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Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateWilliam Cash
Main Page: William Cash (Conservative - Stone)Department Debates - View all William Cash's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will give way in a moment. I am warming to a theme—let me warm!
The theme is this: in our fight against terrorism—in our determination to protect the public against those who spread hate, division, death and injury, irrespective of what might motivate them, because we know that we have a cohort of different types of terrorist—we are defending something of value. We are defending a democratic, free society. We are defending the rule of law. We are defending the values of this place and, indeed, the values of all the people we have the honour and privilege of representing. That is something worth defending. By using due process, we mark ourselves out as distinct from, better than and different from those who seek to divide us.
Is my right hon. Friend in receipt of advice from the Law Officers on this question? I say that because whatever arguments he may address with regard to compatibility and his statement on the front of the Bill, the reality is that this could easily end up in the courts if they can possibly manufacture an argument. I want to be quite clear that his advice relates to action in the courts and not just to incompatibility.
I can assure my hon. Friend that all the usual processes were followed. I am not going to go into the weeds of what the Law Officers might have said. We know that they have a particular function when it comes to the necessary clearances for the introduction of a Bill. I can assure him that those processes have been followed and that the issues that he rightly outlines—and, indeed, presages through his amendments—are very much uppermost in our considerations.
I am hugely grateful to my right hon. Friend, who, as the House will know, was a distinguished Security Minister and Northern Ireland Secretary, and had to deal with these issues daily. I will say this to him: he will know that the counter-terrorism Bill, which was announced some weeks ago, will be coming before the House soon. There will be measures in it not only on the minimum term to be served for serious terror offences, but on the way in which licence periods will be applied as part of such a sentence. That is clearly one of the most effective ways to deal with this problem—through the criminal prosecution and conviction process.
My right hon. Friend makes a wider point. He will know from having navigated through the House the TPIMs legislation, which has been subsequently strengthened and amended, that there are other circumstances in which public protection will have to play a function in the absence of a conviction. It is on that particular cohort that the Government are placing a lot of attention and concentration. It would perhaps be idle of me to speculate by outlining what precise forms those will take, but it is a dialogue that I encourage him actively to take part in over the next few months and it is something I would want to develop with support from all parts of this House.
At this stage in the debate, and trying to avoid our having what might otherwise turn into an argument about the law in court, may I ask my right hon. and learned Friend whether the case of del Río Prada has actually been taken into account? Does he know if that has been taken into account, because it was about policy and administration?
My hon. Friend will be glad to know that not only has it been taken into account, but I have read it. It is a 2013 authority from the Strasbourg Court that relates to a particular set of circumstances involving the Kingdom of Spain. There have been subsequent cases both before that court and, indeed, domestically. In summary, we are satisfied, on the basis of all the information we have, that the provisions of article 7 are not engaged in this respect.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I think we sometimes see things in isolation, but cuts to many other services have also had an impact, which the Government need to take into account. Indeed, when we talk about conditions for our prison officers to work in, a third of our prisons were built in the Victoria era. There is a £900 million maintenance backlog and a desperate need for new investment.
On mental disturbance, does the hon. Gentleman accept that there are circumstances in which the principle of mens rea may not apply simply because the person in question, for a variety of reasons, some of which may be drug-affected or intrinsic, is incapable of making an act within the framework of mens rea? In those circumstances, should we perhaps be thinking further down the line about what kind of containment people need to restrain them from performing such murderous acts?
A number of issues about mens rea, which is an essential element of committing a criminal offence, have been decided before the courts. However, elements of our law can already deal with those who suffer from severe mental health problems, and they can be used and operated appropriately on a multi-agency basis.
The speeches from both Front Benchers have been very thoughtful and that matches the significance of this debate. My right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor made a very compelling case for this legislation. It is not the type of legislation that the House should undertake lightly, but protecting the public must ultimately trump all other considerations. It is always right that we should protect the public in a way that is commensurate with the rule of law. I believe that the Government and the Lord Chancellor have managed to achieve that balance and I am glad that the official Opposition recognise that, too. That is a fundamental duty for all of us, and reconciling the two is a considerable achievement, given the pressures we are under at this time.
The reason that I think it is necessary to move in this way has been well set out. I speak as somebody who represents a London constituency: many of my constituents work in and around the places where we have seen so many atrocities. That brings home to us profoundly the catastrophic risk that can come when an individual is released. Even though the index offence that caused them to go to prison may not have led to a very long sentence, the nature—I am sorry to say—of the type of terrorism that we see now, often based on perverted ideologies and the deep-seated hatred that that breeds, gives us the need to be particularly careful and cautious about all forms of release going forward. The automatic point of release will be moved to two thirds—in fact, that will no longer be automatic but will, in all cases, be considered by the Parole Board, and that is a worthwhile and important aspect of the Bill.
I am listening with great interest to everything that my hon. Friend says, as ever. Does he think that the question over the Bill is that it will have a limited effect, whereas the problems that we face have a much longer-term consequence? Does he believe, therefore, that we ought to have a more rigorous analysis in future—this is only emergency legislation—to make sure that human life in this country takes priority over the interpretation of law?
I follow the line taken by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on the cross-party consensus that is needed in passing this Bill.
However, as I have already indicated in a number of interventions, I am concerned about the restrictive and restricted nature of this Bill. We should get the Justice Committee to look at the longer-term issues raised by these incidents, murders and terrorist offences. I entirely understand why this Bill has been introduced, and I support it. I am glad the House, as a whole, has clearly indicated the same.
We have to take these problems seriously, as they are deeply entrenched in parts of our society, and they will continue. They will not change just because this emergency legislation has been passed. The Bill will have a limited effect, so we need a longer-term assessment of the real problems that underpin it.
