Highways (Financing) Bill (Second sitting)

Tristan Osborne Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)]

Q Both of your organisations and many others have highlighted how the UK is not great at delivering infrastructure quickly and efficiently. Do you believe that the Bill in its current form has the potential to accelerate the delivery of major road projects?

Ben Hopkinson: I completely agree that the UK has a long historical challenge with delivering infrastructure cheaply and quickly. HS2 is the most expensive railway ever built, and the Bakerloo line extension will be one of the most expensive underground lines ever built. Tramlines are double the cost here compared to other European countries. We have the most expensive nuclear power plant ever built. There is a real long-term failure to build infrastructure quickly and cheaply.

On the Bill, it is good that we are getting private financing in, and that will help ease some of the burden on the state, when we are already pushed up against our fiscal limits. As I have mentioned, I have a little concern about the incentive structure, especially insofar as the private constructor has incentives to escalate costs as much as they can get away with under the ORR. A concession model might work a little better.

Sam Dumitriu: One of the important things when it comes to infrastructure delivery is ensuring you have a pipeline of projects, you know what you will build next and you can plan appropriately. We have many reasons why, in the UK, those pipelines get knocked about. Sometimes you have a road that you want to build, and everyone wants it built, but someone has brought a lawsuit against the road and it is delayed by a year. That makes planning for that really challenging.

One of the other problems is that sometimes those delays mean that you get pushed into different funding windows—the Treasury can reopen conversations about value for money, especially when in every Budget someone is trying to squeeze things into the fiscal rules and moving things from one period into another period, and cost-saving measures that are really delays. Those things tend to happen, and have happened for ever.

One thing that was really impressive under the last Government was the road investment strategy approach, which essentially said “We will set out a strategic case for all the big roads we want to build, we will give a pot of money and then we will give a delivery body the freedom to execute that.” The freedom to execute was slightly constrained by the planning system and all those delays, but fundamentally that is a very good approach. The challenge comes when the money is not quite there from the public purse, in part because the fiscal situation is tighter, but also because different choices are being made. In that case, private finance can fill the gap and ensure that you have a much more stable pipeline. I am in favour of that aspect and I think that will speed up delivery.

[Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)]

Q Under the French model which you have cited as a template, 91% of roads are owned by privatised companies, and that is very different to the UK. They are extremely controversial and many accuse companies in France of price gouging. We have concerns about asset management and the valuations. You have said that the RAB model is potentially ideal, but is there any element of it that you can say is better than the French concessionary model? What teeth would you give the regulator to make it so, if we were to go down that route? What is missing from the RAB model that would make it more effective?

Ben Hopkinson: It is a good question. First, in the French example, I am well aware that it is quite expensive to drive on a French motorway. On the other hand, they have many more miles of motorway, and if it is too expensive you can take the equivalent of an A road for certain journeys. Judging by the number of people who drive on French motorways, I think people are generally willing to accept the costs, especially given that they have built many more miles of motorway just this century than we have in total.

I could be proved wrong if it works really well, but the main challenge with the RAB model is the sheer uncertainty of whether the ORR is up to the task and has the right staff in place. It has never done this before. I know there have already been some concerns about capacity issues and general commercial experience within the ORR. I would be concerned if the private sector had large commercial control and contract teams and the public sector did not have them and was out-negotiated. That is certainly possible if civil servants are not able to properly push back on price increases.

I think the fundamental incentives in a RAB model are not right for delivering one-of-a-kind, unique pieces of infrastructure. It works a lot better for infrastructure that has very clear unit costs—for example, the cost of laying 100 metres of pipe. That is good because a regulator is clearly able to understand how much 100 metres of pipe costs to lay and can apply that across its base, whereas the cost of one lower Thames crossing is up in the air. Some additions from the private contractor might seem sensible; they might get away with that. Having a more environmentally friendly construction process certainly seems sensible on the face of it, but that also adds cost. I would want to be reassured that the ORR is up to the task and has both the capacity and the know-how to properly understand the arrangements it is entering into.

Sam Dumitriu: You mentioned price gouging. It is important to work out what the main risks are. Roads are, in most cases, natural monopolies, and the best thing about being a monopoly is a quiet life. It is not necessarily that you have all these opportunities to gouge your customers; it is that the lack of competition means you are not forced to adopt cost-saving measures, or become more customer-friendly and so on. You might have a situation where various people are claiming quite high margins or they are being aggressive in that sense, but the UK has the other problem, where people are not on it around costs. They are not working out what the best structure is to ensure that costs keep falling.

