Europe
William Bain Excerpts(11 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
It is 62 years since the treaty of Paris was adopted, and 57 years since the adoption of the first treaty of Rome. In that time we have seen peace among the great powers in Europe, a great boost to our growth and trade, and a greater sense of social unity between Europe’s peoples. That is now under threat because the Government no longer seem willing to make the case that pooling part of our sovereignty increases our collective economic strength within Europe, and that our influence in the world increases as a result.
The success of the European Union means that other countries such as Serbia and Turkey are queuing up to join, and the model of peaceful rules-based co-operation between nation states has been followed in Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in Africa with the African Union, and in south America with Mercosur. We know from the views of the American Administration and the Government of China that our sense of and influence in the world is bound up with our full participation in the European Union, and we risk that at our peril.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), my grandfather served during the first world war and my parents were children during the second world war when Europe was in the process of tearing itself apart.
Mr Bain
Sadly I cannot because of time. For my generation, Europe stands stronger together with common rights at work, free movement for workers and a successful single market of 480 million with whom we trade more than 48% of our exports. On many issues, the common stance that we have adopted has added to our strength in the world. That is why, as a Scottish Member of Parliament, I am clear that we must remain part of the United Kingdom and through that play a crucial part in Europe. I am hugely concerned that the Scottish Government’s proposals to take Scotland out of the United Kingdom would impact on that strong link with Europe and lead to years of negotiations and uncertainty about our currency and central bank, and our inclusion in global trade agreements.
The EU is at an important crossroads and needs reform, not least of its economic policies. Through the fiscal pact to which 25 countries have signed up, we see southern Europe at risk of a generation of austerity. The tragedy of the Prime Minister’s leadership—as the ghost of Maastricht continues to stalk the Conservative Benches two decades after the ratification of that treaty—is that Britain is well placed to lead on major issues of reform such as reducing agricultural subsidies through the CAP, increasing Europe’s investment in science and innovation, and completing the single market in energy. Instead of prioritising those areas, the Prime Minister is throwing that opportunity away and trying to diminish the rights of workers within the single market to paid holidays, maternity and paternity leave, and safe conditions at work.
As the Government’s survey shows, if Britain is not part of the single market and if the rest of Europe completes it in our absence, our national income would be 7.4% lower—[Interruption.] The analysis, which Government Members can consult, was conducted by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.
The Prime Minister is placing his increasingly forlorn ambition of uniting his party above our national interests at the heart of Europe. It is the Opposition’s duty to make the positive case.
Oral Answers to Questions
William Bain Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Chris Ruane (Vale of Clwyd) (Lab)
11. What discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on the UK’s position at the December 2012 European Council meeting on the development of a banking union.
Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
13. What discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on the UK’s position at the December 2012 European Council meeting on the development of a banking union.
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
I have made it clear to my colleagues in the European Union that while we accept that the eurozone needs a banking union, the detailed arrangements need to safeguard the interests of those member states that will not be part of the eurozone or of the banking union.
Mr Lidington
I reject the hon. Gentleman’s caricature of our position. We are playing an extremely active and constructive part in the negotiations. We recognise that getting the arrangements for a banking union sorted out is of real importance to our friends and partners who have committed themselves to the single currency, and that their financial stability will be of great benefit to the United Kingdom’s economic interests.
Mr Bain
The International Monetary Fund’s Christine Lagarde said at the weekend that a banking union was the first priority in saving the eurozone. If the Minister agrees with that, will he tell us precisely how many EU states agree with his plan for double majority voting to ensure that rules applying to banks in Britain are not dictated by a banking union bloc through the European Banking Authority?
Mr Lidington
All 27 EU Heads of State and Government said in the conclusions to the October European Council that, in the arrangements for a banking union, there needed to be a “level playing field” between the ins and the outs, as well as safeguards
“in full respect of the integrity of the single market in financial services.”
UK Constituent Parts (EU)
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Ann McKechin
I thank the hon. Gentleman for proving my case about volatility and disputes in the European Union. Any union or partnership that lasts a long time has difficult phases, and this is one. He has proved my point that the negotiations will not involve simply providing a list—that is what the First Minister always seems to suggest—saying what Scotland would like and expecting people to nod and say, “That’s fine. Don’t worry. That’s okay with us.” That will not happen, and any attempt to try to prove the opposite shows the weakness of the argument.
On the national central bank and financial regulators, Croatia’s recent entry negotiations show that they are not tick-box exercises, and again there is no guarantee that other EU members would be attracted to the solution that the Scottish Government prefer at the moment of relying on another EU member to provide both important institutions, and that is if that EU member agreed to that in the first place.
Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a powerful argument. I remind her that the most recent entry to the EU, Croatia, had to satisfy stringent tests about guaranteeing bank deposits, the independence of its central bank, monetary policy and financial security. Does she see anything in any of the plans produced by the Yes Scotland campaign that deals with any of those points?
Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North (Ann McKechin) on securing this debate and on speaking with such authority and passion in her opening remarks. One of my best decisions since being elected to this House three years ago was last November when I asked the Commons Library to publish a paper on the implications for Scotland of the debate around separation, in particular what it meant for continuing—or perhaps not continuing as we have uncovered in this debate—EU membership. Indeed, many of the points in that document will form the basis of the rest of the debate today.
As a member of the Labour Movement for Europe, I care passionately about our having a positive engagement with the European Union. Scotland can best protect, embrace and progress its national interests as part of a large state—the United Kingdom—which has a good degree of influence, and which, under the new arrangements, will have proportionately more votes within the Council.
The process for new accession countries—which Scotland would clearly be, according to the consensus of advice coming from the European Commission and the important statement from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office a couple of weeks ago—is arduous. As we explored in a debate in the main Chamber a couple of weeks ago, Croatia went through stringent steps in establishing the independence of its central bank, to show that proper procedures were in place to control its financial system, and to prove that it had a system to regulate and guarantee deposits. None of those concepts has been dealt with in the proposals from those who argue for Scotland to separate from the rest of the UK. Indeed, none of the countries that has acceded to the European Union has relied on the central bank and financial institutions of another state to show that it has sufficient financial independence in its own territory. The position put forward by the Scottish Government simply does not add up.