In response to the intervention by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), I mentioned the state of mind of some of the people concerned and the question of whether, in certain cases, it is evidence of some degree of insanity, of a drug-affected mind or of mental disturbance on such a scale as to impinge on the question of mens rea. We do not have time to go into all of it this afternoon, but I want such longer-term assessments because some of these people, from whatever part of society, have had to be confined to Broadmoor and other similar secure places because of their mental state. I put that on the record as a suggestion that needs to be taken up by the Justice Committee and, indeed, other Committees.
I also raised in an intervention that, for me, this Bill does not answer the question of why automatic early release, with the agreement of the Parole Board, should be moved from halfway to two thirds of a sentence. In circumstances where we are dealing with public safety and human life, I do not see why two thirds should be chosen as a boundary line. There are circumstances in very severe cases where I do not believe there should be any release at all, for the reasons I have already touched on in relation to certain people’s instability of mind.
Does my hon. Friend agree that terrorists are traitors? They have declared this country their enemy, and they have declared he and I, and civilians, as legitimate targets to be murdered and assaulted on our streets. I therefore agree entirely that they should serve at least their full sentence. We should be looking at far longer sentences than just 14 years.
My hon. Friend touches on a point that I raised several years ago, shortly after the infamous, terrible murder of Lee Rigby. On the question of persons returning to this country from ISIS, I told the House that, as far as I was concerned, the issue of their return should be evaluated in accordance with article 8 of the convention on the reduction of statelessness, which makes it clear that a person can be made stateless if they give allegiance to another country—the caliphate could be regarded as such in this context. I accept this is controversial, but the United States, for example, already applies article 8 in that way. If the person in question gives allegiance to another country, by definition they have moved into the zone of treason and have deliberately and voluntarily abdicated their allegiance to this country. I put that on the record because we have to take these matters extremely seriously, and I attempted to make such an amendment to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This is about not just external activities, but internal ones, within our domestic law, so we need to take this incredibly seriously. That is why I am appealing for this longer term assessment of all these questions, including the one my hon. Friend has raised, because it is so important and cannot just be put into a category of “rather extravagant thinking”. This is really serious.
As I said earlier, human life and public safety are much more important than the question of whether the courts may or may not interpret a particular provision in a more “fashionable” judicial interpretation than we ought to expect of our courts. I go further and say that human life is more important than any legal interpretation of human rights, which is why I have tabled my amendments. I imagine that the Committee stage will be pretty truncated, so I am not going to go into this in Committee in the detail that I will now. As this is a Second Reading issue and a matter of principle, let me say that we should include in the Bill, in clause 1, the exclusion of the Human Rights Act 1998. I have something of a history in that respect, but so do the Foreign Secretary and many others, such as the distinguished Martin Howe, QC. We were regarded as highly unfashionable some years ago, but issues of the kind that gravitate around the Bill have drawn attention to the fact that we have to take these matters really seriously. I understand that the Bingham Centre has made a number of representations on the matter, and there are clear indications that there are lawyers of some notoriety, if not distinction, who will seek to overturn the provisions of this Bill by going to the courts. I deplore the fact that they would seek to do so.
I am looking forward to the discussion in the House of Lords on this matter, because there are distinguished lawyers on all sides of the debate in that House, who, with the greatest respect to all of us here in the House of Commons, have been practising at the Bar, have been in the Supreme Court and so on. They will be able to bring to bear the right degree of analysis of the case law, which needs to be looked at carefully in this context.
As ever, my hon. Friend is making a compelling case. I suggest to him that this requires a more fundamental review of the characteristic and extent of rights, and how they relate to citizenship, duty, responsibility and the public good. I wonder what he thinks of that.
That is an extremely important point. As my right hon. Friend knows, I have the greatest respect for his analysis when it moves from not just the law into the broader societal and philosophical questions, which ought to inform opinions made in this House; we should not just treat issues of this kind as if they are somehow matters of semantics. We are dealing with the kind of society that we want, and the impact of the terrorism, and murderous and dangerous behaviour, of the perpetrators of these crimes our own constituents. A most recent case involved somebody who travelled from Stafford down to London, and therefore was a matter of immediate concern to my constituents, because he had been living there for some time. The manner in which he was allowed to leave to come down to London and commit murder in Fishmongers’ Hall and in the vicinity is a lesson for us all.
I now want to deal with the retrospectivity elements of this Bill, which relate to my general concern to tie down this issue in the longer term. The Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and I had an exchange about a number of cases. I am well aware that this is not the place for us to attempt to make an assumption that we are able to treat this Chamber as though it is a court of law, although we are, of course, the High Court of Parliament, but that is to miss the point; the fact is that proper analysis of the case law has to be conducted. Some of that has already been done in blogging and in some pamphlets, and I am expecting the House of Lords to home in on it effectively when the Bill gets to that House, although it will not have much time.
We know that Ministers have been warned about the likelihood of a legal battle; despite the assertions of the Government that the Bill is compatible with article 7 of the European convention on human rights—for reasons that I will explain, I am sympathetic to their view—there are those who will argue that it is not. I can see this coming, so my amendment would remove any chance that there could be that kind of legal battle on the applicability of the Human Rights Act to this Bill. My amendment would insert the words
“notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
That is a belt-and-braces approach, and it is what I am seeking. I am not going to move this amendment in Committee with any intention of dividing the Committee of the whole House on it; I think the matter needs further consideration outside this House, and I look to the House of Lords for some indication of views.
My argument goes like this: this Bill is compatible with article 7. No one has read it out so far, so I will do so. It states:
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence”—
for conduct —
“which did not constitute a criminal offence…at the time when it was committed.”
