks to reduce further the permitted period of detention. As far as I can see, there is no disagreement among members of the Committee that the current period of up to 72 hours is much too long. It was put in place to take into account bank holidays, weekends and so on, but that is not good enough. We cannot have a situation in which, because someone has a mental health crisis on the Friday night of a bank holiday weekend, they find themselves in a police cell for 72 hours. That is simply unacceptable. It cannot be right to hold someone who is suffering a crisis and is in urgent need of a mental health assessment against their will for up to three days anywhere, not just in a police cell.
Clause 61 deals with that issue by introducing the concept of a permitted period of detention, and setting that period at 24 hours. We have also allowed for an extension by a further 12 hours if—and only if—the person’s clinical condition merits it. This is not a target time. Just as they are now, we expect that the vast majority of cases will be resolved much more quickly. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has recommended, as a matter of good practice, that the assessment should start within three hours of the person being detained, and that has been built into the Mental Health Act code of practice. I want to be clear that 24 hours is not a target. We do not expect that a mental health assessment will start at 23 hours. We want it to start as soon as is reasonably practical, to ensure that the person gets the assessment and treatment that they need as soon as it is required.
We have been told by stakeholders that there will be occasions when the clinical condition of the person is such that they simply cannot be assessed immediately—for example, because they are intoxicated through drugs or alcohol. We have listened to that advice, and the maximum permitted period of detention has been set at 24 hours so that time is built in for the effects of intoxication to wear off. Otherwise, we would risk creating a situation in which the assessment process was made difficult or impossible because the person was unable to participate fully.
Equally, a shorter maximum detention period would risk the person having to be released before they had been assessed because they were not yet clinically fit to participate. Clearly, that would be in no one’s best interests. For those reasons, we have set the permitted period of detention at 24 hours. In the Government’s view, that provides a good balance between keeping periods of detention as short as reasonably possible and making sure that the assessment can be carried out in the most effective way.
The provision for an extension of not more than 12 hours over and above the original 24 hours, is for the very rare cases where the clinician responsible for carrying out the assessment is satisfied that the person’s clinical condition is such that the assessment cannot be started or completed within the 24-hour period. I want to be clear here: the provision to extend beyond 24 hours will be based solely on the person’s clinical condition. There is no scope for it to be used in any other circumstance, such as staffing problems.
In practice, the average period of detention is now less than 11 hours. That time includes the person being detained, the assessment being made and any future care or treatment arrangements arising out of that assessment being put in place. In the majority of cases, the necessary processes are already completed well within 24 hours. Of course, we recognise that the reduction to 24 hours may represent more of a challenge in some areas than others, but the work that is going on across England to improve mental health crisis care services, backed by both the national crisis care concordat and the 94 local concordat groups, is helping to develop services that can respond to the changing needs of the areas they serve.
I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for North Durham that the 24-hour time limit is not some arbitrary figure that has been chosen for convenience, but a deliberate decision that seeks to establish the balance between compulsion and care that I mentioned earlier.
New clause 11 seeks to introduce an annual reporting requirement in respect of detention in places of safety. The Government agree that the police should be transparent about the use of their powers under the Mental Health Act, so that we can see how often these sensitive powers are used, who they are used for and what further actions are taken. That will enable the changes being made through the Bill to be monitored effectively. It is only through looking at the data that we are in the position we are in. When my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister had responsibility for this area, he was determined to get to the bottom of what was and was not working well, and to make the decisions and changes that were needed to get to things working well across the country.
The Health and Social Care Information Centre and the National Police Chiefs Council publish annual data on detentions under sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act. For section 135, data are provided by health services covering the volume of detentions in which people are taken to a health-based place of safety. For section 136, the data include the numbers of people taken to police custody and health-based places of safety and are provided by the police and health services respectively.
However, we know that police data in this area have varied in quality. As a result, the Home Office is working with forces across England and Wales on a new data collection system for section 135 and 136 detentions to raise the level of consistency across the country. The new data set is voluntary in 2015-16, but will become a mandatory part of the Home Office’s annual data requirement for all forces in England and Wales from April this year—this month.
The annual data requirement will capture not only the number of detentions, but the age, ethnicity and gender of the people detained; the place of safety used, including, where applicable, the reason for using police custody; and the method of transportation and, where a police vehicle is used, the reason why. We intend to publish the data annually to ensure that there is full transparency, so I hope the hon. Member for North Durham will not need to ask written questions at that point.
Mr Kevan Jones
I welcome what the Minister has said, as it goes to the core of what new clause 11 aims to achieve. In what format will those data be published? Will there be a consistent approach, as she suggests, so that areas can be compared? That is the other important point to consider as this legislation progresses: we must ensure that it is working, that people do not end up in police cells and that we have comparable data from different areas.
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If we do not have comparable data, we cannot compare. My right hon. Friend the Policing Minister, who set this work in train, was adamant that we needed comparable, appropriate data, which would be available online, so that we could make a fair comparison.
It is a fair suggestion that the length of time for which people are detained should be recorded, but there are practical difficulties. It would be incredibly difficult for the police to keep such information, because, quite frankly, we do not want police officers to be part of the process once somebody has been detained under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act, apart from in the very rare cases where a police station is used.
Mr Kevan Jones
As I said, my amendments are probing amendments. I thank the Minister for the full way in which she has responded to them. I know, and I want to put it on the record, that she, too, has a genuine interest in this subject and wants to do the best for individuals who suffer mental health problems.
I welcome the Minister’s response to new clause 11. The data are going to be very important, because they will attest to whether the changes are working. By comparing areas with one another, local scrutiny will allow areas to improve their situations and to learn from best practice. As she said in response to an intervention, what happens in one area can be transferred to another.
I hear what the Minister says about new clause 12. I accept her point that this situation is very different from being sectioned under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, but for people to be detained without any right to advocacy is unique. Like her, I do not want to overburden or inhibit the system, but there needs to be a basic right for individuals to have access to information. Given her commitment to further discussions on new clause 12, I shall not press it to a vote, but we may come back to it on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Application of maritime enforcement powers: general
Amendment made: 214, in clause 62, page 71, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) a National Crime Agency officer having the powers and privileges of a constable in England and Wales under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, or”.—(Karen Bradley.)
This amendment makes express provision for National Crime Agency officers to come within the definition of law enforcement officer that applies for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 4.
Clause 62, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 63 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 77
Firearms Act 1968: meaning of “firearm” etc.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 227, in clause 77, page 81, line 7, leave out subsection (5).
This amendment would remove the exception for airsoft guns from the definition of a lethal barrelled weapon.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I, too, hope that you had a really happy holiday—I am learning from the Minister how to do these things.
The amendment would remove the exemption for airsoft guns from the definition of a lethal barrelled weapon from the Bill. It has been tabled as a probing amendment to understand why the Government have allowed an exemption in this case.
Lyn Brown
Oh heavens!
The Bill exempts airsoft weapons from the 1 J limit. If we pass the Bill without making the amendment, airsoft weapons will be allowed to exceed that limit; instead, they will not be able legally to exceed 1.3 J, or 2.5 J for a single-shot weapon. Why has the exemption for airsoft weapons been put in place? If the Home Office is of the view that a 1 J threshold successfully identifies a lethal weapon in other instances, why are airsoft weapons any different?
Deputy Chief Constable Andy Marsh has cited evidence from the Forensic Science Service that the 1.3 J and 2.5 J thresholds would not be lethal for airsoft weapons, as was noted by the Law Commission, but that research is from 2001 and therefore more than 14 years old. There must surely be something more recent. If there is not, why is that? Why have we not commissioned something?
Mike Penning
Unless my information is wrong, that research was done in 2011.
Lyn Brown
Well, my research tells me it was in 2001. We will wait for some inspiration on that.
There is some dispute about whether airsoft guns can be converted into weapons that can shoot lethal ammunition. I am told that numerous YouTube videos exist in which enthusiasts claim that they can do exactly that. It was revealed by a 2013 freedom of information request that the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives believes that some airsoft weapons can be converted. Given that, the Minister needs to explain the rationale behind the exemption of airsoft weapons from the standard 1 J limit. If 1 J is the definition of lethality and airsoft weapons can, as we understand, be converted to be lethal, it seems to me that they should comply with the 1 J limit and not be allowed a 1.3 J limit.
I accept that the Minister might well talk about the fun he has on his holidays playing these weird games.
The Chair
Order. The Committee will be fascinated to hear about the Minister’s holiday activities, provided that they are germane to the Bill.
Lyn Brown
Absolutely, Mr Howarth. My mind is boggling. I think I need to get back to the issue at hand.
The Minister may argue that the 1.3 J threshold is necessary to protect the airsoft industry, but the truth is that airsoft weapons could still be produced and carried without a firearms licence without this exemption; they would just have to be below the 1 J threshold of lethality. If airsoft guns are toys and not weapons, I do not see the problem with them being less powerful than lethal weapons. If airsoft enthusiasts still wish to have a powerful airsoft gun over the 1 J threshold, they could still do so without the exemption; they would just have to apply for the same licence and subject themselves to the same checks that we would expect for any other weapon that powerful. It does not seem to be too onerous a set of regulations to comply with.
Britain rightly prides itself on having among the most stringent gun control laws in the world. We see the public and their safety as the primary clients of gun control legislation. Elsewhere in the world, the so-called rights of gun owners are given preference, with tragic consequences. In this context, the Committee will be interested to know that Japan—where airsoft was invented and is profoundly popular—imposes a single 0.98 J limit on all guns, including airsoft weapons. Japanese manufacturers of airsoft weapons were happy to sign up to those regulations so, again, I do not see the need to exempt airsoft.
There must be a case for saying that a single power limit for all weapons, without exemptions or loopholes, would be legally preferable and more enforceable. That is what our amendment would achieve, and I know it is something for which the Gun Control Network, which was founded in the aftermath of the Dunblane tragedy, has campaigned. I look forward with interest to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Before I finish, I will talk about the use of airsoft weapons as realistic imitation firearms. These weapons are designed to look almost exactly like real firearms, and are only exempt from laws against the manufacture of realistic imitation firearms because of a set of defences provided in the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. In other countries, such as Canada, airsoft weapons are treated as realistic replica weapons and regulated as such.
On seeing these guns, I was immediately worried that they could easily be used to threaten and intimidate. There is no doubt that the owners and manufacturers of these weapons pride themselves on their guns looking exactly like the most deadly of weapons. I urge members of the Committee to go online and look for themselves. Websites such as Patrol Base sell guns that look exactly like military assault rifles.
I was not surprised to read that a cache of airsoft weapons was seized in December from an ISIS terror cell in Belgium. Two men were arrested and military fatigues, airsoft weapons and ISIS propaganda were found in their property. Brussels’s main new year’s eve fireworks display was cancelled as a result of the find.
Let’s face it: if a terrorist walked down Whitehall with one of these guns and threatened to shoot us, we would fear for our lives and comply with the instructions given by the bearer of the gun if we were unable to run for our lives. Even if these weapons are not lethal, they can certainly bring fear and terror. I ask the Minister whether any thought has been given to reviewing the exemption for airsoft guns from the laws against realistic imitation firearms in the light of the incident in Belgium. If not, I strongly urge him to think about it.
I feel so passionately about this matter that if the Minister is unable to help us today, I would be happy if he would consider it further, write to me and perhaps come back to it on Report.
Mike Penning
As the shadow Minister indicated, we have some of the toughest firearms laws in the world. That is how it should be, and we will continue to strengthen and tighten the laws, providing clarity for the police and the public. I have looked at several aspects related to this matter.
I have two girls and I used to see toy guns when I went to toy shops with them when they were very young. Even as an ex-military man, I would not know the damn difference, from a distance, if someone came down Whitehall with one. Nevertheless, we are not going to ban all children’s toy guns. It is an offence to use a toy gun, or any other kind of replica, in that way. There are powers on the statute book.
I should declare that I have never used an airsoft weapon and I have never been to one of the play sites, but nearly 50,000 people do have the kind of fun that I have not enjoyed. Given the days I spent with real weapons, I would not fancy taking up such an invitation, but plenty of people do.
We looked carefully at proportionality and whether or not the 1 J limit recommended in the Law Commission’s report would have an adverse effect on the public’s enjoyment. We looked carefully at whether the police or the National Ballistics Intelligence Service had reported any instances of airsoft guns causing serious injuries, and they had not. We had to look at whether the effect would be proportionate on people who were enjoying an activity against which there was no evidence whatever. The Law Commission itself discussed in its report whether changing the limit would be proportionate. We have looked into the matter and can find no evidence of injuries.
We already have restrictions. I accept that other countries have made different legal decisions. I lived in Canada for a short time. Interestingly, hunting rifles and other weapons are freely available there, yet the velocity of airsoft weapons is restricted. We think that the existing legislation is proportionate. If someone wants to adapt one of these guns, other legislation is immediately triggered. For example, if it becomes a weapon and they are unlicensed, the sanction is five years or a fine. If someone creates a weapon from something that is not designed to be one and it becomes a firearm, that is captured by a completely different piece of legislation. If someone comes wandering down the street with a toy gun, let alone one of the weapons we are discussing, it is an offence if they use it inappropriately or in a threatening manner.
We do not want to prevent 50,000-odd people from enjoying themselves, even if they are enjoying themselves in ways that are slightly different from how the shadow Minister and I enjoy ourselves.
Jake Berry (Rossendale and Darwen) (Con)
Was any research undertaken into what difference such a change would make? Airsoft weapons have been known to cause injuries, even when used in safe, recreational settings. Did the Department undertake any research into the likelihood of reduced injury if the power of the weapons was reduced from the proposed 1.3 J limit to 1 J or even 0.98 J, which is the limit in Japan?
Mike Penning
We looked at the evidence from the police and the National Ballistics Intelligence Service. Yes, there have been injuries, in which there might have been other factors, but the police have not reported any instances of serious injuries.
I understand the shadow Minister’s concern about something that neither of us are likely ever to enjoy, but 50,000-odd people do and I do not want to prevent them from doing so. I hope she will withdraw her amendment.
Lyn Brown
I hear what the Minister says, but I have not heard an explanation of why an airsoft weapon could not be 1 J or less than 1 J, as is the case in Japan. No evidence has been put forward today to suggest that that would stop the enjoyment of people who want to run through forests waving firearms. The other point that I do not understand is why it would spoil their enjoyment if airsoft weapons were a different colour—pink, red or green—so that they did not look as realistic as they do at the moment.
Mike Penning
I have finished. I am sorry, but I do not agree.
Amendment 227 negatived.
Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 78 and 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Applications under the Firearms Acts: fees
Lyn Brown
I beg to move amendment 228, in clause 80, page 83, line 31, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would ensure that the firearms licensing system achieves full cost recovery.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 229, in clause 80, page 84, line 7, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would ensure that the firearms licensing system achieves full cost recovery.
Amendment 230, in clause 80, page 84, line 27, leave out
“the amount of any fee that may be charged”
and insert
“that the fee charged must be equal to the full cost to the tax payer of issuing a licence.”.
This amendment would ensure that the firearms licensing system achieves full cost recovery.
Lyn Brown
These amendments would be a first step towards ending state subsidy of gun ownership. They would achieve that goal by ensuring that the full costs of licensing prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums are recovered.
Full cost recovery was a Labour manifesto pledge. It is a key objective of the Gun Control Network, and it is even stated as a policy goal in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill. It would therefore appear that we are all united in wanting to achieve the same end. However, the Bill would bring the licensing fee regime of prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums in line with the fees regime that exists for standard section 1 firearms. That is a problem. I do not believe that the fees regime for section 1 firearms provides for full cost recovery, so I do not have the confidence that these proposals will achieve full cost recovery for the licences that they control.
The Bill deals with relatively narrow issues around licensing fees. At the moment, there is no system to recover costs from the licensing of prohibited weapons. Subsection (1) will allow authorities to set fees for very powerful, prohibited weapons, such as rocket launchers, which can only be obtained with the permission of the UK Defence Council. The fee will be variable and set by the Secretary of State by regulations, just as is presently the case for ordinary section 1 firearms.
Subsections (2) and (3) deal with the licensing of pistol clubs and museums respectively. At the moment, such fees are fixed under the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, and the Secretary of State does not have the power to change them by secondary legislation. The Bill will bring the licensing system for those institutions in line with the licensing system for individual firearm owners by granting the Secretary of State the power to change the fees by regulation and by allowing variable fees. The Bill does not actually propose any change in the fees for pistol clubs or museums, and as a result the amount of money that these proposals involve is relatively small.
The Government estimate that these changes will bring in £570,000 a year for the Home Office, £78,000 for the English and Welsh police, £42,000 for the Scottish Government and £6,000 for Police Scotland. As it is said, every little helps. That increased revenue is welcome, as is the capacity for the Secretary of State to change the fees when the costs of licensing increase; but however welcome these changes are, the unfortunate truth is that these proposals will only make a small dent in the gun ownership subsidy that still persists in this country.
In the previous Parliament, the Labour party campaigned on full cost recovery. Fees for section 1 firearms had remained frozen for too long, and as a result the taxpayer was subsidising gun ownership to the tune of £17 million a year. That is insane. The police estimated that the cost of licensing a firearm was £196, yet the fee was stuck at £50. The taxpayer was paying three quarters of the cost of a gun owner getting a licence.
To be fair to the coalition Government, they did respond to the pressure. A working group was set up by the Home Office, the police and the British Association for Shooting and Conservation to consider the matter. After negotiations, it proposed that an £88 fee would be mutually acceptable to the police and shooters. The £88 fee was considerably short of the £196 that the police had independently estimated to be the true cost of licensing guns, but it was still a welcome increase. The £88 fee was finally introduced just before the general election. However, the fee was frozen for 14 years before it was finally increased. The £88 fee was arrived at only after negotiations with BASC and was not imposed following independent estimates.
Our amendments to the Bill would mandate the Secretary of State to set the cost of a licence for prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums at the full cost to the taxpayer. A legal requirement that the fee match the full cost would take some of the politics out of the process. The fee decisions would be based on an evidential analysis, conducted by the Home Office, of the true cost to the taxpayer. If the process proved to be successful for prohibited weapons, pistol clubs and museums, the Minister could consider extending it to section 1 firearms. This legislation could be a first step to true full cost recovery.
I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on the issue. I urge him to accept amendments 228, 229 and 230. The taxpayer should not have to subsidise gun ownership, as it currently does. Our amendments would be a first step to bringing that unfairness to an end once and for all. Labour pushed hard for full cost recovery in the previous Parliament, and we have seen some movement from the Government on the issue. I urge the Minister to work with us, both by accepting our amendments today and by looking at the issue of section 1 licences in the future, to achieve what seems to be a realistic and realisable common goal.
Mike Penning
We are as one on the fact that the taxpayer should not subsidise licensing. The Bill, which is about Home Office licences, will not have an effect on police fees. However, given that the shadow Minister referred to police licence fees, I will respond to that as well. I completely agree that this should have been done years and years ago, under several Administrations. I will therefore look at police licence fees, which the Bill does not do, but which the hon. Lady was referring to.
The legislation has been changed. As from April 2015, police licence fees increased by between 23% and 76%, depending on the certificate type. That is the first increase since 2001. Once the new police online system, eCommerce, is introduced, fees will recover the full costs of licensing. That is specific: it is in the legislation. I had problems myself with the coalition Government, along with several of my colleagues.
Let us look briefly at the Home Office licence fees. I completely agree that it is wrong that the taxpayer is subsidising other organisations. Currently, combined, the authorisation and licensing of prohibited weapons, shooting clubs and museums costs the taxpayer an estimated £700,000 a year. I do not feel that the amendment is necessary: I will explain why. Clause 80 will create a consistent set of charging powers across all Home Office firearms licences and authorities. The Government’s intention is that licence holders, and not the taxpayer, should pay the full cost. The Government will set fees at the appropriate level, based on clause 80, but with agreement from the Treasury. Fees will be set out in a public consultation later this year, which will give affected organisations the chance to raise any issues. Final fee amounts will be introduced via regulations subject to the negative procedure.
Lyn Brown
What is the need for consultation on this? If the Home Office is going to impose the full cost of the licence fee on the person who is applying for the licence, what are we consulting about? If the consultation comes back with some interested group saying, “We can’t afford this—we only really want 50% or 30%,” might the Government be minded to agree with that, rather than impose the full 100% of the cost?
Mike Penning
There are frustrations in being a Minister, as former Ministers know. Consultation is a requirement, because we are likely to be challenged in law. That is why we consult. We will say what we want to do and then consult. One area where there may be real concern is the cost to museums. That is right. Other organisations may want to put their four pennyworth in, as often happens in consultations. We would not want to have a massively adverse effect on museums, though, so we will need to look at that. When proposing changes to legislation or to use delegated powers, it is always best to consult.
Jake Berry
Other people affected by this will be gamekeepers. For example, several gamekeepers in my constituency require a firearm for their job; so I hope that the Government will consider extremely widely. I do not think that, as a matter of principle, we should be saying that the Government should never subsidise sports. I am not particularly interested in volleyball, but I am very happy that we had the London Olympics, with £9 billion of Government money spent on hosting them. I do not think that the principle that we should never subsidise sport should be set out in law, so I hope that the Government will consider this and consult widely.
Mike Penning
I fully understand what my hon. Friend is saying. There is now a confusion between police licence fees and Home Office licensing fees. Gamekeepers will be dealt with under police licensing for shotguns for the control of vermin and so on. This part of the legislation is different: it is to do with Home Office licensing, for armed guards or merchant shipping, for example. Whether a museum is holding weapons—they are still tangible weapons—is separate. I understand that there is confusion: we look at police fees and licensing and think of that as one thing, but they are two different things. Police licensing fees have been set for the first time since 2001, but that is a different issue altogether. I will write to my hon. Friend to confirm exactly what I just said. However, with that and what I propose about using delegated legislation powers later in the year in mind, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw her amendment.
Lyn Brown
I am grateful to the Minister for making my day—that is a great birthday present for tomorrow. I look forward to receiving his letter, which will provide clarification. I will bring this back on Report if everything is not as hunky-dory as we think. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 81
Guidance to police officers in respect of firearms
Amendment made: 215, in clause 81, page 85, line 20, leave out from “must” to end of line 22 and insert
“have regard to any guidance issued under section 55A that is relevant to the appeal.”.—(Mike Penning.)
This amendment requires a court or sheriff hearing an appeal against a decision by the police under the Firearms Act 1968 to have regard to any guidance issued to chief officers of police under the new section 55A of that Act inserted by clause 81.
Clause 81, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 82 to 90 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 91
Power to impose monetary penalties
Lyn Brown
I beg to move amendment 231, in clause 91, page 94, line 37, leave out “50%” and insert “200%”.
This amendment would increase the maximum civil penalty for breaking financial sanctions from half the value of the funds or resources involved to double the value.
The Opposition support the measures in the Bill that will toughen up the enforcement of financial sanctions. We appreciate that financial sanctions are an important diplomatic and strategic power, but we are concerned that the penalties proposed are too light and may not deter an individual from taking a calculated risk.
I am sure we all welcome the news that in recent weeks ISIS has been in retreat in parts and has lost the ancient city of Palmyra. I have no doubt that the financial sanctions that the UK and other countries have placed on 258 individuals and 75 entities that support ISIS have played their part, but, as the executive director of the Iraq Energy Institute told the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee last month, ISIS’s spending patterns suggest that it must still be receiving substantial donations and outside financial assistance. That is an important reminder that those who break financial sanctions can be a serious threat to national security and to British interests. Those people must be stopped and punished.
The Bill introduces sensible and welcome measures on enforcing financial sanctions, which we support. For example, we support the changes in clause 89, which will allow the Secretary of State to increase the penalty for breaking EU financial sanctions to seven years’ imprisonment. That matches the maximum penalty for breaking an asset freeze under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. Given the severity of the crime, that is a far more fitting penalty than the two years currently provided for.
Clauses 97 and 98 address the gap in time between the UN passing a financial sanction resolution and our Government adopting the EU regulations needed to implement it. The Bill will allow the Treasury to enforce United Nations financial sanction resolutions immediately by introducing temporary sanctions as an interim measure. This sort of interim measure seems entirely reasonable, given the importance of financial sanctions to national security. It was, indeed, recommended by Lord Rodger in the Supreme Court when reviewing the case of Mohammed Jabar Ahmed.
Although I support the general thrust of the measures on financial sanctions, there are a few areas in the Bill where I seek assurances from the Minister. In particular, I am concerned that the civil penalties introduced by clause 91 might be perceived as a mere slap on the wrist by those contemplating illegal business activity: that the civil penalties might be light enough that breaking sanctions might be considered to be a risk worth taking. Clause 91(3) states that the maximum civil penalty for breaking financial sanctions is either £1 million or
“50% of the estimated value of the funds or resources”,
if that is more than £1 million. I wonder whether this is insufficient.
I know that £1 million sounds a lot—it is for me—but imagine an individual selling a property in the London property market with a value well in excess of £1 million to a foreign buyer who is subject to financial sanctions. Members of the Committee may have seen last year’s Channel 4 documentary that showed a buyer posing as a Russian official who told the vendors of London properties that his funds were embezzled. Those dealing with him seemed completely and utterly unperturbed. We were not told by the journalists that they were subsequently contacted by any of the vendors to withdraw their interest in the sale, in reconsideration of the fact that the funds were embezzled.
Of the Mossack Fonseca companies tied up in the Panama papers leak, 2,800 appear on the UK Land Registry list of overseas property owners and have assets worth more than £7 billion. It is little wonder that Donald Toon of the National Crime Agency has said that
“the London property market has been skewed by laundered money.”
There is little doubt that London property is seen as a safe haven for both legitimate and illegitimate investors. So my contention is that the threat of being fined 50% of the value of the property might not be sufficient deterrent to stop an individual seller undertaking a sale. As I understand the Bill, the vendor would still be able to keep 50% of the proceeds of a sale even if they are caught. That, if they received it in cash, might be more valuable to them than alternative revenue streams they could have received from the property. I would be grateful if the Minister let me know whether my reading of the Bill is correct. If it is, I would be grateful if she explained why she thinks that that is reasonable. If we want to discourage people who are contemplating engaging with an illegal business, the civil penalties need to be stronger.
I accept that the Minister—getting all my arguments in at once—may stand up and say that these are only civil sanctions and that anyone engaging in illegal business activity will still be subject to criminal sanctions, which include custodial punishments. That may well be the case, but the civil standard of proof of “the balance of probabilities” is a lot easier to meet than the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”. That is particularly true with regards to financial crime, where the complexities of the financial system have seen calls for fraud cases to sit outside the jury system. That is not a call I agree with, as an individual, but it has been considered and debated in the recent past.
There is a danger that the new Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, run by the Treasury, will rely on civil punishments rather than on the more difficult to achieve criminal punishments. If that is the case, the low level of civil penalties might actually only make the problem worse. Financial sanctions are an important diplomatic and strategic power. Individuals or companies breaking financial sanctions are a serious threat to the national interest and must be stopped.
Policing and Crime Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
In conclusion [Laughter.] Financial sanctions are an important diplomatic and strategic power. Individuals or companies breaking financial sanctions are a serious threat to the national interest and must be stopped. We cannot allow the civil penalties introduced under the Bill to be perceived as a mere slap on the wrist, and a reasonable risk to take for those who would do business with people they should not. By accepting our amendments, the Minister could prevent that from happening.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)
May I start by wishing the hon. Member for West Ham happy birthday for tomorrow? I hope we will not be sitting down to do this the day after her birthday, so I hope she enjoys her day without having to worry about getting up for Committee the next day, although she will obviously continue to represent her constituents in the excellent way that she does.
The enforcement of financial sanctions is vital to our foreign policy and national security, but it is also important to note that the size of a breach and the culpability of those involved in a breach will vary from case to case. It is therefore important to ensure that the enforcement of financial sanctions is both appropriately targeted and proportionate.
I will respond to some of the points made by the hon. Lady. I welcome her support for these measures. I reassure her that the new Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, or OFSI, and the increased resource behind sanctions enforcement will ensure that financial sanctions make the fullest possible contribution to the UK’s foreign policy and national security goals, as well as helping to maintain the integrity of and confidence in the UK financial services sector.
I would also like to reassure her that OFSI will not seek to use monetary penalties as an alternative to a criminal prosecution. Where a serious breach of the kind described by the hon. Lady is identified by OFSI, the full range of potential enforcement mechanisms will be considered. Although the monetary penalties set out in the Bill will provide a valuable contribution, prosecution and asset seizure under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 will also be available.
I note that the Crown court will, on conviction, be able to impose an unlimited fine. We intend to consult shortly on where and when to use monetary penalties. The proposed maximum limits of £1 million or 50% of the value of the breach are based on evidence about the value of breaches reported to the Treasury over the past two years. We believe that those levels are both proportionate and adequate to remove profits made from breaches of financial sanctions and provide a sufficient deterrent.
The hon. Lady will also be aware that the clause already obliges the Treasury to keep the maximum limits under review, and it includes a power to vary that figure by regulations. Clearly, if it turns out that the provisions are not appropriate, based on the evidence we have today, we can always vary that figure. Finally, I would like to reassure the hon. Lady that if evidence shows that the limits should be set at a higher level we can, and we will, change them.
In the context of the civil sanction regime, it is right that the legislation should provide clear and proportionate limits on the amount of the financial penalty. We believe that, based on the evidence, £1 million or 50% of the estimated value of the funds is an appropriate limit and, accordingly, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendment.
Lyn Brown
I am grateful to the Minister for that clear and concise answer to the points that I made. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 92 to 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clauses 103 to 107 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Initiation of investigations by IPCC
‘(1) Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 (handling of complaints and conduct matters etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 4 (reference of complaints to the Commission), in sub-paragraph (7), in the words before paragraph (a), after “occasion” insert “, or that has been treated as having been so referred by virtue of paragraph 4A”.
(3) After paragraph 4 insert—
“Power of Commission to treat complaint as having been referred
4A (1) The Commission may treat a complaint that comes to its attention otherwise than by having been referred to it under paragraph 4 as having been so referred.
(2) Where the Commission treats a complaint as having been referred to it—
(a) paragraphs 2 and 4 do not apply, or cease to apply, in relation to the complaint except to the extent provided for by paragraph 4(7), and
(b) paragraphs 5, 6, 6A, 15 and 25 apply in relation to the complaint as if it had been referred to the Commission by the appropriate authority under paragraph 4.
(3) The Commission must notify the following that it is treating a complaint as having been referred to it—
(a) the appropriate authority;
(b) the complainant;
(c) except in a case where it appears to the Commission that to do so might prejudice an investigation of the complaint (whether an existing investigation or a possible future one), the person complained against (if any).
(4) Where an appropriate authority receives a notification under sub-paragraph (3) in respect of a complaint and the complaint has not yet been recorded, the appropriate authority must record the complaint.”
(4) In paragraph 11 (recording etc of conduct matters otherwise than where conduct matters arise in civil proceedings), omit sub-paragraph (5).
(5) In paragraph 13 (reference of conduct matters to the Commission), in sub-paragraph (7), in the words before paragraph (a), after “occasion” insert “, or that has been treated as having been so referred by virtue of paragraph 13A”.
(6) After paragraph 13 insert—
“Power of Commission to treat conduct matter as having been referred
13A (1) The Commission may treat a conduct matter that comes to its attention otherwise than by having been referred to it under paragraph 13 as having been so referred.
(2) Where the Commission treats a conduct matter as having been referred to it—
(a) paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 do not apply, or cease to apply, in relation to the matter except to the extent provided for by paragraph 13(7), and
(b) paragraphs 14 and 15 apply in relation to the matter as if it had been referred to the Commission by the appropriate authority under paragraph 13.
(3) The Commission must notify the following that it is treating a conduct matter as having been referred to it—
(a) the appropriate authority;
(b) except in a case where it appears to the Commission that to do so might prejudice an investigation of the matter (whether an existing investigation or a possible future one), the person to whose conduct the matter relates.
(4) Where an appropriate authority receives a notification under sub-paragraph (3) in respect of a conduct matter and the matter has not yet been recorded, the appropriate authority must record the matter.”
(7) In paragraph 14A (duty to record DSI matters), omit sub-paragraph (2).
(8) In paragraph 14C (reference of DSI matters to the Commission), in sub-paragraph (3), after “occasion” insert “, or that has been treated as having been so referred by virtue of paragraph 14CA,”.
(9) After paragraph 14C insert—
“Power of Commission to treat DSI matter as having been referred
14CA (1) The Commission may treat a DSI matter that comes to its attention otherwise than by having been referred to it under paragraph 14C as having been so referred.
(2) Where the Commission treats a DSI matter as having been referred to it—
(a) paragraphs 14A and 14C do not apply, or cease to apply, in relation to the matter except to the extent provided for by paragraph 14C(3), and
(b) paragraphs 14D and 15 apply in relation to the matter as if it had been referred to the Commission by the appropriate authority under paragraph 14C.
(3) The Commission must notify the appropriate authority that it is treating a DSI matter as having been referred to it.
(4) Where an appropriate authority receives a notification under sub-paragraph (3) in respect of a DSI matter and the matter has not yet been recorded, the appropriate authority must record the matter.”
(10) In section 29 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (interpretation of Part 2 of that Act), in subsection (1), in paragraph (a) of the definition of “recordable conduct matter”, for “or 11” substitute “, 11 or 13A”. —(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause is intended to take the place of clause 14. The amendments of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 in the new clause are aimed at giving the IPCC the ability to consider whether or not it is necessary for a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter to be investigated and, if so, to determine what form the investigation should take, as soon as the IPCC becomes aware of the complaint or matter.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 2
Sensitive information received by IPCC: restriction on disclosure
‘(1) Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (complaints and misconduct) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 21 insert—
“21A Restriction on disclosure of sensitive information
(1) Where the Commission receives information within subsection (3), the Commission must not disclose (whether under section 11, 20 or 21 or otherwise) the information, or the fact that it has been received, unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(2) Where a person appointed under paragraph 18 of Schedule 3 to investigate a complaint or matter (a “paragraph 18 investigator”) receives information within subsection (3), the paragraph 18 investigator must not disclose the information, or the fact that it has been received, to any person other than the Commission unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(3) The information is—
(a) intelligence service information;
(b) intercept information;
(c) information obtained from a government department which, at the time it is provided to the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator, is identified by the department as information the disclosure of which may, in the opinion of the relevant authority—
(i) cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or
(ii) jeopardise the safety of any person.
(4) Where the Commission or a paragraph 18 investigator discloses to another person information within subsection (3), or the fact that the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator has received it, the other person must not disclose that information or that fact unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(5) In this section—
“government department” means a department of Her Majesty’s Government but does not include—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service, or
(c) the Government Communications Headquarters (“GCHQ”);
“intelligence service information” means information that was obtained (directly or indirectly) from or that relates to—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service,
(c) GCHQ, or
(d) any part of Her Majesty’s forces, or of the Ministry of Defence, which engages in intelligence activities;
“intercept information” means information relating to any of the matters mentioned in section 19(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000;
“Minister of the Crown” includes the Treasury;
“paragraph 18 investigator” has the meaning given by subsection (2);
“relevant authority” means—
(a) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to the Security Service, the Director-General of the Security Service;
(b) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to the Secret Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service;
(c) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to GCHQ, the Director of GCHQ;
(d) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to Her Majesty’s forces or the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State;
(e) in the case of intercept information, the person to whom the relevant interception warrant is or was addressed;
(f) in the case of information within subsection (3)(c)—
“relevant interception warrant” means the interception warrant issued under section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 that relates to the intercept information.
21B Provision of sensitive information to the Commission and certain investigators
‘(1) A person who provides information that is intelligence service information or intercept information to the Commission or a paragraph 18 investigator (whether under a provision of this Part or otherwise) must—
(a) make the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator aware that the information is intelligence service information or (as the case may be) intercept information, and
(b) provide the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator with such additional information as will enable the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator to identify the relevant authority in relation to the information.
(2) In this section, “intelligence service information”, “intercept information”, “paragraph 18 investigator” and “relevant authority” have the same meaning as in section 21A.”
(3) In Schedule 3 (handling of complaints and conduct matters etc), in Part 3 (investigations and subsequent proceedings)—
(a) omit paragraph 19ZD (sensitive information: restriction on further disclosure of information received under an information notice);
(b) in paragraph 22 (final reports on investigations: complaints, conduct matters and certain DSI matters)—
(i) after sub-paragraph (6) insert—
“(6A) Where a person would contravene section 21A by submitting, or (as the case may be) sending a copy of, a report in its entirety to the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (2) or (3)(b), the person must instead submit, or send a copy of, the report after having removed or obscured the information which by virtue of section 21A the person must not disclose.”;
(ii) in sub-paragraph (8), at the end insert “except so far as the person is prevented from doing so by section 21A”;
(c) in paragraph 23 (action by the Commission in response to an investigation report under paragraph 22), after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2ZA) Where the Commission would contravene section 21A by sending a copy of a report in its entirety to the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or to the Director of Public Prosecutions under sub-paragraph (2)(c), the Commission must instead send a copy of the report after having removed or obscured the information which by virtue of section 21A the Commission must not disclose.”;
(d) in paragraph 24A (final reports on investigations: other DSI matters), after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(3A) Where a person would contravene section 21A by sending a copy of a report in its entirety to the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (2)(b), the person must instead send a copy of the report after having removed or obscured the information which by virtue of section 21A the person must not disclose.”” —(Karen Bradley.)
Paragraph 19ZD of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 currently imposes restrictions on the further disclosure by the IPCC of certain sensitive information received by it under an information notice. This new clause replaces paragraph 19ZD with new section 21A of the 2002 Act, which applies irrespective of how the IPCC has obtained the information. New section 21A also applies to investigators appointed under paragraph 18 of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act (investigations by an appropriate authority under the IPCC’s direction). New section 21A is supplemented by new section 21B, which is intended to assist those needing to comply with section 21A.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Release without bail: fingerprinting and samples
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 61(5A) (fingerprinting of person arrested for a recordable offence) —
(a) in paragraph (a) omit “in the case of a person who is on bail,”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) omit “in any case,”.
(3) In section 63(3ZA) (taking of non-intimate sample from person arrested for a recordable offence)—
(a) in paragraph (a) omit “in the case of a person who is on bail,”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) omit “in any case,”.—(Karen Bradley.)
Sections 61(5A) and 63(3ZA) of PACE allow fingerprints and samples to be taken from persons released on bail. Because of changes in the Bill, persons will be released without bail (rather than on bail) unless pre-conditions are met. The amendments change those sections so they cover persons released without bail too.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Release under section 24A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
(1) Section 24A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (arrest for failure to comply with conditions attached to conditional caution) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2) for paragraphs (b) and (c) substitute—
“(b) released without charge and without bail (with or without any variation in the conditions attached to the caution) unless paragraph (c)(i) and (ii) applies, or
(c) released without charge and on bail if—
(i) the release is to enable a decision to be made as to whether the person should be charged with the offence, and
(ii) the pre-conditions for bail are satisfied.”
(3) In subsections (3)(a) and (4) for “subsection (2)(b)” substitute “subsection (2)(c)”.
(4) After subsection (8) insert—
(8A) In subsection (2) the reference to the pre-conditions for bail is to be read in accordance with section 50A of the 1984 Act.”—(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause changes the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to persons who are arrested because they are believed to have failed to comply with conditions attached to a conditional caution. To reflect the changes made in the Bill, those persons will be released without bail (rather than on bail) unless pre-conditions are met.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Duty to notify person released under section 34, 37 or 37CA of PACE that not to be prosecuted
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 34 (limitations on police detention) after subsection (5A) (inserted by section 42 of this Act) insert—
(5B) Subsection (5C) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (5), and
(b) the custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(5C) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(5D) Subsection (5C) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.
(5E) In this Part “caution” includes—
(a) a conditional caution within the meaning of Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
(b) a youth conditional caution within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 4 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998;
(c) a youth caution under section 66ZA of that Act.”
(3) Section 37 (duties of custody officer before charge) is amended as follows.
(4) After subsection (6) insert——
(6A) Subsection (6B) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (2), and
(b) the custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(6B) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(6C) Subsection (6B) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(5) After subsection (8) insert—
(8ZA) Where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (7)(b) or (c), and
(b) the custody officer makes a determination as mentioned in subsection (6A)(b),
subsections (6B) and (6C) apply.”
(6) Section 37B (consultation with Director of Public Prosecutions) is amended as follows.
(7) After subsection (5) insert—
(5A) Subsection (5) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(8) Omit subsection (9).
(9) In section 37CA (release following arrest for breach of bail) after subsection (4) insert——
(5) Subsection (6) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (2), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(6) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(7) Subsection (6) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(10) In section 24B(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (application of provisions of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984)—
(a) in paragraph (d) for “(5)” substitute “(5E)”, and
(b) in paragraph (f) for “(6)” substitute “(6C)”.—(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause requires a custody officer to notify a person released under section 34(5), 37(2) or (7)(b) or (c) or 37CA(2) of PACE if it is decided not to prosecute. So the person is put in the same position as a person released under section 37(7)(a) (who is notified under section 37B(5)).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 6
Duty to notify person released under any of sections 41 to 44 of PACE that not to be prosecuted
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 41 (limits on period of detention without charge) after subsection (9) insert—
(10) Subsection (11) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (7), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(11) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(12) Subsection (11) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(3) In section 42 (authorisation of continued detention) after subsection (11) insert—
(12) Subsection (13) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (10), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(13) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(14) Subsection (13) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(4) In section 43 (warrants of further detention) after subsection (19) insert——
(20) Subsection (21) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (15) or (18), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(21) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(22) Subsection (21) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.”
(5) In section 44 (extension of warrants of further detention) after subsection (8) insert——
(9) Subsection (10) applies where—
(a) a person is released under subsection (7), and
(b) a custody officer determines that—
(i) there is not sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence, or
(ii) there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with an offence but the person should not be charged with an offence or given a caution in respect of an offence.
(10) The custody officer must give the person notice in writing that the person is not to be prosecuted.
(11) Subsection (10) does not prevent the prosecution of the person for an offence if new evidence comes to light after the notice was given.” —(Karen Bradley.)
This new clause requires a custody officer to notify a person released under section 41(7), 42(10), 43(15) or (18) or 44(7) of PACE if it is decided not to prosecute. So the person is put in the same position as a person released under section 37(7)(a) (who is notified under section 37B(5)).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 22
Combined authority mayors: exercise of fire and rescue functions
‘(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (4).
(2) After section 107E insert—
“107EA Exercise of fire and rescue functions
(1) This section applies to a mayor for the area of a combined authority who—
(a) by virtue of section 107D(1), may exercise functions which are conferred on a fire and rescue authority in that name (“fire and rescue functions”), and
(b) by virtue of section 107F(1), may exercise functions of a police and crime commissioner.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order make provision—
(a) authorising the mayor to arrange for the chief constable of the police force for the police area which corresponds to the area of the combined authority to exercise fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor;
(b) authorising that chief constable to arrange for a person within subsection (4) to exercise functions exercisable by the chief constable under arrangements made by virtue of paragraph (a).
(3) An order under subsection (2) may provide that arrangements made under the order—
(a) may authorise the exercise of any fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor;
(b) may authorise the exercise of any fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor other than those specified or described in the order;
(c) may authorise the exercise of fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor which are specified or described in the order.
(4) The persons mentioned in subsection (2)(b) are—
(a) members of the chief constable’s police force;
(b) the civilian staff of that police force, as defined by section 102(4) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011;
(c) members of staff transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1);
(d) members of staff appointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2).
(5) Provision in an order under section 107D(1) for a function to be exercisable only by the mayor for the area of a combined authority is subject to provision made by virtue of subsection (2).
(6) This section is subject to—
(a) section 107EB (section 107EA orders: procedure), and
(b) section 37 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (prohibition on employment of police in fire-fighting).
107EB Section 107EA orders: procedure
‘(1) An order under section 107EA(2) may be made in relation to the mayor for the area of a combined authority only if the mayor has requested the Secretary of State to make the order.
(2) A request under subsection (1) must be accompanied by a report which contains—
(a) an assessment of why—
(i) it is in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness for the order to be made, or
(ii) it is in the interests of public safety for the order to be made,
(b) a description of any public consultation which the mayor has carried out on the proposal for the order to be made,
(c) a summary of the responses to any such consultation, and
(d) a summary of the representations (if any) which the mayor has received about that proposal from the constituent members of the combined authority.
(3) Subsections (4) and (5) apply if—
(a) the mayor for the area of a combined authority has made a request under subsection (1) for the Secretary of State to make an order under section 107EA(2), and
(b) at least two thirds of the constituent members of the combined authority have indicated that they disagree with the proposal for the order to be made.
(4) The mayor must, in providing the report under subsection (2), provide the Secretary of State with—
(a) copies of the representations (if any) made by the constituent members of the combined authority about that proposal, and
(b) the mayor’s response to those representations and to the responses to any public consultation which the mayor has carried out on that proposal.
(5) The Secretary of State must—
(a) obtain an independent assessment of that proposal, and
(b) in deciding whether to make the order, have regard to that assessment and to the material provided under subsection (4) (as well as the material provided under subsection (2)).
(6) An order under section 107EA(2) may be made only if it appears to the Secretary of State that—
(a) it is in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness for the order to be made, or
(b) it is in the interest of public safety for the order to be made.
(7) The Secretary of State may, in making an order under section 107EA(2) in relation to the mayor for the area of a combined authority, give effect to the mayor’s proposal for the order with such modifications as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.
(8) Before making an order which gives effect to such a proposal with modifications, the Secretary of State must consult the mayor and the combined authority on the modifications.
(9) In this section—
“constituent council”, in relation to a combined authority, means—
(a) a county council the whole or any part of whose area is within the area of the combined authority, or
(b) a district council whose area is within the area of the combined authority;
“constituent member”, in relation to a combined authority, means a member of the authority appointed by a constituent council (but does not include the mayor for the area of the combined authority).
107EC Section 107EA orders: further provision
‘(1) An order under section 107EA(2) may make provision for the making of a scheme to transfer property, rights and liabilities (including criminal liabilities) from a fire and rescue authority or the combined authority to the chief constable (including provision corresponding to any provision made by section 17(4) to (6) of the Localism Act 2011).
(2) A chief constable to whom an order under section 107EA(2) applies may appoint staff for the purpose of the exercise of functions exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of the order.
(3) A chief constable to whom an order under section 107EA(2) applies may—
(a) pay remuneration, allowances and gratuities to members of the chief constable’s fire and rescue staff;
(b) pay pensions to, or in respect of, persons who are or have been such members of staff;
(c) pay amounts for or towards the provision of pensions to, or in respect of, persons who are or have been such members of staff.
(4) In subsection (3) “allowances”, in relation to a member of staff, means allowances in respect of expenses incurred by the member of staff in the course of employment as such a member of staff.
(5) Subject to subsections (6) to (8), a person who is employed pursuant to a transfer by virtue of subsection (1) or an appointment under subsection (2) may not at the same time be employed pursuant to an appointment by a chief constable of the police force for a police area under Schedule 2 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
(6) Where an order under section 107EA(2) is in force in relation to the chief constable of the police force for a police area, the person who is for the time being the police force’s chief finance officer is to be responsible for the proper administration of financial affairs relating to the exercise of functions exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of the order.
(7) Subsection (5) does not prevent a person who is employed as a finance officer for fire functions from being at the same time employed as a finance officer for police functions.
(8) In subsection (7)—
“finance officer for fire functions” means a member of a chief constable’s fire and rescue staff who—
(a) is not a chief finance officer of the kind mentioned in subsection (6), and
(b) is employed to carry out duties relating to the proper administration of financial affairs relating to the exercise of functions exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of an order under section 107EA(2);
“finance officer for police functions” means a member of a chief constable’s civilian staff within the meaning of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 who—
(a) is not a chief finance officer of the kind mentioned in subsection (6), and
(b) is employed to carry out duties relating to the proper administration of a police force’s financial affairs.
(9) Where an order under section 107EA(2) is in force, the combined authority to which the order applies must pay—
(a) any damages or costs awarded against the chief constable to whom the order applies in any proceedings brought against the chief constable in respect of the acts or omissions of a member of the chief constable’s fire and rescue staff;
(b) any costs incurred by the chief constable in any such proceedings so far as not recovered by the chief constable in the proceedings;
(c) any sum required in connection with the settlement of any claim made against the chief constable in respect of the acts or omissions of a member of the chief constable’s fire and rescue staff, if the settlement is approved by the authority.
(10) Where an order under section 107EA(2) is in force, the combined authority to which the order applies may, in such cases and to such extent as appears to the authority to be appropriate, pay—
(a) any damages or costs awarded against a member of the fire and rescue staff of the chief constable to whom the order applies in proceedings for any unlawful conduct of that member of staff;
(b) costs incurred and not recovered by such a member of staff in such proceedings;
(c) sums required in connection with the settlement of a claim that has or might have given rise to such proceedings.
(11) In this section “fire and rescue staff”, in relation to a chief constable to whom an order under section 107EA(2) applies, means—
(a) staff transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of subsection (1);
(b) staff appointed by the chief constable under subsection (2).
107ED Section 107EA orders: exercise of fire and rescue functions
‘(1) This section applies if—
(a) an order under section 107EA(2) makes provision in relation to the area of a combined authority, and
(b) by virtue of the order, fire and rescue functions exercisable by the mayor for the area of the combined authority are exercisable by the chief constable of the police force for the police area which corresponds to that area.
(2) The chief constable must secure that good value for money is obtained in exercising—
(a) functions which are exercisable by the chief constable by virtue of the order, and
(b) functions relating to fire and rescue services which are conferred on the chief constable by or by virtue of any enactment.
(3) The chief constable must secure that other persons exercising functions by virtue of the order obtain good value for money in exercising those functions.
(4) The mayor must—
(a) secure the exercise of the duties which are exercisable by the chief constable or another person by virtue of the order,
(b) secure the exercise of the duties relating to fire and rescue services which are imposed on the chief constable by or by virtue of any enactment,
(c) secure that functions which are exercisable by the chief constable or another person by virtue of the order are exercised efficiently and effectively, and
(d) secure that functions relating to fire and rescue services which are conferred or imposed on the chief constable by or by virtue of any enactment are exercised efficiently and effectively.
(5) The mayor must hold the chief constable to account for the exercise of such functions.
107EE Section 107EA orders: complaints and conduct matters etc
‘(1) If an order is made under 107EA(2) that enables arrangements to be made for the exercise of functions by members of a police force or the civilian staff of a police force, the Secretary of State may by order amend Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (persons serving with the police: complaints and conduct matters etc) in consequence of that provision.
(2) If an order is made under section 107EA(2) that enables arrangements to be made for the exercise of functions by members of staff transferred to a chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) or appointed by a chief constable under section 107EC(2), the Secretary of State may by order make provision of the type described in subsection (3) in relation to those members of staff.
(3) The provision referred to in subsection (2) is—
(a) provision corresponding or similar to any provision made by or under Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002;
(b) provision applying (with or without modifications) any provision made by or under Part 2 of that Act.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order, in consequence of any provision made under subsection (2), amend Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002.
(5) Before making an order under this section the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales,
(b) the Independent Police Complaints Commission,
(c) such persons as appear to the Secretary of State to represent the views of police and crime commissioners,
(d) such persons as appear to the Secretary of State to represent the views of fire and rescue authorities, and
(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
107EF Section 107EA orders: application of local policing provisions
‘(1) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) apply (with or without modifications) any provision of a local policing enactment in relation to a person within subsection (2);
(b) make, in relation to such a person, provision corresponding or similar to any provision of a local policing enactment.
(2) Those persons are—
(a) a mayor for the area of a combined authority to which an order under section 107EA(2) applies,
(b) a chief constable to which such an order applies, and
(c) a panel established by virtue of an order under paragraph 4 of Schedule 5C for such an area.
