Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Will Forster Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

I aim to please with my tie. The hon. Gentleman can probably attach as much importance to the policy paper as he sees fit, as he does with anything else I might or might not say; it is for him, and for readers of the debate, to determine the value and weight they add to that. Another proposal we have put forward is on salary thresholds and what someone should be earning in order to remain in this country. I think that is a big deal; I will go on to outline why I think it is important, but yes—it is a big deal.

As I was saying, The Economist said only last week in one of its leaders that

“governments must also learn from the policy mistakes that lend it credibility. It was foolish to admit lots of newcomers without liberalising housing markets. Also, since migration flows to rich countries cannot be unlimited, it makes sense to favour highly skilled economic migrants over lower-skilled ones nearly all the time. Arguments for low-skilled migration built around supposed labour shortages are flawed.”

Interestingly, in countries outside the UK, research has shown the importance of income in long-term migration. A report in the Netherlands, which used detailed microdata on fiscal contributions and benefits to the entire population to calculate the discounted lifetime net contribution of the immigrant population present in 2016, was published in December 2024 and concluded:

“If the parents make a strongly negative net contribution, the second generation usually lags behind considerably as well. Therefore, the adage ‘it will all work out with the second generation’ does not hold true. High fiscal costs of immigrants are not that much caused by high absorption of government expenditures but rather by low contributions to taxes and social security premiums. We also find evidence for a strong relationship of average net contributions by country with cultural distance, even after controlling for average education and the cito-distribution-effect.”

Although we should acknowledge that the Netherlands is a different country with its own unique systems and that its situation does not necessarily apply to the UK, the finding highlights the need to examine the impact of migration decisions in comparable nations. New clause 32 takes steps to do that, ensuring that migrants contribute to our economy.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

This is a very different hon. Member for Stockton West speaking now from the one who spoke last week, when he spoke against and voted against the Liberal Democrat amendment to allow and encourage asylum seekers to work so that they could benefit our economy. Does he not remember last week? Where was his concern for the taxpayer then?

[Matt Vickers]

I would suggest that that is quite a creative interpretation of last week’s events. This debate is about what people contribute when they are legally able to, rather than creating anything that would draw more people to make that crossing and to turn up in this country.

New clause 32 would revoke indefinite leave to remain in certain circumstances: that a person

“is defined as a ‘foreign criminal’ under section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007”;

that the person

“was granted indefinite leave to remain after the coming into force of this Act,”

but has not spent 10 years resident in the UK;

that the person or their dependants

“have been in receipt of any form of ‘social protection’…from HM Government or a local authority”;

or that the person’s

“annual income has fallen below £38,700 for six months or more in aggregate during the relevant qualification period, or subsequent to receiving indefinite leave to remain.”

Let us be absolutely clear about one thing, because it is a cornerstone of this proposal and speaks volumes about who we are as a nation and what we stand for when the chips are down: anyone who has entered this country under the carefully crafted, well-designed and wholly principled safe and legal routes—those lifelines that we have extended through the Ukraine scheme, the British nationals overseas scheme or the Afghan schemes—would find themselves entirely exempt from the rigours of new clause 32, and rightly so. Those schemes are not just policies, but promises; they are solemn commitments that speak to our national character, and we stand by those we have pledged to protect.

Let us think of the more than 200,000 Ukrainians welcomed since 2022, fleeing Putin’s bombs—families clutching what they had, offered sanctuary through the Ukraine family scheme and Homes for Ukraine.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)

Will Forster Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Katie Lam]

Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?

Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are talking about electronic monitoring in the context of serious crime prevention orders; we are not talking about monitoring simply in connection to being an asylum seeker or migrant. I would not want Opposition Members to worry or mix up those two things.

This part of the Bill is about dealing with serious and organised criminality, some of which will involve people smuggling, and some of which will involve drugs, firearms or other serious organised crime. This is electronic tagging in the context of the granting of serious and organised crime orders, or interim serious and organised crime orders, which are designed to disrupt and prevent the activities of serious organised crime groups, not just general asylum seekers or migrants. Obviously, there may be some connection between the two, but it is not direct in this area.

Those orders and their conditions, such as electronic monitoring, therefore will not apply to migrants generally. Law enforcement agencies use serious crime prevention orders to manage individuals who have been convicted of, or are suspected of, serious criminality, where the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting the person’s involvement in serious crime.

Serious crime prevention orders can be imposed on offenders for a range of offences relating to people smuggling. The specific conditions of the order will be a matter for the judge in the High Court who makes it, and for the law enforcement body that makes the application. This is very focused, and it is all about the context of the individual who has been served with such an order. For that to happen, there has to be evidence of their involvement in serious and organised crime.

Clearly, tagging is about being able to check where people are, while electronic monitoring can also apply to other activity. It will apply in a particular context to a particular person for disruption reasons, so there is not one definition of electronic tagging. I hope that helps the hon. Member for Woking to understand the monitoring that we are talking about. On that basis, I hope members of the Committee will agree to clause 46.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Interim serious crime prevention orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Will Forster Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It has been a while since the sitting began, and it is easy to overlook that I have not been up on my feet so far. We have had an interesting debate. The amendments before us range from, at one end, the Opposition, whose amendments seek to criminalise everyone who gets in a small boat and presumably cart them directly to prison, through to the other end of the argument, represented with his usual passion by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, who feels that, if someone is an asylum seeker, they should be exempt from being judged at all on the behaviour that happens on the boat.

