Courts and Tribunals Bill

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I welcome much in this Bill, including the investment in legal aid, the additional sitting days and the funding for our courts. However, I want to focus my remarks on two proposals within it: the restriction of jury trials for either-way offences, and the removal of the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court.

I speak as someone who began their legal career as a prosecutor in the 1990s. The kind of backlogs we see today simply did not exist in those days, even though more cases were heard in the Crown court because magistrates had sentencing powers of only six months. The delays we face today are not caused by jury trials. I remember that as shadow Justice Minister I repeatedly challenged the previous Conservative Government about the consequences of the decisions they were making. Courts were closed, judicial sitting days were cut, court staff were reduced, and legal aid was placed under enormous strain. At the same time, the system had to cope with the demands of modern digital evidence, delays in disclosure, problems with prisoner transport and the disruption caused by covid.

The Government argue that these reforms are necessary to reduce the Crown court backlogs, and often point to the delays faced by victims of sexual and domestic abuse. I take those concerns very seriously—a substantial part of my career as a prosecutor was spent as a designated child and sexual abuse specialist and rape specialist. I worked closely with victims, witnesses and families affected by these traumatic offences. If I believed that the abolition of jury trials would genuinely allow those cases to be heard more quickly, I would support it, but I do not.

There is also the issue of removing the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court. This change will disproportionately affect defendants from poorer backgrounds who may not have legal aid representation. We know that a significant proportion of those appeals succeed, which raises serious concerns about access to justice.

These two proposals will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable in our society, particularly those from socially, economically and educationally deprived backgrounds. My constituency ranks as the 38th most deprived in the country. For many of my constituents, the criminal justice system already feels distant and difficult to navigate. We should be careful not to introduce changes that risk criminalising and disadvantaging them even further.

There are real reforms that could address the delays. The first and foremost is the Labour party’s commitment to having properly funded specialist rape courts. I know that lawyers and judges will be prepared to sit at weekends to tackle those cases. Secondly, we could be more like the civil system, where timelines are set so that cases progress properly. If any of the parties do not act properly, there could be financial sanctions for them. I know we will be opening more courts and courtrooms, but we need to expand the number of judicial sitting days. We also need to review the contracts with Serco and other bodies that produce defendants in court, because a lot of delay is caused by defendants not being produced at court. The prosecution and the police need to be able to present their evidence to the defence as soon as possible, and the defendant needs to be legally represented, so that additional evidence can be considered. As a result, we could have pleas at a much earlier stage. We need to look at those things first, put them in place, and see what happens, before we get rid of or restrict jury trials.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I am about to conclude, so I will not.

I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I want to comment on two points. First, I agree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Chichester on the problem with clause 3 and jury allocation, and I especially agree with her point about the retrospective reallocation of cases, whereby people waiting for trial by jury will suddenly find that their case will be removed from the jury and heard elsewhere. She outlined in comprehensive detail all the issues—not just jurisprudence issues but legal and factual issues. I support what she said so I will not repeat it.

I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about these issues. She highlighted the disparities in the way that different groups of people are treated in our criminal justice system. I applaud my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29. I hope that the Government will consider accepting it although, of course, if we did not abolish jury trial we would not need it.

We are told that the reason for clauses 1 and 3, which restrict access to jury trials in many cases, is to do with the backlog. That is where the Government start their position—the backlog—and I want to concentrate on that aspect. Please bear with me: I will blind the Committee with a few facts and figures because I think that they will make logical sense of why people such as me say that juries are not the reason for the delays. It is important that we get that sense.

There are currently around 88,000 cases awaiting trial in the Crown courts. The queue for the Crown court is now so long that some trials are being fixed for 2030—the Committee has heard that. We have talked about the old adage that, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” That is happening, and the delay is unacceptable, but the answer is honestly not to get rid of one of the fundamental systems that we have had in our country for centuries.

The reason for the delay is not juries but the court structure and how things happen there. One judge sitting in one courtroom for one day is known as a sitting day. The Old Bailey has 18 courts. It therefore has capacity for 18 sitting days per day, 90 sitting days per week and 4,500 sitting days in a 50-week year. For the last 15 years, restrictions have been placed on the number of sitting days in Crown court centres around the country. Resident judges, who are the principal judges at each court centre, have been told that funding will be given only for a limited number of sitting days. Restrictions of between 9% and 25% have been imposed. That is what the previous Government did.

There is always a queue for the Crown court; that is inevitable, as cases cannot be tried immediately. However—and here is the story—up until the start of 2019, that queue was managed without any undue delay. The backlog had come down from around 56,000 cases in 2014 to 33,000 cases by the start of 2019. All those cases were tried by a jury, and within a reasonable time: within six months if the defendant was in custody, and between eight and 12 months if they were on bail. Given that cases were being tried within a reasonable time in 2019, the suggestion that jury trials somehow take longer or are more complicated has no basis.

The length of the cases backlog rose from 33,000 at the start of 2019 to 71,000 by summer 2024, and rose by another 10% to around 80,000 last year. That increase is a direct consequence of the restrictions placed on sitting days. The problem was exacerbated by the closure of some courts. For example, Blackfriars Crown court in central London, which was a custom-made, modern Crown court building with eight courtrooms and the capacity to host 2,000 sitting days in a 50-week year, was closed and sold in 2019. Over the six years since then, 12,000 potential sitting days have been lost.