This Bill does not purport to create a new criminal offence. Rather, it seeks to prevent terrorists convicted by UK courts on the basis of offences that existed prior to the Bill from having automatic early release. I have already made my point about the length of time indicated. Furthermore, the explanatory notes state:
“The Bill does not retrospectively alter a serving offender’s sentence as imposed by the court, or alter the maximum penalties for offences.”
They state that the Bill is concerned with the “administration of a sentence”. I still believe, despite the exchanges I had with the Chairman of the Justice Committee, that the del Río Prada case could well still come into play there. I fear that it might be used effectively against the Bill. So my conclusion on the question of a textual interpretation of article 7 of the ECHR indicates that is not incompatible with this Bill. However, Parliament does have the power to legislate retrospectively—
Order. I just want to let the hon. Gentleman know that I am sure he will have the opportunity in Committee to address his amendment. I am sure he will be aware that there are quite a few people who wish to speak on Second Reading; I just want to assure him that he will be able to address his amendment during the Committee stage.
I do understand that, but I also anticipate that there may be a need for brevity at that point. That is how these things go, from my experience, which goes back some time. I am talking about matters of principle. I repeat: I am talking about matters of principle.
As established by Willes J in Phillips v. Eyre, courts ascribe retrospective force to new laws that affect rights only if
“by express words or necessary implication that such was the intention of the legislature”.
Clause 1 will amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and expressly restrict eligibility for the release of prisoners who have been sentenced for a terrorist offence
“whether before or after this section comes into force”.
My conclusion on this point is simple: the courts would be expected to give retrospective effect to the Bill.
The principle I wish to address is that I am concerned that the courts have a disinclination and reluctance to give effect to retrospective legislation, particularly when it deals with criminal acts. That is well established, and I could quote Bradley and Ewing, page 56, which explains that. Although I do not think that article 7 applies to the Bill, to ensure that the courts do not find a way around the Bill or a misguided interpretation that would frustrate its real purpose, I shall move my amendment in Committee, for the purposes of legislative clarity and for the avoidance of doubt in relation to the power of Parliament to legislate retrospectively. That is the principle that I am addressing at this moment.
I have no further comment to make for the purposes of this debate, but this matter has to be taken seriously. The wording that I intend to introduce in Committee will be taken as a serious attempt to make sure that no way around the provisions is found by the courts or by some ingenious lawyers, who would avoid and frustrate the purposes and principle of the Bill, as expressed on Second Reading, which we are debating.
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). He referred to lawyers of some “notoriety” rather than, perhaps, remarkable lawyers; he is not the former. He has raised in the House the considerations relating to his amendment, so should this matter ever reach the courts for adjudication, the courts may, having been served with notice that the wording he proposes in his amendment should have been in the Bill, be even more inclined to accept the argument, knowing that Parliament was fully apprised of the considerations and had the opportunity so to heed the advice. That said, it was pragmatic of the hon. Member to indicate that although he may move his amendment, he may not force it to a vote, hoping instead that it is considered in the other place. I understand why he did that.
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this debate, which has been incredibly positive so far. We have been considering a serious issue, but every Member who has spoken so far has done so with a determination— in recognition of the difficulties that we have faced as a society from terrorism in responding appropriately, pragmatically, sensibly and swiftly—that this debate should add to the response that we as a Parliament should bring.
It was of benefit to hear from the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill), if I may mention him specifically. He is new to the House, but he has incredible knowledge of a parliamentary approach to early release. He did not refer to any individual cases in his remarks, but Members should know that the hon. Member has been through the political, practical, public and moral rigours of early release for those engaged in terrorist offences. We have benefited from his insight.
Reference has been made already to the contributions from the former reviewers of terrorism and terrorist legislation, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, the latter of whom has indicated that he believes that the Bill will be subject to legal challenge. Of course, that may be right, but I do not think that ultimately the House should fear that. It is appropriate that if people feel this legislation is incompatible with the European convention on human rights they get the opportunity to challenge it in the courts, but the Lord Chancellor expertly took the House through all the implications as to whether article 7 is engaged. It is surely engaged, but not in a fundamentally flawed way. It is fair for us to say that, yes, there are the considerations that we have discussed this afternoon and that will be discussed in another place and in the courts, but I believe that ultimately this Bill is the right approach for Parliament to take.
The right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) rightly referred to the comments of Lord Anderson QC. It was entirely appropriate for Lord Anderson to say that should this process, through this Bill, exhaust the opportunity for licence, compliance and control within the public sector and society at large, that would be a missed opportunity. We need to be alive to that in this debate. I think the Lord Chancellor nodded when he was considering TPIMs and the protective measures that have been in place and that could be put to good use. Licensing and rehabilitation are important parts of the criminal justice process, so the retention of someone in custody, without giving them the opportunity under control orders, is something that we should think about. We should recognise that if somebody spends the entirety of their sentence in custody without any control on release, that places an even bigger burden on our security services, when other aspects of the criminal justice system should be more appropriately engaged in monitoring, surveying and ensuring compliance and the rehabilitation of offenders who have been brought before the courts previously.
As a representative from Northern Ireland, I must focus on the fact that the Bill does not apply to our jurisdiction. The Lord Chancellor did proffer a view—I think this fairly reflects his comments—that the way we calculate sentences in Northern Ireland means that although the Bill does not fundamentally or injuriously engage article 7 considerations in England and Wales or Scotland, it would in Northern Ireland. I would be keen to explore that in greater detail with the Minister somewhere else. I do not think it would be appropriate to do that on the Floor of the House this afternoon, but it is worthy of further interrogation. I do not challenge what the Lord Chancellor said on the Floor of the House, believing what he said to be true, but I am not sure that what was indicated is right, nor indeed do I believe that it was the totality of the issues that may have been under consideration in connection with the Bill and its application to Northern Ireland. I say that as somebody who has contributed to many debates on terrorism and who lamented the fact that the counter-extremism strategy was introduced in this place and similarly did not apply to Northern Ireland.
