Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting) Debate
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Joanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting)
Joanna Cherry ExcerptsTuesday 12th April 2016
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 April 2016 - (12 Apr 2016)
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I remind the Minister that when I spoke before lunchtime, I highlighted the fact that the Intelligence and Security Committee has a concern about secondary data derived from content not being protected. What does the Minister make of the ISC’s concerns? Why have the Government dismissed them?
Mr Hayes
I wondered whether the ISC might be raised in this respect. Of course the hon. and learned Lady is right. With her typical diligence she has identified that the ISC does indeed make that point. The answer to the question is that we welcome scrutiny and we invite consideration of these proposals. All of the Committees that looked at these matters made a whole series of recommendations, some of which the Government accepted with alacrity, some of which the Government continue to consider, and some of which the Government do not agree with. It is true that that point has been made, and I said that this might reasonably be argued. However, I think that we have gone far enough in this area in balancing the proper desire for effective safeguards with the operational effectiveness of the agencies.
Bulk collection is really important. Without giving away too much sensitive information, I can happily let the Committee know that as Security Minister I have visited GCHQ, as the Committee would expect me to do. I have looked at the kind of work the staff there do in respect of bulk data collection, and I have seen the effect it has. Contrary to what might be described as a rather crude view of what bulk collection is all about, it is not searching for a needle in any haystack; it is being highly selective about which haystacks are looked at. It is about trying to establish connections, networks and relationships between organisations and individuals; places and people. I have no doubt that without these powers the work of our intelligence and security services would be inhibited. However, I accept that safeguards are needed: I do not for a moment suggest anything else.
I turn now to amendments 58, 59 and 60. These amendments seek to extend the circumstances in which a targeted examination warrant is required beyond the current situation in the Bill, such that they are not limited to persons in the UK. The intention of amendment 58 appears to be that an individual targeted examination warrant would be required from the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner each time an analyst in an intelligence agency wished to examine the content of any communications acquired under a bulk data interception warrant. This would apply irrespective of where in the world the sender or recipient of the communication was located. As currently drafted, the Bill makes it clear that a targeted examination warrant must be sought if an analyst wished to examine the content of communications of individuals in the British islands which had been obtained under a bulk interception warrant.
Amending the scope of a targeted examination warrant as proposed would, in my view, fundamentally alter the operation of the bulk regime. I am advised to that effect by those who use these powers. There is plainly a rational justification for treating the communications of persons known to be in the British Isles differently to those of persons who are believed to be overseas. Within the UK, the interception of communications is a tool that is used to advance investigations into known threats, usually in conjunction with other capabilities and other tools. Of course, serious investigations of the kind we are talking about are complicated, and very often this will be only one of the means that are used to establish the patterns of activity of the networks I have described and the threats that I have outlined.
Mr Hayes
I do not want to delay the Committee unduly, but I will offer this response. First, I direct the hon. and learned Gentleman to the “Operational Case for Bulk Powers”, which specifies the ways in which bulk powers will be used. The operational case will be specific. I am grateful to him for not pressing the amendment. I am happy to write to the Committee to reinforce our arguments and I think that we might reach a Hegelian synthesis—I am very keen on Hegel, as he knows. I agree that it is often necessary to examine the secondary data to determine the sender—he knows that that is the case—but I disagree about the lack of specificity on the operational purposes. We cannot give too much detail on that, for the reasons of sensitivity that he will understand, but I am happy to write to him to draw his and the Committee’s attention to the “Operational Case for Bulk Powers”, which is targeted at overseas threats but might, as he properly said, draw in some data from those who are in the UK. I hope that when I write to him he might decide not to bring these matters back further. I am grateful for his consideration.
Joanna Cherry
I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr Owen. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Before lunch, I spoke to amendment 83, concerning secondary data. I did not speak to amendment 84, because it was tabled but not selected, but it is really a corollary: it proposes leaving out clause 14.
I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said and I am grateful to him for his detailed explanation, but he does not take on board the concerns that I attempted to articulate on secondary data, notwithstanding the fact that similar concerns were articulated by the Intelligence and Security Committee. We will have to agree to differ for the time being. I associate myself with the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the other issues relating to the these amendments, in particular his pertinent and typically incisive point about clause 125(3).
Having sought clarification this morning from the Chair on the voting procedures, I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote, because I think that I would end up with something of a pyrrhic victory. However, I emphasise that I stand by the necessity for the grouped amendments and wish to revisit them later during the passage of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Obtaining secondary data
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Joanna Cherry
I tabled an amendment to delete clause 14. I do not think it has been selected, but I have made my position clear. I wish to revisit this issue at a later stage.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Subject-matter of warrants
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 15, page 12, line 3, leave out “or organisation”.
This amendment, and others to Clause 15, seek to preserve the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals while requiring an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 5, in clause 15, page 12, line 8, after “activity” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
Amendment 6, in clause 15, page 12, line 9, leave out “or organisation”.
Amendment 7, in clause 15, page 12, line 11, after “operation”, insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
Amendment 8, in clause 15, page 12, line 12, leave out paragraph (2)(c).
Amendment 9, in clause 15, page 12, line 13, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 52, in clause 27, page 21, line 7, leave out ‘or organisation’.
Amendment 53, in clause 27, page 21, line 8, leave out ‘or organisation’.
Amendment 54, in clause 27, page 21, line 13, leave out
‘or describe as many of those persons as is reasonably practicable to name or describe’ and insert ‘or otherwise identify all of those persons’.
Amendment 55, in clause 27, page 21, line 15, leave out ‘or organisation’.
Amendment 56, in clause 27, page 21, line 19, leave out
‘or describe as many of those persons or organisations or as many of those sets of premises, as it is reasonably practicable to name or describe’ and insert ‘all of those persons or sets of premises’.
Joanna Cherry
The effect of these amendments to clause 15 would be to retain the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals but require an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided. Associated amendments to clause 27 would be required. This would narrow the current provisions, which, in my submission, effectively permit a limitless number of unidentified individuals to have their communications intercepted.
As drafted, clause 15 permits warrants to be issued in respect of people whose names are not known or knowable when the warrant is sought. That is confirmed by clause 27, which provides that a thematic warrant must describe the relevant purpose or activity, and
“name or describe as many of those persons…as…is reasonably practicable”.
The creation of thematic warrants in the Bill means that communications intercepted in their billions under part 6 could be trawled thematically for groups sharing a common purpose or carrying out a particular activity. The difficulty with that is that it provides for an open-ended warrant that could encompass many hundreds or thousands of people, and the expansive scope of these warrants, combined with the broad grounds with which they can be authorised, does not impose sufficient limits on the authorities’ interception powers.
The existence of thematic interception warrants was avowed by the Secretary of State in March 2015. The Intelligence and Security Committee has reported that the significant majority of section 8(1) warrants under RIPA relate to one specific individual but that some do not apply to named individuals or specific premises, and instead apply to groups of people. The current Home Secretary has apparently derived the authority to do so from a broad definition given to the word “person” that is found elsewhere in RIPA, despite the unequivocal reference to “one person” in section 8(1) of RIPA. I suggest that what has gone on in the past is a very unorthodox statutory construction.
Be that as it may, in considering the terms of this Bill the ISC has reported that the Interception of Communications Commissioner has
“made some strong recommendations about the management of thematic warrants”
and in some cases recommended that they be cancelled. The ISC has expressed further concerns about the extent to which this capability is used and the associated safeguards that go along with it. It has suggested that thematic warrants must be used sparingly and should be authorised for a shorter time than a standard section 8(1) warrant.
Reporting on the draft version of the Bill, the ISC noted that “unfortunately”—the Committee’s word—its previous recommendation about thematic warrants
“has not been reflected in the draft Bill”;
nor has it been reflected in the revised Bill, in which the scope for thematic warrants remains unchanged. It is not only the ISC that has concerns about this issue. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill also recommended that
“the language of the Bill be amended so that targeted interception and targeted equipment interference warrants cannot be used as a way to issue thematic warrants”.
Many lawyers believe that the scope of warrants permitted under clause 15 as drafted would fail to comply with both the common law and European Court of Human Rights standards, as expounded in a very recent decision in Zakharov v. Russia from 4 December 2015. In that case, the ECHR found that Russia’s interception scheme was in violation of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Also, the Court cited the fact that Russian courts sometimes grant interception authorisations that do not mention a specific person or a specific telephone number to be tapped but authorise interception of all telephone communications in the area where a criminal offence has been committed. Although thematic warrants do not relate to geographical location, in my view and that of many far more distinguished lawyers, they are sufficiently broad to violate article 8 of the convention. Our amendments are required to make clauses 15 and 27 compatible with that article.