There are around 4,000 rape cases in the backlog. Trials for rape that have one defendant and one complainant often takes five days—although some trials are quicker and some take longer—so 2,400 of such cases could have been tried in the 12,000 sitting days that were lost following the closure of those eight courtrooms at Blackfriars. The budgetary decision to close one court led to the inability to try what would have been half of all rape cases in the backlog. Similar examples exist all over the country, including where individual courtrooms within a Crown court building sit empty, meaning that the court is open but operating below its potential capacity.

The Crown court estate has a maximum capacity of around 130,000 sitting days. Currently, it is permitted to have 113,000 sitting days, which is partly because the Government have invested some money and allowed an increase to the number of sitting days. The Government have said that that number is a “record high”, but it is high only relative to the low numbers of the previous 15 years. Given the current backlog, I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is high. We need to invest in more sitting days and having more courtrooms open.

[Alex McIntyre]

I too am pleased that the Government have decided to uncap sitting days, but does my hon. Friend recognise that although the physical capacity might be there, there are capacity issues with all the teams around that? Even if we open the courts and uncap sitting days, it will not bring down the backlog in the short term, because we will still need to find more prosecutors, solicitors, barristers, court clerks and, of course, judges. All those need to be in place, which would take longer than just uncapping the funding.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

There are enough solicitors, barristers and judges available. Some of my former colleagues, who are now assistant recorders and recorders, were told that they could do x number of jury trials in a year, then the night before they would be due to sit in a particular Crown court, their session would get cancelled. The only issue here is with the number of court clerks, many of whom were dismissed during the years of Conservative Governments. However, those people do exist, and they can be recruited. It is not that difficult to recruit a few extra court clerks, as courts still have the capacity to do so, and it is better to do that than to throw away the whole jury system as we are doing at the moment.

It is important to note that, in any event, this law will not come into place for two or three years, which is enough time to recruit more people if there is a capacity issue—

[Alex McIntyre]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will, but first let me explain. We have enough time to get those people in, so that we can increase the sitting days and reduce the backlog.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

No, because let’s face it: in the jury trials we are talking about, people are not getting sentences of more than three years. There is hardly going to be a King’s counsel dealing with those cases—it is not even going to be a leading junior who will deal with those cases. A lot of the barristers will be middle ranking; the KCs will not be dealing with these types of cases. There are enough members of the Bar to fill the capacity issue.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That is absolutely correct. Of course, one of the reasons why some people left the criminal Bar is the fact that the legal aid funding was not great, but I assure Members that if they did not have other work to do, they would come back to the Bar. There are enough barristers and solicitors in the legal system for that.

[Alex McIntyre]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

In a moment.

The main reason why the Government have cited is the backlog. What I am trying to say is that it is not the juries that cause the backlog. It is quite clearly the case that, with investment in court structures and court personnel, the courts could be fully up and running, and we could probably get rid of the backlog within the next year or two. The right to a jury trial is not worth sacrificing to get rid of court backlogs.

[Alex McIntyre]

I remember the discussion the shadow Minister spoke about; we discussed MPs swapping political constituencies at the same time. The Institute for Government was very clear that the biggest constraint is the workforce, so is my hon. Friend saying that the Institute for Government has got it wrong?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

The Institute for Government also said that juries do not take up that much time—they save more time. The point is that, without too much difficulty, we could get the courts up and running and working for extra sitting days. Essentially, if we had more court sitting days, we would not have the backlog; it is not the juries that are causing the backlog.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that the 2025 Criminal Bar Association study noted that one in five barristers are considering leaving the criminal Bar, not because of the ineffectiveness of jury trials but because they have to work in crumbling buildings, because there is a significant administrative burden associated with passing on information to the CPS and because of the number of ineffective cases that then do not go ahead? Does she agree that if we tackle the inefficiencies in courts, we are more likely to improve our retention of criminal barristers and encourage some of them to come back into the profession because the system will work better?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.

[Dr Mullan]

We are leaning heavily on the points made by the Criminal Bar Association. The Government seem quite rightly to be extremely concerned about the training of future barristers, but the Criminal Bar Association has made the point that that training often takes place in what the Government are describing as less serious cases. That is where the more junior people get the experience they need to work on the more serious cases. If those cases are not available, how do the Government expect barristers to be trained to the level required to take on the more serious cases with a jury trial?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I agree with the hon. Member.

I want to set out why we have a backlog and what we can do. Everybody has talked about various things that we could do, such as triaging the cases more effectively and more routinely, like Liverpool Crown court and some of the others that have seen a considerable reduction. There are the issues of transporting prisoners on time and internet connections in court. We have discussed a number of things that can lead to a reduction in the backlog.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I thank her for tabling new clause 29. The reason why we need it is that, years ago, the importance of jury trials was recognised by the current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and the fact that the new clause has been tabled shows that we believe they are important. We really should not be restricting jury trials. It is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

[Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is a passionate advocate for fairness and equality, as she has demonstrated throughout this Committee and in her work more broadly. By tabling new clause 29, she offers an approach to ensuring that we can build confidence in the system once the changes have been implemented. We have to recognise that the system is not creating fairness at the moment. We have significant backlogs, which have more than doubled since 2019. Continuing with the system as we find it is simply not an option. Ensuring that trials go ahead in a timely manner will also improve fairness.

On Second Reading, I spoke about my experience as a victim of an either-way offence. The defendant chose a jury trial. The choice to experience a jury was not mine. I did not choose to be cross-examined by the defendant. I did not choose for the case to be postponed twice, and colleagues working in the system, who had to arrange for witnesses and courts to be available not just once but three times, did not choose those postponements either. We heard the testimony from Chief Constable Sacha Hatchett about the process and the impact that delays are having on all parts of the system. She said:

“Our focus has to be on victims and on keeping people safer from harm. That is absolutely where our officers are, but the caseload and the work that is generated by delays in the system do affect our officers.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 68, Q137.]