I will deal with some of those points in turn, but I also want to compliment my colleagues who have made their own comments and some very important points in this debate. It is important, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, that we are clear-eyed about what is happening in the channel. We can be romantic about it in many ways, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire often appear to be, or we can regard all those who come over as criminals and a threat, but the truth is somewhere in between.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East made a moving speech about the realities of what can happen in these circumstances; it is easy to forget, when we are sat in a nice warm Committee Room—although it is not always warm, facing as it does on to the river. Imagine ending up in the water in the channel, Mr Stuart; you can last only so long. You could easily have a heart attack in that cold water and not be resuscitated. Clearly, if you are a child, or vulnerable in any other way, then that is likely to happen—and it will happen to you first.

My hon. Friends the Members for Bassetlaw, for Clwyd East and for Dover and Deal made important points about the realities too. I will come on to what the Government are trying to do with this offence and why it is in the Bill, but I will deal with the amendments first. I hope I will be able to answer some of the questions that have been asked during this important debate—[Interruption.] I also hope that my voice is going to last out.

Amendment 15 focuses on the length of the sentence attached to clause 18 and seeks to increase the sentence from six to 14 years where an irregular entrant arrival has caused or created a risk of serious personal injury or death to others during a sea crossing to the UK. Clause 18 introduces a new criminal offence that is to be inserted into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. The current sentence for the offence of arriving in breach of a deportation order under section 24(A1) of the Immigration Act is five years.

Because clause 18 will be inserted into section 24 of the Act, the intention of the clause is to ensure that, given the egregious and serious natures of the acts committed under the new offence, the maximum sentencing is increased, albeit remaining in line with the existing sentencing framework in section 24 of the Act. The issues about the length of sentence are all about keeping sentencing in that section of the Immigration Act coherent. Grabbing extra, lengthier sentences out of the air to insert them into the Act can create inconsistency and mess up the structures of sentencing involved in the Act, making it less coherent than it should be. The sentence of five years was reached after discussions with partners about all the sentences and offences in this particular area, and it rightly reflects that coherence.

An increased sentence of six years is considered to be appropriate for the endangerment offence. It furthers the deterrence aim of the policy, but is not so severe as to deter prosecutors from bringing a prosecution in the first instance. That is another area in which the rhetoric of even longer sentences deters prosecutors from bringing charges at all. We have seen that with the facilitation offences, where the introduction of a life sentence has led to fewer prosecutions being pursued; prosecutors think that for a sentence of that length, more obvious evidence has to be accrued, so they charge fewer people. An increased sentence can sometimes have a perverse effect on the system. We think that the sentence in the Bill is in keeping with the Immigration Act and is about right.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

I am pleased that the Minister talked about the length of the sentence, which we have not talked about very much in the debate so far. Fourteen years is the maximum sentence for placing explosives with intent to cause bodily injury, and for such other offences as causing death by dangerous driving. To me, 14 years is more applicable in those cases. Does she agree? I do not understand the rationale for 14 years.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, and it is not for me to get into the head of the hon. Member for Stockton West. Perhaps he will talk to us about why he picked that particular number. I agree with the hon. Member for—is it Worthing? [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Woking—I knew it began with a W, and my own constituency begins with a W, so we are there or thereabouts in the dictionary.

Similarly, amendment 16 seeks to increase the sentence from five years to 14 years where an irregular migrant or arrival has caused or created a risk of serious personal injury or death to others during a sea crossing to the UK and is entering without the requisite leave to enter, entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation. As with the approach taken to those who arrive in breach of a deportation order, and as discussed in relation to amendment 15, clause 18 will provide an increased sentence compared with the offences under section 24(B1), (D1) and (E1) of the Immigration Act.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Will Forster Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

Clauses 19 to 23 contain very wide powers. Often, police constables have those powers only when they are authorised and monitored by their superiors, but the powers in the Bill almost allow civil servants and immigration officers to use them without oversight. Clause 25, first, allows Ministers to extend those powers to privately employed staff, and secondly, does so without requiring Ministers to give directions for the exercise of those powers. That sits very poorly with me. I am quite concerned about that. I can understand why we need some broad powers, and I was happy to let the others go through on the nod, but clause 25 seems to go further still. Could the Minister try to reassure me—or us? Particularly, would the Government agree to issue directions for the use of those powers, either today or before MPs vote fully, on Report? I think some colleagues out there will say that the private sector should not have these powers, but if they are clearly identified and statutory guidance is issued, I would feel a lot more reassured.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The first thing to say is that the powers under the Criminal Justice and Police Act are already used by law enforcement and apply in many statutes. Therefore, all of these powers will be used to ensure compatibility with ECHR protections, GDPR protections and data protection generally. We have a very high level of expectation when it comes to data protection in these instances.

Both hon. Gentlemen—the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Woking—have asked about the extension to further authorised people, which is potentially available as part of the clause. It is not unusual—the hon. Member for Woking has made this point—for the Government to hire and use contractors, on either a short-term or a long-term basis, depending on demand or business needs. One example that comes to mind in this context would be for a forensic data specialist to do analytics of the information that had been downloaded. [Interruption.] I am very sorry if that is me. Hopefully it is not.

Some of this is about ensuring flexibility in the statute, within the protections that I have just talked about—the GDPR, data protection legislation and ECHR requirements —to be able to deal with the information in all circumstances without having to come back to primary legislation. Clearly, those people would be working under the same data protection expectations and requirements as any directly employed person working for the Home Office.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Will Forster Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Mubeen, do you have a comment?