Victoria Atkins (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)
Is the purpose of the clause to address those circumstances where, for example, the security services or police know that someone has been kidnapped, but they do not know the names of the kidnap gang or even perhaps the number of gang members? The clause is designed to enable the security services to make the inquiries they need to make to save a life.
Joanna Cherry
I think I am correct in saying that this section is directed more towards security concerns than serious crime. I will no doubt be corrected, but I can only stand by what others who deal with surveillance issues have said in their evidence to the Committee. I would also like to point to what David Anderson QC said in his follow-up evidence to the Committee at paragraphs 4 and 5.
Joanna Cherry
David Anderson, in his typically helpful, studious and hard-working way followed up his oral evidence to us with some additional thoughts in written evidence. He has a section headed “Thematic Targeted Powers” in which he says:
“I recommended that the practice of issuing thematic warrants be continued into the new legislative regime…I envisaged their utility as being ‘against a defined group or network whose characteristics are such that the extent of the interference can reasonably be foreseen, and assessed as necessary or proportionate, in advance’—for example, a specific organised crime group”.
Perhaps that answers the hon. Lady’s question. He went on to say:
“I also recommended that the addition of new persons or premises to the warrant should…require the approval of a judicial commissioner, so that the use of a thematic warrant did not dilute the strict authorisation procedure that would otherwise accompany the issue of a warrant targeted on a particular individual or premises”.
His following statement is very important. He says:
“On both counts, the Bill is considerably more permissive than I had envisaged. Thus: The wording of clause 15 (interception) and still more so clause 90 (EI) is extremely broad”.
This answers the hon. Lady’s point. Even David Anderson, who envisaged thematic warrants having some utility against a defined group or network such as an organised crime group, says that the wording of clause 15 is considerably more permissive than he had envisaged.
Victoria Atkins
The hon. and learned Lady states the opinion that clause 15 is really aimed at dealing with the security services point. It is but, may I refer her to clause 18, which deals with the grounds on which warrants may be issued by the Secretary of State? It is very clear that it can be done for national security reasons but also for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime.
Joanna Cherry
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I stand corrected. Fortunately I have the assistance of David Anderson on this point. He has made the point that whereas he sees envisaged their utility in identifying a defined group or network—for example, a specific organised crime group—he remains of the view that the wording of clause 15 is “extremely broad”. It should concern all members of this Committee that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation considers the wording of this clause to be extremely broad. If the Government will not take the Scottish National party’s word for it, then they can take the word of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I seek the Government’s assurance that they will go away and look again at clause 15 and clause 27 very carefully, in the light not only of what I have said but, more importantly, what has been said by Sir Stanley Burnton, Lord Judge and David Anderson.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her very detailed points. Does she accept that even though David Anderson thinks that the wording is too broad, the amendments that she proposes would make the provision too narrow? If the words “or organisation” are taken out then only a person or a premises will be identified, which would not catch the circumstances that David Anderson is thinking about. In her submission, the hon. and learned Lady identified that while the current wording was too broad, some of the organisations that she mentioned did recognise that in some circumstances the thematic powers were useful.
Joanna Cherry
The hon. and learned Lady makes a point that I have to take on board to a certain extent. I suspect that my amendments to clause 15 go further than David Anderson would if he were drafting an amendment to this clause. We are at a very early stage in this procedure. I am really seeking an assurance from the Government that they will take on board, if not my concerns, then at the very least the concerns of Sir Stanley Burnton, Lord Judge and David Anderson, and that they will take away clause 15 and clause 27 and look at them again.
Keir Starmer
I will be brief because a lot of the detailed work has been done. I listened very carefully to the Minister, not only today but on other occasions, and he indicated that the Government want to improve the Bill and that they do not have a fixed view. I therefore make these submissions in the hope that the Minister and the Government will not circle the wagons around the existing formula in clause 15 simply because those are the words on the page. The warrants are supposed to be targeted, but when reading clause 15(2) it is clear that they are very wide. I will not repeat the concerns of Lord Judge, Sir Stanley Burnton and David Anderson, but they are three individuals with huge experience of the operation of these warrants.
I take the point about kidnap cases or examples of that type. They are exactly the cases that Lord Judge and Sir Stanley Burnton will have seen in real time and reviewed, and that David Anderson will have reviewed after the event. When those three distinguished individuals say that they have concerns about the breadth of the clauses, they do so against huge and probably unparalleled experience of what the warrants provide for. I doubt that anyone would suggest that they are not alive to concerns about the warrants being practical and effective in the sort of circumstances that have been described.
Mr Hayes
That is an example of what I meant. There could well be people, either here or travelling here, whose identity is known only in the broadest terms. They are part of a network, a wider group or organisation, but no detail is known about them. That does not apply only to terrorist investigations; it might apply to serious organised crime investigations, in which by their nature we are dealing with organisations that desire anonymity. That means that investigations are challenging and makes the powers in the Bill absolutely necessary.
It is perfectly possible that a terrorist or criminal organisation might be seeking to travel in or out of the United Kingdom. It might not be clear at the outset which individuals will be travelling, or that all those travelling share an identified common purpose and will be carrying on the same activity, as required by the definition of “group of persons”.
It is also important to note that the Bill imposes strict limits on the scope of the warrant in relation to organisations. We need to be clear that activity against an organisation must be for the purpose of a single investigation or operation, and the Secretary of State and judicial commissioner will both need to be satisfied that the warrant is sufficiently limited to be able to meet the necessity and proportionality case. It is not just that it needs to be necessary and proportionate; it must be sufficiently limited to legitimise that.
Joanna Cherry
I am thinking about the example of the man in the hat. Is that really apposite here? We are talking about targeted interception warrants and targeted examination warrants. We cannot intercept someone’s communications, or examine them, before we have identified who or where they are. Simply knowing that there is a man in a hat is of absolutely no use to us until we find some way to narrow it down and identify who the man in the hat is, even if just that he is a man living in a particular place.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Lady may have misunderstood. Part 2 targeted warrants, even if they are thematic, cannot be used to trawl information collected en masse or in bulk. Targeted interception warrant applications must specify the scope of the activity to be intercepted. They cannot be open-ended; they are time-limited and must provide sufficient information for the Secretary of State to assess that the activity proposed is necessary. Indeed, all targeted interception warrants will be time-limited to six months.
Where the interception of calls between a particular handset and a group of individuals, for example, may help to identify a kidnapper—we have heard the example of kidnapping—or show where a kidnapper is, the details of what they are planning or where they might be holding the victim, it is of course possible to identify individuals to whom the warrant relates at the point when it is sought. Where that is the case, the warrant requesting agency will be expected to add the identities of the suspects to the warrant as they become known. That is a further assurance and an important new safeguard, as the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras knows. It will allow the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner to oversee the conduct taking place under the warrant. That obligation will be given statutory force through the code of practice, as he said. Even though it will be in the code of practice, it will have statutory force.
Mr Hayes
That is true, it is in the code. I think I indicated that earlier. None the less, it is an obligation. The reason we added to the codes, largely following the Joint Committee report, was that we wanted to provide additional assurances without the rigidity of placing too much on the face of the Bill.
There is always a tension—I spoke about it in our morning session—between how much is placed on the face of a Bill, which of course provides a degree of certainty but by its nature simultaneously provides rigidity, and how much is placed in supporting documentation. Codes of practice are important supplements to a Bill, and, in their final form, to an Act. It should be emphasised that they are not merely advisory documents—they are legally binding in their effect. As I also emphasised, these are draft codes of practice that we expect to publish in full, partly as a result of this Committee’s consideration and what we learn from it.
The warrant application process will allow the Secretary of State to understand the potential risk that communications will be intercepted incidentally to the purpose of testing or training, and to approve the measures to be taken to reduce the chance of communication being accidentally intercepted. Clear safeguards are in place to protect the privacy of the citizen, so I invite the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I am not minded to withdraw the amendment. For the same reasons that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras gave earlier, and the reasons that I gave in relation to amendments to clause 13, I will not insist on a vote just now—I suppose that means that I do withdraw the amendment, but I reserve the right to bring it back at a later stage.
The Chair
For clarification, when the hon. Lady says that she will bring it back at a later stage, it will be on Report.