We have an opportunity to tackle the backlog and to put trust back into the system. I spoke to the CPS in the east midlands just a few weeks ago, and it said that it is currently listing cases for 2028. We cannot just rely on increasing sitting days to solve the backlog. If it were that simple, we would not have an increasing backlog today. We cannot just rely on improving technology. We have to work through a whole package of changes, and that was echoed in Sir Brian Leveson’s report.

I have heard, not only in the Chamber but in this Committee, that jury trials are a cornerstone of the legal system, but we have to be honest with ourselves. That cornerstone is at risk if changes are not made. We need to ensure that changes to the system, including to jury trials, create confidence in that very system. The evidence presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington identified that we need to address the perception of fairness from those of any ethnic background or those who are white British and live in lower-income households. It needs addressing now, even without the changes—we have to reflect on that. The current system has to be addressed, and I would welcome a response from the Minister on how we can work through the detail of the review mechanism suggested by my hon. Friend.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

The justice system depends on the belief that mistakes can and will be fixed. By restricting access to appeals and forcing successful cases back into the summary system, we risk creating a parallel system that simply displaces the backlog, while degrading the quality of justice. We must maintain the automatic right to appeal, and provide the flexibility for successful appellants to have their day before a jury. That is the only way to ensure that our system remains fair, transparent and worthy of public trust.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I will speak to amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.

We have had a discussion about this provision. The amendments seek to give a right to renew an application for permission to appeal orally, and to allow grounds for appeal to raise issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as issues of law. Clause 7 currently suggests that a person can only appeal in writing on matters of law, which means that a person is going to have to construct a proper legal argument. The problem with that is that the majority of people in the magistrates court are unrepresented.

It is wrong to say that this is comparable with Crown court cases going to the Court of Appeal, or the higher courts having to deal with the issue of leave to appeal—for example, as in judicial review. Magistrates courts tend to have some very “minor” offences leading to some quite serious repercussions. When I say “minor”, I am talking only in terms of sentencing, because we must remember that offences that we call minor can have a significant impact on a defendant’s life—for example, even drink driving, which does normally not carry a custodial sentence, certainly carries a disqualification.

That is also often a mandatory disqualification so that no discretion is given to the magistrates as to whether they should disqualify somebody. If someone is the sole breadwinner, or has care of a disabled person, and they feel that this conviction was wrong, they will not have the right to appeal—because very rarely will somebody charged with those matters will be getting legal aid.

However, in the Crown court, most people will have legal aid or be using legal advice at some point, because the trial will normally be conducted by solicitors or lawyers. Therefore, they are already being paid and if there is an appeal against either conviction or sentence, they already know what they are talking about and what they need to quote—the legal jurisprudence that they need to refer to, to prove their case—along with the issues with examining the witnesses or the evidence that has been given. They are then able to say, for example, that a particular witnesses’ evidence was not credible or that a witness said contradictory things or different things in their statement to the police compared with during the trial. They can do that because they have conducted the trial and they can forensically examine what happened—not only what legal direction the judge gave, but the factual evidence that came out during the trial. In the magistrates court, most people are not represented, so they cannot argue all those things.

To take away the automatic right to appeal is, therefore, a change to the fundamental basic rights of an individual. Let us remember that the state has all the might and all the resources, and that professionals will be prosecuting—whether they are lay prosecutors, Crown prosecutors or independent lawyers. On the one side, there will be the state represented by legal professionals; on the other, there will be the lone individual coming up by themselves to be subject to trial. If they are then not satisfied with the conviction or the sentence, they must then think how to legally write an appeal. That is putting a lot of pressure on them.

As Members of Parliament, many of us will have met many constituents who are quite reluctant to even write to us. I often say to constituents, “Please can you drop us an email?” and they say, “Well, I don’t know how to use a computer, and I don’t have the internet at home.” We then make a face-to-face appointment so that they can explain themselves. That is not unusual because a lot of people are not able to write very well and would not be in a position to construct a coherent legal argument as to why they should have their appeal in the Crown court.

Sometimes, when we are talking about possible efficiencies and saving money, we forget about individuals. People who come before the criminal justice system tend to be from poorer backgrounds and are often less well educated. Some of them may well be unemployed. A lot of them have other issues going on in their lives. Therefore, the fact that they can appeal to the Crown court automatically in the current system is an immense safeguard for them.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an important point that we have not really discussed on the Committee. It is estimated that half the prison population have a reading age of less than 11; that is to say, they are counted as functionally illiterate. We have seen a decline in prison education. How does she expect all these prison inmates to be able to negotiate or navigate an appeals process?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That is exactly the point I am trying to make. I think we sometimes forget, sitting in our rarefied environment, that a lot of the people out there—our citizens—are not well educated or able to write a proper paragraph or construct an argument. Sometimes they can just about get two or three simple sentences together. As they often do not have legal representation, allowing them to automatically appeal against a sentence or conviction is a really important safeguard for them. The Crown court and Court of Appeal criminal division is not the right comparison, because in most Crown court cases people have full legal representation who will be able to advise on this.

The other thing we found is that apparently 40% of appeals are successful. Think about that: four out of 10 appeals are successful. If people do not have a right to appeal, they have to find a way to make a legal argument on matters of law, which they know very little about. Asking them to do that is basically letting four out of 10 people be convicted or receive a sentence that could have an impact on their lives.