The House knows the history that we in Northern Ireland have had in respect of both terrorism and extremism. I have made the point in the Chamber before that as a Member of Parliament for four and a half years I have seen a member of my own constituency murdered by the Provisional IRA, an organisation that most in the Chamber would believe does not exist any more; I have had a prison officer in my constituency murdered by dissident republicans through an under-car booby-trap bomb; and in January last year I had a father murdered by loyalist paramilitaries in my constituency. In four and a half years, we have had three individual murders by three different paramilitary terrorist organisations, at a time of peace. So it does jar, whenever we lend our weight—give our support—to counter-terrorism measures in this place, that we are not incorporated.
Members who have an interest in Northern Ireland affairs will be aware that the political process and the Good Friday agreement led to the early release of terrorist prisoners in Northern Ireland, and that there were two protections. Everyone was released on licence, and legislative provision was made for those licences to be revoked if it was the view of the Secretary of State that the person had engaged in activity that was leaning towards paramilitary or terrorist activity yet again: the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.
In preparation for the introduction of this Bill, I tabled questions to the Northern Ireland Office to ask how many people who had been jailed in Northern Ireland as a result of terrorist activity had been released and had their licence subsequently revoked because of their activity. One answer, on the 1998 Act, was that two licences had been revoked since 1998, but I got the most obtuse answer on those who had licences revoked under the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order.
When you are trying to paint a picture, Madam Deputy Speaker, and you are trying to do research to understand where we have had parallel experiences in the past, and where people have been released for altogether different political reasons and under a different political settlement but have had licences revoked because they re-engaged in terrorist activity, it is important that this House has those figures. The answer, from 2001 to 2020, was that policing and justice was devolved in 2010.
That answer tells us nothing. I think it entirely discourteous to me, as a Member of Parliament seeking information, and to the House. It does not answer the question about 2001 to 2010 and it does not answer the question about licences revoked under national security considerations—information that would have been appropriate and important to inform us during the passage of the Bill.
I am very interested in what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I wonder whether steps are being taken to raise these matters, not only as he is doing in Westminster, but also now in Stormont. Is that now under consideration in the context of the Bill?
That is a very fair question. When national security considerations are engaged—so that relates to terrorism—the devolved institutions at Stormont do not have a role; that remains the competence of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. But there are issues that I want to pursue, and I hope the Minister will give a commitment that we can have a discussion about article 7 and how it is engaged differently, in a way that makes the Bill incompatible with the European convention on human rights but not in England, Scotland or Wales.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I think you know our position when it comes to legislation to protect society and curtail the excesses of those who want to frustrate everything we value in the United Kingdom—the positive values and principles that we hold dear in this Parliament and in this place. We will support this Bill and I am grateful for the opportunity to make those ancillary comments about Northern Ireland, which I hope help to set this debate in context.
The Chair of the Justice Committee makes a good point. It is important to retain experience in the prison officer establishment. Prison staff have long expertise and long experience, and the Prisons Minister, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), is acutely aware of the importance of retention.
Many hon. and right hon. Members, including the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) and the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), have drawn attention to the importance of a comprehensive deradicalisation programme in prisons—the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood) also made that point in his excellent speech. We are acutely conscious of the importance of that and of the need to do more. We have the theological and ideological intervention programme, the healthy identities programme and the deradicalisation programme in place, and I am sure there is more that needs to be done in those areas. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) touched on that in his speech, and I know the Prisons Minister would like shortly to take up his offer of a meeting to discuss exactly these issues.
Of course, it is equally important to make sure these offenders are properly monitored after release, whether on licence or otherwise. The TPIM regime was strengthened in 2015, and we always have multi-agency public protection arrangements where necessary. As we saw, those arrangements were effective in the case of Sudesh Amman. After he began his behaviour, it was a matter of seconds before the police were able to intervene, which is an example of MAPPA working well in practice.
In the few minutes remaining to me, I will address the question of retrospection, touched on by a number of hon. Members, including the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). It is our very firm belief, based on legal advice, that these measures do not contravene article 7. They do not constitute a retrospective change of the penalty, because the penalty is the total sentence. The penalty is the sentence handed down by the judge at the point of sentencing and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) elaborated, a wide body of case law says that changing the early release point does not change the penalty. In fact, early release ameliorates the penalty—it reduces the penalty—so changing the early release point does not add to it. The Uttley case makes that clear, as do other cases that have come before the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.
I do not think the Del Río Prada case, in which the Kingdom of Spain was a respondent, is directly germane because it concerns the calculation of concurrent sentences and a change in how concurrent sentences are handled, which is obviously not the matter before the House today. The Government are clear that the Bill does not contravene article 7 and does not constitute a retrospective change to the penalty; it simply constitutes a change to how the sentence is administered.
Let me touch briefly on the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), which I suspect we may debate more fully in Committee shortly. We do not believe that a “notwithstanding” clause is necessary, because we do not believe article 7 is contravened by this legislation—we can debate this more. We are also not wholly convinced that a “notwithstanding” clause would derogate our treaty obligations under the ECHR.
I am conscious of time. I would be happy to give way in Committee to debate this at greater length. I very much look forward to hearing my hon. Friend’s further views on this and I would be happy to take an intervention in Committee, but I must wrap up in a minute or so.
The right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) asked about the MAPPA review and the Prevent review. The MAPPA review is under way and is being led by Jonathan Hall, QC. The Prevent review has a statutory deadline of August 2020, which we intend to abide by. We will make further announcements about its progress—this will include appointing a new reviewer—as soon as possible.
Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateWilliam Cash
Main Page: William Cash (Conservative - Stone)Department Debates - View all William Cash's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move amendment 3, page 1, line 8, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
With this it will be convenient to consider:
Amendment 4, in page 1, line 12, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Amendment 1, page 2, line 34, leave out “two-thirds” and insert “nine-tenths”.
