Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAdam Afriyie
Main Page: Adam Afriyie (Conservative - Windsor)Department Debates - View all Adam Afriyie's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis is a crucial test, which will be addressed, I am certain, in clauses that we have yet to discuss. There is much to be said for providing a clarification, and that is one of the central things that we will come on to in a few moments’ time.
I very much support the direction of travel in new clause 1. Would it not be fairly straightforward for the Minister, even at this stage—although perhaps he does not have the words available—simply to confirm the intention, which might then negate any need for the new clause?
In fairness, the Bill’s intention is clearly expressed in the clauses that we have before us. I accept that the discussion will be ongoing; nobody is saying that it is the end of the matter, but as things stand, I think it is fair to say that there has been a great deal of discussion and a great deal of investigation of different options, and that this is the best consensual position that we have established to date. Although of course the debate will continue, I have yet to be persuaded that there is a sound and definitive case for changing what we have before us.
I believe that the Bill provides a sound framework and guidance to our independent judiciary to deal with the serious harm that SLAPPs can cause. Judges are well versed in interpreting provisions, assessing evidence and, ultimately, ensuring that justice is done. I believe very strongly that we must be careful here, because unclear direction or too much direction risks creating difficulties—more difficulties than it resolves. Words have to be precise.
Although I thank the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden for his continued commitment on the issue of SLAPPs and his consideration of the Bill, I consider that new clause 1 at the moment goes a bit too far. It risks undermining, and certainly draws into question, the careful balance that the Bill strikes, as well as the efficacy of the provisions, and it potentially complicates unnecessarily the Bill’s onward passage, and not just in this House; let us remember that it has to go to the other House as well.
Clarification is always needed, and the debate will be ongoing. I understand that the Government are prepared to provide clarification in the appropriate place, such as the explanatory notes. That is extremely important, because the explanatory notes provide the clarification for the Bill and add substantial meaning to it.
I will turn shortly to amendment 1 and the other amendments in my name, but I will first address the function of clause 2, which creates a statutory definition of what constitutes a SLAPP claim, so that courts can effectively identify such misuses of our justice system. It will mean that a case will be considered a SLAPP if each limb of a three-part test is met: a defendant has had their freedom of speech restrained, the story is a matter of public interest, and the claimant’s behaviour has been harassing, alarming or distressing to the defendant, including by running up inappropriate expense or inconvenience “beyond that ordinarily encountered” in litigation.
Before discussing my amendments, I want to recognise the targeted, constructive efforts by stakeholders who have invested time by providing feedback on the Bill, to ensure that those at risk of SLAPPs receive the backing they need to curtail abusive proceedings in the courts. I am also grateful for the work and support of the Government, who have shown their commitment to cementing the UK’s reputation as a jurisdiction that values free speech and broad public participation.
I will start with amendment 1 and will also speak to amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, which are consequential to it. In short, amendment 1 seeks more prominently to convey the Bill’s purpose by reordering the first two of the three components of a SLAPP so that public interest is given the primary position in clause 2, ahead of free speech. The amendment does not diminish or undermine the importance of an expression of freedom of speech or the claimant’s misconduct in the identification of a SLAPP. Each of the three components in clause 2 must still be present for a case to be found to be a SLAPP. Public interest considerations are at the heart of SLAPP cases, and amendment 1 reflects that importance. Accordingly, I commend the amendment to the Committee, alongside amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, which are required for drafting purposes if clause 2 is reordered as proposed.
Amendments 2 and 5 seek to ensure that there is an appropriate degree of objectivity in the intention test when considering the effects a claim has on a defendant’s freedom of speech and the misconduct of the claimant in pursuing the claim. That is achieved by introducing the concept of reasonableness. The amendments will allow the court to consider the claimant’s behaviour in terms of whether it is reasonable to conclude, based on their conduct, that the claimant intended to restrict the defendant’s freedom of speech and to cause harm. Any harm beyond what can be reasonably expected to be incurred in the course of properly conducted litigation—bearing in mind that by its very nature, litigation is stressful and inconvenient—would result in the case being identified as a SLAPP and being struck out.
On a point of clarification: I am not a lawyer either, but under the amendment, if a judge were to determine that a case were a SLAPP and strike it out, could he do so partially? Is there a mechanism by which the claimant can appeal the initial strike-out?
I will seek clarification, as I am a layperson. My understanding is that the judge’s decision is definitive and will achieve the desired effect.
The introduction of reasonableness will give the court a clear ability to draw conclusions about a claimant’s intention from all the objective evidence before it. That evidence will be from both the claimant and the defendant, and its extent will be controlled by the court. The court will also be able to determine the degree to which it is tested, and will therefore be in a proper position to infer from it whether the necessary intention from the claimant is present, so as to warrant the case being found to be a SLAPP. Amendments 2 and 5 will assist courts in ensuring that an objective and fair assessment is made of whether the case is a SLAPP.
Amendments 6 and 7 clarify the misconduct element of the test to decide whether a claim is a SLAPP. They respond to concerns from stakeholders who said that the original formulation of the clause suggested that there is a level of harassment, alarm and distress that is acceptable to pursue as a tactic to cause intimidation in conducting litigation. That was never the intention, and I wish to make that point firmly and very clearly.
The intention of the clause is to isolate claimants who are perpetrating misconduct in the way in which they are pursuing their claim. It will separate those who are using litigation as a weapon from those who have a legitimate grievance and are behaving properly in conducting their case. These amendments will mean that a defendant will be able to assert that, through improper behaviour, a claimant has caused them harm. In making that claim, the defendant will be able to invoke harm of any sort, including but not limited to harm, distress, expense, inconvenience or harassment. I consider that this new formulation will assuage the legitimate concerns raised by stakeholders and parliamentarians alike. It is therefore extremely important.