On sentences, when a conviction happens, even if it is in the magistrates court, it fundamentally affects people’s lives. It could mean that they are not able to get a job again or are dismissed from the job they have. If someone’s job involves driving and they are disqualified because of drink driving, that will be an extra burden on them, but it is not just that. Even if someone gets a suspended sentence or community service order for what we call smaller offences, a lot of people are not able to do that. Taking away their right to appeal is, with respect, very harsh.

Legal aid has already been reduced considerably over the years. I have to put the blame for that on the Conservatives, because they massively cut legal aid while in government. They also massively restricted the rights of judicial review. In that respect, I have to hold the Conservatives a bit responsible for what they did in 14 years in power. I am very grateful that the Labour Government have put money into legal aid—that is great—but I ask them to please give that to the magistrates court as well.

I have travelled in different parts of the world where the justice system is perhaps a bit haphazard or where there is not much trust in the state’s justice system, for whatever reason. It does not necessarily have to do with the wealth of a country; there are very wealthy countries where the state is much more authoritarian and the institutions are almost stacked against the individual. The one thing that people really love about the UK, apart from our beautiful country and everything else, is our judicial system. I am not just saying that; it is the most respected system in the world, especially our criminal justice system, because people feel that they have protection at the point that their liberties are being taken away.

Think about a conviction for shoplifting: people say, “Oh, shoplifting,” but even if someone takes a bottle of milk out of a shop, they may get a conviction and there will be hundreds of jobs that they can never apply for. For a lot of people who rely on shop work or other manual jobs where they may come across money, it means that they are never going to get a job. If they get a conviction in the magistrates court for theft, that is devastating for them. The Theft Act refers to the “intention of permanently depriving”. That is quite important, because people make mistakes, but intention has to be proved, because the Theft Act requires it. It is not just taking the thing; it is the intention to permanently deprive. How do we define “permanently deprive”? A layperson would not know how to construct that argument, but a lawyer would.

--- Later in debate ---

Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 8, page 19, line 13, after “charge” insert—

“including any behaviour or communication preceding the charge that is connected to the event itself”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will not press the amendment, which is self-explanatory, to a vote, but I ask the Committee and the Minister to think about it.

[Dr Mullan]

We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand.

Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence. The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past.

To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court.

Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice.

Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests.

I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial?

The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) for tabling amendment 67.

The speech that the hon. Member for Reigate just made was not only helpful and constructive, as is so often the case, but really compelling. At a societal level, we have been on a journey with regard to how we approach rape and serious sexual violence. There is a recognition that for far too long not only has the court been in danger of becoming a site for re-traumatisation, but frankly the response of our entire criminal justice system has been inadequate to meet what is now widely recognised to be an epidemic of violence against women and girls in our society. Unless we send a message at the very pinnacle of the criminal justice system that that is unacceptable and we cannot tolerate it, and get serious about conviction rates, the amount of charging decisions and the number of cases that come to court, we will not deter people from this kind of behaviour. Her speech setting that out, and some of the work that was done before this Parliament to get here, was very valuable.

Let me begin by setting out the rationale for clause 8, and then turn to amendment 67. Far too many victims of rape are dropping out of the justice system because they feel that they are the ones on trial. That needs to stop. Following the Law Commission’s careful consultation, the Bill will stop rape myths and misconceptions entering our court rooms. Clauses 8 to 11 will raise the threshold so that a victim’s past sexual history or previous allegations can be used only when necessary and relevant. The reforms will also prevent the defence from insinuating that victims are lying or motivated only by money just because they claimed compensation or reported a previous offence. We will also allow patterns of domestic abuse, of any type and against any victim, to be shown to the court in cases where they indicate a propensity for further offending.

All those measures sit alongside the Government’s wider efforts to improve the victim experience of the justice system. This Government have already implemented special protections for victims’ counselling records. We have commissioned a new project led by Professor Katrin Hohl to bring Operation Soteria into the courtroom. We are rolling out trauma-informed training for not just judges but all court staff, and we have dedicated £6 million, to be invested over the next two years, to deliver independent legal advice for rape victims. Taken together, these measures are transformative.

Clause 8 reforms the framework that governs when sexual behaviour evidence about a complainant may be introduced in criminal proceedings. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sets out important protections intended to prevent irrelevant or prejudicial material about a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour from being placed before the court. The Law Commission’s consultation found that the current provisions are complex and difficult to navigate, and that they are not being applied consistently across cases. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about monitoring the new framework, but some of this has been driven by the monitoring of the existing framework, and ensuring, by codifying the test, greater consistency of practice.

As a result of that complexity and inconsistency, there are some instances where sexual behaviour evidence about a victim’s previous sexual behaviour is admitted to a court and heard by a jury, despite it having no real bearing on the case. Simplifying the law will help judges to apply a clearer and more coherent test. Clause 8 replaces the existing statutory gateways with a clearer admissibility test. It will continue to be the case that sexual behaviour evidence should not be admitted into the court unless approval is granted by the judge. Judges must consider whether the evidence has substantial probative value. The clause also requires judges to consider a series of statutory factors, including whether the evidence relies on improper inferences, rape myths or misconceptions.

These reforms clarify the law, rather than altering the threshold per se. They reflect principles that are already applied by courts but set them out in a more structured way, which will improve consistency and transparency. We will also extend the new threshold to all offence types, not only sexual offences. This is because issues relating to a victim’s past sexual behaviour may occasionally arise in other trials, and complainants in those cases should benefit from the same safeguards and be treated equally.