Joanna Cherry
Indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Power of Secretary of State to issue warrants
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 17, page 13, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
This amendment, and others to Clause 17, seeks to remove the role of the Secretary of State in formally issuing interception warrants and instead requires Judicial Commissioners to issue such warrants.
Keir Starmer
No, it does not. With all due respect, thinking on accountability and safeguards in this field is on the move. The sort of regime that was perhaps thought appropriate five, 10 or 15 years ago is now accepted as not appropriate. One of the points of this legislation in many respects is to bring it up to date and make sure that scrutiny and safeguards are more powerful. The fact that an ex-Home Secretary thinks their role was very important and need not be interfered with did not surprise me, but neither did I find it persuasive.
I have probably exhausted my point. The amendments are intended to reflect the position set out by David Anderson for the very good reasons that he draws attention to in paragraph 14.56(a): the political accountability card is overplayed in resisting this argument.
Joanna Cherry
I just want to address the joint amendments briefly. I want to draw attention to amendment 101, which was tabled on behalf of the Scottish National party and reflects a later amendment to delete clause 19. Scottish Ministers issue warrants at present in relation to serious crime. If the amendments were taken on board, their role would be replaced by judicial commissioners, and they are comfortable with that. I simply draw attention to that consequential amendment.
I support everything that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras has said in support of the group of amendments to clause 17. I have just three points to make: three reasons why I support the amendments. First, I associate myself with the argument that arguments concerning Ministers’ democratic or political accountability for surveillance warrants are misconceived and misplaced. Secondly, one-stage judicial authorisation is the norm in many comparable jurisdictions. Thirdly, and picking up another point made by David Anderson, judicial authorisation would encourage co-operation from technical firms in the United States of America.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for exploding the myth, also exploded by David Anderson, that Ministers are democratically accountable for their role in issuing warrants, because of course it is a criminal offence to disclose the existence of a warrant, and that will remain the case under clauses 49 and 51.
What is often advanced and has been advanced by Government Members is that a corollary to this argument is that Ministers are politically accountable for the agencies and will be required to resign if things go wrong. That is incorrect. Although the Home Secretary is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the Government’s counter-terrorism policy and the Cabinet Minister is responsible for MI5, MI5 is like the police: operationally independent. MI5’s director general retains operational independence for day to day decision making. Historically, when terrorist attacks have tragically succeeded, they have not led to political resignations in this country. Despite inquests and inquiries following the terrible tragedies of the 7/7 attacks and the ghastly murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, and despite the fact that those inquests and inquiries uncovered internal errors in the agency’s handling of information relating to those responsible for the attacks, this did not result in the political accountability that is now so strongly claimed.
The reality is that the oversight we have for such decisions and the accountability for the agency is provided by a patchwork of mechanisms, including the ISC—although I dissociate myself with the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras on the limitations of the ISC—and also by public inquiries and legal challenges brought against the Government. No doubt we could argue that such oversight and accountability as there is in relation to the operation of the security agencies could be enhanced, but it is simply not correct to argue that political accountability is provided by the ministerial sign-off on warrants, because it is not. I have been in the House for only nine months, but when questions around these issues are asked of Ministers, I have seen them repeatedly reply, probably quite properly, that they cannot answer for reasons of national security.
My second point is that one-stage judicial authorisation is the norm in comparable jurisdictions. It happens in America, where federal, investigative or law enforcement officers are generally required to obtain judicial authorisation for intercept. A court order must be issued by a judge of a US district court or a US court of appeals judge. In Australia, law enforcement interception warrants must be issued by an eligible judge or a nominated administrative appeals tribunal judge. In Canada, it is unlawful to intercept private communications unless the interception is in accordance with an authorisation issued by a judge. In New Zealand, police can only intercept a private communication in tightly prescribed circumstances, including requiring a warrant or emergency permit that can only be issued by a High Court judge. If the United Kingdom wants to be able to claim that it is in a world-class league for good practice in surveillance, in my submission, it should adopt one-stage judicial authorisation.
Those of us who are lawyers in the Committee or have ever dealt with the law are familiar with the concept of a judge being got out of his or her bed in the middle of the night to grant an interdict in Scotland or an injunction in England, in civil matters of far less importance than the sorts of matter the Bill deals with. In the aftermath of—God forbid—another attack in the United Kingdom such as 7/7, judges would be as readily available to deal with warrants as Ministers of the Crown are at present.
Thirdly, judicial authorisation would encourage co-operation from US technical firms. That point was pressed home by David Anderson QC in his review, when he said that given the United States tradition of judicial warrants, Silicon Valley technical firms feel uncomfortable with the United Kingdom model of political authorisation. Those firms operate in a global marketplace, which underlines the need for us to adhere to procedures fit for a world-leading democracy. The United Kingdom is alone among our democratic allies with similar legal systems in permitting political-only authorisation. The SNP supports the amendments for those three reasons.
Mr Hayes
This is an important debate, as my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General said. The shadow Minister is wrong, as I described earlier, factually, philosophically and politically. I will try to deal with those in turn.
The factual case is this. Accountability is a much more sophisticated thing than the shadow Minister suggests. Accountability is about who makes decisions, as well as about the decisions they make. People who are elected, by their nature, are accountable to those who elect them. The judgments they make and the powers they exercise reflect that direct relationship with the electorate. It is almost undeniably true that those of us sitting in this room and others like us are bound to be more influenced and affected by the wider public because we do not do a job unless they continue to have faith and belief in us. We are elected by them; we are answerable to them.
The Home Secretaries, the Northern Ireland Secretaries and the Foreign Secretaries who make these decisions are elected constituency Members of Parliament who every day, every week and every month are communicating with constituents who have profoundly held views about the very matters over which those Secretaries exercise their judgment, in a way that people who are not elected simply do not. That line of accountability to the wider public should not be understated or underestimated.
Joanna Cherry
On a point of order, Mr Owen, the amendments are also in my name, so will I, too, have to state my position on them?
Joanna Cherry
I would like to respond to one or two of the points made by the Minister, if I may briefly.
The Chair
There is a bit of a job share going on among the Front Benchers and I am getting a little confused. The mover of an Opposition amendment is the person who finishes on behalf of the Opposition. Mr Starmer has had the opportunity to do that and you have had your opportunity to speak; we are now going to vote.
Joanna Cherry
I hear what you are saying, Mr Owen. My position is that the amendments are crucial to the Bill. I am not insisting or objecting—
The Chair
Order. The Question is that the Committee agrees to withdraw the lead amendment. If you do not wish that to happen, you may object and we will proceed to a vote.
The Chair
If you wish to speak to any amendment, you may make your position clear at that time, even if you are not the mover of the amendment—
Joanna Cherry
My name is not on amendment 61, but is on amendment 93, but that is an amendment to clause 27.
The Solicitor General
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen, for the first time in what I am sure will be a number of important sittings.
May I address the amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras? I am grateful to him for rightly pointing our way to paragraph 4.7 of the draft code. Indeed, by reference, paragraph 4.8 gives a clear basis for the decision maker to assess the nature of the proportionality. Therein lies something of the problem with regard to the approach to be taken in the clause. It is tempting, on the face of it, to include the test in the primary legislation, but it might provoke more questions than answers.
Naturally, when one makes a bald statement about proportionality, people want to know more, so where does one end in terms of adding to the primary legislation the detail that is necessary for decision makers to reach a considered conclusion? My simple argument is that the amendments therefore are not necessary. What makes this the right balance is the combination of the primary legislation that sets out the framework and a living document—the code of practice—that will be more easily amendable and accessible in terms of any changes that need to be made in the light of experience and practice.
We do not want to end up with a situation where this type of warrantry can only be obtained when all other avenues have been exhausted, a bit like the position when one comes to an ombudsman. That would be an artificial scenario to end up with and would cause problems operationally. I can think of examples where the exhaustion of other avenues will just not be practicable. For example, in a kidnap situation where an individual’s life might be in danger, this type of warrantry would probably be the most appropriate step to take before any other type of intervention. Of course, there are occasions where other means of intelligence gathering, such as live human intelligence sources, might be high-risk or result in a higher degree of collateral inclusion.
