Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Bill

Wayne David Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 1—Purpose and Interpretation—

“(1) The purpose of this Act is to protect and promote the ability of individuals and organisations to participate in public debate, advance accountability, and speak out on matters of public interest, and to prevent the use of the courts to undermine these rights through abusive legal action.

(2) Provisions in this Act should be broadly construed and applied to advance the purpose defined in subsection (1).”

This new clause places a purpose and interpretation of the proposed Act at the beginning of the Bill.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott. I tabled this private Member’s Bill to tackle SLAPPs—strategic litigation, or lawsuits, against public participation—in all their forms, so that any abuse of litigation to attack free speech in the public interest, regardless of subject matter, can be addressed through the courts.

The Bill has had a long gestation. On Second Reading on 23 February, the version that I tabled, with Government support, was unanimously agreed by the House, but hon. Members clearly expressed some concerns and made some constructive comments. I am pleased to say that since Second Reading, a quite remarkable and very positive series of discussions has taken place between the Ministry of Justice and me, and between us and a number of stakeholder bodies. There have also been formal and informal discussions with Members who have taken a keen interest in the subject for a long time, in particular the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden. The result has been not total, but a high degree of consensus on quite difficult and intense issues.

I remind everyone that SLAPPs are abusive or threatened lawsuits that are designed to inhibit free speech. These hostile lawsuits masquerade as genuine claims, but their underlying objectives are far more sinister. Such cases are often brought by powerful individuals and corporations with the aim of avoiding scrutiny by shutting down critical voices that seek to hold them accountable.

Protecting freedom of speech in the public interest is something that all parties in Parliament hold in high esteem. In all debates in this House and in the other place, there has been broad consensus on the need for reform to tackle the harmful effect of SLAPPs. As champions of media freedom, we must ensure that the free press is never made so vulnerable that it resorts to self-censorship on vital matters in the public interest. Grounded, well-researched investigative reporting must be protected, not reined in for fear of legal action. Of course, such protections cannot and must not come at the expense of access to justice, but the fact that claimants can currently exploit the system means that that important balance has not been struck. I have worked with the Government to make sure that the approach underpinning the Bill achieves the necessary protections and balances.

Clause 1 provides that rules of court must be made to provide a means of dismissing SLAPP cases at an early stage. The provisions require that rules are developed to make sure that a claim can be struck out where the court has determined, first, that a claim is a SLAPP, and secondly that the claimant has failed to show that their claim is more likely than not to succeed at trial. That will ensure that a court has the power to dismiss SLAPP claims at the earliest possible opportunity, thereby protecting defendants from unnecessary and intimidatory litigation that is used to silence and suppress articles, investigations and reporting being conducted in the public interest.

The rules of court will also establish the appropriate procedure to be followed so that Parliament’s intention to prevent the harm of SLAPPs is properly achieved in such cases. Subsections (2) and (3) provide that the rules will be able to identify what evidence will be considered and the degree to which it will be tested by the court in determining the various matters that it has to address, including the use of presumptions with respect to matters of fact. I will turn shortly to other provisions that will assist the judge, for example by setting out common attributes and behaviours that are characteristic of SLAPP-style litigation.

Clause 1(4) provides for the development of rules to establish costs protection for defendants in cases identified as SLAPPs. The rules will provide that the court must not order the defendant to cover the costs of the claimant in SLAPP cases, unless they themselves have behaved inappropriately. The purpose of this provision is to protect defendants from the exorbitant costs that are currently racked up by claimants in such cases, and from the use of the threat of such costs to intimidate them.

At present, the risks of high costs often force defendants to abandon their legitimate defence against challenges to important reporting in the public interest, because of fear of financial ruin. That is wrong and must be put right. Defendants in SLAPP cases will often not have the same means available to them as claimants; they are therefore commonly intimidated into abandoning cases and/or reporting, even when they know the story in question to be true. They often find that the risks of adverse costs orders, which can result in great personal debt, including having to sell their home or go through bankruptcy, are far too great to contemplate, even for the sake of important stories.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Sir David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I commend the hon. Member for Caerphilly for his Bill. It has been long in the coming, but it deals with a very important problem, and it is brilliant that he has actually brought it to the House. If I may say so, he has managed it in a formidably diplomatic way, given the sometimes quite difficult arguments that have gone on. My unreserved congratulations go to him.

The hon. Gentleman has done a brilliant job of outlining the point of the Bill, so I will not reiterate that, save to say that it is a difficult and technical Bill. We are balancing rights—the right to sue for defamation versus the right not to be oppressed and to enjoy free speech—and that is not easy to do. It is a subtle problem. Quite properly, the legal profession, the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice want to maintain that balance. They are very sensitive about that, but we should also remember that the right to sue for defamation is pretty much a rich man’s right. Very few of my constituents will exercise it, and very few people in this room will exercise it—perhaps one or two are rich enough. Nevertheless, it is important that it is maintained; I accept that without reserve.

It is understandable that the Ministry of Justice, in its advice on the Bill, seeks to compromise. I generally agree with compromise, but not with compromise between right and wrong. It has to be said that the Ministry will be being lobbied—with how much effect I cannot say—by the Society of Media Lawyers, including such leading lights as Carter-Ruck, Mishcon de Reya and Schillings, the very people who have created the problem that we are now trying to resolve. People have created a multimillion-pound industry out of oppressing the right to freedom of speech and making London the global capital of that. I could pick a ruder word for it, but I will just say that it is the global capital of SLAPPs.

I have one proposal to put to a vote, but first I want to talk a little about the vagaries of the Bill. Throughout all our discussions, the common theme has been, “How will the judge interpret this phrase, or this clause, in the context of what we are trying to do?” We are trying to protect freedom of speech and, at the same time, people’s right to look after their own reputation in court.

New clause 1 aims to give judges guidance on interpretation and tell them what the high priority of the Bill is. I will read out the clause in full:

“(1) The purpose of this Act is to protect and promote the ability of individuals and organisations to participate in public debate, advance accountability, and speak out on matters of public interest, and to prevent the use of the courts to undermine these rights through abusive legal action.

(2) Provisions in this Act should be broadly construed and applied to advance the purpose defined in subsection (1).”

I ask the Committee to see that as effectively an instruction to the judges as to how broadly they should interpret the Bill when it becomes an Act. I will press no amendments other than new clause 1 to a vote, because there is consensus on almost everything.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you. Would Wayne David like to respond?

[Wayne David]

What can I say? We have had an excellent discussion this morning. It has been very good indeed and has in many ways got to the core of the issue. I want to genuinely thank the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden for prompting this excellent debate through his new clause. As I said, I brought forward this Bill to tackle SLAPPs in all their forms and provide protection for free speech in the public interest. The fact that SLAPP claimants can misuse the justice system shows that the right balance between access to justice and protections against abuse of process is currently not being struck. The Bill must ensure that balance, and it has.

I want to stress that the Bill has been carefully drafted to ensure that all litigants are able to properly and fairly exercise their rights of access to justice. It will ensure that attempts by claimants to misuse the justice system in order to limit the rights of defendants to free speech on matters in the public interest cannot succeed. This point is crucial: it will do so without unduly and unfairly preventing claimants from achieving their own rights, such as the right to not be defamed.

New clause 1, however, risks and draws into question that carefully balanced approach. It is undoubtedly well-intentioned and many of us would agree with the sentiments expressed this morning, but it runs a risk of undermining the efficacy of the Bill as a whole; that is, of course, opposite to the intention of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden. The new clause risks that by introducing new and uncertain concepts into domestic law, such as the right to public participation, and requiring a supremacy of those concepts over other established rights. These are big and important issues.

[Sir David Davis]

I am afraid that, perhaps for the first time in all this, we disagree on something. The right to free speech and public participation is not new in British law: it goes back to Magna Carta.

[Wayne David]

I am not familiar with Magna Carta, but I suspect our common law has moved on somewhat since then.

The uncertainty about the scope and effect of the new clause also raises the somewhat unfortunate spectre of new and unexpected avenues for litigation, when these measures are intended to do the exact opposite. I am clear that the drafting of the Bill makes its purpose transparent. It is a purpose that is consistent with rights already established in domestic and international law and that addresses the fundamental need to ensure access to justice for both claimants and defendants.

[Chris Clarkson (Heywood and Middleton) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that at the heart of this is the application of the reasonableness test? Although I agree with the thrust of new clause 1, I think there is an opportunity to apply the existing framework to achieve its goals. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden said, the idea of freedom of speech and public participation is already a fundamental part of our common law, but even when we are applying the reasonableness test we often give judges instruction on how they should interpret reasonableness. Does the hon. Gentleman think that there is an opportunity to ensure, before Report, that we have embedded that concept?

[Wayne David]

I am a very reasonable person—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] I am glad that all Members agree.

[Sir David Davis]

He’s the good cop.

[Wayne David]

This is a crucial test, which will be addressed, I am certain, in clauses that we have yet to discuss. There is much to be said for providing a clarification, and that is one of the central things that we will come on to in a few moments’ time.

[Adam Afriyie (Windsor) (Con)]

I very much support the direction of travel in new clause 1. Would it not be fairly straightforward for the Minister, even at this stage—although perhaps he does not have the words available—simply to confirm the intention, which might then negate any need for the new clause?

[Wayne David]

In fairness, the Bill’s intention is clearly expressed in the clauses that we have before us. I accept that the discussion will be ongoing; nobody is saying that it is the end of the matter, but as things stand, I think it is fair to say that there has been a great deal of discussion and a great deal of investigation of different options, and that this is the best consensual position that we have established to date. Although of course the debate will continue, I have yet to be persuaded that there is a sound and definitive case for changing what we have before us.

I believe that the Bill provides a sound framework and guidance to our independent judiciary to deal with the serious harm that SLAPPs can cause. Judges are well versed in interpreting provisions, assessing evidence and, ultimately, ensuring that justice is done. I believe very strongly that we must be careful here, because unclear direction or too much direction risks creating difficulties—more difficulties than it resolves. Words have to be precise.

Although I thank the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden for his continued commitment on the issue of SLAPPs and his consideration of the Bill, I consider that new clause 1 at the moment goes a bit too far. It risks undermining, and certainly draws into question, the careful balance that the Bill strikes, as well as the efficacy of the provisions, and it potentially complicates unnecessarily the Bill’s onward passage, and not just in this House; let us remember that it has to go to the other House as well.