The purpose of the clause is not to prevent a defendant from having a fair trial or to exclude evidence that is genuinely relevant; it is to ensure that decisions about admissibility are based on proper evidential reasoning and not on prejudicial assumptions. For that reason, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 67, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington, seeks to exclude from the proposed admissibility threshold any sexual behaviour evidence that took place prior to the charge, but that is connected to the offence. That goes against the purpose of the clause, which as I have said is to ensure that sexual behaviour from a victim’s past is admitted only when it has clear relevance to a significant issue in the case or is important explanatory evidence. That is to prevent evidence that relies solely on perpetuating rape myths and misconceptions from being used against a victim.

The amendment, which as we have heard has support from across the combating violence against women and girls sector, would significantly broaden the amount of sexual behaviour evidence that the defence could bring to court without any consideration from the judge, including evidence that neither has substantial probative value nor is important explanatory evidence.

Sexual behaviour evidence connected to the event itself could, for example, include any previous sexual behaviour between the same two parties, even though we know that the majority of sexual violence occurs within a relationship. That would allow a huge amount of sexual behaviour evidence to be brought into court entirely unscrutinised and unfiltered by the judge. Insinuating that because a victim has previously engaged in sexual behaviour of the same kind or with the same defendant they are somehow more likely to have consented to the events on trial is a well-known misconception.

Whether or not that was the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Easington in tabling the amendment, the effect would be to perpetuate this narrative, and we cannot accept it. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I will deal with the normal courtesies: devices must be on silent and tea and coffee are not allowed. Today is the last sitting of line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Under the programme order agreed by the Committee, I must bring proceedings to a close by 5 pm, if we have not already finished by that point.

New Clause 1

Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 73 (Reduction in sentence for guilty plea), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2ZA) The maximum level of reduction in sentence for a guilty plea that the court can apply is two-fifths.

(2ZB) The reduction set out in subsection (2ZA) may not be limited to a guilty plea at the first stage of proceedings.

(2ZC) A reduction of sentence under subsection (2ZA) is available to the defendant prior to a retrial.’”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir John. New clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), would address cases in which the prosecutions need to start a second or third time. It would reclassify offences and move the threshold of offences that are in the Crown court to summary offences. It would increase the maximum possible sentence reduction on a guilty plea to two fifths, remove the restriction that means the highest reduction is available only for early-stage guilty pleas, allow the defendant to receive that reduction even if they plead guilty later in the process, and extend eligibility so that the reduction can also apply before a retrial.

The new clause would build on the huge successes of the Liverpool model and Operation Expedite—which was praised by Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts—in bringing down court backlogs. Those successes were largely based on a focus on pre-trial negotiation or plea bargains to avoid cases going to a trial and taking up court time.

The new clause is in tune with the Government’s recent announcement following the review carried out by the former Lord Chancellor, David Gauke, which looked at trying to avoid giving people a sentence of less than one year because of the disruptive nature of those sentences. The Government could accept the new clause as part of the process of trying to prevent a backlog. It would also allow people to plead guilty, which would be better for victims, complainants, witnesses and the court system.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I wish to make some brief remarks. I am keen to see suggestions of alternative approaches, but we have to be careful when it comes to discounts for guilty pleas, because there is a balance to be struck from the perspective of victims and complainants. We do not want to be in a situation where they feel that justice is undermined, particularly given the many other things the Government are doing to reduce the punitive element of the justice system.

I am sure the Committee will know that thousands of serious violent sexual offenders will be getting reductions in their prison time. For example, two thirds of those sent to prison every year for rape will have their prison time reduced, and more than 90% of those sentenced for child grooming offences and similar offences will have their prison time reduced to one third. We are already seeing appalling erosions of the punitive element of the justice system by the Labour Government; I would be wary about doing anything that adds to that.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for speaking to the new clause. As she knows, an early guilty plea avoids the need for a trial, shortens the gap between charge and sentence and, crucially, can save victims and witnesses from the concern of having to give evidence.

Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review of the criminal courts found that

“guilty pleas are being entered later and later”

in the process. It found that

“in 2016, approximately 25% of defendants who pleaded guilty to all counts prior to trial did so at or after their third pre-trial hearing”,

compared with 35% in 2024. That reflects the decline in the efficiency and the increase in delays in the criminal courts. Sir Brian made it clear that that was contributing to the backlog and, in turn, creating a “feedback loop” of perverse incentives for defendants. There are, then, clearly benefits to ensuring that those who intend to plead guilty do so at the earliest possible opportunity.

For those reasons, it has long been the practice of the criminal courts to give a reduction in sentence when an offender pleads guilty earlier in the process. The level of sentence reduction that the court can give on a guilty plea is currently set out in sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council. In his review, Sir Brian made a number of recommendations relating to early guilty pleas, including a recommendation to increase the maximum reduction in sentence for a guilty plea from 33% to 40%, which new clause 1 seeks to implement.

However, we must maintain the right balance between the benefits to the system obtained by the making of early guilty pleas and ensuring that offenders are appropriately punished for their crimes. Sir Brian also notes that increasing the maximum sentencing discount for early guilty pleas could increase the

“risk of pressure being brought to bear on defendants to plead guilty, who might not otherwise have done so.”

It is therefore important that we consider whether there are alternative ways to encourage early guilty pleas, as opposed to increasing the level of maximum sentence discount.

We are not convinced that a further discount will work to incentivise the behaviours that we desire in the system, not least because other matters play their part in incentivising an early guilty plea, or the opposite. They include the nature of the offence, whether a defendant is remanded or released on bail, and the level of early engagement by the prosecution and defence in advancing case progression. We consider all those things as alternative factors that drive defendant behaviour. Most importantly, the punishment must be appropriate to the offence in question, and we think the new clause would cut against that.