I am concerned that we do not end up, despite the best intentions of the hon. and learned Gentleman, with an inflexible approach on the face of primary legislation. It is far better, in my submission, to keep the balance as it is, as clearly outlined in the code of practice and the framework within the clause.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for the way he has approached this, but it misunderstands the amendment. Of course, whether information could be reasonably obtained by other means is relevant to the assessment of proportionality and necessity. The amendment proposes that, having taken all the factors into account, if it transpires at the end of that exercise that the information could have been reasonably obtained by other less intrusive means, it is not proportionate—that is the end of the exercise. That, in our submission, is the right test that should be on the face of the Bill. At this stage, I will withdraw the amendment with a view to raising it at a later stage if it is appropriate to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 18, page 14, line 20, after “security”, insert “or”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 85, in clause 18, page 14, line 20, after “security” insert—
“where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”
This amendment, and others to Clause 18, seeks to require that the grounds for an interception or examination warrant are tied to a threshold of reasonable suspicion of criminal behaviour; and that reference to a separate ground of “economic well-being, etc.” is deleted from the face of the bill.
Amendment 86, in clause 18, page 14, line 21, after “crime” insert—
“where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”
Amendment 31, in clause 18, page 14, line 21, leave out “or”.
Amendment 32, in clause 18, page 14, line 22, leave out paragraph (2)(c).
Amendment 35, in clause 18, page 14, line 33, leave out subsection (4).
Joanna Cherry
These amendments would delete the separate ground for interception of economic wellbeing from the face of the Bill and require that grounds for interception are tied to a threshold of reasonable suspicion of criminal behaviour.
The Bill re-legislates for RIPA’s three broad statutory grounds for issuing surveillance warrants. The Secretary of State may issue warrants for interception, hacking and so on
“in the interests of national security…for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or…in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.
That final ground can apply only where it relates to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British islands.
I support the amendments because all three main statutory grounds are, in my submission, unnecessarily vague and are left dangerously undefined. As the decision will continue to lie with the Secretary of State, the test will be met by whatever he or she subjectively decides is in the interests of the national security or economic wellbeing of the UK, having regard to popular sentiment rather than to what is necessary and proportionate, as we have now heard from the Minister’s own mouth. The tests mean that individuals are not able to foresee when surveillance powers might be used, and they grant the Secretary of State a discretion that is so broad as to be arbitrary. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill recommended that the Bill should include a definition of national security, and I call upon the Government to produce such an amendment. If the Government sprinkle the Bill so liberally with the phrase “national security”—indeed, it is the Government’s job to defend national security—they need to tell us what they mean by that phrase, so I call upon them to define it.
The Joint Committee also recommended that the phrase “economic wellbeing” should be defined, but the ISC went further and said that economic wellbeing should be subsumed within a national security definition, finding it unnecessarily confusing and complicated. I heartily endorse the ISC’s view in that regard. The third ground is an unnecessary repetition unless there is something sinister behind the definition of “economic wellbeing,” and many Members of the official Opposition, and indeed of my own party, have serious concerns about what that might be about.
Recently, the Prime Minister went so far as to say, ridiculously in my view, that the Labour party is now a “threat to national security”. I am not a member of the Labour party, although I once was when I was a student.
Joanna Cherry
I am very happy to join Labour in many aspects of this Bill, but I have taken a slightly more radical path in middle age as an SNP MP. It is a disgrace to suggest that the Labour party is a threat to national security, and such loose language shows us that the continued undefined use of the term “national security” in enabling legislation is not sustainable.
The ISC also queried both the agencies and the Home Office on the economic wellbeing ground, and it reported that neither the agencies nor the Home Office have “provided any sensible explanation.” I hope that we might get a sensible explanation from the Government today, and I wait to hear whether we get one. Regrettably, the recommendations of the ISC and the Joint Committee have been dismissed, and the core purposes for which the extraordinary powers can now be used remain undefined and dangerously flexible within the Bill.
That is the nub of my concerns about the definitions of “national security” and “economic wellbeing.” The SNP amendments go slightly further than the Labour party is prepared to go at this stage by requiring reasonable suspicion. At the moment, the three grounds contain no requirement for reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or intends to commit a serious criminal offence, nor even suspicion or evidence that a serious crime has been or is going to be committed. In my submission, that gives licence for speculative surveillance.
Briefly, on the national security ground, the courts have in the past responded with considerable deference to Government claims of national security, viewing them not so much as a matter of law but as Executive-led policy judgments. As a legal test, national security is meaningless unless the Government attempt to tell us what they mean by it. The second ground is similarly broad and open-ended because the Government have not sought to clarify the circumstances in which national security, as opposed to the prevention and detection of serious crime, will be in play.
I invite the Government to table an amendment to tell us what they mean by national security, to explain why it is necessary to have a ground revolving purely around economic wellbeing, to explain why they have discounted the recommendations of the Joint Committee and the ISC, and to tell us why there is no requirement for reasonable suspicion in these grounds.
Simon Hoare
In opening, let me address what I detect is the elephant in the Committee Room, as amplified by the amendment as it was. As I made clear in the July 2015 debate on the Anderson report and on Second Reading, I am not a lawyer, so I view the proposal through the narrow prism of the man on the Clapham omnibus, for want of a better phrase: a practical proposal to try to keep my constituents and others as safe as the Government possibly can. I do not view it through the perfectly proper prism of trained legal eyes and I would not be able to do that.
Coming to the breadth point that the hon. and learned Lady who speaks for the SNP has been making, it is clear to me that, from a legal point of view or from a lawyer’s point of view, the narrower, tighter and more prescriptive the language in statute, the better. It narrows, eliminates, eradicates or whatever the opportunity for a wider debate about the interpretation of this or that word, almost like Coolidge, whose immediate response when told that a senator who had always opposed him had died, was: “I wonder what he meant by that.” I think we should be rather careful. I make no apology for viewing this as just an ordinary guy—a father, a husband, a constituent and a Member of Parliament—who believes it is my duty to support any Government of the day who are seeking to keep our country safe.
Joanna Cherry
Does the hon. Gentleman also accept that, as Members of Parliament, we have a duty to protect our constituents’ civil liberties and privacy? Lawyers look for narrow definitions and certainty not for their pleasure, but to protect their clients. The reason why Members of Parliament should look for narrow definitions and certainties is to protect their constituents.
Simon Hoare
Up to a point, Lord Copper. I find myself in broad agreement with the hon. Member for City of Chester. Likewise, I could not give a tinker’s cuss about most of these things as long as I can look a constituent in the eye were something horrible to happen on the streets of Shaftesbury, Blandford Forum, Gillingham or any of the villages in my constituency. They might look at me and say, “Mr Hoare, are you convinced that you supported everything you possibly could to avoid this atrocity?” I would prefer to say, “Yes, I did.” If it impinged upon or offended against the virgo intacta of civil liberties as a sort of purist academic—I use that word not in an abusive way—definition, I would side with the security argument at every step and turn.
I am not using that as the Luddite argument that someone who has done nothing wrong has nothing to be afraid of. It is absolutely right that to govern is to choose. It straddles that often imperceptible divide between the application of the rule of law and discharging the first duty of the state—to keep the realm safe—and preserving the sacred and long-cherished liberties and freedoms that we all enjoy.
I accept what the hon. and learned Lady says on that point, but it is not just Liberty and Amnesty and other organisations that have access to legal counsel. It is not that the statue, as it emerges through all our processes, would be available only to us and the good guys. It would be available to those who wish us well, but I am going to hazard a guess that one or two of those who wish this country ill—whether in terms of national security, serious crime or acting in an injurious way to our economic wellbeing—may just have recourse to a legally trained brain or two themselves. They, too, would be able to say, “Ah, we’ll do it that way”, because the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or the Defence Secretary would be so hogtied by the narrow definitions contained in the statute of the Bill, because people sought to stand—this is a phrase I used on Second Reading—like vestal virgins, defending the flame of civil liberty, because that is the flame that must be defended above all others and national security must be secondary to it. That is a perfectly acceptable and reasonable position to take, but it is one with which I profoundly disagree. It offends everything that motivates me as a politician.
We need to be very careful about having, either in the proposed amendments or during the progress of the Bill in Committee and on Report, an obsessive regard to trying to narrow down our language. Providing that the double lock with the judicial oversight remains for all circumstances whereby these warrants and other facilities can be granted—as long as that judicial view is there—that would seem to be in order to secure the provision for the short, medium and longer term, so that we do not have to come back through the legislative process to continually update the narrow language in the Bill to reflect circumstances or address scenarios that, without sounding too much like Donald Rumsfeld, in 2016, we did not think existed or could exist.