Clarification is always needed, and the debate will be ongoing. I understand that the Government are prepared to provide clarification in the appropriate place, such as the explanatory notes. That is extremely important, because the explanatory notes provide the clarification for the Bill and add substantial meaning to it.

[Sir David Davis]

May I just say to the hon. Gentleman that I have viewed many court cases in my time and I have heard judges refer explicitly on many occasions to the wording of the law, but I have never yet heard them refer to explanatory notes?

[Wayne David]

The right hon. Gentleman might not have heard judges refer explicitly to explanatory notes, but I know it to be a fact that judges quite regularly provide interpretations and receive information derived from them, so I suggest to him that explanatory notes are very, very important. The two—the legislation itself and the Government’s official explanatory notes—should go in tandem.

I am delighted that the right hon. Gentleman has decided not to press his new clause. I can assure him that I, like the Minister, will ensure that the discussion continues, because this is an important debate. We have had a good discussion this morning; this is not the end of the matter, but it is important at this point to affirm that we stand by what has been put forward. I am delighted that the right hon. Gentleman will not press his new clause, because it would be unfortunate to divide the Committee on an issue on which there is so much genuine understanding and consensus. I thank him for not pressing it, and I give a commitment that the debate will continue.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Meaning of “SLAPP” claim

[Wayne David]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 2, page 2, line 6, at end insert—

“(aa) the claim relates to an expression or potential expression made or to be made by the defendant which discloses or would disclose information relating to a matter of public interest;”.

This amendment and amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9 re-order themes in the subsection so that the public interest is referred to before freedom of speech.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 11, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 7 to 18 and insert—

“(a) the information that is or would be disclosed by the defendant relates to a matter of public interest;

(b) the claimant’s behaviour in relation to the matters complained of in the claim is such that it is reasonable to conclude that the behaviour has, or is intended to have, the effect of restraining the defendant’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech; and

(c) any of the behaviour of the claimant, including leading up to or alongside the claim, in relation to the matters complained of in the claim is such that it is reasonable to conclude that the behaviour is intended to cause the defendant any other harm or inconvenience beyond that ordinarily encountered in the course of properly conducted litigation.

(1A) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to ‘harm’ includes, but is not limited to, a reference to any of the following—

(a) expense,

(b) alarm,

(c) harassment or distress.”

Amendment 2, in clause 2, page 2, line 8, after “claim” insert

“is such that it is reasonable to conclude that the behaviour”.

This amendment ensures that the condition in subsection (1)(a) is met if the court determines that it is reasonable to conclude that the claimant’s behaviour has or is intended to have the effect in question.

Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 2, line 9, after “exercise” insert

“by that disclosure or potential disclosure”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 4, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, leave out from beginning to “and” in line 11.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 2, line 13, after “claim” insert

“is such that it is reasonable to conclude that the behaviour”.

This amendment ensures that the condition in subsection (1)(c) is met if the court determines that it is reasonable to conclude that the claimant’s behaviour is intended to have the specified effect.

Amendment 6, in clause 2, page 2, line 14, leave out sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) and insert “any harm or inconvenience”.

This amendment and amendment 7 restate sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) for the purpose of clarifying the condition in subsection (1)(c).

Amendment 7, in clause 2, page 2, line 18, at end insert—

“(1A) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “harm” includes (but is not limited to) a reference to any of the following—

(a) expense;

(b) harassment;

(c) alarm;

(d) distress.”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 6.

Amendment 8, in clause 2, page 2, line 20, leave out “or (b)”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 9, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, leave out “(1)(b)” and insert “(1)(aa)”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 10, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, leave out from second “the” to end of line 24 and insert

“matters that are of ‘public interest’ include (but are not limited to) the following—”.

This amendment rephrases the opening words of subsection (3) so as to make it explicit that matters of “public interest” are not limited to the specified matters.

Amendment 12, in clause 2, page 2, at end of line 39 insert—

“(ba) the use of dilatory strategies, excessive disclosure requests, disproportionate or unreasonable pre-action threats, or any refusal without reasonable excuse to resolve the claim through alternative dispute resolution;

(bb) the choice of jurisdiction;

(bc) the use of public relations campaigns to bully, discredit or intimidate the defendant;”.

This amendment sets out a wider context of SLAPPs.

Clause stand part.

Clauses 3 and 4 stand part.

[Wayne David]

I will turn shortly to amendment 1 and the other amendments in my name, but I will first address the function of clause 2, which creates a statutory definition of what constitutes a SLAPP claim, so that courts can effectively identify such misuses of our justice system. It will mean that a case will be considered a SLAPP if each limb of a three-part test is met: a defendant has had their freedom of speech restrained, the story is a matter of public interest, and the claimant’s behaviour has been harassing, alarming or distressing to the defendant, including by running up inappropriate expense or inconvenience “beyond that ordinarily encountered” in litigation.

Before discussing my amendments, I want to recognise the targeted, constructive efforts by stakeholders who have invested time by providing feedback on the Bill, to ensure that those at risk of SLAPPs receive the backing they need to curtail abusive proceedings in the courts. I am also grateful for the work and support of the Government, who have shown their commitment to cementing the UK’s reputation as a jurisdiction that values free speech and broad public participation.

I will start with amendment 1 and will also speak to amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, which are consequential to it. In short, amendment 1 seeks more prominently to convey the Bill’s purpose by reordering the first two of the three components of a SLAPP so that public interest is given the primary position in clause 2, ahead of free speech. The amendment does not diminish or undermine the importance of an expression of freedom of speech or the claimant’s misconduct in the identification of a SLAPP. Each of the three components in clause 2 must still be present for a case to be found to be a SLAPP. Public interest considerations are at the heart of SLAPP cases, and amendment 1 reflects that importance. Accordingly, I commend the amendment to the Committee, alongside amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, which are required for drafting purposes if clause 2 is reordered as proposed.

Amendments 2 and 5 seek to ensure that there is an appropriate degree of objectivity in the intention test when considering the effects a claim has on a defendant’s freedom of speech and the misconduct of the claimant in pursuing the claim. That is achieved by introducing the concept of reasonableness. The amendments will allow the court to consider the claimant’s behaviour in terms of whether it is reasonable to conclude, based on their conduct, that the claimant intended to restrict the defendant’s freedom of speech and to cause harm. Any harm beyond what can be reasonably expected to be incurred in the course of properly conducted litigation—bearing in mind that by its very nature, litigation is stressful and inconvenient—would result in the case being identified as a SLAPP and being struck out.

[Adam Afriyie]

On a point of clarification: I am not a lawyer either, but under the amendment, if a judge were to determine that a case were a SLAPP and strike it out, could he do so partially? Is there a mechanism by which the claimant can appeal the initial strike-out?

[Wayne David]

Like the hon. Gentleman, I am not a lawyer—

[Adam Afriyie]

I apologise for asking the question!

[Wayne David]

I will seek clarification, as I am a layperson. My understanding is that the judge’s decision is definitive and will achieve the desired effect.

The introduction of reasonableness will give the court a clear ability to draw conclusions about a claimant’s intention from all the objective evidence before it. That evidence will be from both the claimant and the defendant, and its extent will be controlled by the court. The court will also be able to determine the degree to which it is tested, and will therefore be in a proper position to infer from it whether the necessary intention from the claimant is present, so as to warrant the case being found to be a SLAPP. Amendments 2 and 5 will assist courts in ensuring that an objective and fair assessment is made of whether the case is a SLAPP.

Amendments 6 and 7 clarify the misconduct element of the test to decide whether a claim is a SLAPP. They respond to concerns from stakeholders who said that the original formulation of the clause suggested that there is a level of harassment, alarm and distress that is acceptable to pursue as a tactic to cause intimidation in conducting litigation. That was never the intention, and I wish to make that point firmly and very clearly.

The intention of the clause is to isolate claimants who are perpetrating misconduct in the way in which they are pursuing their claim. It will separate those who are using litigation as a weapon from those who have a legitimate grievance and are behaving properly in conducting their case. These amendments will mean that a defendant will be able to assert that, through improper behaviour, a claimant has caused them harm. In making that claim, the defendant will be able to invoke harm of any sort, including but not limited to harm, distress, expense, inconvenience or harassment. I consider that this new formulation will assuage the legitimate concerns raised by stakeholders and parliamentarians alike. It is therefore extremely important.

[Sir David Davis]

In many ways, this goes to the heart of the argument that we have had throughout all this. The truth of the matter is that anybody in receipt of normal judicial action in an ordinary defamation case faces distress and expense. A person who receives a lawyer’s letter at the beginning of such a claim suffers, if not a nervous breakdown, then something quite close to it, so this is quite difficult to elucidate. I know that the hon. Gentleman takes that point.

[Wayne David]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an extremely important point that gets to the heart of the Bill. Such cases are extremely stressful and cause all manner of feelings, which are clearly indicated here, and often enormous expense. One of the things that is recognised in this Bill is that in many cases that is quite deliberate. SLAPP cases are often designed to cause a maximum amount of distress, alarm and expense to defendants. That is precisely what we want to iron out of the system to introduce an objective fairness, so that cases are really judged on their merits and not on what quite often happens behind the scenes. I consider this new formulation to be much stronger than what we initially had in mind, and it is therefore very important and appropriate. I very much hope that it receives the full support of this Committee.

Finally, amendment 10 seeks to clarify the scope of “public interest” as set out in clause 2(3). That is achieved by amending the language so that it is clear that the list of matters in the “public interest” is not exhaustive. This amendment will assist the court in the identification of SLAPP claims and ensure that all relevant claims can be dealt with under the scope of this Bill. It brings greater clarity to the definition of “public interest” in the Bill and addresses concerns from parliamentarians that the Bill would not achieve its aim of identifying SLAPP claims as currently drafted. I commend amendment 10 to the Committee.

For completeness, I note that clause 3 will amend the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 by removing the provisions for SLAPPs that relate to economic crime. Sections 194 and 195 of the ECCTA are no longer required as this Bill’s provisions will capture all SLAPPs, including those that feature an element of economic crime. The measures in this Bill will deal with SLAPPs in the round, and not just those related to economic crime currently contained in the 2023 Act. In other words, this is a holistic approach that encompasses all SLAPPs and should be recognised as such.