(3) The power conferred by subsection (1)(a) or (b) includes power to apply (with or without modifications) any provision made by or under a local policing enactment or make provision corresponding or similar to any such provision.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order amend, revoke or repeal a provision of or made under an enactment in consequence of provision made by virtue of subsection (1).
(5) In this section “local policing enactment” means an Act relating to a police and crime commissioner.
(3) In section 107D(6)(b) (general functions exercisable by the mayor for the area of a combined authority) after “section 107E” insert “or 107EA”.
(4) In section 120 (interpretation) after the definition of “EPB” insert—
““fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;”.
(5) In section 26 of the Fire Services Act 1947 (firefighters’ pension scheme) (as continued in force by order under section 36 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004) in subsection (5A) (as inserted by paragraph 12 of Schedule 1)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and
(b) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(c) a transfer to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or
(d) an appointment by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act.”
(6) In section 63 of the Police Act 1996 (Police Advisory Board for England and Wales) in subsection (4) (as inserted by paragraph 15 of Schedule 1) for “also imposes a requirement” substitute “and section 107EE of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 also impose requirements”.
(7) In section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (police powers for civilian staff) in subsection (11A) (as inserted by paragraph 17 of Schedule 1) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(c) any member of staff transferred to that chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (transfer of property, rights and liabilities to chief constable to whom fire functions of combined authority may be delegated);
(d) any member of staff appointed by that chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act (appointment of staff by chief constable to whom fire functions of combined authority may be delegated).”
(8) In section 34 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (pensions etc) in subsection (11) (as inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and
(b) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(c) transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or
(d) appointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act.”
(9) In section 37 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (prohibition on employment of police in fire-fighting) (as substituted by paragraph 10 of Schedule 1) in subsection (3)—
(a) after “whom” insert “—(a)”, and
(b) after paragraph (a) insert “, or
(b) functions of a fire and rescue authority which are exercisable by the mayor of a combined authority have been delegated under an order under section 107EA(2) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.”
(10) In Schedule 8 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (appointment, suspension and removal of senior police officers) in paragraph 2 (no appointment until end of confirmation process) in sub-paragraph (1AA) (as inserted by paragraph 23 of Schedule 1) after “section 4F of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004” insert “or section 107EA(2) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009”.
(11) In Schedule 1 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 (persons in public service: definitions) in paragraph 6 (fire and rescue workers) in paragraph (aa) (as inserted by paragraph 24 of Schedule 1)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i), and
(b) for the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (ii) substitute—transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, orappointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act, or”.”
(i) transferred to the chief constable under a scheme made by virtue of section 107EC(1) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or
(ii) appointed by the chief constable under section 107EC(2) of that Act, or”.” —(Mike Penning.)
This new clause makes provision for and in connection with enabling the mayor of a combined authority by whom fire and rescue functions are exercisable to delegate those functions to the chief constable for the police area which corresponds to the area of the combined authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims (Mike Penning)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mike Penning
New clause 22 applies the single employer model to combined authority mayors to enable mayors with both policing and fire functions to delegate fire functions to a single chief officer, who will employ both police and fire personnel. This allows combined authority mayors to realise the core benefits of collaboration between the police and fire services, for example by bringing together a senior management team or allowing rapid consolidation of back-office functions. The candidates for metro mayor who are coming forward are particularly looking for that collaboration: it will be essential to producing the efficiencies, economy and effectiveness needed. The new clause will give metro mayors the ability to function in the way we all expect them to.
Lyn Brown
The new clause will give metro mayors the power to put in place a single employer model for the fire service and for the police force, where they have taken on the role of fire and rescue authority and police and crime commissioner. There are already provisions in the Bill that enable metro mayors to take on responsibility for the governance of policing and fire, but there is no existing legislation to give a mayor who has taken on both roles the power to implement the single employer model.
As we discussed in a previous sitting, the Bill provides for police and crime commissioners who have taken responsibility for fire and rescue to put in place a single employer model; the new clause extends this power to mayors. Since we were opposed to the single employer model then, it will be no surprise to the Minister or the Committee that we are still opposed to it now. The Committee will be relieved to hear that I am not going to repeat the arguments I made on the first day against the single employer model in quite as much detail today—the Committee has heard my concerns, and I am sure the Minister took note of them—but I would like to re-address the important arguments.
A large proportion of the work carried out by the fire service is preventive: smoke alarms are checked, sprinklers are fitted and homes are made safer. This preventive work is not an add-on to the fire service’s work; it is at the core of what it does. We need to be honest: there are some people who would not welcome a policeman into their homes without a warrant. Police officers turning up at their door can be a scary experience. There are fears that under the single employer model it may be more difficult for the fire service to carry out vital preventive work if a member of the public is concerned that the firefighters coming into their home may have to share information with or report back to their boss, the police.
There is a fundamental difference between the humanitarian service that the fire and rescue service provides and the law enforcement service carried out by the police. This is not an attack on our police, who provide an important public service, as we all know. However, for the public to allow firefighters into their homes for preventive checks, there has to be a level of trust in the fire service, which is quite simply not paralleled elsewhere.
There is also the issue of workers in the police force and the fire and rescue service enjoying different terms and conditions of employment, not least around the right to strike. I think there are legitimate fears that the single employer model will be used as a means of cutting back on the workers’ rights of those in the fire service.
Finally, I am concerned about extending the power of the single employer model to metro mayors at this late stage in the legislative process. By including that in a late amendment, the Government have not given those living in metropolitan areas the time to consider and be consulted about what is on offer. Will the Minister explain why this important part of the Government’s reform is being made via an amendment at this late stage?
Mike Penning
I am, sadly, not surprised that Her Majesty’s Opposition continue with the concern that they raised about the PCCs. The principle here is pretty simple: that it will have no operational effect on the fire service. There are two separate pillars of funding—two separate positions to be in. We have tabled numerous amendments, which is quite normal; we are making sure that there is no anomaly between PCCs and mayors.
There was initial support from Her Majesty’s Opposition. The shadow Policing Minister said:
“I think that police and fire services logically sit within the context of a combined authority.”—[Official Report, 14 October 2015; Vol. 600, c. 376.]
I agreed with him at the time. What we are now discussing—who trusts whom going into homes—has nothing to do with that; it is to do with whether we have the same system for PCCs as we have for mayors. That is the reason for the amendments.
Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)
This point has been raised previously. It is one thing to seek to get all the statutory agencies effectively to collaborate as part of a combined authority. It is another thing altogether to merge the police and the fire service. We have no problem with the former, but we are opposed to the latter.
Mike Penning
I respect the shadow Policing Minister’s position. There are very few things we disagree on, particularly in the Bill, but on this particular point we disagree. There will be plenty of time on Report and in the other place to discuss that further, but it would be wrong to leave an anomaly between PCCs and mayors, which is why the Government have tabled these amendments. I hope the Committee will approve them.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 42—Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel: interpretation.
New clause 43—Breach of pre-charge bail—
“(1) A person commits an offence if, having been released on bail under sections 37, 37C(2)(b) or 37CA(2)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 under investigation for a terrorism offence or serious crime offence they breach any of the terms of their bail specified that place restriction on their ability to travel including surrendering their passport and/or place conditions on their residency.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to 6 months imprisonment or a fine or to both.
(3) For the purposes of this section, serious crime shall be specified of the Secretary of State by order.”
This new clause would make it an offence for those suspected of serious crimes and terrorism to break bail conditions linked to travel.
Government amendment 226
Mike Penning
This is a very important Government new clause and amendment, which I discussed with the shadow Minister outside the room, but I think it is particularly important that we debate them properly in Committee. The issue of suspected terrorists absconding from pre-charge bail was quite rightly raised on Second Reading. In January, the Prime Minister indicated to the Liaison Committee that the Government would look very carefully at the issue to avoid a repeat of instances in which somebody is not charged, released on police bail and then breaks the conditions of that police bail within the counter-terrorism context.
This new clause is about counter-terrorism suspects, a subject on which I know the Opposition would like to expand. Although I will keep under review any other offences that are alleged against somebody who has been released on pre-charge bail, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 already lists a range of offences, including membership of proscribed organisations, that would prevent bail from being granted. The new clause relates to people for whom bail has been granted because the police need to continue with their investigations and do not have evidence to give them concern about a more serious offence taking place. The breach of this bail would carry a maximum penalty of 12 months imprisonment. This very important Government new clause enacts the commitment that we made, and I look forward to the Opposition’s response.
Jack Dromey
The starting point for us is that we may have our disagreements on other fronts but there is unity across the House in opposition to the grotesque threat posed to our nation by terrorist violence. There is utter determination that we rise to the challenge of keeping our communities safe. On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), the shadow Home Secretary, called on the Government to toughen the police bail regime for terror suspects, and we are pleased that the Government have listened and are now taking action.
James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that was in fact a recommendation of the Select Committee on Home Affairs? The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) circulated something to the Committee this morning saying that it was his cross-party Committee that brought the issue to the Government’s attention, and it is something on which we all agree.
Jack Dromey
All I would say is that this measure was not part of the original Bill. It is certainly true that the Home Affairs Committee has done valuable work on this matter, but ultimately it was our proposal on Second Reading that led to the Government’s welcome shift. The fact that there is cross-party support is also welcome.
If we believe that the Government have moved, we are not convinced that they have yet gone far enough. The issue of principle is simple: it should not be right that terror suspects on pre-charge police bail have previously been able to leave the country with ease to escape justice, and it is essential that the loophole is closed as a matter of urgency. The Government’s new clause would make it an offence for those suspected of terrorism to break bail conditions linked to travel.
On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh referred to the case of Siddhartha Dhar, who absconded while on police bail and went to Syria via Dover, as a prime example of the unacceptable loophole in the current system. In reference to what the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton said earlier, the Home Affairs Committee investigated forensically and collected evidence on this important issue. That was strongly buttressed by the compelling evidence given by the head of counter-terrorism, Mark Rowley, and Sara Thornton, the chair of the National Police Chiefs Council, when they came before this Committee. They both made it absolutely clear that they wanted to see the removal of the limitations currently obtaining, which are operational constraints.
Although we welcome the Government’s amendment and new clause, we want to ensure that in cases such as that of Siddhartha Dhar the police are able to insist on a suspect’s passports being handed over when they are in the custody suite. We should not wait to write to them after they have been released to say, “Please, would you hand over your passport?” because we risk that they may have already used the opportunity to leave the country, as Mr Dhar did. The Home Affairs Committee recommended that to the Government some considerable time ago, and we welcome the fact that Ministers are now acting, but their proposal does not set out how exactly the police can seize travel documentation, where necessary. For example, will the police be able to accompany the suspect to wherever his or her passport is being stored? Could they prevent a suspect from leaving until documentation is brought to the station? Will the police be able to request the surrender of passports and travel documents as a condition of release from custody? What exactly does the Policing Minister envisage happening next time the police arrest a terrorist suspect who inconveniently does not have his travel documentation on him at the time of arrest? I would be grateful if the Government would set out in some detail how they see this working.
Mike Penning
The new clause is about breach of a bail condition that carries a 12-month sentence. The police already have the power to set police bail conditions and, if they wish, they could say that a person cannot be released on bail until their travel documents have been surrendered. That could be part of the bail. It could be seven days. They already have the powers. It is not within the Bill because it does not need to be.
Jack Dromey
I have looked at what the Minister said in our earlier discussions, in particular in relation to the Terrorism Act 2000. There is no provision for bail, before or after charge, under the Terrorism Act. Under the Act it boils down to either charging or releasing a suspect; the initial detention limit is 48 hours, which is extendable, and there is no existing terrorist legislation, therefore, that provides for the police to seize a passport from a terrorist suspect or relates to the enforcement of pre-charge bail conditions.
Jake Berry (Rossendale and Darwen) (Con)
An interesting point in the case of terrorism is that many—not all—people accused of terrorism offences will have dual nationality and more than one passport. Has there been any thought as to how that would be discovered by the police, if the information was not volunteered, and what provisions may be required to get someone to surrender passports of another country as well as their British passport?
Jack Dromey
The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. That is precisely why I referred earlier to “passports”. There have been a number of cases of people having dual nationality in the way the hon. Gentleman has suggested. Fundamentally, this is about making sure that we do not have somebody like Dhar who walks out of the police station, says, “Yeah, okay, I will surrender my passports, I will be back tomorrow” and is then on the first plane to get out of the country. It is about certainty beyond any doubt that that simply cannot happen in future. Relatedly, have the Government looked at the issue of the ability of agencies to communicate immediately when passports are to be surrendered—for example, crucially, the Border Force? We look forward to clarification on these crucial points.
On another issue, the Government proposal applies only to terrorist suspects and not to those suspected of serious crimes. There is no question but that there is something uniquely awful about the terrorist threat to our country but, having said that, our new clause includes serious crime offences to be specified by the Secretary of State in regulation and so would address cases where, for example, suspects have fled the country before standing trial over rape allegations. The Minister has very helpfully said that he will keep this matter under review. We hope, however, that the Government will now give the Home Secretary that power; of course, it is for the Home Secretary to determine, in consultation, how that power is exercised thereafter.
The Minister was right when he said that the National Police Chiefs Council highlighted that it would like this power not to be confined to counter-terrorism. We urge the Government to include suspects of other offences in their proposals. As such, in circumstances where the Government are taking action, we will not press our new clause to a vote today. We seek assurances from the Government on the points I have raised as soon as possible, however, and we stand ready for further dialogue before Report. I very much hope that we can go to Report with a common position. In that dialogue, we will seek a strengthened clause and we will work with the Government to make sure that the pre-charge bail regime truly has teeth. We will return to this on Report; for now, on this crucial issue, we urge the Government to reflect and I stress, once again, that we very much hope that we are able to make common progress by the time of Report. The way we vote on Report will depend on whether we can put our hand on our hearts and say that never again will there be a case like that of Dhar.
Mike Penning
I am genuinely pleased that the shadow Minister is not going to push this to a vote. Perhaps it is right that a subject of this seriousness is debated on the Floor of the House on Report. Yet again, I offer the shadow Minister my help and that of my Bill team to see if we can come to a consensus.
The shadow Minister asked specifically whether the police can accompany the person who was still under arrest before they were given police bail, to ascertain their travel documents; under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, they can do that. Where police have already requested under the arrest warrant their immediate surrender, they can accompany the individual to their place of residence. If they breach that—in other words, they try to abscond and so on—that is where the sanctions in the new clause apply.
Of course, the shadow Minister is absolutely right that under the Terrorism Act 2000, there is no bail—a point that I made earlier on. This proposal relates to other alleged offences. Let us see what position we can come to. It is very important, because we are all as one in wanting to protect the public. We are as one in wanting people who are suspected of terrorism offences not to abscond. But the police have substantial powers at the moment. I have discussed that with them extensively to make sure that they use their existing powers, including making sure that they have the travel documents.
I do not want to go into individual cases. It is for officers in an operation to make operational decisions, not for politicians, but it is for us to give them the powers and to say to them, sometimes, “By the way, you already have the powers and you should use them.” I am pleased that new clause 43 will not be moved and we offer as much assistance as possible to reach consensus, as we have done throughout the progress of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 41 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 42
Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel: interpretation
“(1) This section defines words used in section (Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel)(2).
(2) “Travel document” means anything that is or appears to be—
(a) a passport, or
(b) a ticket or other document that permits a person to make a journey by any means from a place within the United Kingdom to a place outside the United Kingdom.
(3) “Passport” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971),
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation, or
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
(4) “Port” means—
(a) an airport,
(b) a sea port,
(c) a hoverport,
(d) a heliport,
(e) a railway station where passenger trains depart for places outside the United Kingdom, or
(f) any other place at which a person is able, or attempting, to get on or off any craft, vessel or vehicle in connection with leaving the United Kingdom.”.—(Mike Penning.)
This new clause defines certain terms used in NC41.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 7
National Assembly for Wales: devolution of responsibility for policing
“(1) In Schedule 7 to the Government of Wales Act 2006 after paragraph 20 insert—
Policing
21 Policing, police pay, probation, community safety, crime prevention.
Exceptions—
National Crime Agency
Police pensions
National security”.—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd)
: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Diolch yn fawr, Mr Cadeirydd. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. This is a probing new clause, and I do not intend to press it to a Division. None the less, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that policing in Wales is an anomaly in the UK. Although policing is a devolved power in Northern Ireland and Scotland, Welsh policing remains reserved to Westminster. At the same time, the Welsh police forces are unique in the UK in that they are non-devolved bodies operating within a largely devolved public services landscape.
When we were discussing the police and fire authorities earlier in Committee, I was aware that there were perhaps cost implications for the police forces in Wales that are not necessarily appreciated. We are seeing changes happening even during the progress of the Bill. It is as important to draw attention to that as much as to the principle of devolving policing.
The Welsh police forces are unique in the sense that they are required to follow the agenda of two Governments; crucially, that means that Welsh police forces operate on the basis of English priorities, such as knife crime. Some of these issues are major problems in England but less so in Wales; correspondingly, issues that are significant in Wales have a lower priority here. Thus, while there are clear and numerous benefits to devolving policing, the arguments for keeping it reserved to Westminster appear to be comparably weak—and weakening, given that it is already devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
That was, of course, reflected in the recommendations of the Silk commission, which was set up by the previous coalition Government and comprised a nominee from each of the four main parties, academics and industry experts. It received written evidence, heard oral evidence and visited every corner of Wales; it was a very broad consultation project. It heard evidence from the police themselves calling for the devolution of policing, and the report recommended as such. All four parties represented on the Silk commission recommended that policing be devolved, as has every Member of the National Assembly.
Jack Dromey
Wales is a proud nation, well served on the one hand by some excellent Labour Members of Parliament on this Committee, including my hon. Friends the Members for Swansea East and for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney, and on the other hand by a first-class police service. Like the Policing Minister, I have seen that first hand in Wales—more recently in north Wales with David Taylor, looking at the good work being done to tackle rural crime.
In south Wales, only last weekend, together with my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, I was looking at how the police safeguard public order at major public events, in that case a football match. I was deeply impressed by the police officers that we met—Jason, Steve and Joe—who were all doing a first-class job together with their police and crime commissioner Alun Michael. They are rooted in the community and talk about the community. That is a style of policing that has evolved over the past 20 years and is popular with the people of Britain as a whole, and Wales in particular.
So Wales is a proud nation, well served. It is right, nevertheless, that the people of Wales have a greater say over the policing of Wales. It is also right that the Welsh Assembly has the right to draw up in partnership a policing plan for Wales. That would be in partnership, on the one hand, with the four forces and their police and crime commissioners and, on the other hand, a range of statutory agencies.
Historically, Labour is the party of devolution. We do support the devolution of greater powers over policing to Wales but time and thought are necessary to get it right. I was speaking only last night with Carwyn Jones, and he has talked about a 10-year process of evolution of the arrangements in Wales and those between Wales and the rest of the UK.
Time and thought are necessary due to the sometimes complex interface with other areas in the criminal justice system and Government, but they are also necessary because I do not believe that anyone is proposing that all powers be devolved to Wales. The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made the point that the work of the National Crime Agency on serious and organised crime would clearly not be devolved. Likewise, counter-terrorism strategy would clearly not be devolved. As an example at the extreme end, when I was in Swansea with my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, we talked at length about the policing of the NATO summit and how to keep safe Heads of State from all over the world. Clearly, that would not be devolved either.
It is therefore a question of working through those crucial principles at the next stages. How can the people of Wales have a greater say in their policing? How best can the Welsh Assembly have the right to draw up a policing plan for Wales, in consultation with others? Then comes a process of evolution of the existing arrangements to achieve those objectives. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her comments, including that she would not push the amendment to a vote. She has raised important and complex issues, but the amendment is not the appropriate vehicle to resolve them; they will require resolving in the next stages.
Finally, I could not let an opportunity like this go by without reminding the Committee that in Labour Wales, a Labour Administration has made a difference to policing, with 500 extra PCSOs, 200 of them in south Wales. It was a privilege to meet some of them at the weekend. They are good men and women on the ground keeping our communities safe, thanks to what a Labour Administration did.
Mike Penning
I reiterate the comments made by the shadow Policing Minister about the tone of how the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd introduced her amendments. It has been useful. The issue is enormously complicated for Wales as part of the United Kingdom. The obvious references to Scotland and Northern Ireland are difficult to add to a report, not least because they have completely independent and different criminal justice systems. There is only one police force in Scotland now, and there has been only one police force in Northern Ireland for many years.
This issue must be decided by the people of Wales. The Government have made it clear that if there is not consensus within the Silk commission’s proposals, we will not consider devolving full powers to the Government of Wales and the Welsh Assembly. I heard the hon. Lady say that there is consensus, and that is certainly true of the correspondence and conversations that I have been having. I reiterate what the shadow Police Minister said. I have visited Wales on many occasions. There are many Conservative MPs there, not least the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. What I am trying to indicate politely is that it is not a one-party state.
PCC elections will be held in Wales imminently. They will give the people of Wales the best chance to decide what sort of policing they want in their part of the world. That is devolution, and that is democracy. Although I understand that this is a probing amendment, I am also pleased that new clause 7 will not be pressed to a vote.
Liz Saville Roberts
I welcome the change of standpoint by Labour MPs. Possibly it indicates a shift since the process undertaken through the St David’s day negotiation resulted in not all the recommendations of the Silk report being adopted, even though they were cross-party.
On devolution and the issues to be decided by the people of Wales, when I was discussing the draft Wales Bill, we were told that in the St David’s day discussions certain issues had been brought ahead or otherwise. I note that the people of Wales did not support the police commissioners in that state when that decision was made.
Finally, another issue that is developing as we speak, in the nature of devolution, is the development of a distinct legal jurisdiction, with a separate legislature in Wales able to produce its own legislation. Although we are talking about 10 years, I anticipate and very much hope that we will see policing devolved to Wales before then. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Annual Report by Chief Inspector of Constabulary
“In Part 2 of the Police Act 1996, omit section (4A) and insert—
“(4A) A report under subsection (4) must include the chief inspector’s assessment of—
(a) The efficiency and effectiveness of policing, and
(b) The crime and non-crime demand on police in England and Wales for the year in respect of which the report is prepared.”.”—(Jack Dromey.)
This new clause would add a duty for HMIC to assess demand on police on a yearly basis in addition to the efficiency and effectiveness of policing.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Jack Dromey
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe it is appropriate to charge the chief inspector of constabulary with producing reports on a regular basis, not just on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing but, crucially, on the crime and non-crime demand on police in England and Wales for the year in respect of which the report is prepared and for two and five years ahead. For example, we may disagree on how to handle cybercrime, but it is common ground across the House that it is a major and growing area of crime and a relatively new development; we must therefore always properly assess the demand on the police service before making decisions about how best to meet that demand.
To be quite frank, the problem is that things are increasingly difficult for the police. Some 18,000 police officers and some 5,000 police community support officers have gone. The thin blue line has been stretched ever thinner; ever fewer are being asked to do ever more, on four fronts in particular.
First, following scandals in recent years, there is now a great national will to do everything necessary to protect children in our society. Only last week, Simon Bailey, the chief constable who heads up the police’s multi-faceted strategy on the protection of children, said that it was already costing the police £1 billion, and that that would rise to £3 billion by 2020, such are the scale and complexity of the cases involved, both current and historical, and the investigation necessary.
Secondly, there has been an enormous increase in cybercrime. As we were rehearsing only yesterday, someone is more likely to be mugged online than in the street. Some of the major banks have estimated 20% or 30% increases in attempted crime against their customers every year. The scale of it is enormous.
Thirdly, there is the sheer scale of what is required for counter-terrorism. Last November, the Government decided not to go ahead with what would have been 22% cuts on top of 25% cuts. One reason for that decision was the strong representations, made by people like Mark Rowley and Bernard Hogan-Howe, that numbers matter, both for surge capacity in the event of a Paris-style attack and for neighbourhood policing, which was described by Peter Clarke, the former head of counter-terrorism, as the “golden thread” that runs from the local to the global. The patient building of community relationships is key to gaining intelligence; as a consequence, arrests for terrorism are now happening at the rate of almost one a day. As Bernard Hogan-Howe and Mark Rowley have said before the House, that is a consequence of good neighbourhood policing, but it is incredibly resource-intensive.
Fourthly, there is the wider problem of the police being increasingly seen as the force of last resort. In his powerful contribution this morning, my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham rightly made the point that, if there are no other agencies ready to respond, the police are the force of last resort. Sara Thornton, the chair of the National Police Chiefs Council, said recently that the police tend to be the people who, after 5 o’clock on a Friday, can be counted on to turn out when others perhaps do not because they no longer have the resources. Classically that includes going after looked-after children.
Mike Penning
Let me say from the outset that I recognise the importance of understanding the demand on police forces, which is exactly where the shadow Policing Minister is coming from. However, I do not see the need for new clause 10, as we are actually doing many of the things that the shadow Minister has asked for.
It is for a chief constable to assess the demands that their forces face and ensure that resources are allocated accordingly. The purpose of inspectors of constabulary is clearly set out in section 54(2) of the Police Act 1996. Their role is to inspect the “efficiency and effectiveness” of every force. Section 54(4) and section 54(4)(a) of the 1996 Act require the chief inspector of constabulary to prepare an annual report, and for that report to include his assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales.
Reliable, independent information is crucial in understanding the demands on the police force. It is for this reason that the Home Secretary asked the inspectorate to introduce annual, all-force inspections, which has led to the development of the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy—commonly called PEEL—programme. As part of the efficiency assessment, the inspectorate assesses how effectively each force understands and is responding to the demand that it faces. The inspectorate also works with forces to support them to better understand the demand that they face. There is work going on as we speak, including from the College of Policing, which I think everybody accepts has been a great success.
That includes the development of force management statements, which will be prepared with chief constables, and are intended to ensure that information on a force’s available resources and the demand they face is produced annually to an agreed standard—ensuring the same across all forces—and is accessible to chief constables, PCCs and, most importantly, the public. I accept that this is a work in progress, but it is in progress, and the police are doing it themselves with the inspectorate and the College of Policing so, respectfully, I do not see the need for new clause 10. I hope that the shadow Minister understands that.
Jack Dromey
Some of the things that the Minister said were helpful. We have common ground on wanting to understand the nature of need. I hope that the Minister’s comments on what the Government are doing and will do in the next stages will contribute to exactly that. In those circumstances we will not push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 16
Digital Crime Review
“(1) The Secretary of State shall have a duty to provide for a review of legislation which contains powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime in order to consolidate such powers in a single statute.
(2) In the conduct of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the statutes and measures that he deems appropriate, including but not limited to—
(a) Malicious Communications Act 1988, section 1,
(b) Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 2, 2a, 4, 4a,
(c) Offences against the Person Act 1861, section 16, 20, 39, 47,
(d) Data Protection Act 1998, section 10, 13 and 55,
(e) Criminal Justice Act 1998, section 160,
(f) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, section 30(1), (3),(5),(6), 78(5),
(g) Computer Misuse Act 1990, as amended by Serious Crime Act 2015 and Police and Justice Act 2006,
(h) Contempt of Court Act 1981,
(i) Human Rights Act 1998,
(j) Public Order Act 1986, section 4, 4a, 5, 16(b), 18,
(k) Serious Organised Crime Act 2005, section 145, 46,
(l) Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, section 48,
(m) Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2014, section 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
(n) Protection of Children Act 1978,
(o) Obscene Publications Act 1959,
(p) Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 28, 29-32,
(q) Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 145, 146,
(r) Communications Act 2003, section 127, 128-131,
(s) Data retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, section 4,
(t) Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1992, section 5,
(u) Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015,
(v) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 33(5), 29(6),
(w) Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 2,
(x) Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 4, 8, 10, 62,
(y) Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 43,
(z) Magistrates Court Act 1980, section 127,
(aa) Suicide Act 1961, section 2(1) as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
(ab) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, section 63,
(ac) Theft Act 1968, section 21, and
(ad) Criminal Law Act 1977, section 51(2)
(3) It shall be a duty of the Secretary of State to determine for the review any other statute under which persons have been prosecuted for a crime falling under section 1 of this Act.
(4) In the conduct of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with any person or body he deems appropriate, including but not limited to—
(a) the Police,
(b) Crown Prosecution Service,
(c) judiciary, and
(d) relevant community organisations.”—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 17—Surveillance and monitoring: offences—
“(1) A person commits an offence if the person—
(a) uses a digital device to repeatedly locate, listen to or watch a person without legitimate purpose,
(b) installs spyware, a webcam or any other device or software on another person’s property or digital device without the user’s agreement or without legitimate reason,
(c) takes multiple images of an individual unless it is in the public interest to do so without that individual’s permission and where the intent was not legitimate nor lawful,
(d) repeatedly orders goods or services for another person if the purpose of such actions is to cause distress, anxiety or to disrupt that person’s daily life,
(e) erases data remotely whilst a digital device is being examined by the police or any other lawful investigation,
(f) monitors a digital device registered to a person aged 17 or less if the purpose of that monitoring is to obtain information about a third person,
(g) monitors any other person’s digital device if the intent of the monitor is either to damage or steal data from that person, or
(h) creates a false persona on line without lawful reason if the purpose of such a creation is to intend to attempt to defraud, groom, impersonate or seriously damage the reputation of any other person.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1)(a) or (b) is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or a fine.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1)(a) “repeatedly” shall be deemed as on two occasions or more.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1)(d) is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory limit.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1)(e), (f), (g) or (h) is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.
(6) The Secretary of State shall introduce restrictions on the sale of spyware to persons under the age of 16 and requests all persons who are purchasing such equipment to state their intended use of such equipment.”
New clause 18—Digital crime training and education—
“(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Home Department to ensure that each Police Service shall invest in training on the prioritisation, investigation and evidence gathering in respect of digital crime and abuse.
(2) It shall be the responsibility of the Home Department to ensure that all Police services record complaints and outcomes of complaints of digital crime and abuse.
(3) It shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to publish annual statistics on complaints and outcomes of digital crime and abuse.”
Liz Saville Roberts
Diolch yn fawr. Forgive me if my understanding of procedure is incorrect; I am learning as I go along. I speak about these three new clauses and then I take a response, if I understand correctly.
Liz Saville Roberts
Thank you very much. I am just covering myself in case something goes terribly wrong.
New clause 16 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to undertake a review of all relevant legislation that contains powers to prosecute people involved in digital crime, and to consolidate those powers in a consolidation Bill. This is because prosecution can currently be initiated using a confusing array of criminal legislation. There are 30 Acts listed here; there are actually more than that but these are the most relevant. Some date back to the 19th century. Existing provision is therefore evidently fragmentary and inadequate, and that is a hindrance to effective prosecution. It allows abuse—which, interestingly, we are talking about, from all directions, more and more—to continue unchecked, up to a point.
A very high threshold is set for the prosecution of hate crime over the internet, and this is understandable, but the way this threshold is interpreted varies between police forces across the country. Indeed, this is true of many aspects of digital crime. People’s experiences when they approach the police can vary widely under these interpretations, and the fact that so many pieces of legislation have to be referred to does not bring any additional clarity when clarity is what we need, first and foremost. So consolidation is the theme of new clause 16.
New clause 17 relates to offences associated with surveillance and monitoring. It would make it an offence, for example, to post messages or images that are discriminatory, threatening or would cause distress or anxiety. It would make it illegal to install spyware or webcams without good reason. It would also place further responsibilities on social media platforms to block offensive postings or postings inciting violence, for example. Current legislation is insufficient to deal with actions whereby people are now using digital means to harass or carry out crime.
New clause 18 is concerned with digital crime training and education. Given that the College of Policing estimates that half of all crimes reported to front-line officers now has a cyber element, there is a real need to consider how we prepare police personnel at all levels to deal with this problem. It is estimated that there are 7 million online frauds a year and 3 million other online crimes. The Chief Constable of Essex, Stephen Kavanagh, has warned that the police risk being swamped with digital crime cases. None the less—this is where training is important—I have been informed that only 7,500 police officers out of a total of 100,000 across Wales and England have been trained to investigate digital crime. This is a particularly significant area because it is extremely new to senior police officers in particular; it has not been part of their training in the past. There is also an issue for the police in that those who are particularly efficient at dealing with digital crime are often offered posts outside the police service.
To summarise this simplistically, it appears that the police, historically, were trained to deal with 20th century crimes, while we are now seeing crime shifting online. From those answering phones in call centres to those dealing with front-line issues, they all need training to respond appropriately to what threatens to become overwhelming. How do we identify what is crime that needs to be addressed and what is unfortunate social behaviour, which we would not condone but we would not necessarily associate with the police? There have been instances in the past of misinterpretation of the most adequate approach. I do not intend to push these new clauses to a Division, but I await the Minister’s response with interest.
Jack Dromey
The hon. Lady made a compelling case. I have three points. First, there is the nature of the growing threat and, I hate to say it, the terrible things that people do in the privacy of their homes, including, for example, hate crime and abuse on social media, which are absolutely unacceptable.
Secondly, the hon. Lady is right when she says that there is a real problem of capacity in the police force. Stephen Kavanagh is an impressive chief constable. Some of us struggle with digital literacy, but the figure to which he referred of fewer than one in 10 people being digitally literate is chilling given the scale and rapid rise of digital crime and cybercrime.
Thirdly and finally, the hon. Lady makes a good point about strategy in the police service. For example, with the national fraud strategy, the police have been moving down the path of a national product but local delivery. Local delivery means the work that the police do in terms of prevention and their being more digitally literate in future. Indeed, Gavin Thomas, the new chairman of the Police Superintendents Association, recently said that many more younger police officers who understand the technology need to be recruited. The hon. Lady has put her finger on a very important set of issues relating to a rapidly growing area of crime, the sheer scale of which the police are struggling to cope with.
Karen Bradley
I am very grateful to the hon. Lady, whose constituency I am going to try to pronounce correctly. I last dealt with this pronunciation when we considered the Serious Crime Bill last year. I have the luxury of the Solicitor General, who is a very adept Welsh speaker, to prompt me on how to pronounce this: Dwyfor Meirionnydd.
Karen Bradley
Not bad. I will not try again, but at least I have got that far. I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling the new clauses, because they give the Committee the opportunity to debate these important issues. I hope to reassure her that the Government are absolutely committed to tackling them.
Digital crime and cybercrime are threats that we take very seriously. The Government continue to invest in law enforcement capabilities nationally, regionally and locally to ensure that law enforcement agencies have the capacity to deal with the increasing volume and sophistication of online crime. Through the national cyber-security programme, we invested more than £90 million in the previous Parliament to bolster the law enforcement response, and we will continue to invest. As the Chancellor announced in November, the Government have committed to spending £1.9 billion on cyber-security over the next five years, including for tackling cybercrime.
Additionally, we have invested in the national cybercrime unit in the National Crime Agency and created cyber teams in each of the regional organised crime units. Those teams provide access to specialist capabilities at a regional level. I think that we can all accept that it is expensive to have such technical support available to every force at a local level, and that is why the regional organised crime units, with their fantastic cyber units that are accessible to all forces, are incredibly impressive.
I remember visiting the south-east regional organised crime unit during the last Parliament, when organised crime was part of my portfolio, and meeting the young lady who had sat in that unit and cracked the case—I do not know if hon. Members remember it—of the Xboxes that no one could access at Christmas because of the activity of some hackers. A young lady working in one of our regional organised crime units here in the UK solved that crime and found the individuals responsible. We should be proud of the work that those forces do and the fact that we have such incredibly talented individuals working in the ROCUs.
James Berry
Does my hon. Friend agree that a lot of this online crime—online fraud—is not local crime but happens in boiler rooms that sell, or mis-sell, things across the whole of the UK, and that there needs to be a collective national approach to it? A lot of this work is done by Action Fraud, which is based in the City of London police, so that the people committing these crimes that affect people across the UK are investigated in a single place here in London.
Karen Bradley
My hon. Friend gets this absolutely right. As a central repository of intelligence and information, Action Fraud can work out which force is best placed to investigate. It may well be that that is the National Crime Agency or an international force. I will give an example. One of my constituents could go to the marketplace in Leek in Staffordshire Moorlands and have a fraud committed on them there. It would be very clear that that had happened in Staffordshire Moorlands and that Staffordshire police should investigate. But if that happens online, the criminal could be based in eastern Europe, or the far east, or anywhere in the UK. Action Fraud can put that information into a central repository and get the links; that means that we have an excellent facility for finding the right force to investigate and for finding the criminal.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham)
I do not disagree with what the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton was saying. These things are best looked at nationally—some of the conspiracies are clearly international as well—but does the Minister also agree that one of the problems with Action Fraud is that many people who have contacted it feel let down because of a lack of feedback about what happens in their individual case, or how their individual case may well be helping a bigger fraud?
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. I had ministerial responsibility for Action Fraud, then my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister covered it and it now sits within the portfolio of the Minister for Security. We have all identified that problem and the City of London police are taking action to address that. They understand that feedback.
There has been a problem that local forces feel that they can pass the information to Action Fraud and it will deal with everything. There is a still an obligation on the local force to feed back to the individual. The crime has still been committed on that individual in the local force area, and it is incredibly important, and incumbent on the local force— working with Action Fraud—to make sure that feedback is given. I echo the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
It is important to make the point that crime is crime—whether it happens online or offline, it is crime. Somebody stealing money from someone is theft. It may be fraud. It may be that it could be prosecuted under some other offence, but it does not matter what the offence is—it is still crime. We need to make sure that the police have the capabilities to understand where the evidence is. It is not like somebody breaking into your home leaving fingerprints, but they will be leaving fingerprints online. There will be digital fingerprints all the way back. We need to make sure that the forces have the capability to see that and that local forces also know the opportunities that this affords.
One of my favourite examples of the great opportunity of online is that if somebody breaks into a house and they are carrying a smartphone, it will try to find the wi-fi. There will be a digital fingerprint from that smartphone. That is an opportunity for local forces to be able to crack more crimes.
We need to ensure that training is happening. Working across the Home Office with local forces, the National Crime Agency and ROCUs, I know that there is an incredible amount of work going on to ensure that local forces and police officers—bobbies on the beat—understand the problem that they are dealing with and how to tackle it. But it is crime. It does not matter whether it is online or offline: it is crime.
Turning to the new clauses, I will deal first with new clause 16, which calls for a digital crime review. As the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd explained, the aim of such a review is to consolidate into a single statute criminal offences and other powers relevant to tackling digital crime and the misuse of digital devices and services. She made a very persuasive argument, but I am far from persuaded that such a lengthy and costly exercise would deliver the benefits she seeks. I do not accept her premise that the criminal law is defective in this area. As a general principle, any action that is illegal offline is also illegal online.
Legislation passed before—in some cases, well before—the digital age has shown itself sufficiently robust and flexible to be used today to punish online offending. Consequently, most of the long list of statutes and offences in new clause 16 relate to offending that may be carried out by both digital and non-digital means. I think the terminology is that this is cyber-enabled crime: it is the same crime that has always happened—it is just that the digital platform of the internet enables criminals from thousands of miles away to have access to victims here in the UK and across the world that they would never have had access to without the internet.
Crime is crime. It does not matter whether it is 20th-century or 21st-century crime—it is crime, and it needs to be tackled. The offences that have long been tested in the courts and in the legal system are the right ones to use, whether they have been committed online or offline.
The new clause suggests that the Government should review, with a view to producing a single statute, all legislation
“which contains powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime”.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate all those powers from those used to prosecute non-digital crime. The new statute would not consolidate the powers, as the new clause suggests. Rather, it would inevitably reproduce and duplicate many existing offences, which would also need to be retained in existing legislation for non-digital offending.
That is not to say that, where we identify specific gaps in the law or new behaviours that ought to be criminalised, we will not take action to plug those gaps. Indeed, the Bill will criminalise the live streaming of offences relating to the sexual exploitation of children. Years ago, none of us would even have thought it possible, but there is live streaming and we need to make sure that we deal with it.
Likewise, in the last Parliament we created a new criminal offence of disclosing private sexual photographs and films
“without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and with the intention of causing that individual distress.”
That is what we would perhaps call revenge porn. I think we can all see that that crime may have been committed before, but a partner sharing a photograph with a few friends in the pub, although equally offensive, is not as destructive as that photograph appearing online and being available across the world for millions of people to see. It is very important that where there is criminality and we see gaps like that, we act. We are determined to do so, and will continue to do so. I mentioned that the hon. Lady’s predecessor was a member of the Public Bill Committee that considered the Serious Crime Act 2015. In that Act, we further strengthened the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
New clause 17 seeks to create a raft of new offences relating to digital surveillance and monitoring. I presume that the intention is to address issues such as harassment and stalking offences, which can now occur through digital means. I want to be absolutely clear: abusive and threatening behaviour, in whatever form and whoever the target, is totally unacceptable. That includes harassment committed in person or using phones or the internet. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 introduced specific provisions to deal with incidents of harassment, including the offences of harassment and putting people in fear of violence—offences that may be committed by online or offline behaviour, or a mixture. The 1997 Act also enables victims to apply for an injunction to restrain an individual from conduct that amounts to harassment, and it gives courts the power to make restraining orders. Those powers are regularly used to successfully prosecute offences committed by digital means.
I want to add one other point. I do not think that the issue we are discussing is whether the offence exists or whether it is sufficient; it is about understanding the offences and ensuring that the public and law enforcement know the offences and use them appropriately. I have experience of this in my own constituency: a business run by one of my constituents was subjected to an online trolling attack. I made the point that if my constituent had walked down the street and paint had been thrown at her, we would all have understood that offence. This was, effectively, digital paint being thrown at her from hundreds of miles away to destroy her business. That does not change the fact that she was being harassed. The issue is not that the offences are in some way lacking; it is about ensuring that they are known and understood, and that appropriate evidence is gathered.
Mims Davies (Eastleigh) (Con)
Does the Minister agree that online and offline behaviour is partly an educational issue? If my 12-year-old was at the shops for four or five hours, doing what they wanted, unmonitored and unchecked, I would certainly ask who they were talking to, what they were doing and what was going on. There are parents who allow this behaviour, probably not seeing the dangers out there in respect of who children are talking to and what they are getting up to for a significant amount of time.
Karen Bradley
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is so important. I co-chair, along with the Minister for Children and Families and Baroness Shields, the UK Council for Child Internet Safety—UKCCIS. It is a very important forum, bringing together internet service providers, education providers and people who have the ability to influence young people and parents. Parents must understand that they need to turn their filters on; it may be a pain to have to occasionally put in a password when looking at a website, but those filters will protect their children.
We are also consulting on age verification for pornography. When I was growing up, it was not possible to access the kind of images that children can download on their smartphones and look at in playgrounds up and down the country. It simply was not available. Again, we have to be clear: if a child cannot purchase that material offline in a corner shop, newsagent or specialist retailer, they should not be able to access it online. We need to make sure that we have those safeguards in place.
We need to get rid of any suggestion that this is too difficult or too hard, and say to parents that they need to understand what the dangers are and to make sure that filters are in place so that their children are protected online. Schools have a role to play in that, too, as we all do. I would be happy to write to all Committee members on the work that we are doing, which they can share with their constituents and local headteachers. I will be delighted if we can get more information to headteachers and others about the work that is being done to protect children online.
New clause 18 deals with digital crime training and education, which is linked to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh made. I support the underlying objective, but I do not think that we need to legislate to require police forces to provide such training. Since the introduction of the College of Policing’s cybercrime training course in February 2014, more than 150,000 modules have been completed across all forces, and in September last year the College of Policing launched the second phase of its mainstream cybercrime training course for police forces. This is a modular course consisting of a series of self-taught and interactive modules that are accessible to all police officers and staff, which provides an introduction to how to recognise and investigate cybercrimes.
We need to get rid of the barriers and obstacles that make people think that they cannot investigate a crime because it happened online. They absolutely can; it is the same type of crime. It is money being stolen, it is harassment, it is stalking or it is grooming. These are all crimes. The fact that they happen online does not change the nature of the crime.
Additionally, more than 3,900 National Crime Agency officers have completed digital awareness training as part of equipping the next generation of highly-skilled digital detectives. The national policing lead for digital investigation and intelligence is co-ordinating a programme of activities to equip forces with the capabilities and technology to effectively police in a digital age and protect victims of digital crime. We need to repeat this point: it is not for the Home Office to mandate this training. Whitehall does not know best here. Delivering that training is something that the police are rightly leading on.
In conclusion, the Government recognise that tackling digital crime is one of the most important challenges that the police face today, and we continue to support and invest in the police to ensure that they have the resources and the capability to respond effectively. Having answered the points that the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made, I hope that I have persuaded her not to press her new clauses.
Liz Saville Roberts
As I stated earlier, this is a probing new clause. The very purpose of tabling it was to hear the response. I am very pleased to hear that the view on cybercrime is that “crime is crime”. The Minister very effectively described it as “digital paint” being thrown at her constituents.
I believe, in line with those who advise us, such as Stephen Kavanagh, that there is room to look at this matter in a slightly different way. Training is a significant consideration. It has been brought to my attention that, although there are some powerful, centralised initiatives, the front-line work of all police personnel is significant, because there have been cases like the one that I mentioned, in which somebody in a call centre, taking the first contact call, did not interpret the harassment as something that should be taken as a crime. We should be very alert to the means by which we can strengthen the response.
James Berry
Does the hon. Lady agree that this is not just an issue for the Government to tackle, but an issue for internet companies? Whereas online banking fraud has been quite effectively tackled by the banks, companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook need to do much more. They are some of the richest companies in the world, with some of the best technical brains in the world and if this was an advertising opportunity by which they could make money, they would be up it like a rat up a drainpipe. This is about protecting users and the public, and they need to do a lot more. It is not just an area for Governments; it is an area for the people who are making money out of these services.
Liz Saville Roberts
I had sat down, but I will stand up again. I agree entirely. What is very interesting is how we define, as a society, the behaviour that parents should be addressing in their children and how children should be taught to behave online. What behaviour is socially unacceptable, what is the behaviour in which the police should be involved, and what behaviour really is a threat to safety?
Karen Bradley
Before the hon. Lady sits down, I would like to give a quick response to the point about internet companies. I want to put it on the record that many internet companies are working very hard with the Government to deal with this issue. There is always more that can be done, but Google, for example, works with the Government and the Internet Watch Foundation to make sure that we close down inappropriate or illegal content as soon as it is identified—if not before it is identified, in fact. I pay tribute to them for the work they have done with the Government on that.
Liz Saville Roberts
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 19
Modern technology: specialist digital unit (child abuse)
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must ensure that within their force there is a unit that specialises in analysing and investigating allegations of online offences against children and young people.
(2) The chief officer must ensure that such a unit has access to sufficient digital forensic science resource to enable it to perform this function effectively and efficiently.”—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 20—Child sexual abuse: specialist unit—
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must ensure that within their force there is a unit responsible for working with local agencies to coordinate early identification of children at risk of child sexual abuse, including child sexual exploitation, and early identification of children and adults at risk of sexual offending.”
Liz Saville Roberts
Diolch yn fawr iawn. Everyone will know how to say “thank you” in Welsh by the end of the afternoon.
New clauses 19 and 20 relate to offences against children. New clause 19 relates to online offences against children and calls for modern technology specialist digital units for child abuse. Again, these are probing amendments and are pertinent to what we have just been discussing. New clause 19 would ensure that every local police force has a specialist digital child abuse unit with the latest equipment and expertise to analyse, investigate and take action in relation to online offences against children, including children being groomed and forced to commit sexual acts online, and the making and sharing of sexual images and videos involving children.
We have talked about the explosion of online crime, so I will not go through it again, but I echo the concerns that the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Children’s Society and Barnardo’s raised during oral evidence to the Committee about the lack of capacity and expertise within local police forces to tackle these crimes. Beyond the cases that reach the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre threshold, local forces are left with a huge volume of other cases where children are at risk, which they do not have the expertise or capacity to deal with adequately.
Emerging findings from research by the NSPCC show that the scale of this type of offending is far greater than previously thought. The sheer volume of offenders, devices and images relating to online offences against children has left the police swamped and unable to protect children to the best of their ability. In one sense, the increase in recording and reporting is to be welcomed, as these crimes are now being recorded. None the less, they are increasing, which is an issue that we should be addressing.
Recent reports by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary on the responses of individual police forces to child protection cases have revealed significant delays—in some cases of up to 12 months—in the forensic analysis of the devices of suspected offenders. We are talking about children here. Some of those delays can pose serious risks to the safeguarding of children, leaving offenders free to continue abusing or exploiting other victims, not to mention the impact on the child victim. While the expertise and capacity of high-tech and cybercrime units are crucial, it is child protection and offender management knowledge and skills that are vital to ensuring that children are best protected.
The Prime Minster gave child sexual abuse the status of a “national threat” in the strategic policing requirement, but what assessment has been made of the increased policing capacity and expertise needed to deal with this issue, given the rise of online offences, and what reassurances can the Minister give that those will be made available? What steps are Ministers taking to ensure that police forces are trained and have the necessary technical capacity to investigate such offences using the newest technology available?
New clause 20 is concerned with preventing child sexual exploitation and with the establishment of specialist units for child sexual abuse. It would help to ensure that all police forces had the resource and support that they needed to work with other local agencies to prevent child abuse, including child sexual exploitation. This subject is particularly pertinent to me because I work with North Wales police. Of course, the Macur review, which discusses this area, was published recently. That review was based on the Waterhouse inquiry, one of the recommendations of which was that there should be a children’s commissioner for Wales. How forces operate in respect of these issues is very significant. I am glad to say that my force, North Wales police, has a child sexual exploitation unit.
In the current economic climate, the police and others face a significant challenge in focusing on prevention. By the time incidents of grooming or sexual abuse come to the attention of the police, it is too late. The Government need to send a clear message that the early identification of children at risk, and of adults and children at risk of offending, is vital. Improving identification of children at risk means confronting difficult issues. Around a third of sexual offences are committed by children under the age of 18. That is often called peer-on-peer abuse. Barnardo’s is currently running a cross-party inquiry into how we can improve our responses to such young people, many of whom have themselves been the victims of abuse or trauma. Police and local agencies must have the resources that they need to work together, and in partnership with charities and others, to prevent horrific crimes such as child sexual exploitation. Will the Minister commit to ensuring that that will happen?
Lyn Brown
I support new clauses 19 and 20. New clause 19 would ensure that there was a unit specialising in analysing and investigating allegations of online offences against children within each police force, and new clause 20 would ensure that there was a unit responsible for working with local agencies to co-ordinate early identification of children at risk of sexual abuse. This is important preventive work.
A report by the Children’s Commissioner in November last year showed that only one in eight children who are sexually abused are identified by professionals. I really do not think that that is good enough. Early identification is incredibly important. The National Police Chiefs Council lead for child protection and abuse investigation, Chief Constable Simon Bailey, has said that
“by the time a child reports sexual abuse the damage has been done and we must do more to stop the abuse occurring in the first place.”
I could not agree more.
We need to do better on early identification, and the specialist units provided for in new clause 20 would help towards that end. The provision for a specialist unit within each police force would mean that both the police and the Crown Prosecution Service had a specialist or specialists working exclusively on child sexual exploitation, just as now happens with domestic violence. Many police forces already have specialist units dealing with child sexual exploitation and that is to be welcomed, but it would be good to see this replicated across the country if possible. Making the provision of specialist units statutory will help to give vulnerable children in all areas of the country a much greater chance of having their abuse recognised before it is too late.
The last decade has seen a huge increase in the number of children with access to the internet, particularly using smartphones and tablets. Current data shows that 65% of 12 to 15-year-olds, and 20% of eight to 11-year-olds own their own smartphone. In 2004, Barnardo’s identified 83 children as victims of some kind of online abuse, but today that number is in the thousands. Clearly, the way in which perpetrators of child sexual abuse contact and groom vulnerable children is changing, and those of us who wish to prevent these awful life-damaging crimes must change the way that we work too.