I want to put on record a couple of points that are important in relation to international constitutional law—perhaps a reference back to my old life before I became a Member of this House. The Scottish Government have relied on a couple of arguments: one in relation to the Vienna convention; and the other in relation to EU citizenship.
First, on the Vienna convention, the Scottish Government have said that Scotland would sign up to all the treaty commitments that the United Kingdom has at the moment, but, frankly, that is fatuous. The Vienna convention is primarily concerned with the process of decolonisation. Indeed, the International Law Commission withdrew a category of quasi newly independent states to deal with cases of secession. A new state is not entitled automatically to become a party to the constituent treaty and a member of an organisation as a successor state simply because at the date of secession, its territory was subject to the treaty and within the ambit of the organisation. That principle, which is recognised in article 4 of the Vienna convention and is the declared legal opinion of the International Law Commission, is entirely contrary to the position of the Scottish Government.
Citizenship of the EU is not distinct from being a citizen of the member state. It does not provide a legal basis for re-entry to the European Union. As other Members have said, that must come about as a result of a process of negotiation and unanimity with what will soon be 27 other member states. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, only Russia was able to succeed to most international agreements. [Interruption.] I am not saying that the United Kingdom is remotely like the Soviet Union. It would be absurd for any Member of this House to make an assertion that the two states were in any way comparable.
This debate matters hugely. The referendum must proceed on the basis of fact and law, not assertion and bluff. The debate has been important in distinguishing those two characteristics this morning. I care passionately about our future. If we want Scotland to thrive within Europe, that means that we will continue—and I hope that people will vote to have us thriving—within the United Kingdom.
Mr Swire
The hon. Gentleman was not even in the debate.
The voting weight, capability and credibility of the UK’s negotiations in the EU are mobilised in the service of all UK citizens. However, that does not mean the devolved Administrations are involved in EU policy only when we are coming up with an agreed negotiating position for the UK. The Government have been open to having Ministers from the devolved Administrations in the room, where appropriate, during the negotiations themselves.
The current devolution arrangements allow the special circumstances of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to be championed by one of the largest and most influential member states. Scottish independence, with a complex accession negotiation and no guarantee of favourable terms of membership at the end of it, would inevitably put a stop to that. Those advocating splitting off from the UK need to be clear about what that means in practice and to use evidence to set out their position.
As we have heard this morning, some advocate a fundamental reworking of the existing constitutional settlement that so benefits the people of the UK. Those who argue for an independent Scotland suggest that only independence will give their nation a voice in Europe. Their argument is underpinned by the assertion—it is only an assertion—that an independent Scotland would simply continue in membership of the EU, automatically inheriting the same arrangements that pertain to the UK now.
We learned only a few weeks ago, and we heard again this morning—the SNP was forced to reveal this following a freedom of information request—that it had not previously commissioned any legal advice on an independent Scotland’s place in the EU. Yet, the SNP has been making assertions that it had for several years while in government. Many will find it absolutely astonishing that while seeking to make its case for splitting Scotland from the UK, the SNP has been basing its case on unfounded assertions, rather than cold facts.
The hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), whom I like very much indeed, referred to his earlier musical career in Runrig. He will remember a song, which he may have written, called “The Message”. It says:
“You take your message to the waters
And you watch the ripples flow”.
Perhaps it is time he and his colleagues made sure that that message was backed up by substance and fact.
I do not need to remind hon. Members that the UK has, over the years, managed to negotiate exemptions from membership of the euro and the Schengen common visa area, ensuring that the UK can maintain control over its monetary and border policies.
Mr Swire
I am afraid I have no time. I will at the end if I have time.
In addition, hon. Members will be only too aware of the importance of the UK’s rebate, negotiated with great skill and determination more than 25 years ago. The rebate continues to ensure that the UK taxpayer is relieved of some of the burden of supporting some of the most imbalanced parts of the EU budget, which is of great concern to us all at the moment.
The UK therefore has a permanent opt-out from the euro and from the Schengen border-free zone; a permanent rebate on our net contributions to the EU budget; a choice whether to join new EU laws in justice and home affairs; and a protocol on how the charter of fundamental rights applies to the UK. However, if Scotland left the UK and applied to join the EU, all those issues would be subject to negotiation, and there is no guarantee whatever that it would obtain any of the special rights the UK currently enjoys.
It is precisely the UK’s weight and influence as one of the largest member states that has helped us to succeed in negotiating such arrangements. Scotland, like England, Northern Ireland and Wales, derives enormous advantage from them. I can see why the SNP is so keen to suggest to those voting in the referendum before the end of 2014 that those arrangements would simply continue in the event of independence, as if nothing had changed. However, the fact is that if Scotland became independent, everything would change. Independence is not simply an extension of the devolution arrangements that have worked so well; it is not merely a further point on the constitutional continuum; it is a fundamental change—a definitive split from the rest of the UK, and an irreversible step. Independence would bring devolution to an end.
As set out in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry into a separate Scotland, independence would create a new state, one that would have to take its place on an already crowded international stage. England, Northern Ireland and Wales would continue the international legal personality of the UK; Scotland, having decided to leave the UK, would start afresh. The overwhelming weight of international legal precedent underscores that point. There are many examples. One is India and Pakistan: following independence, India continued the UN membership, and Pakistan joined the UN as a new state. Another, as we have heard, is the USSR: Russia continued the legal personality of the USSR, and the other former Soviet Union states were treated as new states. There are also Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sudan and South Sudan.
The new state would need to decide which international organisations it wanted to belong to, in the context of its overall foreign policy. Obviously, it could not simply assert its membership of any of those organisations. The most likely scenario by far is that an independent Scotland would have to apply to join the EU as a new state, involving negotiation with the rest of the UK and other member states, the outcome of which cannot be predicted.