It is not from some sort of bovine, recidivist, reactionary, “We are the law and order side of the Tory party” sentiment that I find this quest for the narrowing down of our language to be wrong. It would fetter and constrain the decisions of Ministers and those who, on a daily basis, put their lives at risk under the rule of law to keep us safe. I shall be opposing this set of amendments, just as I will any other amendment, not because my Front Bencher or my Whip advises me to, but merely because I think that there is nothing intrinsically wrong—this is the non-lawyer’s approach—in having broad definitions that provide accountable scope to those who take the decision, so that they are able to take those decisions in response to circumstances as they arise.
Joanna Cherry
I listened carefully to the Minister, and I noted that he said he wanted to provide a bridge on the issue of national security and can perhaps deal with issues and political fears related to that, but that he does not want to significantly change the language on economic wellbeing and is not happy with the SNP amendments in relation to reasonable suspicion. I do not want to get too bogged down on trade union rights and I certainly do not want to kick down the bridge that the Minister wants to build, but I have to say that, on trade union rights, actions speak louder than words. This Government have introduced some of the most draconian anti-trade union legislation that has been seen in this country for many years—worse than Mrs Thatcher’s. In that context, I do wonder whether we can be assured about the Government’s intentions in relation to trade unions. However, the Minister is an honourable man; I take him at his word and will listen to what he has to say in the future on this issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 19 and 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Approval of warrants by Judicial Commissioners
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 21, page 17, line 4, leave out from “must” to “the following matters” in line 5 and insert “determine”.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful for that intervention. There are several different positions here, and we are finding our way. The amendments would take out the review element and make it clear that it is a double lock. There would then be a separate decision by the Secretary of State and a decision by a judge on the same material. Of course, a judge would always give weight to the Secretary of State’s view, but they would still come to a decision of their own. That is position No. 1, and let me be clear that that is what the amendment is aimed at—a true and equal lock.
Joanna Cherry
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that amendment 89, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and I, would specifically take out subsection (2) and the reference to judicial review? That would make clear what he is saying: amendment 62, which I also support, would amend subsection (1) so that the judge would determine the review in regard to necessity and proportionality, and judicial review would come out completely.
Keir Starmer
I agree. I notice that my name is not on amendment 89. I think it should have been, because amendment 62 only works if subsection (2) comes out, but that is neither here nor there at this stage. I am not quite sure what happened, but given that both amendments have been tabled, it does not matter one way or another.
To be clear, the position is that it should be a substantive decision by the judge according to necessity and proportionality, and those terms obviously have their own special application. Through amendment 89, the review, whether by judicial review principles or otherwise, would come out, making it a true double and equal lock.
It is a new approach and a new provision, so it is for Parliament to decide on the appropriate way forward, but the amendments would give clarity and a real safeguard with an equal lock. That is the position. There probably is a fall-back position, which is that if it is to be a review of some sort, amendment 89 should stand on its own feet—that the review should not be on the principles of judicial review, and something more would need to be written into the Bill.
I do not know what response the Minister will give, but this matter goes to the heart of the issue, and it may be that further consideration needs to be given to the precise test. As it stands, the test is insufficiently precise and will lead to difficulties in its application. It is a matter of real concern to the judiciary. Lord Judge does not make such comments without a good deal of thought. If he is concerned about the provision, the Government should be, too. The simple way through is to have a simple but substantive double and equal lock.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. I remind myself that we will be able to debate those new clauses but I thought it important to look, in essence, at the full picture of David Anderson’s recommendations, bearing in mind that we had quite a lively debate about the role of the Executive. It would be a mischaracterisation of Mr Anderson’s view about the role of the Executive to say that somehow there was a wholesale move away from the Executive’s position with regard to warrantry and what Government Members certainly strongly feel is the important role of the Executive.
Coming back to where we are with regard to the judicial review test, we have already heard reference to the noble Lord Pannick. The intervention he has made is powerful and it is important that he thinks the test is robust. The criticism is, perhaps, not justified. Of course, that is not the only basis on which we have reached that conclusion. We all know—those of us who are lawyers and those who are not—the growing importance of judicial review in our public life. It is a concept that has evolved and that will continue to evolve. It is flexible, too.
Joanna Cherry
It is so general. I have advised people on the potential for judicial review. Does the Minister agree that it is difficult to advise a client on the potential for judicial review in the absence of a reasoned decision? In this Bill, there is no duty on the Secretary of State to give a reasoned decision, so judicial review scrutiny will be happening in a vacuum in the context of a decision for which no written reasons have been given because the Bill does not demand it.
The Solicitor General
Herein lies the problem. We have the judicial lock—the commissioners, of course, will be giving reasons—so that there is a check and balance upon the decision of the Executive. The hon. and learned Lady makes a proper point, because Executive decisions are administrative decisions that are judicable. I want to avoid further unnecessary and, frankly, unhelpful litigation that will get in the way of the important work of warrantry, which has to be undertaken, bearing in mind not only the interests of national security but, looking down the scale, the various scenarios that will confront commissioners, such as serious crime cases. The flexible scrutiny will allow differing approaches to be taken. Returning to the main point, I am worried that we might end up creating something that is too inflexible, which will create injustice rather than solve the problem.
Joanna Cherry
But how will the judicial commissioner scrutinise the Secretary of State’s decision, having regard to judicial review principles, when she is under no duty to give reasons for it? How will they do it practically?
The Solicitor General
They will have access to all the material that the primary decision maker has. The hon. and learned Lady is right to ask the question but, simply speaking, the judicial commissioner will have access to the material that the Secretary of State has. In fact, the judicial commissioner will be able to ask for more material, so there should not be any fear that the vacuum she mentioned will exist in relation to the judicial lock.
Returning to the obvious experience of judicial commissioners, I am keen to ensure that we end up in a position where commissioners feel that, on a case-by-case basis, they are not only free to agree with the Secretary of State, but are absolutely free to disagree. If there is not that element of flexibility, this double lock will be meaningless. Again, without casting any imputation upon the good intentions of those who have tabled amendments, my concern is that, first, this amendment is based on a difference of opinion on the nature of the judicial commissioner stage. Secondly, there is a danger that we might end up in a position where decisions are being second-guessed in a way with which the judiciary would feel uncomfortable, and where the balance between the actions of the Executive and proper scrutiny by the judiciary is not clearly delineated.
The Solicitor General
I am not going to point to that because, as I have said, it is important to have wide discretion. But equally, as Sir Stanley Burnton said, there will be other approaches and judges will be compelled to take a much closer look or hands-on approach—I think Sir Stanley said “stringent approach”—when looking at the case. But that will depend on the case before the commissioner. For example, a case of extreme importance with potentially draconian impacts deserves a very close look under the microscope. That is important. What I want to get across is that there should be not a sliding scale, but a gradation and wide discretion in the test that allows differing approaches to be taken.
In response to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I would be surprised to see bald decisions on Wednesbury unreasonableness. Bearing in mind that, most of the time, European convention on human rights points will have to be engaged, and, by dint of that, necessity and proportionality will have to come into play anyway. Perhaps the point is too axiomatic to be made, but it is important that we do not get too fixated by a worry that judges will take an old-fashioned clubbish approach to whether the Home Secretary is totally out or order. I do not believe that will be the case, bearing in mind the calibre and experience of the commissioners who have done the work up to now and who I expect will carry on doing it in the unified commission that we will create.
In a nutshell—the point does not improve on repetition—there is a danger that in going down the seductive line of seeking greater clarity, we may end up fettering the reviewer’s discretion, which I do not think is in anyone’s interest and does not support the thrust of what all hon. Members want: an effective lock mechanism that properly involves the judiciary in a way that is unprecedented but welcome in our mature democracy.
Joanna Cherry
I have heard nothing that answers what in my submission is a knockout point about lack of reasons. I am not tooting my own trumpet because it was not my idea. I got the point from my learned devilmaster, Laura Dunlop QC, a distinguished silk at the Scottish Bar and former law commissioner. I asked her to look at this and she said the first thing that occurred to her was how can there be scrutiny under judicial review principles when there is a vacuum of any reasoning. I have not heard any answer to that question in what the Solicitor General has said, with all due respect to him.
On that basis, I remain of the view that amendments 62 and 89 will be essential in due course, but following the course of action we have taken today, I will not insist on them at this stage. I reserve the right to bring them forward at a later stage, about which the Chairman has advised me.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Solicitor General. I have listened carefully to what he has said. There is a difference between us, because I seek to ensure through the amendment that the judicial commissioner is a proper decision maker.