Clause 4 sets out the legal jurisdictions to which the provisions will apply and the commencement of this legislation. The Bill applies only to England and Wales, as justice is a devolved matter, and it will be for the Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland to consider whether and how they wish to legislate to address the challenges that SLAPPs represent in their own jurisdictions; I very much hope that they will follow our good example. Although the Bill will take effect two months after Royal Assent, it will be implemented in full once the necessary rules of court have been developed by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee; those will come into force through secondary legislation.

On that basis, I commend clause 2, as amended by the amendments in my name, and clauses 3 and 4 to the Committee.

[Sir David Davis]

I have just looked with amusement at the selection list. The grouping of amendments under clause 2 reads:

“1 [David] + 11 [Davis]…10 [David] + 12 [Davis]”

I am not responsible for all of them—the hon. Member for Caerphilly and I are brothers in arms, but not brothers. I agree with every single amendment that he has tabled in his name; they will all improve the Bill. They also demonstrate that the Bill was very flawed before, as indeed was the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, to which there is also an amendment here. I am afraid that that demonstrates that the Government’s original approach was not as thought-through as it should have been.

The two amendments in my name both seek to do the same thing: to broaden the view of the judge, when they are making a ruling on whether a case is a SLAPP case, to the extrajudicial behaviour outside the court room, included in which is the selection of forum. If someone were to pursue a court case in London rather than in their domestic court, that would be an indication that they were seeking to exploit our laws in pursuit of a SLAPP.

In some ways, the point about extrajudicial action is even more important. It is that the actions taken against the individuals on the receiving end of SLAPPs are intimidatory and bullying in a whole series of extrajudicial ways. I should think everybody on the Committee knows about the cases of Tom Burgis, Catherine Belton and our erstwhile colleague Charlotte Leslie. Intimidatory social media campaigns, threatening phone calls, not-so-subtle surveillance, hacking—the list goes on and on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Freer]

I thank my right hon. Friend and reiterate my offer to sit down with him and go through this in detail, whether for me to reassure him that the Bill meets his objectives or for him to convince me that we need to go further.

Clause 2(1)(c), to which amendment 12 would add, is broad: “any” behaviour can be considered by the court as evidence of misconduct. Subsections (4) and (5) give examples, but are certainly not intended to be exhaustive lists. Furthermore, many matters in the amendment are covered by clause 2(4). For example, the reference to

“disproportionate reaction to the matters complained of in the claim”

will cover excessive disclosure requests and dilatory strategies, as well as questions regarding the choice of jurisdiction.

The Government expressly support the amendments of the hon. Member for Caerphilly to clause 2 and the reasonableness test. We will not support the amendments that my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden has tabled but not moved, as we believe that materially they cover the same ground. However, I repeat my offer to meet and see where we can agree.

I reiterate my thanks to the hon. Member for Caerphilly for promoting this important Bill, and I confirm the Government’s continuing support for it. The Bill will ensure that all those who speak out against corruption, hold the powerful to account and guard our freedoms through raising their voice are protected.

[Wayne David]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The hon. Member for Windsor is absolutely correct that what we have experienced today and previously highlights the fact that this is a good process. There should be more private Members’ Bills and more time allocated to them in the procedures of this House. That is an important point to make.

I am extremely grateful for the knowledgeable contributions from hon. Members, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill. I have very much relied on their experience and good advice in the passage of the Bill so far. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse for her excellent contribution about her personal experience, which shows clearly why the Bill is required.

It is worth noting that the Bill has changed remarkably during its passage. The amendments to which we are in the process of agreeing will substantially strengthen the legislation. A number of stakeholders have been intimately engaged in the process. The Anti-SLAPP Coalition, to which several hon. Members have referred, has done a remarkable job and many of its suggestions have been directly incorporated into the legislation.

May I particularly thank the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden for his amendments? He noted that it looks rather strange to see the names “David” and “Davis” together on the amendment paper. The only conclusion is that we must both have Welsh blood in our veins—there must be some commonality that transcends our party political differences. His amendments show that his careful consideration has enhanced our process enormously.

On amendment 11, I wholly agree in principle with the right hon. Gentleman’s proposal to give the public interest element of clause 2 greater prominence. Indeed, that is why I have tabled amendments 1, 3, 4, 8 and 9, which have the same aim. In view of the specific language in clause 2(1)(a) and (b), I consider that the formulation used in amendments 1, 3, 4, 8 and 9 will better achieve that purpose.

The right hon. Gentleman’s amendment 12 was drafted to expand the categories of conduct that show wrongful behaviour on the part of the claimant, in turn expanding the misconduct element of the test to establish whether a case is a SLAPP. The current drafting was purposely designed on the basis of evidence gathered, from stakeholders across the spectrum of views, in the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence. The list is non-exhaustive and allows the court to take into consideration any matter that may be relevant. On that basis, I believe the categories of wrongful behaviour under clause 2 to be more than sufficient to identify whether the behaviour of the claimant amounts to misconduct.

I thank all hon. Members again for their contributions and their participation. I particularly thank the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden for tabling his amendments but not pressing them, which has ensured an excellent debate this morning. I look forward to cross-party unanimity being expressed clearly at the end of our deliberations.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Amendments made: 2, in clause 2, page 2, line 8, after “claim” insert

“is such that it is reasonable to conclude that the behaviour”.

This amendment ensures that the condition in subsection (1)(a) is met if the court determines that it is reasonable to conclude that the claimant’s behaviour has or is intended to have the effect in question.

Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 2, line 9, after “exercise” insert

“by that disclosure or potential disclosure”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 4, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, leave out from beginning to “and” in line 11.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 2, line 13, after “claim” insert

“is such that it is reasonable to conclude that the behaviour”.

This amendment ensures that the condition in subsection (1)(c) is met if the court determines that it is reasonable to conclude that the claimant’s behaviour is intended to have the specified effect.

Amendment 6, in clause 2, page 2, line 14, leave out sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) and insert “any harm or inconvenience”.

This amendment and amendment 7 restate sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) for the purpose of clarifying the condition in subsection (1)(c).

Amendment 7, in clause 2, page 2, line 18, at end insert—

“(1A) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to ‘harm’ includes (but is not limited to) a reference to any of the following—

(a) expense;

(b) harassment;

(c) alarm;

(d) distress.”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 6.

Amendment 8, in clause 2, page 2, line 20, leave out “or (b)”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 9, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, leave out “(1)(b)” and insert “(1)(aa)”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 1.

Amendment 10, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, leave out from second “the” to end of line 24 and insert

“matters that are of ‘public interest’ include (but are not limited to) the following—”.—(Wayne David.)

This amendment rephrases the opening words of subsection (3) so as to make it explicit that matters of “public interest” are not limited to the specified matters.

Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 3 and 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Bill

Wayne David Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 23rd February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Second time.

I have been a Member of Parliament for nearly 23 years. [Hon. Members: “No!] I know it is difficult to believe for some, but it is true. This is the first occasion on which my name has been drawn in the private Member’s Bill ballot; I am pleased to say my name was drawn fourth. I thought long and hard about the most appropriate and best piece of draft legislation to bring forward. I decided on this Bill, because I genuinely think it is incredibly important, and I will set out to the House why that is.

The Bill tackles strategic litigation against public participation cases, widely known as SLAPPs, in all their forms. Last year, I and the Labour Opposition welcomed the measures enacted in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 that ensured that SLAPPs relating to economic crime can be tackled. I am pleased to bring forward a Bill to expand on that. Reform to protect freedom of speech and the public interest is something that all parties in Parliament hold dear. In all debates in this House and the other place there has been a broad consensus about the need for reform to tackle the pernicious effect of SLAPPs. However, in both Houses it has been clear that the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act does not go far enough.

SLAPPs have taken and do take many forms. It is vital to bring forward legislation that genuinely tackles the issue in a holistic and rounded sense. There are many examples of SLAPPs. I will refer to a few high-profile cases that have reached court and received some publicity, and to others that have not received that much publicity.

I begin with a case that I am sure hon. Members will be aware of, because it has attracted a great deal of attention. In 2022, a defamation case was reportedly brought against the journalist Tom Burgis, the Financial Times and publishers HarperCollins by a Kazakh mining company. The case concerned a book by Burgis entitled “Kleptopia: How Dirty Money is Conquering the World”.

A defamation case was brought by Roman Abramovich against journalist Catherine Belton and HarperCollins regarding her book “Putin’s People”. It is an excellent book and well worth reading. There was a legal assault on the book through a number of lawsuits in quick succession, justifiably provoking a group of campaigners for free expression to state that London’s courts were becoming the venue of choice for legal action designed to “quash critical journalism”. Catherine Belton, the author of “Putin’s People”, has called for the introduction of reforms to tackle this global industry, based here in London. Hopefully, the Bill will begin to address this significant problem seriously.

Then there is the case of Amersi v. Leslie. A British business owner, Mohamed Amersi, brought a defamation case against Charlotte Leslie, a former Conservative MP and managing director of the Conservative Middle East Council. I am familiar with the case, because I am the shadow Minister for the middle east and north Africa. The case concerned a memo on Amersi’s background and dealings with Russia. It was put together in response to his attempt to become the chair of CMEC. The claim by Amersi was struck out, because he had failed to show how the memo caused serious harm to his reputation.

It is not only high-profile cases that involve SLAPPs. There is the case of Nina Cresswell who named a person who violently sexually assaulted her after her original report was dismissed by the police. She commendably wanted to alert other women who may become victims of sexual assault. The man who was named sued her for defamation. Ms Cresswell won a landmark judgment last year, but the very fact that she had to fight the case at all demonstrates the huge gaps that SLAPP claimants are only too ready to exploit, and we need to address that fact.

I have also heard stories of patients who have left negative reviews for botched plastic surgeries being issued with SLAPP claims by the surgeons. I have heard of tenants who have spoken out about their uninhabitable housing being issued with SLAPP claims by their landlords. That is wrong and it must be stopped.

I have given a few examples of relatively high-profile cases, and also of some that are not so well known. There are many cases that do not attract any attention in court and there are many more that we do not know about because individuals are intimidated before legal proceedings actually commence. The data that the Government have is only the tip of the iceberg. As I have suggested, SLAPPs are extremely pernicious before any action reaches court. Pre-action letters and legal pressure are applied well before proceedings are initiated. This often results in the search or the investigation being withdrawn before publication, or, in some cases, in a whole variety of different areas, the effectiveness of threats and intimidation are such that the cases never see the light of day. Accordingly, that will never be reflected in available data.