Scotland would no longer be represented through a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Nor would a separate Scotland qualify for the G8 or the G20. In answer to the question from the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) about the WTO, there have been no discussions with the Scottish Government on the issue. We are not in the business of pre-negotiating, as we do not believe the people of Scotland will vote for independence.
The UK Government are not alone in taking a factual and legally based approach to the issue. José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, made clear:
“A new state, if it wants to join the European Union, has to apply to become a member like any state.”
Recent correspondence between the Spanish Government and Commissioner Reding on the issue also supported that interpretation.
In simple terms, an independent Scotland could not just assert that it would be a member of the club; the other members would need to agree as well. The comments of the Spanish Foreign Minister, José Manuel Garcia-Margallo, to the Spanish Parliament on the 23 October must be noted:
“in the hypothetical case of independence, Scotland would have to join the queue and ask to be admitted, needing the unanimous approval of all Member States to obtain the status of a candidate country.”
The Spanish Foreign Minister was referring to the list of candidate countries wanting to join the EU, which include Iceland, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. Those are the remarks of a Foreign Minister of a major EU member state with an obvious interest in this issue. The Scottish Government must be prepared to respond and to be up front about the uncertainties surrounding their position.
An independent Scotland would not, therefore, simply continue automatically in membership of the EU. The EU treaties would have to be amended to allow it to join, and that would involve a negotiation. What terms would Scotland secure? Would it be able to avoid the commitment to join the euro or the Schengen area, which every new member state since 1992 has taken on? The simple answer is that we do not know—none of this is clear.
In contrast to the SNP, the UK Government are taking a transparent approach to analysing the legal issues, including by engaging with eminent legal experts. On 2 October this year, the Advocate-General for Scotland—one of the UK Government’s three Law Officers—delivered a speech at the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law, setting out the Government’s initial view on the legal questions. The Government have also made it clear that we will provide detailed evidence and analysis so that people in Scotland can make an informed decision about whether to stay in the UK and about the implications of leaving it. We will publish that analysis over the course of 2013.
It is the clear position of the UK Government that Scotland is better off in the UK, and the UK is better off with Scotland in it. We are backing up that position with a robust programme of analysis and evidence. Those advocating independence for Scotland are making assertions and pursue their argument with no solid foundation in fact.
Middle East
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
What discussions has the Foreign Secretary held with Secretary Clinton over Egypt’s role in brokering a comprehensive ceasefire agreement? Might such an agreement deal with issues such as border crossings and trade between Gaza and Egypt, which would help reduce Gaza’s economic dependence upon Israel?
Mr Hague
Yes, we are in close touch with the United States. I have regular discussions with Secretary Clinton and we are to have another very shortly. The wider solution for Gaza, not just an immediate ceasefire, is of course important. It includes the role of better access to and from Gaza and greater assurance that weapons are not going into Gaza—there are many aspects. We will discuss that with the United States as well as Egypt directly.
European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson). I am sure that throughout the debate we will have a few flashpoints over our differences in interpretation of the treaties, and the lessons of the Bill.
It is a testament to how far Croatia has progressed in the past nine years since it first applied for EU membership that we are being asked to approve the Bill that will ratify its likely accession to the EU as the 28th member state on 1 July 2013. Whereas 20 years ago it was recovering from the aftermath of the conflict with Serbia, the siege of Dubrovnik and the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia now has exciting plans to diversify its economy and invest in energy and tourism, and is cutting its deficit to under 4% of GDP, albeit in a period of somewhat patchy economic growth.
Although members of the European Scrutiny Committee are right to point to the further progress that needs to be made on judicial reform, the elimination of corruption in state-owned companies and the detection of crime, and that more must be done to bring suspected remaining war criminals to justice, it is also fitting that we now ratify the accession treaty signed on 9 December 2011, following 18 other EU member states that have done so, or have voted to do so, since February.
In January, some two thirds of those voting in Croatia’s referendum supported its accession to the EU as a means of embedding the rule of law and democratic values, and as a route to prosperity. There are, as hon. Members have mentioned, still some outstanding issues in connection with the ratification of the accession treaty by Slovenia, which has indicated that an agreement with Croatia over debts arising from the collapse of Ljubljanska banka in the 1990s still has to be reached.
Croatia proceeded through the 35 chapters of accession in the period of just more than five years, prior to the Commission’s making a favourable recommendation on its membership status. The political criteria required Croatia to ensure the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, minorities. The economic criteria require the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.
The acquis criterion refers to the ability to take on the obligations of membership arising from the treaties and the Union’s legislation—the acquis—including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, which would mean in due course Croatia adopting the euro as its currency, as under article 5 of the accession treaty it has no opt-out from participation in economic and monetary union. Indeed, no other accession state has had an opt-out, and no newly acceding or re-acceding member state would be likely to have one in future either.
The Commission’s monitoring report from last month found real progress being made on many fronts, although further attention had to be paid to the protection rights for LGBT people, the selection of new judges and prosecutors, and rooting out corruption in public procurement. On asylum and immigration policy, Croatia shows a good level of compatibility with the EU acquis, although further progress is required on visa requirements. As a new member state that will have to sign up in due course to the Schengen acquis, further work before entry to the Union will be required with regard to the free transit agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is interesting to note that the record for the shortest period from application to accession in the history of the EU was Slovakia, which completed all stages within two and a half years. Croatia’s accession process, which has taken five years, compares relatively favourably with that. Of course, the example of Slovakia’s accession is a cautionary tale for all states intending to accede or re-accede that believe the process to be a mere formality. As we know from remarks by the Commission, the President of the EU Council and the FCO, that would not be the case for any state seeking accession or re-accession.