To make the argument that the judges might be fettered is really to misunderstand the amendment that I have tabled. The duty of the judge is to apply the test that Parliament sets out in statute. That is straightforward, and if Parliament is clear about the test, the judge is exercising his or her duties properly in applying the test. There is no question there, but there is this fundamental point between us as to whether it should be review or decision making. I think that is clear enough.
In light of the argument, at this stage I will not push this amendment to a vote, but I will reserve it for a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Joanna Cherry
SNP amendment 102 is very similar to amendment 39, which the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras spoke to, but there are two differences. First, on the areas in which a judicial commissioner must instruct the special advocate, I have deleted
“in the interests of the economic well-being”
in line with an earlier amendment. Secondly, in relation to the appropriate Law Officer who appoints special advocates, I have inserted, for the purposes of subsection (7)(b), the Lord Advocate as opposed to the Advocate General. The reason for that is that subsection (7)(b) deals with
“the consideration of items subject to legal professional privilege”,
which would relate to devolved rather than reserved matters in general terms. In my submission, it would be respectful for the Lord Advocate as well as the Advocate General to be consulted about special advocates.
I am wedded to the notion of special advocates. I do not have a huge amount to add to what the hon. and learned Gentleman said, other than to point out that David Anderson QC, in paragraph 18 of his written evidence to this Committee submitted following his oral evidence, states that he would
“like to confirm my view that the right of the Judicial Commissioners under the dual lock system should be clearly acknowledged”
and
“use standing counsel to act as amicus where appropriate in relation to applications for the approval of warrants”.
The special advocate scheme that I advocate goes a bit further than that. The purpose of the special advocate would be
“to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest”
in the protection of privacy. The amendment would place a judicial commissioner under a duty to appoint a special advocate in a case involving a claim of national security or one that is subject to legal professional privilege. The appointment of the special advocate would ensure that the material produced to support an application is subject to adversarial testing as far as possible. That is the broad thrust of the amendment.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. The hon. and learned Lady was very clear about the different basis of her amendment. My concern is that there are two schools of thought here. There is the amicus curiae school of thought, with which I have a great deal of sympathy. One of the roles of the Law Officers is, when we are approached by various jurisdictions, to consider whether the attorney himself should intervene or whether the court should have an amicus appointed. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to talk about some of the confusion that can exist in regard to inherent jurisdiction. I am going to take that point away and consider it.
I am concerned about a full-blown replication of the important special advocate system that we have to assist, for example, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or of the genesis of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the closed material procedure. There is an important difference between the public interest in having special advocates and this type of scenario. In such cases, there are affected parties—usually respondents to important applications—for whom huge issues are at stake and who need that sort of quality representation within what we accept are exceptional and unusual departures from the principle of open justice. That is why special advocates were created. They perform an invaluable and important role.
I do not see the read-across from that to this scenario. What we have here is an investigatory procedure. It takes place at the early stages—to take a case example—of the investigation of a crime or a threat to national security. There may not be at that stage an identifiable suspect; there is, therefore, a difference and a difficulty in identifying the prejudice that could be caused to the interest of an individual who is a party to the proceedings. It is a different scenario and, tempting though it might be to introduce that type of regime, it would serve only to introduce delay, bureaucracy and extra expense with no tangible benefit to the integrity of the system.
In a nutshell, I will consider carefully the amicus curiae point, but I have wholly to reject a wider approach and the creation of a special advocate system which, frankly, would go beyond even the American jurisdiction, with which comparison is often made—in the foreign intelligence surveillance court in the US they have amici curiae available to assist the court. On that basis, I urge the hon. and learned Member to withdraw the amendment.
Keir Starmer
I have nothing to add. In the light of what the Solicitor General has said I will not press the amendment. I look forward to what he produces and to further discussing that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I have nothing to add either.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss:
New clause 1—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify a warrant in those cases where—
(a) The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct authorised by the warrant is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and relates to—
(i) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(ii) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(b) The Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(2) A warrant certified by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(3) In deciding whether to approve a warrant certified by the Secretary of State under subsection (1), the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State under subsection (1); and
(b) in the opinion of the Judicial Commissioner, approving the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds under section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b) of this section.
(4) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a warrant certified by the Secretary of State under this Section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for that decision.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, refuses to approve a warrant under subsection (3), the Secretary of State, or any special advocate appointed may ask the investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the warrant.”
This new clause is intended to replace existing Clause 21 and provides for the Secretary of State to certify warrants in cases concerning defence or foreign policy before they are considered by a judicial commissioner.
New clause 5—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify an application for a warrant in those cases where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that an application is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and involves—
(a) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(b) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(2) A warrant may be certified by the Secretary of State if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within section 18; and
(b) the Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(3) Any warrant certified by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) In deciding to approve a warrant pursuant to this section, the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1);
(b) the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds subject to section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b); and
(c) the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the person’s decision to approve a warrant under this section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for the refusal.
(6) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, approves or refuses to approve a warrant under this Section, the person, or any Special Advocate appointed, may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the decision to issue the warrant.”
Keir Starmer
I do not wish to speak to new clause 1. It stands or falls with the clause 17 amendments and is to that extent withdrawn along with them.
Joanna Cherry
My new clause 5 is in the same category as new clause 1, the ground of which I think we have covered. The new clauses are slightly different, in that they followed David Anderson’s initial recommendation, but we will obviously revisit the matter at a later stage so I will not take up time unnecessarily to labour the point.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Approval of warrants issued in urgent cases
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 22, page 17, line 29, at end insert—
“(1A) A warrant under this section can only be issued in an emergency situation posing immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to a person.”
This amendment, and others to Clause 22, seek to require urgent warrants can only be issued where it is necessary in an emergency situation posing immediate danger of death or serious physical injury; require that a Judicial Commissioner must immediately be informed that such a warrant has been issued; and reduce the period within which a Judicial Commissioner must decide whether to authorise the warrant to 24 hours after issue.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 40, in clause 22, page 17, line 30, after “must”, insert “immediately”.
Amendment 41, in clause 22, page 17, line 35, leave out from “ending” to the end of line 36 and insert
“24 hours after the warrant was issued.”
Amendment 42, in clause 22, page 17, line 35, leave out from “ending” to the end of line 36 and insert
“48 hours after the warrant was issued.”
Joanna Cherry
Bear with me a moment, Mr Owen, I have my notes in a bit of a schmozzle, as we say in Scotland—[Interruption.] Or as they say in Ireland, to be accurate. In Scotland they would say they were in a fankle. If you give me two minutes, I will sort myself out.
Joanna Cherry
Thank you, Mr Owen, and apologies to Committee members. The purpose of the amendments is to—sorry, I have lost my train of thought completely.
The Solicitor General
I think we were dealing with urgent cases. I hope that is of some assistance.
Joanna Cherry
Yes, I am very grateful to the Solicitor General. I skipped ahead to modifications, so I will skip back to urgent. The purpose of the amendments is to specify that urgent warrants can be issued only when they are necessary, in an emergency situation that poses an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury, and that a judicial commissioner should be informed immediately that an urgent warrant has been issued. They also seek to reduce the period within which a judicial commissioner must decide whether to approve the issue of a warrant to 24 hours after its issue.
There were differing recommendations from the Joint Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee. I think I am correct in saying that the ISC recommended 24 hours and the Joint Committee 48. In terms of case law, recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights suggest that 48 hours would be an absolute minimum, so I would insist on that as a fall-back position.
Victoria Atkins
I sat with my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham and my hon. Friend and neighbour, the Member for Boston and Skegness, on the Joint Committee, where we debated this in great detail. It is right to say that it was not a unanimous decision of the Committee to change the time limit for the urgency provisions. Indeed, I said to the Committee that if that point was ever raised, I would make clear that the decision was not based on any evidence we heard. I will not say that members of the Committee drew the figure out of the air, but—[Interruption.]
Victoria Atkins
Okay, out of the air. The Joint Committee arrived at that figure on the basis of no evidence. That may assist the hon. and learned Lady.
Joanna Cherry
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for being so precise and clear about that. Essentially, the concern about clause 22 is that the scope of the urgent mechanism is extremely broad and ill defined. In my view, it could fatally undermine any safeguard provided by a mechanism for judicial authorisation or indeed judicial review in the double lock.
