(2 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberTo ask the Minister to make a statement on the UK’s and NATO’s military commitment to Ukraine.
Russia’s assault on Ukraine is an unprovoked, premeditated attack against a sovereign democratic state that threatens global security. As set out to the House previously, the United Kingdom and NATO stand with Ukraine. We are providing political and practical support to support its self-defence, and will further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Individual NATO allies, led by the UK, are also supporting Ukraine with lethal aid to ensure that Ukraine wins.
The United Kingdom was the first country to provide lethal aid, and we have increased our military and aid support, bringing the total budget to £1.3 billion. To date, we have sent over 6,900 anti-tank missiles; five air defence systems, including Starstreak anti-air missiles; 120 armoured fighting vehicles, including a small number of Stormers; 1,360 anti-structure munitions; 4.5 tonnes of plastic explosives; and 400,000 rounds of small-arms munitions. In addition, we have supplied over 200,000 items of non-lethal aid, including more than 82,000 helmets; more than 8,000 body armour kits; range finders; and medical equipment. As announced on 6 June 2022, we are providing cutting edge multiple-launch rocket systems, which can strike targets up to 80 kilometres away with pinpoint accuracy, offering a significant boost in capability to the Ukrainian armed forces. On 17 June, the Prime Minister offered to launch a major training operation for Ukrainian forces, with the potential to train up to 10,000 soldiers every three months—120 days.
We are currently supplying significant air power to NATO, including increased air patrols, with both Typhoons and F-35s for NATO air policing. We have also deployed four additional Typhoons to Cyprus to patrol NATO’s eastern border. That means that we now have a full squadron of Royal Air Force fighter jets in southern Europe, ready to support NATO tasking. The United Kingdom has contributed more troops than any other ally to NATO’s enhanced forward presence. UK troops will also be deploying a company-sized sub-unit to Bulgaria to work bilaterally alongside our Bulgarian counterparts for up to six months, enhancing interoperability. The PM will meet NATO leaders again for next week’s Madrid summit, where NATO will agree the new strategic concept to set the direction of the alliance for the next decade and will agree long-term improvements to our deterrence and defence posture in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United Kingdom’s commitment to the alliance and European security is unconditional and enduring. Our commitment to article 5 of the Washington treaty is iron clad. We stand ready to defend our allies.
First, may I thank you, Mr Speaker, for the flag-raising ceremony that you hosted today to mark Armed Forces Week?
The Prime Minister was right to visit Ukraine last week. The UK has been an exemplar in our support to that country compared with many of our NATO allies. But Russia is not losing and Ukraine is not winning. The Prime Minister said, “Prepare for a long war”, and the new head of the British Army seeks to reconfigure our land forces to potentially face Russia on the battlefield. This all starkly illustrates that long-term European security is threatened not just by the utility of force but a wider conflict between the west and growing authoritarianism.
However, future generations may ask of NATO, “Why did you not put that fire out in Ukraine when you could have?”—by securing the port of Odesa, for example, rather than instead allowing Putin to claim a win and take his fight elsewhere. The penny is dropping in this regard. If we now recognise that our world is becoming more dangerous, Britain should lead a coalition of the willing that offers Ukraine the scale of support that it requires. Recognising this new picture requires us to review our own defence posture. We can certainly be proud of what Britain has done in upgrading its battle presence in the Baltics, leading the way in training Ukrainians and providing lethal weapons systems, but I say to the Minister that the tempo of these duties is unsustainable. We are overloading our troops with those widening commitments and we are not replenishing our defence stocks fast enough. All three services are now too small to manage the ever-greater burden that we are going to place on them. The cuts set out in the 2021 integrated review to personnel and military equipment must now be reversed.