Croatia had to make speedy progress in several areas of the accession process, demonstrating the standard that the EU expects of new aspirant member states or—dare I say it?—parts of member states that decide to separate and form new entities that might seek entry to the EU. This debate is instructive, therefore, not only because of what Croatia had to do to satisfy the entry criteria or what other aspirant states, such as Serbia or Turkey, might have to do in the future, but in terms of what Scotland might have to do to become a member state if it votes for separation in 2014.
The first area where Croatia had to make significant reforms was in relation to the creation of an independent central bank. The EU Council issued a draft common position on the progress of the access negotiations with Croatia in 2009 in which it commented extensively on the advances made in the administrative capacities and remit of Croatia’s central bank, the HNB. It noted that during the financial crisis of 2008 the bank adopted prudential measures regarding reserve requirements and foreign currency liquidity requirements. In particular, it reduced the reserve requirements from 17% to 14%, decreased the foreign currency liquidity ratio from 28.5% to 20% and raised banks’ maximum allowed open foreign exchange positions. The HNB has been designated by the Council as the component supervisory authority for electronic money institutions—a vital step in ensuring financial stability, which is a prerequisite of EU entry.
The Council also accorded significant importance to the capacity of the central bank in its foreign currency liquidity requirements. Croatia has implemented regulations aligning it with the EU acquis on the new capital framework, the supervision of electronic money institutions, the winding up and reorganisation of credit institutions, the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates and deposit guarantee schemes, and the enforcement of prudential requirements. Croatia required all this financial infrastructure before the Commission recommended that it be accepted for entry.
Let us apply the example of Croatia to the debate on other potential aspirant countries seeking accession or re-accession. Such a state, if it did not have its own central bank, would have to rely on another sovereign country’s central bank in order to harden or relax financial rules and requirements.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. We are drifting. I have pulled up other Members for doing the same. We need to stick to the subject in hand, rather than turning to other areas of accession.
Mr Bain
It does not follow from the EU’s deliberations with Croatia that Croatia’s offering another state’s central bank would have been acceptable to the EU in order to obtain the Commission’s recommendation for approval. That has intriguing lessons for future accessions and re-accessions. That is the implication of the Bill.
Croatia, through the State Agency for Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation, can guarantee bank deposits. It made significant improvements to this scheme in anticipation of complying with EU directive 94/19/EC, which specifies that all member states must have in place a safety net for bank depositors. It cannot be a criterion, then, for future accession or re-accession countries to fail to have a system to protect bank deposits. That is the implication that comes from Croatia’s accession process and which is reflected in the Bill.
The obvious question arises—the FCO mentioned this in a statement on Thursday—of how, if part of the EU were put into limbo, it could possibly meet the terms of such an EU directive, having no independent central bank, no machinery to guarantee bank deposits and having to rely on the central bank of another state to guarantee bank deposits. Those are all implications that come from Croatia’s accession process.
The lessons of the negotiations for any new aspirant state highlight the following issues: does it have its own financial services regulator or would it seek to continue with the current regulatory framework, which would be conducted by another state? What would be the governance arrangements for any financial services regulator? What degree of independence from Government would that have? What institution would be prepared to stand behind financial services firms with large deposits or policy holder liabilities? Indeed, how would it be possible to provide lender of last resort facilities without assuming regulatory control over financial transactions such as mortgages, insurance and even pensions? All these are issues that arise out of the Bill and the accession process that Croatia went through.
Finally, a framework to wind up failing or failed banks is required. In Croatia’s case, in chapter 9 of the 2009 common position document, the EU welcomed the alignment of Croatia’s legislation to the EU acquis with regard to bank accounts, branch accounts and the re-organisation and winding up of banks. In addition, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in its 2010 to 2013 strategy for Croatia, considered the securities market regulator highly effective in pursuing complex cases. All those steps were essential in showing compliance with the EU acquis in order for Croatia’s application for membership to be accepted.
With reference to the rights of EU citizenship being conferred on Croatians joining the EU, it is appropriate that the Bill permits a phasing in of the right to work. The Minister was right to say that the UK should make use of the flexibility that allows up to seven years before full free movement rights will apply to Croatian nationals in the UK, as was the case with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU earlier.
The Opposition support future enlargement on the proper criteria. We note the applications made by Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. Serbia was granted candidate status on 1 March this year, but has been advised by the EU that it can commence formal accession negotiations only if progress is made on the status of Kosovo and its future relations with Kosovo.
The Bill is important for Croatia’s relations with the rest of the EU and the outside world. In demonstrating that a country engaged in a bloody conflict two decades ago can emerge and be in a position to join the EU now, it shows the powerful benefits of full membership of the EU—benefits that go far beyond being a member of the European Free Trade Association. Simply being a member of that institution could render a country liable to be a net contributor to the EU budget but without any influence over how it is spent, and to be bound by the rules of the single market but with no ability to shape those rules. It was interesting that we had some figures this morning from the recent past of Scottish politics advising that a separate Scottish state should, instead of seeking EU membership, seek membership of EFTA instead—
Angus Robertson
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Would I be right in remembering your ruling to Members of the House that the debate should be about Croatia, not Scotland?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
That is not a point of order, but the hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. I have mentioned to Mr Bain that I need him to come to order on Croatia. I am sure he will do that, in the same way as other Members did who drifted when we pulled them back into order. That is where Mr Bain is now going.
Mr Bain
Indeed, that demonstrates Croatia’s wise decision to join the EU proper rather than seeking membership only of the European Free Trade Association, given the clear advantages that will accrue to its people when it becomes a full EU member state.
Furthermore, the Bill demonstrates precisely what states must do and the entry criteria with which they must comply before becoming members of the EU. I congratulate the people of Croatia on the progress they have made and welcome their entry next year. However, I also believe that it demonstrates the value of membership of the United Kingdom, the votes we have as a member of the EU Council and the ability to influence key decisions. That is a real benefit, and one that I and Opposition Members would not wish to see Scotland lose in coming years.
