Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Seamus Logan]

I welcome the Minister’s response. Having heard what she said about working with me about how we might operationalise the issue, I am prepared to withdraw the amendments. However, it is important to remember, in that conversation, that justice delayed is justice denied.

We have seen so many examples of inquiries and investigations that take years, when months would be much more appropriate. In the circumstances we are speaking about—in this case and the many others that this law will apply to—we must give chairs and leaders of inquiries and investigations some sense of what is reasonable when it comes to public authority responses.

We heard from the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale about the health service; I worked in it for 33 years. There is no good reason why it should not be able to respond in if not 30 then 90 days. Some backstop needs to be applied in relation to these responsibilities. I am happy to continue the conversation with the Minister and beg to ask leave withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Application of duty of candour and assistance

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 35, in schedule 1, page 25, line 23, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 36, in schedule 1, page 28, line 38, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

Amendment 37, in schedule 1, page 31, line 34, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

Amendment 38, in schedule 1, page 34, line 15, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

Amendments 35 to 38 would extend the application of the duty of candour and assistance to the intelligence services but would disapply it to individual officers.

[Mr Morrison]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. These amendments do nothing more than fix something in the current draft of the Bill, which seems inadvertently to have carved out the security services—an area that could be strengthened, as we heard during the evidence session last week. The amendments seek to extend the duty of candour and assistance to the intelligence services as organisations, ensuring that they as bodies are required to be open and co-operative with the inquiries and any investigations. The amendment balances accountability with national security, by stating that direction will not be given to public officials

“if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence”.

Several of our witnesses last week gave evidence that laid out various examples of how the security services had failed to be fully candid, disregarded accountability, and, at times, misled inquiries. We also know that the Government assured campaigners, Members and other interested parties that there would be no carve-out for the security services in the Bill. The security services do an incredible job in keeping us safe and ensuring that our country’s interests are protected. It is right that their work is covered by the secrecy Act; no one wishes to change that. However, because of that power they should be held to highest standards of accountability. We know that in recent history that has not been the case.

Last week we heard from Pete Weatherby, who, as well as working with the Hillsborough families, supported several families impacted by the Manchester Arena bombing. He said:

“There was a major failure of the intelligence services and the way they dealt with the aftermath of the bombing…MI5 then put an incorrect narrative—a false narrative—to the inquiry itself. The judge, the chair of the inquiry, found that the corporate case that it had put was incorrect.”––[Official Report, Public Office (Accountability) Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2025; c. 6, Q3.]

The amendment would ensure, as much as any law can, that that could not happen again, by explicitly ensuring that the security services are accountable to this Bill and therefore to a public who willingly consent to how these organisations work to protect us and our country. This amendment would not endanger national security. It would not impact the way in which some evidence is required to be provided in closed sessions. It would provide the security services with the necessary safeguards to ensure that secret and classified information is protected.

This is what happens now. We heard from the journalist Daniel De Simone, who worked on the agent X story, where the security services tried to mislead and were found out. His testimony stated:

“I do not think it is wrong that there are special advocates in closed material procedures; it is now an established part of a court process. What it does do, though, is place a special responsibility on MI5 to be candid, because their evidence is often very important in very significant cases, where there has been significant loss of life, where people’s citizenship is being removed or where people are being deprived of their liberties.”––[Official Report, Public Office (Accountability) Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2025; c. 95, Q138.]

Because of that, it is vital that we do not allow any carving out, intentional or otherwise, of the security services, to ensure that they, too, are held to account and must tell the truth. That will strengthen not only their work, but the trust that we place in them.

[Dr Mullan]

I emphasise that we need clarity on this. Those of us who were able to attend the meeting with the intelligence services will know that they seemed to provide quite a clear account of their individual personal responsibility and all the ways in which they thought the Bill would affect them. That was quite clearly contradicted in our evidence from other witnesses. I am grateful to the Minister for sending round a further note to Committee members this morning, and for our brief chat ahead of this sitting. Even that note raises further contradictions, however, because it says, and I quote, that “the individual public officials working for the UK intelligence services are capable of being caught by the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour”. It lists some other ones, but it includes the duty of candour. Further down, it says, “the Bill specifies that the duty of candour and assistance can only be addressed to public authorities and not individual public officials”.