We are currently carefully reviewing Sir Brian’s remaining recommendations, alongside part 2 of his review, and we will set out our full detailed response to that review in due course. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the clause.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Specialists courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations establish specialist courts for cases relating to sexual offences and domestic abuse.

(2) Any case heard in a court established under subsection (1) must be conducted with a jury and specialist judge.

(3) Additional guidance or directions may be formulated by the judiciary in relation to—

(a) the nature and dynamics of behaviour including—

(i) coercive control, and

(ii) honour-based abuse;

(b) best practice in hearing cases involving violence against women and girls, including ensuring fair and trauma-informed proceedings.

(4) Regulations under this section must make provision for such courts to have specialist facilities for alleged victims.

(5) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary resources for judicial, administrative and legal support, including advisors, prosecution and defence, to be made available to operate such courts.

(6) Any case heard by a court established under subsection (1) must be subject to such considerations regarding—

(a) time limits for case preparation,

(b) fixed dates for trial, and

(c) third party material review and disclosure,

as the Lord Chancellor may by regulations specify.

(7) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of hearings and trials for such cases in such specialist courts, including the prioritisation of cases where the defendant is on bail.

(8) Regulations in this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)

This new clause would establish specialist courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases, with those cases heard by a specialist judge and a jury. It makes further provision including for victim support, and to prioritise cases where a defendant is bailed.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 6—Fast-track courts for rape and serious sexual offences—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations make provision for specialist court capacity for cases involving rape and serious sexual offences (‘RASSO’).

(2) Regulations under this section must include provision for the prioritised listing and progression of RASSO cases.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must take reasonable steps for any necessary judicial, administrative and support resources to be made available to operate such court capacity.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to ensure that specialist court capacity is made available for the fast-tracking of RASSO cases.

New clause 23—Report on the effect of the Act on prosecution of rape and serious sexual offences—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on proceedings of cases involving rape and serious sexual offences.

(2) The matters the report must consider include—

(a) the effect of the Act on the time taken to dispose of cases;

(b) the effect of the Act on witness participation in proceedings; and

(c) the effect of the Act on experience of victims during proceedings.

(3) The report must make recommendations to improve each of the matters set out in subsection (2).

(4) Recommendations may include—

(a) recommendations about how the Act is implemented, and

(b) recommendations about further provision necessary to improve each matter.

(5) In this section, serious sexual offences are such offences as the Crown Prosecution Service may from time to time specify.

(6) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require a report on the effect of the provisions of the Bill on the progression of RASSO cases, and require the Lord Chancellor to respond to these recommendations.

New clause 25—Courts for rape and sexual offences—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a specialist sexual offences court to be established at each Crown Court location in England and Wales for the purpose set out in subsection (2).

(2) The purpose of any court established under subsection (1) is to ensure that trials relating to sexual offences, sexual abuse, and rape are heard as quickly as possible.

(3) Any court established under subsection (1) must make provision for support from independent sexual violence advisers to be accessible to victims.

(4) Regulations under this section must make specialist trauma training available for staff working in each such court.

(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This amendment would set up the specialist rape courts promised in the Labour Party Manifesto.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 2, which was tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols). On Second Reading, my hon. Friend made one of the most powerful contributions the House has heard in recent memory. She spoke from her own experience as a victim of rape and made a point that deserves to be heard again in this Committee. She said that the experiences of victims are being “weaponised” and used as a rhetorical cover for reforms that do not deliver anything meaningful for those victims.

My hon. Friend also said something that goes to the heart of this debate: we promised specialist rape courts in our manifesto. The Bill does not deliver them. That observation raises a wider question for the Committee, as we consider new clause 2, about the manifesto commitment and what the Bill does instead. The Labour manifesto made a clear commitment to establish specialist courts for rape and sexual offences and for domestic abuse. That commitment existed because we recognised that the system was failing victims, not because of juries but because of how cases were being managed—the delays, lack of court capacity, the way evidence is handled and the limited support available to those giving evidence.

New clause 2 is the legislative delivery of that manifesto commitment. It would not require us to restrict jury trials or accept a reform the benefits of which may, according to the Institute for Government, amount to as little as a 1% to 2% reduction in delays—a reduction the Bar Council considers optimistic. Instead, it would require us to build something that is already proven to work.

What works and what does not work? On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North pointed to the work already under way at Liverpool and Preston Crown courts. That work is reducing waiting times for complainants and defendants—we are talking about months, not years—without removing anyone’s right to be tried by a jury. That is the model, that is what we should be scaling, and that is what the new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to do.

Instead, the Government have brought forward reforms that will not take effect until 2028 or 2029. A victim who reports a rape today will wait through years under the existing system before a single one of the Bill’s provisions affects their case. We are being asked to accept a permanent reduction in defendants’ rights in exchange for a speculative and delayed improvement in victims’ experience. That is not a serious offer.

Let us be clear what the Bill does not do. It will not improve how evidence is handled, how cases are managed or how victims are supported through the process. It will not guarantee timely disclosure, it will not ensure fixed trial dates, it will not provide independent sexual violence advisers where they are needed, it will not reform the conduct of cross-examination, and it will not address wider support or compensation issues. All of those things, which the violence against women and girls sector and Rape Crisis England and Wales have consistently called for, remain untouched.

As my hon. Friend said on Second Reading, we should not claim that the Bill delivers justice for victims unless it actually does. The Bill will not do that. New clause 2 would take a different approach. It would preserve jury involvement in every case while introducing a specialist court designed to deal properly with sexual offences and domestic abuse. Each case would be heard by a jury and a specialist judge with training in coercive control, trauma responses, honour-based abuse and best practice in cases involving violence against women and girls. That combination matters. A specialist judge improves the management of proceedings. A jury brings the collective judgment and diversity of the public.