Mr Kennedy
I was near enough. I have represented constituencies such as Ross, Skye and Inverness West, or Ross, Cromarty and Skye. Single title constituencies always have me scratching my head.
As the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain) has said, the negotiations were successful. The political and social distance travelled in just a couple of decades is immense—that is not a long time, and Croatia is not far distant from us in global terms. Nevertheless, the accession negotiations were tough. Croatia was the first country to negotiate under the new chapter 23—tough new rules on judicial reform and fundamental freedoms that were introduced at European level as a result of the lessons learned from the Romanian and Bulgarian accessions.
Therefore, the European institutions have acquitted themselves well in dealing with Croatian accession both politically and in terms of financial prudence, and according to the founding principles of Europe, which follow from the founding principles of the Council of Europe—human rights, the rule of law and democracy. We hear so much that is negative, so it is worth putting those things on the record.
On the Irish dimension of the Bill, it is worth stressing that the protocol does not change the content or application of the treaties. Indeed, the European Council conclusions adopted in 2009 confirm that the guarantees given to the Irish, which form the subject of the protocol,
“will clarify, but not change either the content or the application of the Treaty of Lisbon.”
The conclusions also state that the contents
“will in no way alter the relationship between the EU and its Member States”
and are
“fully compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon and will not necessitate any re-ratification of that Treaty”.
Those who might be tempted down another diversionary line—another fault line in parliamentary politics—might wonder whether the Bill could be used to prise open the argument over the repatriation of other powers, but the answer is most definitely non, non, non. That was made crystal clear some three years ago, but it is worth underscoring in the debate.
When the Conservatives were in power alone back in the ’80s, with very large majorities and Mrs Thatcher at the helm, the Foreign Office and Prime Minister argued in support of the enlargement of Europe. Many of us who came at the argument from an instinctively pro-European point of view believed that the Conservatives supported the widening of Europe to prevent the deepening of Europe. It was a colossal political misreading. It was not, perhaps, as colossal as Mrs Thatcher’s instinctive initial opposition to the reunification of Germany, but it was of that order—a classic Conservative misreading of the way in which Europe would develop.
As we have seen over the 20 to 25 years since then, the widening of Europe has necessitated, in so many respects, a further deepening, resulting in a European Union, or a European Community or Common Market, as it was initially known. It began with six members, now has more than two dozen, and is likely to have many more. Common sense alone suggests that one does not have to be a constitutional lawyer to see that a deepening and a greater democratic process at the core of that deepening are needed if those individual component parts, the member states, as well as the overarching body itself are to function effectively. Croatia and what will follow in its slipstream in coming years, in tandem with the ongoing arguments about the fate of the single currency, mean that there will have to be further European deepening in many respects if the institutions of Europe are to serve their purpose. If the House of Commons passes this Bill, it would show that it supports that purpose, and I would welcome that.
Oral Answers to Questions
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
18. If President Abbas did present proposals to the UN within the next month for Palestine to be accorded observer status, and if the UN General Assembly approved them, would that not constitute an important statement by the international community of the primacy of a two-state solution, and would it not have the potential to break the diplomatic impasse?
Mr Hague
That is a hypothetical question. Of course it could be argued that it would be a very important statement. As I have said, I think that Members on both sides of the House believe in the importance of bringing about a Palestinian state, but if that cut across the ability of a re-elected or new US Administration to put its full weight behind this, and if it made Israelis less likely to enter into constructive negotiations in the coming months, it would take us further away from our goal rather than nearer to it.
Oral Answers to Questions
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Mr Hague
It was progress of a kind to have the discussions between the E3 plus 3—with Baroness Ashton speaking on our behalf, but all six countries present—and the Iranian negotiators, but those negotiations have not produced any breakthrough. Baroness Ashton and the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator, Mr Jalili, spoke again on 2 August—their most recent conversation—and we expect further contact between them in September. But for those conversations to make progress, it will be necessary for Iran to have less unrealistic objectives for the negotiations, and to be ready to respond to the clear and generous offer that the E3 plus 3 have made.
Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
6. What discussions he has had with his Russian counterpart on Syria since June 2012.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)
I held intensive discussions on Syria with Foreign Minister Lavrov during June, in Kabul and Geneva; the Prime Minister and I met President Putin in August; and I will look forward to meeting Foreign Minister Lavrov again at the United Nations General Assembly this month.
Mr Bain
I thank the Foreign Secretary for that answer. The civil war in Syria has just witnessed its most bloody week, and the head of the Syrian National Council has today said that the extent of the economic destruction in Syria means that nothing less than a Marshall plan by the international community will be required to reconstruct the Syrian economy. Will the Foreign Secretary continue to remind his Russian counterpart that a policy of engagement rather than obstruction is necessary for a secure middle east, and is in our and the Russian national interest?
Mr Hague
I absolutely will, and I did that, as I reported to the House yesterday, at the meeting of the UN Security Council in New York last Thursday. We will, of course, continue to press this point through the General Assembly meeting later this month. Again as I said in my statement yesterday, we are, in the meantime, working on what happens the day after Assad in Syria. There will be immense challenges for any future Administration of Syria. It is difficult for the United Nations to do all the necessary planning because the current Government of Syria are still a member of the United Nations, but we are doing that with the Friends of Syria group and we will be taking it forward energetically over the next few weeks.
Syria
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Mr Hague
They are being developed all the time. There was a constructive meeting last week in Cairo of opposition groups, which we hope will be built on, and the UK special representative to the opposition is working with them on an hourly basis and giving good advice. We are working in that respect with countries such as Turkey, France and the United States and, importantly, with Arab countries, and we will continue to do so. I always stress to Syrian opposition groups that when a country such as ours faces an existential crisis, such as the last world war, across all parties we come together and sink all differences for the duration of the crisis. Syria is in an existential crisis and that is exactly what they need to do.
Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
Following the horrific airstrikes by the Assad regime, an estimated 180,000 refugees have fled across the border into Jordanian refugee camps. What representations will the Foreign Secretary make to his international counterparts to ensure that the estimated $700 million funding shortfall is met and a humanitarian disaster avoided?
Mr Hague
I hope that I have covered that in answer to previous questions. I made the very strongest possible representations at the Security Council last week, in bilateral meetings and in the Security Council itself. We will be doing this over the coming weeks through our embassies around the world and with our European Union partners—I will meet them all at the end of this week—and of course the Prime Minister and I will pursue this with all the nations of the world at the UN General Assembly later this month.
Iran
William Bain Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
Iran is a historic nation with a proud and brave population. Many hon. Members will, like me, have friends in Iran and know of the hospitality of its people. There is little doubt, however, that the Iranian regime is one of the most oppressive anywhere in the world. It is a sponsor of terrorist activities, is involved in systematic persecution of the opposition and minorities, and is attempting to isolate its people from the outside world.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2008 democracy index ranked Iran 145th out of 167 countries and listed it among 49 countries considered authoritarian. Amnesty International has reported regularly that trial hearings are often heard in private and that political detainees are being denied access to legal counsel during judicial proceedings despite official assurances to the contrary. A 2007 US Department of State report pointed out that although in theory defendants had the right to a public trial, a lawyer of their choice and the right of appeal, in practice these rights were not respected by the regime.
We know that women and young people were at the heart of the pro-reform green movement in 2009, with young people comprising 40% of the electorate, yet the regime has launched a vicious counter-offensive by resorting to the mass detention of young activists and expulsions from universities, and by widening the powers of its youth paramilitary forces. Many Iranian women have resisted the imposition of a religiously justified patriarchal structure that systematically discriminates against them.
From extensive interviews with men and women inside and outside Iran, Human Rights Watch has documented widespread patterns of arbitrary arrest and torture based on sexual orientation and gender identity. As the UN discovered in 2010, the regime’s failure to meet young people’s socio-economic expectations is a major cause of its internal unpopularity: about 70% of the unemployed in Iran are young people; youth unemployment has doubled in the past 20 years; and even graduates take on average about three years to find a job.
Abhorrent though the regime is, pre-emptive military action, whatever its origin, would be as wrong as it was in Iraq a decade ago. But we must not take the options off the table. The attitude of the young people of Iran will shape its future in the coming decades, which is why we should stand with them, attempt to engage with those parts of Iranian society that believe in co-operation with the rest of the middle east and the west, while being firm in our opposition to the regime’s internal repression, its state sponsorship of terrorism elsewhere in the middle east and its belligerence over the status of Israel.
Following the attacks on the Israeli embassies in Tbilisi and New Delhi last week, the Government of Iran and their agent, Hezbollah, are increasingly isolated in the middle east, as many of their traditional supporters have been alienated by a perceived pro-Shi’a favouritism in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq. Syria acts as a prime channel to Hezbollah in Lebanon, as a base for Hamas leaders running Gaza, as a front-line ally in the confrontation with Israel and the United States, and as a political and commercial pathway into the Arab world.
The Iranians know, however, that in Syria the political balance between the minority Alawi Shi’a regime in Damascus and the Sunni majority has shifted to Iran’s distinct disadvantage, and that their main regional ally could soon fall. The Iranian regime knows that if the Arab spring topples the Assad regime in Syria, its greatest threat will be from revolution from within.
The true purpose of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme is difficult to establish comprehensively, which leads to suspicions about its motives. The RAND Cooperation think-tank published a paper recently stating that Iran would be able to acquire the threshold capabilities to build a weapon within the decade, but its view was that Iran did not yet have the will to develop nuclear weapons. Analyses by those such as the Royal United Services Institute, Stratfor and even the IAEA concur that there is no conclusive evidence, as yet, that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Rather, they believe that Iran’s aim is to reach a stage where it can let the international community know that it has the ability and resources to have the option of acquiring the bomb rather than to actually do so. Nevertheless, last November’s IAEA report remains suspicious of the regime’s intent given its concealment of the third enrichment facility near Qom.
There is evidence that sanctions that focus on Iran’s central bank might secure a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The new restrictions, announced by the US Administration last week, target banks that handle proceeds from the sale of Iranian oil imports if the country that they belong to has not significantly reduced the volume of oil that it imports from Iran by the end of June. The sanctions complement the EU embargo on Iranian oil imports, to be introduced by 1 July. As Dennis Ross, President Obama’s special assistant on the middle east between 2009 and 2011, wrote in The New York Times last Tuesday, through Iran’s backing of the Assad regime in Syria there are signs of diminishing support for Iran in the middle east, and it may be seeking “a way out”. Iran cannot obtain credit or do business with any reputable international bank. It cannot insure its ships or find energy investors. Its currency has dramatically declined in value against the US dollar in recent months. All this has led the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, to indicate that Tehran will seek to resume negotiations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, as well as to discuss Russia’s proposals for resolving the dispute, which it point-blank refused to consider when they were first drawn up last year.
A diplomatic solution is best for the stability of the entire middle east. Although all options should remain open, constructive dialogue should be the aim of the policy of this Government and the United Nations. In the event of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the Iranian leadership could use its connections and regional influence to cause regional breakdown, and deploy its paramilitary allies elsewhere in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and insurgent groups in Syria and Afghanistan, to create mayhem. As Colin Kahl, the former US deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the middle east said last month,
“force…should remain…a last resort, not a first choice.”
Sudan and South Sudan
William Bain Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Owen. I declare an interest as the new chair of the all-party group on Sudan and South Sudan, and I pay tribute to the work of my predecessor, my noble Friend Baroness Kinnock, for her commitment to alleviating poverty and hunger throughout the region.
This is a particularly timely debate, as it is nearly six months since South Sudan became the newest member of the international community. It is a new state with good natural resources, particularly in agriculture, but with genuine challenges as one of the least developed countries in the world. Chronic food insecurity in Sudan and South Sudan has been exacerbated by delayed rains in South Kordofan, the conflicts in that state and in Abyei and Blue Nile, and rising commodity prices linked to global factors and border restrictions and closures.