The Minister was able to give me a brief, informal explanation of that, but I do think this is extremely important. It may be that people are happy for the security services to be excluded to a certain extent, but we have to vote on a shared understanding of what exactly the Bill does in relation to them as entire organisations, as well as to the people who work for them and those who are in charge. I would be grateful if the Minister provided some clarity on that.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank hon. Members for raising those important points. In this Bill, we have aimed to ensure candour while protecting national security. As it stands, inquiries and investigations will be able to demand any information and assistance they require from the intelligence services. Where national security information is concerned, the agency as a whole will provide that assistance to the inquiry or investigation by complying with a compliance direction, rather than individuals directly in their own right.

To balance that, and to ensure that there are no gaps, carve-outs or exclusions, those in charge of the agencies are subject to specific requirements to put arrangements in place for individuals to maintain records of information relating to any acts that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation, and to provide information to the authority to ensure that the duty is complied with as set out in clause 6. Rightly, a failure to have these arrangements in place will result in criminal sanctions.

Intelligence services obtain and retain sensitive security and intelligence information in order to protect the public from national security threats. Vital public interests, including national security, would be at real risk of harm from the unrestricted disclosure of this sensitive information. We all share the same aims here—ensuring that candour is in place while protecting national security and the public.

Taking on board the points raised by Hillsborough Law Now and others, we constructed clause 6 in such a way as to ensure that there is a secure process that the intelligence services can work through so that any information required by an inquiry or investigation reaches that place safely, so that there can be full candour. However, we have heard the concerns from Hillsborough Law Now and from members of this Committee about our provisions. I assure hon. Members that the Government have taken their points on board, and we will commit to working with them and others actively to consider steps to address this in time for Report.

I turn to the other amendments, which set out that the intelligence authorities are to be listed as a public authority for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance, and the code of ethical conduct in schedule 2. Clause 6 already makes it clear that the duty applies to the intelligence services as it applies to all other public authorities; therefore, it is beyond doubt that they are included, as a public authority, in the Bill.

We have not set out an exhaustive list of public authorities in schedule 2 to avoid unintentionally excluding some bodies by failing to list them. No individual Department or arm’s length body of central Government is included in the list for that purpose. If we begin to list public bodies, there is a risk that we imply that those not listed are not covered, which could weaken the Bill. I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment, but I reiterate my commitment to working with Members on a way forward to capture all the concerns raised both in the Committee and outside of it.

[Mr Morrison]

I thank the shadow Minister for the points that he made; he is spot on that the lack of clarity in the Bill, particularly surrounding what came out of the evidence sessions, raises more questions than answers. However, I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government are happy to work with us on tightening those gaps before Report. This is not about unrestricted evidence; it is about getting to the truth, which must be our focus throughout. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 26, line 30, at end insert—

“(1A) Inquiries under subsection (1) include those designated by the Secretary of State as local inquiries into grooming gangs.”

This amendment would apply the Duty of Candour to the five local grooming gangs’ inquiries announced by the Government and any further ones established.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Morrison]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am not sure whether this is the right time to ask, but on the amendment paper, amendment 34 is down as a Liberal Democrat amendment, but on the groupings that were sent across to us, it was down as an SNP amendment. I just wanted to clarify where we are with that.

[The Chair]

I understand that that has been corrected online, and the matter is now on the record as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Byrne]

I thank my hon. Friend for that, and she is absolutely right; a commitment was made not to weaken that. Clause 2(5) of the Bill imposes a duty on the chief officer or chief executive to “take all reasonable steps” to ensure corporate compliance, but that is not command responsibility—I think that is a really important point. It is far weaker, and I feel it will be ineffective. Command responsibility is straightforward and places the responsibility for the discharge of the corporate duty on the head of the body.

[Mr Morrison]

Does the hon. Member agree that, when someone is in that position of power over a public body, they have a huge responsibility, not just for the culture but for the training, the personnel, the HR practices and the policies? With that responsibility, someone needs to ensure that that goes throughout the whole of the organisation, and command responsibility focuses the mind to ensure that everything below them is working to clock.