Courts and Tribunals Bill

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I welcome much in this Bill, including the investment in legal aid, the additional sitting days and the funding for our courts. However, I want to focus my remarks on two proposals within it: the restriction of jury trials for either-way offences, and the removal of the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court.

I speak as someone who began their legal career as a prosecutor in the 1990s. The kind of backlogs we see today simply did not exist in those days, even though more cases were heard in the Crown court because magistrates had sentencing powers of only six months. The delays we face today are not caused by jury trials. I remember that as shadow Justice Minister I repeatedly challenged the previous Conservative Government about the consequences of the decisions they were making. Courts were closed, judicial sitting days were cut, court staff were reduced, and legal aid was placed under enormous strain. At the same time, the system had to cope with the demands of modern digital evidence, delays in disclosure, problems with prisoner transport and the disruption caused by covid.

The Government argue that these reforms are necessary to reduce the Crown court backlogs, and often point to the delays faced by victims of sexual and domestic abuse. I take those concerns very seriously—a substantial part of my career as a prosecutor was spent as a designated child and sexual abuse specialist and rape specialist. I worked closely with victims, witnesses and families affected by these traumatic offences. If I believed that the abolition of jury trials would genuinely allow those cases to be heard more quickly, I would support it, but I do not.

There is also the issue of removing the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court. This change will disproportionately affect defendants from poorer backgrounds who may not have legal aid representation. We know that a significant proportion of those appeals succeed, which raises serious concerns about access to justice.

These two proposals will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable in our society, particularly those from socially, economically and educationally deprived backgrounds. My constituency ranks as the 38th most deprived in the country. For many of my constituents, the criminal justice system already feels distant and difficult to navigate. We should be careful not to introduce changes that risk criminalising and disadvantaging them even further.

There are real reforms that could address the delays. The first and foremost is the Labour party’s commitment to having properly funded specialist rape courts. I know that lawyers and judges will be prepared to sit at weekends to tackle those cases. Secondly, we could be more like the civil system, where timelines are set so that cases progress properly. If any of the parties do not act properly, there could be financial sanctions for them. I know we will be opening more courts and courtrooms, but we need to expand the number of judicial sitting days. We also need to review the contracts with Serco and other bodies that produce defendants in court, because a lot of delay is caused by defendants not being produced at court. The prosecution and the police need to be able to present their evidence to the defence as soon as possible, and the defendant needs to be legally represented, so that additional evidence can be considered. As a result, we could have pleas at a much earlier stage. We need to look at those things first, put them in place, and see what happens, before we get rid of or restrict jury trials.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I am about to conclude, so I will not.

I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I want to comment on two points. First, I agree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Chichester on the problem with clause 3 and jury allocation, and I especially agree with her point about the retrospective reallocation of cases, whereby people waiting for trial by jury will suddenly find that their case will be removed from the jury and heard elsewhere. She outlined in comprehensive detail all the issues—not just jurisprudence issues but legal and factual issues. I support what she said so I will not repeat it.

I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about these issues. She highlighted the disparities in the way that different groups of people are treated in our criminal justice system. I applaud my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29. I hope that the Government will consider accepting it although, of course, if we did not abolish jury trial we would not need it.

We are told that the reason for clauses 1 and 3, which restrict access to jury trials in many cases, is to do with the backlog. That is where the Government start their position—the backlog—and I want to concentrate on that aspect. Please bear with me: I will blind the Committee with a few facts and figures because I think that they will make logical sense of why people such as me say that juries are not the reason for the delays. It is important that we get that sense.

There are currently around 88,000 cases awaiting trial in the Crown courts. The queue for the Crown court is now so long that some trials are being fixed for 2030—the Committee has heard that. We have talked about the old adage that, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” That is happening, and the delay is unacceptable, but the answer is honestly not to get rid of one of the fundamental systems that we have had in our country for centuries.

The reason for the delay is not juries but the court structure and how things happen there. One judge sitting in one courtroom for one day is known as a sitting day. The Old Bailey has 18 courts. It therefore has capacity for 18 sitting days per day, 90 sitting days per week and 4,500 sitting days in a 50-week year. For the last 15 years, restrictions have been placed on the number of sitting days in Crown court centres around the country. Resident judges, who are the principal judges at each court centre, have been told that funding will be given only for a limited number of sitting days. Restrictions of between 9% and 25% have been imposed. That is what the previous Government did.

There is always a queue for the Crown court; that is inevitable, as cases cannot be tried immediately. However—and here is the story—up until the start of 2019, that queue was managed without any undue delay. The backlog had come down from around 56,000 cases in 2014 to 33,000 cases by the start of 2019. All those cases were tried by a jury, and within a reasonable time: within six months if the defendant was in custody, and between eight and 12 months if they were on bail. Given that cases were being tried within a reasonable time in 2019, the suggestion that jury trials somehow take longer or are more complicated has no basis.

The length of the cases backlog rose from 33,000 at the start of 2019 to 71,000 by summer 2024, and rose by another 10% to around 80,000 last year. That increase is a direct consequence of the restrictions placed on sitting days. The problem was exacerbated by the closure of some courts. For example, Blackfriars Crown court in central London, which was a custom-made, modern Crown court building with eight courtrooms and the capacity to host 2,000 sitting days in a 50-week year, was closed and sold in 2019. Over the six years since then, 12,000 potential sitting days have been lost.

There are around 4,000 rape cases in the backlog. Trials for rape that have one defendant and one complainant often takes five days—although some trials are quicker and some take longer—so 2,400 of such cases could have been tried in the 12,000 sitting days that were lost following the closure of those eight courtrooms at Blackfriars. The budgetary decision to close one court led to the inability to try what would have been half of all rape cases in the backlog. Similar examples exist all over the country, including where individual courtrooms within a Crown court building sit empty, meaning that the court is open but operating below its potential capacity.

The Crown court estate has a maximum capacity of around 130,000 sitting days. Currently, it is permitted to have 113,000 sitting days, which is partly because the Government have invested some money and allowed an increase to the number of sitting days. The Government have said that that number is a “record high”, but it is high only relative to the low numbers of the previous 15 years. Given the current backlog, I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is high. We need to invest in more sitting days and having more courtrooms open.

[Alex McIntyre]

I too am pleased that the Government have decided to uncap sitting days, but does my hon. Friend recognise that although the physical capacity might be there, there are capacity issues with all the teams around that? Even if we open the courts and uncap sitting days, it will not bring down the backlog in the short term, because we will still need to find more prosecutors, solicitors, barristers, court clerks and, of course, judges. All those need to be in place, which would take longer than just uncapping the funding.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

There are enough solicitors, barristers and judges available. Some of my former colleagues, who are now assistant recorders and recorders, were told that they could do x number of jury trials in a year, then the night before they would be due to sit in a particular Crown court, their session would get cancelled. The only issue here is with the number of court clerks, many of whom were dismissed during the years of Conservative Governments. However, those people do exist, and they can be recruited. It is not that difficult to recruit a few extra court clerks, as courts still have the capacity to do so, and it is better to do that than to throw away the whole jury system as we are doing at the moment.

It is important to note that, in any event, this law will not come into place for two or three years, which is enough time to recruit more people if there is a capacity issue—

[Alex McIntyre]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will, but first let me explain. We have enough time to get those people in, so that we can increase the sitting days and reduce the backlog.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

No, because let’s face it: in the jury trials we are talking about, people are not getting sentences of more than three years. There is hardly going to be a King’s counsel dealing with those cases—it is not even going to be a leading junior who will deal with those cases. A lot of the barristers will be middle ranking; the KCs will not be dealing with these types of cases. There are enough members of the Bar to fill the capacity issue.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That is absolutely correct. Of course, one of the reasons why some people left the criminal Bar is the fact that the legal aid funding was not great, but I assure Members that if they did not have other work to do, they would come back to the Bar. There are enough barristers and solicitors in the legal system for that.

[Alex McIntyre]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

In a moment.

The main reason why the Government have cited is the backlog. What I am trying to say is that it is not the juries that cause the backlog. It is quite clearly the case that, with investment in court structures and court personnel, the courts could be fully up and running, and we could probably get rid of the backlog within the next year or two. The right to a jury trial is not worth sacrificing to get rid of court backlogs.

[Alex McIntyre]

I remember the discussion the shadow Minister spoke about; we discussed MPs swapping political constituencies at the same time. The Institute for Government was very clear that the biggest constraint is the workforce, so is my hon. Friend saying that the Institute for Government has got it wrong?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

The Institute for Government also said that juries do not take up that much time—they save more time. The point is that, without too much difficulty, we could get the courts up and running and working for extra sitting days. Essentially, if we had more court sitting days, we would not have the backlog; it is not the juries that are causing the backlog.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that the 2025 Criminal Bar Association study noted that one in five barristers are considering leaving the criminal Bar, not because of the ineffectiveness of jury trials but because they have to work in crumbling buildings, because there is a significant administrative burden associated with passing on information to the CPS and because of the number of ineffective cases that then do not go ahead? Does she agree that if we tackle the inefficiencies in courts, we are more likely to improve our retention of criminal barristers and encourage some of them to come back into the profession because the system will work better?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.

[Dr Mullan]

We are leaning heavily on the points made by the Criminal Bar Association. The Government seem quite rightly to be extremely concerned about the training of future barristers, but the Criminal Bar Association has made the point that that training often takes place in what the Government are describing as less serious cases. That is where the more junior people get the experience they need to work on the more serious cases. If those cases are not available, how do the Government expect barristers to be trained to the level required to take on the more serious cases with a jury trial?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I agree with the hon. Member.