Barnardo’s 2015 report states that
“young people at risk of harm online may not have any previous vulnerabilities that are often associated with being victims of sexual abuse and exploitation”.
As a result, these victims are less likely to be known to the authorities and the police may only identify cases of exploitation when it is really rather too late. Encouragingly, in July 2014, initial outcomes of Operation Notarise showed that 660 people suspected of sharing illegal images of children had been arrested and around 500 children had been safeguarded. I welcome the good work that the police and charities like Barnardo’s are doing to combat online child sexual exploitation, but this is not the time to be complacent. I am very interested in hearing the Minister’s response to the suggestions in these new clauses.
Karen Bradley
I fully understand why the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd has tabled these new clauses. I believe that they have been prompted at least in part by concerns about significant digital forensics backlogs in some forces, which were highlighted by the recent Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary national child protection investigations. I thank HMIC for the work that it did. It is very important that we all understand what is happening on the ground and that there is an honest appraisal of the work that local police forces are doing, so that police and crime commissioners and others can take the necessary steps to ensure that those issues are addressed.
It almost does not need saying, but I will say it anyway: we can all agree that child sexual exploitation, whether on or offline, is an abhorrent crime and that the police and other relevant agencies must up their game to effectively respond to such crimes and safeguard vulnerable children. The shadow Minister and others have made reference to last year’s report by the Children’s Commissioner. It is worth setting out the context in which we are operating.
The Children’s Commissioner estimated that there are about 225,000 cases of child abuse a year. Of course, the vast majority of that was intra-familial abuse and, as the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd mentioned, peer-on-peer abuse—children-to-children, or young people to children abuse. Child sexual exploitation online is part of the problem, but intra-familial abuse is an enormous part of it. The national policing lead, Simon Bailey, is very clear on the work that needs to be done in schools, with social services and others, working in multi-agency safeguarding hubs, to ensure that children are protected and that we have places for people to go. For example, the Government launched the child sexual abuse whistleblowing helpline, which was one of the recommendations in the Louise Casey and Alexis Jay report on Rotherham. The report said that there needed to be a safe place for professionals to report concerns that child sexual abuse that had been reported had not been dealt with. The NSPCC runs that helpline for the Home Office, and will help to make sure that children can be protected.
Lyn Brown
May I probe the Minister a little on the idea that we do not need specialist units? We now have specialist units within our police forces for domestic violence, which are provided for across the country. They seem to me to have had a massive impact on the safety of women in our communities; they have raised the issue locally and have meant that we are tackling domestic violence so much better than we were. Since those units have had such an impact on domestic violence, may I ask her gently to go away and think about them a bit more, rather than rejecting them out of hand, because they may be the answer to child exploitation and child abuse within our localities.
Karen Bradley
I understand exactly the hon. Lady’s point, but I think we need to differentiate between online and offline exploitation of children. Policing online exploitation is a detailed, technical job that requires great skill and depth. CEOP, which is part of the National Crime Agency, leads on that nationally, with the child abuse image database that is rolled out to all forces, and with their expertise. The Prime Minister committed £10 million to CEOP at the first WePROTECT summit at Downing Street in December 2014; my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice was there. We have the specialist capability sitting within CEOP to give all local police forces access to data on online grooming and exploitation.
However, dealing with child sexual abuse in a wider context—not necessarily online—has to be part of every police officer’s work: working with the multi-agency safeguarding hub, with social services, with health professionals and others to ensure that we identify the victim. It is not as easy as finding a victim online—although that is not easy either—because these are very hidden crimes. We need to ensure that they are the business of every police officer, that all officers are aware of what is involved, and that we work within the multi-agency safeguarding hub.
Frankly, it is far too often the police who end up leading on this matter. When a crime is committed, the police absolutely have a role to play. But if there is an allegation of abuse within a family context, two big burly coppers turning up at the front door may not be as successful as a social worker or a health professional. We need to get the right professionals and it needs to be an operational local matter; it is not something that we should be mandating nationally. With that in mind, I hope I have persuaded the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd to withdraw her new clause.
Liz Saville Roberts
I reiterate the point that the hon. Member for West Ham made: there is a risk, when making something everybody’s responsibility—particularly children and safeguarding—that it becomes nobody’s responsibility. It was felt that the particular focus required for the police to deal with domestic abuse would not have come about without units present in every police force; that prompts similar questions for child sexual exploitation, which is very much in the same area.
I do not intend to press the matter to a Division, but I hope we will be able to discuss it further. We are all aware of incidents such as those in Rotherham—we can all list them—and the ongoing cases within Operation Pallial; we know that we have not solved the problem, in any shape or form.
Karen Bradley
May I make an analogy with mental health, which we were debating earlier? I think the difficulty there was that the police stepped into a void that no other agency was stepping into. We have the opportunity here to have multi-agency and cross-agency working, to really help children. My fear is that, if we mandate the police to be the agency that deals with the problem, it will all be police-driven. I am not sure that that is in the best interest of the victims or that it is the best way to tackle this issue. I think that there has to be a multi-agency response, which is what we are working towards through the work that all multi-agency safeguarding hubs and others are doing.
Liz Saville Roberts
I thank the Minister for her comments, which I appreciate, but none the less it strikes me that in my own area North Wales police, evidently as a result of the Waterhouse inquiry and Operation Pallial, which is, of course, ongoing, felt it needed a child sexual exploitation unit. We know that child sexual abuse is not restricted to certain areas of the country. Yes, many cases—the majority of cases, possibly—are intra-familial and we have talked about peer-on-peer, but if it was felt to be significant and necessary in north Wales, and wherever the other units are, I feel strongly that it is necessary throughout all police forces. I ask the Minister to consider this again on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 21
“Offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17
‘(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if, knowingly and without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, he—
(a) takes a child to whom this section applies away from the responsible person; or
(b) keeps such a child away from the responsible person; or
(c) induces, assists or incites such a child to run away or stay away from the responsible person or from a child’s place of residence;
(2) This section applies in relation to a child who is—
(a) a child in need as defined in Section 17 of the Children Act 1989;
(b) a child looked after under Section 20 of the Children Act 1989;
(c) a child housed alone under part 7 of the Housing Act 1996;
(d) a child who is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm subject to Section 47 1(b) of the Children Act 1989.
(3) In this section “The responsible person” is—
(a) a person with a parental responsibility as defined in the Children Act 1989; or
(b) a person who for the time being has care of a vulnerable child aged 16 and 17 by virtue of the care order, the emergency protection order, or section 46, as the case may be; or
(c) any other person as defined in regulations for the purposes of this section.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both such imprisonment and fine; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.
(5) No prosecution for an offence above shall be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”—(Liz Saville Roberts.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Liz Saville Roberts
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Diolch yn fawr iawn eto byth. You may be glad to hear that this is the last time you will be hearing my voice on another aspect of children’s safeguarding in relation to abduction. Again, I shall not be pushing new clause 21 to a Division. This probing measure concerning child abduction warning notices, or CAWNs, would ensure that police can protect vulnerable 16 and 17 year- olds by the same method they use to protect younger children.
Child abduction warning notices are used by the police to disrupt inappropriate relationships between children and people who seek to groom them. We mentioned earlier that children are maturing sexually earlier, but not emotionally. There are, of course, people who are very vulnerable although they have reached the age of 16 or 17. These notices are civil orders stemming from the Child Abduction Act 1984. In addition to their use with under-16s, they can currently be used to protect very limited groups of vulnerable 16 and 17 year- olds—those children who have been formally taken into care under section 31 of the Children Act 1989, those subject to an emergency protection order and those in police protection. This, as you can imagine, accounts for a very small number of vulnerable 16 and 17 year-olds. Latest statistics for England show that just 190 16 and 17 year-olds were taken into care under section 31 last year. This left a further 4,320 young people of that age who became looked-after in the same year who would not have the same protections if they were at risk of sexual exploitation.
This is particularly concerning when reported sexual offences are on the rise. In Wales alone there was an increase from 1,545 incidents in 2013-14 to 1,903 in 2014-15. Anything we can do to prevent these offences, including using child abduction warning notices, is vital, as I am sure we would all agree. Professionals working with vulnerable young people and charities such as the Children’s Society and Barnardo’s have consistently argued that CAWNs should be available for police to use in the protection of all vulnerable 16 and 17-year olds. Will the Minister therefore consider closing this loophole in the law?
Lyn Brown
I do not want to repeat everything the hon. Lady has said, but I agree with much of it. Child abduction warning notices can only currently be issued with regard to children under the age of 16, or to 16 and 17 year-olds formally taken into social care under a section 31 notice. We believe that, when it comes to sexual exploitation, this is simply too narrow a definition of a child and that there are very vulnerable 16 and 17 year-olds who could be protected by a child abduction warning notice. The most recent annual statistics available show that only 190 children aged between 16 and 17 were taken into care by their local authorities under a section 31 notice and would thus be able to be protected by a child abduction warning notice. However, a further 4,320 young people of that age are looked after by their local authorities and, as the law currently stands, they are not able to receive that form of protection. The Children’s Society report, “Old enough to know better?”, calculated that the number of 16 and 17-year-olds who live outside the family and are vulnerable to sexual exploitation is actually as high as 7,200. Whatever the exact number, there is clearly a substantial gap between the number of vulnerable 16 and 17-year-old children and the number eligible to be protected by a child abduction warning notice.
Karen Bradley
As with other amendments that the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd has tabled, I understand and have great sympathy for the intention behind the new clause, but there are problems, as I hope she and the shadow Minister would acknowledge. Sixteen and 17-year-olds are adults. They are lawfully able to get married. They are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents and are otherwise able to make decisions affecting their way of life, not least in sexual matters. Extending the offence of abducting a child who is capable of exercising his or her own free will could therefore raise difficult issues. We therefore need to think very carefully about and debate this matter. I would be delighted to meet the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the shadow Minister to discuss it, and I have talked to the Children’s Society about it.
We have a very difficult balance to strike here. We discussed this issue—and will be discussing it shortly—in connection with the coercive control offence when we debated the Serious Crime Bill last year. The difficulties we have—of recognising and ensuring that we respect the rights of somebody who is legally able to leave home and legally able to engage in sexual intercourse, while recognising their need for protection and their vulnerabilities —are considerable, and there is a very fine line. The fact is that there are many 21 and 22-year-olds who are incredibly vulnerable people. It is about the nuance and where we draw the line on these matters.
Lyn Brown
I appreciate that the Minister is doing her best here and I appreciate having the opportunity to talk about this issue, but my colleague on the team—my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion)—who is not here today is probably the better person to talk to about it. However, I just say to the Minister that the children who have been in and out of care are so vulnerable. They are desperate for love, affection and to be able to put down roots. They are so vulnerable. We really should be able to find a way through the difficulties with the law with regard to 16 and 17-year-olds to provide protection for this small number of very vulnerable young people.
Karen Bradley
I understand the hon. Lady’s point. I am working closely with my colleagues in the Department for Education to ensure that children in care have special treatment. To be clear, children in care do get different treatment from those who are otherwise vulnerable.
I will give an example, which I raised with the Children’s Society when it gave evidence, of where that could create problems. In an honour-based violence situation, a young person may have chosen to leave home because they fear what might happen to them there. I have heard horrendous examples of 16 and 17-year-old girls who left home and were forced to go back to their parents because they were vulnerable and that was the best place for them. In some cases, that led to the most horrendous outcomes. We have to be very careful and mindful of the fact that we confer rights on 16 and 17-year-olds over and above the rights that are conferred on 14 and 15-year-olds.
I appreciate fully the hon. Lady’s point about ensuring that children in care have special protections and, as I say, I am working closely with the Department for Education to ensure that we deal with that. I hope that she will recognise that the Government have legislated to introduce new civil orders, sexual risk orders, and slavery and trafficking risk orders, which provide the police with powers to tackle predators of 16 and 17-year-olds. We need to use those orders and civil powers, not make a blanket decision at this stage without having thought very carefully about the consequences.
That is why I would appreciate having a discussion. I understand that the hon. Lady referred to the hon. Member for Rotherham. I would be happy to meet them both to discuss this issue further, but we need to be careful. Before making a blanket decision on a matter such as this, we need to think about all the risks and consequences for all young people, on whom, as I say, at 16 and 17 we confer rights of adulthood in many ways. We need to respect those rights. For that reason, although the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd said that she would not press the new clause to a Division, I would be happy to discuss this issue further.
Liz Saville Roberts
I thank the Minister for her full response and I appreciate that she is endeavouring to address this issue. I am particularly concerned that, as we are very much aware, vulnerable 16 and 17-year-olds can be targeted and are more open to abuse because they have reached an age at which some people perceive that it is legal to act so. The 1984 Act gives some precedent for us to look at those groups of people. If three categories of young people are already defined in that Act, are there other categories that we could look at pushing ahead with? However, I appreciate what the Minister said about being cautious about taking a blanket approach and I would very much like to take her up on her offer to meet her and the hon. Member for Rotherham. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 44
Controlling and coercive behaviour in non intimate or family relationships in relation to a child aged 16 and 17
‘(1) Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 76, insert—
“76a Controlling and coercive behaviour in non intimate or family relationships in relation to a child aged 16 and 17
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—
(a) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards a child (B) aged 16 or 17 that is controlling or coercive,
(b) at the time of the behaviour A and B are not in an intimate or family relationship which each other,
(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and
(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B.
(2) A’s behaviour has a ‘serious effect’ on B if—
(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or
(b) it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities, or
(c) it inhibits B’s ability to withhold consent to activities proposed by A through A supplying B with drugs or alcohol.
(3) In this section the ‘non intimate or family relationships’ are relationship other than those defined in Section 76.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”’—(Carolyn Harris.)
This new clause would make controlling and coercive behaviour towards a 16 or 17 year old a criminal offence.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd—I can say it—on the excellent way in which she presented her arguments on the measures tabled in both her name and mine. I support everything that she said.
New clause 44 would make controlling and coercive behaviour towards 16 and 17-year-olds a criminal offence. I cannot accept the argument that 16 and 17-year-olds are that capable of knowing their own minds; there seems to be a contradiction if they are capable of making decisions about their sexual behaviour but are not permitted to vote. That aside, this behaviour—child sexual exploitation—is happening every day in our constituencies and communities and in the homes of many young people. That behaviour takes many forms, and it is our job to ensure that the law is able to address them all.
Through the Serious Crime Act 2015, the Government introduced a new offence of coercive and controlling behaviour. That rightly seeks to prevent vulnerable individuals in intimate and family relationships from suffering abuse. It recognises that domestic abuse is wrong and illegal, and that individuals do not need to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence. The 2015 Act focuses on habitual arrangements, but there are parallels to be drawn in other contexts. In the case of child sexual exploitation, police often struggle to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence. Supplementary documents to the Government’s guidance, “Working Together to Safeguard Children”, acknowledged that
“Violence, coercion and intimidation are common, involvement in exploitative relationships being characterised in the main by the child or young person’s limited availability of choice resulting from their social/economic and/or emotional vulnerability.”
However, the current offence of child sexual exploitation is much more narrowly defined in legislation. It mentions power and coercion, but it must go further. In particular, we must recognise the role of drugs and alcohol in coercing a child into sexual activity in a private residence. Will the Minister commit to reviewing the offence in the 2015 Act, and will she consider what more can be done to ensure that those who are grooming children using drugs and alcohol receive appropriate sentences?
Lyn Brown
I speak in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East. As the Minister rightly said, children aged 16 and 17 are over the age of consent, but there is no doubt that they can still be victims of child sexual exploitation. Often without financial means and the life experience necessary for complete independence, children can be manipulated and pressured into complying with the wishes of those who have power over them. They may find themselves in a situation where they are frightened of saying no to someone, or stressed that if they say no they will lose the financial support and assistance that that person provides them with. However, under current legislation, it is very difficult for the police to prosecute in those situations, as they are required to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence. The new clause would make it easier to protect that vulnerable group of people from grooming and sexual exploitation.
The Serious Crime Act 2015 introduced a new offence of coercive and controlling behaviour in the home and I welcomed that move, as it rightly seeks to protect those individuals in intimate and family relationships who suffer the agony of domestic abuse. It recognises that domestic abuse is wrong and illegal, and for the first time it established that individuals do not need to prove specific instances of sexual or physical violence in order to demonstrate they have been the victim of the crime of domestic abuse. A partner who manipulates, bullies and emotionally torments is an abuser and the law finally recognises that.
The new clause would extend the provisions on manipulative and controlling behaviour to protect 16 and 17-year-olds in non-habitual arrangements with their abuser. It would make any behaviour that has a serious effect on a child, such as increasing their levels of stress or creating the fear of violence, controlling and coercive. It would, for example, have applied to the girls in Rotherham who were described by the Jay report as fearing the violent tendencies of their abusers, even if the men had not directly and physically attacked them. I would be grateful if the Minister would seriously consider the new clause.
Jake Berry
I want to speak briefly to the new clause to say that I hope the Minister will listen to the arguments being made. It is a hugely important issue. I pay tribute to the work that she has done on violent and coercive behaviour.
This is not an issue that I was particularly aware of, though I was aware that the Government had taken action. If anyone is a fan of “The Archers”, they will have heard, I am sure, the sensitive and good way that the issue is being covered in a relationship on that programme, which has made huge steps in raising awareness. I have been deeply shocked by this form of abuse, to the point of being unable to listen to a programme that I have listened to for the last 15 years.
I am extremely proud of the Minister and our own Government for all that we have done so far, but I hope that she will listen to Opposition voices and perhaps take this away to review. Protecting 16 and 17-year-olds, in the way that we have already done, is something that we should investigate, even if just for the future.
Karen Bradley
We had this debate when we introduced the coercive control offence in the Serious Crime Bill in 2015. It goes back to the points that we discussed during debate on previous clauses about the need to respect individuals’ right at 16 or 17 to leave home, marry legally and make decisions, and how best to respect that in law. I am a great believer in legislating where there is a true gap in the law—where new legislation is needed because at the moment prosecution cannot be brought.
On the offence of coercive control, my hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale and Darwen mentioned “The Archers”. He may well have spotted me on “Countryfile” on Sunday night, discussing exactly that point. It was very difficult; we knew that there was a problem. When I was talking about the issue at a meeting recently, I met a lady who grabbed me afterwards with tears in her eyes—a well-to-do lady, somebody whom one would perhaps not expect it to have happened to—and said, “That was me 30 years ago. All the police told me was that they had to hope he kicked my door in, because then they could get him for criminal damage.” There was no offence available that the police could use.
That is the point. Is there an offence available, and is it possible to get a prosecution? The answer goes back to the point that we were discussing earlier about digital offences. Where an offence exists, it is not a case of re-legislating or creating new offences; we should ensure that the offence is used. It will be understood by the courts and the legal system, and we need to ensure that the police understand it and use it appropriately. However, where there is no offence and protection cannot be offered, the Government want to take note and listen. I fear that on this issue, there are offences already in place. A suite of powers are available to the police and others. Therefore, although I am happy to discuss the point, I am not persuaded that at this stage, the amendment is the right approach.
The new coercive control offence, which we commenced on 29 December last year, was introduced to address a specific gap in the law and capture patterns of abuse in an intimate partner relationship. Patterns of abuse outside an intimate partner relationship, which the new clause seeks to address, are already captured by harassment, the test for which is partially replicated in the proposal, and stalking offences, which can apply to patterns of abuse directed against 16 and 17-year-olds.
One question that we faced when considering the coercive control offence was how to get evidence. Much of what the hon. Member for Swansea East and the shadow Minister discussed involves gathering evidence. We have seen from stalking offences that it is perfectly possible for the police to gather evidence of persistent or repetitive behaviour to ensure prosecutions, which is what we all want.
The hon. Member for Swansea East mentioned child sexual exploitation. I hope that she has seen that we have recently consulted on the definition of child sexual exploitation, making it clear that the term applies to children under 18 and thus includes 16 and 17-year-olds. As I said, stalking and harassment also apply to 16 and 17-year-olds. The new domestic abuse offence enacted in the Serious Crime Act 2015 means that 16 or 17-year-olds in intimate partner relationships who are coerced or controlled are covered by the new criminal law. Equally, if a 16 or 17-year-old is living with a parent or other family member who seeks to control them in a way that causes them to fear violence or feel alarmed or distressed, the domestic abuse offence offers protection. For the sake of completeness, I should say that if a young person does not live with the family member or parent concerned, existing harassment legislation will offer the same protection.
The hon. Lady discussed gangs and the approaches that they might take in terms of drug trafficking and so on. That is precisely the reason why the Government’s new ending gang violence and exploitation programme, which has replaced our ending gang and youth violence programme, is there.
The point that the hon. Lady makes about vulnerable young people being exploited by gangs, under what is known as the county line phenomenon, is something that we are determined to tackle, but it is possible to tackle it using existing legislation and offences; it does not require a new offence. For example, the Policing and Crime Act 2009 introduced a new civil tool that allows the police or a local authority to apply for an injunction against an individual to prevent gang-related violence and, from 1 June 2015, gang-related drug dealing, which we discussed during the passage of the Serious Crime Act last year.
A wide range of powers are available. I would be very happy to sit down and thrash out whether there really is a gap in the law, or whether it is merely that the existing powers are not being properly used; we need to be clear on that. I hope at this stage that the hon. Lady will withdraw her new clause.
Carolyn Harris
We believe that there is still a gap in the existing harassment legislation that is not covered, as was recently proven in Rotherham. I thank the hon. Lady for her comments and I am delighted that she has offered further conversation on this important matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 45
Prevention of child sexual exploitation and private hire vehicles
“(1) The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 is amended as follows—
(a) after section 47(1) insert—
“(1A) A district council must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(b) at end of section 48 (1) insert—
“(c) a district council must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(2) Section 7 of the London Cab Order 1934 is amended as follows—
(a) after Section 7(2) insert—
“(2A) Transport for London must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(3) Section 7 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 is amended as follows—
(a) after Section 7(2) insert—
“(3) The licensing authority must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.—(Carolyn Harris.)
This new clause would place local authorities under a duty to consider how they can prevent child sexual exploitation when they issue licences for taxis and private hire vehicles.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Carolyn Harris
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Licensing authorities have a duty to protect children from harm. Horrific cases that we have seen on television, in connection with Rotherham, have highlighted the need for this amendment, which could bring us a step closer to making our communities safer for our most vulnerable children. We already place duties on authorities that license premises to sell alcohol to carry out functions with a view to protecting children from harm. This amendment would create similar duties for licensing authorities in relation to taxis and minicabs. We know that taxis and private hire vehicles often feature in cases of child sexual exploitation. Indeed, in February of this year, Mohammed Akram was found guilty of sexual activity with a child under the age of 16, which took place in the back of his cab. He was sentenced to five years in prison.
This is not to say that all drivers are inherently likely to be involved in these crimes. The vast majority of drivers are law-abiding citizens but, along with other night-time economy workers, they have a role to play in helping to keep young people safe. Licensing authorities have a role to play in raising awareness so that drivers can spot the signs of harm and know how to intervene. There have been examples of good practice in Oxford, but we should have good practice across the United Kingdom. We need much more consistency.
Barnardo’s has been working with a range of night-time economy workers across the country to help improve awareness of children at risk. It is a part of the move towards prevention, which we need to see in this area. Will the Government consider introducing new duties on licensing authorities so that communities can be confident that all taxi and minicab drivers are able to spot the signs of abuse, and can help to keep children safe?
Lyn Brown
As my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East said, the new clause would place local authorities under a duty to consider child protection when they issue licences for drivers of taxis and private hire vehicles. We support it because we think it could lead to important safeguarding measures.
Taxi drivers do a fantastic job up and down the country. I could not happily live my life without them. More than 242,000 licensed vehicles in England provide transport for millions of people every day. Outside of rural areas, interestingly, there is a high satisfaction level—about 68%—with taxi and private hire services. The review of child exploitation in Oxford made it clear that taxi drivers can and do play a very positive role in tackling grooming and child exploitation. The report noted that taxi drivers had driven young girls to the police station when they were worried that the girls were being sexually exploited, and that they were well regarded across the city because of the role that they had played.
However, we have to recognise that in some of the grooming rings exposed in recent years taxi drivers have not played such a positive role. Taxi drivers have been reported as abusing their position of power when they collect young people. The independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham found:
“One of the common threads running through child sexual exploitation across England has been the prominent role of taxi drivers in being directly linked to children who were abused”.
This is, quite clearly, a problem that needs to be tackled. I believe that my hon. Friend’s amendment could pave the way for important safeguarding measures that, frankly, should already be in place. For example, a number of local authorities up and down the country have imposed “conditions of fitness” tests on taxi drivers. These can involve criminal record checks and even live reporting to licensing authorities if a taxi driver commits a criminal offence after they have been granted a licence. Realistically, I do not believe that a licensing authority could carry out its duty to promote the prevention of harm to children, which is what the new clause provides for, without conducting checks on all drivers.
The Department for Transport provides guidelines on how local authorities should assess the criminal records of those who wish to have a licence to drive a private hire vehicle. The guidelines state that authorities
“should take a particularly cautious view of any offences involving violence, and especially sexual attack.”
Those are proportionate and appropriate words. However, because local authorities have discretion to interpret what is meant by a “fit and proper” person to drive a private hire vehicle, not all private hire vehicle drivers outside London are even subject to a criminal record check. We should consider reversing that; I believe that this proposed statutory duty to protect would have precisely that effect.
Other good practice can be considered. In Oxford, taxi drivers have been trained how to respond if they believe that their customers are victims of sexual exploitation. The independent review suggests there is evidence that that training is working. With a statutory duty in place to promote the prevention of child sexual exploitation, we could see such practices replicated across the country. Will the Minister say what measures the Government have put in place to ensure that best practice, like that in Oxford, can be shared across the country?
Karen Bradley
I hope that I am going to cheer everybody up—spoiler alert! I am not going to repeat the arguments made by the hon. Member for Swansea East and the shadow Minister, who have summed up the problem exactly. We have been working closely with the Local Government Association and others to ensure that best practices are spread. I recently enjoyed a taxi ride from Stoke-on-Trent station to my constituency home, in which the taxi driver, without knowing who I was, told me all about the safeguarding training he had been through that day. It was very good to hear him share that knowledge with someone he thought was a complete stranger to it.
We still need to go further. I have been working with the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Andrew Jones) on the further reforms that are urgently needed on taxi and private hire vehicle licensing arrangements.
Although I absolutely agree with the spirit of the new clause, I suspect—the hon. Member for Swansea East may be shocked to hear this—that more will be required, with respect both to strengthening the Bill’s provisions and to making additional amendments to relevant legislation. I assure her that I am committed to delivering this change; we want to ensure, working with colleagues at the Department of Transport, that those exercising licensing functions have access to the powers and are subject to the appropriate duties that best ensure that our licensing arrangements provide the strongest possible protections. Once we have determined the best way forward, we will carefully consider what legislative vehicle is most appropriate to make any necessary changes. I cannot promise that that will be in this Bill, but it may be. With that assurance, I hope that the hon. Lady will be content to withdraw her new clause.
Carolyn Harris
I am happy to withdraw it. In the words of my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, “You’ve made my day”. Thank you very much.
Carolyn Harris
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 46
Child sexual exploitation: assessment of needs for therapeutic support
‘(1) Where police or a local authority have received a disclosure that a child who has been sexually exploited or subject to other forms of child abuse, police or the local authority must make a referral to a named mental health service.
(2) The named mental health service must make necessary arrangements for the child’s treatment or care.
(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations—
(a) define “named mental health service” for the purpose of this section;
(b) specify a minimum level of “necessary arrangements” for the purpose of the section.”
This new clause enables the Future in Mind report’s recommendation that those young people who have been sexually abused or exploited should receive a comprehensive initial assessment, and referral to appropriate services providing evidence-based interventions according to their need.—(Mr Kevan Jones.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 47— Child sexual exploitation: duty to share information—
“The local policing body that maintains a police force shall have a duty to disclose information about children who are victims of sexual exploitation or other forms of abuse to relevant child mental health service commissioners in England and Wales.”
See the explanatory statement for NC46.
Mr Jones
The new clauses are probing. This afternoon we have talked about some of the issues surrounding child exploitation. This is about the support that should be given to the victims of child exploitation. The NSPCC and the Children’s Society have been campaigning very hard to ensure that victims of sexual and physical abuse have access, as a matter of course, to therapeutic services. It is true that these things are costly—we talked about that this morning—but in my experience of talking to organisations that deal with such cases, proper, early intervention, especially with young victims, can save money in the long term, by preventing greater trauma many years later.
New clause 46 says that where police or others receive a disclosure that a child has been sexually exploited or subjected to other forms of child abuse, they should refer them to mental health services. It comes back to the question we asked this morning about whether reference to mental health services is a police function. Yes, it is, in terms of investigating the crime that was committed, but how do we then put the holistic bubble around the victim and support them? We need to ensure that the perpetrator of the abuse is taken to court and dealt with, while making sure that the individual gets the emotional and mental health support that they need. Is that naturally a police issue? Directly, no, it is not, but as the Minister said this morning, it is about how we create a link-up between the police service, the health service and other support services.
I accept that some of the services will be provided not by statutory services but by the voluntary sector. A great organisation in my constituency called the Just for Women Centre works with women who have been victims of domestic violence or abuse. It was very interesting listening to the debate this afternoon about victims coming forward. The spike in Durham has come out of the Savile revelations, but it is not about well-known individuals; the issue in that local group is the number of people who have come forward to report family members who abused them over many years.
There has been huge concentration, nationally, on the more high-profile figures, but in local areas a lot of victims who have never come forward before have now done so and are in need of a huge amount of emotional support. This provision refers to children, but without the support given to many of the women at the Just for Women Centre in Stanley in my constituency, early abuse would have led to other problems. Talking to those individuals, we hear that their problems throughout life stem from the fact that they were abused as youngsters. I commend Durham police for their proactive approach to investigating such cases and ensuring that victims get the proper emotional support.
New clause 47 is about information sharing. It says that local policing bodies shall maintain a duty to disclose information about a child who has been a victim of sexual exploitation to the relevant mental health services. I can hear minds crunching among the civil servants in the room, saying that there are obviously problems about sharing information and so on. I accept that, but if we are to ensure that those young people do not fall through the cracks between our statutory services, some method of getting that information to the services that count needs to be put in place.
I accept that ultimately, victims cannot be forced to accept help, but it must be on offer for them. Many of the women whom I have met who have been supported by the Just for Women Centre in my constituency had years of anguish and torment, the root cause of which was not getting help and assistance when they were young. If we can put in place a system that prevents that for future generations, that early intervention could prevent a lifetime of mental health issues, relationship problems and other things. As I said, these are probing amendments to explore how we can put in place practical support for victims of sexual and physical child abuse.
Lyn Brown
New clauses 46 and 47 act on a recommendation made in a joint report by NHS England and the Department of Health in 2013 called “Future in mind”, which argued that we need to ensure that those who have been sexually abused and/or exploited receive a comprehensive assessment and referral to the services that they need, including specialist mental health services.
In 2014, the NSPCC produced a summary of the academic literature on the relationship between childhood sexual abuse and victims’ later mental health. In each instance, the NSPCC offered a conservative estimate of the known impact of one on the other. Despite that effort not to sensationalise, the numbers are truly shocking. Children who are victims of sexual abuse are twice as likely to suffer from depression as those who are not victims. They are three times as likely to attempt suicide, to self-harm or to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder at some point in their lifetime and twice as likely to become dependent on alcohol, meaning that their physical health as well as their mental health is endangered.
All the evidence shows that the trauma and emotional confusion that follows childhood sexual abuse leaves victims more likely to suffer from poor mental health. We should, as a matter of course, do all we can to prevent that from happening, or at least to ensure that those mental health issues are made easier for victims to manage. That involves high-quality and appropriate mental health treatment and professional emotional counselling. There is evidence, for example, that abuse-specific therapeutic interventions relieve depressive symptoms among victims.
New clause 46 would require police or local authorities to make a referral whenever they receive a disclosure that a child has been the victim of sexual or other abuse. They would have to make a referral even if they do not believe there is enough evidence or grounds to take further legal action. That is important, because the burden of proof necessary for law enforcement to use its full array of powers is obviously higher than the level of suspicion needed for our full safeguarding and health measures to be utilised.
The NSPCC has found that delays between children suffering from traumatic events and receiving treatment lead to exacerbated mental health issues and we know that victims of sexual abuse have often had difficulty in being believed by the professionals charged with their care and protection. Duties to refer are not new to our legal system when dealing with safeguarding measures. For example, some employers must refer an individual to disclosure and barring services whenever an allegation of a sexual or abusive nature is made. The provisions in the new clause would not charge local authorities or the police to carry out the task of diagnosis, which they are not trained to do. It would be a precautionary measure that applied to all those about whom they receive a disclosure, not just those they believe to be suffering from a mental or emotional health issue. It is a sensible proposal, in keeping with established safeguarding practice and the assignment of appropriate professional duties.
The proposals are also well thought out. New clause 47 would put a duty on the police to share information with the relevant mental health service commissioner in their area. I believe that that new clause would work with new clause 46 to create a culture of collaboration between law enforcement, health agencies and local government, which is needed if the victims of child sexual exploitation are to be given the care and support that they need.
Karen Bradley
I thank the hon. Member for North Durham for again raising a very important issue. He is absolutely right. We must make sure that vulnerable or traumatised children must never fall through the gaps between services. I would appreciate it if, when we meet, we could discuss the way that that might best be addressed, because I am not convinced that the best way is a mandatory way. For example, some young people who are abused or exploited do not develop mental health problems and I have a nervousness about intervening unnecessarily, which could create unintended harms. We need to make sure that we intervene where we need to and that each child is treated as an individual and has the care that they need; I do not think that it should be mandated.
Mr Kevan Jones
I take the Minister’s point. We cannot force anyone to have treatment, but the offer of some support for individuals would make a real difference.
Karen Bradley
I would really appreciate talking this matter through outside the Committee, and I would like the shadow Minister to attend that meeting as well. There is work being done. The shadow Minister mentioned the “Future in mind” report, which the Department of Health is working on to ensure that an emerging workforce strategy is put in place. Perhaps we can discuss that privately.
The hon. Member for North Durham referred to civil servants getting slightly scared about the idea that personal data should automatically be disclosed to third parties. I appreciate the good intentions, but I do think that that is a dangerous road to be travelling down. We need to have a conversation about how best to manage that.
It is right that we need to make sure that children get support. I have talked about the children I have met who have experienced abuse. They need the right support. At what point do they go into recovery? At what point can they lead a functioning life? It is clear from the work we are doing through the troubled families programme that in the families who have gone through the programme, there are multiple problems—mental health, abuse, domestic abuse and other problems. We need to tackle all of those. I know these are probing amendments and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will allow us to discuss them at length outside this room.
Mr Kevan Jones
I thank the Minister for her reply. Discussing these issues is worth while. I know there is an onus on things somehow being about cash, especially in a time of austerity, but I have to say that, if properly implemented, the new clause would save money in the long term as well as help individuals. Nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Suspension of Licences
“(1) Licensing Act 2003 is amended as follows—
(2) After section 171 insert—
“171A Suspension of Licences
(1) A licensing authority may suspend a premises licence, or a club premises certificate if the holder of the licence or certificate has failed to pay the non-domestic rates due, from one or more previous financial years, to the licensing authority in respect of the premises for which the licence or certificate relates.
(2) A licensing authority may not suspend a premises licence or a club premises certificate using the powers granted by this section if—
(a) the licensing authority is unable to demonstrate that earlier efforts to secure payment of the debt have been made but have failed, or
(b) either—
(i) the licence holder failed to pay the required amount of non-domestic rates at the time it became due because of an administrative error (whether made by the holder, the authority or anyone else), or
(ii) before or at the time the non-domestic rates became due, the holder notified the authority in writing that the holder disputed liability for, or the amount of, the rates.
(3) If a licensing authority suspends a premises licence or club premises certificate under subsection (1), the authority must give the holder of the licence or certificate notice of the grounds on which the licence or certificate has been revoked and specify the day the suspension takes effect.
(4) The date specified in the notice under subsection (3) must be at least 10 working days after the day the authority gives the notice.
(5) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any outstanding non-domestic rates which are owed to the licensing authority six months after the commencement of this section.””—(Lyn Brown.)
This new clause would enable a licensing authority to suspend a premises licence where a business has wilfully or persistently failed to pay the business rates due to the licensing authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
New clause 52—Cap on Licensed Premises—
“(1) Amend the 2003 Licensing Act as follows.
(2) At the end of subsection 3 of section 18 insert—
“(c) have regard to the cumulative impact of granting the licence application given the number of other licensed establishments in the vicinity of the applicant premise.”
This new clause would allow local authorities to reject a licensing application on the grounds that there are already too many licensed premises.
New clause 53—Public health licensing objective—
“(1) The Licensing Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 4(d) insert—
“(e) promoting public health.””
This new clause would make promoting public health a statutory objective for licensing authorities.
Lyn Brown
These new clauses have all been tabled to help local authorities to carry out their alcohol licensing function.
New clause 51 would enable a licensing authority to suspend a premises licence where a business had wilfully or persistently failed to pay the business rates due. It has been tabled with the support of the Local Government Association. New clause 52 would allow local authorities to reject a licensing application if they felt there were already enough licensed premises in a particular area. New clause 53 would make promoting public health a statutory objective for licensing authorities.
New clause 51 has been tabled because, as the law stands, local authorities must issue licences to businesses even when they may owe debts running into tens of thousands of pounds. I am told by the LGA that that has become a problem in some localities, such as West Sussex, where local authorities are struggling to collect the business rates to which they are entitled. The new clause would end the problem by allowing local authorities to suspend the licence of an establishment that has persistently failed to pay its business rates. The hope is that the power would rarely be used, as premises would change their behaviour as they would no longer have reason to see their local authority as a soft creditor.
The new clause is by no means an attack on drinking establishments. We recognise the role that they play in our communities as social hubs that are an important part of our cultural heritage. The Opposition want to ensure that we keep as many of our well-run drinking establishments open as possible. We understand that the proposal could be seen as a threat to that, which is why it contains a power for a local authority to revoke a licence that would apply only if it was able to demonstrate first that earlier efforts to secure payment of the debt had been made but failed. That safeguard is included to ensure that the power is used only as a last resort.
Furthermore, the power to revoke a licence would not apply if the business failed to make the payment because of an administrative error on the part of the holder, the authority or anybody else—for example, the business’s bank. Taken together, those safeguards would ensure that the power to revoke licences was used only as a very last resort and would protect well-run local pubs from accidentally having their licence removed because of an administrative error.
The Local Government Association predicts that the safeguards, alongside the Government’s extension of small business rate relief, would mean that we would not see important community pubs closing as a result of the new power. However, the power would enable local authorities to ensure that they do not lose out on important revenue to which they are entitled and on which many of our basic services rely.
New clause 52 would allow local authorities to reject a licensing application if they felt they were saturated with licensed premises in a particular area. The Licensing Act 2003 allows local authorities to reject licensing applications only in a limited and defined set of situations: either where the premises has not demonstrated that it will meet statutory licensing objectives, or where door or cover supervision is not provided for.
Home Office guidance suggests that a local authority can refuse a licence based on
“the potential impact on the promotion of the licensing objectives of a significant number of licensed premises concentrated in one area.”
However, a local authority can do so only if it demonstrates in its licensing statement that the number of licensed premises in its area has already had a negative cumulative impact on its licensing objectives. That is called a cumulative impact policy and means that local authorities have to wait until they can demonstrate a negative impact on the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance or the protection of children from harm. That leaves local authorities powerless to act until after the fact, and I just do not think that that is right. I believe that the licensing objectives are incredibly important and I want to give local authorities the power to be proactive to ensure that they are upheld.
For instance, a small town with two large nightclubs could not reject an application for a licence from a third nightclub even if the local authority believed that it would not be appropriate for the town to have yet another nightclub. It is of course important to consider the individual characteristics of the premises concerned, but it is also important to consider the individual characteristics of our towns and cities, which many residents want to see conserved. In effect, local authorities have no power to control the number of licensed premises in any given locality until they can demonstrate that it is having an adverse impact on one of their licensing objectives, by which point it would be rather late.
New clause 52 would allow a local authority to reject a licensing application based on the belief that an area is already saturated with drinking establishments. It would give local authorities a sure footing and a legal foundation to allow them to be proactive in ensuring that their licensing objectives are met, and more power over how their towns and cities look and operate.
New clause 53 would make promoting public health a statutory objective for licensing authorities. I do recognise—honest—the important place that pubs, clubs, bars and restaurants play in our society. Drinking is a social activity, and drinking establishments are essentially social places where people go for conversation, relaxation and pleasure. I understand that in our busy and stressful lives, the socially integrative, egalitarian environments in our favourite locals can be the perfect way to switch off and unwind. For me, a decent beer, a good meal, an engaging book and the company of my four-legged friend is a great joy and a perfect way to spend a weekend afternoon or an evening. I also acknowledge that that can provide significant public health benefits—it certainly does for me—but we must not lose sight of the significant impact that drinking can have on public health.
It is well known that there is a causal relationship between alcohol consumption and a range of health problems, including alcohol dependency, liver diseases, some cancers and cardiovascular diseases. Furthermore, it can lead to unsafe behaviour and thus the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. The World Health Organisation estimates that 5.1% of the global disease burden is due to harmful use of alcohol. New clauses 52 and 53 would enable local authorities to reject licensing applications on the basis that the number of premises in an area was having a negative impact on public health. We cannot ask local authorities to be responsible for public health and then not give them the powers that they say they need to have an impact upon it.
I understand that implementing public health as a licensing objective in Scotland has proved to be somewhat difficult; however, that should not deter us from at least considering it. Alcohol clearly has a major impact on public health, so local authorities should be enabled to consider that impact when undertaking their licensing function. I believe that we have to find a way of successfully implementing what was attempted in Scotland. Local practitioners certainly think so; a recent Local Government Association survey of directors of public health found that nine out of 10 were in favour of adding a public health objective to the Licensing Act 2003, saying that it would help them do their jobs more effectively. Our amendment has the support of the Local Government Association.
Karen Bradley
I thank the shadow Minister for her comments. I too have read the very informative LGA briefing. I ought to declare an interest in that I am not just an avid—and regular—user of licensed premises. I grew up in a licensed premises, and my brother still has a licence and runs the family pub, which has been in the family since 1967. I think we probably have some experience of these things. Perhaps I could deal with the new clauses in the order that I am attracted to them.
I will start with new clause 51. The four licensing objectives that local authorities have are the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance, and the protection of children from harm. It is very important that we stick to those when we come to look at the new clause. The hon. Lady will know that there is a provision in the 2003 Act for the licensing authority to suspend a premises licence or club premises certificate if the premises has failed to pay the annual fee. That power is directly linked to the local authority’s need to obtain a fee from premises in order to carry out its functions. If it is not paid it undermines licensing authorities’ ability to operate fully, and it is therefore right that they should have the corresponding power to suspend the licence and thus the legal operation of such premises.
Business rates are a different matter. They must be paid by not just licensed premises but all businesses. There are already enforcement remedies available to local councils for the non-payment of those rates. I am not sure that linking the payment of business rates to the right to hold a licence to sell alcohol is necessarily an appropriate route to take. I am therefore afraid that I cannot commend new clause 51 to the Committee.
New clause 53 seeks to introduce a health-based licensing objective. I want to assure the hon. Lady that the Government have sympathy for the view that considerations of public health should play a greater role in licensing, and we remain interested in the possibility of introducing a health-related licensing objective. However, this is neither the right time nor the legislative vehicle to do so. It may superficially seem straightforward, but licensing decisions must be proportionate and made on a case-by-case basis. To try to establish direct causal links between alcohol-related health harms and particular premises would be very difficult. Without the necessary processes and supporting evidence in place, licensing decisions based on health grounds would be unlikely to stand up to legal challenge.
Lyn Brown
I have an awful lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady says, especially about this not being the right legislative vehicle. It was an opportunity for us to test the waters.
We did not envisage this new clause being about the health risk of a particular pub, premises or bar, but about the amount in a particular area, or possibly the type of risks in a particular area. Effectively, the new clause would allow local authorities to take that into consideration when making decisions on licences.
Karen Bradley
I understand the hon. Lady’s point. I should make the point that the public health requirement, in the case of two-tier authorities, is on the county council, as it is in my case, but the district council deals with licensing. Licensing decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis, so we would be asking a district or borough council to take a licensing decision on an individual premises on the basis of a public health implication that may or may not be properly founded. I want to assure the hon. Lady that Public Health England is looking at the lessons learned from the evidence-based work that was done in 2014-15. A consultation process would need to follow, but it is looking carefully at that point.
New clause 52 covers the cumulative impact. The hon. Lady linked new clauses 52 and 53, but I do not think we need to do that. I hope that she has read avidly the Government’s modern crime prevention strategy, which was published just last month, because in that we made a commitment to put cumulative impact policies on a statutory footing.
Mr Kevan Jones
It is my understanding that if a local authority draws up a local policy, it can use cumulative impact to refuse further licences in an area.
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. There are already more than 200 cumulative impact policies in England and Wales and they allow local authorities to control the number or type of licence applications granted in an area where it can be shown that high numbers or densities of licensed premises are having an adverse impact on the licensing objectives. They can also put a levy on such premises. However, the cumulative impact policies currently have no statutory basis and it is unclear whether all local authorities are making best use of the power. That is why we intend to place them on a statutory footing both to maximise their effectiveness and to improve local authorities’ ability to ensure that the right premises for their area are granted licences to sell alcohol and late-night refreshment.
Mr Kevan Jones
I am a bit of an anorak on the Licensing Act 2003 from when we were in power. The Minister makes an important point about putting cumulative impact on a statutory footing. One thing that confuses the public is that while the ability to reduce licences or take action is there—the onus is on the local authority—in many cases they do not use the powers they have got.
Karen Bradley
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that local authorities do not necessarily use the powers available to them and this measure will ensure that they understand those powers and use them. I hope that he and the hon. Member for West Ham understand that the change requires proper consultation with those affected. We need to consult the licence trade, the alcohol industry and local authorities. Therefore—I hope that the hon. Lady will forgive me—we need a little time to undertake such consultations. We will do them as quickly as possible. I cannot promise that they will have been completed in time for Report, but suffice it to say that we support the objectives behind new clause 52 and will seek to bring forward proposals of our own as quickly as possible.
Lyn Brown
The Minister has obviously delighted me. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Schedule 1
Disciplinary proceedings: former members of MoD Police, British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary
“1 The Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 is amended as follows.
2 (1) Section 3A (regulations relating to disciplinary matters) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1A) insert—
“(1B) Regulations under this section may provide for the procedures that are established by or under regulations made by virtue of subsection (1A) to apply (with or without modifications) in respect of the conduct, efficiency or effectiveness of any person where—
(a) an allegation relating to the conduct, efficiency or effectiveness of the person comes to the attention of the chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, the Ministry of Defence Police Committee, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner or the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland,
(b) at the time of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness the person was a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, and
(c) either—
(i) the person ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police after the allegation first comes to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a), or
(ii) the person had ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police before the allegation first came to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a) but the period between the person having ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police and the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a) does not exceed the period specified in the regulations.
(1C) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1B) must provide that disciplinary proceedings which are not the first disciplinary proceedings to be taken against the person in respect of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness may be taken only if they are commenced within the period specified in the regulations, which must begin with the date when the person ceased to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police.”
(3) In subsection (2), for “The regulations” substitute “Regulations under this section”.
3 In section 4 (representation etc at disciplinary proceedings), in subsection (4)—
(a) in the definition of “the officer concerned”, after “member” insert “or, as the case may be, the former member”;
(b) in the definition of “relevant authority”—
(i) after paragraph (a) insert—
(ii) after paragraph (b) insert—
4 In section 4A (appeals against dismissal etc), in subsection (1)(a), after “member” insert “, or former member,”.
5 Regulations made in pursuance of section 3A(1B) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (as inserted by paragraph 2)—
(a) may not make provision in relation to a person who ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police before the coming into force of paragraph 2 of this Schedule;
(b) may make provision in relation to a person who ceases to be a member of the Ministry of Defence Police after the coming into force of paragraph 2 of this Schedule even though the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness occurred at a time before the coming into force of that paragraph, but only if the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness is such that, if proved, there could be a finding in relation to the person in disciplinary proceedings that the person would have been dismissed if the person had still been a member of the Ministry of Defence Police.
Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (c. 20)
6 The Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 is amended as follows.
7 In section 36 (police regulations: general), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) To the extent that subsection (1) concerns regulations made in pursuance of section 50(3A) of the Police Act 1996, or matters that could be dealt with by such regulations, the reference in subsection (1) to constables or other persons employed in the service of the Police Force includes former constables and other persons formerly employed in the service of the Police Force.”
8 In section 37 (police regulations: special constables), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) To the extent that subsection (1) concerns regulations made in pursuance of section 51(2B) of the Police Act 1996, or matters that could be dealt with by such regulations, the reference in subsection (1) to special constables of the Police Force includes former special constables of the Police Force.”
9 In section 42 (police regulations by Secretary of State), in subsection (3)—
(a) after “50(3)” insert “or (3A)”;
(b) after “51(2A)” insert “or (2B)”.
10 Regulations made under section 36, 37 or 42 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 that make provision that applies regulations made in pursuance of section 50(3A) or 51(2B) of the Police Act 1996, or that deals with matters that could be dealt with by such regulations, in relation to former constables, and former special constables, of the British Transport Police Force and other persons formerly employed in the service of the British Transport Police Force—
(a) may not make provision that would not be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by section 22(7)(a);
(b) may make provision that would be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by section 22(7)(b).
Energy Act 2004 (c. 20)
11 The Energy Act 2004 is amended as follows.
12 In section 58 (government, administration and conditions of service of Civil Nuclear Constabulary), in subsection (1)(a), after “members” insert “or former members”.
13 (1) In Schedule 13 (directions by Secretary of State about Civil Nuclear Constabulary), paragraph 3 (government, administration and conditions of service) is amended as follows.
(2) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) To the extent that sub-paragraph (2) concerns provision that may be made in pursuance of section 50(3A) of the Police Act 1996, the reference in sub-paragraph (1) to members of the Constabulary includes former members.”
14 Provision made by the Civil Nuclear Police Authority that relates to former members of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and matters which are the subject of regulations made in pursuance of section 50(3A) of the Police Act 1996—
(a) may not be provision that would not be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by section 22(7)(a);
(b) may be provision that would be permitted in relation to former members of a police force and former special constables by 22(7)(b).”—(Mike Penning.)
This new Schedule includes amendments relating to the Ministry of Defence Police, the British Transport Police Force and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary which produce an equivalent effect to the amendments at clause 22 of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 2
Office for Police Conduct
Part 1
Amendments to Schedule 2 to the Police Reform Act 2002
Introductory
1 Schedule 2 to the Police Reform Act 2002 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule (see also paragraph 54 below for further minor and consequential amendments).
Director General
2 (1) Paragraph 1 (chairman) is amended as follows.
(2) For sub-paragraph (1) substitute—
(1) The Director General holds office in accordance with the terms of his or her appointment.
(1A) A person who holds office as Director General must not be an employee of the Office (but may have been such an employee before appointment as the Director General).”
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) for “chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) for “chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) for “chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
(6) In sub-paragraph (5) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
Appointment etc of members
3 After paragraph 1 insert—
“Appointment of members
1A (1) The non-executive members of the Office are to be appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) A person who is a non-executive member must not be an employee of the Office (but may have been such an employee before appointment as a non-executive member).
1B (1) The employee members of the Office are to be appointed from the staff of the Office by the non-executive members.