Does the Minister agree that once again, Britain finds itself leading other European allies in spelling out the scale of the threat that the continent now faces, and stepping forward when other nations hesitate to confront that threat? We cannot do that on a peacetime defence budget of 2.2%; it is time to upgrade our defence posture and spending to 3% if we are serious about preventing the spread of conflict in Europe.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to some of my right hon. Friend’s points. He said that Russia is not losing in Ukraine, with which I would take issue. I think that Russia is losing and that it was losing from the point of invasion. Its catastrophic losses in the west of the country and the way that it has had to refocus in the east describe that strategic loss, so I disagree with him on that.
Our domestic response will always be threat-based. My right hon. Friend made some remarks about whether NATO forces should have been deployed to Ukraine in anticipation of the Russian invasion. Our judgment is—and collectively, everyone would judge—that we got the balance right between providing reassurance and effect, while avoiding the direct conflict that would have resulted immediately from putting NATO forces directly into Ukraine.
As I said, we are a threat-based organisation. In making the argument for defence expenditure, we need to understand that there are three basic points of context that I ask my right hon. Friend to take note of. First, we do everything as part of the NATO alliance. We are one of a 30-member defensive alliance—soon to be 32—and because of that, we are a great deal stronger than we are separately. One of the significant lessons for the Russian military machine is how exposed it is by being alone. We are stronger as an alliance; as an alliance, we massively outnumber any kind of effect the Russians can bring to bear.
Secondly, it is important to recognise that we acknowledged the significant threat posed by Russia as part of our defence Command Paper, which came out of the integrated review and was released in March 2021; many right hon. and hon. Members will have read it. Page 5, paragraph 1.4 leads with the fact that
“Russia continues to pose the greatest nuclear, conventional military and sub-threshold threat to European security.”
In terms of our doctrine and our response, that is not new to UK national defence. That is a really important contextual thing to understand.
Thirdly, that is why we are making good use of the £24-billion uplift that we have had under this Government, which is driving forward the agility, deployability and lethality that we need in the new global context. Manifold lessons will be drawn from the outrageous Russian invasion of Ukraine, including the vulnerability of armour and of large bodies of troops; the potency of technology and remote fires; and the urgent importance of having a fully modernised military with match-fit technology. That is what the integrated review and the defence Command Paper do.
We have more money than we have ever had—£24 billion more than we would have had otherwise. We will always keep things under review, but we should be confident that doctrinally and militarily, in terms of kit and equipment, we are on the right lines.
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf all NATO countries had provided the same scale of support to Ukraine as Britain has there is every possibility that Russian forces would now have been pushed out of mainland Ukraine. Instead, Russia is consolidating in the Donbas and there is every chance it may now be turning its sights to Odesa. If that port falls, Ukraine will be landlocked, further impacting on the cost of living crisis here and across Europe because critical grain exports cannot get out.
Is it time for the UK to lead a coalition of willing NATO allies to secure a United Nations General Assembly-approved humanitarian zone around the port and territorial waters, with neighbouring international waters policed by an international maritime force? That would ensure that the breadbasket of Europe and beyond is able to function and remain part of Ukraine.
My right hon. Friend makes the valid and important suggestion that we must do what we can to get the grain out of Ukraine. It is not just an energy crisis that people face; it will be a food crisis if the Russians are continually to both steal and blockade that grain.
However, I am afraid, with due respect to my right hon. Friend, that securing the Black sea and the UN mandate to do that are definitely easier said than done. I continue to speak to a number of Black sea partners and other members to see what else we can do to explore getting that grain out both overland and at sea. While Russia has talked the talk, it has done the complete opposite when it comes to providing assurances on any humanitarian corridor, especially on the land, as we saw at Mariupol, and now obviously at sea.
(2 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI pay tribute to the company’s workers and to my hon. Friend, who was very assiduous, at all hours of the day, in making certain that Ministers were aware of the project and the need to get those export licences through. I am glad that officials in the two Departments have moved very swiftly to achieve those export licences. The brutality shown by Russian forces in this conflict is shocking. I am glad that we are doing our utmost to support the humanitarian effort in Ukraine, having provided civilian ambulances, battlefield ambulances and simple things such as generators.