I want to set out why we have a backlog and what we can do. Everybody has talked about various things that we could do, such as triaging the cases more effectively and more routinely, like Liverpool Crown court and some of the others that have seen a considerable reduction. There are the issues of transporting prisoners on time and internet connections in court. We have discussed a number of things that can lead to a reduction in the backlog.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I thank her for tabling new clause 29. The reason why we need it is that, years ago, the importance of jury trials was recognised by the current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and the fact that the new clause has been tabled shows that we believe they are important. We really should not be restricting jury trials. It is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

[Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is a passionate advocate for fairness and equality, as she has demonstrated throughout this Committee and in her work more broadly. By tabling new clause 29, she offers an approach to ensuring that we can build confidence in the system once the changes have been implemented. We have to recognise that the system is not creating fairness at the moment. We have significant backlogs, which have more than doubled since 2019. Continuing with the system as we find it is simply not an option. Ensuring that trials go ahead in a timely manner will also improve fairness.

On Second Reading, I spoke about my experience as a victim of an either-way offence. The defendant chose a jury trial. The choice to experience a jury was not mine. I did not choose to be cross-examined by the defendant. I did not choose for the case to be postponed twice, and colleagues working in the system, who had to arrange for witnesses and courts to be available not just once but three times, did not choose those postponements either. We heard the testimony from Chief Constable Sacha Hatchett about the process and the impact that delays are having on all parts of the system. She said:

“Our focus has to be on victims and on keeping people safer from harm. That is absolutely where our officers are, but the caseload and the work that is generated by delays in the system do affect our officers.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 68, Q137.]

We have an opportunity to tackle the backlog and to put trust back into the system. I spoke to the CPS in the east midlands just a few weeks ago, and it said that it is currently listing cases for 2028. We cannot just rely on increasing sitting days to solve the backlog. If it were that simple, we would not have an increasing backlog today. We cannot just rely on improving technology. We have to work through a whole package of changes, and that was echoed in Sir Brian Leveson’s report.

I have heard, not only in the Chamber but in this Committee, that jury trials are a cornerstone of the legal system, but we have to be honest with ourselves. That cornerstone is at risk if changes are not made. We need to ensure that changes to the system, including to jury trials, create confidence in that very system. The evidence presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington identified that we need to address the perception of fairness from those of any ethnic background or those who are white British and live in lower-income households. It needs addressing now, even without the changes—we have to reflect on that. The current system has to be addressed, and I would welcome a response from the Minister on how we can work through the detail of the review mechanism suggested by my hon. Friend.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Amendment 61 stands in the name of the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Hussain), who is not a member of the Committee. Does anyone wish to speak to amendment 61? As nobody wishes to move the amendment, we come to amendment 29 in the name of Yasmin Qureshi, with which it will be convenient to debate amendment 46.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

Could I have a little guidance, Ms Butler? Amendment 29 goes hand in hand with amendments 30 to 33. Can I cover those all in one go, instead of repeating the same speech in support of each amendment?

[The Chair]

If the Committee is happy to debate amendments 30 to 33 then we can do that now, but they will be voted on later on, when we come to them in the Bill.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I understand that. It will just save me repeating the same thing again and again in support of each of the amendments, all of which concern clause 4. I thank the Committee for enabling me to deal with them in one go.

I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(d) the length of the trial is agreed by the defence and prosecution to be likely to exceed 5 months.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”

This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.

Amendment 30, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out “no” and insert “a”.

Amendment 31, in clause 4, page 11, line 38, at end insert—

“(k) an offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988;

(n) health and safety offences resulting in a fatality or offences connected to a fatality; and

(o) offences under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 where there has been a fatality.”

Amendment 32, in clause 4, page 11, line 41, at end insert—

“(c) any offence resulting in a person becoming subject to a notification requirement under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

Amendment 33, in clause 4, page 12, line 9, at end insert—

“(e) an offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving under section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988;

(f) an offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2C of the Road Traffic Act 1988;”.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

Amendment 29 would insert into subsection (3) an additional ground for a lengthy or complex case to be tried without a jury in England or Wales, to require agreement by the defence and the prosecution that the trial is likely to exceed five months. Amendment 30 is almost self-explanatory: it would provide a right of appeal against a judge’s decision to prevent a case from going to a jury trial. We seek to give a right of appeal to the defence—and the prosecution—if the judge decides that the case fits the category of a complex case such as a fraud case. Amendments 31 to 33 would add additional offences to the list of offences that will be excluded from the provisions of clause 4. Offences such as homicide, including under road traffic legislation, will be excluded, and amendments 31 to 33 would extend that list.

I want to speak both to clause 4 and to clause 5, which, as I understand it, will enable clause 4. Unlike the provisions in clauses 1 to 3, clauses 4 and 5 at least provide that the defence and the prosecution may make representations before a judge directs a trial without a jury. I acknowledge that that is a meaningful procedural difference, but the principle remains deeply troubling, and I want to explain why. It is a further restriction on the right to trial by jury; more cases could be caught by this provision, which means that people will not be able to have a trial by jury.

The central argument for clauses 4 and 5 is that certain cases—fraud cases, multi-handed cases or those involving extensive financial or digital evidence—are simply too complex or long for a jury to follow. I have to say directly that I find that argument unfair to ordinary members of the public. Trial by jury is not simply a procedural mechanism; it is a fundamental expression of the relationship between the citizen and the state. It says that, when the state seeks to deprive a person of their liberty, that judgment will not be made by the state alone but by 12 of that person’s fellow citizens. That is important, because it is embedded in our legal tradition.

Let me speak from direct experience: in my years of criminal practice, I never once saw a jury that looked confused, overwhelmed or unable to follow the case before them. One of the last cases I conducted at the Bar was a seven-handed trial at the central criminal court. It went on for a number of weeks and involved serious allegations, multiple defendants, CCTV evidence and complex factual issues. Some of the defendants were charged with murder and manslaughter, there were issues such as joinder—agreement by different groups of people about whether they were committing crimes or not—and all sorts of legal directives had to be given. As it happened, the jury followed the evidence, assessed it and reached its verdicts. That has been my experience across many cases, including complex fraud, multi-defendant drug conspiracies and cases involving technical or sensitive evidence.

One of the jobs I had as a prosecutor was as a specialist casework lawyer for London CPS, which meant dealing with some of the most complex cases. When I was in the CPS, I also worked on proceeds of crime cases. In fact, I was what they call a POCA—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—specialist for my branch. We were looking at financial auditing and asset recovery, deciding what kind of charges to go by, dealing with the issues of undercover operations, surveillance evidence, what we call the RIPA—Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 —rules, and cases involving public officials. Across all of that experience, the issue was never whether the jury could follow the evidence; the issue was whether the case was properly presented.

Given the way trials work, what a prosecutor presents to a jury is exactly what they would present to a judge. They explain the evidence, they connect the facts and the dots, and they build a case. The process does not change, but the audience does. If the evidence is presented clearly, a jury can follow it. If it is not, that is a failure of advocacy, not a failure of the jury, and the judge will get as confused as anybody else.

For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove certain things, they will say, “If you look at exhibit 25 on page 1,000 of the jury bundle, you will see that this phone belongs to the defendant,” and create a link. Then they will say that another page shows the evidence extracted from the phone and explain how that is linked. They would do that for a judge as well, because judges want the prosecution to explain things to them, too. They must do that and follow the continuity of the evidence.

At the end of the day, whether the case involves insider dealing or financial accounting, people can see if the information is presented to them properly. The prosecutor might show them a document that says there was x amount of money in one account, but it went missing and has now been found in another person’s account. It is about making sure that all the dots are connected, and they would have to do that with a judge as well. The judge will not just flick through the papers and say, “Ms Prosecutor, you can just sit down and I’ll go through it.” The prosecutor, through their witnesses or their physical evidence or their section 9 statements or section 10 admissions, will have to prove each and every aspect of the case and the role each defendant played in it.

Although a number of people may be charged with one offence, we know that under our criminal law the sentence they can get if convicted varies depending on the role they played in the crime. Issues include who counselled it, procured it, aided and abetted it—who played what role—and people will be sentenced accordingly. Again, that is a matter on which a prosecutor or defence counsel would show everyone evidence and say, “This is what happened.” Therefore, it really makes no difference whether the case is being presented to jurors or a judge.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the hon. Lady agree with His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, who argued that jury trials could actually impose discipline in complex fraud cases, whereas in a judge-only trial there is no incentive to get on and hear all the evidence? He also said that in such cases, juries decide issues of dishonesty and facts that are not necessarily technical, meaning that 12 jurors are in a much better position to reach a decision based on dishonesty.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I could go on and on explaining how evidence is presented, but all I will say from my years of experience—not just in the CPS, but in the independent Bar as well—is that I have gone through thousands of pages of documents, and juries have reacted to that and been able to deal with the cases unfazed. The issue is how well the evidence is presented, and counsel would have the same duty to do that in front of a judge.

In some respects, a jury trial is better when legal issues or the admissibility of evidence have to be determined during a trial. In a jury trial, the judge can send the jury out and listen to everyone’s representations about whether something should be admitted or not, and then make a decision. That is helpful because juries then never know about all the debates that have taken place. Sometimes there is evidence that a party wants to be admitted that is inadmissible or would be prejudicial.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view.

Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say:

“The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.”

Those include

“the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting”

for a long time and

“any other matters the court considers relevant.”

Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us.

The written evidence continues:

“In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.”

Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty.

Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve.

In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost.

By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides.

In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate.

That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request.

When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished.

Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so.

In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail.

To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will not press my amendment to a vote. In fact, Ms Butler, I notify you and the Committee that I am not asking to vote on any of my amendments.

[The Chair]

I will call the Minister, and then you can withdraw your amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

We consider it to be set out in clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision.