Mubeen Bhutta: I do not have anything more to add to the important points that Daniel made.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

Q I want to broaden this out. Enver highlighted the Refugee Council’s view on the Bill being too narrow. What is the view of the Scottish Refugee Council and the British Red Cross on that? What do you think of safe, legal routes?

Mubeen Bhutta: I did not quite catch the first bit of your question, but I think you are asking about safe and legal routes. I endorse some of the comments that my colleague Enver has already made. We welcome the Bill. We welcome the intention of the Bill around reducing the loss of life in the channel, but that is only half of the story.

It is really important that we look at the reasons why people are putting their lives in the hands of people smugglers in the first place. It is often because there is no other choice—there is no route that they can take. We would like to see more safe and legal routes, whether that is new routes, such as enabling people to apply for a humanitarian visa in the country that they are in to come directly to the UK and then be able to claim asylum, or expanding existing routes such as family reunion, so that there is more eligibility for people to use those routes.

It is really important to look at both sides of the coin. In a way, you could consider this Bill to be looking at the supply of this sort of activity, but it does not do anything about the demand. People will still need to make those journeys if no other routes are available.

Daniel O’Malley: For us, this is another migration Bill on top of many migration Bills. The system that people seeking asylum currently face is convoluted and arbitrary, and it is founded on hostility. As Mubeen rightly said, it is about the enforcement and stopping people crossing, rather than creating a more efficient asylum system. For us at the Scottish Refugee Council, that is what we are concerned about in the Bill. You talked about the Bill being quite narrow, but there are aspects of it that are far too broad and that can be applied in too broad a manner.

For the Scottish Refugee Council, the asylum aspects of the Bill do not address an updating of the asylum system. There are points on integration that should be considered as well. Nothing in the Bill talks about the integration of people seeking asylum while they are in the system. We commend the Government for speeding up the clearing of the backlog, which is great, but work needs to be done to help people who are in the system to integrate into the country. About 75% of people in the system will typically be granted refugee status, so work needs to be done to help them to integrate into communities, rather than having them in asylum accommodation or hostile environments.

The Government are rightly looking at asylum accommodation and the Home Affairs Committee is also doing an inquiry into it, so we know the work is being done. We would have liked to see the Bill contain a point about integration. The work in Scotland on this is the “New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy”, with an approach to integration from day one of arrival. We would like to see that extended to the UK level as well, mirroring what has also been done in Wales.

[Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)]

Q We have met previously, Mr Solomon, and I want to declare that I have worked for the National Crime Agency in the past and in a counter-terror role. I understand the points you made on enforcement, but what are your views on the fact that the Bill also includes strong disruptive measures, which is of course pre-enforcement, such as search and seizure?

Enver Solomon: I think those measures are legitimate. As I said, it is important to take steps to disrupt the activity of gangs that are causing huge harms to the lives of individual men, women and children, who are often extremely vulnerable. Attempts such as the powers you referred to are important and have a role to play—I am not disputing that. What I am saying is that they need to be used proportionately and to be clearly targeted at the individuals behind the criminal gangs and the trade of the criminal gangs.

Our concern is that, by broadening criminal powers in the Bill and specifically by introducing new offences, individuals will be caught up in that process. People who are coming across in very flimsy and dangerous vessels will end up being criminalised through no fault of their own. We are also concerned that using further laws—as has been seen across a whole range of different areas of public policy—is a blunt instrument to try to change the behaviour of people.

People will not stop getting into flimsy dinghies and coming across the channel or the Mediterranean because of new offences that they might face. They will probably know very little about the nature of those offences. They will know very little about the new rules that mean, if you get refugee protection, you will no longer be able to go on and gain British citizenship. We know that from our experience: they will know nothing about that, so it will not change behaviour or provide the deterrence that I think it is hoped it will provide.

That is why you need to use these powers in a very targeted, proportionate way that deals with the prosecution of the criminal behaviour but does not result in, in effect, punching down on those vulnerable people who are getting into the boats because they want to seek safety. It will not change their behaviour. That is our experience from having worked with refugees and people seeking asylum over many decades.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Zoe, what is your view on the idea that has gained traction in certain areas of this debate—that the Human Rights Act and the ECHR are effectively preventing us from having a reasonable system, and that the only way to have an asylum system that works is to pull out of those international agreements?

Zoe Bantleman: As the witnesses in the previous session have already said, those are not the only international legal agreements by which we are bound. The UK has voluntarily agreed to be bound by a great many international legal agreements, including in relation to the rights of children, the convention on action against trafficking and the conventions on the rights of stateless persons. There are a whole host in addition to the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights.

One of the hallmarks of the new Government has been this new-found commitment towards our international legal obligations, and also restoring the UK’s position as a leader in the international rules-based order, which all three of the previous Acts—the Safety of Rwanda Act, the Illegal Migration Act and the Nationality and Borders Act before it—eroded. I think it is fundamental to retain our commitment towards our international legal obligations. But there was also a case in the High Court in Belfast, brought by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in relation to the Illegal Migration Act, that found that it was not only the convention on human rights that was breached by the Illegal Migration Act, but also the Windsor framework itself.

At a time when His Majesty’s Government are trying to reset the relationship with Europe, it seems a very strange thing to do—to try to back out of our human rights obligations. Again, the Good Friday agreement and the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union are both based on our compliance with the European convention on human rights.