On Ben’s point, one possible way of resolving the issue is quite a radical reform that is probably beyond the scope of the Bill. I have always wondered whether it makes sense for the UK to have Ofgem doing RAB regulation for energy networks, Ofwat doing it for water, the ORR for road and rail and Ofcom for telecoms, or whether it makes sense to have a specialist economic regulator that deals with the costs of natural monopoly networks. That would have a bunch of advantages. It would potentially resolve some of the revolving door problems that you might see. It would also ensure that there is a similar expertise and a standard approach. You do not want varying approaches between all the regulators, because that suggests that they are doing something wrong when you have essentially the same economic problem to solve. As I say, however, that would be far beyond the scope of the Bill.

[Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)]

Q I will build on some of what the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire, said about tipping points. My question is to both of you, so please feel free to answer in whichever order you prefer. The shadow Minister was referring to things such as fuel duty, I am acutely conscious that the cost base of the lower Thames crossing project is going up and is as yet unknown, and we do not know what the toll will be.

In a situation such as we have at the moment, where diesel is at £2 a litre and the sustainable version another 50p on top of that, costs are going right up not only for the build, but for the corporate budgets of the haulage companies and for everyday individuals, who have to manage their household budgets. If the cost goes up to a level beyond the right balance of pricing that is commercially viable for the operator, or absorbable for the family or the business, what happens?

At the moment, I am worried about a white elephant across the Thames. In such circumstances, in the end all the costs would get absorbed by the taxpayer and this model goes up in smoke. I am keen to hear from you how concerned I should be about that and what alternative models there are elsewhere.

Ben Hopkinson: The ultimate backstop is the Exchequer. Already the Exchequer has had to bear the cost of bringing the lower Thames crossing through planning. I think it is expected to spend about £3.1 billion on the lower Thames crossing even before private investment is brought in. If we have a circumstance where the toll is not paying back what is necessary and the private body that has financed the road falls into difficulty, the Bill states that the Exchequer is able to top up or provide payments, guarantees or low-cost loans. The backstop is therefore ultimately the taxpayer, combined with higher charges for motorists on the road.

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[Olly Glover]

Q I have a quick follow-up on something you said earlier, Mr Godfrey, about the importance of getting the licence right. You perhaps cannot answer, but let me ask the question in a slightly mischievous way. There was a debate about the Railways Bill and how it was important to see ancillary documents that it referred to while considering it, because those documents had a lot of implications for how the Bill would operate in practice. Would you view the licence and the code, which this Bill stipulates that the ORR must create, as operationally critical to how the Bill would be implemented in practice?

Will Godfrey: One distinction I would draw with the Railways Bill is that that Bill was so significantly concerned with the creation of Great British Railways, which will be responsible for something like 75% of all traffic on the network—not quite the whole market but a very significant proportion of the market. People are therefore understandably keen to see what arrangements are in the licence for that entity. This Bill is enabling and economy-wide. Clearly, the main project that we are talking about currently is the lower Thames crossing, but in principle several other licensed entities could be out there. That is one distinction that I would draw.

As to whether a particular licence is essential to inform the scrutiny of a Bill, my feeling is that the Bill gives you, as a regulator, the kind of duties, functions and powers that you would expect. On the licence, clearly there is work to be done there, but one advantage is that the licences will be put out to competitive tender. That provides a different level of scrutiny from the arrangements under the Railways Bill, in which the licence is awarded to GBR as the given entity that will receive it.

[Tristan Osborne]

Q The recent independent regulatory review of the ORR included a section specifically about the Thames crossing. Paragraph 5.58 of that review indicated that there are resource concerns:

“There are, however, likely to be gaps such as those relating to construction phase price controls, project specific

I know you said that you had confidence in that area, but that report was published just last month. Can I get some clarity? Are you saying that the report is not entirely right and that you are confident that the three aspects it raised will be covered going forward?

Will Godfrey: We very much welcome that independent review of the ORR. It is always helpful to have that sort of outside-in look and scrutiny.

On what it describes as gaps, the other point that Dr Richard Judge brought out was that we are not building from scratch, so this is about providing incremental capacity. I think he was right to draw out those areas as ones where you would want to make sure that the gaps have been filled by the time you are past Royal Assent, the first licence has been awarded and you are into the start of the first price control, which is a long way from today. The point I am making is that, from the discussions I have been having with the Department, I am reasonably confident about being able to resource what I would describe as incremental gaps, rather than starting from a blank sheet.

[Shivani Raja (Leicester East) (Con)]

Q It has been really clear today that cost control is a crucial element in the success of this project. Should there be safeguards for motorists within the regulatory framework where, for example, unexpected charges arise or costs are excessive?

Will Godfrey: At the heart of the regulator’s responsibilities would be furthering the interests of current and future users. Those are exactly the kind of considerations that would be at the heart of how you approach the regulation, how you set up the instruments—I am referring specifically to the licence—and how you then hold the company to account against that licence.

For the first control period, in the case of the lower Thames crossing, the licence would be awarded by the Department, so the particular tolling structure and the level of tolls would be set through that competition for the first licence. Thereafter, the way that the ORR operates is that the code that the ORR would be responsible for creating on the approach to tolling arrangements will clearly be important once you are past that first point.