I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment.

Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the Minister for her response. My amendments are short and easily identifiable. I think the offences I have suggested should be included within the categories of certain murders and homicides, but as I said earlier, I will not press the amendments to a vote.

[Dr Mullan]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

My understanding of the time saving—we measure it in the context of Crown court sitting days—is that we are looking at around 500 sitting days, which no one is suggesting is a huge number. As I said, the reality of how we expect judges to apply the provision in these cases is that jury trial is the default. The provision in clause 4 is fairly narrowly drawn, so we do not expect that lots of cases will be captured by it, but we expect that lengthier fraud and financial crime cases that come within the provision will result in significant time savings—significant when every little helps, to put it that way. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.

As I have said previously, the principles of natural justice—the way in which the amendment is framed—are preserved in the framework provided by these reforms. We think that makes the introduction of an additional, open-ended safeguard unnecessary.

The right to a fair trial, protected under article 6 of the European convention, is preserved here. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards of clause 4, considering suitability and public interest on a case-by-case basis. It is not a category approach; it is based on the individual nature and facts of the case. Judges will also, in accordance with the established principles of fairness and open justice, have to give reasons for those allocation decisions, which we think will also ensure a level of accountability. We think that judges, in accordance with their judicial oath, will do this transparently, fairly and well. For those reasons, the amendment would not add to a procedural safeguard, and I urge the hon. Member not to press it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”—(Dr Mullan.)

This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 6, page 15, line 28, after “regulations” insert

“made under the affirmative resolution procedure”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 15, line 36, leave out lines 36 and 37.

This amendment provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months.

Amendment 21, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(1B) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This amendment would make changing the general limit on custodial sentence for an eitherway offence in magistrates’ courts changeable by affirmative resolution only.

Amendment 53, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(1B) In paragraph 14A(3), for “negative” substitute “affirmative””

This amendment ensure regulations to extend magistrates’ courts sentencing powers must be approved by both houses of Parliament.

Amendment 71, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(1B) In Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 (powers to amend the Sentencing Code), in paragraph 14A (general limit on magistrates’ court’s power to impose custodial sentence), omit sub-paragraph (3).”

This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 34.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

Amendments 34 and 71 are probing amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed). I will not be asking for them to be put to a vote.

Amendment 34 concerns magistrates’ sentencing powers. The amendment would remove the word “regulations” and insert

“made by the affirmative resolution procedure”

to prevent significant changes from being made to the sentencing powers of magistrates courts without a proper debate and vote in Parliament. If such changes are to be made, Parliament should fully discuss their impacts. Amendment 71 is consequential on amendment 34.

Clause 6 increases magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many people, that represents a restriction on appeals. If sentencing powers are increased while access to appeals is reduced, which is what is being done in clause 7, the risks to fairness in the system are significantly heightened, particularly for those without legal representation, given that the rules for legal aid in the magistrates court are very different from those in the Crown court.

For those reasons, the Bill raises fundamental questions about fairness, trust and the proper functioning of the justice system. The solution to delay is not to remove our historical safeguards, but to fix the system. I ask the Minister to consider whether it is right to give the magistrates court the power to impose sentences of 24 months, which is a considerable period. If that is being contemplated, there should be a proper debate and a vote in Parliament; it should not be put through on the nod.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 13, which was tabled in my name, provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months, which would keep the Bill in line with Leveson’s suggestions. The Government have failed to take into account the impact that increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers will have. Magistrates’ backlogs are increasing, and magistrates courts are not set up to take on more complex cases.

The Government are also making some bold assumptions about the speed at which magistrates can clear these cases. They have their own backlog to face, which stands at 379,000 cases and increasing. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, which comes alongside a major cut to the number of magistrates over the past decade or so, from 28,000 to just over 14,000. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the changes in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Magistrates will be required to deal with more complex cases despite the summary nature of their jurisdiction. Either they will be unable to handle those cases and will send them to the Crown court, or they will risk delivering poor-quality justice, which would let down victims and defendants alike.

The cohort affected by this change consists by definition of defendants expected to receive a prison sentence of between one and two years. The impact assessment shows that the Government assume that each of these trials in the magistrates courts will be completed within just four hours. The impact assessment also assumes that cases involving a guilty plea will take just 30 minutes. Either the impact assessment is incorrect or these cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve.

Our other amendment, amendment 21, would make changing the general limit on custodial sentences for either-way offences in the magistrates court possible by affirmative resolution only. It is very similar to amendment 34, which the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden spoke to on behalf of her hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. The amendment would ensure that any changes to magistrates’ sentencing powers—if amendment 13, to limit their powers, is not passed—is subject to the affirmative procedure. It would give greater parliamentary oversight, as all changes would have to pass through a Delegated Legislation Committee. Leaving that to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor is not a strong enough condition; it does not provide enough scrutiny or protection against rogue actors. The measure was also recommended by the Law Society of England and Wales. It would provide just that protection, and would ensure that Parliament would have and maintain its say in matters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all.

Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone.

There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Jardine. Amendment 34 would ensure that the negative procedure—what I call the back route—cannot be used to allow magistrates courts to take away people’s rights for up to 24 months; it would require a proper debate and a vote in Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I am not sure that is right. I think we have all agreed—even those Opposition Members who were responsible for the justice system and deprived it of the resources that were needed—that more investment is needed, and the Government are making that. I make these points about capacity partly to meet the question that was asked, but also to meet the concern expressed. It is a legitimate concern: by following the thrust of the IRCC recommendations, are we diverting some cases into our magistrates court and creating a risk for that court?

People have pointed to the size of the caseload; we need to distinguish between open caseload and backlog. The magistrates court currently has a caseload, which it needs to operate efficiently, but we obviously do not want that to become a backlog, or to simply divert the problem from one place to another, which is why I talk about resources. I am trying to reassure the Committee and the wider public that by empowering magistrates to assume greater sentencing powers, which means dealing with more serious cases, we are equipping them with the resources they need to do that responsibly.

Extending magistrates courts sentencing powers will retain more cases in the magistrates courts, thereby freeing up valuable Crown court capacity. A sentencing increase of up to 18 months is estimated to save 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year. When magistrates court sentencing powers were raised from six to 12 months in May 2022, a review of the impact confirmed that it helped to reduce the pressure on the Crown court at the time, with fewer cases sent for sentencing and trial. In November 2024, the extension of magistrates court sentencing powers was estimated to free up the equivalent of 2,000 Crown court sitting days a year—so it is proven to work.

By increasing magistrates courts sentencing powers, offences such as common assault, the theft of lower-value items and lower-level fraud could be heard in the magistrates court. This will ensure that Crown court resources are rightly focused on the most serious and complex cases. We have confidence in magistrates to exercise higher sentencing powers accurately and fairly. As others have pointed out, in the youth court magistrates already have the power to impose detention and training orders of up to two years in cases concerning serious violence.

It cheers me that the change was welcomed by the Magistrates’ Association and that magistrates are willing to take on the additional challenge with greater powers, aligning with the youth courts. The Magistrates’ Association has stated that this is

“the most effective and straightforward way for magistrates’ courts to further assist in reducing the Crown Court backlog”.

The introduction of the ability to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months will address the open case law and provide the flexibility to enable a more proportionate allocation of resources. For the reasons I have set out, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to seek to withdraw her amendment.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

As I said, my amendments are probing amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

I gently remind Members to use the third person when speaking to one another, as when they say “you” they are actually referring to me.

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[Siân Berry]

It is very good to see you in the Chair this evening, Ms Jardine; thank you for looking after us. I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken already about the many risks piling up with the Bill, and this amendment is one essential mitigation for some of those risks. If the Government press ahead, they cannot ignore it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I rise to support the comments made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, about the importance of legal aid. There has already been a real reduction in the number of cases in which legal aid is given. Many defendants turn up at the magistrates court without any legal representation because of the constraints on legal aid. Bearing in mind that such defendants could now, if the Bill goes through, be facing up to 24 months imprisonment, it is important that legal aid provision is given to people facing custodial sentences. Means should not be the only element; an important thing to consider is whether somebody has a real chance of going into custody.

We have found historically—this may be anecdotal evidence—that defendants not getting legal representation at an early stage results in more delays. They often plead guilty right at the last stage, when the matter is set for trial. By then, six or eight months have passed, and they might have been able to save some money; or it has got into their head that they have to have this trial, so they try to raise some money. That causes delays. If people are guided, right at the beginning, as to what the evidence and the likely sentence are, they are more likely to plead guilty at an earlier stage.

The previous Government made significant cuts to legal aid. One of the arguments I remember raising then—this was more than 10 years ago, during the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—was that restricting legal aid would mean lots of unrepresented people turning up at court, and that that would delay the system. It is also fundamentally unfair. Someone facing a criminal charge should be able to access legal aid. I ask the Government to think about that, and perhaps extend legal aid and make it more generous.

[Joe Robertson]

This looks like another entirely reasonable amendment, which looks to mitigate some of the harsher provisions in the changes that will allow magistrates to give sentences of up to two years. A moment ago, I talked about the difference between the more rough and ready justice in the magistrates court and the more rigorous, lengthy and developed procedure, practice and ability to operate in the Crown court. When it comes to deciding the income threshold for whether a defendant qualifies for legal aid, surely the most important thing is not the process or procedure as such, but the harshness of the possible sanction that the state is looking to impose on that person.