The Bill provides that an urgent warrant can be issued by the Secretary of State in a case where she considers there is an “urgent need”, which is not defined. We then have the three-day period. As the hon. Lady said, no specific reason has been given for the selection of three days. The Joint Committee took the view that it should be shortened significantly to provide for approval within 24 hours. I think the ISC suggested 48 hours—I apologise if I have got that the wrong way round.
The purpose of the amendments is to remove the urgent provision in the Bill altogether or to restrict it to very limited circumstances, with the urgent authorisation having to take place during a 24-hour period. The concern underlying the amendments is that in their absence, the provisions for urgent warrants in the Bill will drive a coach and horses through even the double lock provision, because they will enable the judicial authorisation part of the procedure to be bypassed in very loosely defined circumstances. That is the case as precisely as I can put it.
Keir Starmer
I will be brief. There is a real concern about the provision for urgent cases being three days. Although we need such a provision, that period allows warrants to be operable before the double lock can apply, and therefore the period should be as short as possible.
The problem is not only that three days is too much but that three days can, I think, be five days, because it is three working days, and therefore there is the potential for three days to morph into more than three. If I am wrong about that, I will happily be corrected. I have put my name to the amendments suggesting 24 and 48-hour periods, to give the Government the option to reduce the threshold to either of those and put it in terms of hours, which removes any possible confusion about the use of the word “days”.
The Solicitor General
This is, of course, an important issue that has already seen a good deal of consideration for the Government and a move away from the original proposal to three working days; the hon. and learned Gentleman is right about that.
Although we are considering the matter carefully, at this stage the right balance is being struck between the interests of the security services and the other agencies in ensuring that crime is detected and prevented at the earliest possibly opportunity, and the interests of preserving the balance between the rights of the individual and the need to deal with crime and threats to national security. I am happy to consider amending the relevant draft codes to deal with the question about the notification to judicial commissioners, so that it is made clear on the face of the code that that should happen as soon as reasonably practicable. That wording is more appropriate than “immediately”, given that it may take a small period of time to draw together the materials that the commissioner will wish to review when considering whether to approve the warrant.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West made a point about decision making in a vacuum. The commissioner will have the decision of the Secretary of State and all the materials upon which that Minister has made the decision, as well as access to further material. I think it is clear that the decision maker will have everything they need and more to come to an informed and reasoned decision based upon the principles of judicial review. On the basis of my undertaking to consider amending the draft code of practice, I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras feels able to withdraw the amendment proposing the word “immediately”.
Let me deal with the central points about the decision and the length of time within which the warrant should be approved. The effect of the amendments would be to reduce that, and I recognise that the Joint Committee that undertook the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill made a similar recommendation. We have therefore responded in an appropriate way by shortening the window within which urgent action can be taken. That has been widely welcomed. It is an important consideration and an example of how, throughout this procedure, the Government have taken note of reports, listened and acted accordingly on those recommendations.
It is not in anybody’s interests to create so tight a statutory framework that decisions end up being rushed. I therefore consider that the three working days now provided for in the Bill should give sufficient time for the judicial commissioner to be presented with and to consider the grounds upon which the Secretary of State decided to issue the urgent warrant. My worry is that by reducing the time period even further, we would give the commissioner even less time, which would lead to the sort of decision making that would perhaps not be in anybody’s interests, let alone those of the state.
Amendment 91 seeks to define urgency on the face of the Bill and to replace the definition currently provided for in the draft statutory codes of practice with a narrower definition. As the Committee will appreciate, we must provide law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies with an operationally workable framework. We will have failed with this Bill if we provide the agencies with the powers that they need, but with ones that cannot keep up with the pace and scale of the threats that we face. I know that it is always a challenge for legislators to try and—to use the modern phrase—“future-proof” legislation, but it is important that we create a framework that is not only clear and simple to understand, but sufficiently flexible to take into account the fact that, from month to month, the nature of the threat changes.
I am afraid that the effect of the amendment would be to curtail that ability because the definition would be too narrow. The draft statutory codes of practice, which we have all been considering, define urgency, which is determined by whether it would be reasonably practicable to seek the judicial commissioner’s approval to issue the warrant in the requisite time. That time period would reflect when the authorisation needs to be in place to meet an operational or investigative need.
The code sets out the three categories with which we are familiar: first, where there is the imminent threat to life or serious harm, and I gave the example of a kidnap case earlier. The second is where there is an valuable intelligence-gathering opportunity, where the opportunity to do so is rare or fleeting—that might involve, for example, a group of terrorists who are just about to make that trip overseas and are making the final preparations to do so. The third is where there is a time-limited significant investigative opportunity—here I speak with years of experience of dealing with drugs cases—such as the imminent arrival of a major consignment of drugs or firearms, when timing is of the essence.
I am afraid that narrowing the definition of urgency so that it only relates to an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to a person would mean significant lost opportunities when it comes to investigation and gathering of intelligence. It would have an impact on the ability to act in a way that would allow interception at a time, for example, that would be apposite to capture a particular drugs seizure.
Another example would be the terrorist cases that I deal with week in, week out—in terms of the function of the Law Officers granting consent to prosecution. If, for example, a group was making final preparations to travel out to Syria to join Daesh, it would cause a problem for the security and intelligence agencies if they were not able to seek urgent authorisation to intercept telephones because there was no immediate danger of death or serious physical injuries.
In my considered opinion, I am afraid that the amendment would allow a significant gap in the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ ability to keep us safe. I do not think that any hon. Member in this House wants that to happen. I know that it not their intention but it is my genuine concern. On that basis, I invite hon. Members to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I have listened carefully to the Solicitor General. The difficulty for him and the Government is this: according to recent case law from Strasbourg, a 48-hour timeframe for authorisation would be the maximum to harmonise the process with that recent case law. The case of Zakharov v. Russia included that a complaint for urgent interception could occur without judicial authorisation for up to 48 hours. There really is no reason why the UK should allow a longer period for approved surveillance than Russia. The difficulty with three working days is that if they fall over a weekend, it can mean five days or, indeed, if it is a bank holiday weekend, six days. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Failure to approve warrant issued in urgent case
Joanna Cherry
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 23, page 18, line 7, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment, and others to Clause 23, would require a Judicial Commissioner to order that material collected under an emergency warrant which he does not subsequently authorise, be destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment
Amendment 44, in clause 23, page 18, line 9, leave out paragraphs (3)(b) and (c) and insert—
“(3A) If the Judicial Commissioner determines that there are exceptional circumstances, the Judicial Commissioner must instead impose conditions as to the use or retention of any of that material.”
Joanna Cherry
I will keep this fairly brief. The amendment would require a judicial commissioner to order that material collated under an urgent warrant that he does not authorise subsequently be destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances. As the Bill stands, should material be obtained under an urgent warrant that is later unapproved by the judicial commissioner, the judicial commissioner may, but is not required to, order destruction of material obtained. Once again, it is my argument that the provision, as it stands, creates a significant loophole that could be used to bypass the legal protections that purport to be provided by the judicial review mechanism.
An urgent warrant allows the relevant agency to access material that it may not be authorised to access in law. Permitting the retention of that material in anything other than exceptional circumstances creates a clear incentive to use the urgent process in inappropriate cases so, in order to ensure that the applying agencies—the agencies that apply for warrants—only use the urgent process where strictly necessary, the Bill needs to ensure that there are no advantages to be gained from seeking an urgent warrant where it is not strictly necessary. The amendment would ensure that where a judicial commissioner does not authorise the use of the warrant retrospectively, the position must be that the material collected is destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances.
The Solicitor General
I am once again grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for setting out her place clearly and with admirable succinctness. There is a problem with the amendment because it very much begs the question of what might constitute exceptional circumstances. The question of who will determine whether the threshold had been met in a given instance is also raised. Introducing that caveat to the Bill would unnecessarily complicate the commissioners’ decision-making process. The commissioners will be extremely well qualified to decide how material should be used when cancelling a warrant. They will take into account all the relevant circumstances on a case-by-case basis, and the clause, as drafted, allows them to do just that without the necessity of introducing subjective terms.
The amendments also suggest that the only two viable options following the failure to approve a warrant issued in an urgent case are to destroy the data or, in undefined exceptional cases, to impose restrictions on their use. That is unnecessarily limiting. There may be occasions when vital intelligence is acquired that could be used to save lives or to prevent serious crime, and where using that intelligence may not involve any further undue incursions into privacy. In that situation a judicial commissioner may wish to allow the intercepting agency to continue with its work without restriction in the interests of the great benefit it might have. Of course, that is a decision for the commissioner to determine, and clause 23, as drafted, allows just that. I am afraid that the amendments would mean that a judicial commissioner could not choose, after carefully considering the facts of the matter at hand, to allow such vital work to continue unrestricted. My worry is that the unintended consequences of such a proposal could seriously inhibit the work of the intercepting agencies.