My feeling is that the arrangements necessary to provide protections to end users around, for example, tolling and toll shocks and so on feel about right to me in the enabling legislation. What is really important is what goes into the licence and what we put into the code, and then how the company responds. I hope there will be a virtuous circle, in which there is a clear signal of what is expected, we hold the company to account, it delivers and implements it, and we then take the feedback from the market. I do not know if you were anticipating a different concern, but I will pause there in case I have not answered your question.

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[Olly Glover]

Fair enough.

[Tristan Osborne]

Q This question links to the independent review. I questioned the ORR on this. Obviously, you are sitting on the other side of the table, and you are looking to extract as much as you can from an investor perspective. You represent one side of the spectrum, and the regulators are on the other side. There has to be a working partnership between you both. Obviously, the efficiency of a project finance model such as the one for this crossing relies on certainty and predictability for investors, and regulators being there to ensure the stability of the regime. Obviously, we do not have a regulator that manages this at the moment. Where does investor confidence stand regarding the ORR? Do you think investor confidence is there for this model to work going forward?

Andrew Truscott: I would slightly reject your first statement, if I am honest. As an infrastructure investor, we provide, candidly, the lowest cost private capital that is available across the world. If you are attracting John Laing and people like us, I can guarantee that you are getting the lowest cost of equity capital that you can possibly attract and therefore the risk transfer needs to be accordingly appropriate.

I will slightly repeat my opening comments: when we first started interacting with DFT about this project, I was quite nervous about the RAB model. I am not a RAB nerd; there are lots of RAB nerds, and I am not one. RAB can be incredibly complicated, and it can take a huge amount of time to drill down. There is not a regulator. There is an awful lot of work that needs to be done. Am I nervous that that is going to take longer than it should do or could do? Yes, I am, but again, credit to DFT and the Treasury, they seem to be well on track. Maybe the better answer to your question is that we as investors will need absolute certainty—and I mean absolute certainty—about what that regulatory model is, who the regulator is and how that regulation is going to work before we will put in a dollar, a pound, or a euro—whatever currency you like.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q I want to go back to comments that both of you have made. Andrew, you said that you can count on one hand the number of projects that finish on time and on budget, and that is despite the extensive experience that you both have. Roger, you said that cost overruns come from uncertainty. I had a 30-year private sector career. One experience I had negotiating contracts was that when the customer was creating unrealistic expectations or poor procurement was taking place, where you had a competitive environment and people were trying to win the contract was where you ended up with cost and time overruns. Are there any lessons the Government should be learning about how we procure these types of contract so that we get the best possible outcome at the best possible price, but without cost and time overruns?

Roger Forsdyke: It is really interesting that you say that from your experience it is the commercial pressure. The most important thing in the tendering process is to have measurables beyond just the cost. If it is first past the post, you are destined to push the price down to the lowest-quality bid, which often creates the problems you are describing and that we described earlier. You have to look at how you will measure the quality of the tenders in real terms, beyond the cost of the lowest bid. I do not think that is regularly done effectively, so you end up with cheap materials, optimistic programming, optimistic budgeting and all those things just to get to a price that is probably optimistic in the first place. That echoes what Andrew said.

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[Tristan Osborne]

Q I have a question on the ORR. My line of questioning is about whether the regulator is ready. Obviously we had the independent report last month. I challenged on one particular finding of that. Is the ORR ready for this challenge? Is the regulatory landscape in a firm place where we can solicit investor interest next year?

Again, speaking to the investor spokesperson today, they said that regulatory certainty was absolutely critical for them. I want to understand the operational capabilities, the engagement between the DFT and the ORR, and whether or not we will have that structure and that robust regulatory regime in place, and how confident you are about that.

Justin Madders: I am confident about that, because that is what the Bill intends to do. It sets it out very clearly. We have heard from the investors that that certainty will be a very attractive opportunity for the long-term investment we are seeking to deliver. There will be a need for some additional capability and capacity in the ORR, but I was very impressed with the evidence we heard today. It is very much on top of this, but there is much more to be done, and the Bill will enable it to do that.

[Douglas Lumsden]

Q Minister, we heard from the last person who gave evidence, the investor, that he would not be able to invest because of the uncapped cost overrun risks. You heard that as well. Would you look at it again to make changes to ensure investors are not so scared away by that risk?

Justin Madders: I am not too familiar with the factors he takes into account when investing, but my advice from officials is that the soft market testing that has been taking place has shown a lot of interest in this. He also said in his response that there would be quite a lot of people who would be looking to invest in this. That conversation is ongoing.

Having the legislation on the statute book will actually help give more certainty to investors. Clearly one of the reasons why the project has already started is to de-risk it to some extent. All the indicators I am getting are that we are putting this in a strong position to attract investment.