Rather than looking at the £22,000 income threshold for magistrates courts and £37,500 for Crown courts, we could instead say that, if someone will be sentenced for up to one year, the income threshold is £22,000, and if someone will be sentenced for more than one year, it is £37,500. That is a true statement—that is how it currently stands. We should merely extend that principle, basing the figures on sentencing thresholds rather than on the venue that dishes out that sentence. That would achieve fairness, so that if somebody might be locked up for two years, they have the legal might and can afford the legal advice to defend themselves and articulate a case in a more professional manner. If having a legal professional does not give someone at least the chance of delivering that in a more professional manner, there is plainly little point in the legal profession.

That is the rationale, and the Government do not have to apply a different principle at all if they just see the current threshold as applying to a one-year sentence rather than to venue. This delivers again on other amendments, not only from others on these Benches but from the shadow Minister, and it allows the Government to deliver what they want to deliver. It does not run against the principle of what the Government are trying to do, even though Conservative Members have differences of opinion on that. It merely perfects, improves and cures some of the defects and unintended consequences of the Bill. The entire reason that the Bill Committee sits is to seek to do that, but time and again, the Government would prefer to just vote things down and use their majority rather than taking the time to look at provisions that seem to me objectively reasonable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

Yes, absolutely. I have acknowledged that on a number of occasions, along with what the Government have done on Crown court sitting days and a number of other ways that I recognise the Government have improved things. The point I have made repeatedly is that the Crown court backlog prior to the pandemic was lower than the backlog we inherited from the previous Labour Government. Again, I think the Minister might get a better hearing from us Conservatives if she was fairer in that regard, in terms of her criticisms of our record—if she actually acknowledged the record in its entirety in relation to the backlogs prior to covid.

I mentioned that £34 million because the Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say, “We are doing everything possible,” and then react so vociferously when I point out a clear example of where the Government are not doing everything possible. If they were doing everything possible, that £34 million would be available to practitioners through additional legal aid. So right now, the Government are not doing something that they could do to help increase things such as the availability of legal advice and the number of people choosing to practise in the criminal Bar.

Again, in relation to legal aid, this is a perfectly reasonable amendment. I am pretty confident that the Government will have to announce or concede to this change at some point, and it is purely for party political reasons that the Minister will not concede this point—because it is a Lib Dem amendment. I would eat my hat, if I ever had one, if this Government do not end up conceding this point in the end anyway.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

On a note of clarification, I understand that Opposition Members have mentioned defendants cross-examining victims, but, in fact, the procedures have been changed. For sexual or domestic abuse-type offences, a defendant cannot cross-examine the victim or complainant himself, or herself. Instead, the court will appoint a solicitor or barrister to do the cross-examination for them. I just add that for clarity.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment, because the issue and importance of legal aid is something that I think we both care deeply about. Access to justice is a fundamental principle within our justice system; it is fundamental to the fairness of processing criminal cases through our courts. But if I am vociferous, I think it is entirely justified. We are a Government stretching every sinew to put our legal aid sector back on a sustainable footing.

That, by the way, is not simply a matter of increased fees, although we have done that and are continuing to do so. The inheritance we received—I say this not just as the Courts Minister responsible for the legal aid system—regarding the whole infrastructure of legal aid and the IT systems on which that was built, was wholly inadequate. It is no surprise, then, that the minute there is a cyber-attack, the whole thing keels over.

One of the difficulties with these fees is actually implementing them. We cannot implement them overnight because of the lack of investment, as well as the cutting of fees, that took place over 14 years. What we have done, as one of our first steps, is make significant uplifts to criminal legal aid fees for criminal solicitors, focusing on duty solicitors and prison lawyers—precisely the people we need to deliver this court transformation. That has already been implemented; we have an additional £116 million a year once in steady state. And we have announced the funding that is to come as part of these reforms, with £34 million for criminal legal aid advocates, alongside a commitment to match-fund criminal barrister pupillages to open up the pipeline to people from all backgrounds and to build our workforce.

So that is pragmatism, principle, social mobility and investment. No one could doubt the passion and commitment, as well as the investment, in transforming the infrastructure so badly needed to implement these criminal legal aid fees, and indeed the civil legal aid fees, which, by the way, we are also uplifting. This investment reflects the valuable and tough decisions that we have had to take, and the valuable and tough work undertaken by those who work in the criminal justice system. It will help them to ensure that justice is served.

Turning to the specifics of amendment 22, under the current financial eligibility rules, the Government are confident that the majority of defendants charged with either-way offences are expected to be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates court. For individuals who do not qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates court to provide some support. The hardship review mechanism can provide support to those who fail or who do not meet the means test for legal aid but face higher than usual outgoings or expenses associated with their case. In addition, unrepresented defendants may also receive support via the free duty solicitor scheme, which we are investing in and that can provide representation at a first hearing if required.

In terms of remuneration for legal aid lawyers, legal aid fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates court and Crown court. The magistrates court fee scheme is designed to be simpler to administer and use for providers, reflecting the greater speed and volume of cases going through that court. Providers appreciate the greater simplicity. A non-standard fee route exists for exceptional cases to ensure that work on more complex cases is appropriately remunerated. Fees and financial eligibility conditions at magistrates courts can already provide representation for defendants facing potentially longer sentences if convicted of an either-way offence.

We remain committed to the provision of legal aid and recognise the vital role that it plays in underpinning access to justice. We will keep our approach to the rules that govern financial eligibility across legal aid under review, including by carefully assessing the impact of all the recommendations made by the independent review of the criminal courts and the final formation of the Bill before taking further decisions. In the light of that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Chichester will agree to withdraw her amendment.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

The justice system depends on the belief that mistakes can and will be fixed. By restricting access to appeals and forcing successful cases back into the summary system, we risk creating a parallel system that simply displaces the backlog, while degrading the quality of justice. We must maintain the automatic right to appeal, and provide the flexibility for successful appellants to have their day before a jury. That is the only way to ensure that our system remains fair, transparent and worthy of public trust.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I will speak to amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.

We have had a discussion about this provision. The amendments seek to give a right to renew an application for permission to appeal orally, and to allow grounds for appeal to raise issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as issues of law. Clause 7 currently suggests that a person can only appeal in writing on matters of law, which means that a person is going to have to construct a proper legal argument. The problem with that is that the majority of people in the magistrates court are unrepresented.

It is wrong to say that this is comparable with Crown court cases going to the Court of Appeal, or the higher courts having to deal with the issue of leave to appeal—for example, as in judicial review. Magistrates courts tend to have some very “minor” offences leading to some quite serious repercussions. When I say “minor”, I am talking only in terms of sentencing, because we must remember that offences that we call minor can have a significant impact on a defendant’s life—for example, even drink driving, which does normally not carry a custodial sentence, certainly carries a disqualification.

That is also often a mandatory disqualification so that no discretion is given to the magistrates as to whether they should disqualify somebody. If someone is the sole breadwinner, or has care of a disabled person, and they feel that this conviction was wrong, they will not have the right to appeal—because very rarely will somebody charged with those matters will be getting legal aid.

However, in the Crown court, most people will have legal aid or be using legal advice at some point, because the trial will normally be conducted by solicitors or lawyers. Therefore, they are already being paid and if there is an appeal against either conviction or sentence, they already know what they are talking about and what they need to quote—the legal jurisprudence that they need to refer to, to prove their case—along with the issues with examining the witnesses or the evidence that has been given. They are then able to say, for example, that a particular witnesses’ evidence was not credible or that a witness said contradictory things or different things in their statement to the police compared with during the trial. They can do that because they have conducted the trial and they can forensically examine what happened—not only what legal direction the judge gave, but the factual evidence that came out during the trial. In the magistrates court, most people are not represented, so they cannot argue all those things.

To take away the automatic right to appeal is, therefore, a change to the fundamental basic rights of an individual. Let us remember that the state has all the might and all the resources, and that professionals will be prosecuting—whether they are lay prosecutors, Crown prosecutors or independent lawyers. On the one side, there will be the state represented by legal professionals; on the other, there will be the lone individual coming up by themselves to be subject to trial. If they are then not satisfied with the conviction or the sentence, they must then think how to legally write an appeal. That is putting a lot of pressure on them.

As Members of Parliament, many of us will have met many constituents who are quite reluctant to even write to us. I often say to constituents, “Please can you drop us an email?” and they say, “Well, I don’t know how to use a computer, and I don’t have the internet at home.” We then make a face-to-face appointment so that they can explain themselves. That is not unusual because a lot of people are not able to write very well and would not be in a position to construct a coherent legal argument as to why they should have their appeal in the Crown court.

Sometimes, when we are talking about possible efficiencies and saving money, we forget about individuals. People who come before the criminal justice system tend to be from poorer backgrounds and are often less well educated. Some of them may well be unemployed. A lot of them have other issues going on in their lives. Therefore, the fact that they can appeal to the Crown court automatically in the current system is an immense safeguard for them.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an important point that we have not really discussed on the Committee. It is estimated that half the prison population have a reading age of less than 11; that is to say, they are counted as functionally illiterate. We have seen a decline in prison education. How does she expect all these prison inmates to be able to negotiate or navigate an appeals process?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That is exactly the point I am trying to make. I think we sometimes forget, sitting in our rarefied environment, that a lot of the people out there—our citizens—are not well educated or able to write a proper paragraph or construct an argument. Sometimes they can just about get two or three simple sentences together. As they often do not have legal representation, allowing them to automatically appeal against a sentence or conviction is a really important safeguard for them. The Crown court and Court of Appeal criminal division is not the right comparison, because in most Crown court cases people have full legal representation who will be able to advise on this.

The other thing we found is that apparently 40% of appeals are successful. Think about that: four out of 10 appeals are successful. If people do not have a right to appeal, they have to find a way to make a legal argument on matters of law, which they know very little about. Asking them to do that is basically letting four out of 10 people be convicted or receive a sentence that could have an impact on their lives.