[Mr Forster]

Q If I may, I will turn away from these historic strategic issues back to the wording in the Bill. I would welcome your thoughts on clauses 13, 14 and 16 about the new offences. How effective do you think they would be? Zoe, what do you think of the drafting? Dr Walsh, how commonly do you think they would be used given that so much of the preparation is done abroad?

Zoe Bantleman: The offences are drafted in quite broad terms and the defences are quite narrow. There is a real concern, particularly on behalf of the legal professions, as to what would constitute a defence. For example, one of the defences is where a person was

“acting on behalf of an organisation which—

(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and

(ii) does not charge for its services.”

Would a legal aid firm charging the legal aid fund for services come within the scope of this defence? That is a real question.

We could also imagine the much more practical question of someone who is, for example, in Calais with their family member, and their family member wants to get on to a small boat and they are saying, “No, don’t get on to the small boat. Look here—this is what the weather is going to be today” and they show them on their phone what the weather is going to be. That could be useful to that person in helping them to prepare for their journey to the UK, and it would be the collection, recording and viewing of that information. It is not clear that such a person would have a defence if they were to reach the UK by a safe route, if a safe route was available to them. Even though that was done in France rather than the UK, they could potentially be prosecuted once here because of the extraterritorial scope of the offences, subject of course to prosecutorial discretion.

There is a very large scope to the offences and the defences are potentially not sufficient and holistic enough to account for all situations in which persons should not be prosecuted and should not be criminalised for their behaviour.

[Chris Murray]

Q Dr Walsh, you said something fascinating that the Minister picked up on about the Dublin system and the driver of people getting on small boats. Could you say a little bit more about that? First, what is the evidence for that? Secondly, we know that people getting on to a small boat on the French side of the channel are part of a long stream of networks, illegal organisations and people fleeing. They are travelling through multiple countries. Could you give us a bit more detail on how those networks are functioning now, how they have evolved over the last couple of years in response to various conflicts and drivers, and the routes that people are taking?

Dr Peter Walsh: The Dublin system provided a mechanism for asylum seekers to be transferred between EU member states and prioritised the idea that people should have their claim processed in the first state in which they arrived. There are other things that the decision can be based on—one might be having family members in the country; that could also be the basis for a transfer.

There is emerging evidence from when researchers have spoken with migrants in and around Calais. They ask them, “Why have you taken this dangerous journey to the UK?” They talk about family, the English language and perceptions of the UK as being safer. Often they have experienced harsh treatment at the hands of the French police. Increasingly, they specifically mention Dublin.

What we can infer from that is that these people have an outstanding or rejected claim—or claims, potentially in a number of EU member states, even though there are rules and processes to prevent that. They have exhausted what they view as the opportunity to receive a successful asylum claim in the EU. That leaves the UK. They understand that because the UK is no longer a part of Dublin, we are effectively not able to return them to the continent. That is fairly recent evidence we have found.

On the smuggling networks and how they work, one of the big challenges is that they operate transnationally, so they are beyond the jurisdiction of any single authority. That, by its very nature, makes enforcement more difficult because it requires quite close international co-operation, so the UK would be co-operating with agencies that operate under different legal frameworks, professional standards and norms and maybe even speak a different language. That challenge applies with particular force to the senior figures, who are often operating not only beyond the UK’s and EU’s jurisdictions but in countries where there is very limited international law enforcement co-operation with both the UK and the EU. I am thinking of countries such as Afghanistan, Syria and Iran.

More generally, the smuggling gangs have become more professionalised. They are very well resourced and are highly adaptable. There is a sense that law enforcement is constantly having to play catch-up. The gangs are decentralised, and there are quite small groups of, say, eight to 12 individuals, spread out across the continent, who are responsible for logistics—for example, storing equipment like motors and engines in Germany that are imported to Turkey from China and then transported in trucks to France. Those networks stretch out across the continent. That is why it is so hard for law enforcement to fight them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q What is your general opinion of the changes that would be introduced to the current immigration law structures with the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act and the vast majority of the Illegal Migration Act? What is your opinion on strengthening the powers of the Border Security Command, which are a central part of the Bill?

Dame Rachel de Souza: I do not want to see any child crossing the channel in a small boat. I have sat in those small boats myself. I have talked to children who have come across on them. I have seen eight-year-olds, blind children and children with Down’s syndrome come across on them. The crossings are dangerous. One case that sticks in my mind is that of a young Iranian lad who saw his parents killed in front of him. He was taken by smugglers and did not know where he was going, but he came across on a small boat. Anything to stop these wicked traffickers is good in my book, as long as we are protecting and safeguarding children.

You will know that I was very vocal about the Illegal Migration Act, particularly the bits that conflicted with the Children Act 1989. When a child is on this soil, up to the age of 18, the Children Act has authority over them. I was very worried about the Home Office accommodating children, and I am pleased to see that has now been changed. Every Home Office official was working hard to do their best by those children, but the Home Office accommodation and the hotel accommodation were not suitable. Children were languishing without proper safeguarding in inappropriate places. Children’s social care must look after unaccompanied children, so I am pleased to see that change.

From a children’s perspective, I am pleased to see the Rwanda Act repealed. Children told me that it would not have stopped them coming; they were just going to disappear at 18. It would have ended up putting them at more risk. I had concerns about that. I also had concerns about children who had been settled here for a number of years then, at 18, being liable to be moved to Rwanda, so I am pleased to see that changed.

In general, I am really supportive of this Bill. There are some things that I would like to see it go further on, and I do have some concerns, but in general I am very supportive.