Conflict has meant that hundreds of thousands of people, those who were displaced and those who were not, have missed the planting season and remain unable to access their livelihoods. As of 4 September, some 4 million people in Sudan and as many as 3 million in South Sudan were at risk of food insecurity according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, which is of particular concern because the Sudanese economy depends on agriculture for almost a third of its output.
There have been significant recent developments across the two nations. Negotiations resumed between Sudan and South Sudan on 21 November in Addis Ababa, on several issues outstanding since the secession of South Sudan and expiration of the mandate of the comprehensive peace agreement in July. The negotiations focused on the sharing of oil revenues and on debt, trade, citizenship and border demarcation. But violence continues across Blue Nile and South Kordofan states in Sudan, with new waves of conflict-displaced people heading into South Sudan. The Sudanese armed forces state that they have captured key rebel holdings in Taruje, South Kordofan, which rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North forces deny. Médecins Sans Frontières states that new waves of refugees are reported to be fleeing the Blue Nile region for South Sudan, as the Government army have intensified air raids on the rebel SPLMN. That follows reports by the Satellite Sentinel Project of aerial bombardments of civilian areas between 11 and 27 November by the Sudanese armed forces in Blue Nile state. Thirteen thousand refugees have been reported thus far. Tens of thousands of southerners in the north attempting to return to South Sudan are left in limbo, unable to return home or reintegrate into life. They have sold their homes and possessions and are stuck in temporary camps with limited access to basic amenities.
Unresolved issues between Sudan and South Sudan continue to give rise to considerable tension, as the Government of Sudan continue to halt the south’s oil exports until a transit fee is arranged. Sudan is also confiscating 23% of the south’s oil entitlement as payment owed since independence. It is significant that China has sent senior official Liu Guijin to mediate between the two states. Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has expressed deep concern about the fighting in Blue Nile state and South Kordofan. The EU made €40 million available for humanitarian action in Sudan and South Sudan throughout September, part of which was set aside for South Kordofan. As I mentioned earlier, in late November, the EU welcomed the resumption of crucial negotiations in Addis Ababa between Sudan and South Sudan under the auspices of the African Union high level implementation panel, led by Thabo Mbeki. It urged both parties to make every effort to resolve outstanding issues, including those related to oil, transitional financial arrangements, borders and Abyei, and to reach a negotiated settlement.
The EU has announced that it would provide funds for new early recovery projects in areas of Darfur where the security situation is stable and to where displaced people have voluntarily decided to return, with priority being given to health, education, food security and securing livelihoods. On 11 November, the EU Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, announced that the European Commission had pledged €200 million to South Sudan to address key sectors such as health, education, rule of law and infrastructural development, particularly in connection with the construction of feeder roads. But the EU has not been able to disburse the €294 million pledged to Sudan in 2008 for between then and 2013, as Sudan chose not to ratify the revised Cotonou agreement because it included clauses about co-operation with the International Criminal Court.
There are ongoing conflicts in Abyei, South Kordofan, Blue Nile state, and Darfur. In Abyei there are still flows of people crossing the Banton bridge from Agok and going to areas north of the Bahr al-Arab, or Kiir river. Some 60 people cross daily and fewer return. The UK’s Special Representative for Sudan, Michael Ryder, stated in Juba on 1 December that the deployment of UN troops from Ethiopia in the Abyei region has led to improvement in the stability of the area. He indicated that civilians are now able to return to their homes and that the remaining controversy is about the formation of the Abyei administrative council. The Government of Sudan have indicated that they will fully withdraw their troops once the council make-up has been agreed.
In South Kordofan, international non-governmental organisations estimate that 300,000 people have been displaced since the summer. A camp for refugees from South Kordofan in Yida, South Sudan, was bombed by the Sudanese armed forces on 10 November, an act that has met with international condemnation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees now plans to facilitate the voluntary relocation of some Sudanese refugees from the Yida site to safer locations further south. Heavy shelling has been reported though, and the UNHCR reports that 80,000 people have now fled conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile state. Some 36,000 Sudanese refugees are estimated to be in Ethiopia, in three refugee camps—Sherkole, Tongo and Fugnido—as well as at Adimazin transit centre. Foreign aid workers and journalists are still prohibited from accessing the area to verify information and provide much needed humanitarian aid.
Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. He is turning now to international access and the lack thereof, particularly by journalists. He is eloquently outlining the problems, but does he agree that one of the big issues from now on will be the information to the west and the developed world about what exactly is happening in Sudan and South Sudan, so that we can more appropriately and better deploy the resources to help the people there?
Mr Bain
The hon. Gentleman makes a very interesting and accurate point. It is interesting that more than 35,000 refugees have been displaced from Blue Nile state into Ethiopia, but up to 13,000 new refugees are fleeing Blue Nile into South Sudan as the Sudanese armed forces’ air raids on rebel forces are reported to have intensified on 2 December. Information about what is happening on the ground will be critical to resolving the disputes.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that some 700,000 southerners of Sudan have not had their nationality recognised? They are in a grey area—limbo-land. Does he feel that the Government should be doing more to address that issue, so that people know where they belong? Is it north, is it south—where are they?
Mr Bain
That is the issue to which I referred a few moments ago. I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising it once more. Clearly, the Government should use their influence to speak with Catherine Ashton and UN agencies to ensure that the issue is resolved in negotiations between the two states as urgently as possible.
To return to dislocation, a further 8,000 refugees are thought to be on the move towards South Sudan from Blue Nile state. Some are reported to have walked for more than a week to reach safety in Doro village in South Sudan, 40 km from the border between the two states. Satellite images captured in November indicated that war planes had attacked villages directly. Between 10,000 and 15,000 refugees are estimated to have fled to the border areas of Upper Nile state after infighting in Blue Nile state, according to UNHCR information.