(2) If the non-executive members propose to appoint an employee member, the Director General must recommend a person to the non-executive members for appointment.
(3) The Director General may also recommend a person to the non-executive members for appointment as an employee member without any proposal having been made under sub-paragraph (2).
(4) On a recommendation of a person for appointment under sub-paragraph (2) or (3), the non-executive members may—
(a) appoint the person, or
(b) reject the recommendation.
(5) If the non-executive members reject a recommendation they may require the Director General to recommend another person for appointment (in which case this sub-paragraph applies again and so on until somebody is appointed).”
4 (1) Paragraph 2 (ordinary members of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) for “an ordinary” substitute “a non-executive”.
(3) Omit sub-paragraph (2).
(4) In sub-paragraph (3) for “an ordinary” substitute “a non-executive”.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) for “an ordinary”, in both places, substitute “a non-executive”;
(b) for “five” substitute “three”.
(6) In sub-paragraph (5) for—
(a) for “An ordinary” substitute “A non-executive”;
(b) for “his office as a member of the Commission” substitute “from being a non-executive member of the Office”.
(7) In sub-paragraph (6)—
(a) for “an ordinary” substitute “a non-executive”;
(b) omit paragraph (b).
(8) Omit sub-paragraph (8).
5 After paragraph 2 insert—
“Terms of appointment etc: employee members
2A (1) A person holds office as an employee member in accordance with the terms of his or her appointment (subject to the provisions of this Schedule).
(2) Those terms may not include arrangements in relation to remuneration.
(3) An appointment as an employee member may be full-time or part-time.
(4) The appointment of an employee member terminates—
(a) if the terms of the member’s appointment provides for it to expire at the end of a period, at the end of that period, and
(b) in any event, when the member ceases to be an employee of the Office.
(5) An employee member may resign by giving written notice to the non-executive members.
(6) The non-executive members may terminate the appointment of an employee member by giving the member written notice if they are satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in paragraph 2(6)(a) to (g) apply in relation to the employee member.”
6 Omit paragraph 3 (deputy chairmen) (including the italic heading before that paragraph).
7 Omit paragraph 5 (chief executive) (including the italic heading before that paragraph).
Vacancy or incapacity in office of Director General
8 After paragraph 3 insert—
“Director General: vacancy or incapacity
3A (1) This paragraph applies if—
(a) the office of Director General is vacant, or
(b) it appears to the Office that the ability of the Director General to carry out the Director General’s functions is seriously impaired because of ill health (whether mental or physical).
(2) The Office may, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, authorise an employee of the Office to carry out the functions of the Director General during the vacancy or period of ill health.
(3) A person who falls within section 9(3) may not be authorised under this paragraph to carry out the functions of the Director General.
(4) A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three months or more may not, at any time in the five years following the day of sentence, be authorised under this paragraph to carry out the functions of the Director General.
(5) Paragraph 1(6) applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4).
(6) Authorisation of a person under this paragraph ceases to have effect—
(a) at the end of the vacancy or period of ill health,
(b) on the Office revoking the authorisation for any reason, or
(c) on the Secretary of State withdrawing agreement to the authorisation for any reason.”
Remuneration arrangements
9 (1) Paragraph 4 (remuneration, pensions etc of members) is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “the chairman” to the end substitute “the Director General as the Secretary of State may determine”.
(3) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a), for “chairman, deputy chairman or member of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) in the words after paragraph (b) for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(4) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
(3) The Secretary of State may make remuneration arrangements in relation to non-executive members of the Office.
(4) Remuneration arrangements under sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) may make provision for a salary, allowances and other benefits but not for a pension, and
(b) may include a formula or other mechanism for adjusting one or more of those elements from time to time.
(5) Amounts payable by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) are to be paid by the Office.”
Staff
10 (1) Paragraph 6 (staff) is amended as follows.
(2) For sub-paragraph (1) substitute—
(1) The Office may appoint staff.”
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) after “staffing” insert “(including arrangements in relation to terms and conditions and management of staff)”;
(c) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) for “Commission”, in the first place, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission”, in the second place, substitute “Director General”.
(6) After sub-paragraph (4) insert—
(4A) The powers under this paragraph are exercisable only by the Director General acting on behalf of the Office (subject to the power under paragraph 6A(1)).”
(7) In sub-paragraph (5) for “by the Commission of its” substitute “of the”.
Delegation of functions
11 After paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 insert—
“Delegation of functions
6A (1) The Director General may authorise a person within sub-paragraph (2) to exercise on the Director General’s behalf a function of the Director General.
(2) The persons within this sub-paragraph are—
(a) employee members of the Office;
(b) employees of the Office appointed under paragraph 6;
(c) seconded constables within the meaning of paragraph 8.
(3) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to a function of the Director General is to any function that the Director General has under this Act or any other enactment.
(4) A person (“A”) who is authorised under sub-paragraph (1) to exercise a function may authorise another person within sub-paragraph (2) to exercise that function (but only so far as permitted to do so by the authorisation given to A).
(5) An authorisation under this paragraph may provide for a function to which it relates to be exercisable—
(a) either to its full extent or to the extent specified in the authorisation;
(b) either generally or in cases, circumstances or areas so specified;
(c) either unconditionally or subject to conditions so specified.
(6) Provision under sub-paragraph (5) may (in particular) include provision for restricted persons not to exercise designated functions.
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (6)—
(a) “designated functions” are any functions of the Director General that are designated by the Director General for the purposes of this paragraph (and such functions may in particular be designated by reference to the position or seniority of members of staff);
(b) “restricted persons” are, subject to any determination made under sub-paragraph (8), persons who fall within section 9(3).
(8) The Director General may, in such circumstances as the Director General considers appropriate, determine that persons are not to be treated as restricted persons so far as relating to the exercise of designated functions (whether generally or in respect of particular functions specified in the determination).
(9) The Director General must publish a statement of policy about how the Director General proposes to exercise the powers conferred by sub-paragraphs (7)(a) and (8).
(10) The statement must in particular draw attention to any restrictions on the carrying out of functions imposed by virtue of their designation under sub-paragraph (7)(a) and explain the reasons for imposing them.
(11) The exercise of the powers conferred by sub-paragraphs (7)(a) and (8) is subject to any regulations under section 23(1) of the kind mentioned in section 23(2)(g) (regulations limiting persons who may be appointed to carry out investigations etc).
(12) An authorisation under this paragraph does not prevent the Director General from exercising the function to which the authorisation relates.
(13) Anything done or omitted to be done by or in relation to a person authorised under this paragraph in, or in connection with, the exercise or purported exercise of the function to which the authorisation relates is to be treated for all purposes as done or omitted to be done by or in relation to the Director General.
(14) Sub-paragraph (13) does not apply for the purposes of any criminal proceedings brought in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by the authorised person.”
Protection from personal liability
12 After paragraph 7 insert—
“Liability for acts of the Director General
7A (1) A person holding office as the Director General has no personal liability for an act or omission done by the person in the exercise of the Director General’s functions unless it is shown to have been done otherwise than in good faith.
(2) The Office is liable in respect of unlawful conduct of the Director General in the carrying out, or purported carrying out, of the Director General’s functions in the same way as an employer is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct of employees in the course of their employment.
(3) Accordingly, the Office is to be treated, in the case of any such unlawful conduct which is a tort, as a joint tortfeasor.”
Regional offices
13 For paragraph 9 (power of Commission to set up regional offices) substitute—
9 (1) The Office may set up regional offices in places in England and Wales.
(2) But the power under sub-paragraph (1) is exercisable only by the Director General acting on behalf of the Office (subject to the power in paragraph 6A(1)).
(3) The power under sub-paragraph (1) may be exercised—
(a) only with the consent of the Secretary of State, and
(b) only if it appears to the Director General necessary to do so for the purpose of ensuring that the functions of the Director General, or those of the Office, are carried out efficiently and effectively.”
Proceedings
14 In paragraph 10 (proceedings), after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
(1A) But the arrangements must include provision for—
(a) the quorum for meetings to be met only if a majority of members present are non-executive members of the Office, and
(b) an audit committee of the Office to be established to perform such monitoring, reviewing and other functions as are appropriate.
(1B) The arrangements must secure that the audit committee consists only of non-executive members of the Office.”
Part 2
Minor and Consequential Amendments to the Police Reform Act 2002
15 The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.
16 For the italic heading before section 9, substitute “The Office for Police Conduct”.
17 (1) Section 10 (general functions of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) omit “itself”.
(3) In subsection (1)(e) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (1)(f) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (3) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(6) In subsection (3A) (as inserted by this Act), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(7) In subsection (3B) (as inserted by this Act), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(8) In subsection (4), in paragraph (a)—
(a) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(9) In subsection (6)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(10) In subsection (7)—
(a) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its”, in both places, substitute “the Director General’s”.
18 (1) Section 11 (reports to the Secretary of State) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) for “its”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “the Office’s”;
(b) for “Commission shall” substitute “Director General and the Office must jointly”;
(c) for “its”, in the second place it occurs, substitute “their”.
(3) For subsection (2) substitute—
(2) The Secretary of State may also require reports to be made (at any time)—
(a) by the Director General about the carrying out of the Director General’s functions,
(b) by the Office about the carrying out of the Office’s functions, or
(c) jointly by the Director General and the Office about the carrying out of their functions.”
(4) After subsection (2) insert—
(2A) The Director General may, from time to time, make such other reports to the Secretary of State as the Director General considers appropriate for drawing the Secretary of State’s attention to matters which—
(a) have come to the Director General’s notice, and
(b) are matters which the Director General considers should be drawn to the attention of the Secretary of State by reason of their gravity or of other exceptional circumstances.”
(5) In subsection (3)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
(6) After subsection (3) insert—
(3A) The Director General and the Office may jointly make reports under subsections (2A) and (3).”
(7) In subsection (4)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(c) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(8) In subsection (6) for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(9) After subsection (6) insert—
(6A) The Director General must send a copy of every report under subsection (2A) —
(a) to any local policing body that appears to the Director General to be concerned, and
(b) to the chief officer of police of any police force that appears to the Director General to be concerned.”
(10) In subsection (7) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”.
(11) In subsection (8)—
(a) after “subsection” insert “(2A) or”;
(b) for “Commission” substitute “Director General or the Office (as the case may be)”.
(12) In subsection (9)—
(a) after “subsection” insert “(2A) or”;
(b) for “Commission” substitute “Director General or the Office (as the case may be)”.
(13) In subsection (10) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(14) In subsection (11)—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(c) for “(3)” substitute “(2A)”.
(15) After subsection (11) insert—
(12) The Office must send a copy of every report made or prepared by it under subsection (3) to such of the persons (in addition to those specified in the preceding subsections) who—
(a) are referred to in the report, or
(b) appear to the Office otherwise to have a particular interest in its contents, as the Office thinks fit.
(13) Where a report under subsection (2A) or (3) is prepared jointly by virtue of subsection (3A), a duty under this section to send a copy of the report to any person is met if either the Director General or the Office sends a copy to that person.”
19 In section 12 (complaints, matters and persons to which Part 2 applies), in subsection (6)(a) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
20 (1) Section 13B (power of the Commission to require re-investigation) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1)—
(a) for “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) in paragraph (b), before “under” insert “(or, in the case of an investigation carried out under paragraph 19 of Schedule 3 by the Director General personally, is otherwise completed by the Director General)”.
(4) In subsection (2) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (3) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(6) In subsection (9)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(7) In subsection (10)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
21 (1) Section 15 (general duties of local policing bodies, chief officers and inspectors) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (3), in the words after paragraph (c) after “Director General” insert “of the Agency”.
(3) In subsection (4)—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
22 (1) Section 16 (payment for assistance with investigations) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place except as mentioned in sub-paragraph (3), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (4), for “the Commission”, in the second place where it occurs, substitute “Office”.
(4) In subsection (5)(b), after “Director General” insert “of that Agency”.
23 (1) Section 17 (provision of information to the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) for “it” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
24 (1) Section 18 (inspections of police premises on behalf of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading and provisions inserted by amendments made by this Act), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)(b), for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
25 (1) Section 19 (use of investigatory powers by or on behalf of the Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) In the heading, for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1), for “Commission’s” substitute “Director General’s”.
26 (1) Section 20 (duty to keep complainant informed) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including provisions inserted by amendments made by this Act), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1)(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (3) for “it”, where it occurs after “as”, substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (8A) (as inserted by this Act)—
(a) for “its” substitute “their”;
(b) after “submitted”, in the first place it occurs, insert “(or finalised)”;
(c) after “submitted”, in the second place it occurs, insert “(or completed)”.
(6) In subsection (9) for “its” substitute “their”.
27 (1) Section 21 (duty to provide information for other persons) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including provisions inserted by amendments made by this Act), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (6)(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (8) for “it”, where it occurs after “as”, substitute “the Director General”.
(5) In subsection (11A) (as inserted by this Act)—
(a) for “its” substitute “their”;
(b) after “submitted”, in the first place it occurs, insert “(or finalised)”;
(c) after “submitted”, in the second place it occurs, insert “(or completed)”.
28 In section 21A (restriction on disclosure of sensitive information) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
29 In section 21B (provision of sensitive information to the Commission and certain investigators) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
30 (1) Section 22 (power of the Commission to issue guidance) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (3)(c) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
31 (1) Section 23 (regulations) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)(o) for “it” substitute “the Director General or the Office”.
32 In section 24 (consultation on regulations) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) the Office;
(aa) the Director General;”.
33 In section 26 (forces maintained otherwise than by local policing bodies), for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
34 In section 26BA (College of Policing), for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
35 (1) Section 26C (the National Crime Agency) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) before “and other” insert “of the National Crime Agency”.
(3) In subsection (2) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “the Office or its Director General”.
(4) In subsection (4) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
(5) In subsection (5)—
(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “Commission’s”, in both places, substitute “Director General’s”;
(c) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
36 (1) Section 26D (labour abuse prevention officers) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (4), for “Commission’s”, in both places, substitute “Director General’s”.
37 (1) Section 27 (conduct of the Commission’s staff) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission’s”, in each place (including the heading), substitute “Office’s”.
(3) In subsection (4) for “Commission” substitute “Office and the Director General”.
38 Omit section 28 (transitional arrangements in connection with establishing Commission etc).
39 (1) Section 28A (application of Part 2 to old cases) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place other than in subsection (3) of that section, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (1), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
(4) In subsection (4), for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
40 (1) Section 29 (interpretation of Part 2) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) omit the definition of “the Commission”;
(b) after the definition of “death or serious injury matter” insert—
““the Director General” means (unless otherwise specified) the Director General of the Office;”;
(c) after the definition of “local resolution” insert—
““the Office” means the Office for Police Conduct;”.
(3) In subsection (6)—
(a) for “Commission” in each place substitute “Director General”;
(b) omit “itself”.
41 In section 29C (regulations about super-complaints) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (3) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
42 (1) Section 29E (power to investigate concerns raised by whistle-blowers) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
43 (1) Section 29F (Commission’s powers and duties where it decides not to investigate) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In the heading—
(a) for “Commission’s” substitute “Director General’s”;
(b) for “where it decides” substitute “on decision”.
44 (1) Section 29G (special provision for “conduct matters”) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) or “it”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the”.
45 (1) Section 29H (Commission’s powers and duties where whistle-blower is deceased) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In the heading for “Commission’s” substitute “Director General’s”.
(4) In subsection (1) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
46 In section 29HA (duty to keep whistle-blowers informed) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (1)—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(b) for “it” substitute “the Director General”.
47 In section 29I (protection of anonymity of whistle-blowers) (as inserted by this Act) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
48 In section 29J (other restrictions on disclosure of information) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
49 In section 29K (application of provisions of Part 2) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
50 In section 29L (regulation-making powers: consultation) (as inserted by this Act), for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
51 In section 29M (interpretation) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (1)—
(a) omit the definition of “the Commission”;
(b) after the definition of “conduct” insert—
““the Director General” means the Director General of the Office for Police Conduct;”.
52 In section 36 (conduct of disciplinary proceedings), in subsection (1)(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
53 In section 105 (powers of Secretary of State to make orders and regulations), in subsection (5) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
54 (1) Schedule 2 (the Independent Police Complaints Commission) is amended as follows.
(2) For the italic heading before paragraph 1 substitute “Director General”.
(3) For the italic heading before paragraph 2 substitute “Terms of appointment etc: non-executive members”.
(4) In paragraph 7—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “chairman or as a deputy chairman of the Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(c) omit “or as a member of it”.
(5) In paragraph 8—
(a) for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission’s”, in both places, substitute “Office’s”.
(6) In the heading before paragraph 9 omit “of Commission”.
(7) In paragraph 10—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”;
(b) for “Commission’s”, in each place, substitute “Office’s”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5)(c) omit “by the chief executive or”.
(8) In paragraph 11—
(a) for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”;
(b) in paragraph (a) for “chairman, a deputy chairman” substitute “Director General”;
(c) in paragraph (b) for “chairman” substitute “Director General”.
(9) In the italic heading before paragraph 12, for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
(10) In paragraph 12—
(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) in paragraph (a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(c) in paragraph (b) for “Commission” substitute “Director General”.
(11) In paragraph 13 for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(12) In paragraph 14—
(a) for “Commission” substitute “Office”;
(b) in paragraph (a), after “it” insert “or the Director General”;
(c) in paragraph (b)—
(i) after “it”, in both places, insert “or the Director General”;
(ii) for “its” substitute “their”.
(13) In the italic heading before paragraph 15, for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(14) In paragraph 15 for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(15) In paragraph 16 for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(16) In paragraph 17 for “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Office”.
(17) In the italic heading before paragraph 18, for “Commission” substitute “Office”.
(18) In paragraph 18 for “Commission”, in both places, substitute “Office”.
55 (1) Schedule 3 is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place where it occurs, substitute “Director General”.
(3) For “Commission’s”, in each place where it occurs, substitute “Director General’s”.
(4) For “it”, in each place where it occurs and is used as a pronoun in place of “the Commission”, substitute “the Director General”.
(5) For “its”, in each place where it occurs and is used to mean “the Commission’s”, substitute “the Director General’s”.
(6) The amendments made by virtue of sub-paragraphs (2) to (5)—
(a) include amendments of provisions of Schedule 3 that are inserted, or otherwise amended, by other provisions of this Act (whether or not those other provisions come into force before or after the coming into force of this paragraph);
(b) do not apply if otherwise provided by another provision of this paragraph.
(7) In paragraph 19 (investigations by the Commission itself)—
(a) in the heading omit “itself”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (1) omit “itself”;
(c) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
(2) The Director General must designate both—
(a) a person to take charge of the investigation, and
(b) such members of the Office’s staff as are required by the Director General to assist the person designated to take charge of the investigation.
(2A) The person designated under sub-paragraph (2) to take charge of an investigation must be—
(a) the Director General acting personally, or
(b) another member of the Office’s staff who is authorised to exercise the function of taking charge of the investigation on behalf of the Director General by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 2 (delegation of Director General’s functions).”;
(d) in sub-paragraph (4) for “member of the Commission’s staff” substitute “person”;
(e) in sub-paragraph (5) for “member of the Commission’s staff” substitute “person designated under sub-paragraph (2)”;
(f) in sub-paragraph (6) for “members of the Commission’s staff” substitute “persons”;
(g) in sub-paragraph (6A) for “member of the Commission’s staff” substitute “person designated under sub-paragraph (2) who is”.
(8) In paragraph 19ZH (further provision about things retained under paragraph 19ZG) (as inserted by this Act)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (4)(a) for “Commission’s” substitute “Office’s”.
(9) In paragraph 19A (as substituted by this Act), in sub-paragraph (2)(b) after “investigating” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”.
(10) In paragraph 19F (interview of persons serving with police etc during certain investigations), in sub-paragraph (1)(b) for “the Commission itself” substitute “a person designated under paragraph 19 (investigations by Director General)”.
(11) In paragraph 20 (restrictions on proceedings pending conclusion of investigation), in sub-paragraph (1)(b) at the end insert “or, where under paragraph 19 the Director General has personally carried out the investigation, a report has been completed by the Director General”.
(12) In paragraph 20A (as substituted by this Act)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)(a) after “investigating” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (3) after “and” insert “(where the person investigating is not also the Director General carrying out an investigation under paragraph 19 personally)”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (4)(b) after “investigation” insert “or, where the investigation is carried out under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally, finalise one,”.
(13) In paragraph 21A (procedure where conduct matter is revealed during investigation of DSI matter)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1), omit “or designated under paragraph 19”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (2A) (as inserted by this Act), insert—
(2B) If during the course of an investigation of a DSI matter being carried out by a person designated under paragraph 19 the Director General determines that there is an indication that a person serving with the police (“the person whose conduct is in question”) may have—
(a) committed a criminal offence, or
(b) behaved in a manner which would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings,
the Director General must proceed under sub-paragraph (2C).
(2C) The Director General must—
(a) prepare a record of the determination,
(b) notify the appropriate authority in relation to the DSI matter and (if different) the appropriate authority in relation to the person whose conduct is in question of the determination, and
(c) send to it (or each of them) a copy of the record of the determination prepared under paragraph (a).”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5), after paragraph (a) insert—
(aa) is notified of a determination by the Director General under sub-paragraph (2C),”.
(14) In paragraph 22 (final reports on investigations: complaints, conduct matters and certain DSI matters)—
(a) for sub-paragraph (5) substitute—
(5) A person designated under paragraph 19 as the person in charge of an investigation must—
(a) submit a report on the investigation to the Director General, or
(b) where the person in charge of the investigation is the Director General acting personally, complete a report on the investigation.”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (6) after “submitting” insert “or, in the case of an investigation under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally, completing”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (8) after “submitted” insert “or, in the case of an investigation under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally, completed”.
(15) In the italic heading before paragraph 23 (action by the Commission in response to investigation reports), for “response” substitute “relation”.
(16) In paragraph 23—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)(b) before “under” insert “, or is otherwise completed,”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (1A) (as inserted by this Act), after “submission” insert “or completion”;
(c) in each of the following places, after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”—
(i) sub-paragraph (2);
(ii) sub-paragraph (5A) (as inserted by this Act);
(iii) sub-paragraph (5F) (as inserted by this Act).
(17) In paragraph 24A (final reports on investigations: other DSI matters)—
(a) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
(2A) Sub-paragraph (2)(a) does not apply where the person investigating is the Director General carrying out an investigation personally under paragraph 19, but the Director General must complete a report on the investigation.”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (3) for “this paragraph” substitute “sub-paragraph (2) or completing one under sub-paragraph (2A)”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (4) after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”;
(d) in sub-paragraph (5) (as inserted by this Act) after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”.
(18) In the italic heading before paragraph 24B (action by the Commission in response to an investigation report under paragraph 24A), for “response” substitute “relation”.
(19) In paragraph 28A (recommendations by the Commission)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)—
(i) after “received a report” insert “(or otherwise completed one in relation to an investigation carried out under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally)”;
(ii) in paragraph (b) for “Commission itself” substitute “or on behalf of the Director General”;
(iii) in paragraph (c) after “24A(2)” insert “or (2A)”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (4)(a) after “receipt” insert “or completion”.
(20) In paragraph 28B (response to recommendation), in sub-paragraph (12) (as inserted by this Act) after “received a report on” insert “(or otherwise completed one on in relation to an investigation carried out under paragraph 19 by the Director General personally)”.
56 (1) Schedule 3 is further amended as follows (but these amendments apply only if this Schedule comes into force before the coming into force of Schedule 4 to this Act).
(2) In paragraph 19B (assessment of seriousness of conduct under investigation), in sub-paragraph (1) after “investigating” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”.
(3) In paragraph 20A (accelerated procedure in special cases)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1)—
(i) for “his” substitute “an”;
(ii) after “conduct matter” insert “or, in the case of an investigation by a designated person under paragraph 19, the Director General,”;
(iii) for “he” substitute “the person investigating”.
(b) in sub-paragraph (3) for “his belief” substitute “the belief referred to in sub-paragraph (1)”.
(4) In paragraph 23 (action by the Commission in response to an investigation report), in sub-paragraph (6) after “receipt of the report” insert “(or on its completion by the Director General)”.
57 (1) Schedule 3A (whistle-blowing investigations: procedure) (as inserted by this Act) is amended as follows.
(2) For “Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General”.
(3) In paragraph 1(1) omit “itself”.
(4) In paragraph 4(2)—
(a) for “it”, where it occurs in the first place, substitute “the Director General”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the”.
Part 3
Other Minor and consequential amendments
Superannuation Act 1972 (c. 11)
58 In Schedule 1 to the Superannuation Act 1972—
(a) in the list of entries under the heading “Royal Commissions and other Commissions”, omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission;
(b) in the list of entries under the heading “Other Bodies”, insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct.”;
(c) in the list of entries under the heading “Offices”, omit the entries relating to—
(i) the Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission;
(ii) the Commissioners of the Independent Police Complaints Commission;
(iii) the Deputy Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (c. 24)
59 In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (bodies of which all members are disqualified), omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct.”
Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (c. 25)
60 In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (bodies of which all members are disqualified), omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct.”.
Police Pensions Act 1976 (c. 35)
61 In section 11 of the Police Pensions Act 1976 (interpretation), in subsection (2A)(ba) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”.
Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (c. 4)
62 In section 4 of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (representation etc at disciplinary proceedings), in subsection (5)(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”.
Aviation, Maritime and Security Act 1990 (c. 31)
63 In section 22 of the Aviation, Maritime and Security Act 1990 (power to require harbour authorities to promote searches in harbour areas), in subsection (4)(b)(i) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Police Act 1996 (c. 16)
64 (1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In the following provisions, for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”—
(a) section 50(3A)(a) (regulation of police forces) (as inserted by this Act);
(b) section 51(2B)(a) (regulations for special constables) (as inserted by this Act);
(c) section 87(1) (guidance concerning disciplinary proceedings etc) (as amended by this Act).
(3) In the following provisions, for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”—
(a) section 84(5) (representation etc at disciplinary and other proceedings);
(b) section 88C(5)(d) (effect of inclusion in police barred list) (as inserted by this Act);
(c) section 88K(3)(d) (effect of inclusion in police advisory list) (as inserted by this Act).
(4) In section 54(2D) (appointment and functions of inspectors of constabulary)—
(a) in paragraph (a)—
(i) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct (“the Director General”)”;
(ii) for “that Commission” substitute “the Director General”;
(b) in paragraph (b)—
(i) for “that Commission”, in both places, substitute “the Director General”;
(ii) for “its” substitute “his or her”.
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36)
65 In Part 6 of Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (other public bodies and offices: general) omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct”.
Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (c. 21)
66 In section 4I of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (5)(b) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (c. 11)
67 (1) The Commissions for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 18 (confidentiality), in subsection (2)(g)—
(a) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”.
(3) In section 28 (complaints and misconduct: England and Wales)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct (“the Director General”)”;
(b) in subsection (2)—
(i) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”;
(ii) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”;
(c) in subsection (3) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(d) in subsection (4) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General”.
(4) In section 29 (confidentiality etc), in subsection (3)—
(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;
(b) for “its” substitute “the Director General’s”;
(c) in paragraph (a), for “Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(d) in paragraph (b), for “Commission” substitute Director General”.
Police and Justice Act 2006 (c. 48)
68 (1) In section 41 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 (immigration and asylum enforcement functions and customs functions: complaints and misconduct)—
(a) in subsection (1) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct (“the Director General”)”;
(b) in subsection (2A) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(c) in subsection (3) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(d) in subsection (4)(b), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(e) in subsection (5) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General”;
(f) in subsection (6) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in both places, substitute “Director General.
(2) In the heading before that section for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”
Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (c. 20)
69 In section 107EE of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (section 107EA orders: complaints and conduct matters etc) (as inserted by this Act), in subsection (5)(b) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c. 25)
70 In section 47 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (meaning of “interested person”)—
(a) in subsection (2)(k) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”;
(b) in subsection (5) for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct”.
Equality Act 2010 (c. 15)
71 In Part 1 of Schedule 19 to the Equality Act 2010 (public authorities: general), under the heading “Police” omit the entry relating to the Independent Police Complaints Commission and insert at the appropriate place—
“The Office for Police Conduct”.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (c. 13)
72 (1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 65 (disqualification from election or holding office as police and crime commissioner: police grounds), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission” substitute “Office for Police Conduct”.
(3) In Schedule 7 (regulations about complaints and conduct matters), for “Independent Police Complaints Commission”, in each place, substitute “Director General of the Office for Police Conduct.”—(Mike Penning.)
This new Schedule contains amendments to the Police Reform Act 2002 and other enactments in connection with the re-naming of the Independent Police Complaints Commission as the Office for Police Conduct and the creation of the new position of Director General.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Clauses 108 and 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 110
Extent
Amendments made: 149, in clause 110, page 109, line 23, leave out “paragraph” and insert “paragraphs 15E and”.
This amendment and amendment 150 provide for the consequential amendment to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in amendment 108 to extend to the whole of the United Kingdom, reflecting the geographical extent of that Act.
Amendment 150, in clause 110, page 109, line 23, leave out “that paragraph” and insert “those paragraphs”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 149.
Amendment 216, in clause 110, page 109, line 24, at end insert—
“() section (Combined authority mayors: exercise of fire and rescue functions)(11);”.
This amendment provides for the amendment to Schedule 1 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 in NC22 to extend to the whole of the United Kingdom, reflecting the geographical extent of that provision.
Amendment 154, in clause 110, page 109, line 28, at end insert—
“( ) section 22(8), so far as relating to paragraphs 1 to 5 of Schedule (Disciplinary proceedings: former members of MoD Police, British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary), and those paragraphs;”.
This amendment is consequential on NS1.
Amendment 217, in clause 110, page 109, line 28, at end insert—
“( ) section (References to England and Wales in connection with IPCC functions)(2) and (3);”.
This amendment is consequential on NC23.
Amendment 218, in clause 110, page 109, line 39, after “sections” insert “62(2) to (5),”.
This amendment, together with amendment 219, provides expressly for the procedure relating to the exercise of the regulation-making power in clause 62(3)(f) to form part of the law of the United Kingdom. The regulation-making power may be used to add to the list of persons who are law enforcement officers for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 4 and who may therefore exercise the maritime enforcement powers in hot pursuit by virtue of clause 64 (which also extends to the United Kingdom).
Amendment 219, in clause 110, page 109, line 39, leave out from “73” to end of line 40.
Please see the explanatory statement to amendment 218.
Amendment 220, in clause 110, page 109, line 40, at end insert—
“( ) sections (Application of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: general)(2) to (7), (Exercise of maritime enforcement powers in hot pursuit in connection with Scottish offences) to (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: other supplementary provision) and (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: interpretation);”.
This amendment, together with amendment 224, set out the extent of NC29 to NC39.
Amendment 151, in clause 110, page 110, line 3, leave out “and 13” and insert “, 12E to 12G, 12L, 12N, 12AE, 12AH, 12AL to 12AS, 14A to 14D, 15D and 17C”.
This amendment provides for certain of the consequential amendments in amendments 106 to 109 to extend to England and Wales and Scotland, reflecting the geographical extent of the Acts they amend.
Amendment 221, in clause 110, page 110, line 5, at end insert—
“() section (Combined authority mayors: exercise of fire and rescue functions)(5) and (8);”.
This amendment provides for the amendments to section 26 of the Fire Services Act 1947 and section 34 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 in NC22 to extend to Great Britain, reflecting the geographical extent of those provisions.
Amendment 152, in clause 110, page 110, line 7, leave out “and 104” and insert “, 104 and 114”.
This amendment provides for the consequential amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in paragraph 114 of Schedule 2 to extend to England and Wales and Scotland, reflecting the geographical extent of that Act.
Amendment 153, in clause 110, page 110, line 7, at end insert—
“( ) section22(8), so far as relating to paragraphs 6 to 14 of Schedule (Disciplinary proceedings: former members of MoD Police, British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary), and those paragraphs;”.
This amendment is consequential on the new Schedule NS1.
Amendment 222, in clause 110, page 110, line 7, at end insert—
“() section (Office for Police Conduct)(9), so far as relating to paragraphs 61 and 71 of Schedule (Office for Police Conduct), and those paragraphs;”.
This amendment provides for specified amendments in Part 3 of NS2 to have the same extent as the provisions amended.
Amendment 223, in clause 110, page 110, line 15, at end insert—
‘( ) Section (Office for Police Conduct)(9), so far as relating to paragraphs 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67 and 68 of Schedule (Office for Police Conduct), and those paragraphs, extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.”.
This amendment provides for specified amendments in Part 3 of NS2 to have the same extent as the provisions amended.
Amendment 226, in clause 110, page 110, line 17, after “paragraphs,” insert
“and sections (Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel) and (Offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel: interpretation)”.
This amendment provides for NC41 and NC42 to extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
Amendment 224, in clause 110, page 110, line 19, leave out “extends” and insert
“and (Application of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: general)(1) and (8), (Restriction on exercise of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences) and (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: obstruction etc) extend”.—(Mike Penning.)
Please see the explanatory statement for amendment 220.
Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 111
Commencement
Amendment made: 225, in clause 111, page 110, line 41, at end insert—
‘( ) Before making regulations appointing a day for the coming into force of any provision of sections (Application of maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: general) to (Maritime enforcement powers in connection with Scottish offences: interpretation) the Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers.”. —(Mike Penning.)
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before bringing NC29 to NC39 into force.
Clause 111, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 112 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mike Penning
On a point of order, Mr Howarth. As is customary as we come to the conclusion of the Committee stage, we as joint Ministers will put some votes of thanks together, particularly to you, Mr Howarth, and to your co-chair, Mr Nuttall. Both of you have been very pragmatic in expediting the Bill.
I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary. She is the new crime Minister, having taken over crime responsibilities from myself, when I took on something called fire.
I turn to the Opposition Front Bench, and I hope that this goes on the record. I think that this is the way that Bills should be scrutinised: agree on what we agree on, disagree on what we disagree on and talk sensibly inside and outside the Committee. We will never agree on everything but we can see that a rather large Bill has gone through Committee stage in probably record time, but with scrutiny in the areas of disagreement. I think that that is right. I pay tribute to the Opposition Front-Bench spokespeople.
My own Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover, has expedited these discussions brilliantly, together with his opposite number, the hon. Member for Manchester, Withington: the Whips Office has done expertly. We have to say that, don’t we?
My Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley is missing—it is outrageous —so I have a trainee PPS, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes, who has been doing absolutely brilliantly. I do not think she managed to pass me anything at all, which is very good.
The Bill managers have done brilliantly well. If I have the list right, the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Treasury, the Department for Transport, the Department of Health, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the devolved Assemblies and Administrations, and the Wales Office, the Scotland Office and the Northern Ireland Office—I have probably missed one or two off—have all been part of a very large but very important Bill, and been part of the process. Legislation will obviously come forward through the Bill based on that.
Hansard, who hate me, because I never pass any notes to them—thank you very much indeed. The Doorkeepers have also done brilliantly well. Can I particularly thank the people who I give the hardest time to: the lawyers in the Home Office?
Jack Dromey
Further to that point of order, Mr Howarth. First, in terms of the team behind the Bill, can I thank the Clerks and all those who have worked with us throughout the Committee stage, for their professional support at all hours of the day and night, as we discovered on one particular occasion? Secondly, like the Police Minister—
Jack Dromey
Like the Policing and Fire Minister, I thank all those who have supervised our proceedings, including the Doorkeepers and Hansard, all of whom play a very important role.
I want to come straight to the heart of one thing that the Policing and Fire Minister said. The Bill has been professionally debated, with substantial common ground. Where there has not been common ground, we have disagreed not for the sake of it but in order to focus on areas in need of further probing and areas of disagreement. On the former, I welcome some of the commitments given to next-stage dialogue on issues relating to children and mental health. We will take advantage of the offers made. On the latter, there are areas of disagreement, particularly in relation to fire and volunteers. There are also areas where we hope the Government will go further in the next stages, such as pre-trial bail. All these things have been properly rehearsed, recorded and debated in the Committee.
Finally, I thank all Committee members. The debate has been conducted in a good-humoured way throughout. I also particularly thank my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, for her prodigious efforts throughout the Bill’s passage. We look forward to Report.
The Chair
On behalf of all those who must remain silent, I thank Committee members for the tributes that they have paid to everybody involved, including the Doorkeepers, Hansard, the Clerks and those who serve the Ministers. On behalf of my co-Chair and myself, I thank the Front Benchers and every individual Committee member. You would be amazed how often the Chair gets it wrong. Thank you for not noticing. It has been a good-humoured Committee, as has already been observed. Co-operation with the Chair has been excellent. On behalf of my co-Chair and myself, I thank each and every Committee member for that co-operation and good humour.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
Investigatory Powers Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
The Chair
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Would everyone please ensure that all mobile phones and other electronic devices are switched into silent mode?
We first consider a motion to amend the programme motion agreed by the Committee on 24 March. The motion is on the amendment paper in the Minister’s name. I remind Members that the Standing Orders provide that a Minister must make such a motion and that if any member of the Committee signifies an objection, the proceedings on the motion will lapse. I call the Whip to move the motion.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 24 March 2016 be varied so that the Committee shall meet at 4.30 pm and 7.00 pm on Tuesday 3 May instead of at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on that day.—(Simon Kirby.)
The Chair
I should like to tell Members that, as a general rule, I and my fellow Chair do not intend to call starred amendments. The required notice period in Public Bill Committees is three working days, therefore amendments should be tabled by the rise of the House on Monday for consideration on Thursday and by the rise of the House on Thursday for consideration on the following Tuesday.
The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the website. It shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for the debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same, or a similar, issue. A Member who has put their name to the leading amendment is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments in the group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate. At the end of the debate I shall call again the Member who moved the leading amendment and, before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendments or new clauses in a group to a vote, they need to let me know. I shall work on the assumption that the Minister wishes the Committee to reach a decision on all Government amendments.
Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. In other words, the debate occurs according to the selection and grouping list. Decisions are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. New clauses are decided after we have finished with the existing text, so after consideration of clause 232. I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules, following the debate on the relevant amendments. I hope that that is helpful.
Clause 1
Overview of Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
I welcome you to the Chair, Ms Dorries. It is a delight to serve under your stewardship. I also welcome all members of the Committee.
Clause 1 provides an overview of the Bill and, for that reason—and with your indulgence, Ms Dorries—it is perhaps worth my setting our consideration in context. The Bill is significant, bringing together as it does for the first time a set of powers currently used by the intelligence agencies and law enforcement. It adds checks and balances regarding authorisation and oversight, and provides a degree of certainty regarding those powers and those checks and balances, which up until now has not been there in that form. It certainly provides greater navigability. Many of the powers are contained in a variety of legislation passed over time, so the point made by the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee on Second Reading of the draft Bill—that it is hard to navigate the legislation that supports the powers—was well made. The Bill provides greater transparency and, I hope, greater clarity.
It is important to understand that privacy is at the very core of the Bill. Clause 1 deals with that core. There have been calls, and we may hear them again during our consideration, for privacy to be defined more explicitly, but my counter view, without wishing to be unnecessarily contentious at this early stage, is that privacy runs through the very fabric of the Bill and that to separate it out—to desiccate it in that way—would weaken the commitment to privacy that is at the heart of the legislation. The protection of private interests and the protection of the public are at the heart of all we seek to do in the Bill. In my view, it is therefore unacceptable to limit the privacy provisions to a single clause.
Perhaps it would be advisable for me to give a little more detail about what the Bill does in respect of privacy. By underpinning the powers and sensitive capabilities available to law enforcement and security services, the Bill provides—as successive Governments have, by the way—an appropriate degree of oversight of those powers. Furthermore, through the change to authorisation—for the first time and in groundbreaking terms—they answer the call of those who have argued that both the political masters who drive these things and the judiciary should play a part in reinforcing those safeguards, based very much on the core principle of necessity and proportionality which applies to all such powers.
It is fair to say that in sweeping away some of the cobwebs that surrounded the powers I have described—certainly in the view of some of their critics—the provisions here shed a light on some of the most sensitive powers available to our intelligence and security agencies. It follows absolutely the direction provided by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, that the capability examined in the Corston review of investigatory powers should be avowed and put on a statutory footing.
It is important that the public and Parliament understand that the powers I describe are there to keep us safe. It is also important that those powers are constrained in the way I have briefly described. The Bill places very strict controls on the use of those powers. They reflect the proposals of the 2015 report by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee on privacy and security. They include limitations around who can use each of the powers; for what purposes and in what circumstances; how information can be obtained under the powers must be protected; when it can be shared and in what circumstances it must be destroyed; and, perhaps most importantly, the penalties—including criminal sanctions—for improper use of the powers.
In addition, the Bill delivers the strongest possible safeguards for the way the powers are authorised. I have spoken about the groundbreaking introduction of the double lock which means that politicians and the judiciary are involved in authorising powers. This maintains democratic accountability and adds a new element of judicial independence. No doubt we will discuss this in subsequent consideration of the Bill. Indeed, I note that amendments have been tabled that will allow us to do just that. However, I remain of the view that it is very important that this House and Ministers play a key part in the business of authorising these powers. The introduction of judges into the process of issuing warrants represents a highly significant change to the way the security and intelligence agencies operate—perhaps one of the most significant changes since they began in the last century. These things are not done lightly and should not be taken for granted. It is a very important change.
I spoke earlier about oversight and the Bill also introduces world-leading new oversight provisions, drawing together some of what is done already but adding visibility and transparency in the way that I mentioned. This is an opportunity for the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be an effective advocate for the public. The commissioner will have unfettered access to the work of the security and intelligence agencies and new powers to inform people who have suffered as a result of serious errors. He or she will leave no question in the minds of the public or that of Parliament that these powers are used within both the letter and the spirit of the law.
Returning to my initial point about the clause, let us reflect on what the privacy safeguards amount to. In essence, they reflect the collective consideration of the three independent reviews and three Parliamentary Committees that preceded the Committee’s consideration of the Bill. There have been those who have surprisingly—some might say remarkably or incredibly—argued that the Bill has been rushed in some way. My goodness, I cannot remember a single other piece of legislation in my time in Parliament that has been published in draft preceded by three independent reports; has then been considered by three separate Committees of the House; and published in its full form and debated on Second Reading. The Bill is about to have consideration of the most serious kind—I say that, looking around at the cerebral members of the Committee—and will then, of course, proceed to the other place for similar scrutiny. I hesitate to say that it is unprecedented, but it is quite unusual and reflects the Government’s absolute determination to get this right. I hope that the Committee will move ahead as one in our determination to put both these powers and the safeguards—the checks and balances—in place.
The consideration of the Bill that has already taken place covers the vast proportion of the clauses. No doubt we will refer to some of those reports during the next few days and weeks. I am absolutely sure that all members of the Committee want what I want—for this legislation to be in a form that engenders complete confidence that those whose mission is to keep us safe have what they need to do so, but that the checks on the exercise of their powers are rigorous, robust and transparent. In that spirit, and with that hope about the further consideration, I commend clause 1 to the Committee.
Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Ms Dorries. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Our starting position is that in the aftermath of attacks such as those we have recently seen in Brussels, which are only the latest in a series of similar attacks, there can be no doubt that the security and intelligence services and law enforcement agencies need all the powers that are necessary and proportionate to deal with serious threats. That is the starting position on the Bill, so far as the Labour party is concerned.
As the Minister has said, it is a good thing that the powers that had previously been exercised by the security and intelligence services are now avowed on the face of the Bill. That is welcome, but those powers also need to be justified, clearly defined and limited, and there must be proper safeguards. The Opposition’s proper role in the process we are about to undertake is to robustly challenge the Bill’s provisions where they do not meet those criteria and to push back and probe. Through that process, we hopefully will improve the final product so that the Bill achieves what it needs to achieve, but goes no further than what is necessary and proportionate.
On justification, as the Minister no doubt knows, the shadow Home Secretary wrote to the Home Secretary on 4 April making a number of points, one of which was the need for a better assessment of the operational case and, in particular, an independent assessment of bulk powers. He said:
“Whilst I accept the broad argument advanced by the authorities that powers to extract information in bulk form may provide the only way of identifying those who pose a risk to the public, the operational case for bulk powers which accompanied the Bill’s publication has significant gaps. This was clear from contributions made at Second Reading from both sides of the House.”
Anyone who reads the operational cases will see that they are slim indeed, and more than half the printed case is introductory matter.
The shadow Home Secretary suggests in the letter that
“the simplest way to proceed would be, firstly, to produce a more detailed operational case and, secondly, to accept the recommendation of the Joint Committee and commission an independent review of all the bulk powers.”
The Labour party suggests that that review should conclude in time to inform Report and Third Reading. Obviously the Minister will probably not want to deal with the matter here and now, but I ask that a reply to the letter be prepared as soon as possible so that we can move forward on that issue.
The letter also deals with concerns about internet connection records, which we will deal with when we come to the appropriate clauses, but it particularly highlights the problems of definition in clause 54 and the question of the threshold for accessing internet connection records along with other comms data.
The letter also talks about the
“definitions of ‘national security’ and ‘economic well-being’”,
which we will probably start to debate today. The letter also raises meaningful judicial authorisation and oversight and the need for an overarching criminal offence of deliberate misuse and for effective protections for sensitive professions. Can a reply to the letter be prepared as soon as possible so that we can move forward, particularly on the operational case? If there is more work to be done, the sooner it starts the better. With luck it can then be finished in time for the next stage, which is Third Reading. Will the Minister ensure that there is a speedy response to that letter?
On the question of privacy provision, I listened carefully to what the Minister said. The recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee was that there should be general safeguards on privacy. Clause 1 does not provide that. The Minister says that the safeguards run through the Bill. I will make the cheap point, but I will make it quickly. The only amendment to part 1 in response to the Intelligence and Security Committee was the insertion of the word “privacy” in the title. It used to say “General protections”, and it now says “General privacy protections”. However, clause 1 in itself is clearly not enough. It is true that there are safeguards in the Bill, but there is also considerable inconsistency, and that is where overarching principles would play their part.
I will flag up for the Committee three examples of that inconsistency. It is the sort of inconsistency that an overarching provision would deal with. The first is in the draft code of practice on the interception of communications that is before the Committee, which we will consider further this morning. There is a strong proposition in paragraph 4.7 of the draft code, under the heading:
“Is the investigatory power under consideration appropriate in the specific circumstances?”
It states:
“No interference with privacy should be considered proportionate if the information which is sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means.”
So there is a clear proposition on necessity; it is not necessary if information can be obtained by other less intrusive means.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I welcome you to the Chair, Ms Dorries and it is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship. I would like to make some brief opening remarks on behalf of the Scottish National party in response to the Minister. We acknowledge the attempt to codify and modernise the law, and we think that the attempt is laudable. However, we think that the execution of this attempt is not laudable. We believe that there has been a rush to legislate, and it is not only we who say that. Members will remember that, when evidence was given to the Committee by Jo Cavan, the head of the Interception Commissioner’s Office, she spoke of an aggressive timeline for the Bill. When I asked her to elaborate on that, she said:
“It is a really complicated and significant piece of legislation. Although I broadly support the Bill, because it is a good thing to put a number of the powers used by the intelligence agencies on a clearer statutory footing and to try to improve transparency, I do think that the scrutiny process has been very hurried. That is of concern because there are some significant privacy implications to the clauses in the Bill. There is still a long way to go towards strengthening some of the safeguards. Also, a lot of the operational detail is in the codes of practice. It is really important that those are scrutinised properly, line by line.”––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 70.]
She agreed with me that the time afforded for scrutiny of the Bill is inadequate, particularly with regards to the international legal implications of aspects of the Bill.
Mr Hayes
I have no wish to delay us unduly or indeed to embarrass the hon. and learned Lady, but I remember the evidence that was given. As she will remember, I challenged the witness on it because, as I said earlier, I cannot recall another piece of legislation that has enjoyed such close scrutiny over such a period of time. Can the hon. and learned Lady think of another such piece of legislation?
Joanna Cherry
I do not recall legislation of such detail and such constitutional significance. I have only been in this House for nine months, but I have followed the operation of this House closely since I was a teenager. This is a massive Bill, and it is its constitutional significance that matters. I chaired an event last night at which the chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales spoke. She raised her concerns about the rush to legislate because of the constitutional significance of the legislation and its implications for the rule of law. The Minister does not embarrass me at all. I wholeheartedly stand by what I say. It is a widely held view, across parties and across society, that there is not sufficient time for the scrutiny of this legislation.
Joanna Cherry
I will make some progress, if I may. I would like to echo the comments of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the proper role of the Opposition, which I spoke about on Second Reading. As he said, it is the proper role of the Opposition to robustly challenge the legislation, to push back on it and to probe, hopefully with a view to improving it. That is why my party did not vote the legislation down on Second Reading. We are honestly engaged here in a process of improvement, but if the Government are not prepared to listen to us then we may well vote against the legislation at a later stage.
I echo what the hon. and learned Gentleman said about the failure to amend the draft Bill to deal with the ISC concerns regarding the lack of overarching principles on privacy. I also strongly echo what he said about a request for the Minister to clarify how the Committee is to approach the codes of practice which, as the hon. and learned Gentleman said, this Committee does not have the power to amend, and which contain some enormously important detail. Jo Cavan, the head of the Interception Commissioner’s Office, also drew attention to that in her evidence.
On Second Reading on the Floor of the House, I promised to table radical amendments. The SNP has tabled radical amendments to the part of the Bill we will look at today. We want to ensure that surveillance is targeted, that it is based on reasonable suspicion, and that it is permitted only after a warrant has been issued by a judge rather than by a politician. We want to expand the category of information which will be accessible only by warrant, and to ensure that warrants may not be provided without proper justification. We also want to remove the widely drafted provisions of the Bill that would allow modification of warrants and urgent warrants without any judicial oversight. Those provisions, if they remain in the Bill, will drive a coach and horses through the so-called double-lock protection in the legislation.
We have also laid amendments to ensure a proper and consistent approach to the safeguards afforded to members of the public who correspond with lawyers, parliamentarians and journalists. We want to put a public interest defence into the offence of disclosure of the existence of a warrant. Those are the sort of radical, principled amendments that we believe are required to render parts 1 and 2 of the Bill compliant with international human rights law, bring the Bill into line with practice in other western democracies and meet the concerns of the UN special rapporteur on the right to privacy. We recognise that the security services and the police require adequate powers to fight terrorism and serious crime, but the powers must be shown to be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with law. If the House is not about the rule of law, it is about nothing.
Simon Hoare
I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way. I do not agree with her and her party that the Bill is the constitutional earthquake they represent it to be. However, she has just referenced a point that would mean constitutional upheaval, if I heard her correctly—namely, to remove any political input, and therefore democratic accountability, to this House and to elected Members, and to bypass it all to unelected, unaccountable judges, though I mean that in no pejorative sense. To effectively create massive cleavage between democratic accountability and the day-to-day action allowing those things to go ahead would be a constitutional upheaval. Have the hon. and learned Lady and her party colleagues considered that viewpoint in that context?
Joanna Cherry
We have considered it in detail and I will be addressing it later in my submissions to the Committee. The hon. Gentleman and I will have to differ in our view on this. I do not consider that there is anything constitutionally unusual in judges being solely responsible for the issue of warrants. That happens in a lot of other western democracies—it is called the separation of powers. The idea that Ministers are democratically accountable to this House for the issuance of warrants on the grounds of national security is nonsense. I will explain later why I consider that to be so.
I was trying to stress that the SNP position is that we recognise the necessity of having adequate powers. I hope to be writing the security policy for an independent Scotland before I am an old lady and I would want to have a responsible, modern security policy that dovetails with that of England and other countries in these islands, but I want to model it on what other western democracies are doing, rather than going as far as this Bill, which, without proper justification, goes beyond what other western democracies do. The SNP intends to table amendments to deal with what I called on Second Reading the fantastically intrusive provisions of this Bill regarding internet connection records and bulk powers. We also want to look at ensuring a proper oversight commission, but that is for a later date. I look forward to addressing amendments on parts 1 and 2 of the Bill.