Amendment 2, page 2, line 37, leave out “two-thirds” and insert “nine-tenths”.
Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.
Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 4, line 2, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Amendment 6, page 4, line 6, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Clause 3 and 4 to 10 stand part.
That schedules 1 and 2 be the First and Second schedules to the Bill.
New clause 1—Review of prison deradicalisation programme—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person to review the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme.
(2) The person appointed under subsection (1) may enter any prison premises in order to scrutinise the operation of the prison deradicalisation programme.
(3) The person appointed under subsection (1) must make a report to the Secretary of State on the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme before the end of the period of 6 months after the date on which this Act is passed.
(4) The person appointed must make further reports at intervals of not more than three months to the Secretary of State on the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme.
(5) The person appointed under subsection (1) may include in any review or report under this section consideration of the adequacy of resources made available to the prison deradicalisation programme, including resources made available for the supervision of probation and rehabilitation work.
(6) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must make arrangements to lay a copy of it before each House of Parliament as soon as the Secretary of State is satisfied that doing so will not prejudice any criminal proceedings.
(7) The Secretary of State may, out of money provided by Parliament, pay a person appointed under subsection (1), such expenses and allowances as the Secretary of State determines.”
This new clause would require the appointment of an independent reviewer of the prison deradicalisation programme.
New clause 3—Review—
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 9 to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.
(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to the imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review.
(3) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.
(4) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—
(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and
(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (4)(b) within one month of receiving the report.
(6) The Secretary of State may—
(a) make such payments as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in connection with the carrying out of the review, and
(b) make such other arrangements as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in connection with the carrying out of the review (including arrangements for the provision of staff, other resources and facilities).
(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day when this Act comes into force.”
I have already canvassed some parts of what I am about to say, but there is more to say, for a very sound reason. Parliament is full of opinions and Ministers are full of opinions. Two Ministers are sitting on the Front Bench at the moment, no doubt debating the issue before the Committee, but their opinions are not the law, and nor are those of leading counsel, whether senior Treasury counsel or those involved in academic discussion. I say that really seriously. I have been practising the law since 1967 and I know a little about how the law is interpreted. We saw the Gina Miller case the other day. How many times were we told that there was absolutely no question but that the Government were right in their interpretation? I served as the shadow Attorney General and saw the whole of the Iraq and Peter Goldsmith exercise. We were told over and over again in the House this, that and the other about interpretation—“This is what will happen. This is the way it will go.” That is no way to make decisions on matters of this kind of critical importance.
There are occasions on which the question of interpretation may merely be about a modification of policy; this is actually about saving human life. I repeat that: saving human life. Where it is possible for the House to ensure that human life cannot be unreasonably and wilfully disposed of by people who are intent on murdering for no reason at all, we need to take seriously the question of whether or not we can exclude the courts —because this is Parliament, not the judiciary—from making wrong decisions when matters come before them.
I heard with interest the Chairman of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and the various cases he mentioned, and I have just heard the Minister refer to the Uttley case. There is also the Hogben case, which was of course in 1985, before the Human Rights Act 1998. Reference was also made to the del Río Prada case. As a matter of fact, the legislation does not depend on an interpretation of those individual cases by way of precedent, and that is not what we should be worried about; we should be thinking about the purpose and scope of the Bill and its objective, which is to do everything that we can to ensure that human life and public safety come first. I do not want this to become an argument about the interpretation of law, which is why I tabled amendment 3 to clause 1.
On the subject of opinions, does my hon. Friend intend to test the opinion of the Committee, or merely the opinion of the Minister?
That is an extremely good question on which I have already given an indication. Being a realist, I know perfectly well that this is not a Bill to which an amendment is going to be passed—certainly not today—but I did say that the House of Lords, which is where the Bill is going, is full of lawyers, some of whom I will disagree with and have disagreed with for as many years as I have been in the House, but there are others who will take a different view.
I am interested to hear the views of the House of Lords on the question of my proposal to amend clause 1. The wording of clause 1 currently refers to an offence “within subsection (2)” and a sentence imposed
“whether before or after this section comes into force”,
at which point I propose to insert the words
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The effect of that would be to put a complete bar on the use of the Human Rights Act, by interpretation of the courts, in any attempt, whether it is regarded as misguided or is a matter of culture—there is currently a load of culture in the courts relating to human rights questions that have built up over the whole of my lifetime in the law.
I am deeply concerned that we could allow legislation to go through that could be interpreted in a way that would result in human life being lost and public safety being infringed. That is my concern. [Interruption.] I see the Minister looking at me either apprehensively or with anticipation; I am not sure which it is and I do not really care. What I am saying is that I want certainty. I know that if the words “notwithstanding the Human Rights Act” are brought into the Bill, the effect will be to exclude completely, for reasons that I am about to give, any attempt by the courts to modify the effect that the Bill otherwise would have.
I have other concerns about the Bill that I have already made clear. I do not think that offenders should be considered for release after half or two thirds of their sentence. I have a lot of sympathy for what my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) proposes in amendment 1; he says it should be nine tenths. I do not know whether he will address that point later.
The bottom line is that we should not allow this situation if we can avoid it—and we can avoid it, because we are the Houses of Parliament, and as a result of Brexit, we have just regained an awful lot of our sovereignty. This is more a matter of the European convention on human rights than of the charter of fundamental rights—or, for that matter, of Brexit—but the amendment is an indication of the House’s determination to use our sovereignty to make law that will guarantee that we do not face people losing their life, or public safety being undermined.