As the Lammy review found, juries are far more diverse than the judiciary, and there is no evidence that jury verdicts are affected by the ethnicity of the defendant. By contrast, the removal of juries risks undermining confidence, particularly among victims from minority backgrounds or people from poorer working-class backgrounds.

To address the real causes of delay, we ask that strict time limits for case preparation are set. We ask for fixed and reliable trial dates; the proper management of disclosure and third-party material; the prioritised listing of cases, including those of defendants who are on bail; specialist facilities for victims; and the adequate resourcing of judicial, administrative and legal support, including independent sexual violence advisers. These practical reforms would make a material difference to how cases are handled and to the experience of the victim, and they can be done quite quickly.

The Government have relied heavily on the experience of victims to justify the reforms, so they should support new clause 2, which would deliver on our manifesto commitment. It is based on a model that already works well. It would improve things for victims without removing fundamental safeguards and does not ask victims to wait until the end of the decade to see any benefit.

The Government have identified a real problem but, with respect, have chosen the wrong solution. If the Bill was truly about delivering justice for victims of rape and sexual violence, we would not be debating the restriction of jury trial; we would be implementing the specialist courts we promised. The Bill does not do that. I ask the Government to consider the new clause; otherwise, it will be a missed opportunity. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. We are all here because we recognise that the current state of our criminal courts is untenable. Complainants and defendants alike are facing unacceptable delays, and victims and innocent defendants are suffering as a result. The Government’s response, as set out in the Bill, is a radical restructuring of our trial processes, most notably in the removal of the right to a jury in a vast number of cases—around half, in fact. We believe there is a strong obligation on the Government to institute a more targeted, and potentially more effective, way to address the specific delays that they most frequently cite, through the establishment of specialist courts for rape and serious sexual offences.

The Minister herself raised this issue in the Chamber on 7 January. When talking about jury trial reforms, she said:

“Does it make sense that the queue of the victim of rape or of a homicide is shared with someone who has stolen a bottle of whisky”?—[Official Report, 7 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 278.]

In December, the Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor said:

“if someone is charged with an offence such as theft of a bicycle, theft from a vehicle or employee theft, they can opt for a trial that, by necessity, goes into the system and will delay a rape trial”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2025; Vol. 776, c. 807.]

That point has been made by a number of Labour MPs, including the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). The Opposition have been clear that that is an oversimplification of how the listing process works, and that some of those examples are extremely unlikely to be in the queue in the Crown court, except for in specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the Government have been advancing that case.

A commitment to introduce specialist courts was actually in the Government’s manifesto. By fulfilling the promises made to the electorate, the Government can deliver swifter justice for a group of victims they have centred in the debate, without dismantling the constitutional right to elect for jury trial. The Government’s proposals to halve the number of jury trials was not in the Labour party manifesto, but on page 67 there was a commitment to

“fast-track rape cases, with specialist courts at every Crown Court location in England and Wales.”

It could therefore be argued that—as much as we can debate what in an entire manifesto the public vote for—the public voted for a system that would prioritise these types of cases through specialisation and resourcing, and did not vote for a system that would instead prioritise administrative throughput by removing the right to elect to be judged by one’s peers.

Sometimes, Governments do things that were not in their manifesto one way or another, or were not touched on in any way, but it would be difficult for people to argue that the public had a specific idea that they were not going to get certain things. However, if a Government put in their manifesto a particular element of direct relevance, as they did in relation to specialist courts, the public would have every right to be aggrieved if something entirely different, and significantly so, appeared as Government policy instead of what was in the manifesto.

Opposition new clause 25 asks the Government to return to their original vision. It is similar to the other new clauses tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, and by the hon. Member for Warrington North. They are crafted in different ways—for example, new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Warrington North, is more prescriptive about how the courts would operate—but the intention and outcome are essentially the same. Specialist courts equipped with trauma-informed training and access to independent sexual violence advisers would recognise the unique complexity of these cases in a way that a simple bench division cannot.

As I have said, the Government frequently refer to the experience of rape victims waiting years for justice as a significant justification for restricting jury trials. They argue that moving towards judge-led trials in 50% of cases will streamline the process and reduce the backlog, but the evidence for the broader claims of efficiency is highly contested.

Independent analysis by the Institute for Government suggests that judge-only trials in the Crown court might save as little as 1.5% to 2.5%—[Interruption.] The Minister is right to say, and I do not mind accepting, that the saving is higher for the broader package—that has never been a point of dispute—but we are less concerned about the broader package, and there are things in it that we agree with. We are concerned about the much smaller saving that the IFG has pointed out. The Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s modelling assumes that the trials will be completed twice as fast as is realistic. We must ask whether the trade-off is proportionate, especially when there is another option.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Fair enough. I therefore turn to Yasmin Qureshi—you can speak now if you wish to.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will withdraw new clause 2, because I know that the Minister is addressing the issue and I accept her commitment. She is an honourable lady and I accept her word, and I look forward to the specialist courts being implemented very soon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

[Hon. Members]

No.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).

(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—

(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;

(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;

(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and

(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.

(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.

New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.

(2) There must be a target for the—

(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and

(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.

(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.

New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.

(2) A report under this section must—

(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—

(i) witness participation;

(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;

(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;

(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).

(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.

New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—

(a) the provisions of this Act;

(b) The wider criminal justice system;

(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;

(d) the condition of the courts estate; and

(e) the use of technology.

(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—

(a) delays,

(b) backlogs, and

(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.

(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.

New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.