[Mr Forster]

Q What are the things that you would like to see the Bill go further on? We just heard from the legal director at the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association that they have some concerns at least about the Government’s rhetoric, if not some of their actions, against the international law, particularly on children. Could you comment on that as well?

Dame Rachel de Souza: Because I see so many of these children and work with them directly, I am often thinking practically about what their lives are like and how to ensure that they are okay, so I tend to come at your questions from that approach. One of the things that I am worried about is the potential for getting the scientific age assessment wrong.

There was a fantastic debate in the other House, where Lord Winston and others talked about the British Dental Association and the lack of clarity and slight vagueness around age assessment procedures. What I will say is that the social work team down at the Kent intake unit are fantastic and they have developed a strong approach to and knowledge about how to get those age assessment decisions right, with an understanding of school systems and other things about young people. I think we need to be really careful on the age assessment side.

You know that I am also going to be worried about safe and legal routes. Let me give you two examples two young ambassadors out of my large group. One is from Ukraine. She came under the Ukraine scheme, managed to complete her Ukrainian education and her UK education at the same time, and is going to King’s College. She has had nothing but support. The other is from South Sudan and, with no safe and legal route, came as an illegal immigrant. Female genital mutilation was an issue; there were some really serious issues. She found it hard to find somewhere to live and hard to get a job. She is now at Oxford University, because we have supported her and she is brilliant. Those are just two completely contrasting cases.

I stood and welcomed off the boat the first child who came from Afghanistan, who spent his nights weeping because he did not know whether his parents were alive. There is that safe and legal routes issue, particularly for children we know are coming from war-torn areas—we know that they are coming. We really need to think about that and think about support for them. That perhaps answers your tone question as well.

[Chris Murray]

Q We heard from the previous panels about how the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act caused wholesale dysfunction in the immigration system and especially in asylum. I want to ask you about the impact that that dysfunction had on children. As we were moving unaccompanied asylum-seeking children from Kent around the rest of the UK, how dysfunctional was that system? What was it like for local authorities that were trying to support them and the local communities? They have statutory obligations about child protection.

Dame Rachel de Souza: Down in Kent, because needs must, hotels were set up, so I visited the hotels that children were in. The situation was wholly inappropriate. Many children were languishing there for months, without English teaching. Kent county council was doing its best. Some of the best provision that I saw for children who were just arriving was put on by Kent, which had managed to get school going and get interpreters in, but it was overwhelmed.

What I will say, to pay tribute to local authorities around the country, is that whenever there was a very young child or a disabled child, they would step up and help. But it was hard to get the national transfer scheme going and the children were confused by it as well. The Hghland council offered a range of places to some of the children, and they were like, “Where is the highlands and what are we going to do there?” It felt discombobulated at best. It was really tricky.

Of course, let us not forget that a lot of those children were older teenagers, and a lot of the provision that they were going to was not care, but a room in a house with all sorts of other people—teenagers and older people. They were left to fend for themselves, which was incredibly disorientating. We have a problem with 16 and 17-year-olds in the care system. There was a massive stretch on social care. Every director of children’s social care who I spoke to said that it is a massive stretch on their budgets, and that they do not know what to do with those children.

I think we could be more innovative. Again, there is massive good will out there in the country. We should be looking at specialist foster care, and not sticking 17-year-olds in rooms in houses on their own. There are so many things we could be doing to try to make this better, such as settling children in communities with proper language teaching.

The No.1 thing that children tell me that they want, given that they are here, is to learn—to be educated—so that they can function well. For me, particularly with some of the children who I have seen, they do not in any way mirror the stuff that we read in the media about freeloading—coming here for whatever. Most of them are really serious cases, and given that they are here, they want to try to learn and be good productive members of our communities. There is much that we can do.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Will Forster Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q We often hear that organised immigration crime is very lucrative, well established and transnational, and that there is therefore no point in doing a lot about it. What is your answer to that?

Rob Jones: You could say that about all serious organised crime. Where do you go from there? I do not agree with that view. It is definitely transnational and complicated, but it is a relatively new serious organised crime threat, and it is not too late to stop it. In 2018, there were a few hundred people coming on small boats. There were 36,000 last year. We need to unravel the conditions that have allowed that to happen, and this legislation will help with that. I do not take the view that you cannot stop it.

There will always be people attempting organised immigration crime, but this element of it—small boats—is relatively new. There are very specific things that organised crime groups involved in it need to do. They need access to very specific materials—otherwise they cannot move the numbers that they attempt to move—and they need to be able to operate using materials that are lawfully obtained, albeit for criminal purposes. This attacks that business model because we can pursue the dual-use materials with more vigour and have more impact. It is challenging, and it is a different challenge from drugs and other threats, but it is there to be dealt with. It is a very public manifestation of the OIC threat that has always been there. This part of it relies on a very specific business model that we can attack.

Sarah Dineley: The follow-on point from that, and one that you raised, is that people are making a lot of money out of this, so the illicit finance piece is really important. These new clauses actually give us more on which to hang illicit finance investigations. There is a lot of work going on in the illicit finance sphere; in particular, and most recent, the illicit finance taskforce between the UK and Italy, was set up specifically to look at the profits being made by the people who are preying on other people’s misery.