Mr Hayes
The shadow Minister raised a number of issues, some of which related to the letter he mentioned—I have a copy—which the shadow Home Secretary sent to the Home Secretary. This consideration is an answer to the letter; I might even go so far as to say that I am the personification of the answer to the letter. None the less, it is important that a reply is drawn up, not least because that reply will be useful to the Opposition in helping to frame their further ideas. For that reason, I will ensure that a reply to the letter is sent in good time, so that all members of the Committee, mindful of that response to the original letter, can form their consideration accordingly..
Keir Starmer
I accept that we will deal with most of the points in the letter when we get to specific clauses—that is an appropriate way forward. The issue of most concern in the letter, which I ask the Minister to consider, is that of the independent assessment of bulk powers. The Committee will not be looking at the operational case in the way that is called for in the letter. It is simply a timing issue: if there is to be any movement here, it needs to be quick. A speedy response would be welcome.
Mr Hayes
Let me deal with that specific point. It is true that there will always be a debate about what is on the face of Bills and what is in supporting documentation. The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned the codes of practice. I emphasise these are draft codes of practice and, of course, it is important that the consideration by the Committee informs how their final version will be framed. The reason we published them was partly so that we could have a better debate here and learn from it in drawing up the final codes of practice.
The hon. and learned Gentleman will know very well that there is a perennial argument about how much is placed on the face of the Bills because of the problem that creates in terms of rigidity, particularly in highly dynamic circumstances, such as those we face in relation to some of these matters. However, I accept that from a legal perspective what is on the face of the Bill adds additional weight to the protections that the hon. and learned Gentleman seeks. I understand that argument and have no doubt it will permeate much of what we consider. I re-emphasise that the codes of practice are themselves not set in stone and will undoubtedly metamorphose as a result of our considerations.
The hon. and learned Gentleman raised a second point in respect of bulk powers and particularly the operational case that needs to be made for such powers. This is a highly sensitive issue. All Governments of all political persuasions have recognised that, because we are dealing with some matters that cannot be debated publicly. That applies to the operational case that the Security Services might need to make when requesting powers to intercept communications, for example, but it could be the case with a number of other powers.
Furthermore, I accept that there are particular sensitivities in respect of bulk powers. The hon. and learned Gentleman and the Committee have been briefed by the intelligence and security services as part of our considerations. He will know that GCHQ use bulk powers very extensively in a number of highly sensitive operations, and there is a limit to how much of that can be placed on the face of the Bill or even made available more widely.
The hon. and learned Gentleman will also know that the Intelligence and Security Committee has privileged access to more information than the House as a whole. It exists, in part, for that purpose. It provides a means by which the Government can be held to account by a Committee made up of members of all political parties in this House. The case that the shadow Home Secretary makes on the definition of the operational case for exercise of these powers is something that we will consider. However, I emphasise that we are treading on quite sensitive ground here and there may be a limit to how far the Home Secretary or I can go. I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman will want to acknowledge that.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful that the Minister will give further consideration to the matter. The reason it is of great concern is because, first, we are being asked to approve new powers in the Bill. I accept that some of the powers are obviously avowal of existing powers, but there are new powers and internet connection records is one. Of the avowal powers, this is the first time that Parliament has had the chance to debate them, so they are new to Parliament in that sense.
I take the point that members of the Committee have been briefed and some of us have experience of the operation of some of these powers, but therein lies part of the problem. I think there is a democratic deficit if we proceed only on the basis that a select number of people can know the detail, but the public cannot. Of course there are sensitivities. I do not think anyone is suggesting that a full operational case without any modifications, redactions and so on, could be published. I ask for consideration of something more than what we have that allows for independent assessment, which does not necessarily need to take place in the public domain, but can be viewed through the eyes of the informed member of the public who wants to be assured about the necessity of the powers without having to listen to politicians or others saying, “We’ve been briefed; trust us”, because in this day and age that approach is no longer acceptable. I hope the Minister and others will try to see this through the eyes of the informed and concerned member of the public who wants to be assured about what the Bill is actually bringing forth for the security and intelligence services and law enforcement.
Mr Hayes
I do not want to get into a great debate about this now because we are at the beginning of the Bill and this will come up again during further consideration. I acknowledge that the hon. and learned Gentleman has recognised there is a sensitivity about how much can be put in the Bill and how much can be debated in a public forum. He is right that we tread a tightrope between making sure that we have public confidence that the system is fit for purpose, but also proportionate, and on the other hand not tying the hands of those wishing to keep us safe. That is the tightrope that every Government of all persuasions has had to walk.
Whether the hon. and learned Gentleman is right about a changing public mood is more debatable. Most surveys of the public mood suggest a very high level of confidence in our intelligence and security services and the powers that they exercise, so I am not sure there is a great public clamour for them not to be able to do some of the things they have to do. Contextually, given the threat we now face, I suspect most of the public would say they need absolutely all the powers necessary to face down that threat, so I am not absolutely sure that we do not occasionally see these things through the prism of a chattering class view of what the public should think, rather than what the public actually think. I am committed to the idea of politicians continuing to be involved in these things, because we have a regular and direct link to the British public and are in a pretty good position to gauge what their attitudes to such matters might be. So the issues are sensitive, but I appreciate the spirit and tone of the hon. and learned Gentleman and I am determined that we get this right in a way that we can both be comfortable with in the end.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asked how we might subsequently deal with issues around authorisation. We will have a chance to debate that at greater length as we go through the Bill, so it would be inappropriate to do so now. That point was made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. I think we are going to disagree about quite a lot of these matters, not because I do not want to move ahead in the spirit of generosity and unanimity where we can possibly do so, but I think that my position is more like that of the former Home Secretaries who gave evidence to the Committee, Lord Reid and Charles Clarke, who were very clear that the involvement of Ministers in authorising powers is an important way in which the public can be represented in these areas. Ministers bring a particular insight to such work. I was unsurprised by their consideration, but pleased that they were able to reinforce the view that I know is held by almost everyone who has been involved in the warranting process in modern times.
We heard from the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson), in similar vein. Indeed, he was doubtful about giving judges any role in the process at all, and many others take that view. The Government, however—always anxious to achieve balance and compromise—developed the double-lock, which the hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned. It retains the involvement of Ministers, as Lord Reid and others argued we should, but introduces judicial involvement and, one might argue, adds a greater degree of empiricism to the process, as David Anderson recommended in his report.
Joanna Cherry
The Minister will recall that, under questioning by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, Lord Judge, in his evidence to this Committee, expressed concern about the phrase “judicial review”. He said that it
“is a very easy phrase to use. It sounds convincing, but it means different things to different people…Personally, I think that when Parliament is creating structures such as these, it should define what it means by ‘judicial review’. What test will be applied by the judicial…commissioner, so that he knows what his function is, the Secretary of State knows what the areas of responsibility are and the public know exactly who decides what and in what circumstances? I myself do not think that judicial review is a sufficient indication of those matters.”––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 69, Q220.]
What are the Government going to do to take on board what that distinguished judge had to say about this matter?
Mr Hayes
Yes, but Lord Judge also went on to say in the same evidence session that what really matters is what Parliament actually wants. He wanted to be clear about what Parliament wants and to respond accordingly. I heard what Lord Judge said, but I also heard what Lord Reid and Charles Clarke said. Frankly, I see no evidence that the warranting process is not considered carefully by Ministers, that they do not take that work incredibly seriously, that they do not seek all the information they need to exercise reasonable judgment and that they do not apply the tests of necessity and proportionality diligently. Neither this Committee nor the Joint Committee heard evidence to suggest that there is anything faulty in that system.
I am a conservative, so I would be expected to say that if something works there is no good reason for changing it, but because I want to be moderate and reasonable—notwithstanding my conservatism—we introduced the double-lock. My goodness, we have already gone a very long way down the road.
Keir Starmer
We are going to get to this issue in due course. I will not take long, but it is important that I set it up, because the more thinking that can be done now, the more quickly we can deal with it when it comes up. There are two different issues. Lord Reid talked about whether the judiciary should be involved at all. Lord Judge asked, assuming that they are involved, about the test that they are to apply. He was concerned about judicial review because, as everybody knows, there are different forms of judicial review. Sometimes it involves close scrutiny, where the judges virtually make the decision themselves. In other circumstances, there is much more deference. He was concerned that, within that range, it is not clear what the judges are being asked to do.
There were a number of references in the questioning and on Second Reading to the necessity and proportionality tests. Of course, that is what the Secretary of State considers, but the judges’ function is different. On the face of the statute, their function is to review. The question is, what does that mean? We tabled amendments to that end. It is important that we do not confuse this matter. Lord Judge identified something very important, and when someone as distinguished as him says that what is on the face of the Bill is not clear enough, we have all got to go away and have a good, hard look at what the words are.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that we should not debate things that are going to be debated later—Ms Dorries, you will draw me to order if I do so anyway. The important issues around judicial review principles will be debated when we come to a subsequent amendment. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General will deal with those matters. Lord Judge drew attention to the basis on which the double-lock will operate. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right about that. My point in response to the hon. and learned Lady’s argument was about whether politicians should be involved in the process at all. I do not mean to be unkind to the hon. and learned Gentleman, and I certainly do not want to start off in anything other than a convivial spirit. However, given that the shadow Home Secretary’s letter talks about an equal lock, given that he has argued for the simultaneous presentation of the material to both parties and given the great debate about the same information being available to the judicial commissioner and the Home Secretary, I was slightly surprised to find that amendments had been tabled that would take the Home Secretary out of the process altogether.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Tort or delict of unlawful interception—
“Any interception of a communication which is carried out without lawful authority at any place in the United Kingdom by, or with the express or implied consent of, a person having the right to control the operation or the use of a private telecommunication system shall be actionable by the sender or recipient, or intended recipient, of the communication if it is either—
(a) an interception of that communication in the course of its transmission by means of that private system; or
(b) an interception of that communication in the course of its transmission, by means of a public telecommunication system, to or from apparatus comprised in that private telecommunication system.”
This new clause creates a civil wrong of unlawful interception.
Joanna Cherry
I will deal with new clause 3 in fairly short compass. The amendment was suggested to me by the Scottish division of Pen International, which is a world association of writers. It would introduce a tort, or a delict as we call it in Scotland, for unlawful interception. Such a tort or delict exists already as a result of section 1(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and I am not entirely sure why it has not been replicated in the Bill. I would be interested to hear from the Solicitor General or the Minister for Security why the Government did not include the measure in the Bill, and whether they will give it serious consideration. It would give a meaningful avenue of recourse and act as a motivation to intelligence agencies, police forces and the Government to ensure that all interception is lawfully authorised, on pain of an action for damages if it is not properly authorised. It is really a very simple new clause modelled on section 1(3) of RIPA. I am interested to hear what the Government have to say about this suggestion.
The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)
It is a pleasure to take this first opportunity to say that I am looking forward to serving under your chairmanship, Ms Dorries, and indeed to serving with all colleagues on the Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for making her observations in a succinct and clear way. I am able to answer her directly about the approach that we are taking. One of the aims of the Bill is to streamline provisions to make them as clear and easy to understand as possible. She is quite right in saying that RIPA had within it this provision—a tort or a delict, as it is called north of the border, that would allow an individual to take action against a person who has the right to control the use or operation of a private telecommunications system and to intercept communication on that system.
The Government have fielded a number of inquiries about the non-inclusion of the RIPA provision in the Bill. The circumstances in which it applies are extremely limited, and as far as we are aware it has never been relied on in the 15 years of RIPA’s operation. The provision applies only in limited circumstances because it applies to interception on a private telecommunications system, such as a company’s internal email or telephone system. Where the person with the right to control the use or operation of the system is a public authority, there are of course rights of redress under the Human Rights Act 1998, such as article 8 rights.
The Bill is intended to make the protections enjoyed by the public much clearer and we feel that introducing that course of action or replicating it would not add to that essential clarity, but I have listened carefully to the hon. and learned Lady and we are happy to look again at the issue in the light of her concerns. On that basis, I invite her not to press her new clause and I hope we can return to the matter on Report.
Joanna Cherry
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his constructive approach. I am happy not to press the new clause at this stage on the basis that the Government will look at it. I am happy to receive any suggestions about the drafting, which is mine. I had some discussions about the terms of the drafting with Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland and James Wolffe, the dean of the Faculty of Advocates, but any infelicities are my fault alone. I would be happy to discuss the drafting with the Government.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Definition of “interception” etc.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
There are no amendments tabled to the clause, which we support, but I say for the record and for clarification that what is welcome in clause 3 is the spelling out in legislation of the extent of an interception—an issue that has bedevilled some recent criminal cases. Importantly, as the explanatory notes make clear, it is now provided in clear terms that voicemails remaining on a system, emails and text messages read but not deleted and draft messages stored on a system will count within the phrase “in the course of transmission” and will therefore be covered by the offence. We welcome that. I wanted to emphasise that point and put it on the record, because a lot of time and effort was spent when that phrase was not so clearly defined.
The Solicitor General
I am extremely grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. He is right: we have moved a long way from phone tapping, which he, I and many others understood to be clear interception whereas, for example, the recording and monitoring of communications at either end of the process was not interception. As he rightly says, the internet and email have caught up with us, so as part of the Government’s thrust to have greater clarity and simplicity, this essential definition is a welcome part of the statutory framework that now exists.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 4 and 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Monetary penalties for certain unlawful interceptions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
Again no amendments are tabled to the clause, but there are some questions that arise from it. The explanatory notes say, and it is clear in the Bill, that the clause creates a power for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to impose fines where an interception has been carried out, but there was no intention. It relates to action that might otherwise be an offence, but the intention element is not made out. Against that background, I have some questions for the Solicitor General.
If the power applies where an interception is carried out but there was no intention to do so, it is hardly likely to have a deterrent effect because the person did not intend to do it in the first place, so what is the rationale and purpose of this provision? It is clear in schedule 1, which is related to clause 6, that the commissioner has very wide discretion in relation to the operation of the powers under the clause including, in paragraph 13, powers to require information from individuals
“for the purpose of deciding whether to serve”
an enforcement notice. Thus we have a provision that is premised on a non-intentional interception that then triggers quite extensive powers to require information with penalties for failure to provide that information. Schedule 1 states that guidance will be published on how the powers are to be exercised, but what is the real rationale and purpose? Why are the powers as extensive as they are and will the Minister commit to the guidance envisaged under schedule 1 being made public?
In clause 6(3)(c) there is reference to a consideration by the Commissioner that
“the person was not…making an attempt to act in accordance with an interception warrant”,
which suggests that that is outside the scheme of the provision. We have also noted that the provision relates only to a public telecommunications system. It is in many ways supplementary or complementary and we are not questioning it in that sense, but there is a number of unanswered questions. If we are to scrutinise and probe, it would be helpful to have those answered now if possible, and if it is not answered in writing.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for his questions. I assure him that there is a very good rationale for the inclusion of these powers. They are a replication of powers that were added to RIPA in 2011. Monetary penalty notices followed a letter of formal notice that was issued by the European Commission setting out its view that the UK had not properly transposed article 5(1) of the e-privacy directive and articles of the data protection directive. In particular, the Commission identified:
“By limiting the offence in Section 1(1) RIPA to intentional interception, the UK had failed to create a sanction for all unlawful interception as required by Article 5(1) of the E-Privacy Directive and Article 24 of the Data Protection Directive.”
The Government rightly conceded the defective transposition that had been identified and therefore the monetary penalty notice regime was established to introduce sanctions for the unintentional and unlawful interception in order to remedy the deficiency.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right that it is a step down from a criminal offence, where intention has to be informed, but as my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security said when opening the debate, underpinning all of this is the importance of privacy, and the right to privacy is demonstrated in practical form by the inclusion of clause 6 and schedule 1. It is important so that we cover all aspects of intrusion because, as the hon. and learned Gentleman will know, privacy is not just about confidentiality. That is often misunderstood, particularly in the light of recent debates about injunctions. It is about intrusion into the lives of individuals, and that intrusion by the authorities in particular should be marked in some way by the imposition of some alternative sanction if it cannot be criminal sanctions. Therefore, there is a very sound rationale for the inclusion of these powers and replicating them from RIPA, and therefore I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 7
Restriction on requesting interception by overseas authorities
Keir Starmer
I have a probing question. It is right to include a provision that makes it clear that the UK authorities cannot evade the protections and safeguards in the Bill by requesting that a foreign authority carry out on their behalf the interception of materials relating to a person in the UK. That is right in principle and we support that. It may be my limitation in going through the provisions in recent weeks, but I am not sure whether there is a sanction for failure to adhere to the clause’s provisions. In other words, it is good that it is there, but I am not sure whether anything formal will happen if it is not followed. Will the Minister answer that now or at least give some consideration to that?
The clause is important and right in principle, but I cannot find a sanction for failing to comply with it and there probably ought to be one. If it is somewhere else in the Bill, I will defer to those who know it better than I do.
Mr Hayes
I am happy to say on behalf of my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General that we will give consideration to that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Restriction on requesting assistance under mutual assistance agreements etc.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
I rise to make essentially the same point as I made on the previous clause, albeit more briefly. This is a good and right in principle clause to ensure that there are restrictions on requesting assistance under mutual assistance agreements, but again the sanction for breach is not entirely clear. That may be something that, under the umbrella that the Minister for Security just indicated, could be taken away to see what the enforcement regime is for these important safeguarding provisions.
The Solicitor General
The hon. and learned Gentleman will know that this mutual legal assistance regime definitely benefits from statutory underpinning. It has become increasingly important. Sadly we have all learnt that relying just on good will or informal arrangements is no longer sufficient, which is why the international work that I know hon. Members are aware of, particularly negotiations with the United States, are so important in speeding up the process and making it ever more efficient, particularly in the light of all the political controversies we have been dealing with in recent days. I undertake to deal with the question that he raises, which I think we can deal with in an umbrella form as he suggests.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Offence of unlawfully obtaining communications data
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 4—Tort or delict of unlawfully obtaining communications data—
“The collection of communications data from a telecommunications operator, telecommunications service, telecommunications system or postal operator without lawful authority shall be actionable as a civil wrong by any person who has suffered loss or damage by the collection of the data.”
This new clause creates a civil wrong of unlawful obtaining of communications data.
Joanna Cherry
The new clause very much relates to what I said earlier about new clause 3. The intention is to create a civil wrong of unlawfully obtaining communications data as opposed to unlawful interception. Again, the drafting is mine and it could do with some serious tightening up, but my intention is to establish the Government’s attitude to the new clause. I hope that the Solicitor General will indicate that.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for the way in which she spoke to her new clause. I see that it very much follows new clause 3. Our argument with regard to new clause 4 is slightly different because it has a wider ambit than private telecommunication.
We submit that this tort or delict would not be practicable. Communications data are different from the content of communication. For example, one would acquire communications data even by looking at an envelope or searching for a wi-fi hotspot when turning on a particular wi-fi device at home. It would not be appropriate to make ordinary people liable for such activity. With respect to the hon. and learned Lady, its ambit is too wide. That said, it is only right that those holding office within a public authority are held to account for any abuses of power. That is why clause 9 makes it an offence for a person in a public authority to obtain communications data knowingly or recklessly without lawful authority. I place heavy emphasis on the Government’s approach to limiting and checking the abuse of power by the authorities.
On the new clause, the interception tool was always intended to address the narrow area that was not covered by the interception offence in RIPA, which is replicated in the Bill. As noted, the communications data offence is intentionally narrower. It would therefore be equally inappropriate to introduce a tort or delict in relation to the obtaining of communications generally or in the areas not covered by the new offence. Under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998, communications data often constitute personal data. That act already provides for compensation for damage or distress resulting from non-compliance with the data protection principles and for enforcement in respect of failing to comply with the provisions of the act.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
Does my hon. and learned Friend think that the offence of misfeasance in public office would also add a civil remedy for any wrongdoing?
Robert Buckland
I am extremely grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. She is quite right. In fact, not only is there the offence of misconduct in public office, as it is now constituted, having been reformed from the old offence of misfeasance, but we have provisions in the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and, as I have already mentioned, the Data Protection Act 1998. I therefore consider that the new offence we are introducing in clause 9, combined with relevant offences in other legislation, in particular the provision in section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998, provides appropriate safeguards. On that basis, I respectfully invite the hon. and learned Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)
It is, as always, a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Dorries. The Solicitor General has given examples of wide-ranging powers that are available to protect the public. I was grateful to listen to his contribution. However, during Second Reading I queried the Home Secretary’s position on the new offences that are being created. Many of the offences the Bill refers to, particularly in clause 9, relate to the regulation of investigatory powers. My concern is that later the Bill requires internet service providers, for example, to amass a large amount of personal data, and there is a danger that those data may be stolen rather than intercepted. I gave the example of a newspaper perhaps finding a low-grade technical operator in a telecommunications company, passing a brown envelope to them and stealing a celebrity’s internet connection records. I am concerned that the offence in clause 9 of unlawfully obtaining communications data does not go far enough.
I bear in mind the Solicitor General’s comments on other protections that are available, but would he or the Government consider an offence of not just obtaining but being in possession of unlawfully obtained communications data, which would strengthen the protections given to members of the public? We all know that the kind of scenario that I am expressing concern about has not been unknown in the last few years, as various court cases have demonstrated—though I should not discuss their details. Is the Minister satisfied that the protections he has outlined and those raised by the hon. Member for South East Cambridgeshire are sufficient, or should we take this clause a bit further, to give the public broader and wider protection of their privacy and the security of their internet and telecommunications transmissions?
Keir Starmer
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend because I want to develop the point. This is a welcome clause, it is right that it is here, and we support it. However, we question whether it goes far enough. It only covers obtaining communications data. We think that serious consideration should be given to an overarching offence of misuse of the powers in the Bill. At the moment, there are specific provisions in relation to intercept which are replicated frim RIPA and we now have this welcome provision, but there is no overarching offence of misuse of the powers in the Bill.
It is all very well to say that there is the tort of misfeasance in public office. That is not the equivalent of a criminal offence. It has all sorts of tricky complications when one tries to apply it in practice. It is fair to say that there are other bits of legislation that might be made to fit in a given case, but it would be preferable and in the spirit of David Anderson’s approach for a comprehensive piece of legislation for an overarching criminal offence to be drafted, either out of clause 9 or in some other way, relating to misuse of powers in the Bill. It has been a source of considerable concern in the past and I ask the Government to think about a wider offence that would cover all the powers, because comms data are only one small subset of the issues and material information we are concerned with.
I have two short supplementary points. In subsection (3) there is a reasonable belief defence. It would be helpful if the Minister said a bit more about that. May I also foreshadow the inconsistency that we will need to pick up as we go along in the way reasonable excuse and reasonable belief are dealt with in the Bill? It is set out in subsection (3), but there is an inconsistency in other provisions that I will point to when we get there.
My other point is to ask the Minister to consider whether obtaining communications data unlawfully is a sufficient definition to make the offence workable in practice. I put my questions in the spirit of supporting the clause, but I also invite Ministers to go further and consider drafting a clause that covers the misuse of powers in the Bill, rather than simply saying that if we fish about in other bits of legislation or common law we might find something that fits on a good day. In my experience, that is not a particularly helpful way of proceeding.
The Solicitor General
Thank you, Ms Dorries, for allowing me to reply to a stand part debate on clause 9. I think we have elided the this and the previous clause, but I crave your indulgence to deal with everything in a global way. May I deal properly with clause 9 and set out the Government’s thinking on this?
The measure is all about making sure once again that those who hold office within a public authority are properly held to account for any abuses of power. The clause will make it an offence knowingly or recklessly to obtain communications data from a communications service provider without lawful authority. Somebody found guilty of that offence might receive a custodial sentence or a fine. The maximum punishment will vary according to whether the offence was committed in England and Wales, or in the jurisdiction of Scotland or Northern Ireland.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to point out the reasonable belief defence. The offence will not have been committed if it can be demonstrated that a person holding office acted in the reasonable belief that they had lawful authority to obtain the data. Where a communications service provider willingly consents to the disclosure of the data, including by making it publicly or commercially available, that would constitute a lawful authority.
The question about reasonable belief is about making sure that genuine error is not penalised, because there will be occasions when genuine errors are made. In the absence of such a defence, public authorities could be deterred by notifying genuine errors to the IPC. It is important that the Investigatory Powers Commission is an effective body monitoring failure and lack of best practice, and preventing future errors.
I think the hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that we both have fairly considerable criminal litigation experience. In this area, I think a regulatory approach will be just as effective, and in some ways more effective, than a criminal sanction. I am grateful to the hon. Member for City of Chester for reiterating the remarks that I remember him making on Second Reading, when he made some powerful points, but I caution that we are in danger of creating an entirely new criminal framework, catching people further down the line, which ultimately will only lead to more confusion and, I worry, the replication of existing offences.
An unauthorised disclosure by someone in a communications service provider would be covered by the Data Protection Act 1998, because those providers have duties and obligations under that Act just like any other holder of data. I hear what the hon. and learned Gentleman says, and I will consider the matter, but my initial reaction to his question and that of the hon. Member for City of Chester is that the Data Protection Act covers such a disclosure.
Victoria Atkins (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)
I have heard Opposition Members’ arguments. Some thought has been given to this point and clause 49 puts a duty not only on people who work in public services but on postal operators, telecommunications operators and any person employed therein to not make unauthorised disclosures in relation to intercept warrants. That might help.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who served with distinction on the Joint Committee. That provision relates to creating a statutory duty, which, with respect to her, is slightly different from some of the arguments we are having about criminal sanctions. However, it is important to pray that in aid, bearing in mind the mixed approach we need to take in order to hold public office holders and public authorities to account when dealing with this sensitive area.
The Bill provides a great opportunity for us to put into statute a new offence, which will, together with the other agencies, provide a robust regime that will add to the checks and balances needed in this area in order to ensure that our rights to privacy are maintained wherever possible, consistent with the Government’s duty towards the protection of our national security and the detection and prevention of crime.
Christian Matheson
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for that clarification. My concern about his reliance on, for example, the Data Protection Act is what happens in the scenario I described, which I do not believe is so unbelievable, bearing in mind the experiences that hon. Members of this House have had in the past few years with the theft of their information. One problem that his solution presents is that if, for example, my personal data were stolen and published, the only recourse I would have is to the telecommunications provider, which is in a sense a victim itself. The real villains and culprits—the people who stole the information and published it—would not be covered by the Data Protection Act, which is why I seek consideration of extending the clause or guidance from the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. I have already indicated that I will consider the matter further. I will simply give this solution. He mentioned the stealing of information. Information is property, like anything else, and of course we have the law of theft to deal with such matters. I do not want to be glib, but we must ensure we do not overcomplicate the statute book when it comes to criminal law. I will consider the matter further, and I am extremely grateful for his observations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Joanna Cherry
On a point of order, Ms Dorries, may I seek clarification on my position on new clause 4, which the Minister invited me to withdraw? I am minded to do so, having regard to what the Solicitor General said about the Data Protection Act and what the hon. and learned Member for South East Cambridgeshire said about misfeasance in public office, but as a novice in these Committees I seek some guidance. If I press the new clause to a vote now and it is voted down, does that prevent me bringing it back to the Floor of the House?
The Chair
As I made clear at the beginning of our sitting, you could move the motion at the end of consideration, but that does not prevent you from bringing the new clause back on Report. This point in the proceedings is not the time for it.
Joanna Cherry
I realise that, but my point is about the conflicting information on the issue. If an amendment is pressed to a vote and voted down in Committee, some people tell me that it cannot then be brought before the House at a later stage; others tell me that that is not the case. I am anxious to have the Chair’s clarification.
The Chair
It is not normal, but it does sometimes happen; it is at the Speaker’s discretion. If voted down, you would have to retable the amendment and it would be up to the Speaker, who would know that it had been heard in Committee and voted down.
Joanna Cherry
I am grateful. So if I withdraw the new clause now, I cannot be prevented from bringing it back later—I will withdraw it in Committee.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 11
Mandatory use of equipment interference warrants
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
I will be very quick. The clause is welcome and we support it, but again my concern is that there is no enforcement mechanism or sanction. Will the Minister take it under the umbrella of these clauses that are intended to ensure good governance, effectiveness and that the proper routes are used, and look in an overarching way at what their sanction might be? I am asking a similar question to one I made before: what is the sanction if what should happen does not happen?
The Solicitor General
Yes, of course, we will do as the hon. and learned Gentleman asks. I welcome his endorsement of the importance of the clause, bearing in mind what it sets out and the clarity we are achieving through its introduction.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Restriction on use of section 93 of the Police Act 1997
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
I make the same point again: the clause is a good provision but appears to lack any enforcement mechanism or sanction, so if it could go into the basket of clauses that are being looked at in relation to sanction, I will be grateful.
The Solicitor General
The clause confirms that section 93 of the Police Act 1997 may not be used to authorise conduct where the purpose of the proposed interference is to obtain communications, private information or equipment data and the applicant believes the conduct would otherwise constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and the conduct can be authorised under an equipment interference warrant issued under part 5 of the Bill. So it does not prevent equipment interference being authorised under the Police Act where the purpose of the interference is not to obtain communications and other data—for example, interference might be authorised under the Act if the purpose is to disable a device, rather than to acquire information from it.
That reflects the focus of this Bill. We are trying to bring together existing powers available to obtain communications and communications data. I emphasise that the measure does not prevent law enforcement agencies from using other legislation to authorise interference with equipment that might otherwise constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act. For example, law enforcement agencies will continue to exercise powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to examine equipment that they possess as evidence. The result of this clause is that all relevant activity conducted by law enforcement agencies will need to be authorised by a warrant issued under part 5 of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
Based on what the Minister has just said, it may be that it is anticipated that any attempt to use other legislation in breach of this provision would automatically be refused. That is the bit where there might need to be some clarity, because in effect it will not be an application under this legislation; it would be an application under different provisions, so does this operate as a direction to any decision maker that that is an unlawful use of another statute? That is not entirely clear. I think that that is what is intended. If it is, that is a good thing, but I am not entirely sure that a decision maker would say, “I am prohibited by law from exercising powers available to me under other legislation.” I leave that with the Minister because it may be something that can be improved by further drafting.
The Solicitor General
I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for that intervention. While I will answer the specific question, I think it is important that I set out the fact that this provision is not the only means. What we are dealing with here is part 5 and the double lock and the enhanced safeguards. If any agency or authority fails to use new part 5 or PACE, for example, in other circumstances, they will be committing an offence under the Computer Misuse Act. Public authorities are no different from any other individual or body: if they are not complying with the existing legal framework by this or other means, they fall foul of the law themselves. I will endeavour to answer the other points raised about sanction but I urge the Committee to agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Warrants that may be issued under this Chapter
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 13, page 10, line 16, after “content”, insert “or secondary data”
This amendment, and others to Clause 13, seek to expand the requirement of targeted examination warrants to cover the examination of all information or material obtained through bulk interception warrant, or bulk equipment interference warrant, irrespective of whether the information is referable to an individual in the British Islands. They would also expand the requirement of targeted examination warrants to cover the examination of “secondary data” obtained through bulk interception warrants and “equipment data” and “information” obtained through bulk equipment interference warrants.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 58, in clause 13, page 10, line 17, leave out from “examination” to end of line 18
Amendment 59, in clause 13, page 10, line 17, leave out from “examination.” to end of line 18 and insert
“of material referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, or British citizen outside the British Islands at that time.”
Amendment 60, in clause 13, page 10, line 17, leave out from “examination.” to end of line 18 and insert
“of material referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, or British, Canadian, American, New Zealand or Australian citizen outside the British Islands at that time.”
Amendment 83, in clause 13, page 10, line 22, after “6”, insert—
“In this Part “secondary data” means—
(a) in relation to a communication transmitted by means of a postal service, means any data falling within subsection (5);
(b) in relation to a communication transmitted by means of a telecommunication system, means any data falling within subsection (5) or (6).”
Keir Starmer
I rise to speak to amendments 57, 59 and 60. Amendment 57 deals with secondary data; amendments 59 and 60 deal with place and whether someone is in the British Isles. I apologise, Ms Dorries: the provision and the amendment are complicated. With your permission I will take some time to set the context so that the amendment can be understood.
Clause 13 deals with warrants. Subsection (1) deals with targeted interception warrants, targeted examination warrants and mutual assistance warrants. Subsection (2) states:
“A targeted interception warrant is a warrant which authorises or requires the person to whom it is addressed to secure, by any conduct described in the warrant, any one or more of the following”,
and paragraph (a) deals with the interception of communications. That is content; paragraph (b) deals with secondary data from the communication; and paragraph (c) deals with disclosure. For targeted warrants under clause 13 there are specific provisions in relation to the content, secondary data and disclosure.
Secondary data for these purposes is further defined in clause 14, subsection (5) of which states:
“The data falling within this subsection is systems data which is comprised in, included as part of, attached to or logically associated with the communication”,
so it has an integral link to the communication and thus to the content.
The Chair
Order. Mr Starmer, if you could keep your comments to clause 13 with just passing reference to clause 14 and further clauses, that would be great.
Keir Starmer
I will, but on this particular occasion, I really think it is almost impossible to understand clause 13(3) without going into clause 14 and then, I am afraid, to a further provision, before coming back.
Keir Starmer
In passing, this is just really to explain what the amendment is intended to achieve. In order to understand what is in clause 13(2), we need to look to clause 14(4) to (6), which set out what secondary data means for the purposes of this part and, thus, is to be read into clause 13.
Clause 14(6) states:
“The data falling within this subsection is identifying data which…is comprised in, included as part of, attached to or logically associated with…is capable of being logically separated…and if it were so separated, would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning”,
so it is integrally bound up with the content of the communication but capable of being separated from it.
So far as clause 13 is concerned, if there is a targeted interception warrant, the warrant deals specifically with content and secondary data, recognising the integral link between the two. That is right and we do not quarrel with that.
Clause 13(3) is different, providing that:
“A targeted examination warrant is a warrant which authorises the person to whom it is addressed to carry out the selection of relevant content for examination, in breach of the prohibition in section 134(4) (prohibition on seeking to identify communications of individuals in the British Islands).”
The purpose of clause 13(3) is different. We move from the targeted warrant to the bulk warrant—an examination warrant that provides authority to examine the content that would otherwise be in breach of clause 134(4). In order to understand that, I take the Committee to clause 119, to which that relates.
Clause 119 deals with bulk interception warrants, which can be issued if conditions A and B are satisfied. Condition A deals with
“the interception of overseas-related communications”
and with “obtaining…secondary data”. The definition of secondary data is the same in that part of the Bill as it is in the part that we have just looked at. I will not test the Committee’s patience by going to that definition, but it is a consistent definition of secondary data.
Condition B sets out that the bulk warrant authorises “the interception”, which is the content,
“the obtaining of secondary data”,
which is the same as a targeted warrant but in relation to the bulk powers, and
“the selection for examination, in any manner described…of…content or secondary data”
and “disclosure”. The bulk warrant allows the interception of the content and secondary data. In and of itself, it provides for the examination on the face of the same warrant.
For content, it becomes more complicated because there is a safeguard, which is in clause 134(4)—safeguards in relation to examination materials. Having provided a broad examination power, there is then a safeguard for that examination power in clause 134(4). A number of conditions are set for examining material that has been obtained under a bulk interception warrant. They are set out in subsection (3) and the first is that
“the selection of the intercepted content for examination does not reach the prohibition in subsection(4)”
which is that
“intercepted content may not…be selected for examination if— any criteria used for the selection of the intercepted content…are referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, and the purpose of using those criteria is to identify the content”.
The long and short of it is that, going back to clause 13, a targeted intercept warrant authorises the examination of both content and secondary data.
For a bulk warrant—this is where clause 13(3) kicks in—there is provision for an examination warrant which provides an ability to look at the content, which in all other circumstances would be a breach of the prohibition in clause 134. The content of communications of individuals in the British Isles can be looked at when it has been captured by a bulk provision, but only when there is a targeted examination warrant. That is a good thing.
What the amendment gets at is this. What is not in clause 13(3) is any provision for an examination warrant in relation to secondary data, so for the targeted provisions these two are treated as one: secondary data integral to the content of communication. When it comes to bulk, they are separated and only the content is subject to the further provision in clause 13(3).
That is a material provision and is a big part of the legislation because, unless amendment 57 is accepted, a targeted examination warrant is not required for secondary data, which are capable of being examined simply under the bulk powers. The purpose of the amendment is to align subsections (2) and (3) and ensure that the targeted examination warrant is not required for both content and secondary data in relation to individuals in the British Isles. The result otherwise would be that, for someone in the British Isles, their secondary data could be looked at as long as it was captured under a bulk provision without a targeted warrant. That is a serious drafting issue of substance.
Our approach to some of the wider retention of bulk powers is this. Although we accept that a case can be made for retaining data that will be looked at later, the wide powers of retentional bulk are a cause of concern on both sides of the House. When it comes to examining what has been caught within the wider net, there are specific safeguards. In other words, as long as there is a specific targeted safeguard when someone wants to look at bulk or retained data, that is an important safeguard when they are harvesting wide-ranging data. That is a very important provision in relation to secondary data.
Amendments 59 and 60 go to a different issue. They are separate and I ask the Government to treat them as separate. The first is about content and secondary data as a hom-set and whether they should be protected in the same way throughout the regime of the legislation, however they are initially intercepted. That is an important point of principle that I ask the Government to consider seriously because it goes to the heart of the question of targeted access.
The second amendment relates to individuals in the British Isles. At the moment, clause 13(3) provides specific protection in relation to the content of communications for people in the British Isles. It is clear from clause 134(4) that that means not residing in the British Isles, but actually in the British Isles. Under clause 13(3), once I get to Calais, I fall out of the protection of that provision, as does everybody else in this Committee, because it is a question of whether someone is physically in the British islands. Therefore, a targeted examination warrant for the content of my communications gathered by bulk powers would not be needed once I got halfway across the channel. Until I went through the analysis, I did not fully appreciate that, and serious consideration is required for both content and secondary data. More generally within amendment 59 are provisions relating to individuals not normally in the British islands or within the countries specified in amendment 60.
I am sorry to have referred to other clauses, but I could not work this out until I went through that torturous route. The net result is a disconnect between content and secondary data, which goes to the heart of protection when it comes to bulk powers. Clause 13(3) is really important for bulk powers and is one of the most important provisions in the Bill, so we have to get it right.
The limit of clause 13(3) to individuals in the British islands is unsustainable and needs further thought. Amendments 59 and 60 intend to remedy that defect. If there is an appetite in the Government to look carefully at those provisions, there may be a different way of coming at the problem, but it is a real flaw in the regime as it is currently set out. I apologise for taking so long to get to that, Ms Dorries. It required a cold wet towel on one afternoon last week to work my way through this, but once we go through the exercise, we realise there is a fundamental problem that either has to be fixed or adequately answered.
Joanna Cherry
I am 100% with the hon. and learned Gentleman in his description of the clause. Indeed, many clauses of the Bill require the application of a cold wet towel or a bag of ice to the head followed by copious amounts of alcohol later in the evening.
Amendments 57 and 83 bear my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. I wish to emphasise the importance of those amendments, which foreshadow important amendments in respect of bulk powers that the Scottish National party intends to table at a later stage. Our amendments would apply the same processes and safeguards for the examination of information or material obtained through bulk interception warrants and bulk equipment interference warrants, irrespective of whether the information or material pertains to individuals in the British Isles, and to require a targeted examination warrant to be obtained whenever secondary data obtained through bulk interception warrants and equipment data and information obtained through bulk interference warrants are to be examined.
In order to gain an understanding of the background to this amendment, I invite hon. Members to look back at the evidence of Eric King to the Committee on 24 March. He explained to us how GCHQ examines bulk material. The targeted examination warrant available on the face of the Bill fails to cover the aspect of communication that is most used by agencies such as GCHQ: metadata, or secondary data, as it is referred to in the Bill.
Simon Hoare
The hon. and learned Lady might have chosen a better witness. If I recall, the gentleman in question admitted in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle that he had had no experience at all in the application for or determination of any warrants. He had never had any security clearance either, so I am uncertain why he is being prayed in aid.
Joanna Cherry
I must say that I do not like the approach of traducing witnesses. If I do not like a witness’s evidence, I will not traduce them; I will just try to forensically dissect their evidence. This is a distinguished witness with significant experience in this field.
Joanna Cherry
No, I will not give way. I am going to finish. Because of his technical expertise, Mr King has been of enormous assistance to myself and my hon. Friends in the Labour party in drafting amendments.
Joanna Cherry
Hon. Members may “Ah” and “Um”, but Mr King has relevant technical expertise. I invite hon. Members to consider his CV.
Joanna Cherry
No, I will not. I will continue to make my point. The amendment was tabled because there should be a requirement to apply for an examination warrant when seeking to examine secondary data. That would protect the privacy of our constituents—I am looking at Government Members—and us. It is not some idle attempt of the chattering classes to be difficult about the Bill; it is an attempt to make the Bill compliant with the rule of law and with the requirement to protect the privacy of our constituents. That is all it is about. Criticising and making ad hominem comments about a witness are not going to undermine the moderate—
Joanna Cherry
No, I will not give way. There will be plenty of opportunity for the hon. Lady to contribute later. I am conscious of the time, Chair, so I will briefly—
Joanna Cherry
No, I will not. I want to continue making my point. Without the amendment, which we support, a GCHQ analyst would be able to search for and view non-content material of anyone in the United Kingdom without a warrant. I do not believe that that is right, necessary or proportionate.
Let us look at what the Intelligence and Security Committee said. If Government Members do not like Mr King’s evidence, let us set him to one side and look at the ISC. Government Members might find its approach more palatable or less easy to criticise. In the ISC’s response to the draft Bill, it highlighted the significant concern that the secondary data, including that derived from content, would not be protected. It said:
“To provide protection for any such material incidentally collected, there is a prohibition on searching for and examining any material that relates to a person known to be in the UK (therefore, even if it is collected, it cannot be examined unless additional authorisation is obtained). However, these safeguards only relate to the content of these communications. The RCD relating to the communications of people in the UK is unprotected if it is collected via Bulk Interception. In direct contrast, if the same material were collected and examined through other means (for example, a direct request to a CSP) then the draft Bill sets out how it must be authorised”.
The ISC expressed a concern that the amendment attempts to address. Because no examination warrant is required for secondary data, a variety of highly intrusive acts could be undertaken without additional authorisation by individual analysts. That is all that the amendment is seeking to address. In my respectful submission, it is appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
Mr Hayes
As the hon. and learned Gentleman was speaking—he recalled having a cold towel placed upon him last week—I wondered, as his peroration ranged across so many different clauses of the Bill, whether he wished the same fate for the whole Committee, although I fully appreciate his point on the complexities of this particular area of our consideration. They are such that, to get to the basis of why he tabled the amendments, it is necessary to look across a range of parts of the Bill.
In essence, this is probably the difference between us—perhaps it is not, but let me present that at least as my hypothesis. We recognise, as the Bill reflects, that different levels of authorisation should apply in relation to different investigative techniques. I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is with us that far, but it is important to say why those different levels should apply. The differences plainly reflect the different operational contexts in which the powers are exercised, and that includes the different organisations, how they use the capabilities, and the statutory purposes for which those capabilities are utilised. We are absolutely clear that those differences are necessary, and that the safeguards that apply to different powers are satisfactory, coherent and effective.
Keir Starmer
I have checked the evidence, and perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee why it is necessary to distinguish between the protection offered to content and secondary data in relation to bulk warrants, when it is not necessary for targeted warrants. They are treated exactly the same for targeted warrants, but he says that it is necessary to distinguish between them for bulk warrants. What is the necessity? Can he spell it out, please?
Mr Hayes
I will try to do that during my response. If one recognises that a different process should apply in the exercise of different powers, contextualised around the operational function of the organisations that are exercising the powers and the purposes for which the powers are being exercised, one begins to appreciate that what might, at first reading, look like inconsistency is not an error or an inconsistency but is a necessary application of different sets of both powers and safeguards for different needs. I will address the hon. and learned Gentleman’s specific point as I go through my response.
Amendment 57 would extend the requirement to obtain a targeted examination warrant to circumstances in which an agency wishes to select for examination the secondary data, as opposed to content, relating to the communications of an individual who is known to be in the UK when the data have been obtained under a bulk interception warrant. Essentially, secondary data are less intrusive than content; their collection and the circumstances in which they may be examined are directly subject to double-lock authorisation. Furthermore, it is necessary to say that it is sometimes important, indeed essential, to examine secondary data to determine whether someone is in the UK. That does not provide an entire answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s question on the difference, but it provides some answer to the argument about where someone resides at a given point in time.
The targeted acquisition of communications data, provided for in part 3 of the Bill, including data relating to individuals in the United Kingdom, currently requires the designation of an authorised person within an organisation. The hon. and learned Gentleman acknowledged that we have taken further steps, which I will talk about later, following the recommendations of David Anderson—forgive me, but this is quite a complex area, and I need to go into it in some detail.
In contrast, bulk interception warrants, which authorise the collection of communications in bulk and set out the circumstances in which material that has been collected can be selected for examination, are subject to the double-lock authorisation of both the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner. That means that the acquisition of content and secondary data, and the operational purposes for which any of the data can be selected for examination, is explicitly authorised by the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner when the warrant is approved. The agencies can only select material for examination when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, in line with one or more operational purposes authorised when the warrant is granted.
Where the security and intelligence agencies wish to look at the content of the communications of an individual in the United Kingdom under a bulk interception warrant, they will need to obtain a targeted examination warrant, which reflects the recommendations from the independent reviewer, David Anderson. I draw attention to his report, “A Question of Trust,” with which members of the Committee will be familiar. The report addresses precisely this point in recommendations 79 and 80 on the use of material recovered under bulk warrants. The regime reflects the well-recognised distinction between less intrusive data obtained through these powers and content—
Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting)
Tuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 58, in clause 13, page 10, line 17, leave out from “examination” to end of line 18.
Amendment 59, in clause 13, page 10, line 17, leave out from “examination.” to end of line 18 and insert
“of material referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, or British citizen outside the British Islands at that time.”
Amendment 60, in clause 13, page 10, line 17, leave out from “examination.” to end of line 18 and insert
“of material referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, or British, Canadian, American, New Zealand or Australian citizen outside the British Islands at that time.”
Amendment 83, in clause 13, page 10, line 22, after “6”, insert—
“In this Part “secondary data” means—
(a) in relation to a communication transmitted by means of a postal service, means any data falling within subsection (5);
(b) in relation to a communication transmitted by means of a telecommunication system, means any data falling within subsection (5) or (6).”
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
I am delighted to welcome you to the Chair, Mr Owen. In your absence, under the stewardship of Ms Dorries, we had enlightening and rigorous scrutiny of the early provisions of the Bill and had got to the point of considering the third group of amendments. They are complicated, as illustrated by the shadow Minister’s opening remarks. I was about to go into some detail about the safeguards that we have put in place. So that we are all up to speed, I will mention that I had referred briefly to the recommendations made by the independent reviewer, Mr David Anderson, in his report, “A Question of Trust”, in relation to this area of the Bill—the use of material recovered under bulk warrants. I had reminded the Committee that the provisions before us reflect that advice. The Government have essentially taken the advice of David Anderson and built it into the Bill that we are now considering.
The current bulk access safeguards under the Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 have, of course, recently been scrutinised by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. After extensive argument, the tribunal ruled that the current approach fully met the UK’s obligations under the European convention on human rights. In particular, the tribunal ruled that it was not necessary to apply the protections that apply to content to related communications data—the other data associated with a communication but not its content that has been redefined as secondary data in the Bill—to ensure ECHR compliance.
Both targeted and bulk warrants authorise the collection of content and secondary data. That, I think, clears up one of the doubts that some Committee members may have had. A bulk warrant also authorises the circumstances in which content and secondary data can be selected for examination. The Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner, when authorising warrants, agree the operational purposes that determine what content and what secondary data can be examined. In other words, at the point when the warrant is issued, both the judicial commissioner, in the arrangements that we propose, and the Secretary of State, in those arrangements and now, are fully aware of the operational reasons for the request. There is no distinction in those terms—again, I think this addresses some of the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras—between content and secondary data.
Where the difference comes is in relation to the additional protections for persons in the UK. In fact, the hon. and learned Gentleman made reference to this. The Bill makes it clear that examination of the content, once it has been collected, of data relating to persons in the UK can take place only when an additional warrant has been issued. People should bear it in mind that there will already be a bulk warrant authorising collection; this is a separate process from the collection of data. An additional warrant must be issued that specifically authorises examination. There is a warrant to collect data and another warrant to examine data, and at the point when those warrants are considered by the Secretary of State and, under these new arrangements, by the judicial commissioner, the purposes will be clearly defined. The Secretary of State will be aware of why the request is being made and why it matters.
We talked earlier, in a different part of our consideration, about authorising powers only where they are necessary because nothing else will do the job—the point raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I want to emphasise that those considerations, around the broad issues—they are no less important because of their breadth—of proportionality and necessity, will govern all these matters.
Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
To clarify, I think I heard the Minister say—if I misheard him, he can ignore this intervention—that two bulk warrants would be put forward at the same time; one for the intercept and one for the examination. However, I am not sure that is right. I had always read this as one warrant within which different types of conduct are authorised. Therefore, the warrant could—I am looking at clause 119(4)—authorise both the interception and the selection for examination. I may be wrong about that, but I had always understood that one warrant would authorise all the conduct in one fell swoop at the beginning, rather than there being two warrants. If I misheard, I apologise.
Mr Hayes
Essentially, in order to obtain collection—to have bulk collection and examination—a warrant is required. The Bill makes it clear that the examination of content of persons in the UK requires an additional warrant. That is the point I was making.
Authorisation for persons in the UK does not apply to secondary data, because it is often not possible to determine the location of a person without taking those data. The reason why it looks like there is an inconsistency in respect of a set of data—or it might be perceived that way, without fuller consideration—is that, in relation to secondary data, it is not always possible to determine where someone is until the secondary data have been collected.
The point I made earlier was that it is a well and long-established principle that non-content is less important and less intrusive than content. Content is likely to be more intrusive, so what we are describing in these terms replicates the existing position—the long-established practice—which, as I said, was upheld by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. This is the existing practice, and it has been examined and found to be appropriate and reasonable. I mentioned ECHR compliance in that respect.
I have described the existing regime and its examination, but the regime proposed under the Bill further enhances the safeguards that the security and intelligence agencies already apply when accessing data obtained under a bulk interception warrant. The access arrangements are set out in part 6 of the Bill: for example, secondary data, as well as content, can be accessed only for one or more of the operational purposes specified on the warrant and approved by the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner. The Bill also includes a requirement that an analyst must consider the necessity and proportionality of any access to any data obtained under a bulk interception warrant in line with the operational purposes. Without putting words into the mouths of Committee members, it could be argued that it is all very well setting out the operational purposes at the outset and that, further, at that point they might be deemed to legitimise the use of the powers in terms of necessity and proportionality, but that that might not be the case further down the line. It is therefore important that we have introduced further analysis of the data collected under the bulk warrant, rather than just when collection is authorised.
Extending targeted examination warrants to non-content data, including secondary data, which is what the amendments propose, would be disproportionate and impractical. That would radically change the bulk data regime, reduce its efficacy and place a substantial burden on the security and intelligence agencies, requiring them to obtain highest level authorisation for data that would often resemble the kind of information routinely collected under a part 3 authorisation.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I remind the Minister that when I spoke before lunchtime, I highlighted the fact that the Intelligence and Security Committee has a concern about secondary data derived from content not being protected. What does the Minister make of the ISC’s concerns? Why have the Government dismissed them?