(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.

(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.

New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,

are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.

(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—

(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;

(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and

(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.

(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.

Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.

Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.

(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.

Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.

(3B) The conditions are that—

(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,

(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and

(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”

This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.

Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—

(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and

(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.

(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—

(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and

(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. New clauses 32 and 33 can be considered almost part and parcel of each other. Our earlier discussion of new clause 29 involved a similar issue, but these new clauses are much more specific.

New clause 32 would introduce a duty to commission an independent review of racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the magistrates court, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in clauses 1 to 7. The Government’s equality impact assessment of the proposal to restrict access to jury trial refers many times to the lack of evidence that the proposals in the Bill have a racist or discriminatory outcome, but the impact assessment does not refer once the Secretary of State’s own 2017 review, which showed reduced racial disparities in jury trial outcomes. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

The new clause would mandate a full review of racial disproportionality before the changes are made. At a time when trust in the justice system among the black, Asian and minority ethnic community is already low, why rush through these changes before we have the full picture?

New clause 33 would introduce a duty to conduct an independent review of whether clauses 1 to 7 give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of person. It is welcome that, in December last year, the Government announced a £92 million investment in criminal legal aid, after years of neglect. However, it will take a while for that investment to have an impact on the disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system for working-class defendants, young males and, in particular, vulnerable people.

Juries are hailed as the fairest component of the legal system, and are widely accepted as more likely to provide an equitable outcome than the judiciary, who are still overwhelmingly privately educated and from particular backgrounds. One of the big issues—this applies to new clause 32 as well as to new clause 33—is that joint enterprise is often used as a dragnet for marginalised and vulnerable communities, impacting not just black people but neurodivergent and working-class communities.

For those who may not be fully aware, a 2016 Supreme Court decision recognised that joint enterprise had been used wrongly for the past three decades. Despite that, little has changed. Very few appeals have been accepted, and there is significant evidence of the continued misuse of joint enterprise. This fills prisons with people of no risk to the public, who are labelled as murderers when they have not killed anyone—an expensive travesty of justice. They are often sent to jail or given longer sentences than they should have received on the basis of assisting or encouraging a crime. They are found guilty by association.

In our criminal justice system, joint enterprise essentially means that if someone has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence, they can be found guilty of an offence committed by someone else. However, the role they have played may vary, and the sentencing powers often reflect that. In reality, a lot of bystanders or people watching, or people who may have known one of the parties but did not take part in the crime, will also end up getting convicted. There has been an attempt to rectify that with a private Member’s Bill, but so far nothing has happened.

Some miscarriages of justice have been challenged, and some cases have received further examination. Dr Nisha Waller of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies states that

“joint enterprise laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, overpunishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent”

or even

“a defendant’s physical contribution”.

Dr Waller’s research shows that the current law is flawed and that it

“encourages…the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence…highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over…evidentiary foundations…the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent.”

She says it allows for a lot of young people to be stereotyped and criminalised, and recommends that

“the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework.”

One reason why it is important to address this issue, in conjunction with new clauses 32 and 33, is that the very people who would be affected by the new clauses are the people who are affected by the law on joint enterprise. I pay tribute to Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, which has been doing tremendous work in this area for many years.

The most recent research by Appeal, which has been monitoring joint enterprise in court cases, concluded:

“There is a clear departure from what the law of complicity should be”

and that:

“Secondary liability is often diluted to little more than association, suspicion, and story.”

It says:

“Prosecution narrative strategy has replaced evidential clarity…meaning joint enterprise trials are often not a truth-seeking process.”

It concludes that the way joint enterprise laws are currently used is

“producing injustice at scale”

and that:

“Public money is being used to stage justice, rather than deliver it.”

Research by Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams at Manchester Metropolitan University shows that nearly £250 million is spent on prosecuting defendants in joint enterprise cases every year. The total future punishment of the 1,088 people convicted under joint enterprise cases each year costs the taxpayer £1.2 billion.

Finally, the report “In Their Own Words”, which is based on a series of family listening days organised by JENGbA, detailed the devastating impact of joint enterprise convictions on families and friends—

[The Chair]

Order. The Clerk advises me that you are going a little out of scope.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I take your ruling and guidance, Dr Huq. I was trying to explain it because the disparities are important and the issue does affect people. I ask the Government to think about new clauses 32 and 33, because they will hopefully have an impact on joint enterprise. I will not press them to a vote.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes.

New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target.

In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility.

In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly.

Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote.

New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform.

A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier.

We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause is, in some respects, fairly self-explanatory, in that it provides that cases should not go to the Crown court without being trial-ready. In essence, it is a safeguard —we could call it an oversight amendment—that is linked to the jury trial reforms in the Bill.

The rationale behind the new clause is to reflect concern that the Government are making significant changes by removing or restricting jury trials without strong evidence of impact. It aims to introduce caution, likely through a review, limits or accountability mechanisms. In that respect it is similar to the approach in new clause 27, about piloting, but it is more about ongoing scrutiny than delaying implementation.

We are trying to say to the Government: “If you are going to do this, please prove that it works and build in the safeguards.” That aligns with the position of the Bar Council and others in the light of the argument regarding jury trials. It fits with the fact that the Government are trying to make structural change, but we say that, before they do that structural change, they should look at all these things before cases are sent up to the Crown court. I will not be pressing the new clause to a vote.

[Sarah Sackman]

Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible.

All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court.

There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences.

In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the Minister for her response. I have made my points—throughout the Committee’s proceedings, I have been making points about the issue of jury trials—and I will not add anything further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Remote Court Participation: Strategy

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time