On sentences, when a conviction happens, even if it is in the magistrates court, it fundamentally affects people’s lives. It could mean that they are not able to get a job again or are dismissed from the job they have. If someone’s job involves driving and they are disqualified because of drink driving, that will be an extra burden on them, but it is not just that. Even if someone gets a suspended sentence or community service order for what we call smaller offences, a lot of people are not able to do that. Taking away their right to appeal is, with respect, very harsh.

Legal aid has already been reduced considerably over the years. I have to put the blame for that on the Conservatives, because they massively cut legal aid while in government. They also massively restricted the rights of judicial review. In that respect, I have to hold the Conservatives a bit responsible for what they did in 14 years in power. I am very grateful that the Labour Government have put money into legal aid—that is great—but I ask them to please give that to the magistrates court as well.

I have travelled in different parts of the world where the justice system is perhaps a bit haphazard or where there is not much trust in the state’s justice system, for whatever reason. It does not necessarily have to do with the wealth of a country; there are very wealthy countries where the state is much more authoritarian and the institutions are almost stacked against the individual. The one thing that people really love about the UK, apart from our beautiful country and everything else, is our judicial system. I am not just saying that; it is the most respected system in the world, especially our criminal justice system, because people feel that they have protection at the point that their liberties are being taken away.

Think about a conviction for shoplifting: people say, “Oh, shoplifting,” but even if someone takes a bottle of milk out of a shop, they may get a conviction and there will be hundreds of jobs that they can never apply for. For a lot of people who rely on shop work or other manual jobs where they may come across money, it means that they are never going to get a job. If they get a conviction in the magistrates court for theft, that is devastating for them. The Theft Act refers to the “intention of permanently depriving”. That is quite important, because people make mistakes, but intention has to be proved, because the Theft Act requires it. It is not just taking the thing; it is the intention to permanently deprive. How do we define “permanently deprive”? A layperson would not know how to construct that argument, but a lawyer would.

--- Later in debate ---

Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 8, page 19, line 13, after “charge” insert—

“including any behaviour or communication preceding the charge that is connected to the event itself”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will not press the amendment, which is self-explanatory, to a vote, but I ask the Committee and the Minister to think about it.

[Dr Mullan]

We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand.

Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence. The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past.

To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court.

Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice.

Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests.

I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial?

The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) for tabling amendment 67.

The speech that the hon. Member for Reigate just made was not only helpful and constructive, as is so often the case, but really compelling. At a societal level, we have been on a journey with regard to how we approach rape and serious sexual violence. There is a recognition that for far too long not only has the court been in danger of becoming a site for re-traumatisation, but frankly the response of our entire criminal justice system has been inadequate to meet what is now widely recognised to be an epidemic of violence against women and girls in our society. Unless we send a message at the very pinnacle of the criminal justice system that that is unacceptable and we cannot tolerate it, and get serious about conviction rates, the amount of charging decisions and the number of cases that come to court, we will not deter people from this kind of behaviour. Her speech setting that out, and some of the work that was done before this Parliament to get here, was very valuable.

Let me begin by setting out the rationale for clause 8, and then turn to amendment 67. Far too many victims of rape are dropping out of the justice system because they feel that they are the ones on trial. That needs to stop. Following the Law Commission’s careful consultation, the Bill will stop rape myths and misconceptions entering our court rooms. Clauses 8 to 11 will raise the threshold so that a victim’s past sexual history or previous allegations can be used only when necessary and relevant. The reforms will also prevent the defence from insinuating that victims are lying or motivated only by money just because they claimed compensation or reported a previous offence. We will also allow patterns of domestic abuse, of any type and against any victim, to be shown to the court in cases where they indicate a propensity for further offending.

All those measures sit alongside the Government’s wider efforts to improve the victim experience of the justice system. This Government have already implemented special protections for victims’ counselling records. We have commissioned a new project led by Professor Katrin Hohl to bring Operation Soteria into the courtroom. We are rolling out trauma-informed training for not just judges but all court staff, and we have dedicated £6 million, to be invested over the next two years, to deliver independent legal advice for rape victims. Taken together, these measures are transformative.

Clause 8 reforms the framework that governs when sexual behaviour evidence about a complainant may be introduced in criminal proceedings. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sets out important protections intended to prevent irrelevant or prejudicial material about a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour from being placed before the court. The Law Commission’s consultation found that the current provisions are complex and difficult to navigate, and that they are not being applied consistently across cases. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about monitoring the new framework, but some of this has been driven by the monitoring of the existing framework, and ensuring, by codifying the test, greater consistency of practice.

As a result of that complexity and inconsistency, there are some instances where sexual behaviour evidence about a victim’s previous sexual behaviour is admitted to a court and heard by a jury, despite it having no real bearing on the case. Simplifying the law will help judges to apply a clearer and more coherent test. Clause 8 replaces the existing statutory gateways with a clearer admissibility test. It will continue to be the case that sexual behaviour evidence should not be admitted into the court unless approval is granted by the judge. Judges must consider whether the evidence has substantial probative value. The clause also requires judges to consider a series of statutory factors, including whether the evidence relies on improper inferences, rape myths or misconceptions.

These reforms clarify the law, rather than altering the threshold per se. They reflect principles that are already applied by courts but set them out in a more structured way, which will improve consistency and transparency. We will also extend the new threshold to all offence types, not only sexual offences. This is because issues relating to a victim’s past sexual behaviour may occasionally arise in other trials, and complainants in those cases should benefit from the same safeguards and be treated equally.

The purpose of the clause is not to prevent a defendant from having a fair trial or to exclude evidence that is genuinely relevant; it is to ensure that decisions about admissibility are based on proper evidential reasoning and not on prejudicial assumptions. For that reason, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 67, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington, seeks to exclude from the proposed admissibility threshold any sexual behaviour evidence that took place prior to the charge, but that is connected to the offence. That goes against the purpose of the clause, which as I have said is to ensure that sexual behaviour from a victim’s past is admitted only when it has clear relevance to a significant issue in the case or is important explanatory evidence. That is to prevent evidence that relies solely on perpetuating rape myths and misconceptions from being used against a victim.

The amendment, which as we have heard has support from across the combating violence against women and girls sector, would significantly broaden the amount of sexual behaviour evidence that the defence could bring to court without any consideration from the judge, including evidence that neither has substantial probative value nor is important explanatory evidence.

Sexual behaviour evidence connected to the event itself could, for example, include any previous sexual behaviour between the same two parties, even though we know that the majority of sexual violence occurs within a relationship. That would allow a huge amount of sexual behaviour evidence to be brought into court entirely unscrutinised and unfiltered by the judge. Insinuating that because a victim has previously engaged in sexual behaviour of the same kind or with the same defendant they are somehow more likely to have consented to the events on trial is a well-known misconception.

Whether or not that was the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Easington in tabling the amendment, the effect would be to perpetuate this narrative, and we cannot accept it. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

Compensation claims in proceedings for sexual offences

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 9, page 20, line 12, leave out “substantial probative value” and insert “relevance”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 69, in clause 9, page 20, line 32, at end insert—

“(8) Where a compensation claim has been made, or an attempt to make a claim has been made, disclosure of the details of that claim is relevant notwithstanding that an application for leave has not been made.”

Clause stand part.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. The amendments are fairly self-explanatory: they just ask to insert a few words. I will leave it at that.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to have you guiding us through the second part of the proceedings today, Ms Jardine.

Clause 9 is part of a rolling set of clauses about the admissibility of evidence. Our task is to ensure that, while we protect complainants from being retraumatised by intrusive lines of questioning, we also maintain a legal framework that is clear, workable and consistent with the fundamental right to a fair trial.

Clause 9 specifically addresses the use of evidence regarding compensation claims made by complainants in sexual offence cases. Under current practices, complainants are sometimes discredited or have their credibility attacked simply because they have sought compensation for the harm they say they have suffered. It is entirely fair and reasonable, and a valid part of our law, for someone to pursue a criminal case and also seek financial compensation. But sometimes there is an underlying misconception that the act of seeking compensation, on its own and without any more evidence, means that the original criminal complaint may have been fabricated.

To address that, clause 9 introduces the following measures: a leave requirement, which means that evidence about a compensation claim cannot be introduced without the court’s explicit permission, and an admissibility threshold, under which a court may admit such evidence only if it has “substantial probative value” in relation to a matter of “substantial importance” to the case as a whole. The goal is to ensure that irrelevant or purely prejudicial material is excluded, while still allowing genuinely probative evidence to be heard when the interests of justice require it. The law must guard against unfair insinuations, but the admissibility test must be applied with precision and discipline. While the objective of protecting complainants from unfair discredit is welcome, there are practical and legal implications that require clarification.

As I have said to the Minister, some of my questions will be consistent throughout the clauses. Can she elaborate on how she expects the courts to interpret the terms “substantial probative value” and “substantial importance”, and outline how the Government will seek to ensure that the restriction does not prevent a defendant from exploring the full circumstances of the case?

Is the Minister confident that the current drafting provides judges and practitioners with a clear enough structure to apply the principles consistently across different courts without creating a postcode lottery? In terms of monitoring and evaluation, what work will the Government do to ensure that these new measures have the desired impact?

Clause 9 is straightforward: its premise is that a victim should not be put on trial for seeking the compensation they are entitled to under the law. Excluding irrelevant and prejudicial material can help ensure that the trial remains focused on the actual evidence of the offence. However, we must be diligent in our scrutiny to ensure that the drafting delivers those protections without compromising the procedural rigour that a fair justice system demands.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

As with the previous debate, I will set out the rationale for clause 9 and then turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris).