If we do not include in the Bill the words that I propose in my amendment 3, I believe—as I said before with respect to the Lee Rigby case—that it is not a matter of if such a thing happens again; it is a matter of when. I concede that this is emergency legislation; that is why I support it, but it requires a full, thorough review, perhaps by the Justice Committee, to ensure that we deal with the issue properly and fully.
I applaud the Government for bringing in this Bill on an emergency basis, but I criticise the fact that the Bill does not go far enough. The Minister is, if I might say so, not a lawyer; he can only have received his information from others who are. He is taking a bit of a punt in saying that the words
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”
are not needed. He does not know that. I say that with not only respect, but knowledge and certainty. It is very difficult even for lawyers to be sure what the impact would be of allowing the Bill through without excluding the Human Rights Act 1998 from it.
I thank the hon. Member for giving way, despite my non-lawyer background. I am of course interested in what he says, and have been listening extremely carefully, as he has seen. How does he think his amendment would operate? In particular, does he think it would in any way disapply our ECHR treaty obligations? Even if we passed his “notwithstanding” amendment, could applicants not still go directly to the European Court in Strasbourg? We cannot disapply that route through this amendment.
I notice that the Minister is reading very carefully from the notes with which he has been provided, and I agree with the sentiment behind them, but I am putting the case in a different way. We are talking about serious questions of human life, and every step should be taken to preserve it. I was originally minded to use the amendment to exclude the European convention on human rights, too. I describe amendment 3 as a probing amendment, but I want proper consideration of it, not just someone saying, “I don’t think the wording would achieve the total effect that the hon. Gentleman would wish it to.”
The risk to human life is serious; we have to take every step to ensure no repetition of the instances of murder and terrorism that we have witnessed, and which, in recent times, from Lee Rigby onwards, have become more and more prevalent. We know that people are prepared to take such steps; it may be that some of them are mentally disturbed. Perhaps people do not think that these things will happen again, but as I said in debate on another counter-terrorism Bill four or five years ago, the question is not whether we have another Lee Rigby, but when. We have had one after another, at regular intervals. They are becoming more and more imminent, and more and more serious. I doubt whether this Bill, however worthy its objectives, will deal with the problem in the manner in which I am setting out and which is necessary.
I am another layperson —a non-lawyer. Can my hon. Friend see any downside to including the set of words that he is suggesting in his amendment? Would they limit something that might otherwise not be limited? I hear very clearly his arguments about its possibly being superfluous and the legislation being subject to interpretation, but is there any downside other than it being an additional safeguard that might not have been required?
Indeed. As usual, my hon. Friend is very perceptive. This is really the main purpose of my words on the subject, because there is no downside at all in this context. I can think of circumstances where it might be arguable that there could be, because somehow or other one might be infringing some genuine human right. However, given that we are dealing with this issue for the sole purpose of preventing people from being murdered in the circumstances and in the manner of these heinous acts, and for the purposes for which people indulge in them, there can be no downside in making this absolutely crystal clear, subject to comments that may be made by other lawyers as a result of what I am saying now and, for that matter, what is said in the House of Lords.
I am not pretending that I have all the answers to every question in matters of this kind, but I do think it is our duty, in the context of what we are seeking to prevent, to ensure that we are as crystal clear as we can be in our direction to the courts that they should not and must not allow human rights considerations to allow murder to take place. That is the problem and that is why I am so emphatic about it. I have noted from the Minister’s remarks and from other conversations I have had with senior Ministers that they are perhaps more interested in questions of interpretation than I am. I do not want any interpretation in this context.
The sole purpose of this Bill is to deal with people who are going to commit murder. Let us be under no misapprehension: this Bill has not been brought forward to deal with some questions relating to the whole generality of human rights law; it is specifically emergency legislation to deal specifically with preventing people who, for a variety of reasons or without reasons, intend to perpetrate murder from doing so. Human life is at risk. That is why this is such a good move on the part of the Government. There is nothing negative in my approach; it is entirely belt and braces. If the opportunity is to be given to Parliament to make sure that we have both the belt and the braces, then for heaven’s sake let us take it and not leave it to the vagaries and the uncertainties of judicial interpretation.
I have already referred to the Hogben case. I am not going to go through the analysis, because this is not something that depends on compiling a judgment about the interpretation of law based on precedents. I do not think that any case we put forward, coming back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Adam Afriyie) said, could generate an upside or a downside. I just want clarity; that is the whole point. The words that I have used adopt the “notwithstanding” formula in section 38 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, relating to the sovereignty of Parliament. I argued this in No. 10, and the Prime Minister, to his enormous credit, completely backed me. I said, “You have to include the words ‘notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972’.” By doing this in a certain manner, one ensures that one achieves one’s objective, without the uncertainty that can arise in the circumstances that I have described.
We need to bear in mind that the Del Rio Prada case was a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. The Minister referred to the other cases. In the case of Uttley, there was an appeal on which the House of Lords concluded that article 7 would be infringed only if a sentence was imposed on a defendant that constituted a heavier penalty than that which would have been imposed at the time the offence was committed. The ECHR then declared that his application was inadmissible. The Del Rio Prada case was to do with Spanish policy, but there is no doubt that part of the argument put forward by the Government today has depended on administration, rather than the object of the Bill. That is another area that needs to be carefully considered, because the question of administration should not be the basis on which we make these decisions.
There we are—I have made my case. The Government could review the situation when the Bill goes to the House of Lords, and I will be interested to see how people develop this argument from now on.
I rise to speak to new clause 1, in my name and that of my hon. and right hon. Friends, but before I do I want to commend my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), who has had to deal with the awful incident that happened on the high street in Streatham shortly after coming into the House. On her intervention on the Minister on Second Reading, the issue of various sentencing decisions over the last 10 years was touched on in a new clause that was not selected, but more broadly I commend the idea of strategically reviewing the sentencing regime, and I hope that the Ministry of Justice will consider that.