Then we come to the press in this country. Let us remember that, as a country that champions freedoms both here and abroad, we must ensure that our free press, which is a real pillar of our democracy, never feels so vulnerable that it self-censors on vital matters in the public interest. No one in the United Kingdom is above the law. Furthermore, no one should be above proper scrutiny on a matter of public interest.

As to the data we have, the provision of figures from the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe are deeply concerning in themselves. It estimates that there were 29 SLAPPs in England and Wales in 2022. That is up from 25 in 2021 and 11 in 2020. CASE’s August 2023 report recorded that the total figure in Europe over the past decade was 793.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

The hon. Member mentions the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe. I wonder whether he agrees with the Anti- SLAPP Coalition that the proposed Bill, as drafted, would introduce a subjective test, requiring a court to infer the state of mind and purpose of the filer. Does he agree with me that that would create complexity, costs and delay, which would potentially make the Bill ineffective?

[Wayne David]

It is an issue that has to be considered carefully, and, indeed, it has been given a great deal of consideration and much debate.

[Chris Clarkson (Heywood and Middleton) (Con)]

On that point, will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Wayne David]

May I just respond to the other point that has been made? It is vital that this issue is considered properly and deeply. I hope very much that, if we are successful today, the debate will continue into Committee, so that further consideration may be given to that issue. At the moment, I am erring on the side of what is suggested by my private Member’s Bill. I think the Bill strikes a balance. It is not quite accurate to talk about subjectivity and objectivity, because a judge will have to make a determination on the facts that are presented and his knowledge of how the case is being conducted. At the moment I err in favour of saying that there is a false dichotomy, but it is something that should be considered further in Committee.

[Chris Clarkson]

I join in concordance with the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David). This is an excellent piece of legislation and I am very broadly in support of it. I just wanted to respond to the comment from the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord). Subjectivity is actually a fundamental part of our legal system already: we talk often of the man on the Clapham omnibus. It is the reasonableness test, so I do not think there is anything in the Bill that is out of scope or inappropriate.

[Wayne David]

I am inclined to agree with that comment, as my Bill suggests, but it is something that needs to have more airing and more consideration. Detailed consideration in Committee would be an appropriate place for that to happen.

As others have said many times, most SLAPP-related activity takes place below the radar before a formal court case and court claim is issued. There are a number of reasons why SLAPPs are so bad, and why SLAPPs claimants are so successful in their warped objective of perpetrating them. Commonly, the comparatively modest means of a defendant are leveraged against them to encourage retraction or the abandonment of the important research that would shine a light on questionable behaviour. Bullying tactics can include huge threatened litigation costs and damages, and all of the unbearable consequences such as bankruptcy and loss of homes and livelihoods, as well as the emotional distress that entails. All of that can cause huge hardship and psychological pressure.

Sadly, many people are not able to withstand all of that. So many of the cases are like David and Goliath, but if David had no slingshot. I should be clear about why the unfairness of a legal system that allows all of that has to be challenged and changed. That is why I am bringing forward the Bill today. We must eradicate the harms caused by that kind of aggressive litigation. We must protect publishers, authors and advocates from spurious claims and empower them to forge ahead with publishing legitimate stories. Grounded, well-researched investigative reporting must be protected, not reined in for fear of colossal legal costs. We must do our utmost to protect and empower ordinary people, and give them the confidence to use the legal system of this country to ensure fairness in the public interest.

Of course, protecting journalists or anyone else cannot be at the expense of denying claimants their rights of access to justice. But at present, the fact that claimants can wrongly exploit the justice system to obfuscate the transparency that is essential in a healthy democracy means that an important balance must be struck. As things stand, that is clearly not the case, and that is why I call for urgent reform today. Robust action to counter SLAPPs in all their forms is needed and it is needed now.

I have sought to work alongside the Government to ensure that the approach underpinning the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act—which was positively received across civil society, media and the legal professions, including the regulators—remains largely intact in the Bill as it achieves what is necessary. The Bill will therefore keep, for the most part, the definition of a SLAPP claim in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, but it will also broaden the scope and capture all SLAPPs in future. In future, any SLAPPs cases in which speaking out is in the public interest, including for publications on economic crime, will be caught.

Let me address the components of the definition. First, the claimant will have acted to restrain the defendant’s exercise of their right to freedom of speech. Secondly, the exercise of that right will have been in the pursuit of the public interest, or exposing potential wrongdoing or other bad behaviour, such as illegality or untruths, or matters to do with public health and safety or the climate and the environment. Thirdly, the claimant will have misused litigation for its threat to cause harm to the defendant, specifically through harassment, stress or expense, which is beyond that which can be ordinarily expected in properly conducted litigation. The last point includes an important distinction. Legal cases almost always bring a measure of stress and expense to the parties involved, given their serious nature.

As I have said, SLAPP claims are often designed to generate excessive stress and expense in pursuit of a remedy that is a mere fig leaf, or excuse to allow the real harm that the claimant wishes to cause. One thing that distinguishes a SLAPP claim is that the legal action is not pursued for the appropriate remedy, but as a means, in its own right, of bringing oppression to bear. To safeguard against that harm in an effective and proportionate way, including by ensuring that legitimate claims can proceed, the Bill will introduce a new early dismissal test. Claimants will have to show that they are more likely than not to succeed at trial. Where they cannot do so, the case will be struck out.

In addition, much of the harm in SLAPP claims lies in the risk of adverse costs that defendants face. A properly functioning early dismissal mechanism will assist in removing many of the risks to the defendant. However, for SLAPP claims that are not dismissed early, the Bill will introduce a new costs regime that protects defendants from costs that they would usually pay if they lost the case. That will ensure that defendants can defend themselves properly and that the risk of costs does not force them to settle claims unnecessarily. The underpinning principles of that new cost regime are included in the provisions, but the detail will be introduced under the usual cost regime-making powers through rules of court.

Together, those provisions will initially require only new civil procedure rules to give them shape and maximise their effectiveness, as the evidence available shows that SLAPPs are focused on civil proceedings. However, the provisions can be extended by regulations to any other proceedings as necessary, such as the online procedure rules. I trust that the Government will make necessary regulations when claimants who are well resourced and able to exploit any perceived loophole choose other courts in which to pursue SLAPPs. That will also help to ensure that the Bill is future-proofed. SLAPPs are likely to evolve, and we need legal infrastructure to be robust enough to meet future challenges.

As a result of the Bill, the courts will have the necessary tools and guidance to deal swiftly with all SLAPPs, which aim to stifle freedom of speech. Investigative journalists will also be empowered to expose wrongdoing in all its forms, whatever that may be. It is my hope that defendants in such cases will, as a consequence, feel safe from attempts to wrongly exploit our legal system. Journalists and others will be empowered to shine a light on criminal misconduct wherever they find it, whatever form it takes, without fear of spurious claims being made against them.

Unscrupulous individuals or corporations brazenly misuse our courts and legal system to further their agendas, to the detriment of the public interest, though it is wrong to do so as a matter of principle. The public must know about wrongdoing and corruption, so that our democratic society can function and the rule of law can be preserved. This Bill recognises the breadth and depth of SLAPPs; currently, the law focuses solely on economic crime, but SLAPPs can be found in all areas of the law. This all-embracing legislation against SLAPPs is, I believe, a truly significant step in ensuring freedom of speech and removing a clear abuse of our legal system. I therefore urge colleagues across the House to give the Bill their full support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Wayne David]

With the leave of the House, I am very pleased that we have had such a good debate. It is laudable that so many Members in all parts of the House have taken the time to attend and to make such excellent contributions. I also pay tribute to people and organisations outside the House, notably the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition. It has worked tirelessly on this issue for some time, and its input has been of tremendous value. I thank the Ministry of Justice and its civil servants for their assistance, its briefings and its constructive engagement at all times.

There are a number of issues that many Members consider particularly important, such as the so-called issue of subjective tests. I am inclined to agree with what the Minister said in summing up the debate, but I accept that there is room for further discussion, and we will be able to deal with it in some detail if the Bill goes into Committee.

I agree that cost is a fundamental issue. A number of Members have cited examples in which it is enormously important in ensuring that justice is done and is seen to be done. In her evidence to a Select Committee, the author Catherine Belton said that in London a single letter cost as much as £9,000, addressing concerns that had been expressed by a number of people. If one letter costs £9,000, we all know how much an entire case could cost. Surely that cannot be right in a democratic country which prides itself on freedom of speech, in which freedom of speech is pivotal, and which allows justice for all.

I hope very much that the Bill will continue its progress through the House and will reach the statute book, because I think that that would be a huge step forward for parliamentary democracy.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time; to stand committed to a Public Bill Committee (Standing Order No. 63).

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Wayne David Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 11th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

Although I campaigned and argued for this country to remain a part of the European Union, I fully accept that that is not the majority view of the country. But I would argue that this is the wrong way to leave the European Union. This is not a general enabling Bill; it is a poorly thought-out, complex and undemocratic piece of legislation. One of the most fundamental problems with the Bill is that it amounts to—yes—a power grab by this Government. That power grab takes several forms, but I want to focus on just two aspects.

First, there is the widespread use of Henry VIII powers, allowing the Government effectively to bypass Parliament and change primary legislation through secondary legislation. That has, of course, happened in the past, but not on such a huge scale as is planned now. As a result of this Bill, we will see extensive use of those undemocratic powers, because some 12,000 EU regulations will be brought into UK law. Some of them will make changes for technical reasons, but, as the most recent paper from the House of Commons Library states, it is anticipated that others will enable “substantive policy changes” to be made by the Government. So changes are likely to be introduced through Committees, which is why the Government are doing their best to pack those Committees with their own MPs, against the established procedure of the House.

We are also seeing an unprecedented power grab with regard to devolution. As a Welsh Member of Parliament and a former Wales Office Minister, I have followed devolution very closely. Many of us expected, as did the devolved institutions themselves, that this Bill would make real the promises the Government set out in their White Paper.

[Stephen Kerr (Stirling) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Wayne David]

There are many speakers, as we have heard, and I am sorry, but I would rather press on.

In the White Paper of March 2017, it was stated that there would be a significant increase in the decision-making powers of the devolved institutions. That was there in black and white. It also intimated that former EU frameworks would be subject to decisions involving the devolved Governments, but such is not the case. The Bill before us does not return powers from the EU to the devolved institutions, as promised. Instead, in devolved areas, such as agriculture and the environment, power is going from Brussels to London, bypassing and therefore undermining devolution. Moreover, this Bill in effect imposes a freeze on the legislative competences of the devolved institutions. As a report by the Welsh Assembly research department points out, the devolved institutions will not be able to modify so-called retained EU law for Wales and Scotland, but a Conservative British Government will be able to do so for England, and may even be able to do so for the devolved nations.