Clause 9 will create a high admissibility threshold for evidence about a complainant’s compensation claims in sexual offence prosecutions. That could include evidence that a victim has made a compensation claim in relation to the offence being tried, the amount of money awarded as compensation, details of the claim or the fact that compensation was refused. The Law Commission report made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offence cases, and that, in some instances, it is used by the defence to insinuate that a victim has fabricated an allegation for financial gain. That kind of reasoning lacks a legitimate basis and risks unfairly undermining victims.

This measure will ensure that such evidence cannot be admitted when its sole purpose is to introduce or perpetuate misconceptions about why survivors come forward. Instead, a judge will be able to admit compensation claim evidence only when it has substantial probative value to a genuinely important issue in the case. These reforms therefore strengthen protections for claimants while maintaining the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

I will respond to the questions from the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. He fairly raises the issue of how we can assess that these tests are being applied fairly and consistently. That will obviously take time as they bed in, but, in many ways, the precise rationale behind these changes is to codify, clarify and simplify tests that already exist for the treatment of evidence in these cases and to assist our judges to use them fairly. There is no doubt that future Ministers and others with responsibility for this issue will want to know that it is working as intended. No doubt studies can be undertaken in the future. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.

I turn to amendment 68. The Law Commission’s review made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offences cases, as I have said. That is precisely why we have introduced the high admissibility threshold in the Bill. The amendment asks for a threshold of merely “relevance”, which is lower than the statutory threshold we propose. If we were to accept it, it would not give complainants any additional protections above the current status quo, despite the Law Commission identifying a clear issue with how this evidence is currently being requested and used. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 69 focuses on the disclosure of evidence to the defence before an application is made to admit that evidence to the courtroom. However, the clause does not change the test that the prosecution must currently apply when considering whether to disclose details of a complainant’s compensation claim to the defence. Instead, it focuses on the stage after the prosecution and defence have reviewed the evidence, and asks the judge to consider whether the evidence indeed has substantial probative value and can therefore be relied on in court.

As the clause stands, the case will remain that the prosecutor must disclose to the defence any material that might be considered capable of undermining or assisting the case of the accused—that is only fair—and that includes the compensation claim evidence. The defence, in cases involving sexual offences, can then consider how they wish to bring that forward. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment to a vote.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Evidence about previous false complaints relating to sexual offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Sarah Sackman]

Clause 10 sets out that evidence or questioning about a victim’s previous allegation of a sexual offence may be admitted only when there is a proper evidential basis for doing so. It also clarifies that certain facts do not, by themselves, mean that a previous allegation was untrue. Those include: if the victim did not report the offence to the police; where an allegation did not result in a charge or conviction; and where a victim withdraws from proceedings.

The Law Commission’s report, alongside the sector campaign “Bad Experiences, not Bad Character”, identified inconsistencies in how courts currently approach previous allegations in sexual offence trials. There have been instances where previous unproven allegations have been raised to suggest, without evidence, that a victim is unreliable by insinuating that such allegations were false. That risks reinforcing myths and misconceptions, making the trial process a traumatic one for the complainant.

This measure will maintain a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Judges will still be able to admit evidence about a complainant’s previous allegations when there is a proper evidential basis for doing so. The clause simply creates a clearer and more consistent statutory test to ensure that such decisions are based on sound evidence rather than speculation. Victims should feel confident that a previous allegation will not be unfairly used against them in the courtroom. Clause 10 strengthens the integrity of the trial process while supporting complainants and survivors to come forward and engage in the justice system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for the points she raised. In many respects, they are well made, and they consider people’s choice architecture—for want of a better phrase—their understanding of what they might be entitled to request, and whether we should default to providing all the special measures or maintaining, as we say we should, a tailored case-by-case assessment of the needs of the witness or the complainant. It is a tricky one.

We want to make sure that, where there is a proper basis for it, special measures can be provided to those who need them and where the judge agrees that they are needed. The hon. Member is right that in the vast majority of cases, the request for special measures or to give evidence by video link is approved— it is almost always approved—but there might be cases when, for reasons of trial fairness, that is not the case. The tailored approach is one that we regard as proportionate.

This also relates to the points made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about court layout and some of the physical constraints that exist within some of our Crown courts. We do not want a postcode lottery. We want consistency, which is what so much of the Bill is designed to achieve. However, we also have to acknowledge that in some of our Crown court centres, the physical constraints are real. That does not necessarily relate to screens, but it might relate to the entrance and exit. For example, there are limitations on the ideal situation of a complainant being able to avoid having to pass a defendant, which might be undesirable for all sorts of reasons. There are some courtrooms in which that simply is not possible without huge capital investment to change the physical structure.

Hon. Members have raised legitimate points and I understand the thinking behind them. We think that in the circumstances, and given that victims have a wide range of needs, a tailored approach, based on a detailed needs assessment, is the most effective approach, but we will continue to consider the situation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Witness to be accompanied while giving evidence

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 13, page 27, line 37, at end insert—

“(7) Disclosure of the details of any connection between the independent supporter and the complainant is required prior to seeking the court’s agreement of the independent supporter.”

This proposed addition is simple. The clause centres on witnesses being accompanied while giving evidence. Essentially, it states that if somebody wants another person to accompany them, they should be able to do so if the court is satisfied that they meet the various criteria. The amendment proposes a seventh criterion requiring that the independent supporter must not be a connected person—that is, a friend, a member of the family or a relative. That is for an important reason: we know that in offences involving domestic abuse or sexual offences, the victims and witnesses can be traumatised, distressed and vulnerable, in which case they can be suggestible when it comes to comments, ideas or suggestions about something that they might not even have seen. That is why the person accompanying the witness should be independent.

I shall illustrate that argument by explaining what happens to children’s evidence when taken as evidence in chief. Often, a specialist lawyer, police officer or even psychologist is present when children give evidence. Sometimes, photographs, diagrams or pictures are shown to the children so as to elicit the best evidence out of them. Whenever such a trial takes place, the notes that a psychologist or other trained person has taken, and the pictures they may have shown to the child to get the best evidence, are adduced in court. There is always a suggestion that the person carrying out the interview may deliberately or inadvertently have put an idea in the head of the child, who may end up saying something that did not actually happen or emphasise that something was stronger than it was.

This small amendment says that this approach should apply to adults as well. It says that the connected person must not be family, a friend or a relative. Often, the first person a victim will talk to will be a friend or family member. I do not think that that would be very good. At the end of the day, we want to make sure that convictions are safe and that the best evidence comes through.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in connection to clause 13 and amendment 70, which are about how witnesses are supported while navigating the potentially stressful environment of the courtroom. Giving evidence in criminal proceedings is inevitably going to be stressful for many people. For victims of crime, including but not limited to victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse—any crime, really—the presence of an individual to support them in the process can mean the difference between successfully completing their testimony and being overwhelmed by the process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Easington for tabling the amendment and my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for moving it today. While I recognise the concern that the amendment is seeking to address—specifically, the transparency about the relationship between complainants and independent supporters—the Government do not consider it necessary to include an express requirement in the legislation to disclose that relationship at the point of application.

Witness supporters are already an important and well-established feature of court proceedings. The court environment can be daunting for many vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. The presence of a trained professional supporter, such as an independent domestic violence adviser or an independent sexual violence adviser—an IDVA or ISVA—can play an important role in helping them feel more at ease while giving evidence.

Clause 13 places that established practice on a clear statutory footing by recognising the use of a professional supporter as a distinct special measure, alongside a presumption that it may be used by a vulnerable, intimidated witness where the supporter is a professional. In practice, details of the proposed independent supporter, including their relationship to the witness, are disclosed to the court before permission is granted to them to accompany the witness. A professional supporter must have no connection to the case in question, and cannot themselves be a witness. That approach will continue unchanged when the use of a supporter is formalised as a special measure.

As clause 13 makes clear, the court must also be satisfied that a supporter’s presence is not contrary to the interests of justice—an assessment that includes consideration of any potential adverse effects that the supporter may have on the fairness of the proceedings. Against that backdrop, we do not think that the amendment would add any substantive value or additional protection, given that all that information already forms part of a court’s decision-making process as to whether to permit the witness supporter. The term “independent supporter” is defined in the Bill, and the courts retain full discretion as to who can act in that capacity based on the factors that I have alluded to and while maintaining trial fairness. For those reasons, we do not think that the amendment is additive. I urge the hon. Member to seek to withdraw the amendment.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I will deal with the normal courtesies: devices must be on silent and tea and coffee are not allowed. Today is the last sitting of line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Under the programme order agreed by the Committee, I must bring proceedings to a close by 5 pm, if we have not already finished by that point.

New Clause 1

Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 73 (Reduction in sentence for guilty plea), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2ZA) The maximum level of reduction in sentence for a guilty plea that the court can apply is two-fifths.

(2ZB) The reduction set out in subsection (2ZA) may not be limited to a guilty plea at the first stage of proceedings.

(2ZC) A reduction of sentence under subsection (2ZA) is available to the defendant prior to a retrial.’”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir John. New clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), would address cases in which the prosecutions need to start a second or third time. It would reclassify offences and move the threshold of offences that are in the Crown court to summary offences. It would increase the maximum possible sentence reduction on a guilty plea to two fifths, remove the restriction that means the highest reduction is available only for early-stage guilty pleas, allow the defendant to receive that reduction even if they plead guilty later in the process, and extend eligibility so that the reduction can also apply before a retrial.

The new clause would build on the huge successes of the Liverpool model and Operation Expedite—which was praised by Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts—in bringing down court backlogs. Those successes were largely based on a focus on pre-trial negotiation or plea bargains to avoid cases going to a trial and taking up court time.