Jim Pearce: It has been said already but I want to reinforce the point about organised crime gangs being involved in polycriminality. Organised immigration crime is one part, but so are modern slavery, serious acquisitive crime and drug running. That is felt in local communities across the whole country. In my own force area of Devon and Cornwall, you would think that modern slavery and organised immigration crime do not exist, but we have a number of investigations and intelligence leads being developed; they are being looked at by both our regional crime units and members of Rob’s team. This exists everywhere across the country. As I say, if you are prepared to effectively smuggle people into the country, or at least to facilitate that, you are prepared to get involved in very serious things indeed.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

Q I want to look at clauses 13 to 17 and what the Crown Prosecution Service thinks of them, so this question is more directed at you, Sarah. Considering their application both inside and outside the UK, what do you think the chances of successful prosecution are? How likely do you think the CPS is to take this up? We heard earlier today that some are concerned about how wide the powers in clauses 13 to 16 could be. We were told this morning that, if I was in Calais and someone asked me, “What’s the weather like today?”, technically I would have committed a crime under these clauses. What is your view of that?

Sarah Dineley: I will deal with the second point first, as it is probably the easiest and it flows into the first. In relation to clauses 13 to 16, with any new legislation, the Crown Prosecution Service always publishes guidance on how it is to be interpreted. Certainly, the example that you gave about asking what the weather is like in Dover when you are stood in Calais would not fall within the guidance as meeting the evidential test. Of course, it is not just about an evidential test being met, but a public interest test as well. Our guidance always deals with that specific question of whether it is in the public interest, so that prosecutors can do that balancing exercise and ask, “Are there factors that weigh in favour of prosecution? Are there factors that tend away from prosecution?” They want to come to a decision that is compliant with our code for Crown prosecutors, so it is a mixture of guidance and application of the code that hopefully gets us to the right conclusion.

Going back to your first point, I mentioned that we have mutual legal assistance and that we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for. One of the problems is that there has to be something called dual criminality—there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books. However, we are confident that there are reciprocal laws in the major OIC countries in Europe to allow us to make those requests for information under mutual legal assistance. We are aided by the network of prosecutors based abroad, which I mentioned. We also have Eurojust and the joint investigation teams run out of Eurojust. We are well versed in working internationally and with the measures that we can deploy to make sure that we build a strong evidential case.

[Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)]

Q I should declare that I have worked for the National Crime Agency in a counter-terror role.

We have talked a lot about the upstream side, which publicly people are well aware of. Is there a significant domestic angle here? Are we confident that we have a sound intelligence picture—as much as we can? Are there crossovers with other crime? Does the Bill help us to disrupt and arrest people in this country?

Rob Jones: I will come back on that first. There is a footprint in the UK for organised immigration crime. The footprint for the small boats crossings has typically been driven by Belgium, Germany, Turkey and further afield, with Iraqi Kurdish and Afghan groups. As more and more people have successfully exploited that route, however, they put down ties, they get involved in criminality and they know it has worked for them, so that drives the problem. There are organised crime groups in the UK that we are targeting. Some of our most significant cases to date have involved a footprint in the UK.

When we look at those groups and what it took to bring them to justice, we have either had to extradite them to another country following a judicial investigation, or we have done very complex covert investigations for many months. This helps with that issue, because when we have got good evidence from covert tactics—this was my earlier point—we are able to go earlier with it. The majority of the criminality that drives the small boats element, however, is based overseas. We have a good intelligence picture through OIC, which has improved dramatically since 2015 when we started targeting this, when the crisis first started.

Jim Pearce: I have a follow-on from policing. I probably have two points to make. First, tomorrow you will start hearing national media on interventions across the country, which are termed Operation or Op Mille—police interventions to do with cannabis farms. A lot of the intelligence linked to that particular operation involves workers who have been brought in illegally from abroad, and all those disruptions will be from across the whole country. That might just bring this to life.

The second point I want to make is on legislation changes, which you just asked about. The two changes—well, there are more than two, but the ones I particularly want to focus on—relate to serious crime prevention orders and the ability of law enforcement, which is the police, the NCA and of course the CPS, to apply for interim orders, especially those on acquittal. Serious crime prevention orders are probably a tool that is underused at the moment. We are keen to push into that space moving forward.

Sarah Dineley: To put that into context, at the moment there are effectively two types of serious crime prevention order: one is imposed on conviction, and between 2011 and 2022, we had 1,057; the other is what we call the stand-alone serious crime prevention orders. Those are made before any charges are brought and they are heard in the High Court. To date, there have only been two applications, one of which was successful. The introduction of this new serious crime prevention order does fill a massive gap in that restrictive order.

Rob Jones: I agree with that, and I welcome those measures. There is a similar regime for sexual offences, which allows control measures for people who are suspected of offences. That has been very successful. We welcome that.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

You still have not told us what indigenous means, but thank you very much.

[Mr Forster]

Q Karl, you talked about how the Bill does not have very much deterrence in it. What is your view on safe, legal routes? If we had safe, legal routes, would that not deter people from unsafe, illegal routes?

Tony, you talked about your perfect solution to borders. You did not mention the costs. Do you have an idea of the set-up and running costs?

Karl Williams: The short answer is that we do have safe and legal routes. The new Home Office immigration data, which was published this morning, pointed out that last year 79,000 people arrived through safe and legal routes. Since 2020, about 550,000, maybe slightly more, have arrived by safe and legal routes: Ukraine, Hong Kong, the Afghan resettlement schemes, and people arriving through UN programmes and from Syria, yet that does not stop the crossings.