[Mr Jenkin]

In the last Parliament, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee took evidence on this matter from the same academic who advised the Scottish Parliament, and he was very clear that the powers being reserved under these proposals were only ever notionally devolved, because they were of course reserved by virtue of our membership of the European Union. This is not a power grab; the Government’s objective is to make sure that the devolved Administrations finish up with more powers than they had before.

[Wayne David]

We are not talking about notional, theoretical powers; we are talking about actual powers on the statute book, and about whether one institution or another is able to enact laws according to that legislation.

There is a big difference between what was in the White Paper and what is in the legislation before us. What is more, undemocratic changes have been introduced without even a modicum of prior discussion, let alone negotiation, with the devolved institutions. This power grab by the Conservative Government is an affront to the devolved institutions, but it is also a slap in the face of the people of Scotland and of Wales. As Carwyn Jones, the First Minister, said in the Welsh Assembly in July, there is a popular mandate for what the Welsh Government are arguing. To quote him exactly:

“The 2011 referendum…saw a large majority vote in favour of giving this National Assembly primary legislative powers”,

but the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is

“an attempt to take back control over devolved policies…not just from Brussels, but from Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast.”

In his letter to Members of Parliament, dated 7 September, the First Secretary of State said that the arrangement I have described was a “transitional arrangement”. My question is: how long is this transitional arrangement for? How long is the period to which we are referring? How long is the rapid period mentioned in the explanatory memorandum? Is it one month, one year, 10 years, 20 years—how long? This Bill is an undemocratic blank cheque that, if passed, will give unprecedented powers to this Government.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Bill has as its prime objective not so much withdrawing Britain from the European Union as concentrating as much power as possible in the hands of a feeble minority Government, headed by a caretaker Prime Minister. Under the cloak of leaving the European Union, the Government seek to emasculate this House and centralise power in their own hands. If the Government were solely concerned about leaving the European Union, there are other ways that it could have been done—other measures could have been put forward—but, no, they chose this particular route. Rather than looking forward to a new and positive relationship with the European Union, this Bill takes us back to the days when the UK was totally London-orientated and inward-looking. That is why I will vote against it, and why I believe that is the right thing to do.

Driving Offences: Government Consultation

Wayne David Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

Most drivers drive safely, and Britain has one of the best safety records in the world. It is good to see growing public awareness of the need for safety, and a growing number of community groups are working with the police to reduce the incidence of speeding on our roads. I refer, for example, to the excellent work of the Draethen, Waterloo and Rudry community voice project and the Machen community road watch, both in my constituency.

At the same time, with a growing number of vehicles on the road, there is growing public concern about aspects of the law as it relates to driving. In particular, the law and sentencing guidelines do not always provide a proportionate response to the crimes committed on our roads. In that context, I refer to an accident that occurred in south Wales a year-and-a-half ago.

In October 2015, an horrendous accident occurred in Georgetown, Merthyr Tydfil in which three young men from Gilfach, Bargoed in my constituency lost their lives. They were passengers in a car that crashed into a roadside telegraph post. Two of the young men were presumed dead at the scene of the accident, and the third man died of his injuries some weeks later. The driver of the car and the front-seat passenger both survived the accident.

The driver of the car was arrested some weeks later on suspicion of causing death by dangerous driving. He was released on police bail and allowed to continue driving. I understand that the law has now been changed to prevent such an occurrence.

At the end of the trial, the judge stated that there was insufficient evidence to

“prove to the right standard that the defendant’s driving was dangerous”.

Instead, the defendant was found guilty of causing death by careless driving. The defendant admitted three counts of death on that basis and was jailed for 10 months. The charges of death by dangerous driving were dismissed by the judge.

The sentence that was delivered was, I am told, in line with sentencing guidelines and reflects the plea of guilty made by the defendant. But given the severity of the crime, the families of the three young men who had lost their lives were naturally shocked and appalled by the leniency of the sentence. Indeed, everyone who has read or heard about this case has been aghast at how such a lenient sentence could have been imposed. I am told that the defendant showed no remorse during the trial and, to make matters worse, he was released from prison having served only five months of his sentence.

Although I do not expect the Minister to comment on this case, I would like to make two further points relating to it. First, I am told that a material fact was not brought to the attention of the judge due to a police failing: some months before the accident, the defendant had been cautioned for a driving offence, but that caution had not been recorded properly by Gwent police and therefore it was not brought to the attention of the judge. The caution would probably have been inadmissible as evidence, but it may have had a bearing on the sentence delivered. The matter has been taken-up with Gwent police and with the police and crime commissioner for Gwent.

I am also concerned about the apparent lack of sensitivity and support for the families of the deceased young men shown by the Crown Prosecution Service. Having indicated to the families that a charge of death by dangerous driving was being pursued, the CPS did not then sufficiently explain to the families why a lesser charge was being imposed. This case is obviously germane to the Government’s consultation on “Driving offences and penalties relating to causing death or serious injury”. That consultation concluded at the start of this month. It was an important consultation and I have made a submission to it. The Government will now consider whether the sentencing guidelines ought to be modified.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The hon. Gentleman has brought a very important issue to the House for consideration, and we are all here because we support him and congratulate him on doing that. Does he agree that the average sentence of not even four years is certainly not enough of a penalty for those who take a life in this way? Does he further agree that we should consider a life sentence for those who have a history of careless driving offences, such as those he has referred to?

[Wayne David]

I have a great deal of sympathy with the point that has been made. One point I want to elaborate on later is the inadequacy of the sentencing for crimes of this sort.

I referred to the consultation and I am disappointed by it, as, unfortunately, the Government circumscribed it from the start. They did that by stating that they had already decided that there was to be no change in the legislation relating to the definition of careless driving and dangerous driving. Although the consultation paper from the Ministry of Justice acknowledges that the distinction between careless and dangerous driving has been

“the subject of extensive scrutiny and debate”,

the Government indicated that they had already made up their mind in favour of maintaining the status quo. This is most unfortunate.

The case regarding my constituents from Bargoed has, among other things, highlighted that the distinction between careless driving and dangerous driving is artificial and unhelpful in ensuring that sentences reflect the gravity of the crime they seek to punish. The definition of careless driving is set-out in section 3ZA of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and it stipulates that a person is driving carelessly if they are driving without “due care and attention'”. The law also adds that there is careless driving if the manner of driving falls below what could be expected of a competent and careful driver.

What constitutes dangerous driving is set out in section 2A(1) of that Act. It applies to a person whose driving falls far below what could be expected of a competent and careful driver.

The consultation paper makes the fair point that it is impossible to set out what might constitute careless or dangerous driving in every case because, quite obviously, every case is different. However, that is a strong argument for having a continuum of what I will call bad driving, rather than a division between careless and dangerous driving. As things stand, given that the threshold for proving dangerous driving is quite high, it is much easier to err on the side of caution and secure a conviction for the lesser offence of careless driving. That is an argument relevant to a prosecutor’s decision, as well as to a judge’s determination.

As I have said, I have made a submission to the consultation. An important submission has also been made by Brake, the road safety charity, in which it, too, argues that the distinction between careless driving and dangerous driving is questionable, particularly in cases relating to death and injury. Brake has also pointed out that there is a lack of consistency in the differentiation between careless driving and dangerous driving. Its submission says:

“the test lacks any bench-mark for consistency due in large part to the variability of facts on a case to case basis”.

In reality, the line between the low of what is expected of a competent and careful driver, and far below that, is impossible to pinpoint with any degree of accuracy. As Brake has pointed out, there is also a need to change our terminology. I accept that it is insufficient simply to advise the judiciary to refer to “bad driving”. Equally, it is inappropriate to talk of careless driving when we are referring to death or serious injury. The language of the charges needs to be changed to reflect the seriousness of the issue.

It is clear that the law needs to be changed. As it stands, the law, and the sentencing guidelines that emanate from it, do not command full public confidence. Surprising though it must seem, only a minority of people convicted of death by careless driving are given a custodial sentence, and the average sentence is little over a year. In 2011, the average length of a custodial sentence for causing death by careless driving was 15.3 months; in 2014, it was 10.4 months; and in 2015, it was 14.4 months. In the case I have highlighted, in which three young men lost their lives, the sentence was a mere 10 months.

I hope the Government listen to what members of the public are saying and take heed of what Brake is arguing for. The consultation may have concluded, but I very much hope that the Government will begin a more fundamental consultative process that will eventually lead to a change in the law. Any changes made will not correct the wrongs that have been done to the families of the three young men from Bargoed, but they will at least help to ensure that other families might not have to go through the torment that they have experienced over the past year and a half.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Sam Gyimah)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) on securing this debate about the Government’s consultation on driving offences and penalties relating to causing death or serious injury. In one way, the debate is timely, as the consultation closed last week—on 1 February. I want to take this opportunity to thank the thousands of people—more than 9,000, in fact—who took the time to respond. We received responses from road safety groups such as Brake, driving organisations, academics, Members of this House, police officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers and families who lost loved ones as a result of terrible driving offences. We also heard from from members of the general public who simply wanted to share what they thought about road traffic offences and penalties. I am grateful for the time and effort that all those people put into their responses.

I am sure that Members appreciate that I am not going to set out now, just a week later, the Government’s assessment and our response to the consultation. We will, of course, consider every one of those 9,000-plus responses. We will then produce a written response and bring forward proposals for legislative or other changes.

Before the consultation closed, I met a number of families who have experienced terrible losses as a result of driving offences. I was struck by how much they wanted to respond to the consultation because they needed to share their experience and wanted to make the law as effective as possible. As a Justice Minister, I cannot comment on individual cases, inlcuding the charges brought or the sentences imposed. However, from talking to those families and a series of debates that I attended last year, I know that many Members of this House will be aware of cases involving road deaths in their own constituencies.

I know that there was a particularly tragic case in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency when three young men were killed by a driver who was subsequently convicted of causing death by careless driving. I extend my deepest sympathies to the families and friends of those three young men who died when they were just at the beginning of their adult lives.