The new clause is in tune with the Government’s recent announcement following the review carried out by the former Lord Chancellor, David Gauke, which looked at trying to avoid giving people a sentence of less than one year because of the disruptive nature of those sentences. The Government could accept the new clause as part of the process of trying to prevent a backlog. It would also allow people to plead guilty, which would be better for victims, complainants, witnesses and the court system.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I wish to make some brief remarks. I am keen to see suggestions of alternative approaches, but we have to be careful when it comes to discounts for guilty pleas, because there is a balance to be struck from the perspective of victims and complainants. We do not want to be in a situation where they feel that justice is undermined, particularly given the many other things the Government are doing to reduce the punitive element of the justice system.

I am sure the Committee will know that thousands of serious violent sexual offenders will be getting reductions in their prison time. For example, two thirds of those sent to prison every year for rape will have their prison time reduced, and more than 90% of those sentenced for child grooming offences and similar offences will have their prison time reduced to one third. We are already seeing appalling erosions of the punitive element of the justice system by the Labour Government; I would be wary about doing anything that adds to that.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for speaking to the new clause. As she knows, an early guilty plea avoids the need for a trial, shortens the gap between charge and sentence and, crucially, can save victims and witnesses from the concern of having to give evidence.

Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review of the criminal courts found that

“guilty pleas are being entered later and later”

in the process. It found that

“in 2016, approximately 25% of defendants who pleaded guilty to all counts prior to trial did so at or after their third pre-trial hearing”,

compared with 35% in 2024. That reflects the decline in the efficiency and the increase in delays in the criminal courts. Sir Brian made it clear that that was contributing to the backlog and, in turn, creating a “feedback loop” of perverse incentives for defendants. There are, then, clearly benefits to ensuring that those who intend to plead guilty do so at the earliest possible opportunity.

For those reasons, it has long been the practice of the criminal courts to give a reduction in sentence when an offender pleads guilty earlier in the process. The level of sentence reduction that the court can give on a guilty plea is currently set out in sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council. In his review, Sir Brian made a number of recommendations relating to early guilty pleas, including a recommendation to increase the maximum reduction in sentence for a guilty plea from 33% to 40%, which new clause 1 seeks to implement.

However, we must maintain the right balance between the benefits to the system obtained by the making of early guilty pleas and ensuring that offenders are appropriately punished for their crimes. Sir Brian also notes that increasing the maximum sentencing discount for early guilty pleas could increase the

“risk of pressure being brought to bear on defendants to plead guilty, who might not otherwise have done so.”

It is therefore important that we consider whether there are alternative ways to encourage early guilty pleas, as opposed to increasing the level of maximum sentence discount.

We are not convinced that a further discount will work to incentivise the behaviours that we desire in the system, not least because other matters play their part in incentivising an early guilty plea, or the opposite. They include the nature of the offence, whether a defendant is remanded or released on bail, and the level of early engagement by the prosecution and defence in advancing case progression. We consider all those things as alternative factors that drive defendant behaviour. Most importantly, the punishment must be appropriate to the offence in question, and we think the new clause would cut against that.

We are currently carefully reviewing Sir Brian’s remaining recommendations, alongside part 2 of his review, and we will set out our full detailed response to that review in due course. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the clause.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Specialists courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations establish specialist courts for cases relating to sexual offences and domestic abuse.

(2) Any case heard in a court established under subsection (1) must be conducted with a jury and specialist judge.

(3) Additional guidance or directions may be formulated by the judiciary in relation to—

(a) the nature and dynamics of behaviour including—

(i) coercive control, and

(ii) honour-based abuse;

(b) best practice in hearing cases involving violence against women and girls, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.

(4) Regulations under this section must make provision for such courts to have specialist facilities for alleged victims.

(5) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary resources for judicial, administrative and legal support, including advisors, prosecution and defence, to be made available to operate such courts.

(6) Any case heard by a court established under subsection (1) must be subject to such considerations regarding—

(a) time limits for case preparation,

(b) fixed dates for trial, and

(c) third party material review and disclosure,

as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify.

(7) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of hearings and trials for such cases in such specialist courts, including the prioritisation of cases where the defendant is on bail.

(8) Regulations in this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)

This new clause would establish specialist courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases, with those cases heard by a specialist judge and a jury. It makes further provision including for victim support, and to prioritise cases where a defendant is bailed.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 6—Fast-track courts for rape and serious sexual offences—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations make provision for specialist court capacity for cases involving rape and serious sexual offences (‘RASSO’).

(2) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of RASSO cases.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary judicial, administrative and support resources to be made available to operate such court capacity.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that specialist court capacity is made available for the fast-tracking of RASSO cases.

New clause 23—Report on the effect of the Act on prosecution of rape and serious sexual offences—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on proceedings of cases involving rape and serious sexual offences.

(2) The matters the report must consider include—

(a) the effect of the Act on the time taken to dispose of cases;

(b) the effect of the Act on witness participation in proceedings; and

(c) the effect of the Act on experience of victims during proceedings.

(3) The report must make recommendations to improve each of the matters set out in subsection (2).

(4) Recommendations may include—

(a) recommendations about how the Act is implemented, and

(b) recommendations about further provision necessary to improve each matter.

(5) In this section, serious sexual offences are such offences as the Crown Prosecution Service may from time to time specify.

(6) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require a report on the effect of the provisions of the Bill on the progression of RASSO cases, and require the Lord Chancellor to respond to these recommendations.

New clause 25—Courts for rape and sexual offences—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a specialist sexual offences court to be established at each Crown Court location in England and Wales for the purpose set out in subsection (2).

(2) The purpose of any court established under subsection (1) is to ensure that trials relating to sexual offences, sexual abuse, and rape are heard as quickly as possible.

(3) Any court established under subsection (1) must make provision for support from independent sexual violence advisers to be accessible to victims.

(4) Regulations under this section must make specialist trauma training available for staff working in each such court.

(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This amendment would set up the specialist rape courts promised in the Labour Party Manifesto.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 2, which was tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols). On Second Reading, my hon. Friend made one of the most powerful contributions the House has heard in recent memory. She spoke from her own experience as a victim of rape and made a point that deserves to be heard again in this Committee. She said that the experiences of victims are being “weaponised” and used as a rhetorical cover for reforms that do not deliver anything meaningful for those victims.

My hon. Friend also said something that goes to the heart of this debate: we promised specialist rape courts in our manifesto. The Bill does not deliver them. That observation raises a wider question for the Committee, as we consider new clause 2, about the manifesto commitment and what the Bill does instead. The Labour manifesto made a clear commitment to establish specialist courts for rape and sexual offences and for domestic abuse. That commitment existed because we recognised that the system was failing victims, not because of juries but because of how cases were being managed—the delays, lack of court capacity, the way evidence is handled and the limited support available to those giving evidence.

New clause 2 is the legislative delivery of that manifesto commitment. It would not require us to restrict jury trials or accept a reform the benefits of which may, according to the Institute for Government, amount to as little as a 1% to 2% reduction in delays—a reduction the Bar Council considers optimistic. Instead, it would require us to build something that is already proven to work.

What works and what does not work? On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North pointed to the work already under way at Liverpool and Preston Crown courts. That work is reducing waiting times for complainants and defendants—we are talking about months, not years—without removing anyone’s right to be tried by a jury. That is the model, that is what we should be scaling, and that is what the new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to do.

Instead, the Government have brought forward reforms that will not take effect until 2028 or 2029. A victim who reports a rape today will wait through years under the existing system before a single one of the Bill’s provisions affects their case. We are being asked to accept a permanent reduction in defendants’ rights in exchange for a speculative and delayed improvement in victims’ experience. That is not a serious offer.

Let us be clear what the Bill does not do. It will not improve how evidence is handled, how cases are managed or how victims are supported through the process. It will not guarantee timely disclosure, it will not ensure fixed trial dates, it will not provide independent sexual violence advisers where they are needed, it will not reform the conduct of cross-examination, and it will not address wider support or compensation issues. All of those things, which the violence against women and girls sector and Rape Crisis England and Wales have consistently called for, remain untouched.

As my hon. Friend said on Second Reading, we should not claim that the Bill delivers justice for victims unless it actually does. The Bill will not do that. New clause 2 would take a different approach. It would preserve jury involvement in every case while introducing a specialist court designed to deal properly with sexual offences and domestic abuse. Each case would be heard by a jury and a specialist judge with training in coercive control, trauma responses, honour-based abuse and best practice in cases involving violence against women and girls. That combination matters. A specialist judge improves the management of proceedings. A jury brings the collective judgment and diversity of the public.

As the Lammy review found, juries are far more diverse than the judiciary, and there is no evidence that jury verdicts are affected by the ethnicity of the defendant. By contrast, the removal of juries risks undermining confidence, particularly among victims from minority backgrounds or people from poorer working-class backgrounds.

To address the real causes of delay, we ask that strict time limits for case preparation are set. We ask for fixed and reliable trial dates; the proper management of disclosure and third-party material; the prioritised listing of cases, including those of defendants who are on bail; specialist facilities for victims; and the adequate resourcing of judicial, administrative and legal support, including independent sexual violence advisers. These practical reforms would make a material difference to how cases are handled and to the experience of the victim, and they can be done quite quickly.

The Government have relied heavily on the experience of victims to justify the reforms, so they should support new clause 2, which would deliver on our manifesto commitment. It is based on a model that already works well. It would improve things for victims without removing fundamental safeguards and does not ask victims to wait until the end of the decade to see any benefit.