We were discussing the fact that Kharkiv was a real and symbolic blow to Russian plans, which we have to believe are coming unstuck. The firing of seven Russian commanders in recent weeks—including the lieutenant general who headed up the invasion of Kharkiv—reeks of a culture of scapegoating and cover-ups, and there is a record of aggression, brutality and incompetence. No wonder the veteran Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev said, as he bravely resigned his post this week, that he had “never been so ashamed” of his country.
At this critical juncture, our aim remains clear: Russia cannot win. We will continue to support our Ukrainian friends, focusing on three key aspects. First, there is the military response, which is about providing a wide range of support to Ukraine so that it can defend itself and its sovereignty. We were the first European country to supply lethal aid, and we have committed to spending at least £1.3 billion on military support. So far, we have delivered in excess of 6,500 anti-tank missiles, many of which have been used successfully to repel columns of tanks, as well as eight air defence systems, including Brimstone and Starstreak missiles—the fastest in the world, travelling at some 2,000 mph. We have also delivered 15 Wolfhound armoured vehicles, which provide increased protection for essential supplies, as well as a small number of armoured Stormer vehicles fitted with Starstreak launchers to further enhance Ukraine’s short-range anti-air capabilities.
I commend my hon. Friend for the work that he and the Ministry of Defence have done in supporting the Ukrainian forces in their hour of need. We face a dilemma, in that as we empty our quartermasters’ stores, they need to be replenished. If he needs help persuading the Treasury to give the Ministry of Defence money to make sure that those Starstreaks, next-generation light anti-tank weapons and Brimstones are replenished, please will he get in touch?
I know that the door of my right hon. Friend, the Chair of the Defence Committee, is always open for such discussions. The Treasury has been very clear that we need to replenish our stocks, and that it will support us in ensuring that they are replenished. I can also assure him that we are making certain that we remain well within our tolerances. There are tasks here for which we always need to be ready, and I can assure him that we remain ready for them.
The equipment that we provide must be as effective as possible, so we are training specialist Ukrainian units in its use. Last month, for example, Ukrainian troops learned how to use our armoured fighting vehicles on Salisbury plain, and those vehicles have now started to arrive in Ukraine; the number will build to 120 in total. Our support does not end there. The House will be pleased to hear that the challenge laid down by Putin’s brutal war has been seized by UK industry. I have been delighted by the agility that the UK’s defence sector has shown, working closely with Defence Equipment and Support, in bringing through innovative ideas; in some cases, those ideas literally go from desktop to theatre in a matter of weeks. I am determined to maintain this innovative drive, so that we capture every idea, support the best of them, and then swiftly put the results in the hands of our Ukrainian friends.
I ask the hon. Lady to write to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay, who is sitting beside me on the Front Bench; he has generously said that he will assure her of a response as soon as possible to the question she has asked on behalf of her constituents.
Thirdly and finally, there is the diplomatic response. We are working intensively with our allies and partners to make it clear to the Russian Government that they must withdraw their forces and engage genuinely in peace negotiations. The Prime Minister has visited in Sweden and Finland to agree increased co-operation on security, and to discuss their applications to join NATO, which I am delighted have now been formally received. We have been clear about our view that those countries should be integrated into the alliance as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary was in Germany to attend the G7 and NATO Foreign Ministers’ meetings, where she pressed the need for further support for Ukraine. The Defence Secretary met his US counterpart, Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, at the Pentagon two weeks ago, and he is in Madrid today for similar discussions ahead of the NATO summit. I will likewise be heading to Canada in a few days’ time.
We are working closely with our allies to hold Putin and his regime to account for their appalling war crimes. This week we have seen the first Russian soldier jailed for life in Ukraine for murdering 62-year-old civilian Oleksandr Shelipov, but the Ukrainian authorities believe that more than 11,000 other war crimes have been committed, from the indiscriminate targeting of civilians to rape and sexual violence, so we have sent support into the country to help collect evidence, including witness statements and video recordings. We have provided additional funding to the International Criminal Court, as well as technical assistance via UK military and police personnel. We have also appointed Sir Howard Morrison to support the Ukrainian prosecutor general in her investigations.