Although I cannot comment on individual cases, I do want to deal with the main points raised by the hon. Gentleman. He suggests that the Government should have expanded the consultation to include a consideration of the differences between careless driving and dangerous driving. The consultation does in fact deal with that important issue, particularly the suggestion that the distinction between careless driving and dangerous driving should be abolished and replaced with one “bad driving” offence.

I recognise, as is set out in the consultation, that this can be a difficult area of law. What amounts to dangerous driving is determined not, as is more normal in the criminal law, by considering the driver’s state of mind or intentions, which in the context of driving is often difficult to ascertain, but by examining the nature of the driving. The law sets out an objective test that is designed to compare the driving of a defendant in the specific circumstances of their case with what would be expected of a notional careful and competent driver. In general terms, if the court considers that the defendant’s driving falls far below that standard, and it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that the manner of the driving was dangerous, the court will find it to have been dangerous driving.

Our law needs to reflect that while the harm caused in homicide cases and fatal driving offences is the same, because someone has died, the offender’s culpability for the death may be significantly different. The consultation examined the option for a single bad driving offence. It set out in detail why the Government are not persuaded of a case for change. Those who propose a single test have said that it will lead to more convictions and longer sentences. As is set out in the consultation, we do not believe that that is necessarily the case. That is because the maximum penalty for the single offence would have to be broad enough to cover the most serious cases—we have proposed a life sentence for causing death—and also the least serious when the driver’s culpability for the death is very low. If we do not have a distinction in the offences between the seriousness of the offending, it is possible that the conviction rate may actually fall because juries might be reluctant to convict a driver in lesser cases—one where they can imagine themselves in the same position—for an offence with a very serious maximum penalty.

[Wayne David]

I acknowledge the Minister’s argument, which I have heard before. If we went out to consultation on this specific issue, which we have not really done, would it not be far better if the Government were informed by a wider legal debate as well as public opinion in case they might want to change the law in the future?

[Mr Gyimah]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. I suspect that if I were to look at his submission to the consultation, I would see that he has made points similar to those that he has raised in this debate. When members of the public have concerns, I am sure that they will have made us aware of them through the consultation process. That is absolutely fair—it is why we have a consultation—but a consultation has to start and finish somewhere.

The Government’s case is that if we do not have a distinction between the seriousness of offences, the conviction rate could fall. Sentences might not increase either, because the judge in the case would still consider the culpability of the offender when deciding the appropriate sentence. I would not want to mislead victims and families by suggesting that a broader offence would necessarily result in higher sentences.

I disagree that a single offence would mean that the Crown Prosecution Service would be unable to accept a lesser plea in circumstances when that was inappropriate. The CPS operates under the code for Crown prosecutors and will bring the most serious charge appropriate for the behaviour when there is a reasonable chance of securing a conviction that is in the interest of justice. It is worth noting that a judge may direct that there is no evidence to sustain a more serious charge in some cases.

In conclusion, let me repeat that there can be nothing more tragic than the loss of young lives—any lives—especially when that loss is avoidable. I know only too well that many hon. Members have seen cases where people have died in such circumstances in their constituencies, and where there are concerns about the sentences imposed. As I said in a debate at the end of last year, for too long these concerns have not been acted upon. At that time, I reaffirmed the Government’s commitment to consulting on the offences and penalties for driving offences resulting in death and serious injury. That is what the Government have done. We will analyse all the responses and come forward with plans in the near future.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Wayne David Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Selous]

The MOJ retains its rights over determining any transfer of the contracts from G4S, and the Secretary of State appointed an independent improvement board at Medway, whose recommendations we will consider and which will no doubt be of value for the future. Finally, the Charlie Taylor review is looking at youth justice and how to put education at its heart by creating a safe and nurturing environment in which people can make real educational progress.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

Next week, we will see a new contract holder for the Rainsbrook secure training centre. The contract has been awarded to an American company called MTC Novo. Given G4S’s appalling record at Rainsbrook and Medway, how can the Minister justify the contract being awarded to a company that has one of its American prisons under judicial oversight, owing to “cruel and unusual punishments” being administered by its staff?

[Andrew Selous]

I think there is some dispute over MTC’s American history, but I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on that point. We are agnostic on provision; we want the best possible provision. As he will know, G4S runs extremely high-quality prisons in Wales, such as Parc prison at Bridgend. I also remind him that the contract with G4S ran under three successive Labour Governments.

Oral Answers to Questions

Wayne David Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Gove]

I can only apologise again, through you, Mr Speaker, to the hon. Lady. She has been persistent on this important issue, and I am truly sorry she has not received answers to her questions. She will be aware, of course, that G4S has said it wants to remove itself from the administration of secure training centres for young people, but it is important that there be full accountability about how public money is spent and how these organisations have operated. I will make sure that a reply comes to her as soon as possible.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

We know that many of the young people in secure training centres have serious mental health problems and therefore require specialist support. That is certainly the case at Medway STC. As the Justice Secretary said, we understand that G4S has decided to end its contract at Medway and at another training centre, but I was surprised to learn that it can sell its contracts to other private companies. There is widespread agreement that G4S has an appalling track record in running STCs. In allowing it to sell its contracts, are not the Government rewarding it for failure?

[Michael Gove]

Absolutely not. It is our responsibility to ensure that children in secure training centres are kept in decent and supportive circumstances that enable them to reintegrate into society. As a result of Youth Justice Board monitoring, the work of the improvement board I set up and the wider work by Charlie Taylor, we are monitoring very carefully the health and welfare of children in all our secure training centres. My Department will have the ability to scrutinise any other organisation that takes over the running of these STCs to ensure that children are kept safe.

Caerphilly County Borough Council

Wayne David Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd February 2016 Westminster Hall

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the financial consequences for Caerphilly County Borough Council of legal action against its senior officers.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz.

This case has been an issue of concern locally in Caerphilly borough for some time, so I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss it in some detail and reflect on the consequences. We have before us a saga that began in September 2012, when the chief executive and other senior officers of Caerphilly County Borough Council were given huge pay increases of up to 30%. In March 2013, the council’s chief executive was arrested. A few months later, the then acting deputy chief executive was arrested on suspicion of committing fraud and misconduct in public office. The head of legal services was arrested later. The three individuals were suspended on full pay by the local authority, as was its obligation.

The Welsh Audit Office investigated, and its public interest report concluded that the senior officers’ pay increases were “unlawful” because the meeting at which the decisions were taken had not been properly advertised and the agenda and reports for the meeting had not been made available for public inspection three days in advance. The report also pointed to other serious concerns, including the fact that the chief executive prepared a report, on which the decisions were subsequently taken, that was far from objective, and that he stayed in the meeting while his own salary was being discussed and decided.

The three officials concerned were the subject of a police investigation throughout 2013 and into summer 2014. Because of the understandably close working relationship between Caerphilly County Borough Council and Gwent police, the investigation was undertaken by Avon and Somerset constabulary. Early in 2014, the three defendants were charged with misconduct in public office. In May 2014, they appeared before Bristol magistrates court and were sent for trial at Bristol Crown court. On 13 May 2014, the trial date was set for 15 June 2015. It was decided that that would give ample time for the defence and prosecution to prepare their cases and for all the evidence to be assembled. From then on, however, there were legal wrangles between the defence and prosecution about the use of materials. There were also problems with the lack of availability of the allocated judge for the estimated trial length—I will say more on that later—so the process grew longer and longer and dragged on through the spring and summer and into the autumn of 2015.

Eventually, in October 2015, the judge dismissed the charges against the three defendants. Judge William Hart said:

“I find that there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly directed could convict any of the defendants of misconduct in a public office on the admissible evidence available.”

In response to the judge’s decision, the Crown Prosecution Service issued a statement, which said:

“This was a complicated, wide-ranging and lengthy investigation into serious allegations against council employees. The investigation was conducted by Avon and Somerset Constabulary at the request of Gwent Constabulary…CPS South West’s Complex Casework unit took the decision to charge the three defendants following extensive consultation with the police. Since that time the prosecution team has pursued the case within the proper judicial process.”

There had been concerns about the length of the trial as the case was progressing. I wrote to the CPS to ask about the apparently excessive delays. In a letter to me, the CPS responded by saying:

“We are conscious of all the public monies that have been expended by the delay in this prosecution but the Court listing is a matter outside the control of the CPS.”

Frankly, that is not good enough. There is widespread concern about how the CPS handled the case and whether it accurately prioritised the pursuit of the most appropriate issues and material.

There is also concern about Avon and Somerset police. Clearly, officers amassed a huge amount of material relevant to the case. It is possible that the ongoing police investigation into other alleged irregularities at Caerphilly County Borough Council meant that they were unable to provide an accurate summary of what material was relevant to the case. The police seized more than 160,000 emails during the investigation, and it is noteworthy that the defence submitted an abuse of process argument, stating that the unused material that had been amassed had not been properly examined by the police.

There is further concern about how the court system itself operated. Following the abuse of process argument, all the parties involved made repeated representations for the case to be listed. Eventually, a new trial date was set for 8 June 2015, but because no judge was available to hear the trial in June, it was further delayed until July 2015—the second delay because of the unavailability of a judge. In the meantime, the defence applied for leave to submit an application for the case to be dismissed. The judge acceded to that request in October 2015.

This whole legal saga dragged on for more than 18 months. There were many reasons for the longevity of the case. It was certainly complex, but a measure of responsibility must be borne by those involved in its prosecution: the police, the CPS, the judiciary and the legal system as a whole. If it stops anywhere, the buck stops with the Government and the Ministry of Justice, who are responsible for the legal system. Caerphilly County Borough Council were legally obliged to suspend the three officers concerned from the moment they were arrested. To date, the bill to the council and its council tax payers is more than £1 million. There is no need to remind the Minister that, like all other local authorities in the country, Caerphilly County Borough Council can ill afford £1 million at a time when services are being cut and jobs are at risk.

As the long-drawn-out legal proceedings were not the fault of Caerphilly County Borough Council or its council tax payers, will the Minister give careful and serious consideration to my request that the council be reimbursed for the salaries it was obliged to pay to the suspended staff? If he accepts the morality of my case, he should surely find a way to ensure that the people of Caerphilly are not unfairly penalised.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Shailesh Vara)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz. I congratulate the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) on securing this debate. He is diligent and conscientious in all that he does for his constituents, so it is no surprise that he brought this important matter to the House of Commons to get a proper answer for his constituents. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to this debate. I understand the concerns of the people of Caerphilly about the cost of the case, but I hope the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the justice system’s obligation to investigate cases, even when they involve high-profile individuals, and the duty on judges to make decisions according to the information before them must continue.