Mr Hayes
I wondered whether the ISC might be raised in this respect. Of course the hon. and learned Lady is right. With her typical diligence she has identified that the ISC does indeed make that point. The answer to the question is that we welcome scrutiny and we invite consideration of these proposals. All of the Committees that looked at these matters made a whole series of recommendations, some of which the Government accepted with alacrity, some of which the Government continue to consider, and some of which the Government do not agree with. It is true that that point has been made, and I said that this might reasonably be argued. However, I think that we have gone far enough in this area in balancing the proper desire for effective safeguards with the operational effectiveness of the agencies.
Bulk collection is really important. Without giving away too much sensitive information, I can happily let the Committee know that as Security Minister I have visited GCHQ, as the Committee would expect me to do. I have looked at the kind of work the staff there do in respect of bulk data collection, and I have seen the effect it has. Contrary to what might be described as a rather crude view of what bulk collection is all about, it is not searching for a needle in any haystack; it is being highly selective about which haystacks are looked at. It is about trying to establish connections, networks and relationships between organisations and individuals; places and people. I have no doubt that without these powers the work of our intelligence and security services would be inhibited. However, I accept that safeguards are needed: I do not for a moment suggest anything else.
I turn now to amendments 58, 59 and 60. These amendments seek to extend the circumstances in which a targeted examination warrant is required beyond the current situation in the Bill, such that they are not limited to persons in the UK. The intention of amendment 58 appears to be that an individual targeted examination warrant would be required from the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner each time an analyst in an intelligence agency wished to examine the content of any communications acquired under a bulk data interception warrant. This would apply irrespective of where in the world the sender or recipient of the communication was located. As currently drafted, the Bill makes it clear that a targeted examination warrant must be sought if an analyst wished to examine the content of communications of individuals in the British islands which had been obtained under a bulk interception warrant.
Amending the scope of a targeted examination warrant as proposed would, in my view, fundamentally alter the operation of the bulk regime. I am advised to that effect by those who use these powers. There is plainly a rational justification for treating the communications of persons known to be in the British Isles differently to those of persons who are believed to be overseas. Within the UK, the interception of communications is a tool that is used to advance investigations into known threats, usually in conjunction with other capabilities and other tools. Of course, serious investigations of the kind we are talking about are complicated, and very often this will be only one of the means that are used to establish the patterns of activity of the networks I have described and the threats that I have outlined.
Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)
I seek the Minister’s clarification more than anything else. Is there a view in the Government that there is a difference between the external threat of people who are not in the British Isles and also are not British citizens, as opposed to those who are British citizens? Is it the Government’s view that we have a responsibility to protect the privacy of British citizens, as we are charged to do, as opposed to those who may present an external threat to the United Kingdom?
Mr Hayes
We legally have different responsibilities with respect to UK citizens. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. UK citizens are protected by all kinds of legal provisions, not only those in this Bill, far from it. He is absolutely right that different circumstances prevail. However, it is slightly more complicated than that, as he knows. We may be talking about people who are British but not in Britain at a particular time, or people who are not British but in Britain at a particular time. We may be speaking about people who are moving in and out of the country. These are often quite complex webs about which we are trying to establish more information. Of course, things such as surveillance and agent reporting will pay a part in this. All the conventional means by which these things are investigated would interface with the tools that the agencies currently use and are given greater detail and more safeguards in the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that we should have an approach that is appropriate to the circumstances and the kind of people we are dealing with.
It is important to emphasise again that applications for targeting reception warrants will be supported by a detailed intelligence case. There has to be a clear operational purpose—a case needs to be made. That means that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the use of these powers is appropriate. The Bill quite rightly ensures that the agencies must provide the same detailed case if they want to examine communications of a person in the UK that have been intercepted under a bulk warrant.
The hon. Gentleman’s point about threats outside the UK is important, because it is often only through bulk powers of the kind detailed in the Bill that we are able to discover threats outside the UK, particularly in countries such as Syria where we may have little or no physical presence and limited cover in respect of the security services, for obvious reasons. In those circumstances, the amount of information we have to deal with being very limited, bulk interception plays a critical part. It will often be necessary to examine the communications of individuals outside the UK, for obvious reasons, based on partial intelligence—the limited intelligence we have—in order to determine whether they merit further investigation or in order sometimes to eliminate people from the inquiries. Many of the powers that I am describing—indeed many of the powers in the Bill—as well as identifying, qualifying and making further steps more exact, are about eliminating people from consideration, because once we know more, we know they do not pose a real or current threat. It is therefore really important that we understand that this plays a vital role in mitigating the threat to the UK from overseas.
Requiring an analyst to seek permission from the Secretary of State or the judicial commissioner every time they consider it necessary to examine the content of a communication sent by a person outside the UK would inhibit the ability of the security and intelligence agencies to identify new and emerging threats from outside the UK.
I want to emphasise that the scale and character of the threats we face have changed and continue to do so. This is partly because of changing technology, the way in which people communicate, the adaptability of those who threaten us and the complexities of the modern world. Unless we have powers that match—indeed, outmatch—the powers that are in the hands of those who seek to do us harm, we will simply not be able to mitigate those threats in the way that is needed in defence of our country and countrymen.
The current bulk access safeguards under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 have recently been scrutinised. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found in particular that there was sufficient justification for enhanced safeguards to be applied only where an analyst is seeking to examine the content of people in the British Isles. Nevertheless, the Bill enhances the safeguards and while I am sympathetic to the aims of amendments 59 and 60, they present practical challenges in their own right.
As hon. Members will appreciate, overseas-based individuals discovered in the course of an investigation do not uniformly present their nationality and passport details to agencies, so in practical terms the agencies will simply not be able to do what the amendments require. The amendments could also give rise to discrimination issues. As I explained, there is a clear justification for applying different safeguards to persons located outside the UK, but it is by no means clear that it is necessary to apply different protections to people of a particular nationality. Accordingly, providing for such a distinction in law could place the UK in breach of its international obligations, particularly our obligation not to discriminate on grounds of nationality.
It is right that we take a view about people who are operating in a way that is injurious to our interests from outside the UK, but it is equally right that we do not make prejudgments. Again, we are trying to strike a balance in this part of the Bill. The aim of the Bill is to place vital powers on a statutory footing that will stand the test of time. I believe that the strongest safeguards for the examination of communications, taking into account the challenges of identifying threats outside the UK, are necessary, and that we are in the right place with the Bill.
Finally, amendment 83 relates to the clause 14 definition of secondary data, which sets out how it can be obtained through an interception warrant provided for in part 2 of the Bill. The amendment seeks to replace the current definition in the Bill with a narrower one.
Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)
Welcome to the Chair, Mr Owen, for my first contribution to this Committee.
Regarding amendments 59 and 60, is it not the position that bulk interception is provided for under section 8(4) of RIPA and is therefore subject to tests of necessity and proportionality? If it relates to a British citizen within the British Isles and an analyst wishes to select for examination the content of the communication of an individual known to be located in the British islands, the analyst has to apply to the Secretary of State for additional authorisation under section 16(3) of RIPA—similar to section 8(1). There are robust and extensive safeguards in place for this purpose.
Mr Hayes
I am delighted to be able to say in response to that extremely well informed intervention that my hon. Friend is right. The Bill does not actually add to bulk powers, contrary to what some have assumed and even claimed. In the sense that it reinforces safeguards and maintains the ability of our agencies to collect bulk data, it builds on what we already do. The Bill pulls together much of the powers in existing legislation; part of its purpose is to put all of those powers in one place, making them easier to understand and more straightforward to navigate. She is absolutely right; we took those powers in RIPA because they were needed to deal with the changing threats and the character of what we knew we had to do to counter them. That was done in no way other than out of a proper, responsible desire to provide the intelligence agencies with what they needed to do their jobs.
To return to amendments 59 and 60, when people are discovered to be outside the country and are subject to an investigation by the security services they do not usually present their credentials for examination, and it is important that the powers we have fill what would otherwise be a gaping hole in our capacity to do what is right and necessary. The aim of the Bill is to place vital powers on a statutory footing that will stand the test of time.
Amendment 83 relates to clause 14 and the definition of secondary data. It is important to point out that it has always been the case that an interception warrant allows communications to be obtained in full. Historically, that has been characterised in law as obtaining the content of communication and of any accompanying “related communications data”. However, as communications have become more sophisticated it has become necessary to revise the definitions to remove any ambiguities around the distinction between content and non-content data and to provide clear, simple and future-proof definitions that correctly classify all the data the intercepting agents require to carry out their functions.
Secondary data describes data that can be obtained through an interception warrant other than the content of communications themselves. Those data are less intrusive than content, but are a broader category of data than communications data. For example, it could include technical information, such as details of hardware configuration, or data relating to a specific communication or piece of content, such as the metadata associated with a photographic image—the date on which it was taken or the location—but not the photograph itself, which would, of course, be the content.
I want to make it clear that the data will always, by necessity, be acquired through interception. The definition does not expand the scope of the data that can be acquired under a warrant, but it makes clearer how the data should be categorised. Interception provides for the collection of a communication in full and the amendment would not serve to narrow the scope of interception. It would, however, reduce the level of clarity about what data other than content could be obtained under a warrant. It would also have the effect of undermining an important provision in the Bill. In some cases secondary data alone are all that are required to achieve the intended aim of an operation or investigation. That is an important point. Another misconception is that it is always necessary to acquire content to find out what we need to know. In fact, sometimes it is sufficient to acquire simpler facts and information. For that reason, clause 13 makes it clear that obtaining secondary data can be the primary purpose of an interception, and the kind of data that can be obtained under a warrant is also set out.
Narrowing the scope of secondary data would reduce the number of occasions on which the operational requirement could be achieved through the collection of those data alone, resulting in greater interference with privacy where a full interception warrant is sought. Where we do not need to go further we should not go further. Where secondary data are sufficient to achieve our purposes, let that be so.
Secondary data are defined as systems data and identifying data included as part of or otherwise linked to communications being intercepted. Systems data is any information that enables or facilitates the functioning of any system or service: for example, when using an application on a phone data will be exchanged between the phone and the application server, which makes the application work in a certain way. Systems data can also include information that is not related to an individual communication, such as messages sent between different network infrastructure providers, to enable the system to manage the flow of communications.
Most communications will contain information that identifies individuals, apparatus, systems and services or events, and sometimes the location of those individuals or events. The data are operationally critical to the intercepting agencies. In most cases, the information will form part of the systems data, but there will be cases when it does not. When the data are not systems data and can be logically separated from the communication, and would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning of the communication, they are identifying data. For example, if there are email addresses embedded in a webpage, those could be extracted as identifying data. The definitions of systems data and identifying data make clearer the scope of the non-content data that can be obtained under the interception warrant.
The fact that the definition of secondary data is linked to clear, central definitions of systems and identifying data ensures that there can be consistent application of powers across the Bill to protect privacy and that data can be handled appropriately regardless of the power under which it has been obtained.
Christian Matheson
Mr Owen, it is traditional that hon. Members recognise the Chair. I do so not only because of your consummate skills in chairmanship, but because as the Member for Ynys Môn you bring back happy childhood memories of many childhood summer holidays in Benllech, Red Wharf Bay, Llangefni market and suchlike.
I listened to the Minister’s detailed explanations—I pay tribute to him for the length and the detail he went to—sometimes with the vision of a wet towel around my head invoked by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras. This is not a very politically correct thing to say and hon. Members may find it disappointing, but frankly I do not give a tinker’s cuss whether, in the defence of the realm, we seek access to information from outside the UK or outside British citizenry. Parliament has a responsibility to this country and we will exercise that. As we have discussed, we also have a responsibility to British citizens to respect their privacy. The crux of the Bill is the balance that we will achieve between those two competing demands.
I am not clear yet, particularly in respect of the point made by my hon. and learned Friend, as to whether the question of secondary data that will be extracted and that affects UK citizens has been correctly answered. If the Minister can give an assurance—I appreciate that he has already given a long and detailed answer—of his confidence that the privacy of UK citizens or people within the UK can be properly protected, I am sure we would be able to move on. The balance that we need to strike between protecting the privacy of UK citizens and protecting their personal security and the security of the nation is difficult.
Mr Hayes
To be absolutely clear, the means of the acquisition of content and secondary data and the operational purposes for which those data can be selected for examination will be explicitly authorised by the judicial commissioner and the Secretary of State. The operational case for the collection of those data must be explicit and sufficiently persuasive that the warrant is granted by the Secretary of State and by the judicial commissioner. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman the assurance he desires.
Christian Matheson
I am most grateful for that assurance and explanation and, indeed, for the previous explanation. The Minister has gone into considerable depth on the matter and I am most grateful for that.
Keir Starmer
I, too, welcome you to the Chair of this Committee, Mr Owen. It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship.
The assurance that has just been asked for cannot be given because the whole purpose of the provision is to enable the secondary data of any of us in this room that is caught by a bulk interception warrant to be looked at without any further warrant. If my data is swept up in a bulk interception warrant, even though I am not the target it can be examined without a separate warrant. That goes for every member of the Committee, every member of the public and everybody residing in the British Isles. The neat distinction between people here and people abroad breaks down in relation to this clause. I want us to be clear about that. The Minister is making the case that that is perfectly appropriate and necessary and that there are sufficient safeguards in place, but he is not making the case that this would not happen for those in the British Isles. It can and undoubtedly does happen, and it will happen under this regime. That means that all our secondary data are caught by this provision, even where we are not the primary target.
The Minister pointed to the double lock and the roles of the Secretary of State and judicial commissioner. He took an intervention on that, but I want to be absolutely clear on what those roles are and how necessity and proportionality play out. Clause 125 sets out what requirements must be met by a bulk interception warrant. Subsection (3) says:
“A bulk interception warrant must specify the operational purposes for which any intercepted content or secondary data obtained under the warrant may be selected for examination.”
The Minister points to that and says that there has got to be an operational purpose, which is true. However, we then read just how specific that operational purpose is likely to be:
“In specifying any operational purposes, it is not sufficient simply to use the descriptions contained in section 121(1)(b) or (2)”.
Those are just the general descriptions of national security and preventing serious crime, so it is not enough to say that the operational reason is national security or to prevent serious crime. Well, good—that that is all that had to be specified, it would not be very much. However, the purposes may still be general purposes, so the operational purposes are likely to be very broad—necessarily so in practical terms, given that it is a bulk warrant.
The role of the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner is to decide whether the warrant is necessary and proportionate according to those purposes. We keep using the words “necessary and proportionate”. We have to keep an eye on what the object of the necessity and proportionality is. The question for the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner is whether it is necessary and proportionate for the very broad operational purposes that are permitted under clause 125. It is not a very detailed, specific examination by the Secretary of State or the judicial commissioner; nor could it be.
At some later date, there is further consideration when it comes to examination. If it was suggested that at the later stage of actual examination, rather than authority for examination, it goes back to the Secretary of State and judicial commissioner, that is just plain wrong. It does not go back at all. All that the judicial commissioner or Secretary of State do is to authorise the general purposes under the warrant. As far as selection is concerned, that is governed by clause 134(1) and (2). Subsection (2) specifies that:
“The selection of intercepted content or secondary data for examination”
—that is at the heart of what we are talking about—
“is carried out only for the specified purposes”.
That relates to back to subsection (1). It continues,
“only so far as is necessary”
—necessary to what? It then refers straight back to the “operational purposes” set out in clause 125. Even at that later stage, the question of necessity and proportionality is against the very broad operational purposes. The Minister has been very clear about this and I am not suggesting otherwise, but the idea that there is some forensic and carefully curtailed exercise that looks in detail at the individual circumstances of the case is pretty far-fetched. In the end, all anyone has to do is ask whether it is necessary or proportionate to the general operational purposes upon which the warrant was issued in the first place. That is very different from the test set out for targeted interception. It is the test that will be applied to all the secondary data of anybody in this room who ever finds themselves caught up in a bulk interception warrant. That is not far-fetched. There will be many bulk intercept warrants, which may well capture the content and secondary data of many members of the public who are not targets in any way.
As a result, although I applaud the Minister for his long and detailed answer, it was not very persuasive regarding the necessity of this scheme or the effectiveness of the safeguards. Simply saying that secondary data may be necessary to determine location is hardly enough to justify the provision. I recognise that secondary data are different to content and that bulk powers are different from targeted powers, but in the end, when this is unravelled, it shows that there is no effective safeguard. In the circumstances we will not divide the Committee on the amendment, but I reserve the right to return to the matter at a later stage. It goes to the heart of the Bill. When properly analysed and understood, the safeguard in this respect is barely a safeguard at all.
Mr Hayes
I do not want to delay the Committee unduly, but I will offer this response. First, I direct the hon. and learned Gentleman to the “Operational Case for Bulk Powers”, which specifies the ways in which bulk powers will be used. The operational case will be specific. I am grateful to him for not pressing the amendment. I am happy to write to the Committee to reinforce our arguments and I think that we might reach a Hegelian synthesis—I am very keen on Hegel, as he knows. I agree that it is often necessary to examine the secondary data to determine the sender—he knows that that is the case—but I disagree about the lack of specificity on the operational purposes. We cannot give too much detail on that, for the reasons of sensitivity that he will understand, but I am happy to write to him to draw his and the Committee’s attention to the “Operational Case for Bulk Powers”, which is targeted at overseas threats but might, as he properly said, draw in some data from those who are in the UK. I hope that when I write to him he might decide not to bring these matters back further. I am grateful for his consideration.
Joanna Cherry
I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr Owen. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Before lunch, I spoke to amendment 83, concerning secondary data. I did not speak to amendment 84, because it was tabled but not selected, but it is really a corollary: it proposes leaving out clause 14.
I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said and I am grateful to him for his detailed explanation, but he does not take on board the concerns that I attempted to articulate on secondary data, notwithstanding the fact that similar concerns were articulated by the Intelligence and Security Committee. We will have to agree to differ for the time being. I associate myself with the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the other issues relating to the these amendments, in particular his pertinent and typically incisive point about clause 125(3).
Having sought clarification this morning from the Chair on the voting procedures, I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote, because I think that I would end up with something of a pyrrhic victory. However, I emphasise that I stand by the necessity for the grouped amendments and wish to revisit them later during the passage of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Obtaining secondary data
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Joanna Cherry
I tabled an amendment to delete clause 14. I do not think it has been selected, but I have made my position clear. I wish to revisit this issue at a later stage.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Subject-matter of warrants
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 15, page 12, line 3, leave out “or organisation”.
This amendment, and others to Clause 15, seek to preserve the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals while requiring an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 5, in clause 15, page 12, line 8, after “activity” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
Amendment 6, in clause 15, page 12, line 9, leave out “or organisation”.
Amendment 7, in clause 15, page 12, line 11, after “operation”, insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
Amendment 8, in clause 15, page 12, line 12, leave out paragraph (2)(c).
Amendment 9, in clause 15, page 12, line 13, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 52, in clause 27, page 21, line 7, leave out ‘or organisation’.
Amendment 53, in clause 27, page 21, line 8, leave out ‘or organisation’.
Amendment 54, in clause 27, page 21, line 13, leave out
‘or describe as many of those persons as is reasonably practicable to name or describe’ and insert ‘or otherwise identify all of those persons’.
Amendment 55, in clause 27, page 21, line 15, leave out ‘or organisation’.
Amendment 56, in clause 27, page 21, line 19, leave out
‘or describe as many of those persons or organisations or as many of those sets of premises, as it is reasonably practicable to name or describe’ and insert ‘all of those persons or sets of premises’.
Joanna Cherry
The effect of these amendments to clause 15 would be to retain the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals but require an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided. Associated amendments to clause 27 would be required. This would narrow the current provisions, which, in my submission, effectively permit a limitless number of unidentified individuals to have their communications intercepted.
As drafted, clause 15 permits warrants to be issued in respect of people whose names are not known or knowable when the warrant is sought. That is confirmed by clause 27, which provides that a thematic warrant must describe the relevant purpose or activity, and
“name or describe as many of those persons…as…is reasonably practicable”.
The creation of thematic warrants in the Bill means that communications intercepted in their billions under part 6 could be trawled thematically for groups sharing a common purpose or carrying out a particular activity. The difficulty with that is that it provides for an open-ended warrant that could encompass many hundreds or thousands of people, and the expansive scope of these warrants, combined with the broad grounds with which they can be authorised, does not impose sufficient limits on the authorities’ interception powers.
The existence of thematic interception warrants was avowed by the Secretary of State in March 2015. The Intelligence and Security Committee has reported that the significant majority of section 8(1) warrants under RIPA relate to one specific individual but that some do not apply to named individuals or specific premises, and instead apply to groups of people. The current Home Secretary has apparently derived the authority to do so from a broad definition given to the word “person” that is found elsewhere in RIPA, despite the unequivocal reference to “one person” in section 8(1) of RIPA. I suggest that what has gone on in the past is a very unorthodox statutory construction.
Be that as it may, in considering the terms of this Bill the ISC has reported that the Interception of Communications Commissioner has
“made some strong recommendations about the management of thematic warrants”
and in some cases recommended that they be cancelled. The ISC has expressed further concerns about the extent to which this capability is used and the associated safeguards that go along with it. It has suggested that thematic warrants must be used sparingly and should be authorised for a shorter time than a standard section 8(1) warrant.
Reporting on the draft version of the Bill, the ISC noted that “unfortunately”—the Committee’s word—its previous recommendation about thematic warrants
“has not been reflected in the draft Bill”;
nor has it been reflected in the revised Bill, in which the scope for thematic warrants remains unchanged. It is not only the ISC that has concerns about this issue. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill also recommended that
“the language of the Bill be amended so that targeted interception and targeted equipment interference warrants cannot be used as a way to issue thematic warrants”.
Many lawyers believe that the scope of warrants permitted under clause 15 as drafted would fail to comply with both the common law and European Court of Human Rights standards, as expounded in a very recent decision in Zakharov v. Russia from 4 December 2015. In that case, the ECHR found that Russia’s interception scheme was in violation of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Also, the Court cited the fact that Russian courts sometimes grant interception authorisations that do not mention a specific person or a specific telephone number to be tapped but authorise interception of all telephone communications in the area where a criminal offence has been committed. Although thematic warrants do not relate to geographical location, in my view and that of many far more distinguished lawyers, they are sufficiently broad to violate article 8 of the convention. Our amendments are required to make clauses 15 and 27 compatible with that article.
Victoria Atkins (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)
Is the purpose of the clause to address those circumstances where, for example, the security services or police know that someone has been kidnapped, but they do not know the names of the kidnap gang or even perhaps the number of gang members? The clause is designed to enable the security services to make the inquiries they need to make to save a life.
Joanna Cherry
I think I am correct in saying that this section is directed more towards security concerns than serious crime. I will no doubt be corrected, but I can only stand by what others who deal with surveillance issues have said in their evidence to the Committee. I would also like to point to what David Anderson QC said in his follow-up evidence to the Committee at paragraphs 4 and 5.
Joanna Cherry
David Anderson, in his typically helpful, studious and hard-working way followed up his oral evidence to us with some additional thoughts in written evidence. He has a section headed “Thematic Targeted Powers” in which he says:
“I recommended that the practice of issuing thematic warrants be continued into the new legislative regime…I envisaged their utility as being ‘against a defined group or network whose characteristics are such that the extent of the interference can reasonably be foreseen, and assessed as necessary or proportionate, in advance’—for example, a specific organised crime group”.
Perhaps that answers the hon. Lady’s question. He went on to say:
“I also recommended that the addition of new persons or premises to the warrant should…require the approval of a judicial commissioner, so that the use of a thematic warrant did not dilute the strict authorisation procedure that would otherwise accompany the issue of a warrant targeted on a particular individual or premises”.
His following statement is very important. He says:
“On both counts, the Bill is considerably more permissive than I had envisaged. Thus: The wording of clause 15 (interception) and still more so clause 90 (EI) is extremely broad”.
This answers the hon. Lady’s point. Even David Anderson, who envisaged thematic warrants having some utility against a defined group or network such as an organised crime group, says that the wording of clause 15 is considerably more permissive than he had envisaged.
Victoria Atkins
The hon. and learned Lady states the opinion that clause 15 is really aimed at dealing with the security services point. It is but, may I refer her to clause 18, which deals with the grounds on which warrants may be issued by the Secretary of State? It is very clear that it can be done for national security reasons but also for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime.
Joanna Cherry
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I stand corrected. Fortunately I have the assistance of David Anderson on this point. He has made the point that whereas he sees envisaged their utility in identifying a defined group or network—for example, a specific organised crime group—he remains of the view that the wording of clause 15 is “extremely broad”. It should concern all members of this Committee that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation considers the wording of this clause to be extremely broad. If the Government will not take the Scottish National party’s word for it, then they can take the word of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I seek the Government’s assurance that they will go away and look again at clause 15 and clause 27 very carefully, in the light not only of what I have said but, more importantly, what has been said by Sir Stanley Burnton, Lord Judge and David Anderson.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her very detailed points. Does she accept that even though David Anderson thinks that the wording is too broad, the amendments that she proposes would make the provision too narrow? If the words “or organisation” are taken out then only a person or a premises will be identified, which would not catch the circumstances that David Anderson is thinking about. In her submission, the hon. and learned Lady identified that while the current wording was too broad, some of the organisations that she mentioned did recognise that in some circumstances the thematic powers were useful.
Joanna Cherry
The hon. and learned Lady makes a point that I have to take on board to a certain extent. I suspect that my amendments to clause 15 go further than David Anderson would if he were drafting an amendment to this clause. We are at a very early stage in this procedure. I am really seeking an assurance from the Government that they will take on board, if not my concerns, then at the very least the concerns of Sir Stanley Burnton, Lord Judge and David Anderson, and that they will take away clause 15 and clause 27 and look at them again.
Keir Starmer
I will be brief because a lot of the detailed work has been done. I listened very carefully to the Minister, not only today but on other occasions, and he indicated that the Government want to improve the Bill and that they do not have a fixed view. I therefore make these submissions in the hope that the Minister and the Government will not circle the wagons around the existing formula in clause 15 simply because those are the words on the page. The warrants are supposed to be targeted, but when reading clause 15(2) it is clear that they are very wide. I will not repeat the concerns of Lord Judge, Sir Stanley Burnton and David Anderson, but they are three individuals with huge experience of the operation of these warrants.
I take the point about kidnap cases or examples of that type. They are exactly the cases that Lord Judge and Sir Stanley Burnton will have seen in real time and reviewed, and that David Anderson will have reviewed after the event. When those three distinguished individuals say that they have concerns about the breadth of the clauses, they do so against huge and probably unparalleled experience of what the warrants provide for. I doubt that anyone would suggest that they are not alive to concerns about the warrants being practical and effective in the sort of circumstances that have been described.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
May I put a slightly counter idea to the hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West? I accept the comments of David Anderson and others, but in some instances it will not be terribly wrong to have broad definitions in the Bill. Getting legislation made in this place is a difficult and lengthy process. We must fetter those who wish this country and its citizens ill, so it is potentially a good idea to have some breadth in the definitions.
Keir Starmer
I understand the spirit underpinning the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, which is that in certain circumstances a broad power can be helpful because future situations are not known. In this case, the breadth of the provision matters above all else, however, because it concerns the subject matter of the warrant. Lest anyone think otherwise, when one looks at the code of practice, one does not find that it restricts what is in the Bill. Paragraph 5.12 of the draft code says, in stark terms:
“There is not a limit to the number of locations, persons or organisations that can be provided for by a thematic warrant.”
In certain circumstances, the Minister and the Government might be able to point to things that are broad in the Bill but restricted by the code, but that would not be appropriate for the subject matter of a warrant and is not the situation in this case. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the intervention, however, because I need to put my concern on the table, and I invite the Government to take the matter away and have another look at it.
I am concerned that in reality, the broadly drawn warrants will be modified. We will get to the modification procedures later. The broad warrant will be signed off by the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner, but the modification, which may well add names as they become available, will not. There is therefore the further hidden danger that the provision is so broad that it will require modification procedures to be used more often than they should, in circumstances in which they are not adequate, for reasons that I will come on to.
At the end of the day, if someone with the authority and experience of Lord Judge, Sir Stanley Burnton and David Anderson—who have more authority and experience than anyone in this room—says that they have concerns about the breadth of the warrants, for the Government simply to say, “We’re not going to have another look at it”, runs counter to the spirit in which they have so far approached the scrutiny of the Bill.
Lucy Frazer
I wonder whether clause 15(1) is as wide as we think, given that subsection (2) seems to relate to a category of people that is not caught by subsection (1). We would not need subsection (2) unless it referred to a wider group than subsection (1). If that is right, someone must have particular characteristics to be caught under subsection (2), which suggests that subsection (1) is in fact narrow.
Keir Starmer
That is absolutely right. If subsection (1) was wide enough to incorporate subsection (2) we would not need it. Subsection (2) is there to enable a warrant to be granted in circumstances that would be constrained by subsection (1). It is permissive—that is why the word “may” is used.
It is subsection (2) that has been singled out. Sir Stanley Burnton was absolutely clear that the wording of the subsection was wide, and that was what he focused his attention on. If someone with the experience of the experts I have named says that there is a problem because the provision is too broad, I invite the Government, in the spirit of constructing a better Bill, to go away and think about that. Those people have unrivalled experience of seeing warrants in practice.
Mr Hayes
I do not want to detain the Committee too long on these amendments, but this is an important debate, because investigation of the kind we are discussing may not at the outset be able to identify particular individuals. The effect of the amendments would be to limit the ability of warrant requesting agencies to apply for a warrant against organisations, and to require the naming of individuals. It is not always possible to do that. That includes individuals using communication devices—it may be known that someone has received a telephone call from a particular number, but not necessarily know who or where they are.
Victoria Atkins
Would a horribly pertinent example be the man in the hat in Belgium? Until this week the security services abroad did not know who that person was and were desperately trying to find out his identity.
Mr Hayes
That is an example of what I meant. There could well be people, either here or travelling here, whose identity is known only in the broadest terms. They are part of a network, a wider group or organisation, but no detail is known about them. That does not apply only to terrorist investigations; it might apply to serious organised crime investigations, in which by their nature we are dealing with organisations that desire anonymity. That means that investigations are challenging and makes the powers in the Bill absolutely necessary.
It is perfectly possible that a terrorist or criminal organisation might be seeking to travel in or out of the United Kingdom. It might not be clear at the outset which individuals will be travelling, or that all those travelling share an identified common purpose and will be carrying on the same activity, as required by the definition of “group of persons”.
It is also important to note that the Bill imposes strict limits on the scope of the warrant in relation to organisations. We need to be clear that activity against an organisation must be for the purpose of a single investigation or operation, and the Secretary of State and judicial commissioner will both need to be satisfied that the warrant is sufficiently limited to be able to meet the necessity and proportionality case. It is not just that it needs to be necessary and proportionate; it must be sufficiently limited to legitimise that.
Joanna Cherry
I am thinking about the example of the man in the hat. Is that really apposite here? We are talking about targeted interception warrants and targeted examination warrants. We cannot intercept someone’s communications, or examine them, before we have identified who or where they are. Simply knowing that there is a man in a hat is of absolutely no use to us until we find some way to narrow it down and identify who the man in the hat is, even if just that he is a man living in a particular place.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Lady may have misunderstood. Part 2 targeted warrants, even if they are thematic, cannot be used to trawl information collected en masse or in bulk. Targeted interception warrant applications must specify the scope of the activity to be intercepted. They cannot be open-ended; they are time-limited and must provide sufficient information for the Secretary of State to assess that the activity proposed is necessary. Indeed, all targeted interception warrants will be time-limited to six months.
Where the interception of calls between a particular handset and a group of individuals, for example, may help to identify a kidnapper—we have heard the example of kidnapping—or show where a kidnapper is, the details of what they are planning or where they might be holding the victim, it is of course possible to identify individuals to whom the warrant relates at the point when it is sought. Where that is the case, the warrant requesting agency will be expected to add the identities of the suspects to the warrant as they become known. That is a further assurance and an important new safeguard, as the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras knows. It will allow the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner to oversee the conduct taking place under the warrant. That obligation will be given statutory force through the code of practice, as he said. Even though it will be in the code of practice, it will have statutory force.
Keir Starmer
Will the Minister confirm, just so we are clear what we are talking about, that that process, as envisaged in the code, is by way of modification and does not involve the double lock?
Mr Hayes
That is an interesting point. I will take further advice on that in the course of my peroration, which will be marginally longer than it was going to be as a result.
Because we recognise that it is important that these warrants are not open-ended, we have added that important safeguard. The fact that it is in the code of practice and not on the face of the Bill does not weaken its significance. I emphasise that it must have force and will be an obligation, as I have described it.
I will come back to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point, but first I will deal with amendments 8 and 9, which would remove the warrant requesting agency’s ability to apply for a warrant for testing or training purposes. It is vital that those authorised to undertake interception are able to test new equipment and ensure that those responsible for using it are properly trained in its use. There are, however, strict controls that govern the handling of material obtained during such tests. We believe that it is right that it should be possible for equipment to be tested in scenarios where it can be checked that it is working properly, for example by armed forces on the battlefield. It would have serious consequences for our military if they did not have the ability to test equipment so that risks and mistakes are avoided.
Victoria Atkins
Returning to the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West about the man in the hat, the reason for the ability to investigate communication devices and numbers to which names may not be attributed is precisely so such a person can be identified through devices seized from suspects who have already been arrested. Is my understanding correct on that? The hon. and learned Lady accused me of misunderstanding, but may I invite the Minister to clarify?
Mr Hayes
My hon. Friend is right, and I can enlighten the Committee by saying that I have seen this in practice. At the National Crime Agency I saw an investigation live, because it happened that while I was visiting, just such a warrant was being used. The identity of a number of those involved in a very serious potential crime was not known, and a warrant was used to piece together information from what was known to prevent an assassination. I will say no more than that for the sake of the necessary confidentiality, but that capability was needed to avert a very serious crime. That warrant was highly effective, and if I needed any persuading, it persuaded me then of the significance of the power we are discussing.
To return to the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, thematic warrants can be modified by adding people, as I think he was suggesting, but only where it is in the scope of the original activity authorised by the warrant and the purpose does not change. It must be for the purpose that the warrant requesting agency gave without the double lock; he is right about that. However, the Secretary of State must be notified when a person is added, so there is a further check in terms of that notification. Modifications are not permitted to change the scope of the warrant. The provision is not open ended—I do not think the hon. and learned Gentleman was suggesting that it was, but he might have been interpreted as doing so.
Keir Starmer
We can probably pick up this baton when we get to clause 30, but I think the provision that the Minister has just mentioned comes from the code, rather than the Bill.
Mr Hayes
That is true, it is in the code. I think I indicated that earlier. None the less, it is an obligation. The reason we added to the codes, largely following the Joint Committee report, was that we wanted to provide additional assurances without the rigidity of placing too much on the face of the Bill.
There is always a tension—I spoke about it in our morning session—between how much is placed on the face of a Bill, which of course provides a degree of certainty but by its nature simultaneously provides rigidity, and how much is placed in supporting documentation. Codes of practice are important supplements to a Bill, and, in their final form, to an Act. It should be emphasised that they are not merely advisory documents—they are legally binding in their effect. As I also emphasised, these are draft codes of practice that we expect to publish in full, partly as a result of this Committee’s consideration and what we learn from it.
The warrant application process will allow the Secretary of State to understand the potential risk that communications will be intercepted incidentally to the purpose of testing or training, and to approve the measures to be taken to reduce the chance of communication being accidentally intercepted. Clear safeguards are in place to protect the privacy of the citizen, so I invite the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I am not minded to withdraw the amendment. For the same reasons that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras gave earlier, and the reasons that I gave in relation to amendments to clause 13, I will not insist on a vote just now—I suppose that means that I do withdraw the amendment, but I reserve the right to bring it back at a later stage.
The Chair
For clarification, when the hon. Lady says that she will bring it back at a later stage, it will be on Report.
Joanna Cherry
Indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Power of Secretary of State to issue warrants
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 17, page 13, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
This amendment, and others to Clause 17, seeks to remove the role of the Secretary of State in formally issuing interception warrants and instead requires Judicial Commissioners to issue such warrants.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 12, in clause 17, page 13, line 8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 13, in clause 17, page 13, line 10, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 14, in clause 17, page 13, line 12, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 15, in clause 17, page 13, line 16, leave out paragraph (1)(d).
Amendment 16, in clause 17, page 13, line 20, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 17, in clause 17, page 13, line 22, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 18, in clause 17, page 13, line 24, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 19, in clause 17, page 13, line 27, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 20, in clause 17, page 13, line 31, leave out paragraph (2)(d).
Amendment 21, in clause 17, page 13, line 35, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 22, in clause 17, page 13, line 37, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 23, in clause 17, page 13, line 39, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”
Amendment 24, in clause 17, page 13, line 42, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 25, in clause 17, page 13, line 45, leave out paragraph (3)(d).
Amendment 26, in clause 17, page 14, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 27, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 101, in clause 17, page 14, line 11, leave out “For the power of the Scottish Ministers to issue warrants under this Chapter, see section 19.”
This amendment reflects the removal of the role of the Scottish Ministers in formally issuing interception warrants sought by Amendment 36 (which proposes leaving out section 19).
Amendment 28, in clause 17, page 14, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 33, in clause 18, page 14, line 30, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 34, in clause 18, page 14, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Keir Starmer
To some extent the amendments overlap with the discussions we will no doubt have on clause 21 and new clause 5. The effect of this group of amendments is to replace the Secretary of State with the judicial commissioner as the primary and only decision-maker in relation to these categories of warrants.
This morning, the Minister said that he was surprised that we had tabled these amendments and I will give him three short answers to that. The first is that from the outset the Labour party called for judicial authorisation before the concept of the double lock was introduced. That was our primary and preferred position. Obviously, the introduction of the double lock, which involves a degree of judicial authorisation, is somewhat better than the Secretary of State being the sole determining decision-maker. Therefore the fact that we are supportive of a situation that is better than the current situation is hardly enough to knock us out from our primary position. The third position—and this is why it overlaps with clause 21—is that to some extent this all depends on what role the judges have. If they are nearer to decision-makers under clause 21, the relationship with the Secretary of State is very different from the position if they are simply long-arm reviewers. I will reserve that for the discussion we will have on clause 21.
So far as the principle in favour of these amendments is concerned, I can be clear. They have been drafted to reflect, as far as possible, the detailed proposals of David Anderson in his report. Members of the Committee have probably seen that they are deliberately drafted to reflect the approach that he suggested was right—particularly when one takes into account new clause 5. I will summarise his reasons, rather than reading them verbatim, laid out in paragraphs 14.47 and 14.57 of his report. He indicates four reasons for the proposed structure. The first is the sheer number of warrants that the Home Secretary has to sign per year. As he sets out in paragraph 14.49, there are thousands of warrants per year, details of which are in the footnotes. Dealing with those warrants is a huge imposition on the Secretary of State’s time, and they could be dealt with in a different way.
There is an important sub-issue here. Points have been made, this morning and on other occasions, about the accountability of the Secretary of State in relation to national security and foreign affairs. I understand how and why those points were made. As David Anderson points out, 70% of the warrants that the Secretary of State routinely signs off are in fact police warrants that do not raise issues of national security or matters of foreign affairs. In many respects, they are no different from the sorts of powers that the police exercise when they search and seize, or exercise other powers available to them through the usual routes of going to the Crown court. His starting point is that it is no longer sensible for the Secretary of State to handle these thousands of cases, particularly since 70% are in fact police cases, not involving national security or foreign affairs.
Secondly, in paragraph 14.50 David Anderson deals with improving public confidence. Thirdly, at 14.51 he deals with the position in the US, where there is a growing insistence that if warrants are to be complied with by those in the US, judicial sign-off of the warrant is required. David Anderson’s concern was that, unless we move to a different system, we might find that warrants would not be honoured when we needed them to be honoured in other jurisdictions. That is obviously a serious point that I know the Government have taken into account.
The fourth reason, in paragraph 14.52, is that there is an established and well-functioning system for judicial approval by commissioners in comparably intrusive measures, when applied for by the police. He lists them as property interference, intrusive surveillance and long-term undercover police operations. Other police activities that require to be warranted go straight to the commissioner, not via the Secretary of State. Since 70% of those cases are the police exercising not dissimilar powers of interception under warrant, there is a powerful argument to say that that category of cases, if nothing else, ought to go straight to a judicial commissioner. That would be modelled on David Anderson’s analysis, for the reasons that he has set out in those paragraphs.
I would like to highlight paragraph 14.56(a), because it has been said today and on other occasions that an important political accountability goes with the role of Secretary of State in relation to these warrants. Yes, that is the case to a certain level, but it must not be misunderstood. I have yet to find an example of any Secretary of State from any political party, certainly in recent history, ever accounting to Parliament for an individual warrant.
Victoria Atkins
What I genuinely do not understand about this argument is that, given that the Secretary of State is not permitted or authorised to account publicly for a warrant, how on earth will that be any different for a judicial commissioner? The nature of the material is sensitive, regardless of whether it is reviewed by the Secretary of State or by the judicial commissioner.
Keir Starmer
The point I am making is not that that judicial commissioner could be more accountable, or that there would be some forum in which the judge could go and explain. I completely accept that that is a limitation. I am meeting the argument against this proposal, which is that at the moment the Secretary of State has some political accountability which would be reduced or taken away if this amendment were accepted.
The point David Anderson makes is that it is of course a criminal offence to disclose that the warrant has been signed, so in fact the Secretary of State could not go to the Dispatch Box even in an extreme case. She would commit an offence if she went to the Dispatch Box to be held accountable for an individual decision. That is exactly why David Anderson writes as he does in paragraph 14.56 of his report. If any other members of the Committee have found an example of a Secretary of State ever actually being held accountable for an individual warrant, I personally would like to see the Hansard report of that taking place.
Suella Fernandes
On the question of accountability, there is a clear line of accountability to the Executive in the form of the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a body of reviewers—elected, accountable and within the parliamentary and democratic process—who have access to this confidential information and can review the actions under this function. That is a clear line of accountability, which exists and is exercised.
Keir Starmer
Again—and I will be corrected if I am wrong on this—the statutory prohibition on the Secretary of State ever saying whether or not she signed a warrant applies across the board, whether in a Select Committee or in any other parliamentary proceedings. In other words, first, she could not be asked a question about an individual warrant because there would be no basis on which it could be put and, secondly, even if it were asked she could not answer it. I take the point that is being made but, wherever the accountability is placed, to hold the idea that there is individual accountability for the hugely important decisions that are made on individual warrants is to misunderstand how the regime works.
Lucy Frazer
One witness—I forget now who it was, but I think they were on the legal panel—said that there is accountability both ways. If the Secretary of State gets it right and there is no terrorist attack, there is nothing to be accountable for. If she gets it wrong, she is extremely accountable for the consequences of something that happened when she made the wrong judgment call about whether to issue a warrant.
Keir Starmer
I recall that evidence, but it is very difficult to see how that could work in practice, because none of us would ever know—nor could we know—whether a warrant had been put before the Secretary of State and whether she had signed it. That is prohibited for us and for the other oversight mechanisms. That is the problem. I accept the broader political accountability—if something goes horrendously wrong, one would expect the Home Secretary to make a statement about what the Government had been doing. However, the idea that on an individual, warrant by warrant basis there could be anything amounting to accountability is what David Anderson was driving at in his report, and it has never happened. That is the best evidence.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Gentleman is so wrong about this that I have an embarrassment of riches on which to draw. He is philosophically, politically and factually wrong, but let me deal first with his factual inaccuracy. The Home Secretary can talk about specific warrants to the ISC. The ISC does conduct detailed investigations into particular cases, as it did into the murder of Lee Rigby, when it scrutinises data in considerable detail. Of course all of that cannot be made public, because of the nature of the investigation, but the hon. and learned Gentleman misunderstands—perhaps because of inexperience—the role of the ISC in those terms. I will deal with his philosophical and political problems later.
Keir Starmer
Perhaps the Minister will point me to an example of the ISC ever making public any criticism of or comment about the Secretary of State’s exercise of the powers in a way that could in any way be described seriously as politically accountable.
Mr Hayes
With respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, he can hardly claim that the ISC is a puppet or poodle of Government given its report on the Bill. The ISC is extremely robust in its scrutiny of Ministers. It makes its views known to Ministers and is not frightened to make known to the House its views about the proposals, policies and performance of Government.
Keir Starmer
I do not think that the Minister was listening to what I said. I asked if he could point me to a single example of the Intelligence and Security Committee ever commenting publicly—in a way that could be accountable to the public—on the exercise by the Secretary of State of her powers to issue a warrant. It is all very well making generalised points, but I am asking for yes or no—the Minister must know.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the ISC could not ask the Secretary of State about particular warrants, but the ISC can and does ask the Secretary of State about particular warrants in pursuit of its inquiries into specific cases. Of course, because of the character of the ISC, rather like the practice of Ministers, it cannot make all that information publicly available. The whole point about the ISC is that it does not make all that it considers publicly available, but that does not mean that Ministers are not accountable to the Committee, which is made up of Members of this House from many political parties.
Keir Starmer
The answer to my question appears to be no, there has never been an example of the ISC or any Committee ever commenting publicly on the exercise by the Secretary of State of her specific powers to issue warrants or not. That is what leads David Anderson to the view that the political accountability card is overplayed in the discussion.
The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)
This is a very important aspect of the debate. On the last remark made by the hon. and learned Gentleman, about David Anderson’s potential conclusion about political accountability being overplayed, I was interested in the arguments, but the fundamental point is the source of the authority that allows the Secretary of State as a democratically elected politician to make the decisions. Also, in particular in the context of national security, it is well set out in case law, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, that proper deference should be paid to the Executive on important decisions of national security. That is at the top end of the scale, then we move down—or across, in a different context—and is that not the issue?
Keir Starmer
I have already accepted the general proposition that if some catastrophe occurred, the Secretary of State would be required or expected to make a statement, setting out what in general terms had been done. I accept that level of political accountability. I am talking about the specifics of signing off warrants and, therefore, what would be lost if the Secretary of State’s role were taken over by the judicial commissioner. There is a question of deference on national security and foreign affairs, but we will get to that when we reach clause 21, because that deals with the scope of review by the judicial commissioner. The point I was making before the interventions, however, was drawing attention to David Anderson’s paragraph 14.5, in which he sets out the reasons why the political accountability card is overplayed.
Victoria Atkins
The hon. and learned Gentleman may recall that we had the privilege of listening to two Labour Home Secretaries, Lord Reid and Charles Clarke. I asked Mr Clarke about his relationship with the security services and his experience of warrantry in the dreadful hours following the 7/7 bombings. I asked him how useful or important that was in the vital hours thereafter and his answer—I will be quick, Mr Owen—started with the words “critically important”. Does that affect the hon. and learned Gentleman’s view in any way?
Keir Starmer
No, it does not. With all due respect, thinking on accountability and safeguards in this field is on the move. The sort of regime that was perhaps thought appropriate five, 10 or 15 years ago is now accepted as not appropriate. One of the points of this legislation in many respects is to bring it up to date and make sure that scrutiny and safeguards are more powerful. The fact that an ex-Home Secretary thinks their role was very important and need not be interfered with did not surprise me, but neither did I find it persuasive.
I have probably exhausted my point. The amendments are intended to reflect the position set out by David Anderson for the very good reasons that he draws attention to in paragraph 14.56(a): the political accountability card is overplayed in resisting this argument.
Joanna Cherry
I just want to address the joint amendments briefly. I want to draw attention to amendment 101, which was tabled on behalf of the Scottish National party and reflects a later amendment to delete clause 19. Scottish Ministers issue warrants at present in relation to serious crime. If the amendments were taken on board, their role would be replaced by judicial commissioners, and they are comfortable with that. I simply draw attention to that consequential amendment.
I support everything that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras has said in support of the group of amendments to clause 17. I have just three points to make: three reasons why I support the amendments. First, I associate myself with the argument that arguments concerning Ministers’ democratic or political accountability for surveillance warrants are misconceived and misplaced. Secondly, one-stage judicial authorisation is the norm in many comparable jurisdictions. Thirdly, and picking up another point made by David Anderson, judicial authorisation would encourage co-operation from technical firms in the United States of America.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for exploding the myth, also exploded by David Anderson, that Ministers are democratically accountable for their role in issuing warrants, because of course it is a criminal offence to disclose the existence of a warrant, and that will remain the case under clauses 49 and 51.
What is often advanced and has been advanced by Government Members is that a corollary to this argument is that Ministers are politically accountable for the agencies and will be required to resign if things go wrong. That is incorrect. Although the Home Secretary is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the Government’s counter-terrorism policy and the Cabinet Minister is responsible for MI5, MI5 is like the police: operationally independent. MI5’s director general retains operational independence for day to day decision making. Historically, when terrorist attacks have tragically succeeded, they have not led to political resignations in this country. Despite inquests and inquiries following the terrible tragedies of the 7/7 attacks and the ghastly murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, and despite the fact that those inquests and inquiries uncovered internal errors in the agency’s handling of information relating to those responsible for the attacks, this did not result in the political accountability that is now so strongly claimed.
The reality is that the oversight we have for such decisions and the accountability for the agency is provided by a patchwork of mechanisms, including the ISC—although I dissociate myself with the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras on the limitations of the ISC—and also by public inquiries and legal challenges brought against the Government. No doubt we could argue that such oversight and accountability as there is in relation to the operation of the security agencies could be enhanced, but it is simply not correct to argue that political accountability is provided by the ministerial sign-off on warrants, because it is not. I have been in the House for only nine months, but when questions around these issues are asked of Ministers, I have seen them repeatedly reply, probably quite properly, that they cannot answer for reasons of national security.
My second point is that one-stage judicial authorisation is the norm in comparable jurisdictions. It happens in America, where federal, investigative or law enforcement officers are generally required to obtain judicial authorisation for intercept. A court order must be issued by a judge of a US district court or a US court of appeals judge. In Australia, law enforcement interception warrants must be issued by an eligible judge or a nominated administrative appeals tribunal judge. In Canada, it is unlawful to intercept private communications unless the interception is in accordance with an authorisation issued by a judge. In New Zealand, police can only intercept a private communication in tightly prescribed circumstances, including requiring a warrant or emergency permit that can only be issued by a High Court judge. If the United Kingdom wants to be able to claim that it is in a world-class league for good practice in surveillance, in my submission, it should adopt one-stage judicial authorisation.
Those of us who are lawyers in the Committee or have ever dealt with the law are familiar with the concept of a judge being got out of his or her bed in the middle of the night to grant an interdict in Scotland or an injunction in England, in civil matters of far less importance than the sorts of matter the Bill deals with. In the aftermath of—God forbid—another attack in the United Kingdom such as 7/7, judges would be as readily available to deal with warrants as Ministers of the Crown are at present.
Thirdly, judicial authorisation would encourage co-operation from US technical firms. That point was pressed home by David Anderson QC in his review, when he said that given the United States tradition of judicial warrants, Silicon Valley technical firms feel uncomfortable with the United Kingdom model of political authorisation. Those firms operate in a global marketplace, which underlines the need for us to adhere to procedures fit for a world-leading democracy. The United Kingdom is alone among our democratic allies with similar legal systems in permitting political-only authorisation. The SNP supports the amendments for those three reasons.
Mr Hayes
This is an important debate, as my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General said. The shadow Minister is wrong, as I described earlier, factually, philosophically and politically. I will try to deal with those in turn.
The factual case is this. Accountability is a much more sophisticated thing than the shadow Minister suggests. Accountability is about who makes decisions, as well as about the decisions they make. People who are elected, by their nature, are accountable to those who elect them. The judgments they make and the powers they exercise reflect that direct relationship with the electorate. It is almost undeniably true that those of us sitting in this room and others like us are bound to be more influenced and affected by the wider public because we do not do a job unless they continue to have faith and belief in us. We are elected by them; we are answerable to them.