Even as we work to stop Putin, we must continue to support the Ukrainian people who are bearing the brunt of Russian brutality. The UN estimates that more than 6 million people have been forced to flee the country, while a further 8 million have been internally displaced. That is why we have committed nearly £400 million of humanitarian and economic aid so far, including more than 5 million medical items, 42 ambulances and more than 500 mobile generators.
At home, the British public have demonstrated their great generosity once again, with more than 200,000 individuals and organisations signing up to offer help. The Ukraine family and sponsorship schemes have, together, issued more than 107,000 visas so far.
We are also preparing to help Ukraine rebuild when this war is finally over. The Foreign Secretary spoke to G7 leaders about the need for a new Marshall plan for the country, which could be paid for in part using Russian assets—the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) will be pleased to hear that.
We have already pledged £174 million in aid to help Ukraine’s economy to recover, including a three-year package of support for energy security and reform. In reference to the point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), the Secretary of State for Transport recently met his Ukrainian counterpart to discuss ways of getting grain out of the country, which would provide a vital lifeline to the local economy and a much-needed global commodity.
My hon. Friend has been very generous in giving way. I was pleased to attend the Lennart Meri security conference in Tallinn last weekend, and my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe and North America, who is in his place, also attended. The support for Britain was overwhelming, reflected not just in those who attended the conference but in the result of the Eurovision song contest, in which we rightly came second to Ukraine.
The Minister is speaking about what other assistance we can provide. Will he clarify whether there is any truth in the reports that we will now be providing hard-power support—troops—to Moldova, in addition to our support for Ukraine?
To answer the question precisely, I am aware of no current plans to do that, but we have a close relationship with Moldova. We work co-operatively with Moldova, and it is a relationship we are keen to foster and build on.
The Ukrainians won the battle of Kyiv and the battle of Kharkiv. They are more than holding their own in bitter fighting, but there remains a long way to go before this war can be won. We must therefore continue to stand by our Ukrainian friends for the long term. They are fighting not just for their survival but for the values of freedom, democracy and justice that are the essence of our society. That is why they must succeed, and this House can rest assured that the United Kingdom will continue to do everything in its power to make sure that outcome is achieved.
It is a real pleasure to participate in this important debate. I begin by commending the Ministers on the Treasury Bench for the regular drumbeat with which they bring this subject to the House to allow us to understand what is happening, to take stock and to comment on the clearly very difficult situation in Ukraine.
If invading Ukraine was an effort to rekindle Russian superpower status, it has been a complete flop. There was no clear initial strategy, no effective command and control, no logistical support and absolutely no appreciation of the Ukrainian people’s fearless desire to stay and fight. For Russia, this has been a dismal campaign. The body bags returning to Russia have piled up in their thousands, and dozens of wrecked Russian T-72 tanks now litter Ukrainian roadsides after a failed attempt to take the capital. With international sanctions starting to bite and countries such as Britain replenishing the arsenal of the brave Ukrainian forces with NLAWs and the like, surely Putin knows he cannot win. But sadly, this is far from over. With little care for the accepted rules of war or even for the loss of Russian life, Russian forces have now regrouped in the south-west of the country and have begun bombing entire towns and cities from afar, carrying out barbaric war crimes to gain territory, specifically in the Donbas region, and exploiting the west’s timidity about getting directly involved.
As NATO leaders head to the Madrid summit in June, there are lessons for the west to learn. Step back from events in Ukraine and we begin to realise that this is not just about Ukraine; it is another turning point in our history—indeed, in European security. We have had it quite easy over the last 30 years, since the end of the cold war, but the next few decades will be extremely bumpy indeed. State-on-state aggression is clearly back. If we do not help to put this fire out in Ukraine, it will spread to other parts of Europe, yet today it seems we are doing only enough to ensure that Ukraine does not lose, and not enough to guarantee that Ukraine can win. Putin may have misjudged Ukraine’s resolve to hold ground and fight, but he was spot-on in believing that NATO would have no appetite for getting directly involved.