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly for bringing this important Bill to the House and getting it to this stage. Like many colleagues, I was at the first debate on lawfare in January 2022 and I am now most grateful to serve on this Committee. I also thank campaigners for what they are doing to prevent the misuse of litigation to suppress freedom of speech, including the campaign groups and campaigners working against the use of the law to silence survivors of domestic abuse and violence.
Democratic and press freedoms are fundamental to our rights and to challenging corruption and the abuse of power. That is why I remain concerned that the Bill has been drafted with too much focus on attempting to balance competing interests within the legal profession, instead of protecting public participation and the fundamental rights of free expression and access to a fair trial. Indeed, we know that the Government have been heavily lobbied by—and, as has been mentioned, have had substantial input from—the very lawyers who bring SLAPP claims.
In particular, colleagues will be aware that the Anti-SLAPP Coalition takes issue with the wording of clause 2(1)(c) because it argues that the wording assumes that there is an acceptable level of “harassment, alarm or distress”, and harm, that a claimant can intentionally inflict on a defendant. It also has a narrow scope, focusing only on conduct directly related to litigation, which leaves claimants free to continue with much of the pre-litigation conduct, and abusive behaviour conducted in tandem with litigation, that make SLAPPs so egregious and hard to monitor.
I am minded to agree with campaigners that it must be clear that claimant behaviour that is intended to harass, alarm and distress, and that harms, is combined with other factors in clause (2)(1)(c) indicative of a SLAPP claim, and that there should be no threshold below which this behaviour is acceptable. Likewise, abusive claimant behaviour prior to and alongside the claim itself should be in scope.
I place on the record my support for amendments 2 and 5, which stand in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly, which seek to ensure that a court can reach a conclusion about a claimant’s intent based on a reasonable and more objective interpretation of their behaviour, rather than rather than an overly subjective inquiry into their state of mind. That would retain the test of a claimant’s intention while mitigating the threat of complex, costly and lengthy satellite litigation, which has already been discussed. I am concerned that campaigners and experts are warning that without these amendments, there is a risk that this Bill’s early dismissal mechanism could render the legislation redundant.
As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on domestic violence and abuse, and having had first-hand experience of how SLAPPs can be used to silence women, I want to ensure that we consider the ability of abusers to weaponise litigation. Back in 2021, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression, Irene Khan, warned about gendered censorship taking place around the world. I have also spoken extensively about this issue, and she rightly pointed out that there is currently an imbalance in the system between “his” right to reputation and, usually, “her” right to free speech.
Having spoken extensively about defamation and public interest defences in this regard, I think that we should aim to have a future free from perpetrators being able to abuse the courts and pursue litigation in this way. I therefore support my hon. Friend’s amendment 10 on the definition of “public interest”. It seeks to ensure that the Bill does not privilege certain types of public interest speech and create an unnecessary and problematic hierarchy that could, as I understand it, cut across principles in the Defamation Act 2013 and data protection law, making it harder for defendants to use the full scope of available defences.
I will not keep the Committee too long. I just want to say that I have sat on many Committees in my 19 years here, and I think that this Committee is a testament to the strength of Parliament in scrutinising legislation that clearly we all want to see. It highlights the nuances of differing views on constitution versus freedom of speech versus public interest, so I very much understand the reason for each one of these amendments.
There is a lot of debate around each amendment, but I suspect that actually the Government and pretty much every MP would agree with the intention of all of them. The question is about the precision of how they are delivered. I rise, to be honest, to speak in support of all the amendments in this grouping—not necessarily the precision of them, but the intention behind each and every one. In particular, I speak in favour of amendments 11 and 12, which stand in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden.
It does seem to me that as MPs, we see all sides of this issue. We see attacks on ourselves from people trying to suppress what we are about to say on the Floor of the House or elsewhere, but we also observe in our local media that the two little journalists stuck in a local regional newspaper are suddenly facing a massive court case if they write something that, to be honest, is in the public interest and fairly innocuous. We can see things from both sides, which is why, particularly in the debate about these amendments, we are all being very gentle in how we approach things: because we know that there are subtleties that we need to address.
However, I am very keen to see that those who have disproportionate power—whether that is financial power, or in business structures, or in access to lawyers—are kept in check when it comes to behaviours that are clearly designed to harass, intimidate, frustrate and frighten people on the receiving end, whether they are local journalists or media, or even, to be honest, mainstream newspapers that may have financial challenges as well, or individuals such as our former colleague Charlotte Leslie, whose life was made an absolute misery. Nobody in any party would want to see or witness that kind of behaviour, no matter which former MP was experiencing it.
This issue needs to be dealt with and I thank the Government for dealing with it. I also thank all hon. Members on this Committee for examining what needs to change. I am very keen on this group of amendments, because they aim to clarify and define more closely what it is we are trying to deal with. The worst kind of legislation is the kind that we have not scrutinised carefully to ensure that when a judge approaches a matter, they have clear directions and a clear understanding of the intention of this House in forming that legislation.
I hope that in Committee and on Report, we will finally get to a resolution on each of the issues that have been raised here, because it is really important that this piece of legislation gets on to the statute books. However, it is equally important that freedom of speech is defended and that the little guy or the little girl in our society—the small media outlets—are protected from deeply wealthy and deeply aggressive litigants.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Elliott. I can be fairly brief, as harmony appears to have broken out across the Committee. I would not want to disturb that harmony in any way.