The UN has reported new cases of displacement in both North Darfur and West Darfur as a result of continued offensives between the Government and rebels. Population movements have also been recorded in South Darfur due to ongoing military operations. Groups displaced before July continue to lack proper access to water, food, health care and sanitation, and humanitarian relief access to the area is also lacking. I hope that the Minister will address several issues in his closing remarks. Will the Government make representations at EU level so that all parties unite in calling for the two states to ensure the welfare of civilians by refraining from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, agreeing an immediate ceasefire and allowing unimpeded humanitarian access? Will the Government engage in diplomatic efforts and encourage actors with leverage over both parties to seek a political solution to the crisis, including by completing post-comprehensive peace agreement negotiations with support from international or regional arbiters, and ensure that the promised popular consultations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile take place as part of broader efforts to include the concerns and priorities of civilians in peace negotiations?
Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab/Co-op)
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. His point about encouraging all those with influence on both countries to exercise it to bring about peace is crucial. What role does he think the Arab nations in particular have to play in providing influence on the Sudan Government? I know that the Sudan Government were congratulated by the new Libyan Government on the support that they gave Libya. Maybe that influence could now be reciprocated to encourage progress in Sudan.
Mr Bain
My hon. Friend raises an interesting point. Where the Arab League and other actors in the Arab world can exercise positive influence, we should welcome that.
It is essential to support the efforts of the UN emergency relief co-ordinator to secure full and unimpeded humanitarian access. Will the Government encourage the EU to seek an end to any support for non-governmental armed groups operating on either side of the border, and support the establishment of a demilitarised zone monitored by the UN along the border?
The international community has been engaged fully in development issues since the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005, but one in eight children die before their fifth birthday, the maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world and more than half the population lives below the poverty line. More than 220,000 people were displaced by conflict last year, and more than 100,000 were affected by floods. Already this year, fighting in the disputed border areas, clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and militia groups, disputes over land and cattle and attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army have forced nearly 300,000 people from their homes.
The 38 aid agencies working in South Sudan have made several recommendations: strengthen the capacity to deal with humanitarian crises; prioritise food security; strengthen the role of civic society; work with the Government of South Sudan to enhance social protection; encourage the development of smallholder agriculture as a means to improve women’s economic participation; address the land issue for returnees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups; and provide technical support for the Sudan-South Sudan border co-operation policy. The Sudan unit within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has indicated that £150 million will be allocated for Sudan each year, with £90 million going to the Republic of South Sudan. To what priorities will that spending be devoted?
The people of Sudan also suffer the plight of HIV/AIDS. An estimated 40,000 people in South Sudan are living with HIV, about 14,000 of whom are eligible for treatment. Of those, only about 3,500 are receiving the medication that they need to return to health and prevent further infections. Between now and 2014, at least 11,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in South Sudan who need antiretroviral treatment will not have access to it, and might die unless additional funding is found. I commend the work of Alliance South Sudan, which currently supports 92 community-based organisations across 23 counties in eight of South Sudan’s 10 states, on its efforts to build capacity for an integrated HIV response.
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was founded in 2002 in response to the devastating impact of those three diseases. It is the largest international financier of action against AIDS, TB and malaria and accounts for 80% of funding for TB, three quarters of malaria programmes worldwide, and half the global AIDS response. It is currently chaired by the United Kingdom. To date, it has disbursed more than $20 billion in 150 countries, saving an estimated 6.5 million lives. It was rated as a high-performing institution providing very good value for money in the multilateral aid review carried out last year by the Department for International Development.
At the board meeting two weeks ago in Accra, however, it became apparent that, for the first time in the fund’s history, its supporter countries lack available funds to sustain the next round of funding. The decision was taken to cancel round 11, delaying any expansion in programming until 2014 at the earliest. That means that the fund will not be able to put more people on vital TB treatment or provide additional bed nets to prevent the spread of malaria. It will also lead to rapidly growing waiting lists for life-saving HIV medicine over the next two and a half years.
The replenishment conference in October 2010 raised just $11.7 billion to cover programming between 2011 and 2013, rather than the $13 billion required to maintain programming and modest expansion, or the $20 billion needed to scale up towards universal access. In addition, donor countries have not paid the amounts pledged on time or in full. South Sudan is among those countries where the delay could have a devastating effect. South Sudan was depending on the fund’s round 11 disbursement to fill a significant funding gap within its health response. Although it has a fully costed national AIDS plan, the plan has a funding gap of 80%.
The UK pledged £384 million in October 2010, in line with the existing £l billion pledge to the fund between 2008 and 2015 made by the previous Government. The Government are paying in full and on time, and have advanced some payments to help ease the fund’s cash flow issues. The UK has also pledged a significant increase in its contribution dependent on implementation of reforms, following the multilateral aid review’s rating of the fund as very good value for money, but nine months after the intention to increase funding was announced, it has not been confirmed.
Will the Minister agree to liaise with DFID to discover whether we can expect an announcement before the fund’s mid-term replenishment, due by mid-2012? Will the Government consider making allocations from DFID’s budget to deal with important issues such as prevention, care and support and work with children affected by AIDS in South Sudan? Will the UK use its influence to encourage other contributor states, such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United States, to follow through the commitments to tackle HIV/AIDS—US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made that commitment in her speech on world AIDS day last week—by offering more financial support to the global fund? Could such action involve the hosting of a special donor conference next year?
The challenges to alleviate poverty and suffering across the two nations are severe. In July, Save the Children reported that South Sudan has the world’s worst maternal mortality rate, that a fifth of all its children suffer from acute malnutrition, and that only 10% of children complete primary school. A hundred midwives and fewer than 500 doctors cover a population of 8.3 million people. This represents the biggest development challenge in the world, and our response to facilitating an end to the internal conflict that has scarred the region for too long is a test of leadership for the international community.