Putin’s invasion did not come out of the blue. His vice-like grip on his own media has, over decades, convinced the majority of Russians that the west—specifically NATO—is a threat and must be confronted. He has publicly expressed a desire to regain control of those countries that were once governed by Stalin. And now, he is sidling ever closer to China, which shares Russia’s disdain for western standards and values.
This is indeed a dangerous turning point in our history, and the threat picture is certainly beginning to change fast. I put it to the House that how we conduct ourselves over the next few months—how we regroup and how we choose to stand up to this growing authoritarianism across the world—could have major implications for how things play out over the next decade. I recall speaking when Parliament was recalled after we decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. I made the statement that our departure could well be the high-tide mark of western liberalism since the second world war. I fear that if we do not get Ukraine right, I might be right in that analysis.
If we are to do things correctly, we face three big tasks, which I put to the Minister today. First, on Ukraine itself, we must agree on what exactly victory looks like. Even in the debate so far this afternoon, there has not been disagreement, but there have been different views on what success actually is. For me, it is the flushing out of all Russian forces from mainland Ukraine—I park Crimea, because it is a more complex issue to be revisited at a later date. Ultimately, I encourage President Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces to clarify that that is what they want to do, because that then makes clear how we can fully support them.
There must be clarity of that mission, because there seems to be a little disagreement taking place across our European allies. France and Germany are suggesting that a chunk of the Donbas could remain in Russian hands. We need to agree what that mission is, because that then helps to define operations, tactics and the equipment that is required. Eastern Ukraine, for those not familiar with it, is open, flat, tank terrain. It is perfect for that form of mobility and firepower. That indicates the sort of equipment we need to give.
The second task—slightly bigger, and stepping back from Ukraine—is to rekindle those cold war statecraft skills and the ability to react robustly to events without assuming that we will lose control of the escalatory ladder and trigger a nuclear war when dealing with Russia. NATO, let us not forget, remains the most formidable military alliance in the world. It is no wonder Sweden and Finland both want in. Yet future generations may ask why NATO formally sat on its hands while a democracy on its doorstep was partially destroyed. Let us remember what happened in 1938 when we hesitated. Too often, we have been spooked by Putin’s rhetoric. We should be shaping events, not reacting to them.
In fairness to the west and in particular to Britain, we have come a long way since our initial hesitance to answer President Zelensky’s pleas for help. Thankfully, NATO allies are catching up with the scale of Britain’s military support for Ukraine, which actually began way back in 2014. However, NATO refuses to formally get involved. It is consensus-driven, and it is clear that some countries do not want to lean forward. It is time therefore to form a coalition of like-minded nations, working together to better co-ordinate military support for Ukraine, increasing the quality and quantity of equipment and assisting with supply chains and training, all united by a mission to see Ukraine push Russian forces entirely out of its mainland.
We must be proactive in limiting the economic harm that Russia is causing. We should establish a humanitarian corridor around the key port of Odesa, so that the grain that much of the world depends on can continue to reach international markets. That is in our interests, because it will help directly tackle the cost of living crisis affecting us here, too.
Our final task is to form a strategy to handle an ever-assertive Russia-China axis that is attempting to exploit our fragile world order. Putin would not have invaded Ukraine if President Xi had not given his backing and support. Both countries share a common goal of building an illiberal alternative world order where authoritarian states can flourish, and Ukraine is just the start of that new axis of autocracy flexing its muscles. We must recognise that the last 30 years have been a walk in the park compared with what lies ahead. All NATO countries must increase defence spending to a minimum of 3% and the recent cuts to our troop numbers, fighter jets and ship numbers must be reversed.
The right hon. Gentleman speaks with great authority and knowledge. Given the emergence of the axis between China and Russia, how concerned is he about reports of a joint military exercise in the last few days over the Sea of Japan?