Finally, the amendments would entirely remove the ability of a commissioner to decide what conditions may be imposed upon material selected for examination. By removing clause 23(3)(c), the remainder of the clause would relate only to material obtained under a warrant. Of course, a targeted examination warrant does not authorise the obtaining of any material, but rather the examination of material obtained under a bulk warrant, which is why clause 23(3)(c), as drafted, includes a specific provision that allows a judicial commissioner to direct how material that has been selected for examination under a rejected urgent warrant should be used.
In effect, the amendments attempt to change a carefully constructed safeguard that gives judicial commissioners absolute control over the actions of the intercepting agencies. I fear that the unintended result of these amendments would be an overall reduction of the judicial commissioners’ powers. For those reasons I invite the hon. and learned Lady to withdraw her amendment.
Joanna Cherry
I have nothing to add, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Members of Parliament etc.
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 104, in clause 24, page 18, line 38, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—
‘(1) This section applies where a warrant issued under this Part would seek to authorise any activity which may involve access to special procedure material.
(2) Special procedure material subject to subsection (1) will include—
(a) communications which are subject to legal professional privilege;
(b) journalistic material which a person holds in confidence; and
(c) communications sent by, or intended for, a member of the relevant legislature.
(3) The warrant subject to subsection (1) may only be granted on application to a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) The Judicial Commissioner must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that—
(a) a criminal offence has been committed;
(b) the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of that offence;
(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the information have been tried without success or were not tried because they were bound to fail;
(d) it is in the public interest that the warrant is granted, having regard to the—
(i) benefit likely to accrue to the investigation and prosecution if the information is accessed,
(ii) importance of the prosecution, and
(iii) importance of maintaining public confidence in the confidentiality of material subject to legal professional privilege, the integrity of journalists’ sources, and/or communications with members of relevant legislature.
(5) Material is subject to legal professional privilege means—
(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client;
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client and any other person with or in contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings;
(c) items enclosed with or referred to in such communications and made in—
(i) connection with the giving of legal advice, or
(ii) connection with the contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings.
(d) communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal professional privilege.
(6) A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—
(a) it is held subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation;
(b) it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.”.
This amendment establishes a consistent approach to the safeguards afforded to parliamentarians, legally privileged material and journalists seeking to protect their sources.
Joanna Cherry
Picking up on what the hon. and learned Gentleman just said, the purpose of amendment 104 is to address a lack of consistency of approach in the Bill regarding the protection afforded to correspondence with Members of Parliament, journalists and lawyers. I stress that the purpose behind the amendment is not to seek a particular privilege for parliamentarians, lawyers or journalists, but to protect the correspondence of members of the public with lawyers, parliamentarians and journalists.
The Bill contains different approaches. Clause 24 affords protections to Members of Parliament subject to targeted interception warrants, but not to journalists seeking to protect their sources. Similarly, although the provisions later in the Bill on access to communications data to target journalistic sources provide for authorisations to be subject to judicial review, access to other comms data that might engage the privilege afforded to Members of Parliament or to legally privileged material is not so protected.
Amendment 104 would provide consistency of approach to all three categories of privileged information, modelling the approach broadly on the provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—an English Act for which I must say I have much admiration. I am still trying to get to grips with it, but I think it is a good piece of legislation. It protects legally privileged material and journalistic material from interference during police searches.
The amendment would also provide a special procedure for access to MPs’ and journalists’ correspondence, which would be dependent on independent judicial authorisation, as opposed to authorisation by politicians. With all due respect to the Home Secretary, I did not find her triple lock on protection for parliamentarians terribly convincing. That is not a point about the present Government—it could apply to any Government of any persuasion—but it seems to me that having the Prime Minister as the triple lock does not give the appearance of political impartiality. Where parliamentarians’ communications are being interfered with, the authorisation should be judge-only.
Last night, I chaired an event with speakers from the Bar Council, the Law Society of England and Wales and the National Union of Journalists. They all consider that the protections in the Bill for journalists, for legal professional privilege and for parliamentarians are not sufficient. My own professional body, the Faculty of Advocates, which is the Scottish equivalent of England’s Bar Council, also considers that the protections in the Bill are not sufficient, as does the Law Society of Scotland.
I will quote what the Law Society of Scotland said in its evidence to the Joint Committee:
“On the 14 December we provided oral evidence to the Joint Committee, alongside the Law Society of England and Wales, expressing our shared and serious concerns in relation to professional legal privilege and the provisions of the Bill. Legal professional privilege”—
referred to in Scotland as the obligation of confidentiality—
“is key to the rule of law and is essential to the administration of justice as it permits information to be exchanged between a lawyer and client without fear of it becoming known to a third party without the clear permission of the client. Many UK statutes give express protection of LPP and it is vigorously protected by the courts. The ‘iniquity exception’ alleviates concerns that LPP may be used to protect communications between a lawyer and client which are being used for a criminal purpose. Such purpose removes the protection from the communications, allowing them to be targeted using existing powers and not breaching LPP.”
I do not wish to be seen to be making any special pleading, either as a lawyer and a politician or on behalf of the journalist profession. It is more about special pleading on behalf of the members of the public who contact journalists, parliamentarians and lawyers, and who wish to do so in confidence for a very good reason.
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for seeking not to get ahead of himself with respect to the arguments on legal professional privilege. I feel a degree of sympathy, because the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West was inevitably going to deal with these matters in the round. Although different considerations apply to each category—parliamentarians, journalists and legal professionals—both hon. and learned Members are absolutely right to lay emphasis not on individuals in those professions but on the client, the source and the constituent. That is why these roles have a special status: it is about the wider public interest. The Government absolutely understand that and we place it at the very heart of our consideration of how warrantry should operate in these areas.
As you will know, Mr Owen, there has already been significant movement by the Government as a result of the various reports that we know all too well. I am delighted that matters of legal professional privilege are now in the primary legislation in great measure. The debate will therefore be about the extent to which safeguards are placed in the primary legislation and about what form they take. I will heed the hon. and learned Gentleman’s exhortation and not stray too far into that area.
I will therefore deal with the amendment to clause 24 and the question of parliamentarians. We heard last year the Prime Minister’s statement about the issue and the important requirement that he or she is to be consulted before the Secretary of State can, with judicial commissioner approval, issue a warrant to acquire communications sent by or intended for a Member of a relevant legislature. The clause applies to all warrants for targeted interception, with the exclusion of warrants authorised by Scottish Ministers, and includes the all-important requirement for the Prime Minister to be consulted before a targeted examination warrant can be issued to authorise the examination of a parliamentarian’s communications collected under a bulk interception warrant.
Part 5 contains similar provisions for equipment interference carried out by the security and intelligence agencies. The important protection in clause 24 will apply to the communications of Members of Parliament, Members of the House of Lords, United Kingdom MEPs and Members of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. It is important to observe that for the first time, what was a doctrine for the best part of 50 years is now codified and enshrined in primary legislation.
It is important to remember in the spirit of the wider public interest that nobody, least of all parliamentarians, is above the law. The Wilson doctrine has perhaps been misunderstood for many years as a blanket exemption for parliamentarians, but that is exactly what it was not. It was actually an explanation that there will be times when the national or the public interest demands that the communications of Members of Parliament be intercepted because there might be criminal purpose behind them. We hope that that will never happen, but sadly human experience teaches us otherwise. It is therefore important to strike a balance between the proper exercise of the privileges of being a Member of this place or of the other Assemblies and Parliaments in the United Kingdom and the principle of equality before the law.
The amendments introduce the concept of special procedure material and try to combine the approach to the safeguards afforded to the three categories that I have discussed. To put it simply, I submit that what is on the face of the Bill and in the accompanying codes of practice already provide those safeguards and indeed go beyond what can be encompassed in primary legislation. At this stage, I will not say anything further, because I want to deal with points that I know hon. Members will raise about the other categories.
Keir Starmer
I have already indicated that I am not putting the amendment to the test. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Joanna Cherry
That is my position as well. I am happy to have addressed the principle at this stage and to look at an amendment at a later stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Items subject to legal privilege
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 25, page 19, line 22, after “items”, insert “presumptively”.