The fundamental problem is that there will always be more demand to come to this country than we would probably be willing to allow for through safe and legal routes. One stat is that, a couple of years ago, Gallup did a very wide-ranging poll of attitudes on migration and found that, globally, about 900 million adults would migrate, given the opportunity—30 million of those people put Britain as their first choice. There is always going to be a longer queue to get in than we have capacity for at any given time. That is my view.

Tony Smith: I do not have a detailed financial breakdown for you, but I can say that the direction of travel in the UK and around the world is to take away officers from the border and to automate a lot of the processes. We are doing that here already: we move, I think, more people through e-gates than any other country does. This is an automated border that will reduce the number of officers required to do frontline, routine tasks, which they really do not want to do, and enable them to target the people they want to focus on. If you were to do that detailed analysis, you would probably find that it will be cost-neutral in the end.

[Mr Forster]

Q Thank you for the answer, Karl. Are you suggesting that, to combat the small boats issue, we should have more schemes like the Ukrainian one?

Karl Williams: I do not think it combats it, and I do not think it is a disincentive. The ideal solution is that, once we have control over the small boats, and therefore who is coming to this country, we can have a serious conversation about, if we want, expanding safe and legal routes, what that might look like and what other parts of the world we might want to help. But so much resource is now sucked up by dealing with the downstream consequences of the channel crossings, such as the hotel bills and so on—this is a sequence of things. I do not think having a safe and legal route is in itself a disincentive to small boat crossings.

[Jade Botterill (Ossett and Denby Dale) (Lab)]

Q All three of you have expressed disappointment at our scrapping the Rwanda scheme as part of the Bill. What part of the £700 million spent by the previous Government do you think was good value for money for the taxpayer?

Tony Smith: I do not think any of it was good value for money for the taxpayer, was it? The history and record speak for themselves. But we need to think about why it did not work and look at the reasoning behind why it took three years to try to get the process going. An awful lot of work was done in Rwanda and the Home Office to try to make it happen, but it was subject to continual legal challenge. Legal challenges were made in Europe, in the domestic courts and by judicial review. On a number of occasions, flights were lined up that did not happen, and a lot of money was therefore wasted in the process.

I am not a big fan of the Illegal Migration Act. Some of it was cumbersome, because it put all the eggs in the Rwanda basket. Rwanda was a limited programme—obviously, we could not send everybody to Rwanda—but under NABA, you had the option to triage and put some people into the Rwanda basket: those hard country removals, where you could not remove them anywhere else. You had that option, but you could still do what you are doing now and process people from places like Turkey and Albania, put them through the asylum system and return them to source.

Losing that triage option is going to be a big drawback, and it is going to cost a lot more money in the long run. The intake will continue to come, and you will then have to rack up the associated asylum, accommodation and settlement costs that run along with that.

Karl Williams: I would ask: “Value compared with what?” There is one argument around the counterfactual of if you had a deterrent, but I would also refer to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer on the fiscal impact of migration. It estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000. We know from analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that, but even on the basis of the OBR analysis, even if everyone ends up in work, if 35,000 people cross a year, which is roughly where we were last year, at that sort of cost range, it will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion of lifetime costs. Compare that with £700 million—it depends on what timescale you are looking at.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Is it desirable to use counter-terrorism-style powers to disrupt so that we can prevent some of these crossings from happening rather than waiting until after people have died in the channel and then trying to pick up the pieces?

Professor Brian Bell: Completely.

[Mr Forster]

Q How would the changes to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs data sharing improve border security?

Professor Brian Bell: I do not have expertise in that area. I am confused as to how significant it will be. As I understand the Bill, it will allow HMRC to share customs data with other parties. It is not clear to me what that achieves. It would be wrong of me to imply that I have any particular operational understanding of how that will help operations.

[Mr Forster]

Q We have heard a lot today about supply and demand factors for migration, which you do understand. Data sharing is meant to be one of the examples of, “This is our way as a country of clamping down on immigration.” In your experience, does it have a de minimis impact?

Professor Brian Bell: Data sharing overall can be phenomenally valuable in thinking about immigration more broadly. The Migration Advisory Committee has been very clear that we need to improve the data. We have access to data from HMRC that we find very useful on the legal migration side. Fundamentally, the question is: what data does HMRC hold that will provide useful information to border security in terms of stopping organised immigration gangs? Presumably, the Government think that there are some useful points. My view is, “Why wouldn’t you try it and see if it helps?” If it does not, you are no worse off.

[Chris Murray]

Q Thank you for coming today. We heard some evidence this morning about the Illegal Migration and Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Acts. Witnesses have called them a disaster, a meltdown, and a fundamental system breakdown. What is your assessment of those Acts on the functioning of the Home Office systems and on the cost to the public purse? How effective have they been in reducing migrant numbers?

Professor Brian Bell: I will take those questions in reverse order. I do not think they were very effective. Again, I would caution that there is always this problem that you see a piece of legislation passing and then look at the numbers and try to guess whether it was the legislation that caused the change that you see. Other things are going on, so it is always difficult to do that.

More broadly, the evidence that we have from people seeking asylum is that the exact nature of the rules that exist in the country they are going to are not big drivers of their decision to go there. People have asked asylum seekers to list the reasons they want to come to the UK, and very rarely are they things like the legal system in operation for dealing with asylum claims. It is all about the fact that English is the most common language in the world and often the second language of these people. There is often a diaspora in the country, or labour market opportunities are potentially better than in some of the other countries. Those things are generally much more important than whether your asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda. I do not think that many people concern themselves with that.