I look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. I will focus on what happens in the European theatre of operations, but he raises an important question about the tilt to the Pacific, which was mentioned earlier, and what is happening in Ukraine. If we now recognise that Russia and China are working together, we must also appreciate that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is in China’s interest, because it has kept us, Europe and the United States busy and distracted so we have not kept an eye on what is going on in other parts of the world. We need to recognise that we must lean into what is happening in the South China sea. I would like to see a development of the Quad—Japan, India, United States and Australia—with Britain and France being invited into that strategic partnership to look after and take a greater interest in the security of that part of the world. I hope that the Government will look forward to that in the discussions at NATO.
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the west has been very timid because of its fear of a nuclear reaction? On the evidence of Putin’s threat, he said that if we imposed sanctions on him through SWIFT, that would be an act of war by the west, but then he did nothing. The Kremlin’s position is that nuclear weapons should not be used unless there is an existential threat to Russia, and nobody is suggesting invading it, so should we not just get Putin out of Ukraine?
There is no doubt that, when dealing with a country such as Russia that is armed with tactical low-yield nuclear weapons, which we do not have in huge numbers in our arsenal, we need to have a sense of caution. However, there would be a stigma attached to Russia using those weapons systems, and countries such as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, India and even China might stop sitting on the fence or supporting Russia and move away from it. Let us not forget that, as we saw in Mariupol, Russia can achieve the same outcome as a tactical low-yield nuclear weapon using conventional systems and without testing its friendship with other nations around the world by crossing such a threshold.
When I visited NATO recently, I asked what NATO’s response would be. It could be that it is tucked away in an envelope in a drawer somewhere to be pulled out, read and acted on if such an event happens. I would like us to respond robustly, because it will take us into a new era of the character of conflict if we say that low-yield nuclear weapons can be used. If one is used in Ukraine, I would like every F-35 in NATO’s arsenal to take out every single Russian asset on the ground, and I would like us to look Russia in the eye—yes, this would be a “Who’s going to blink first?” moment—and say, “We will punish anybody who uses these weapons.” If we do not respond and we do not react, we again allow Russia to gain more confidence, be more assertive and, no doubt, use low-yield nuclear weapons again in the surrounding areas of eastern Europe. How would we respond then? Let us not forget the mistake that we made in Syria. We said that there was a red line on chemical weapons, but what did we do? We blinked. We must not do that again.
The integrated review was an important document. Its threats assessment was correct, but it was incorrect about the speed with which those threats were going to come over the horizon. It was also, as I am afraid we all recognise, tied to a peacetime defence budget. I offer my support in making the case not just that the world is more dangerous now, but that it will get even more dangerous from here. It will be not lull, mop-up, conclusion in Ukraine and then back to normal, but a new era of insecurity. If we want to lead as Britain has, we need to spend more on our hard power. The big NATO strategic concept document on operating together is about to come out, and greater demands will be placed on all members, including the UK. That, I hope, will be a useful opportunity to take stock of our own position—our numbers of armoured fighting vehicles, troops and so forth—to see how we might advance and revisit the integrated review.
European security is once more in peril. Our adversaries are in plain sight, but I fear that we are still a little in denial. We continue to hesitate, and Europe needs leadership. One thing I can say from visiting conferences and from being in America last week is how impressed much of the world is by how Britain has stepped forward, but there is so much to do. I repeat that Russia is now winning in Ukraine, and it is moving to the point where Putin can claim a success and stay in power. If he stays in power, this does not end in Ukraine. That must be very clear.
I seek support from the House not only in praising the Government’s having leant in operationally but in recognising what we need to do strategically to see victory in Ukraine, put that fire out, humiliate Putin and let the Russian people decide whether they want to continue with that leader.
That is right. I will not dwell on that point, because I do not think it takes us much further forward, but there was again the substitution of wishful thinking for critical analysis. The evidence was there that the troops were being massed on the Ukrainian border. We knew there was an intent to use them and yet in a number of European capitals there was still the triumph of hope over experience. That lack of preparedness among some of the western nations put the Ukrainians at a disadvantage at the beginning of the conflict.