I have spoken previously about the Government’s commitment to a one-nation justice system, and a fundamental part of that is the rule of law. Those responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct must be able to do so robustly and without intrusion, and it is crucial that those who make decisions in the system are independent and protected from undue state influence. It is not for this place to challenge the Wales Audit Office’s investigation, the independent prosecutorial decision to bring the proceedings or the judicial decision to bring the proceedings to a close. If it is felt that the investigation or prosecution was lacking, the right place to seek redress is with the Auditor General for Wales or the Director of Public Prosecutions. Those who feel that the case should not have ended in the way it did could have requested that the judge’s decision be scrutinised by the higher courts by bringing an appropriate challenge within the timescales prescribed in law.

I listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman said—particularly about the long time it took to arrive at a conclusion. He is, of course, aware that several factors influenced that timescale—indeed, he alluded to some of them—including the defence’s challenge of the police review of unused material, and judicial and defence counsel availability. Notwithstanding those factors, the case was concluded well within the average time for such complex cases. Cases of that nature take, on average, 25 months from charge to conclusion. That case was dealt with more quickly than the average for complex financial cases. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned listing, which is a judicial decision. Bristol Crown court sees a high number of fast-tracked sex cases, so it takes longer than usual for it to see other types of case.

The Government are undertaking a substantial programme of reform to improve the criminal justice system for those directly involved in it and the general public. In January 2015, Sir Brian Leveson published a review on efficiency in criminal proceedings, which included 56 recommendations for improving efficiency in the criminal courts within the existing legislative framework. His recommendations are the result of considerable consultation across the criminal justice system, and they cover a range of areas, including improving case management and progress in magistrates and Crown courts.

In his review, Sir Brian emphasised the need for more robust case management, and noted the importance of getting it right the first time. He recommended that one person in the police, in the Crown Prosecution Service and for the defence must be responsible for the conduct of each case. That recommendation is being taken forward as part of a better case management initiative, and will be rolled out nationally from the beginning of January following its successful introduction in eight Crown court centres in October 2015.

The initiative emphasises the importance of effectively managing proceedings while preserving judicial discretion. It aims to deal more quickly with cases where there is a guilty plea, which will free up capacity to manage more actively cases that go to trial. It aims to ensure better communication between practitioners and the court before the first hearing; more effective hearings; more guilty pleas; the disposal of many cases without the need for adjournment; and robust judicial resistance to applications to adjourn.

According to the Leveson review, to improve case management it is crucial to encourage early engagement between the prosecution and the defence. Sir Brian recommended that the criminal procedure rules make it clear that the parties are under a duty to engage at the first available opportunity. In response to that recommendation, we made amendments to the criminal procedure rules, and we are due to make more in April. Earlier engagement between parties will ensure greater collaborative working. It will allow parties to focus on the key issues, possible pleas, missing evidence and other material that could help them reach an early resolution.

[Wayne David]

I appreciate the Minister’s point and I welcome the reforms that he says are in the pipeline, but I refer him back to the costs incurred by Caerphilly County Borough Council through no fault of its own. With the benefit of hindsight, would it not have been better for case to have been heard somewhere other than Bristol Crown court if the pressures of work on it were so great? If the case had been held elsewhere, it could have been expedited, and matters could have been dealt with much quicker.

[Mr Vara]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that issue. He will appreciate that it is for the judge to determine who pays the cost of the trial. The judicial process must be based on the legal advice that the council can take. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the cost of employing additional staff to manage the work while a long case is going on is a matter for the council.

On transferring the case to somewhere other than Bristol, I hope that our reforms will enable a broader perspective to be taken on board and allow people to say, “Although this is a local issue, in order to secure justice for the people involved and for justice to be seen to be done quickly, would it be better for it to be dealt with in another nearby court where there is more capacity?” I hope that our reforms will ensure that cases are dealt with quickly and promptly. If there is a delay in one court, we should certainly look at neighbouring courts that have capacity; I do not rule that out. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the Ministry of Justice is putting in place ambitious plans. I am confident that they will be in effect in due course, but I am sorry that they could not benefit his constituents at the time of the case that he refers to.

Improving awareness of the criminal procedure rules will also allow more robust case management. The Judicial Office has been working with the judiciary and defence practitioners to raise awareness of and embed the criminal procedure rules. Discussions have been taking place with the Bar Council, the Law Society, the Judicial College and the criminal procedure rules committee. Compliance with the criminal procedure rules will ensure that court time is deployed to maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

Sir Brian also recommended using technology to improve case management. Case management hearings have become inefficient and expensive. They are essentially administrative in nature and do not always require all participants to be gathered in the same room. He therefore encourages the use of video and audio technology to hold case management hearings outside court, reducing the time spent on unnecessary travel and making case management hearings more effective. Pilot hearings have been implemented in Reading Crown court and are soon to be expanded to Aylesbury and Oxford. Those hearings will be evaluated after a couple of months and should then inform national implementation.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman can feel assured that this Government, together with the judiciary, are taking active and practical steps to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system. In saying that, I do not intend to imply any criticism of the handling of this particular case, as it is not the role of a member of the Government to comment on the outcome of this or any other case. As we improve the system in the coming years, nothing will be done to fetter or interfere with due process, which must be independent of Government and managed by an independent judiciary. I thank the hon. Gentleman again for raising this important issue on behalf of his constituents.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Wayne David Excerpts

Tuesday 26th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Gove]

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. I have to say that the capacity of cadet forces and military involvement to turn around the lives of young men who find themselves in trouble has been attested to over the years. Everything that we can do to support the Education Secretary in extending the work of cadet forces or to support General Sir Rupert Smith, a man who is a hero in my eyes, in helping to rescue the lives of young people we should do.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

The allegations in the “Panorama” programme on 11 January about Medway secure training centre were truly appalling. I am glad that the Secretary of State has listened to the chief inspector of prisons and to us, and will appoint an independent improvement board. I also note that the director of Medway has just resigned.

The three STCs in England—Medway, Oakhill and Rainsbrook—are run by G4S. Following a damning inspection report last year, the Rainsbrook contract was taken away from G4S. This has nothing to do with ideology, but on the basis of the evidence before us, will the Government now take away G4S’s Medway contract and ensure that G4S is not awarded any future contracts?

[Michael Gove]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: it is because the allegations are so serious that we have to investigate them properly. The independent improvement board will both investigate what went on and ensure that children are safe. When any organisation fails in the delivery of public services, as G4S did at Rainsbrook, we will take steps to remove the contract, and a new organisation has been given that contract. Of course, if G4S has failed in this regard, then we will take all steps necessary to keep children safe.

Safety in Youth Custody

Wayne David Excerpts

Wednesday 20th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Kelly Tolhurst]

Speaking from experience, I absolutely believe that institutions are the right place for some young people. For example, it may not necessarily be easy for them to be in a family. It is absolutely right that we have institutions where adults can be mentors, there to look after those young people on a daily basis and to work with them to rehabilitate them. My personal view is that young people should not be integrated with the adult prison service. They have different requirements, and sometimes the offences are different for particular reasons.

My biggest concern is that all these young people will eventually become adults. Whether they are looked-after children who have had a difficult background in different institutions, or whether they are unfortunate enough—maybe through fault of their own—to end up in a secure training centre, for me there is nothing more important than ensuring that we are doing all we can to ensure that the outcomes for those young people as adults are improved. The Government’s aim is to achieve that. I welcome Charlie Taylor’s review of the system. I would like to see a review in particular of the Medway centre and some of the safeguarding. I point out that I definitely have not seen all the footage and I have not been privy to the information that “Panorama” picked up during recording, but the centre is broken up into different units, and I believe that we are only looking at one element. I would like to hear some of the better stories that have come out of that centre, which I am sure exist.

Fundamentally, I welcome the debate and the review that is taking place. From a local council perspective, I was impressed as a local Member of Parliament by the immediate response that my local authority made to deal with the allegations. The local authority is carrying out due diligence in following through on the investigations in the local authority-designated officer review and in co-operating completely with the police.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

What the hon. Lady is saying from her experience and her contact with the Medway centre is very important. In general terms, does she agree that it is partly about the ethos and professionalism of the members of staff, but also partly about the ratios between the young people and the members of staff? Generally speaking, the more staff who can devote time and attention to young people, the better things are.

[Kelly Tolhurst]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. Personally, I still think it is a matter of the individual young person’s needs. There is no system that fits all. I am not so sure that the issue is ratios; it is about the particular care plans around those particular children or young people, the reasons why they are in the centre and the individual support they need. That is obviously just my view, but staff build up relationships with young people who may have been exposed to some desperate situations and who may have seen and witnessed things that have affected their development. Some of the challenges affecting the young people—whether those are mental or in terms of decision making—are not always evident when the staff start working with them. It is harder for young people, because adults can articulate things more easily. Sometimes it is a big challenge for young people to articulate some of the things that have happened to them and some of their thought processes.

My honest belief is that there is not an easy solution. I am pleased that this issue is on our radar, but I wish that it had not had to be brought forward by BBC “Panorama”. I am desperately sad that young people have been affected by what has been shown to have happened there, but we have an opportunity to move forward and do what we can. As an MP who has three secure units in my constituency, I will be taking an interest in the issue, not just because of my interest in looked-after children and wanting the very best outcomes for our young people, but because I want a constituency where my constituents are happy that what is going on in our patch is right. I welcome the debate and I welcome the information that will be released in the coming months by the review.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Selous]

I hear what the hon. Lady says and, given what has happened, I understand the strength of feeling on this issue. Nevertheless, I repeat what I said earlier: it is important that we allow Medway Council and Kent police to investigate fully what are, at the moment, allegations, albeit extremely serious ones. We should wait for the results before we do anything else.

The YJB has increased the availability of the independent advocacy service provided by Barnardo’s. It will now be available on site six days a week, compared with three days a week previously. All youth offending teams that are responsible for those currently held at Medway secure training centre have been contacted and asked whether they have any concerns about individual children or young people. The YJB will consider, on a case-by-case basis, any specific action that needs to be taken to meet the particular needs of each individual child or young person, including, where appropriate, reviewing their placement at the centre. The YJB has also contacted the families of each child and young person at all three secure training centres to explain the actions we have taken and to give them a contact point at the YJB.