The numbers are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act. Of course, asylum seekers might have been really clever and spotted that it was probably going to be declared illegal by the Supreme Court—perhaps they were prejudging the legality of the measures. The cost was staggering for a policy that was very unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect. The previous Government’s difficulty was that they could never actually tell you how many people they thought would be sent to Rwanda. It is not a deterrent if you are sending a few thousand people every year.

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[Mike Tapp]

Q Since you started in your role, 19,000 people have been deported, which I believe is a 24% increase on the same period last year. How have you managed to achieve that in such a short time? Combined with the Bill, do you think that that will start acting as a deterrent?

Dame Angela Eagle: One of the important things for the integrity of any asylum system is that if people fail it, there are consequences that are different from those if they do not. It is the hard and nastier end of any asylum system: if you have no right to be here, we will want you to leave—voluntarily, if at all possible. Sometimes we will even facilitate that, but we will return you by force if we have to. The 19,000 returns that we have achieved since 4 July are an indication that we want to ensure that enforcement of the rules is being put into effect more than it was. There had been very big falls in returns, and very big falls in enforcement, and we want to put that right.

[Mr Forster]

Q We have heard a lot of mixed comments in the evidence sessions today, but quite a few witnesses have highlighted that the Bill only tackles half the story of border security, asylum and immigration. It tackles the supply side, not the demand. Based on today, will you consider some potential amendments, or another potential strategy, to attach to the Bill to tackle the whole picture that, as we heard today, people as a country want us to tackle?

Dame Angela Eagle: Clearly, it is important that we try to deal with the development of organised immigration crime on our borders. Colleagues will have heard the comments from the NCA and the National Police Chiefs’ Council about how important it is to assert the rule of law in such areas. It is very important. That is the main aim of the Bill.

If the hon. Gentleman is talking about safe routes, we heard some evidence today about safe routes. I am personally sceptical that those would stop people wanting to come across in boats. If one takes the example of our Afghan scheme—a safe route for particular people from Afghanistan who have been put in danger by supporting UK forces—that is a legal route that is safe. At the same time, last year the largest nationality represented among small boat arrivals was Afghans.

We have people arriving on small boats who come from countries where we have visa regimes, so I am not convinced that we could provide enough places on safe routes to prevent people smugglers benefiting from that kind of demand. That is my opinion from having looked at what goes on and I accept the hon. Gentleman might have a different one.

Seema Malhotra: If I may add to that, we also heard in the evidence about the scale of the challenge that we face and how small boat crossings are a relatively new phenomenon, in that we had around 300 in 2018, but the number is now 36,000. In a very targeted way, this Bill is looking at what more tools we can bring in along with the Border Security Command to tackle the criminal gangs that are literally making millions—if not more—out of people who are very vulnerable.

The fact that there were more deaths in the channel in 2024 than in previous years shows that the situation is becoming even more dangerous, so we absolutely have to do everything we can to disrupt those criminal gangs. Therefore, I want to focus on that for this Bill, because we cannot do everything in one piece of legislation.

It is important, however, to correct, from my understanding, a bit of evidence that was given earlier by Tony Smith that the UK resettlement scheme was closed—it is actually still open. We have had over 3,000 refugees resettled via that scheme since its launch four years ago. The number of refugees arriving on that depends on a range of factors, and that includes recommendations from the UNHCR as well as how many offers of accommodation we have from local authorities; that is an ongoing system. This is legislation around tackling the small boats and the criminal gangs that are enabling that as a new trade.

[Mr Forster]

Q If I may briefly follow up, I appreciate the Minister for Border Security and Asylum’s thoughts on safe routes. Ukraine has long been held up as a good example: we housed a lot of people safely and one Ukrainian person tried to cross the channel.

To be more specific, I have a follow-up on clause 18. We are creating a new criminal offence of endangering someone on a sea crossing—why is it an unauthorised sea crossing? Why is it not a blanket endangering of someone when crossing the sea? Should that offence not be wider or is it more like an aggravating factor?

Dame Angela Eagle: I will talk about the very detailed aspect of that during our line-by-line scrutiny.

There has been a certain behaviour that has begun to happen, which has been perceived on the crossings in the small boats and which this offence is designed to deal with. That is the various kinds of violent intimidation that goes on, such as putting women and children in the middle of boats that then collapse, so they are crushed and die in that way, or holding children over the edge of boats to prevent rescue.

Sometimes if there has been a fatality on a boat—and we have seen what has happened—we go to pick people up and return them to France. The French authorities also do that. There is then a battle not to be returned and violence is sometimes used to prevent people from accepting the rescue that is offered to them. So there are some very particular things that this endangerment clause and this new offence are seeking to deal with.

[Jo White]

Q Thank you, Ministers, for your evidence. In his evidence, Tony Smith, who retired 12 years ago, was very critical of the role of the Border Security Commander and defined him as a “co-ordinator”. Do you believe that the Border Security Commander’s powers need to be enhanced?

Dame Angela Eagle: Well, the Border Security Commander is very happy with the powers that he has—he has been appointed. Again, we will talk about this in some detail, but it is important that we get co-ordination across different areas of activity. I think you will have heard what the NCA witness said about how he wants somebody else to do the co-ordination while he does the basic work. Everybody is working together very well across the people who have to have regard. The Border Security Commander is bringing together a range of very important players in this area to strategise and co-ordinate, and he has not told me—I meet him regularly—that he needs any more powers.