The Government have identified a real problem but, with respect, have chosen the wrong solution. If the Bill was truly about delivering justice for victims of rape and sexual violence, we would not be debating the restriction of jury trial; we would be implementing the specialist courts we promised. The Bill does not do that. I ask the Government to consider the new clause; otherwise, it will be a missed opportunity. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. We are all here because we recognise that the current state of our criminal courts is untenable. Complainants and defendants alike are facing unacceptable delays, and victims and innocent defendants are suffering as a result. The Government’s response, as set out in the Bill, is a radical restructuring of our trial processes, most notably in the removal of the right to a jury in a vast number of cases—around half, in fact. We believe there is a strong obligation on the Government to institute a more targeted, and potentially more effective, way to address the specific delays that they most frequently cite, through the establishment of specialist courts for rape and serious sexual offences.

The Minister herself raised this issue in the Chamber on 7 January. When talking about jury trial reforms, she said:

“Does it make sense that the queue of the victim of rape or of a homicide is shared with someone who has stolen a bottle of whisky”?—[Official Report, 7 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 278.]

In December, the Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor said:

“if someone is charged with an offence such as theft of a bicycle, theft from a vehicle or employee theft, they can opt for a trial that, by necessity, goes into the system and will delay a rape trial”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2025; Vol. 776, c. 807.]

That point has been made by a number of Labour MPs, including the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). The Opposition have been clear that that is an oversimplification of how the listing process works, and that some of those examples are extremely unlikely to be in the queue in the Crown court, except for in specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the Government have been advancing that case.

A commitment to introduce specialist courts was actually in the Government’s manifesto. By fulfilling the promises made to the electorate, the Government can deliver swifter justice for a group of victims they have centred in the debate, without dismantling the constitutional right to elect for jury trial. The Government’s proposals to halve the number of jury trials was not in the Labour party manifesto, but on page 67 there was a commitment to

“fast-track rape cases, with specialist courts at every Crown Court location in England and Wales.”

It could therefore be argued that—as much as we can debate what in an entire manifesto the public vote for—the public voted for a system that would prioritise these types of cases through specialisation and resourcing, and did not vote for a system that would instead prioritise administrative throughput by removing the right to elect to be judged by one’s peers.

Sometimes, Governments do things that were not in their manifesto one way or another, or were not touched on in any way, but it would be difficult for people to argue that the public had a specific idea that they were not going to get certain things. However, if a Government put in their manifesto a particular element of direct relevance, as they did in relation to specialist courts, the public would have every right to be aggrieved if something entirely different, and significantly so, appeared as Government policy instead of what was in the manifesto.

Opposition new clause 25 asks the Government to return to their original vision. It is similar to the other new clauses tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, and by the hon. Member for Warrington North. They are crafted in different ways—for example, new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Warrington North, is more prescriptive about how the courts would operate—but the intention and outcome are essentially the same. Specialist courts equipped with trauma-informed training and access to independent sexual violence advisers would recognise the unique complexity of these cases in a way that a simple bench division cannot.

As I have said, the Government frequently refer to the experience of rape victims waiting years for justice as a significant justification for restricting jury trials. They argue that moving towards judge-led trials in 50% of cases will streamline the process and reduce the backlog, but the evidence for the broader claims of efficiency is highly contested.

Independent analysis by the Institute for Government suggests that judge-only trials in the Crown court might save as little as 1.5% to 2.5%—[Interruption.] The Minister is right to say, and I do not mind accepting, that the saving is higher for the broader package—that has never been a point of dispute—but we are less concerned about the broader package, and there are things in it that we agree with. We are concerned about the much smaller saving that the IFG has pointed out. The Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s modelling assumes that the trials will be completed twice as fast as is realistic. We must ask whether the trade-off is proportionate, especially when there is another option.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Fair enough. I therefore turn to Yasmin Qureshi—you can speak now if you wish to.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will withdraw new clause 2, because I know that the Minister is addressing the issue and I accept her commitment. She is an honourable lady and I accept her word, and I look forward to the specialist courts being implemented very soon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

[Hon. Members]

No.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).

(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—

(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;

(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;

(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and

(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.

(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.

New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.

(2) There must be a target for the—

(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and

(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.

(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.

New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.

(2) A report under this section must—

(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—

(i) witness participation;

(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;

(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;

(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).

(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.

New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—

(a) the provisions of this Act;

(b) The wider criminal justice system;

(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;

(d) the condition of the courts estate; and

(e) the use of technology.

(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—

(a) delays,

(b) backlogs, and

(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.

(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.

New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.

(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.

(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.

New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,

are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.

(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—

(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;

(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and

(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.

(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.

Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.

Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.

(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.

Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.

(3B) The conditions are that—

(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,

(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and

(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”

This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.

Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—

(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and

(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.

(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—

(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and

(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. New clauses 32 and 33 can be considered almost part and parcel of each other. Our earlier discussion of new clause 29 involved a similar issue, but these new clauses are much more specific.

New clause 32 would introduce a duty to commission an independent review of racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the magistrates court, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in clauses 1 to 7. The Government’s equality impact assessment of the proposal to restrict access to jury trial refers many times to the lack of evidence that the proposals in the Bill have a racist or discriminatory outcome, but the impact assessment does not refer once the Secretary of State’s own 2017 review, which showed reduced racial disparities in jury trial outcomes. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

The new clause would mandate a full review of racial disproportionality before the changes are made. At a time when trust in the justice system among the black, Asian and minority ethnic community is already low, why rush through these changes before we have the full picture?

New clause 33 would introduce a duty to conduct an independent review of whether clauses 1 to 7 give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of person. It is welcome that, in December last year, the Government announced a £92 million investment in criminal legal aid, after years of neglect. However, it will take a while for that investment to have an impact on the disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system for working-class defendants, young males and, in particular, vulnerable people.

Juries are hailed as the fairest component of the legal system, and are widely accepted as more likely to provide an equitable outcome than the judiciary, who are still overwhelmingly privately educated and from particular backgrounds. One of the big issues—this applies to new clause 32 as well as to new clause 33—is that joint enterprise is often used as a dragnet for marginalised and vulnerable communities, impacting not just black people but neurodivergent and working-class communities.

For those who may not be fully aware, a 2016 Supreme Court decision recognised that joint enterprise had been used wrongly for the past three decades. Despite that, little has changed. Very few appeals have been accepted, and there is significant evidence of the continued misuse of joint enterprise. This fills prisons with people of no risk to the public, who are labelled as murderers when they have not killed anyone—an expensive travesty of justice. They are often sent to jail or given longer sentences than they should have received on the basis of assisting or encouraging a crime. They are found guilty by association.

In our criminal justice system, joint enterprise essentially means that if someone has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence, they can be found guilty of an offence committed by someone else. However, the role they have played may vary, and the sentencing powers often reflect that. In reality, a lot of bystanders or people watching, or people who may have known one of the parties but did not take part in the crime, will also end up getting convicted. There has been an attempt to rectify that with a private Member’s Bill, but so far nothing has happened.

Some miscarriages of justice have been challenged, and some cases have received further examination. Dr Nisha Waller of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies states that

“joint enterprise laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, overpunishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent”

or even

“a defendant’s physical contribution”.

Dr Waller’s research shows that the current law is flawed and that it

“encourages…the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence…highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over…evidentiary foundations…the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent.”

She says it allows for a lot of young people to be stereotyped and criminalised, and recommends that

“the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework.”

One reason why it is important to address this issue, in conjunction with new clauses 32 and 33, is that the very people who would be affected by the new clauses are the people who are affected by the law on joint enterprise. I pay tribute to Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, which has been doing tremendous work in this area for many years.

The most recent research by Appeal, which has been monitoring joint enterprise in court cases, concluded:

“There is a clear departure from what the law of complicity should be”

and that:

“Secondary liability is often diluted to little more than association, suspicion, and story.”

It says:

“Prosecution narrative strategy has replaced evidential clarity…meaning joint enterprise trials are often not a truth-seeking process.”

It concludes that the way joint enterprise laws are currently used is

“producing injustice at scale”

and that:

“Public money is being used to stage justice, rather than deliver it.”

Research by Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams at Manchester Metropolitan University shows that nearly £250 million is spent on prosecuting defendants in joint enterprise cases every year. The total future punishment of the 1,088 people convicted under joint enterprise cases each year costs the taxpayer £1.2 billion.

Finally, the report “In Their Own Words”, which is based on a series of family listening days organised by JENGbA, detailed the devastating impact of joint enterprise convictions on families and friends—

[The Chair]

Order. The Clerk advises me that you are going a little out of scope.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I take your ruling and guidance, Dr Huq. I was trying to explain it because the disparities are important and the issue does affect people. I ask the Government to think about new clauses 32 and 33, because they will hopefully have an impact on joint enterprise. I will not press them to a vote.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes.

New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target.

In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility.

In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly.

Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote.

New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform.

A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier.

We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause is, in some respects, fairly self-explanatory, in that it provides that cases should not go to the Crown court without being trial-ready. In essence, it is a safeguard —we could call it an oversight amendment—that is linked to the jury trial reforms in the Bill.

The rationale behind the new clause is to reflect concern that the Government are making significant changes by removing or restricting jury trials without strong evidence of impact. It aims to introduce caution, likely through a review, limits or accountability mechanisms. In that respect it is similar to the approach in new clause 27, about piloting, but it is more about ongoing scrutiny than delaying implementation.

We are trying to say to the Government: “If you are going to do this, please prove that it works and build in the safeguards.” That aligns with the position of the Bar Council and others in the light of the argument regarding jury trials. It fits with the fact that the Government are trying to make structural change, but we say that, before they do that structural change, they should look at all these things before cases are sent up to the Crown court. I will not be pressing the new clause to a vote.

[Sarah Sackman]

Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible.

All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court.

There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences.

In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the Minister for her response. I have made my points—throughout the Committee’s proceedings, I have been making points about the issue of jury trials—and I will not add anything further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Remote Court Participation: Strategy

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time