A number of Members have said that the sanctions on Russia cannot be lifted until all Russian troops leave Ukraine. I would go further: the sanctions on Putin and Lavrov and the architects of this war can never be lifted. That is a different question from what happens to the rest of Russia. Of course, there must be a potential new course in a post-Putin era, but our aim must be to increase the tensions within the Russian regime by making it clear that those who stick with Putin and those who are the architects of the war in Ukraine cannot escape from the sanctions—they crossed the Rubicon; they are war criminals. On the other hand, those who choose a different path for the future can have an alternative future. It is very important that our messaging is consistent and utterly clear.
My right hon. Friend is linking the impact of sanctions to the military progress and what we should be doing on the ground; he is therefore in danger of coming close to having a strategy, and Britain, the west and NATO must have a grand strategy to deal with a resurgent, adventurist Putin.
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberYou heard it here first, Mr Speaker: there was a request for more urgent questions that I am happy to oblige.
I very much welcome the statement, which focused on the operational. However, the reality is now dawning not only that this conflict could last for months—indeed, years—but, more widely, that Europe has entered a new and dangerous era of insecurity. I therefore pose two fundamental questions to the Secretary of State. First, what does success in Ukraine look like? Are we doing enough to prevent Ukraine from losing but not enough to make sure that it wins? What is our strategy? Is it to push Russia back to the pre-February lines or, indeed, to liberate the entire Donbas region? If it is in Europe’s wider security interest to see Putin humiliated in Ukraine, the entire mainland must be liberated. That must be our strategic aim.
The second fundamental issue, on which the Secretary of State touched, is our defence posture. Threats are increasing, but pressures on our armed forces and equipment are growing. Is it not now time to increase defence spending to 3% of GDP?
My right hon. Friend is a doughty campaigner for spending 3% and I consider him my long-range artillery when it comes to the lobbying in the long term, whatever we see as a result of the situation in Ukraine. Our strategic aim is twofold: first, Putin must fail in Ukraine—he must fail in his invasion—and I think he is on course to do that; and he must fail in his occupation of Ukraine, and I think he has definitely failed to achieve that. The fine tuning of that is as much a matter of Ukraine’s choice as it is anybody else’s. Ukraine gets to choose where it wishes to settle for peace. We will do everything we can to support it.
For my part, I want Putin not only beyond the pre-February boundaries; he invaded Crimea illegally and Donetsk illegally, and he should comply with international law and, in the long run, leave Ukraine. Overall, Putin needs to wear the cost and the consequence of what he has done on his shoulders.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I join you, Mr Speaker, in welcoming our American friends to the House of Commons today?
Last week I saw at first hand how UK and American efforts are working hard to support our friends in Ukraine, so I commend both Governments on their efforts, but I remain concerned that NATO, the most formidable military alliance in the world, could have collectively done more in previous months to deter an invasion but chose to hide behind the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member. Yes, we have shored up our NATO flanks, but that still leaves Ukraine exposed. Does the Secretary of State agree that Ukrainian security is European security, and by committing greater support to Ukraine we are trying to prevent a war rather than start one? And with the threat of invasion imminent, may I also call on the Secretary of State to provide more military support to Ukraine?
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome this statement. The penny was dropping at the Munich security conference that this is about not just Ukraine, but a wider realignment of global power with the formation of a new Russia-China alliance that is fuelling Putin’s adventurism and, indeed, perhaps taking us towards another cold war. The money laundering issues aside, which absolutely must be addressed, I ask the Secretary of State to consider the sanctions. There is a concern that we are actually helping Putin with his intention of turning Russia away from the west and towards a new alliance with China in the long term.
If Russia wants to be dependent on China, I think it will recognise that that will be the wrong decision. China and Russia are in direct competition over the high north and the route through the Arctic, and Russia will surely not want to depend entirely on China, in the same way that many European states are regretting being entirely dependent on Russian gas. It is important, however, that we impose a range of sanctions that are directed not only at the Russian Government, but at some of Russia’s bankers and those who help the regime carry on as normal.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberTo ask the Minister for the Armed Forces to make a statement on the migrant channel issues and the role of the military.