I made clear to the Minister previously that it is not my intention to divide the Committee on new clause 1, but scrutiny of the de-radicalisation programme and giving Parliament confidence that the programme is being monitored is very important, and I hope he will address that when he responds.
The new clause specifically requires the appointment of an independent reviewer of the prison de-radicalisation programme. On Second Reading, the Minister mentioned some figures with regard to resources, including £90 million on counter-terror policing and an uplift in the prison budget from £2.55 billion to £2.9 billion, but that does not tell us specifically how much is being spent on the de-radicalisation programme. That is the sort of information that an independent reviewer would be able to discover and then put in a format that the House could consider.
We have already discussed Mr Ian Acheson’s review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice. One of his recommendations was to have an independent adviser on counter-terrorism in prisons who is accountable to the Secretary of State. My new clause goes slightly further than that recommendation. It would require the Secretary of State for Justice to appoint a person to review the operation of the prison de-radicalisation programme, with the power to enter prison premises both to gather evidence and provide scrutiny. There would be a statutory requirement for a report to be laid before Parliament every three months on the programme. That could be regarded as too often, but the general point stands—this House would be in a position to properly judge the effectiveness of rehabilitation work in our prisons.
Subsection (5) of the new clause gives the independent reviewer the power to look into the resources available to the programme, including for probation and rehabilitation work. That proposal of an independent reviewer would give the opportunity for proper scrutiny of this very important programme. The Minister will be aware of the healthy identity intervention and other such programmes that currently exist. Through new clause 1, we seek to build on that and give real confidence in the Government’s work in the rehabilitation and de-radicalisation space. I am not absolutely clear of the extent to which those who have perpetrated these awful atrocities in recent months took part in de-radicalisation programmes, but I hope that will be considered and that the Minister will learn the lessons from that. It is vital that we use the time in prison of whatever length—I had a debate about that earlier with the right hon. Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne)—in a constructive way to protect the public.
Before the shadow Minister sits down, may I ask him a question? I am engaged in a probing exercise—I am not going to push amendment 3 to a vote—and I would like to know what the Opposition think about excluding the Human Rights Act 1998 and what reason he would give for saying that it was unnecessary.
I am delighted to have a chance to respond. I will do so in a moment, but the first thing I would say is that I remember the criticism of me and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) in the last Parliament when we were seeking disclosure of legal advice—not from the hon. Gentleman, but perhaps from others. It strikes me that Members are now discussing case law across the Floor of the House and Ministers are referring to legal advice, which perhaps shows that there is a change.
I do not support the hon. Gentleman’s amendment. First, the point made by the Minister is correct, and even if we put this into the legislation, the right to go to Strasbourg would still exist. The second reason why I am uncomfortable with what the hon. Gentleman is saying—I am quite happy to give way to him again if I am wrong in my interpretation—is that he, as I understand it, wants the House to pass legislation and then somehow prevent courts from being able to adjudicate on it, which surely is not what is meant by having a sovereign Parliament that is accountable to judges.
I can respond to that very simply by referring the hon. Gentleman to the speeches made on the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I was in the House at the time, and it was made absolutely clear that this Act would not in itself impinge on the sovereignty of Parliament. That was made clear, and therefore as far as I am concerned—I understand where he is coming from, but I am afraid that his point is erroneous—it is implicit in the passing of the 1998 Act that we are able, if we wish to do so, to take the legislation that we pass in this House as the final word, and the courts are obliged to obey that.
With respect to the European convention on human rights, I would simply make the point that I made just now, which is that I could have included such words—yet again, that is another part of my probing amendment—and they could have been “notwithstanding the charter of fundamental rights” as a matter of fact, but that would have been destroyed by the existence at that time of the European Communities Act 1972, which was binding on us by Act of Parliament.
With the greatest of respect to the hon. Gentleman, it is not an erroneous point. I taught the Human Rights Act for the best part of 11 or 12 years, but I will resist the temptation to give his contribution a grade. Yes, the Human Rights Act contains the power to make a declaration of incompatibility, thus preserving the concept of parliamentary sovereignty —it is absolutely right that Parliament does not have a strike-down power as, for example, the US Supreme Court does—but I have two fundamental problems with his amendment. The first problem is the one I have set out: this House passing legislation that essentially tells the courts, “Well, you can move aside: this is absolutely what we say”, without any scrutiny.
I know the hon. Gentleman nods his head, but I am not comfortable with that position.
The second point is that I firmly believe we can tackle this issue of terrorism and remain signatories to the European convention on human rights. That is essentially the Government’s position here today, and I really do not think that we need to get into this debate because the Government have clearly stated that the Act—or the Bill, as it currently is—is compliant with article 7. If people wish to challenge that in the courts, that is a matter for them, but the Government must be confident in their legal position.
Under the Human Rights Act, each Bill that comes before the House contains a sentence on its front page to show that Ministers have considered whether it is compatible with that Act. If they had wished, the Government could have stated in the Bill that they did not think it compatible with the Human Rights Act, but they wanted us to proceed regardless. They did not do that, however, and they clearly state on the Bill their belief that it is compatible with the Act. We have heard a case law of history from the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), and others, but that is the Government’s position, and for those reasons I cannot support the amendment. I understand that he will not push it to a vote, and the debate will continue in the other place, but this is not an amendment that would have found favour on the Labour Benches.
Let me return to new clause 1. I will not push the idea of an independent reviewer to the vote—I will not frustrate the passage of the Bill in that way. However, it would assist the Committee if the Minister set out how Members will be able to scrutinise the programme of de-radicalisation over the next few years, and how we can have the information before us—whether from the Ministry of Justice directly or in another way—to assess how it is working.