The Home Secretaries, the Northern Ireland Secretaries and the Foreign Secretaries who make these decisions are elected constituency Members of Parliament who every day, every week and every month are communicating with constituents who have profoundly held views about the very matters over which those Secretaries exercise their judgment, in a way that people who are not elected simply do not. That line of accountability to the wider public should not be understated or underestimated.
Keir Starmer
How would a member of the public ever know, and therefore be able to judge, whether a Secretary of State had made a mistake in relation to a specific warrant?
Mr Hayes
I am prepared to acknowledge that I may not have made the argument sufficiently clearly, rather than to suggest that the hon. and learned Gentleman did not understand it. I was making the point that those who are missioned to make the decisions are likely to be more in touch with the sentiments, values, views and opinions of the public than those who are not elected, because of who they are and the job they do. That is not a particularly difficult concept to grasp, so I am amazed that he does not grasp it.
Keir Starmer
Perhaps the Minister can point me to the provision in the Bill that permits or requires the Secretary of State to take into account the wider public’s views. There are strict legal tests of necessity and proportionality, and the idea that judges could not apply them to specified organisational purposes and so on is to underplay their duty. I have done loads of control order cases and TPIM cases in front of judges and they make such decisions day in, day out.
Mr Hayes
Here is the nub of the difference between us. The hon. and learned Gentleman is a former lawyer who has happily now become a politician. I am a politician who has never had the disadvantage of being a lawyer. Luckily, I have many hon. Friends in the room who are able to supplement my skills in that regard. My fundamental point is that as a constituency Member of Parliament, with all the communications, contacts and understanding that that necessitates in respect of popular opinion—I reapply for my job, as he will, every five years—I am likely to be more in tune and in touch with popular sentiment when exercising all kinds of judgments, including judgments about the Bill, than someone who is not. That is not a particularly controversial view. It is an affirmation of the importance of representative democracy, and we are, after all, Members of a representative democratic forum.
Christian Matheson
Does the Minister understand the point my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras is making about how a balance must be struck between being in touch with popular sentiment—the Minister made that case well—and being correct in terms of legal procedures?
Simon Hoare
I thought my right hon. Friend was about to give a tinker’s cuss, but obviously he refrained from doing so. I think he will agree that the main difference between the two Front Benches is the point made by the hon. Member for City of Chester in an earlier intervention. If the first duty of Government is the protection of the realm and Government can send troops on to our streets and into foreign battlefields and so on, suddenly passing any responsibility for or involvement in the granting of these warrants off to unaccountable judges would be an abdication.
Mr Hayes
I do take that view. The hon. Member for City of Chester did not explicitly articulate, but implied that there needed to be a balance between refusing to abdicate that duty, and indeed affirming it, alongside the affirmation of representative Government that I have already made, and taking into account the significance—as the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras argued, David Anderson made this point clearly in his report—of judicial involvement, not least as a means of reinforcing the system. As he very honestly said, part of David Anderson’s consideration was whether we could make what we do stand up to challenge, and having a judicial involvement through the double lock is a way of creating a system that is more robust and resistant to challenge: a system that people can have greater faith in, in that respect.
Christian Matheson
I am most grateful to the Minister for his generosity in giving way again. Having grown up in a village in rural Cheshire, I probably am quite bourgeois and certainly quite liberal, but I am finding the arguments of Government Members somewhat absurd, in that they seem to have a lack of trust in the judiciary to implement the law and understand what was meant from the original drafting of a law. I think my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras was trying to convey the sense that the balance was not quite there.
Mr Hayes
No, the double lock will provide the judicial commissioner with the same information—the same explanation of need—as that offered to the Secretary of State: the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary. What is more, they will apply the same test of proportionality and necessity, for it is indeed just that: a double lock. Unless both the judicial commissioner and the Home Secretary approve the application for the warrant, it will not happen. It is true that any party can ask for further information and the re-presentation of the warrant, and that may occur if there is uncertainty about the case that has been made, but the double lock has real effect. It is not that we do not believe in the judicial side of this deal; it has equal weight to the political involvement, but it is important that the Executive retain a role in this.
Let us be clear, the effect of these amendments will be to take the Executive out altogether—a substantial change in the Labour position. I suspected, unhappily, that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras might be a bourgeois liberal; I did not know he was going to be a born-again Bolshevik.
Keir Starmer
I am not sure I appreciate the tone with which the Minister is now conducting the debate, to be perfectly honest. To some extent, his comments have lost sight of the point I was making and that David Anderson made. The Minister invokes defence of the realm and national security, and so on, and has forgotten that 70% of these interception warrants are warrants for the police to exercise their powers—not particularly different to a lot of the other powers they exercise. They get search and seizure, they go into people’s houses, they get their letters and they read them, so there is nothing special about content in an intercept to say, “It must be the Secretary of State: only she is in touch with real people.” The police can get a warrant from a judge; they do so every day of the week. They go into people’s houses, they get all their documents and they read the lot, so the idea that that is a function that cannot be exercised unless someone is democratically elected is very hard to sustain.
The Chair
Before the Minister continues, let me say that the shadow Minister will have an opportunity to respond.
Mr Hayes
I just say to the shadow Minister that he may not appreciate the tone, but I could be much tougher. The reason I could be much tougher is because these amendments—which I take great exception to, by the way—stand in direct contrast to the tone of the shadow Home Secretary’s remarks when the draft Bill was published, when he welcomed the idea of a double lock. Speaking of the Home Secretary, he said:
“She has brought forward much stronger safeguards, particularly in the crucial area of judicial authorisation. It would help the future conduct of this important public debate if the House sent out the unified message today that this is neither a snooper’s charter, nor a plan for mass surveillance.”—[Official Report, 4 November 2015; Vol. 601, c. 973.]
That warm welcome of the double lock was affirmed several times since. It then metamorphosed into an equal lock, as the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras and others said that the information provided to the judicial commissioner should be equivalent to that provided to the Home Secretary, and I can even understand the argument that the process might be simultaneous. I do not necessarily agree with it, but I at least understood it, though our case was that the matter should go first to the Home Secretary and then to the judicial commissioner. I thought it might be the Opposition’s settled position that they wanted simultaneous consideration, but these amendments take the Home Secretary out of the process altogether. I can only assume that this change of heart—this about-turn—is not to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s taste, because I know that he is a very sensible chap and I cannot believe that he really believes that the Executive should be removed from the process altogether. Either there has been a command from on high—thus, my point about Bolsheviks—or, I hope, these are merely probing amendments that seek to reach one of the earlier positions I thought he might take.
Lucy Frazer
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West mentioned in her opening speech and on this point the importance of international comparison. Did the Minister notice that she did not refer to paragraphs 8.46 to 8.48 of David Anderson’s report, in which he extensively analyses the comparative jurisdictions?
Mr Hayes
For the sake of brevity and to make sure I do not fall out in the future, I am going to say that, yes, I did notice it.
The shadow Home Secretary, speaking of the Home Secretary, went on to say:
“The two-stage process that she advocates seems to have the merits of both arguments: it will provide public and political accountability, and the independence that is needed to build trust in the system.”—[Official Report, 4 November 2015; Vol. 601, c. 974.]
That is exactly the same point that I made to the hon. Member for City of Chester: it has, in the words of the shadow Home Secretary, the “merits of both arguments”.
Perhaps the shadow Minister will forgive me if I sound a little more arch than I normally do, but I feel that this is such a surprising set of amendments, which is so out of keeping with what I hoped was emerging as a settled position on the balance between the Executive and the judiciary. I thought we would end up with a debate on this, but not one between two positions—our measured, compromise position, and a much more extreme position that I did not expect the official Opposition to adopt. I urge him to think about this again, because I think we reached a good settlement in the terms that I described. That is my political point.
Returning to my original point for a moment, given the evidence provided by the former Home Secretaries, John Reid and David Blunkett, and the former Northern Ireland Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson), I think the balance of opinion lies on our side of the argument. I note the Joint Committee’s report and the fact that the ISC was silent on this issue in its most recent report. I feel that the balance of the argument lies with the proposals in the Bill. Perhaps we can look at the detail—I am happy to do that. Perhaps, in the spirit of trying to make positive progress, we can look at the information is provided to each party under the double-lock or at how the timing works—I do not know. I am not going to make any commitments on that, but I am more than happy to have a measured and reasonable debate about this. However, to take the Executive out of the process is politically very unwise, if I might say so, of the Opposition, and it is certainly not acceptable to the Government.
On the philosophical point, the shadow Minister understands—he is an educated and interesting man—that this strikes at the very heart of the separation of powers. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire said in evidence that
“these are executive decisions. They are operational decisions and must be made by a democratically elected Minister, accountable to Members of Parliament.”
He did not want the judiciary involved at all. We did not take that route because we listened to David Anderson and others, but I take the former Minister’s point.
Finally, so that we do not have any factual inaccuracies, the ISC made a clear recommendation on warranting in the Lee Rigby report that I mentioned earlier. The ISC does comment on warranting, contrary to what the shadow Minister says. It can both interrogate the Home Secretary on specific warrants and comment on warrants in respect of a particular investigation or inquiry. There is a line of accountability, as well as one to the wider public in the general terms that I described, to a well respected Committee of this House, which was established for exactly that purpose. On that basis, and having heard the argument, I urge Opposition Members to think again about these amendments.
Keir Starmer
In the exchanges we have had, I have probably said all I needed to in response to the Minister’s points. David Anderson might be surprised to find out that he is associated with the Bolshevik opposition apparently represented in the amendments. The amendments represent and reflect his thinking, but that is as may be—I will not press the amendments to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
On a point of order, Mr Owen, the amendments are also in my name, so will I, too, have to state my position on them?
Joanna Cherry
I would like to respond to one or two of the points made by the Minister, if I may briefly.
The Chair
There is a bit of a job share going on among the Front Benchers and I am getting a little confused. The mover of an Opposition amendment is the person who finishes on behalf of the Opposition. Mr Starmer has had the opportunity to do that and you have had your opportunity to speak; we are now going to vote.
Joanna Cherry
I hear what you are saying, Mr Owen. My position is that the amendments are crucial to the Bill. I am not insisting or objecting—
The Chair
Order. The Question is that the Committee agrees to withdraw the lead amendment. If you do not wish that to happen, you may object and we will proceed to a vote.
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 17, page 14, line 1, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) No warrant issued under this Part will be proportionate if the information sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 93, in clause 27, page 21, line 6, at end insert—
“(2A) A warrant issued under this Chapter must state the specific purpose that is to be achieved by the warrant.
(2B) A warrant issued under this Chapter must outline the options for obtaining the relevant data and confirm that other less intrusive options have been tried but failed or have not been tried because they were bound to fail and the reasons why.”
This amendment, and others to Clause 27, seek to preserve the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals but would require an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided (in similar vein to the amendments to Clause 15).
Keir Starmer
I mentioned amendment 61 this morning. The interception of communications draft code of practice—at paragraph 4.7, as I indicated this morning—states:
“No interference with privacy should be considered proportionate if the information which is sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means.”
That is a clear and correct statement of principle.
Subsection (4), as drafted, is not so clear. It simply suggests that, if the information can reasonably be obtained by other, less intrusive means, that is a factor to be taken into account, but is not decisive, as set out in the draft code of practice. In our view, the Government cannot have it both ways: if the code is right, it should be elevated and put on the face of the Bill. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve, replacing subsection (4) and replacing it with what is, in essence, paragraph 4.7 of the draft code of practice, which in our view is the right way to articulate necessity in such circumstances.
The Chair
If you wish to speak to any amendment, you may make your position clear at that time, even if you are not the mover of the amendment—
Joanna Cherry
My name is not on amendment 61, but is on amendment 93, but that is an amendment to clause 27.
The Solicitor General
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen, for the first time in what I am sure will be a number of important sittings.
May I address the amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras? I am grateful to him for rightly pointing our way to paragraph 4.7 of the draft code. Indeed, by reference, paragraph 4.8 gives a clear basis for the decision maker to assess the nature of the proportionality. Therein lies something of the problem with regard to the approach to be taken in the clause. It is tempting, on the face of it, to include the test in the primary legislation, but it might provoke more questions than answers.
Naturally, when one makes a bald statement about proportionality, people want to know more, so where does one end in terms of adding to the primary legislation the detail that is necessary for decision makers to reach a considered conclusion? My simple argument is that the amendments therefore are not necessary. What makes this the right balance is the combination of the primary legislation that sets out the framework and a living document—the code of practice—that will be more easily amendable and accessible in terms of any changes that need to be made in the light of experience and practice.
We do not want to end up with a situation where this type of warrantry can only be obtained when all other avenues have been exhausted, a bit like the position when one comes to an ombudsman. That would be an artificial scenario to end up with and would cause problems operationally. I can think of examples where the exhaustion of other avenues will just not be practicable. For example, in a kidnap situation where an individual’s life might be in danger, this type of warrantry would probably be the most appropriate step to take before any other type of intervention. Of course, there are occasions where other means of intelligence gathering, such as live human intelligence sources, might be high-risk or result in a higher degree of collateral inclusion.
I am concerned that we do not end up, despite the best intentions of the hon. and learned Gentleman, with an inflexible approach on the face of primary legislation. It is far better, in my submission, to keep the balance as it is, as clearly outlined in the code of practice and the framework within the clause.
Suella Fernandes
I echo everything that the Solicitor General says. Is not the amendment trite, in that it is clear for any practitioner, judge or decision maker that the question in the amendment—whether the information sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means—is part and parcel of, and essential to, the proportionality test?
The Solicitor General
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. There is a danger when dealing with primary legislation of gilding the lily. I mean that in the spirit of co-operation that I know we have managed to engender in these debates, in the main. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for the way he has approached this, but it misunderstands the amendment. Of course, whether information could be reasonably obtained by other means is relevant to the assessment of proportionality and necessity. The amendment proposes that, having taken all the factors into account, if it transpires at the end of that exercise that the information could have been reasonably obtained by other less intrusive means, it is not proportionate—that is the end of the exercise. That, in our submission, is the right test that should be on the face of the Bill. At this stage, I will withdraw the amendment with a view to raising it at a later stage if it is appropriate to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 18, page 14, line 20, after “security”, insert “or”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 85, in clause 18, page 14, line 20, after “security” insert—
“where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”
This amendment, and others to Clause 18, seeks to require that the grounds for an interception or examination warrant are tied to a threshold of reasonable suspicion of criminal behaviour; and that reference to a separate ground of “economic well-being, etc.” is deleted from the face of the bill.
Amendment 86, in clause 18, page 14, line 21, after “crime” insert—
“where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”
Amendment 31, in clause 18, page 14, line 21, leave out “or”.
Amendment 32, in clause 18, page 14, line 22, leave out paragraph (2)(c).
Amendment 35, in clause 18, page 14, line 33, leave out subsection (4).
Joanna Cherry
These amendments would delete the separate ground for interception of economic wellbeing from the face of the Bill and require that grounds for interception are tied to a threshold of reasonable suspicion of criminal behaviour.
The Bill re-legislates for RIPA’s three broad statutory grounds for issuing surveillance warrants. The Secretary of State may issue warrants for interception, hacking and so on
“in the interests of national security…for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or…in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.
That final ground can apply only where it relates to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British islands.
I support the amendments because all three main statutory grounds are, in my submission, unnecessarily vague and are left dangerously undefined. As the decision will continue to lie with the Secretary of State, the test will be met by whatever he or she subjectively decides is in the interests of the national security or economic wellbeing of the UK, having regard to popular sentiment rather than to what is necessary and proportionate, as we have now heard from the Minister’s own mouth. The tests mean that individuals are not able to foresee when surveillance powers might be used, and they grant the Secretary of State a discretion that is so broad as to be arbitrary. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill recommended that the Bill should include a definition of national security, and I call upon the Government to produce such an amendment. If the Government sprinkle the Bill so liberally with the phrase “national security”—indeed, it is the Government’s job to defend national security—they need to tell us what they mean by that phrase, so I call upon them to define it.
The Joint Committee also recommended that the phrase “economic wellbeing” should be defined, but the ISC went further and said that economic wellbeing should be subsumed within a national security definition, finding it unnecessarily confusing and complicated. I heartily endorse the ISC’s view in that regard. The third ground is an unnecessary repetition unless there is something sinister behind the definition of “economic wellbeing,” and many Members of the official Opposition, and indeed of my own party, have serious concerns about what that might be about.
Recently, the Prime Minister went so far as to say, ridiculously in my view, that the Labour party is now a “threat to national security”. I am not a member of the Labour party, although I once was when I was a student.
Joanna Cherry
I am very happy to join Labour in many aspects of this Bill, but I have taken a slightly more radical path in middle age as an SNP MP. It is a disgrace to suggest that the Labour party is a threat to national security, and such loose language shows us that the continued undefined use of the term “national security” in enabling legislation is not sustainable.
The ISC also queried both the agencies and the Home Office on the economic wellbeing ground, and it reported that neither the agencies nor the Home Office have “provided any sensible explanation.” I hope that we might get a sensible explanation from the Government today, and I wait to hear whether we get one. Regrettably, the recommendations of the ISC and the Joint Committee have been dismissed, and the core purposes for which the extraordinary powers can now be used remain undefined and dangerously flexible within the Bill.
That is the nub of my concerns about the definitions of “national security” and “economic wellbeing.” The SNP amendments go slightly further than the Labour party is prepared to go at this stage by requiring reasonable suspicion. At the moment, the three grounds contain no requirement for reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or intends to commit a serious criminal offence, nor even suspicion or evidence that a serious crime has been or is going to be committed. In my submission, that gives licence for speculative surveillance.
Briefly, on the national security ground, the courts have in the past responded with considerable deference to Government claims of national security, viewing them not so much as a matter of law but as Executive-led policy judgments. As a legal test, national security is meaningless unless the Government attempt to tell us what they mean by it. The second ground is similarly broad and open-ended because the Government have not sought to clarify the circumstances in which national security, as opposed to the prevention and detection of serious crime, will be in play.
I invite the Government to table an amendment to tell us what they mean by national security, to explain why it is necessary to have a ground revolving purely around economic wellbeing, to explain why they have discounted the recommendations of the Joint Committee and the ISC, and to tell us why there is no requirement for reasonable suspicion in these grounds.
Simon Hoare
In opening, let me address what I detect is the elephant in the Committee Room, as amplified by the amendment as it was. As I made clear in the July 2015 debate on the Anderson report and on Second Reading, I am not a lawyer, so I view the proposal through the narrow prism of the man on the Clapham omnibus, for want of a better phrase: a practical proposal to try to keep my constituents and others as safe as the Government possibly can. I do not view it through the perfectly proper prism of trained legal eyes and I would not be able to do that.
Coming to the breadth point that the hon. and learned Lady who speaks for the SNP has been making, it is clear to me that, from a legal point of view or from a lawyer’s point of view, the narrower, tighter and more prescriptive the language in statute, the better. It narrows, eliminates, eradicates or whatever the opportunity for a wider debate about the interpretation of this or that word, almost like Coolidge, whose immediate response when told that a senator who had always opposed him had died, was: “I wonder what he meant by that.” I think we should be rather careful. I make no apology for viewing this as just an ordinary guy—a father, a husband, a constituent and a Member of Parliament—who believes it is my duty to support any Government of the day who are seeking to keep our country safe.
Joanna Cherry
Does the hon. Gentleman also accept that, as Members of Parliament, we have a duty to protect our constituents’ civil liberties and privacy? Lawyers look for narrow definitions and certainty not for their pleasure, but to protect their clients. The reason why Members of Parliament should look for narrow definitions and certainties is to protect their constituents.
Simon Hoare
Up to a point, Lord Copper. I find myself in broad agreement with the hon. Member for City of Chester. Likewise, I could not give a tinker’s cuss about most of these things as long as I can look a constituent in the eye were something horrible to happen on the streets of Shaftesbury, Blandford Forum, Gillingham or any of the villages in my constituency. They might look at me and say, “Mr Hoare, are you convinced that you supported everything you possibly could to avoid this atrocity?” I would prefer to say, “Yes, I did.” If it impinged upon or offended against the virgo intacta of civil liberties as a sort of purist academic—I use that word not in an abusive way—definition, I would side with the security argument at every step and turn.
I am not using that as the Luddite argument that someone who has done nothing wrong has nothing to be afraid of. It is absolutely right that to govern is to choose. It straddles that often imperceptible divide between the application of the rule of law and discharging the first duty of the state—to keep the realm safe—and preserving the sacred and long-cherished liberties and freedoms that we all enjoy.
I accept what the hon. and learned Lady says on that point, but it is not just Liberty and Amnesty and other organisations that have access to legal counsel. It is not that the statue, as it emerges through all our processes, would be available only to us and the good guys. It would be available to those who wish us well, but I am going to hazard a guess that one or two of those who wish this country ill—whether in terms of national security, serious crime or acting in an injurious way to our economic wellbeing—may just have recourse to a legally trained brain or two themselves. They, too, would be able to say, “Ah, we’ll do it that way”, because the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or the Defence Secretary would be so hogtied by the narrow definitions contained in the statute of the Bill, because people sought to stand—this is a phrase I used on Second Reading—like vestal virgins, defending the flame of civil liberty, because that is the flame that must be defended above all others and national security must be secondary to it. That is a perfectly acceptable and reasonable position to take, but it is one with which I profoundly disagree. It offends everything that motivates me as a politician.
We need to be very careful about having, either in the proposed amendments or during the progress of the Bill in Committee and on Report, an obsessive regard to trying to narrow down our language. Providing that the double lock with the judicial oversight remains for all circumstances whereby these warrants and other facilities can be granted—as long as that judicial view is there—that would seem to be in order to secure the provision for the short, medium and longer term, so that we do not have to come back through the legislative process to continually update the narrow language in the Bill to reflect circumstances or address scenarios that, without sounding too much like Donald Rumsfeld, in 2016, we did not think existed or could exist.
It is not from some sort of bovine, recidivist, reactionary, “We are the law and order side of the Tory party” sentiment that I find this quest for the narrowing down of our language to be wrong. It would fetter and constrain the decisions of Ministers and those who, on a daily basis, put their lives at risk under the rule of law to keep us safe. I shall be opposing this set of amendments, just as I will any other amendment, not because my Front Bencher or my Whip advises me to, but merely because I think that there is nothing intrinsically wrong—this is the non-lawyer’s approach—in having broad definitions that provide accountable scope to those who take the decision, so that they are able to take those decisions in response to circumstances as they arise.
Christian Matheson
There has been the requisite level of jousting and debate, and sometimes temperatures have risen a little bit, but I have found Ministers at least prepared to justify their arguments and to listen to other arguments. I say that, importantly, because this clause and the amendments are of profound importance to me and to many Opposition Members. I have absolutely no doubt that there are occasions when attacks on the United Kingdom can be carried out on an economic, rather than a military or criminal, basis. Let us consider a hypothetical example of a country that is adept at undertaking cybercrime against the London stock exchange to manipulate stock market activity or shares, or to bring the stock exchange down. That, of course, would have a serious effect on the operation of the City of London. I accept that that can happen.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West talked about criminal activity. I have no doubt that the activity in the scenario I described would be considered criminal activity, but when my good friend the hon. Member for North Dorset talked about the elephant in the room, I thought he was going to mention the real elephant in the room and he did not. The real elephant in the room, certainly for me, is that, on such a broad definition of economic activity, the activities of trade unions in the United Kingdom could be brought under the scope of the Bill. I ask Members not to try to intervene to correct me because unfortunately that is the case. That is the real elephant in the room.
I do not believe that Ministers today do not consider trade unions to be an important and relevant part of civil society, but on Second Reading my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) gave the example of the Shrewsbury pickets, whose case was examined by the Secret Intelligence Service, and made the point that their convictions still stand. Indeed, there are right hon. and hon. Members of this House today who were right hon. or hon. Members of the House or indeed the Government in the 1980s when trade unions were seen as “the enemy within” and banned from representing members at GCHQ because it was considered that trade union membership and activity was incompatible with a commitment to international security, which is a position that is as absurd as it is downright insulting. I genuinely believe that Government Members have moved on from that positon.
Government Members may well wish to point to subsection (4), which suggests that:
“A warrant may be considered necessary as mentioned...only if the information which it is considered necessary to obtain is information relating to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.”
They may feel that that gives sufficient protection. I must say that, in my experience, unfortunately it does not.
At this point I remind the Committee that I am a member of the GMB and Unite trade unions and I was formerly a senior official with Unite. That experience gives me insight that I wonder whether Ministers and Government Members, through no fault of their own, do not have. My plea is that they bear in mind that our economy is a globalised one, employers and industries are globalising and, in response, trade unions have had to do the same. Trade unions will gather together in bilateral agreements or bilateral alliances. In the UK, they may well join international trade union organisations such as the IMF—I should point out that that is the International Metalworkers Federation rather than any large economic body—or, as I did, they may well form a globalised trade union with other trade unions so that they meet globalised employers on the same basis and cannot be picked off, one against the other.
In the past, for example—this was quite a regular occurrence—I found myself in Canada on negotiations with mining and mineral extraction employers based in Brazil, working with trade unions from outside the UK. There were disputes with British Airways, which at the time was incorporated through International Airlines Group in Spain, and I found myself in Bangladesh working with the Bangladeshi trade unions that we were trying to form to help them develop trade union strength against the exploitation of shipbreakers. Globalised trade unions pursuing genuine avenues of trade disputes with globalised employers are a modern-day reality.
When the hon. Member for North Dorset talked about the elephant in the room, I thought he was going to mention the great fears that Opposition Members have that trade union membership could be seen as damaging to the nation’s economic wellbeing. If we seek to amend the clause to give the greater clarity that I understand Government Members do not wish to see, it is for good reasons of bitter experience—reasons that Ministers are perhaps not aware of, because of their own personal experience.
Keir Starmer
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend, whose comments I endorse. I saw the Ministers nodding that they will take that away and consider it, and I am grateful for that indication. Rather than the broader points that have been discussed so far, I will concentrate my comments on clause 18(2)(c), which deals with
“the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.
The short point is this: if economic harm to the wellbeing of the United Kingdom is so serious that it amounts to a threat to national security, it is covered within subsection (2)(a). If harm to the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom is a serious crime, it is already within subsection (2)(b). The Intelligence and Security Committee has made the point that
“if ‘national security’ is sufficient in itself, then ‘economic well-being…so far as [is] relevant to the interests of national security’ is redundant, since it is a subset of the former.”
The ISC went on to say:
“We have questioned both the Agencies and the Home Office on this matter and neither have provided any sensible explanation. In our opinion, this area is already sufficiently complex so drafters should seek to minimise confusion wherever possible. We therefore recommend that ‘economic well-being’ is removed”.
The Committee makes the same point that if economic wellbeing is already subsumed into paragraphs (a) and (b), paragraph (c) is not necessary. The Committee has asked repeatedly what paragraph (c) covers if not what is already within paragraphs (a) and (b), and I ask that question here today. I ask the Minister or anyone else to give me a single example of what it is envisaged paragraph (c) covers that does not fall within paragraphs (a) and (b).
Subsection (4) has been referred to today and on Second Reading as providing some sort of comfort that subsection (2)(c) is not a matter of concern. It says:
“A warrant may be considered necessary as mentioned in subsection (2)(c) only if the information which it is considered necessary to obtain is information relating to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.”
To be clear, that does not mean the communication itself is outside the British islands, but that the communication relates to acts or intentions of persons outside the British islands. I endorse everything that was said about trade union and other activities that may be outside the British islands, but the suggestion that this provision would only catch communications outside the British islands is a wrong reading, in my submission.
The question on the table for the Minister is whether a single example can be given of something coming within subsection (2)(c) that does not come within subsections 2(a) and (2)(b). If not, how can the clause be justified?
Mr Hayes
I start my contribution to this short debate by confessing a pretty profound prejudice, which is that I am committed to and supportive of trade unions. I am a member of a trade union; my father was a shop steward; my grandfather was chairman of his union branch. I come from a long history of trade unionism, and I believe that the trade union movement in Britain has done immense good for the interests of the people. I am a Disraelian Tory, and so I believe in the elevation of the people, in which trade unions have played an important part. I could wax lyrical about one of my heroes, Joseph Chamberlain, in terms of the elevation of the people, but we do not have time for that. When I approach this clause and this subject, I do so with that profound prejudice. By the way, just as an aside, prejudice is immensely underrated in the modern age, but it is important that we balance all that is rational with all that we feel. Feelings matter.
I make it categorically clear that, as the hon. Member for City of Chester generously said, not only individual Ministers in this Government, but the Government as a whole have no intention that these powers should be used for the kind of political purposes he describes. That is not our intention. Actually—it is always good to go further than one’s officials want—I think we might need to be more emphatic about that in some form, because I want to make it crystal clear that the kind of scenario that he describes cannot happen in our country.
Our country is a free and open place where we celebrate the differences between people and the role played by the trade unions. I am prepared to go as far as necessary down the road to make that categorically clear. To that end, I suggest that I meet Frances O’Grady of the TUC to discuss this. I know her well. I went on a joint business-trade union delegation with her to Germany to look at apprenticeships when I was Skills Minister. I am more than happy to engage with the trade union movement to see what more we can do.
However, let us return to the point about economic wellbeing and these amendments. At the outset of his remarks, the hon. Gentleman rightly recognised that threats to economic wellbeing could be immensely damaging and fundamental in their effect and could be the business of a foreign potentate or another source of malevolence. He described a cyber-attack, which might be an attack on our critical infrastructure, on our financial services system or, heaven knows, on Government itself. The age we live in means that cybercrime, perpetrated either locally or internationally, is a threat that we must recognise and have the means to address, so it is right that the law—this Bill, which I hope will become an Act—includes reference to the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK, but it is equally true, as the Opposition argued on Second Reading and elsewhere, that that interest is closely tied to national security.
One argument that has been made is that if we were to define national security more tightly, we might assuage fears of the kind the hon. Gentleman described. The trouble with defining national security more tightly is that that might of itself create additional rigidity that is unhelpful to the agencies in pursuit of their work. Successive Governments have hesitated to describe national security prescriptively, and having looked at these matters closely I understand why. Successive Governments have affirmed the idea that a small number of law enforcement agencies, the security and intelligence services and the armed forces need to be able to seek and use interception warrants for national security, for preventing and detecting serious crime and in the interests of economic wellbeing. I am reluctant, therefore, either to take economic wellbeing out of that list or to define national security more narrowly. I think that the breadth of those definitions is important for operational effectiveness.
There may none the less be more that we can do to deal with political fears, if I can put it in those terms. The existing law is clear that none of these powers can be used in the interest of a political party or in a particular political interest, but it may be that we can do more to offer reassurance. I am going a little further than we have until now because I want to create a bridge that we can cross. The Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 provide some protection, because they deal particularly with the issue of the interests of any political party being served by the powers. A case has been made about the Shrewsbury 24. Indeed, there was a debate in Westminster Hall on that very subject—I have the transcript here with me—promoted by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram), who is a very good man and a very proud trade unionist; I know him well. The events at that time preceded the legislation that tightened protection. Notwithstanding that, I have heard the argument that has been made today.
The other reason why I do not want to significantly change the language on economic wellbeing, although I understand the argument about ambiguity, is that the phrase “economic wellbeing” reflects the language in domestic legislation—as my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General will know—the European convention on human rights and the European Union directive that covers the scope of interception powers. It is difficult to think of a better, more appropriate or more widely recognised term. Substituting another term could be taken to imply that the agencies should not engage in certain activities in the future that they undertake now. One can easily imagine a future judicial commissioner querying why the language has changed from that used in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and asking whether what the agencies do should change, too.
I am hesitant to make that fundamental change. I am not sure it would do anything for transparency. Indeed, removing economic wellbeing and placing what is done under the broader umbrella of national security might lead to less, rather than more, clarity in the process. As the hon. Member for City of Chester described, some of the events that would be included under the heading “economic wellbeing” could be sudden and of crisis proportions, such as the cyber-attack to which he and I referred, and require prompt and decisive action. Such crises are, by their nature, unpredictable and we must not limit the agencies’ ability to deal with them.
Joanna Cherry
I listened carefully to the Minister, and I noted that he said he wanted to provide a bridge on the issue of national security and can perhaps deal with issues and political fears related to that, but that he does not want to significantly change the language on economic wellbeing and is not happy with the SNP amendments in relation to reasonable suspicion. I do not want to get too bogged down on trade union rights and I certainly do not want to kick down the bridge that the Minister wants to build, but I have to say that, on trade union rights, actions speak louder than words. This Government have introduced some of the most draconian anti-trade union legislation that has been seen in this country for many years—worse than Mrs Thatcher’s. In that context, I do wonder whether we can be assured about the Government’s intentions in relation to trade unions. However, the Minister is an honourable man; I take him at his word and will listen to what he has to say in the future on this issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 19 and 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Approval of warrants by Judicial Commissioners
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 21, page 17, line 4, leave out from “must” to “the following matters” in line 5 and insert “determine”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 89, in clause 21, page 17, line 10, leave out subsection (2).
Keir Starmer
This is where we pick up the discussion about scrutiny. As the amendments to clause 17 were withdrawn, the premise here is that of a dual function, carried out first by the Secretary of State and then by the judicial commissioners. To be clear, we welcome the involvement of judicial commissioners, and the amendments focus on their role in the process. We have had the discussion about whether the judicial commissioners should be the default decision-makers—this is a different exercise.
What is clear in clause 21(1) and (2) is that what is envisaged in the Bill is a review exercise by the commissioners. That is clear from the words “must review”. Subsection (1) states that the judicial commissioner must review the person’s—in this case, the Secretary of State’s—conclusions as to necessity and proportionality, and subsection (2) states that
“the Judicial Commissioner must apply the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.”
It is therefore a review mechanism, and it is a review according to judicial review principles.
Two problems arise from that. The first is that it is not, therefore, truly a double lock. A double lock denotes a decision by the Secretary of State, which survives in clause 17, and a decision by a judge—a judicial commissioner—under clause 21, but this is not that sort of double lock.
The second problem, the reference to judicial review, is equally profound. Committee members will remember my question to Lord Judge:
“Do you agree with me that as the Bill is currently drafted, it is not clear what Parliament intends”—
in relation to judicial review of warrants—
“and therefore it will fall to the judges? In other words, it is broadly enough drafted to cover a longer-arm review or a closer intense review depending on what judges decide as cases evolve. It could accommodate both approaches.”
That is the problem with judicial review here.
I will quote Lord Judge’s response, because he captures the real cause for concern here:
“I think ‘judicial review’ is a very easy phrase to use. It sounds convincing, but it means different things to different people. People say, ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’—that was a case decided by the Court of Appeal in 1948 or 1947, and it has evolved. Personally, I think that when Parliament is creating structures such as these, it should define what it means by ‘judicial review’. What test will be applied by the judicial—I call him that—commissioner, so that he knows what his function is, the Secretary of State knows what the areas of responsibility are and the public know exactly who decides what and in what circumstances? I myself do not think that judicial review is a sufficient indication of those matters.”––[ Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 67-68, Q220.]
That is one of the most experienced and well-respected judges in the country indicating that in those circumstances judicial review is not a sufficient indication of the test.
Amendment 62 would require the judicial commissioner to decide for him or herself on necessity and proportionality. Amendment 89 would take out the reference to judicial review. The scheme and structure of the Bill would therefore be retained. There would be a double lock. Both the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner must be satisfied that necessity and proportionality is made out, at which point the warrant would come into effect, unless of course it is an urgent warrant. There would be clarity about the role of the judge.
In previous exchanges, it has been accepted that the judicial commissioner will see the material that is before Secretary of State and therefore can make that decision. The lock therefore becomes what we have termed an equal lock, where both parties make a decision on the substantive merits of the case. That gets rid of the potential ambiguity with which Lord Judge was concerned. It would then be absolutely clear that this is truly a double lock. It is a simple and straightforward amendment that would bring real clarity to the exercise.
Suella Fernandes
I am listening to the hon. and learned Gentleman with interest, and I appreciate his exploration of the meaning of this term. What is his opinion of Lord Pannick’s assessment of the insertion of judicial review? He concludes that it is sufficient, flexible but clear and strikes the right balance.
Keir Starmer
I know and respect Lord Pannick hugely, but there is no guarantee in the Bill that his preferred way of approaching this under judicial review principles is the one that will be carried out in practice; he has no control over the test that will be applied. Lord Judge’s concern is that some judges may consider that this is an area where they virtually take the decision, which is what they do in certain cases involving particular human rights issues, where they get very close to the decision, while other judges will be much more deferential.
With the best will in the world, Lord Pannick puts forward the view that judicial review will work, but there is no guarantee of that. Unless it is set out in the Bill, the test will be simply left to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Nobody, in this formulation, could argue that a judge who applied long-arm reasonableness was acting in any way other than in accordance with the test.
Obviously, I respect what Lord Pannick says, but Lord Judge was making a different point that goes back to accountability, to some extent. He was alive to the fact that once judges are involved in the decision-making process, a torch will be shone on them in relation to these warrants. There will be inhibitions on what they can say and the circumstances in which anybody could hold them to account. We have rehearsed that. I read into his answer that he wanted absolute clarity and a tightness of test so that the judges knew what they were to do and could operate within those confines, thus protecting themselves from the suggestion that they had applied too close or too loose a test. It is partly about clarity, with one eye on judicial accountability in the longer term for the decisions that have to be made.
Lucy Frazer
The hon. and learned Gentleman earlier cited Sir Stanley Burnton and said, pretty much verbatim, that he would encourage Government Members to look carefully at any submissions that Sir Stanley Burnton made, as he was extremely knowledgeable. On this issue, Sir Stanley said that he was happy with the test and that it might be difficult to draft it more tightly. Another experienced member of the panel who gave evidence, Lord Reid, specifically stated that he thought the judges’ role was
“about oversight…and not about decision making.”––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 84, Q259.]
Keir Starmer
Sir Stanley is a friend and colleague, and I have had the privilege of appearing in front of him on a number of occasions in cases involving national security, in particular control order cases. I think that what he was indicating was that, in his experience and on his own approach, as any of the cases will demonstrate, he is in favour of intense review by the judge. He anticipates that the measure allows that intense review. I have no doubt that that is the approach he personally would take, because that would be consistent with the approach that he has always taken in such cases.
Suella Fernandes
It is an important issue. Evidence to the Joint Committee from Sir Stanley Burnton and Lord Judge was unequivocal, in that Wednesbury unreasonableness would have no place in this context. That seems to be maintained by Sir Stanley Burnton in the evidence that we have received more recently. Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that Wednesbury unreasonableness has no role in this context, especially by virtue of reference to necessity and proportionality?
Keir Starmer
The reference to proportionality and necessity does not help in this context, because the question for the judge on this formula is not, “Is the measure necessary? Is it proportionate?” Judges often make, and are well used to making, that decision. The decision for them on this formula is whether, when the Secretary of State decided that it was necessary and proportionate, she was exercising her powers in a way that cannot be questioned, applying the principles of judicial review. That is the real difference.
Whether I think the long-arm Wednesbury test is appropriate is neither here nor there. So long as we have clause 22(2), it is open to a judge to apply the old-fashioned Wednesbury test, because that is within the principles of judicial review. The case law obviously varies. The closest possible scrutiny is usual in control order or TPIMs cases, but there are many other examples involving national security where the judges have persistently said that long-arm review applies. There are two strong lines of case law, and I am arguing that one is better than the other. The point is whether the Bill is clear enough about the test to be applied.
This is a real opportunity, as much as a challenge, for the Government. The provision is a new one, and it is a double lock if properly applied. It ought to be substantive. The judge ought to decide whether a warrant is necessary or proportionate. As long as he or she does, the warrant comes into existence and can be relied upon. In the 21st century, that is the right approach when such a provision is going into statute for the first time.
Lucy Frazer
I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying that he favours the same test being applied by both the judge and the Home Secretary. If so, that is in conflict with Sir Stanley’s evidence. He said that he would give significant weight to the view of the Home Secretary. If he gave significant weight to the Home Secretary, necessarily he would be reviewing what the Home Secretary has done. If that is appropriate, the word should be “review”, whether it is judicial review or not. It is a review, not an assessment afresh of the same decision.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful for that intervention. There are several different positions here, and we are finding our way. The amendments would take out the review element and make it clear that it is a double lock. There would then be a separate decision by the Secretary of State and a decision by a judge on the same material. Of course, a judge would always give weight to the Secretary of State’s view, but they would still come to a decision of their own. That is position No. 1, and let me be clear that that is what the amendment is aimed at—a true and equal lock.
Joanna Cherry
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that amendment 89, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and I, would specifically take out subsection (2) and the reference to judicial review? That would make clear what he is saying: amendment 62, which I also support, would amend subsection (1) so that the judge would determine the review in regard to necessity and proportionality, and judicial review would come out completely.
Keir Starmer
I agree. I notice that my name is not on amendment 89. I think it should have been, because amendment 62 only works if subsection (2) comes out, but that is neither here nor there at this stage. I am not quite sure what happened, but given that both amendments have been tabled, it does not matter one way or another.
To be clear, the position is that it should be a substantive decision by the judge according to necessity and proportionality, and those terms obviously have their own special application. Through amendment 89, the review, whether by judicial review principles or otherwise, would come out, making it a true double and equal lock.
It is a new approach and a new provision, so it is for Parliament to decide on the appropriate way forward, but the amendments would give clarity and a real safeguard with an equal lock. That is the position. There probably is a fall-back position, which is that if it is to be a review of some sort, amendment 89 should stand on its own feet—that the review should not be on the principles of judicial review, and something more would need to be written into the Bill.
I do not know what response the Minister will give, but this matter goes to the heart of the issue, and it may be that further consideration needs to be given to the precise test. As it stands, the test is insufficiently precise and will lead to difficulties in its application. It is a matter of real concern to the judiciary. Lord Judge does not make such comments without a good deal of thought. If he is concerned about the provision, the Government should be, too. The simple way through is to have a simple but substantive double and equal lock.
The Solicitor General
The debate has been interesting. On a point of order, Mr Owen, I want to ensure that we are dealing with both groups of amendments. The grouping that I have seeks to group new clauses 1 and 5 in one group—
The Solicitor General
That is fine. I am grateful to you, Mr Owen. I will address those amendments, rather than the new clauses, which will be dealt with in the usual way, but the purport of the argument is similar.
To summarise, amendment 89 would remove the provision in the Bill that specifies that when reviewing the decision by a Secretary of State or a Scottish Minister to issue a warrant, the judicial commissioner must apply the same principles as would be applied by a court in an application for judicial review. Instead, the amendment would require him or her to determine the necessity and proportionality of a warrant for him or herself.
There has been a lot of debate on the important report by David Anderson and the Royal United Services Institute review. They have played a huge part in bringing the Bill to germination and its current state. There is a danger here. I listened very carefully to the evidence of Lord Judge and, indeed, asked him a number of questions. The dilemma that I put to him still remains. I can see the attractiveness in seeking to narrow or prescribe the particular criteria to be applied by the commissioners in every instance, but there is a danger that, in doing so, we fetter the proper discretion of judges exercising their review function in looking at each case purely on a case-by-case basis.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras set out his stall very clearly. He prays in aid the equal lock, as he calls it. In essence, he wants a different approach from that which the Government say we should take. We make no apology that the decision made by the Secretary of State is reviewed by the judicial commissioner before coming into force. That is a very simple, staged approach that clearly reflects the way in which case law is going and is also ahead of the curve when it comes to the development of judicial oversight of warrantry in these particular cases.
I will deal with the Anderson carve-out, if I may use that phrase. The problem with the genuine intention of David Anderson in trying to carve out what he recognised to be an important part of the function of Government—namely, national security and foreign affairs, where he recognised that the Executive are the part of our constitution best placed to deal with those matters—and then creating a certification process is that that, in itself, is juridicable. An Executive decision will be made that is, in itself, capable of challenge. My concern is that, however well intentioned attempts to create a hard and fast definition that creates a theoretical space for Ministers to act might be, we will end up with further difficulty, further lack of clarity and, frankly, further litigation that means that the Bill is not future-proof in the way that I want it to be.
Keir Starmer
To save time—I probably should have made this clearer an hour ago when we were rowing about other things—I had seen this certification clause, or new clause 1, as going with the amendments to clause 17. In other words, it was my acceptance that, on certain measures, there ought to be a certificate from the Secretary of State for the limited accountability that I accept is there. Therefore, if it is helpful, amendments 62 and 89 are intended to be taken on their own, not cluttered by the certification process, which possibly would have been better discussed under clause 17.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. I remind myself that we will be able to debate those new clauses but I thought it important to look, in essence, at the full picture of David Anderson’s recommendations, bearing in mind that we had quite a lively debate about the role of the Executive. It would be a mischaracterisation of Mr Anderson’s view about the role of the Executive to say that somehow there was a wholesale move away from the Executive’s position with regard to warrantry and what Government Members certainly strongly feel is the important role of the Executive.
Coming back to where we are with regard to the judicial review test, we have already heard reference to the noble Lord Pannick. The intervention he has made is powerful and it is important that he thinks the test is robust. The criticism is, perhaps, not justified. Of course, that is not the only basis on which we have reached that conclusion. We all know—those of us who are lawyers and those who are not—the growing importance of judicial review in our public life. It is a concept that has evolved and that will continue to evolve. It is flexible, too.
Joanna Cherry
It is so general. I have advised people on the potential for judicial review. Does the Minister agree that it is difficult to advise a client on the potential for judicial review in the absence of a reasoned decision? In this Bill, there is no duty on the Secretary of State to give a reasoned decision, so judicial review scrutiny will be happening in a vacuum in the context of a decision for which no written reasons have been given because the Bill does not demand it.
The Solicitor General
Herein lies the problem. We have the judicial lock—the commissioners, of course, will be giving reasons—so that there is a check and balance upon the decision of the Executive. The hon. and learned Lady makes a proper point, because Executive decisions are administrative decisions that are judicable. I want to avoid further unnecessary and, frankly, unhelpful litigation that will get in the way of the important work of warrantry, which has to be undertaken, bearing in mind not only the interests of national security but, looking down the scale, the various scenarios that will confront commissioners, such as serious crime cases. The flexible scrutiny will allow differing approaches to be taken. Returning to the main point, I am worried that we might end up creating something that is too inflexible, which will create injustice rather than solve the problem.
Joanna Cherry
But how will the judicial commissioner scrutinise the Secretary of State’s decision, having regard to judicial review principles, when she is under no duty to give reasons for it? How will they do it practically?
The Solicitor General
They will have access to all the material that the primary decision maker has. The hon. and learned Lady is right to ask the question but, simply speaking, the judicial commissioner will have access to the material that the Secretary of State has. In fact, the judicial commissioner will be able to ask for more material, so there should not be any fear that the vacuum she mentioned will exist in relation to the judicial lock.
Returning to the obvious experience of judicial commissioners, I am keen to ensure that we end up in a position where commissioners feel that, on a case-by-case basis, they are not only free to agree with the Secretary of State, but are absolutely free to disagree. If there is not that element of flexibility, this double lock will be meaningless. Again, without casting any imputation upon the good intentions of those who have tabled amendments, my concern is that, first, this amendment is based on a difference of opinion on the nature of the judicial commissioner stage. Secondly, there is a danger that we might end up in a position where decisions are being second-guessed in a way with which the judiciary would feel uncomfortable, and where the balance between the actions of the Executive and proper scrutiny by the judiciary is not clearly delineated.
Suella Fernandes
Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that a similar inclusion of a reference to judicial review has worked well in other legislation and in other regimes, such as in relation to control orders and terrorism prevention and investigation measures? We have a history of such references not causing major problems.
The Solicitor General
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. It would not be right for me to make an easy draw-across to the TPIM regime. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras has experience of TPIMs, and I was on the Bill Committee that passed the TPIM law back in 2011, so I have a keen interest in the evolution from what were control orders to TPIMs. The point is staring us all in the face: myriad different circumstances will confront judicial commissioners. It would be too easy for the Committee to come to a conclusion that, somehow, we should create an artificially hard and fast set of criteria that would prevent the judicial commissioners from exercising their duties when considering the varying scale and nature of the applications that they will receive.
Simon Hoare
My understanding of what the Solicitor General is saying—perhaps he will confirm this—and my reading of the Bill is that the bar is being set a lot higher than the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West seems to imply. The onus in the first instance will be on those who will be making the case for the warrant. The Home Secretary, for example, will then review it to see whether it passes the tests in the Act and will do so, as will the author of the case before the Minister, in the knowledge that they will be, for want of a better phrase, peer reviewed by a commissioner. Therefore, the review of the review of the review is almost a triple lock of the case made by the authority seeking the warrant.
The Solicitor General
That is an interesting way of putting it. I want to make it clear that the review is on an appeal. There is a danger that we will end up mistakenly looking at some sort of a de novo application entirely on its merits, not an appeal. There are other mechanisms by which this matter could be taken further up. At this stage, it is part and parcel of the decision being made. That is an important point of clarification.
Keir Starmer
Can the Solicitor General point me to the words in clauses 1 and 2 that would make it wrong for a judge to apply long-armed judicial review principles to a decision?
The Solicitor General
I am not going to point to that because, as I have said, it is important to have wide discretion. But equally, as Sir Stanley Burnton said, there will be other approaches and judges will be compelled to take a much closer look or hands-on approach—I think Sir Stanley said “stringent approach”—when looking at the case. But that will depend on the case before the commissioner. For example, a case of extreme importance with potentially draconian impacts deserves a very close look under the microscope. That is important. What I want to get across is that there should be not a sliding scale, but a gradation and wide discretion in the test that allows differing approaches to be taken.
In response to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I would be surprised to see bald decisions on Wednesbury unreasonableness. Bearing in mind that, most of the time, European convention on human rights points will have to be engaged, and, by dint of that, necessity and proportionality will have to come into play anyway. Perhaps the point is too axiomatic to be made, but it is important that we do not get too fixated by a worry that judges will take an old-fashioned clubbish approach to whether the Home Secretary is totally out or order. I do not believe that will be the case, bearing in mind the calibre and experience of the commissioners who have done the work up to now and who I expect will carry on doing it in the unified commission that we will create.
In a nutshell—the point does not improve on repetition—there is a danger that in going down the seductive line of seeking greater clarity, we may end up fettering the reviewer’s discretion, which I do not think is in anyone’s interest and does not support the thrust of what all hon. Members want: an effective lock mechanism that properly involves the judiciary in a way that is unprecedented but welcome in our mature democracy.
Joanna Cherry
I have heard nothing that answers what in my submission is a knockout point about lack of reasons. I am not tooting my own trumpet because it was not my idea. I got the point from my learned devilmaster, Laura Dunlop QC, a distinguished silk at the Scottish Bar and former law commissioner. I asked her to look at this and she said the first thing that occurred to her was how can there be scrutiny under judicial review principles when there is a vacuum of any reasoning. I have not heard any answer to that question in what the Solicitor General has said, with all due respect to him.
On that basis, I remain of the view that amendments 62 and 89 will be essential in due course, but following the course of action we have taken today, I will not insist on them at this stage. I reserve the right to bring them forward at a later stage, about which the Chairman has advised me.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Solicitor General. I have listened carefully to what he has said. There is a difference between us, because I seek to ensure through the amendment that the judicial commissioner is a proper decision maker.
To make the argument that the judges might be fettered is really to misunderstand the amendment that I have tabled. The duty of the judge is to apply the test that Parliament sets out in statute. That is straightforward, and if Parliament is clear about the test, the judge is exercising his or her duties properly in applying the test. There is no question there, but there is this fundamental point between us as to whether it should be review or decision making. I think that is clear enough.