I shall outline the key safeguarding and monitoring arrangements that already exist in secure training centres, which we have now reinforced at Medway in the light of the recent allegations. First, YJB monitors are appointed at all STCs to monitor and report on the performance of the establishment. Monitors will investigate and report on allegations made against custody officers and, where necessary, suspend and revoke custody officers’ certificates to work. Barnardo’s staff are also in place at all STCs to provide independent support and advice to young people through its independent advocacy service. Young people can raise any issues or concerns through either the YJB monitors or the advocacy service provided independently by Barnardo’s. There are clear processes in place that enable staff to raise concerns.

The YJB’s service specifications and commissioning arrangements for the secure estate make it clear to providers that there is an expectation that children’s welfare and safety is paramount when they are in custody. That expectation has been strengthened and reinforced in the specifications for new STC contracts and as part of the provision in young offender institutions. All persons in charge of secure establishments have a statutory duty to ensure that their functions are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. They must also participate as a member of their relevant local safeguarding children’s board. In line with statutory safeguarding guidance, each secure establishment must have an annually reviewed safeguarding policy and a member of the senior management team with responsibility for implementation of the policy. The policy should promote safeguarding and wellbeing by covering issues such as child protection, risk of harm, restraint, separation, staff recruitment and information sharing.

Each local authority has a designated officer to whom concerns about children’s safety that arise from the behaviour of adults must be referred. That is in addition to the requirement for those working with children to report to the local authority any concerns about a child they believe to have been harmed or at risk of harm. All safeguarding managers in young offender institutions are expected to attend the Working With Young People in Custody training programme, which includes modules on child protection and safeguarding. The head of safeguarding will be supported by an establishment-based qualified social worker from the local authority.

As many Members know, there is now a higher concentration of violent and high-risk offenders in the youth secure estate who present complex risks and needs. The level of violent incidents remains a concern, and one to which there is no single, simple solution. For that reason, we have in place a wide range of measures to manage safety and stability. That begins with the placement of young people. The YJB actively manages where young people are placed to support custodial providers, who in turn manage their regimes locally to keep children safe. In young offender institutions in particular, we are working to use more mental health support and psychological services to better manage and support those detained. We are also implementing a range of tools for staff to manage conflict more positively and deal with challenging and complex children. All the while, we have a zero-tolerance approach to violence and are seeking to increase children’s engagement in education to give them a greater opportunity of making progress during custody and on release. For example, in young offender institutes we now require 30 hours of education a week, which is a significant increase.

[Wayne David]

I welcome many of the positive proposals that the Minister is making, but will he give us a commitment that, if it is clearly demonstrated that certain organisations that run STCs are in breach of their duty of care to young children, they will be formally excluded from future bidding processes?

[Andrew Selous]

As I said earlier, for now, we should wait for the result of the investigation by the local authority and the police. I have already said that we have the power to strike off someone from being a custody officer. We have statutory powers and we are not afraid to use them in pursuit of our serious duties regarding the care of these young people.

The managing and minimising physical restraint policy that I mentioned earlier sets out that robust local governance arrangements should be in place to enable those running secure establishments to identify any poor practice. A weekly use-of-force meeting takes place in all establishments using the MMPR policy, and it is regularly attended by a YJB performance manager. During the meeting, which is attended by senior managers in the establishment, along with the YJB, CCTV footage of all incidents is reviewed, anything that happened in the lead-up to an incident is discussed, and any training that might be required to handle incidents better in future can be identified. Those arrangements were already in place at Medway. If there is an incident that warrants referral, we would expect an establishment to refer it to the local area designated officer at the local authority. If that is not done by an establishment, the YJB’s performance managers can make referrals themselves.

As the Secretary of State made clear in his statement on 11 January, it is a matter of record that there have been earlier examples of where G4S has let down the Ministry of Justice and those in our care. But there are also examples of innovative and high-quality institutions run by G4S. I recognise in particular that unacceptable incidents and practices were identified in Ofsted’s inspection of Rainsbrook last year. In that case, the monitoring arrangements in place were effective. The YJB monitor was aware of each of the incidents as they occurred, took the appropriate action and highlighted them to the inspection team. The YJB immediately required G4S to address the issues swiftly and effectively. G4S put in place new leadership, and the YJB agreed an action plan to improve recruitment and training.

I am pleased to tell colleagues that Ofsted’s latest inspection of Rainsbrook shows significant improvement, with improved findings for both safety and care of young people. Although the report identified two serious incidents of staff misconduct since the previous inspection, in both cases, G4S took action and dismissed the members of staff involved before the latest inspection took place.

Access to Justice: Wales

Wayne David Excerpts

Tuesday 15th December 2015 Westminster Hall

[Carolyn Harris]

It is clear that, alongside access to justice, the Government’s reforms to the criminal courts system have risked another fundamental British principle—the right to a fair trial. One of the most basic attributes that we expect of any justice system is that it is fair. Those who have committed crimes must be punished quickly and effectively, but everyone has the right for their case to be heard and nobody should have to decide how to plead based on whether they can afford to pay the fees—not least because victims of crime deserve better.

Will the Minister agree to an urgent review into how legal aid costs are affecting access to justice in Wales? As court charges—one of the flagship policies—have now been dumped, what confidence does he have that the other changes are not having a similar perverse effect on justice and the right to a fair trial?

Members across the Chamber have serious concerns about the proposal of the Ministry of Justice to close 11 courts and tribunals in Wales. In large parts of the country, it is already hard enough for those attending trials to reach their nearest court in the allotted time, and the decision to close those courts will make that harder still.

The Law Society has found that many people will find it impossible to get to their nearest court within an hour when travelling by public transport. If the Government go ahead with their plan to close, for example, two courts in Carmarthen, just 32% of people taking public transport to my constituency of Swansea for family law cases would be able to get there within 60 minutes. For criminal cases, the figure is 31%. Across Wales, in areas where there is limited or infrequent public transport, it is a very real possibility that defendants and witnesses could end up on the same bus to the court hearing. Members can imagine the distress and legal complications that that will cause.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is quite ridiculous that, at the last Justice questions, the Minister suggested that people could access justice by telephone?

[Carolyn Harris]

I think I referred to it as sentencing by text, if I am not mistaken. It is an absolutely absurd idea.

--- Later in debate ---

[Albert Owen (Ynys Môn) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, I think for the first time, Mrs Moon. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) on an excellent speech that covered most of the points that need to be considered.

I will actually start by agreeing with the Minister and the Ministry of Justice that access to justice for all is a fundamental aspect of our society. That is what it says in the consultation document on proposals for the provision of the court estate in England and Wales. I totally agree that we all want access to justice for all. Indeed, I would say that local justice and democracy are the pillars of a modern society, but we are moving away from that—I shall develop that argument a little later.

I welcome the Minister to the Chamber, because he was kind enough to acknowledge my submission to the consultation and to meet a delegation that included Citizens Advice and a local solicitor. We were able to outline many of my concerns for my area and, indeed, the periphery area of north-west Wales, including Dwyfor Meirionnydd, because the representative from the solicitor represented the whole old county of Gwynedd. However, it is Christmas, and I am going to subject the Minister to my concerns once more because it is important that they are on the record.

People know the importance of direct access to justice. The Ministry of Justice wants to close the two remaining courts in my area in Llangefni and Holyhead. Llangefni is the principal and municipal town of Anglesey. Holyhead is the largest town on the island, but also the furthest from Cardiff and London—it is on the periphery area. It is the hub to the Republic of Ireland and has a large transit population, as well as local residents. The proposal to transfer to Caernarfon court is therefore fundamentally flawed. What is more, the alternative that the Minister has talked about—the virtual courts and the digital fines—are equally flawed. Frankly, the one-size-fits-all proposal of the Ministry of Justice does not fit Wales; each part of Wales should be looked at on its merits. I understand, as I think does every Member in the Chamber, the need to modernise the justice system, but denying access is not modernisation. It is a backwards step and the proposal does not take into account people’s distances from court.

The Government talk about courts being 30 miles away and taking about an hour to reach. The journey from Holyhead to Caernarfon is 30 miles, but it can take an hour and a half. It can involve train journeys, two buses and changing. As has been said, many of those who have to travel will be witnesses, not just those who are up in court.

I believe that the proposal is flawed because it is driven by the Treasury. One of the main reasons why the exercise is being carried out now and in such a way is to save money on the estate. Yes, we need to get value for money, but the process is driven by the Treasury, rather than the Ministry of Justice. It is important to put that point on the record and I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to it.

Access to local justice has to be practical, and people have to be able to have such access. The Minister talks about virtual courts, but they will be virtually impossible to implement. There are very few buildings in my constituency that could accommodate a virtual court. He talks about access via the digital age, but the digital age has not arrived in many rural or peripheral parts of Wales. That is an important point because the superfast broadband roll-out is happening at the exchanges, but not going to many towns and areas that need it. It would be difficult to have a virtual court in north-west Wales, for example, because the information and communications technology systems simply are not there—they are intermittent. I am pleased that the Government have done a U-turn with regard to universal coverage, but that will not come in until 2020, at the earliest, and these proposals are going through now. When will the Minister respond to the consultation exercise and make his recommendations and proposals? I believe that he should wait until we have proper infrastructure if he wants to experiment with the digital age for accessing justice.

I am conscious that other Members wish to speak, so I will not go over most of the issues that I discussed with the Minister. However, I highlight the fact that in the 21st century we still need a court system that individuals can access. The public want individuals to be tried in their area, as has happened historically. If we are to move forward into the digital age, we need the necessary infrastructure in place, and the Ministry of Justice needs joined-up thinking with other Departments.

[Wayne David]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is particularly important that digitalisation is done properly in Wales because we are a bilingual country and people must have access to justice in the language of their birth? If that language is Welsh, they must have access in Welsh.

[Albert Owen]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I was going to make that point in my closing remarks, because when we talk about “local”, we are talking about local culture and local languages as well as the basic principle of access to local courts.

The Government talk about putting in place devolution and decentralisation, yet their record is one of the complete opposite. They are centralising tax offices, for example. If the Government’s proposals go through, the nearest tax office to Anglesey will be in Liverpool, which is nearer to my constituents than Cardiff. We are now talking about courts moving 30 or 40 miles away from their population, which is nothing but centralisation. I urge the Minister to look again at these proposals, to put them on hold, to talk to local communities and to listen to the consultation. He should not rush through the proposals because while I agree with him, ultimately, that we need free and fair access for all, that will not happen if these proposals go through.