The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), intervened on the Justice Secretary during his opening speech, and said that she felt there had been a lack of success in the de-radicalisation programmes. She is right, and we need to see some success in the years ahead. I will not push new clause 1 to the vote, but I hope the Minister will provide some assurances about how such scrutiny could take place.
I do not intend to detain the Committee long, Dame Eleanor, and the Minister should consider this not so much a probing amendment as a prodding amendment—it is my intention to prod the Minister.
The purpose of my amendments is stunningly obvious. At lines 34 and 37 I wish to remove “two-thirds”, and insert the words “nine-tenths”. In reality, many sentences, even for acts of terrorism such as the possession of terrorist promotional material with intent, give rise to a surprisingly short sentence, such as four years. In such a case, the difference between half the sentence, as currently served, and two-thirds, is a mere six months. Admittedly, extending that to nine-tenths of the sentence does not address the nature of the problem—that is why this is a prodding amendment—but the fact is that sentences are too short.
There is a general problem of honesty in sentencing. When a judge hands down a sentence in court, all those in the know work out on the back of a fag packet what it means in terms of imprisonment, but the public, who are generally not in the know, do not understand that the sentence is not that at all. They would be scandalised if they knew.
Does my right hon. Friend remember a recent case of two treasure hunters who I think got as much as 10 years because they had not declared a treasure trove? Compare that with somebody who is intent on murdering people on the streets of London, or anywhere else.
That is the random caprice of the judiciary! Returning to the issue before us, on the specific point of sentencing for terrorist acts, we must be clear in our minds about what intention lies behind our whole sentencing policy. I believe that fundamentally it must be to secure the reformation of the offender before he is released. The problem is that existing strategies for reforming offenders, and de-programming them from their ideology, are somewhat untested. Those that are tested—such as the programme run in Saudi Arabia, which has been shown to be effective—take a relatively long time. I suggest, therefore, that that lends itself to an indeterminate sentence to detainment at Her Majesty’s pleasure until a licensing authority, the Parole Board, has decided that the offender is safe to be released. That is the purpose of my amendment: merely to contribute to that debate.
In the context of what is developing into a very interesting speech, I refer to Edmund Burke’s famous attack on Thomas Paine in respect of what he really thought about human rights. It was a brilliantly expressed metaphor—that we would not be “trussed” like chickens, or something of that kind, by the human rights proposals of Thomas Paine.
Now I might really test your patience, Dame Eleanor, because my hon. Friend invites me to articulate a Burkean case against natural rights, which I will be happy to do, but perhaps on another occasion. Given that I offered the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) the opportunity to have a debate about this, that might be the very occasion. Perhaps my hon. Friend will agree to be my seconder in such a debate—what a humbling experience that would be for me and an elevating one for him. I hope we will do that on another occasion and we can indeed explore why so many people take for granted the existence of natural rights, as though they spring from the ether. As a Christian, of course I could not possibly take that view, but now is not the time to get into that discussion.
On the specifics of the amendment, my hon. Friend makes a belt-and-braces case, as I said, for a notwithstanding clause. The shadow Minister made the point that that was fundamentally disagreeable and made a constitutional argument against the notwithstanding clause per se. However, he also went on to say that he believed the Government were right, or were likely to be right, in asserting that they were clear that, in any case, this legislation did not contradict any existing rights legislation. We heard that today from the Secretary of State and again subsequently in the debate: the Government do not feel that the proposed legislation is likely to be successfully challenged, as my hon. Friend suggested it might. We have to assume that the Government have taken legal advice to make that claim.
I would not have wanted to suggest anything other than that. The hon. Gentleman was very clear that he had heard what the Government said about having taken that advice and their confidence that a legal challenge would not succeed on that basis. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone may be more sceptical than others about that, but it is important to point out that the Government have made it clear that further legislation on counter-terrorism will be forthcoming. That legislation might in itself, on a primary basis, revisit the issue of how counter-terrorism measures interface with and may be contradicted by existing legislation. That would be a very fundamental debate, because of course it will oblige the consideration of exactly the kinds of points that he made. On that basis, I am happy to go with the Minister. Notwithstanding my temptation to follow the example of my esteemed hon. Friend the Member for Stone, I am happy, like the shadow Minister, to err on the side of the Government and to say that if they have taken legal advice, with the further opportunity to revisit these matters in the primary legislation that we hear will be speeding its way to the House, I am prepared to concede the argument about rights.
My right hon. Friend will accept that this is primary legislation and furthermore that I have already said I am looking forward to a proper discussion about this in the future, with a view to getting it right, because the object of the Bill is to prevent people from being killed on the streets of this country.
I am talking about the murderous intent of people I described earlier as wicked. I use that word advisedly: not all these people are mentally disturbed. Some may be, and we know from evidence that some are, but not all. Crime is not an illness to be treated; it is a malevolent choice, an act of wickedness, and wickedness is entirely different from mental illness. I know it is difficult for some to grasp that, but it is important to emphasise it.
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s confirmation that the Scottish Government support these provisions.
Clause 5 relates to the setting of licence conditions. Clause 6 makes further consequential amendments relating to transitional cases. Clause 7 makes further consequential amendments that apply to England and Wales. Clause 8 makes transitional provisions in relation to offenders in Scotland and, again, clause 9 makes further consequential amendments that apply to Scotland.
Finally, clause 10 specifies the Bill’s territorial extent and commencement. It is worth saying that commencement will be upon Royal Assent, and we therefore hope the Bill takes effect from 27 February, which is important from the perspective of the release of certain dangerous offenders.
I hope that covers the clauses and schedules, and that they will stand part of the Bill.
As I have already made clear, I am happy to ask leave to withdraw the amendment with the restrictions and conditions that I have already imposed with regard to the House of Lords.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 1 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 1 and 2 agreed to.
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Bill reported, without amendment.
Third Reading