In light of the argument, at this stage I will not push this amendment to a vote, but I will reserve it for a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Hayes
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 21, page 17, line 13, leave out from “a” to “grounds” and insert
“decision of the Secretary of State to issue a warrant,”.
This amendment makes a minor drafting change to take account of the fact that Clause 21 may also apply in a case where a warrant has already been issued (see Clause 22).
Mr Hayes
These are minor drafting changes, to take account of the fact that clause 21 may also apply in cases where warrants have already been issued by the Secretary of State, and that urgent procedures are covered in clause 22, and that clause 21 may also apply in a case where the warrant has been issued by Scottish Ministers. They are uncontentious changes, and I beg to move the amendment on that basis.
Amendment 2 agreed to.
Amendment made: 3, in clause 21, page 17, line 15, leave out from “a” to “grounds” and insert
“decision of the Scottish Ministers to issue a warrant,”.—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment makes a minor drafting change to take account of the fact that Clause 21 may also apply in a case where a warrant has already been issued (see Clause 22).
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 102, in clause 21, page 17, line 23, at end insert—
“(6) In consideration of any warrant pursuant to this Part, a Judicial Commissioner may instruct a special advocate to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest.
(7) A Judicial Commissioner must instruct a special advocate when considering applications for a warrant—
(a) in the interests of national security; or
(b) involving the consideration of items subject to legal professional privilege.
(8) For the purposes of these proceedings special advocates are persons appointed by the relevant law officer.
(9) The ‘appropriate law officer’ is—
(a) in relation to warrants in England and Wales, the Attorney General,
(b) in relation to warrants in Scotland, in relation to (7)(a), the Advocate General for Scotland, and in relation to (7)(b), the Lord Advocate, and
(c) in relation to warrants in Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
(10) A person may be appointed as a special advocate only if—
(a) in the case of an appointment by the Attorney General, the person has a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,
(b) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Scotland or the Lord Advocate, the person is an advocate or a solicitor who has rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary by virtue of section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, and
(c) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the person is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 38, in clause 21, page 17, line 23, at end add—
“(6) In considering a warrant pursuant to this Part, a Judicial Commissioner may instruct a special advocate to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest.
(7) In considering a warrant pursuant to this Part which is being sought—
(a) in the interests of national security;
(b) in the interest of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security; or
(c) involving the consideration of items subject to legal professional privilege,
a Judicial Commissioner must instruct a special advocate to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest.
(8) For the purposes of this section a special advocate is a person appointed by the appropriate law officer for the country of the United Kingdom to which the warrant relates or mostly relates—
(a) for England and Wales, the Attorney General,
(b) for Scotland, the Advocate General for Scotland, and
(c) for Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
(9) A person may only be appointed as a special advocate by the—
(a) Attorney General, if the person has a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,
(b) the Advocate General for Scotland, if the person is an advocate or a solicitor who has rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary by virtue of section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, and
(c) the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, if the person is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland.”
Amendment 39, in clause 21, page 17, line 23, at end insert—
“(6) In consideration of any warrant pursuant to this Part, a Judicial Commissioner may instruct a special advocate to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest.
(7) For the purposes of this section a special advocate is a person appointed by the appropriate law officer for the country of the United Kingdom to which the warrant relates or mostly relates—
(a) for England and Wales, the Attorney General,
(b) for Scotland, the Advocate General for Scotland, and
(c) for Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
(8) A person may only be appointed as a special advocate by the—
(a) Attorney General, if the person has a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,
(b) the Advocate General for Scotland, if the person is an advocate or a solicitor who has rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary by virtue of section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, and
(c) the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, if the person is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland.”
Amendment 45, in clause 23, page 18, line 22, after “addressed”, insert—
“(c) any Special Advocate appointed.”
Amendment 46, in clause 23, page 18, line 23, after “warrant”, insert
“, or any Special Advocate appointed,”.
Keir Starmer
I am very happy to speak, particularly on amendments 38 and 39. May I just be clear with Committee members about the difference between the amendments? They are alternatives. They are provisions that are intended to allow the judicial commissioner to instruct a special advocate to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant, or the wider public interest.
The difference between the two amendments is that amendment 39 is purely permissive, so that, if a judicial commissioner thinks that he or she wants the assistance of a special advocate, amendment 39 allows that. Amendment 38 is more prescriptive, because it sets out certain circumstances in which a special advocate should be appointed. However, they are deliberately put in alternative form.
I will speak predominantly to amendment 39. There will be circumstances, no doubt, where the judicial commissioner wants assistance from somebody other than the Secretary of State in conducting the exercise that he or she is conducting. If the test remains as set out in clause 21, there may be points that the judicial commissioner wants to hear about, to hear upon and to take into account. This amendment provides a mechanism for him or her to do so.
Experience in the past has shown that, if a clause such as this, or similar to this, is left out, problems arise. Then, there is an attempt, usually by the court, to find its own inherent jurisdiction to allow an amicus or somebody else to be instructed. And it is not straightforward, because some courts and tribunals have inherent jurisdiction and others do not. There are many arguments about that, which we probably do not need to rehearse this afternoon.
This amendment cuts through all that by saying that, if in any given circumstances, a judicial commissioner wants to hear submissions from “A.N. other party”, it allows him or her to have someone make those submissions, either in writing or in person.
I am not personally wedded to the special advocate scheme. If the Solicitor General thinks there is any merit in that argument, I am very happy to work with the Government on a proposal to achieve the same end, but I think that the fall-back of relying on inherent jurisdiction is inherently risky.
Joanna Cherry
SNP amendment 102 is very similar to amendment 39, which the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras spoke to, but there are two differences. First, on the areas in which a judicial commissioner must instruct the special advocate, I have deleted
“in the interests of the economic well-being”
in line with an earlier amendment. Secondly, in relation to the appropriate Law Officer who appoints special advocates, I have inserted, for the purposes of subsection (7)(b), the Lord Advocate as opposed to the Advocate General. The reason for that is that subsection (7)(b) deals with
“the consideration of items subject to legal professional privilege”,
which would relate to devolved rather than reserved matters in general terms. In my submission, it would be respectful for the Lord Advocate as well as the Advocate General to be consulted about special advocates.
I am wedded to the notion of special advocates. I do not have a huge amount to add to what the hon. and learned Gentleman said, other than to point out that David Anderson QC, in paragraph 18 of his written evidence to this Committee submitted following his oral evidence, states that he would
“like to confirm my view that the right of the Judicial Commissioners under the dual lock system should be clearly acknowledged”
and
“use standing counsel to act as amicus where appropriate in relation to applications for the approval of warrants”.
The special advocate scheme that I advocate goes a bit further than that. The purpose of the special advocate would be
“to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest”
in the protection of privacy. The amendment would place a judicial commissioner under a duty to appoint a special advocate in a case involving a claim of national security or one that is subject to legal professional privilege. The appointment of the special advocate would ensure that the material produced to support an application is subject to adversarial testing as far as possible. That is the broad thrust of the amendment.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. The hon. and learned Lady was very clear about the different basis of her amendment. My concern is that there are two schools of thought here. There is the amicus curiae school of thought, with which I have a great deal of sympathy. One of the roles of the Law Officers is, when we are approached by various jurisdictions, to consider whether the attorney himself should intervene or whether the court should have an amicus appointed. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to talk about some of the confusion that can exist in regard to inherent jurisdiction. I am going to take that point away and consider it.
I am concerned about a full-blown replication of the important special advocate system that we have to assist, for example, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or of the genesis of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the closed material procedure. There is an important difference between the public interest in having special advocates and this type of scenario. In such cases, there are affected parties—usually respondents to important applications—for whom huge issues are at stake and who need that sort of quality representation within what we accept are exceptional and unusual departures from the principle of open justice. That is why special advocates were created. They perform an invaluable and important role.
I do not see the read-across from that to this scenario. What we have here is an investigatory procedure. It takes place at the early stages—to take a case example—of the investigation of a crime or a threat to national security. There may not be at that stage an identifiable suspect; there is, therefore, a difference and a difficulty in identifying the prejudice that could be caused to the interest of an individual who is a party to the proceedings. It is a different scenario and, tempting though it might be to introduce that type of regime, it would serve only to introduce delay, bureaucracy and extra expense with no tangible benefit to the integrity of the system.
In a nutshell, I will consider carefully the amicus curiae point, but I have wholly to reject a wider approach and the creation of a special advocate system which, frankly, would go beyond even the American jurisdiction, with which comparison is often made—in the foreign intelligence surveillance court in the US they have amici curiae available to assist the court. On that basis, I urge the hon. and learned Member to withdraw the amendment.
Keir Starmer
I have nothing to add. In the light of what the Solicitor General has said I will not press the amendment. I look forward to what he produces and to further discussing that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I have nothing to add either.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss:
New clause 1—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify a warrant in those cases where—
(a) The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct authorised by the warrant is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and relates to—
(i) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(ii) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(b) The Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(2) A warrant certified by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(3) In deciding whether to approve a warrant certified by the Secretary of State under subsection (1), the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State under subsection (1); and
(b) in the opinion of the Judicial Commissioner, approving the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds under section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b) of this section.
(4) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a warrant certified by the Secretary of State under this Section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for that decision.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, refuses to approve a warrant under subsection (3), the Secretary of State, or any special advocate appointed may ask the investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the warrant.”
This new clause is intended to replace existing Clause 21 and provides for the Secretary of State to certify warrants in cases concerning defence or foreign policy before they are considered by a judicial commissioner.
New clause 5—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify an application for a warrant in those cases where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that an application is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and involves—
(a) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(b) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(2) A warrant may be certified by the Secretary of State if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within section 18; and
(b) the Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(3) Any warrant certified by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) In deciding to approve a warrant pursuant to this section, the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1);
(b) the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds subject to section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b); and
(c) the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the person’s decision to approve a warrant under this section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for the refusal.
(6) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, approves or refuses to approve a warrant under this Section, the person, or any Special Advocate appointed, may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the decision to issue the warrant.”
The Solicitor General
We have dealt admirably with many of the issues in the clause and I will not speak to the stand part debate.
Keir Starmer
I do not wish to speak to new clause 1. It stands or falls with the clause 17 amendments and is to that extent withdrawn along with them.
Joanna Cherry
My new clause 5 is in the same category as new clause 1, the ground of which I think we have covered. The new clauses are slightly different, in that they followed David Anderson’s initial recommendation, but we will obviously revisit the matter at a later stage so I will not take up time unnecessarily to labour the point.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Approval of warrants issued in urgent cases
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 22, page 17, line 29, at end insert—
“(1A) A warrant under this section can only be issued in an emergency situation posing immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to a person.”
This amendment, and others to Clause 22, seek to require urgent warrants can only be issued where it is necessary in an emergency situation posing immediate danger of death or serious physical injury; require that a Judicial Commissioner must immediately be informed that such a warrant has been issued; and reduce the period within which a Judicial Commissioner must decide whether to authorise the warrant to 24 hours after issue.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 40, in clause 22, page 17, line 30, after “must”, insert “immediately”.
Amendment 41, in clause 22, page 17, line 35, leave out from “ending” to the end of line 36 and insert
“24 hours after the warrant was issued.”
Amendment 42, in clause 22, page 17, line 35, leave out from “ending” to the end of line 36 and insert
“48 hours after the warrant was issued.”
Joanna Cherry
Bear with me a moment, Mr Owen, I have my notes in a bit of a schmozzle, as we say in Scotland—[Interruption.] Or as they say in Ireland, to be accurate. In Scotland they would say they were in a fankle. If you give me two minutes, I will sort myself out.
Joanna Cherry
Thank you, Mr Owen, and apologies to Committee members. The purpose of the amendments is to—sorry, I have lost my train of thought completely.
The Solicitor General
I think we were dealing with urgent cases. I hope that is of some assistance.
Joanna Cherry
Yes, I am very grateful to the Solicitor General. I skipped ahead to modifications, so I will skip back to urgent. The purpose of the amendments is to specify that urgent warrants can be issued only when they are necessary, in an emergency situation that poses an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury, and that a judicial commissioner should be informed immediately that an urgent warrant has been issued. They also seek to reduce the period within which a judicial commissioner must decide whether to approve the issue of a warrant to 24 hours after its issue.
There were differing recommendations from the Joint Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee. I think I am correct in saying that the ISC recommended 24 hours and the Joint Committee 48. In terms of case law, recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights suggest that 48 hours would be an absolute minimum, so I would insist on that as a fall-back position.
Victoria Atkins
I sat with my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham and my hon. Friend and neighbour, the Member for Boston and Skegness, on the Joint Committee, where we debated this in great detail. It is right to say that it was not a unanimous decision of the Committee to change the time limit for the urgency provisions. Indeed, I said to the Committee that if that point was ever raised, I would make clear that the decision was not based on any evidence we heard. I will not say that members of the Committee drew the figure out of the air, but—[Interruption.]
Victoria Atkins
Okay, out of the air. The Joint Committee arrived at that figure on the basis of no evidence. That may assist the hon. and learned Lady.
Joanna Cherry
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for being so precise and clear about that. Essentially, the concern about clause 22 is that the scope of the urgent mechanism is extremely broad and ill defined. In my view, it could fatally undermine any safeguard provided by a mechanism for judicial authorisation or indeed judicial review in the double lock.
The Bill provides that an urgent warrant can be issued by the Secretary of State in a case where she considers there is an “urgent need”, which is not defined. We then have the three-day period. As the hon. Lady said, no specific reason has been given for the selection of three days. The Joint Committee took the view that it should be shortened significantly to provide for approval within 24 hours. I think the ISC suggested 48 hours—I apologise if I have got that the wrong way round.
The purpose of the amendments is to remove the urgent provision in the Bill altogether or to restrict it to very limited circumstances, with the urgent authorisation having to take place during a 24-hour period. The concern underlying the amendments is that in their absence, the provisions for urgent warrants in the Bill will drive a coach and horses through even the double lock provision, because they will enable the judicial authorisation part of the procedure to be bypassed in very loosely defined circumstances. That is the case as precisely as I can put it.
Keir Starmer
I will be brief. There is a real concern about the provision for urgent cases being three days. Although we need such a provision, that period allows warrants to be operable before the double lock can apply, and therefore the period should be as short as possible.
The problem is not only that three days is too much but that three days can, I think, be five days, because it is three working days, and therefore there is the potential for three days to morph into more than three. If I am wrong about that, I will happily be corrected. I have put my name to the amendments suggesting 24 and 48-hour periods, to give the Government the option to reduce the threshold to either of those and put it in terms of hours, which removes any possible confusion about the use of the word “days”.
The Solicitor General
This is, of course, an important issue that has already seen a good deal of consideration for the Government and a move away from the original proposal to three working days; the hon. and learned Gentleman is right about that.
Although we are considering the matter carefully, at this stage the right balance is being struck between the interests of the security services and the other agencies in ensuring that crime is detected and prevented at the earliest possibly opportunity, and the interests of preserving the balance between the rights of the individual and the need to deal with crime and threats to national security. I am happy to consider amending the relevant draft codes to deal with the question about the notification to judicial commissioners, so that it is made clear on the face of the code that that should happen as soon as reasonably practicable. That wording is more appropriate than “immediately”, given that it may take a small period of time to draw together the materials that the commissioner will wish to review when considering whether to approve the warrant.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West made a point about decision making in a vacuum. The commissioner will have the decision of the Secretary of State and all the materials upon which that Minister has made the decision, as well as access to further material. I think it is clear that the decision maker will have everything they need and more to come to an informed and reasoned decision based upon the principles of judicial review. On the basis of my undertaking to consider amending the draft code of practice, I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras feels able to withdraw the amendment proposing the word “immediately”.
Let me deal with the central points about the decision and the length of time within which the warrant should be approved. The effect of the amendments would be to reduce that, and I recognise that the Joint Committee that undertook the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill made a similar recommendation. We have therefore responded in an appropriate way by shortening the window within which urgent action can be taken. That has been widely welcomed. It is an important consideration and an example of how, throughout this procedure, the Government have taken note of reports, listened and acted accordingly on those recommendations.
It is not in anybody’s interests to create so tight a statutory framework that decisions end up being rushed. I therefore consider that the three working days now provided for in the Bill should give sufficient time for the judicial commissioner to be presented with and to consider the grounds upon which the Secretary of State decided to issue the urgent warrant. My worry is that by reducing the time period even further, we would give the commissioner even less time, which would lead to the sort of decision making that would perhaps not be in anybody’s interests, let alone those of the state.
Amendment 91 seeks to define urgency on the face of the Bill and to replace the definition currently provided for in the draft statutory codes of practice with a narrower definition. As the Committee will appreciate, we must provide law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies with an operationally workable framework. We will have failed with this Bill if we provide the agencies with the powers that they need, but with ones that cannot keep up with the pace and scale of the threats that we face. I know that it is always a challenge for legislators to try and—to use the modern phrase—“future-proof” legislation, but it is important that we create a framework that is not only clear and simple to understand, but sufficiently flexible to take into account the fact that, from month to month, the nature of the threat changes.
I am afraid that the effect of the amendment would be to curtail that ability because the definition would be too narrow. The draft statutory codes of practice, which we have all been considering, define urgency, which is determined by whether it would be reasonably practicable to seek the judicial commissioner’s approval to issue the warrant in the requisite time. That time period would reflect when the authorisation needs to be in place to meet an operational or investigative need.
The code sets out the three categories with which we are familiar: first, where there is the imminent threat to life or serious harm, and I gave the example of a kidnap case earlier. The second is where there is an valuable intelligence-gathering opportunity, where the opportunity to do so is rare or fleeting—that might involve, for example, a group of terrorists who are just about to make that trip overseas and are making the final preparations to do so. The third is where there is a time-limited significant investigative opportunity—here I speak with years of experience of dealing with drugs cases—such as the imminent arrival of a major consignment of drugs or firearms, when timing is of the essence.
I am afraid that narrowing the definition of urgency so that it only relates to an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to a person would mean significant lost opportunities when it comes to investigation and gathering of intelligence. It would have an impact on the ability to act in a way that would allow interception at a time, for example, that would be apposite to capture a particular drugs seizure.
Another example would be the terrorist cases that I deal with week in, week out—in terms of the function of the Law Officers granting consent to prosecution. If, for example, a group was making final preparations to travel out to Syria to join Daesh, it would cause a problem for the security and intelligence agencies if they were not able to seek urgent authorisation to intercept telephones because there was no immediate danger of death or serious physical injuries.
In my considered opinion, I am afraid that the amendment would allow a significant gap in the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ ability to keep us safe. I do not think that any hon. Member in this House wants that to happen. I know that it not their intention but it is my genuine concern. On that basis, I invite hon. Members to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I have listened carefully to the Solicitor General. The difficulty for him and the Government is this: according to recent case law from Strasbourg, a 48-hour timeframe for authorisation would be the maximum to harmonise the process with that recent case law. The case of Zakharov v. Russia included that a complaint for urgent interception could occur without judicial authorisation for up to 48 hours. There really is no reason why the UK should allow a longer period for approved surveillance than Russia. The difficulty with three working days is that if they fall over a weekend, it can mean five days or, indeed, if it is a bank holiday weekend, six days. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Failure to approve warrant issued in urgent case
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 23, page 18, line 7, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment, and others to Clause 23, would require a Judicial Commissioner to order that material collected under an emergency warrant which he does not subsequently authorise, be destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment
Amendment 44, in clause 23, page 18, line 9, leave out paragraphs (3)(b) and (c) and insert—
“(3A) If the Judicial Commissioner determines that there are exceptional circumstances, the Judicial Commissioner must instead impose conditions as to the use or retention of any of that material.”
Joanna Cherry
I will keep this fairly brief. The amendment would require a judicial commissioner to order that material collated under an urgent warrant that he does not authorise subsequently be destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances. As the Bill stands, should material be obtained under an urgent warrant that is later unapproved by the judicial commissioner, the judicial commissioner may, but is not required to, order destruction of material obtained. Once again, it is my argument that the provision, as it stands, creates a significant loophole that could be used to bypass the legal protections that purport to be provided by the judicial review mechanism.
An urgent warrant allows the relevant agency to access material that it may not be authorised to access in law. Permitting the retention of that material in anything other than exceptional circumstances creates a clear incentive to use the urgent process in inappropriate cases so, in order to ensure that the applying agencies—the agencies that apply for warrants—only use the urgent process where strictly necessary, the Bill needs to ensure that there are no advantages to be gained from seeking an urgent warrant where it is not strictly necessary. The amendment would ensure that where a judicial commissioner does not authorise the use of the warrant retrospectively, the position must be that the material collected is destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances.
The Solicitor General
I am once again grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for setting out her place clearly and with admirable succinctness. There is a problem with the amendment because it very much begs the question of what might constitute exceptional circumstances. The question of who will determine whether the threshold had been met in a given instance is also raised. Introducing that caveat to the Bill would unnecessarily complicate the commissioners’ decision-making process. The commissioners will be extremely well qualified to decide how material should be used when cancelling a warrant. They will take into account all the relevant circumstances on a case-by-case basis, and the clause, as drafted, allows them to do just that without the necessity of introducing subjective terms.
The amendments also suggest that the only two viable options following the failure to approve a warrant issued in an urgent case are to destroy the data or, in undefined exceptional cases, to impose restrictions on their use. That is unnecessarily limiting. There may be occasions when vital intelligence is acquired that could be used to save lives or to prevent serious crime, and where using that intelligence may not involve any further undue incursions into privacy. In that situation a judicial commissioner may wish to allow the intercepting agency to continue with its work without restriction in the interests of the great benefit it might have. Of course, that is a decision for the commissioner to determine, and clause 23, as drafted, allows just that. I am afraid that the amendments would mean that a judicial commissioner could not choose, after carefully considering the facts of the matter at hand, to allow such vital work to continue unrestricted. My worry is that the unintended consequences of such a proposal could seriously inhibit the work of the intercepting agencies.
Finally, the amendments would entirely remove the ability of a commissioner to decide what conditions may be imposed upon material selected for examination. By removing clause 23(3)(c), the remainder of the clause would relate only to material obtained under a warrant. Of course, a targeted examination warrant does not authorise the obtaining of any material, but rather the examination of material obtained under a bulk warrant, which is why clause 23(3)(c), as drafted, includes a specific provision that allows a judicial commissioner to direct how material that has been selected for examination under a rejected urgent warrant should be used.
In effect, the amendments attempt to change a carefully constructed safeguard that gives judicial commissioners absolute control over the actions of the intercepting agencies. I fear that the unintended result of these amendments would be an overall reduction of the judicial commissioners’ powers. For those reasons I invite the hon. and learned Lady to withdraw her amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I have nothing to add, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Members of Parliament etc.
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 104, in clause 24, page 18, line 38, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—
‘(1) This section applies where a warrant issued under this Part would seek to authorise any activity which may involve access to special procedure material.
(2) Special procedure material subject to subsection (1) will include—
(a) communications which are subject to legal professional privilege;
(b) journalistic material which a person holds in confidence; and
(c) communications sent by, or intended for, a member of the relevant legislature.
(3) The warrant subject to subsection (1) may only be granted on application to a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) The Judicial Commissioner must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that—
(a) a criminal offence has been committed;
(b) the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of that offence;
(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the information have been tried without success or were not tried because they were bound to fail;
(d) it is in the public interest that the warrant is granted, having regard to the—
(i) benefit likely to accrue to the investigation and prosecution if the information is accessed,
(ii) importance of the prosecution, and
(iii) importance of maintaining public confidence in the confidentiality of material subject to legal professional privilege, the integrity of journalists’ sources, and/or communications with members of relevant legislature.
(5) Material is subject to legal professional privilege means—
(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client;
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client and any other person with or in contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings;
(c) items enclosed with or referred to in such communications and made in—
(i) connection with the giving of legal advice, or
(ii) connection with the contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings.
(d) communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal professional privilege.
(6) A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—
(a) it is held subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation;
(b) it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.”.
This amendment establishes a consistent approach to the safeguards afforded to parliamentarians, legally privileged material and journalists seeking to protect their sources.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 92, in clause 24, page 18, line 38, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—
‘(1) This section applies where a warrant issued under this Part would seek to authorise any activity which may involve access to special procedure material.
(2) Special procedure material under subsection (1) will include—
(a) communications which are subject to legal professional privilege;
(b) journalistic material which a person holds in confidence;
(c) communications sent by, or intended for, a member of a relevant legislature.
(3) A warrant under subsection (1) may only be granted on application to a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) To approve a warrant under subsection (3), a Judicial Commissioner must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that—
(a) a criminal offence has been committed,
(b) the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of that offence,
(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the information have been tried without success or were not tried because they were bound to fail, and
(d) it is in the public interest that the warrant is granted, having regard to the—
(i) the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation and prosecution if the information is accessed,
(ii) the importance of the prosecution, and
(iii) the importance of maintaining public confidence in the confidentiality of material subject to legal professional privilege, the integrity of journalists’ sources, and/or communications with members of a relevant legislature.
(5) Material subject to legal professional privilege means—
(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client;
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client and any other person with or in contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings;
(c) items enclosed with or referred to in such communications and made—
(i) in connection with the giving of legal advice or;
(ii) in connection with the contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings.
(d) communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal professional privilege.
(6) A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—
(a) it is held subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation; or
(b) it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.”.
This amendment establishes a consistent approach to the safeguards afforded to parliamentarians, legally privileged material and journalists seeking to protect their sources.
Amendment 63, in clause 24, page 19, line 7, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 64, in clause 24, page 19, line 8, at end insert—
‘(2A) Where a warrant is likely to cover special procedure material, the procedure set out in subsection (2C) applies.
(2B) Where a warrant is likely to cover excluded procedure material, the procedure set out in subsection (2D) applies.
(2C) Further to requirements set out elsewhere in this part, the Judicial Commissioner may only issue a warrant likely to cover special procedure material if —
(a) There are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed,
(b) There are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection to the offence at (a),
(c) Other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail,
(d) It is in the public interest having regard to—
(i) the democratic importance of freedom of expression under article 10 ECHR to grant the warrant; or
(ii) the democratic interest in the confidentiality of correspondence with members of a relevant legislature.
(2D) Further to the requirements set out elsewhere in this part, the Judicial Commissioner may only issue a warrant likely to cover excluded procedure material in accordance with provisions in Schedule 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and Schedule 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
(2E) An application for a warrant under this Part must not be granted where the information could be sought using a warrant under Schedule 1 of PACE, unless seeking this information under PACE would defeat the purpose of the investigation.
(2F) In this section “special procedure material” means—
(a) special material as defined in section 14 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; or
(b) correspondence sent by or intended for a member of the relevant legislature.
(2G) In this section “excluded procedure material” has the same meaning as in section 11 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”.
Amendment 80, in clause 225, page 176, line 44, at end insert
“and for the purposes (and only the purposes) of this Act, including the application of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), a “criminal purpose” includes the purpose of—
(i) doing or facilitating anything involving an imminent threat of death or serious injury or an imminent and serious threat to national security, or
(ii) concealing, or impeding the detection or prevention of, the doing or facilitation of any of those things;”.
Keir Starmer
I will speak first to amendment 92, which is on page 18 of the amendment paper. The amendment would introduce additional protection for three special categories: those involving legal professional privilege; that involving journalistic material; and that involving members of a relevant legislature, including MPs. I will also address amendment 63, which is on page 19 of the amendment paper and would remove clause 24(2), to be replaced by amendment 64. For the benefit of the Solicitor General, I indicate that I will address only the principle. Having reviewed the wording, the amendments would not achieve the intended purpose for all the categories I mentioned, and therefore the amendment 104 will not be pressed to a vote. I am therefore speaking to the principles relating to legal professional privilege, journalistic material and members of a relevant legislature.
Joanna Cherry
Picking up on what the hon. and learned Gentleman just said, the purpose of amendment 104 is to address a lack of consistency of approach in the Bill regarding the protection afforded to correspondence with Members of Parliament, journalists and lawyers. I stress that the purpose behind the amendment is not to seek a particular privilege for parliamentarians, lawyers or journalists, but to protect the correspondence of members of the public with lawyers, parliamentarians and journalists.
The Bill contains different approaches. Clause 24 affords protections to Members of Parliament subject to targeted interception warrants, but not to journalists seeking to protect their sources. Similarly, although the provisions later in the Bill on access to communications data to target journalistic sources provide for authorisations to be subject to judicial review, access to other comms data that might engage the privilege afforded to Members of Parliament or to legally privileged material is not so protected.
Amendment 104 would provide consistency of approach to all three categories of privileged information, modelling the approach broadly on the provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—an English Act for which I must say I have much admiration. I am still trying to get to grips with it, but I think it is a good piece of legislation. It protects legally privileged material and journalistic material from interference during police searches.
The amendment would also provide a special procedure for access to MPs’ and journalists’ correspondence, which would be dependent on independent judicial authorisation, as opposed to authorisation by politicians. With all due respect to the Home Secretary, I did not find her triple lock on protection for parliamentarians terribly convincing. That is not a point about the present Government—it could apply to any Government of any persuasion—but it seems to me that having the Prime Minister as the triple lock does not give the appearance of political impartiality. Where parliamentarians’ communications are being interfered with, the authorisation should be judge-only.
Last night, I chaired an event with speakers from the Bar Council, the Law Society of England and Wales and the National Union of Journalists. They all consider that the protections in the Bill for journalists, for legal professional privilege and for parliamentarians are not sufficient. My own professional body, the Faculty of Advocates, which is the Scottish equivalent of England’s Bar Council, also considers that the protections in the Bill are not sufficient, as does the Law Society of Scotland.
I will quote what the Law Society of Scotland said in its evidence to the Joint Committee:
“On the 14 December we provided oral evidence to the Joint Committee, alongside the Law Society of England and Wales, expressing our shared and serious concerns in relation to professional legal privilege and the provisions of the Bill. Legal professional privilege”—
referred to in Scotland as the obligation of confidentiality—
“is key to the rule of law and is essential to the administration of justice as it permits information to be exchanged between a lawyer and client without fear of it becoming known to a third party without the clear permission of the client. Many UK statutes give express protection of LPP and it is vigorously protected by the courts. The ‘iniquity exception’ alleviates concerns that LPP may be used to protect communications between a lawyer and client which are being used for a criminal purpose. Such purpose removes the protection from the communications, allowing them to be targeted using existing powers and not breaching LPP.”
I do not wish to be seen to be making any special pleading, either as a lawyer and a politician or on behalf of the journalist profession. It is more about special pleading on behalf of the members of the public who contact journalists, parliamentarians and lawyers, and who wish to do so in confidence for a very good reason.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for seeking not to get ahead of himself with respect to the arguments on legal professional privilege. I feel a degree of sympathy, because the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West was inevitably going to deal with these matters in the round. Although different considerations apply to each category—parliamentarians, journalists and legal professionals—both hon. and learned Members are absolutely right to lay emphasis not on individuals in those professions but on the client, the source and the constituent. That is why these roles have a special status: it is about the wider public interest. The Government absolutely understand that and we place it at the very heart of our consideration of how warrantry should operate in these areas.
As you will know, Mr Owen, there has already been significant movement by the Government as a result of the various reports that we know all too well. I am delighted that matters of legal professional privilege are now in the primary legislation in great measure. The debate will therefore be about the extent to which safeguards are placed in the primary legislation and about what form they take. I will heed the hon. and learned Gentleman’s exhortation and not stray too far into that area.
I will therefore deal with the amendment to clause 24 and the question of parliamentarians. We heard last year the Prime Minister’s statement about the issue and the important requirement that he or she is to be consulted before the Secretary of State can, with judicial commissioner approval, issue a warrant to acquire communications sent by or intended for a Member of a relevant legislature. The clause applies to all warrants for targeted interception, with the exclusion of warrants authorised by Scottish Ministers, and includes the all-important requirement for the Prime Minister to be consulted before a targeted examination warrant can be issued to authorise the examination of a parliamentarian’s communications collected under a bulk interception warrant.
Part 5 contains similar provisions for equipment interference carried out by the security and intelligence agencies. The important protection in clause 24 will apply to the communications of Members of Parliament, Members of the House of Lords, United Kingdom MEPs and Members of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. It is important to observe that for the first time, what was a doctrine for the best part of 50 years is now codified and enshrined in primary legislation.
It is important to remember in the spirit of the wider public interest that nobody, least of all parliamentarians, is above the law. The Wilson doctrine has perhaps been misunderstood for many years as a blanket exemption for parliamentarians, but that is exactly what it was not. It was actually an explanation that there will be times when the national or the public interest demands that the communications of Members of Parliament be intercepted because there might be criminal purpose behind them. We hope that that will never happen, but sadly human experience teaches us otherwise. It is therefore important to strike a balance between the proper exercise of the privileges of being a Member of this place or of the other Assemblies and Parliaments in the United Kingdom and the principle of equality before the law.
The amendments introduce the concept of special procedure material and try to combine the approach to the safeguards afforded to the three categories that I have discussed. To put it simply, I submit that what is on the face of the Bill and in the accompanying codes of practice already provide those safeguards and indeed go beyond what can be encompassed in primary legislation. At this stage, I will not say anything further, because I want to deal with points that I know hon. Members will raise about the other categories.
Keir Starmer
Can I ask the Minister about journalistic sources? I am concerned that there is nothing about them on the face of the Bill. He will know how anxious journalists are about this. Will he consider whether something should be put on the face of the Bill? There is an inconsistency: in other parts of the Bill, such as clause 68, there is express provision relating to journalists. There is something in the code of practice, but there is nothing on the face of the Bill, which is the problem. Without committing himself to a particular form of words, will he commit to considering one and perhaps liaising with us about what form it could take?
The Solicitor General
I am mindful of the fact that my colleague the Security Minister is meeting with the National Union of Journalists. I cannot commit the Government to a particular course of action, but let me put this on record. We are absolutely committed to the preservation and protection of a free press and freedom of expression in our democratic society. That includes the ability of sources to provide anonymous information to journalists, which is absolutely vital if we are to have throughput of important information that needs to be in the public domain.
At the same time, there is a danger. We must not unduly fetter, on the face of the legislation, the important work of our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. We live in an age of constant blogging and other social media tools. Journalists themselves do not like being defined as a profession. I have been criticised in the past for using that terminology when talking about journalists, for example in the context of the Leveson process. Now, however, there are increasingly wide and loose definitions of who are journalists and what journalism is, and my worry is that that will, and does, inadvertently prevent legitimate investigation of those who are threatening our national security or who are planning to commit serious crime.
Keir Starmer
I have already indicated that I am not putting the amendment to the test. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
That is my position as well. I am happy to have addressed the principle at this stage and to look at an amendment at a later stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Items subject to legal privilege
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 25, page 19, line 22, after “items”, insert “presumptively”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 51, in clause 25, page 19, line 31, leave out paragraph (3)(a) and insert—
“(a) that compelling evidence indicates that the items in question consist of, or relate to, communications made for a criminal purpose such that it is necessary to authorise the interception, or (in the case of a targeted examination warrant) selection for examination, of those items, and”.
Amendment 82, in clause 37, page 31, line 7, at end insert—
“(3) But this section does not authorise interception of a communication containing items presumptively subject to legal privilege.”
Amendment 75, in clause 42, page 33, line 30, at end insert—
“(4) But this section, nor section 43 or section 44, do not authorise interception of a communication containing items presumptively subject to legal privilege.”
Amendment 76, in clause 45, page 35, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) But this section does not authorise interception of a communication containing items subject to legal privilege.”
Amendment 81, in clause 225, page 177, line 6, at end insert—
“presumptively subject to legal privilege”, in relation to an item, means that disregarding any question of criminal purpose, the item falls to be treated as subject to legal privilege;”.
New clause 2—Items subject to legal privilege—
“(1) A warrant under this Chapter, or under Chapter 1 of Part 6, may not authorise conduct undertaken for the purpose of doing anything in relation to—
(a) a communication, insofar as the communication consists of matters subject to legal privilege; or
(b) related communications data, insofar as the data relate to the communication of matters subject to legal privilege.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), legal privilege means—
(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client;
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client and any other person with or in contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings;
(c) items enclosed with or referred to in such communications and made—
(i) in connection with the giving of legal advice, or
(ii) in connection with the contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings.
(3) Communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal privilege.
(4) An application which contains a statement that the purpose of a warrant is to access communications made for the purpose of furthering a criminal purpose, but which would otherwise attract legal privilege must be considered by a Judicial Commissioner.
(5) A Judicial Commissioner may issue a warrant sought under subsection (3), if satisfied that—
(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the communications are made with the intent of furthering a criminal purpose;
(b) that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection with which the application is made;
(c) that the material concerned is likely to be relevant evidence;
(d) other proportionate methods of obtaining the information have been tried without success or were not tried because they were bound to fail; and
(e) it is in the public interest that the warrant is granted, having regard to the—
(i) benefit likely to accrue to the investigation and prosecution if the information is accessed,
(ii) the importance of the prosecution, or
(iii) the importance of maintaining public confidence in the confidentiality of material subject to legal professional privilege.
(6) A code of practice issued under Schedule 6 must contain provision about—
(a) the steps to be taken to minimise the risk of conduct undertaken pursuant to a warrant to which this section applies resulting in accidental acquisition of a communication, or communications data, falling within subsection (1); and
(b) the steps to be taken if it appears that such conduct has accidentally resulted in acquisition of such a communication or data.”
This new clause is intended to replace existing clause 25 and seeks to clarify the approach to legal privilege in line with existing law.
New clause 6—Items subject to legal privilege—
“(1) A warrant under this Chapter, or under Chapter 1 of Part 6, may not authorise conduct undertaken for the purpose of doing anything in relation to—
(a) a communication, insofar as the communication consists of matters subject to legal privilege;
(b) related communications data, insofar as the data relate to the communication of matters subject to legal privilege.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), legal privilege means—
(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client;
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client and any other person with or in contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings;
(c) items enclosed with or referred to in such communications and made—
(i) in connection with the giving of legal advice; or
(ii) in connection with the contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings.
(d) communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal privilege.
(3) An application which contains a statement that the purpose of a warrant is to access communications made for the purpose of furthering a criminal purpose, but which would otherwise attract legal privilege must be considered by a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) A Judicial Commissioner may issue a warrant sought under subsection (3), if satisfied that—
(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the communications are made with the intent of furthering a criminal purpose;
(b) that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and
(c) that the material concerned is likely to be relevant evidence;
(d) other proportionate methods of obtaining the information have been tried without success or were not tried because they were bound to fail;
(e) it is in the public interest that the warrant is granted, having regard to the—
(i) the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation and prosecution if the information is accessed;
(ii) the importance of the prosecution; and
(iii) the importance of maintaining public confidence in the confidentiality of material subject to legal professional privilege.
(5) A code of practice issued under Schedule 6 must contain provision about—
(a) the steps to be taken to minimise the risk of conduct undertaken pursuant to a warrant to which this section applies resulting in accidental acquisition of a communication, or communications data, falling within subsection (1);
(b) the steps to be taken if it appears that such conduct has accidentally resulted in acquisition of such a communication or data.”
This new clause clarifies the approach to legal professional privilege on the face of the Bill and brings it into line with the spirit of existing case law, the common law and PACE.
Keir Starmer
We come to this late, but the provision is an important one. I will try to be brief and to the point. The clause deals with legal privilege. I acknowledge that the Government have responded to the various recommendations so far, setting the provision out in a different form in the Bill.
There are, I am afraid, still problems. I have been discussing those with the Bar Council, which is concerned about the form in which the provision appears in the Bill. I invite the Committee to look at the clause. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) deal with a situation in which the purpose of an intercept warrant is to target material subject to legal privilege and, correspondingly, in relation to targeted examination. Those subsections are relevant to the targeting of material subject to legal privileges. Subsections (4), (5), (6) and (7) serve a slightly different purpose, which is the position if a warrant, although not targeted, may be likely to include items subject to legal privilege.
The difficulty with the first three subsections—this is the strong view of the Bar Council, borne out in the code of practice itself—is that
“Legal privilege does not apply to communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose (whether the lawyer is acting unwittingly or culpably).”
If the communication furthers a criminal purpose, legal privilege simply does not apply. If left unamended, subsections (1), (2) and (3) would allow the targeting of legally privileged material which does not further a criminal purpose, and therefore falls outside the limits of legal privilege itself.
The Bar Council’s point, which is a good one, is that once legal privilege is properly understood it becomes clear that legally privileged material should not be targeted. If the argument is that we may have to target communications between a lawyer and client in which they further a crime—I accept that there have been examples of that—in those circumstances the material has already lost its legal privilege and therefore does not need to be targeted. In fact, something that is not legally privileged is being targeted. It is a very serious point, and new clause 2 was intended to help set out what the Bar Council suggests is a better formulation of clause 25. Subsection (3) of new clause 2 makes it clear that:
“Communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal privilege.”
It approaches it on that basis in order to meet the argument that you cannot ring-fence something which, under the cloak of legal privilege, is in fact furthering a criminal intent. If that is right, it logically follows that clause 25(1), (2) and (3) should not stand as they are currently drafted. New clause 2 is essentially an alternative provision.
In other words, the test in 25(3) of “exceptional and compelling circumstances” is on the one hand welcome, though it is not welcome in a clause that targets legally privileged material that should not be targeted for the reasons I have outlined.
Lucy Frazer
I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for thinking of this as I speak. Is there a risk that we could be unclear as to whether a communication is subject to legal privilege, and think that it is in furtherance of a criminal offence, and then it turns out not to have been? Is there a loophole or lacuna in the legislation that does not cover that eventuality?
Keir Starmer
There is. That is a very good point, and it is one that I have discussed with the Bar Council. In those circumstances, what is being targeted is material that is not legally privileged, though there might be something that is legally privileged within it. There should be safeguards put around that, and I readily accept that examples will arise, probably also in the bulk powers, in which, although the intention is not to target legally privileged material, it is very difficult to have a warrant which does not run the risk.
An example would be when there is a suspicion that a lawyer and client may be involved in some activity that would take the communication outside of legal privilege, but it is impossible to say at what point of the conversation or exchange it loses its legal privilege. That is an obvious example. The answer that the Bar Council gives to that, and that I agree with, is that in those circumstances, rather than having a warrant to target the legally privileged material, there is a regime that recognises that it may be that, when targeting what can legitimately be targeted—namely, the part of the communication that has lost its privilege—there is a risk that privileged communications are incidentally picked up. There should be a provision for dealing with that material and its disclosure.
The powerful point about subsections (1), (2) and (3) is that it is wrong, in principle, to target legally privileged material. It is possible to have a warrant that runs the risk, with a separate set of safeguards to ensure that, if the risk materialises—as it will in some cases—there are provisions for ring-fencing, safeguarding, and not disclosing that material. That is the intention behind the Bar Council amendment.
It may be that further tweaks or improvements can be made, but that is an important point of principle that I invite the Solicitor General to take away and consider. A clause that satisfied the Bar Council in terms of the legal protection of this important privilege would be a prize worth having. Although the Bar Council recognises, as I do, the movement that the Government have made here, they simply have not got this right, for the reasons that I have outlined.
Subsections (4), (5), (6) and (7) are focused, in a sense, on communications that are likely to include items of legal privilege, such as a warrant that touches on a solicitor or lawyer communicating with clients, where it is thought that privilege has been lost but also elements where it has not been lost. In those circumstances, the Bar Council’s view and my view is that what is set out is again simply not strong enough, because there is no test or special provision.
New clause 2 is a comprehensive clause that would deal with that issue. In a sense, it goes with amendment 80, which amends a much later provision. It is intended to tidy up and clarify what the Bar Council says properly represents legal privilege and a regime for protecting it.
Suella Fernandes
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman not think that there is a special level of safeguard incorporated in the clause? A higher bar needs to be overcome. Only in “exceptional and compelling circumstances” will privilege be circumvented. Is that not a high standard to meet?
Keir Starmer
I accept that it is a high standard to meet, but it is focused on the wrong target. If it is wrong in principle to target legally privileged material on the basis that that material might involve communications that further crime, on a proper understanding, that material has already lost its legal privilege. Having a higher test to target something that has not lost its legal privilege is a good thing, but it is not enough. Material that has not lost its legal privilege should not be targeted, because it is in fact not furthering crime. The proper way to deal with it is to recognise that what one really wants to target is communications that have lost their privilege. However, there is a risk of including—unintentionally, because one does not want to target it—other material, and that requires a different approach and a different regime. That is really the point. It is good to have a threshold, but the threshold does not work within the confines of this scheme.
I urge the Solicitor General to view the clause in that light and to reflect again on it. A lot of work has been done to try to get it into a better state, but that has not met with the approval of the Bar Council and, following analysis and discussion with the council, I can see why. New clause 2 is the council’s attempt to get it right. It has spent a lot of time on it and is very concerned about it. I invite the Minister to reflect again and commit to looking again at the clause, perhaps with us and the Bar Council, to try to get a clause that meets with the approval of everyone concerned. If that can be achieved, it will be a prize worth having; if it cannot, it will be a waste of a bit of time on a good cause.
The Solicitor General
Although it comes at a late hour, this is an important debate. We have come a long way on this issue. There was silence as to the presence of legal professional privilege in the draft Bill. The Government have rightly listened to the evidence and have now made important amendments to clause 25.
Keir Starmer
I and the Bar Council would like an example of that. If it is being advanced that even where the iniquity exception is not made out—in other words, it is properly legally privileged communications—there none the less may be circumstances in which the privilege yields under the Bill. We need to be clear about the circumstances he envisages. In a sense, he is suggesting that the communications can be targeted once they have lost their quality in cases where the iniquity exception is not made out—in other words, where it is a proper professional exchange between lawyer and client, fully protected until now. We had better have an example. The Bar Council will be very interested, because this issue goes to the heart of the privilege.
The Solicitor General
I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman has looked at the code, and the example I will give him is the example in the code under paragraph 8.37. I will read it into the record, because this is an important point. The example is:
“An intelligence agency may need to deliberately target legally privileged communications where the legal consultation might yield intelligence that could prevent harm to a potential victim or victims. For example, if they have intelligence to suggest that an individual is about to conduct a terrorist attack and the consultation may reveal information that could assist in averting the attack (e.g. by revealing details about the location and movements of the individual) then they might want to target the legally privileged communications.”
In other words, that is not the furtherance of a crime, because the legal adviser is not hearing or in any way participating in the outline of a plan. There might be information in there that seems to the adviser to be innocent information about the suspected terrorist living in a particular location or associating with particular individuals, but which, because of the surrounding intelligence in the case, may well give a basis for the intelligence agency to target that individual, because the information means more to the agency.
Keir Starmer
The Minister points to an example that I have discussed with the Bar Council. I must put its view on the record, which is that in those circumstances, there would be an offence if someone was not providing the relevant information about that sort of incident to other than the lawyer. We may need to take this discussion forward in an exchange of letters, with the benefit of what the Bar Council has to say, but in its view that is not a good example for what would be an exceptional incursion into legal privilege. That is why I urge the Minister, rather than batting this back at this stage, to take the opportunity to have further discussions with the Bar Council to get this provision into a form that is acceptable to all.
The Solicitor General
I am always happy to discuss matters with the Bar Council. As one of the leaders of the Bar, the hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I go to regular Bar Council meetings. I was with it on Saturday, and I listen carefully to what my friends and colleagues at the Bar have to say.
However, the example I am giving explains the situation. There might be information that is entirely innocuous to the lawyer. Let us say that there is a consultation happening. The lawyer might ask a few questions about the address and associates of the person that do not, to him or her, disclose an offence being committed, but which might, in the wider context, provide the security and intelligence authorities with evidential leads that build a wider picture of which the lawyer will be unaware. That is not the furtherance of a crime; it is innocent. What would be innocuous information to the lawyer might mean something more, because a wider context might give the appropriate agency the grounds upon which it could then make its application for warrantry.
There is a distinction. I am not saying that it will be commonplace—far from it. That is why we have worded the terms of the clause very carefully. We talk about “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. I cannot imagine a higher threshold for an applicant to meet than those words.
An additional attraction is that, for the purposes of this legislation, we do not try to define what is meant by legal professional privilege. It is a bit like the argument about parliamentary privilege—the more we try to modernise and define it, the more it ceases to exist as a meaningful concept. One has to be careful about using vehicles like the Bill to define what is a very wide-ranging principle that applies to myriad circumstances involving lawyers and their clients. Although I am in the spirit of dialogue, that is why I would strongly hesitate before adopting the amendments.
Victoria Atkins
I have listened, with great care, to the submissions made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, and I have some sympathy with the position that he has put forward. One of the issues that has consoled me is that any such warrants that are proposed will have to meet the threshold of the double lock, namely the Home Secretary and the judicial commissioner, who, I imagine, will be very careful to protect legal professional privilege. Is my understanding correct?
The Solicitor General
My hon. Friend sums it up admirably. We have taken a different approach from RIPA, and rightly so. We have listened to the concerns expressed by the wider community, not just members of the profession, and are fully cognisant of the importance of legal professional privilege. It was part of my daily professional life for nearly 20 years so, as a Minister and as a lawyer, I fully understand its importance. Therefore, I hope that the example I have given gives an important insight into what we regard as “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. For those reasons, I urge the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras to withdraw the amendment.
Keir Starmer
I will not take much time. The Solicitor General prays in aid the dangers of over-defining, but the danger of the clause is that it will cut across legal professional privilege. Let us be realistic about what that means: wire taps to listen to privileged legal communications where the iniquity exception does not apply. A lawyer will never again be able to say that a communication—even one within the proper limits of a legal communication—is protected, because there could be no such guarantee. There will always be the possibility that it will not be protected. At the moment, it can be said that as long as it does not fall into the inequity exception, a communication is protected. In the other examples that have been used, it would not be interceptors; it would be bugs in cells. In the end, that is the road that will be opened by this proposal. A lawyer believes that they are having a confidential discussion on proper terms and appropriately with their client, yet that is intercepted. That is why I think the Bar Council feels so strongly about it.
Of course, there is a danger in defining legal professional privilege, but there is a much greater danger in getting to a position where a lawyer can never again say, “I guarantee that, as long as it is within limits, this is a protected communication.” That is at the heart of the Bar Council’s concern. I have said all I need to say. That is the problem.
The Solicitor General
We have to be careful about this. We have prison rules, for example. The hon. and learned Gentleman and I know that there are already certain prescribed circumstances and scenarios that exist. I am not advocating a coach-and-horses approach that can be taken by authorities who have a cavalier regard for LPP. This is a very prescribed exception. The words “exceptional and compelling” are strong. He paints a nightmare scenario—I know that he does so with genuine concern for a privilege that he and I hold dear—but I think that we are getting the balance right and that what he envisages will not come to pass.
Lucy Frazer
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for standing to give way. I was trying to think of circumstances in which legal professional privilege—the relationship between the lawyer and their client—might not be as sacrosanct as the client might expect. For example, if the lawyer considers that there is a risk that their client is involved in money laundering, even if they are not, there are circumstances in which that right is circumscribed. That might not be a perfect example, but we are in the territory of there being the risk of great harm or wrongdoing and evidence that persists of that.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful for the intervention, and I recognise that point. The concern is that, if passed in this form, the Bill will allow interception where there is no question of the inequity exception. Perfectly lawful, proper, appropriate communications between lawyer and client, which are fully protected and recognised in all other circumstances, would come within the scope of an intercept warrant.
At this stage—particularly at this hour—I will not press the point. I urge the Solicitor General to keep at least a residual open mind, so that if a better version of the new clause can be tabled at a later stage, which meets some of the concerns he has outlined, he might look at the proposal again. As I say, this is an issue of real concern to the profession. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 25 agreed to.
Clauses 26 to 29 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Simon Kirby.)