Unacceptable numbers of people continue to make these dangerous channel crossings, and last November’s tragic deaths serve as the strongest reminder of the need to stop them. The Government have been exploring every avenue to prevent further crossings, and have now appointed the Ministry of Defence to take operational primacy for cross-channel counter-migration operations. That will mean a much larger and more visible role for the Royal Navy in operational planning, asset co-ordination and operational delivery.
As the Home Secretary explained during Home Office questions yesterday, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence have worked closely on countering the small boats challenge through the military aid to civilian authorities process. Throughout the last 12 months Defence has provided a range of support, including the provision of surveillance aircraft, additional accommodation and planning expertise, and has assisted in the delivery of trials for novel tactics to help Border Force and the Home Office to better interdict and deter migrant vessels.
Details of how Defence will deliver and maintain the primacy of cross-channel counter-migration operations are currently being worked through. The Government’s objective is that no one should arrive illegally in the United Kingdom on their own terms, and all vessels transporting illegal migrants across the channel must therefore be intercepted before, or as, they land. Defence is committed to delivering that step change. Details of how it will be achieved will be made known in due course, but the House can be reassured that the MOD is working hand in hand with the Home Secretary and her Department to achieve this goal while ensuring the safety of all individuals involved and protecting other Defence priority output.
I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification.
We are rightly proud of our armed forces, who watch our backs and defend our interests across the world, and who are equipped and trained to step forward and assist other Government Departments in times of emergency. However, the bigger picture is clear to see. Our world is becoming more dangerous and more complex, and demands on our military—not least the Royal Navy—are increasing. The integrated review maps out the importance to the UK economy of retaining the freedom of the seas, increasingly challenged by China, Russia and, indeed, Iran. The Defence Committee’s recent review of the Royal Navy concluded that it is now too small to meet its current commitments in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in the Gulf, off east Africa, in the Caribbean and in the Arctic, and, of course, with the tilt to the Indo-Pacific. Yet here we are introducing another task: co-ordinating the migrant crossing response, which is normally the responsibility of the Home Office.
As the Minister said, the migrant channel issue is complex and is not likely to go away soon. It is not an acute emergency, so why is the Navy being drawn in, even in this limited capacity? I say “limited”; the Minister spoke of “operational primacy”, and he is now responsible for it. There is a real danger of mission creep, with further navel assets being sucked into this challenge. Please will the Minister explain who will pay for this mission, what success looks like, and how long the task will last?
This tactic may, on the face of it, look popular, with 28,000 migrants now crossing every year—“send in the Navy to sort it out”—but it is not the strategy that will solve the problem of the movement of migrants. We need first to break up the gangs who encourage migrants in the first place, and secondly to help restore governance and security in the very countries from which these people are fleeing—places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Somalia. Ironically, those are parts of the world where we have used our own hard power to intervene but then departed before there was enduring stability, and now families are fleeing towards Europe.
Unless the fires are put out at source, we will never reduce the numbers. We need a broader strategy than simply tasking the Navy to the channel, which will not be the answer.
I thank my right hon. Friend for elaborating on his urgent question. I take issue with his point that the Navy has to make a binary choice between work at home and work overseas. Ships are deployed all over the world right now, and other ships are making ready to set to sea in response to whatever crises may unfold in the Euro-Atlantic over the coming weeks.
In addition, there is capacity to do as we do year round, which is to deploy naval resources into the channel for purposes such as fishery protection and, indeed, securing our border. That is an important point. The purpose of our nation’s armed forces is to secure the UK’s national security interests both at home and abroad, and I would argue that deploying our armed forces to ensure that our borders are robust is a perfectly appropriate use of them. Indeed, as I know my right hon. Friend is very aware, there are parts of Europe right now in which state-sponsored illegal migration is being used as a sub-threshold weapon of competition. I am not suggesting for a second that the migration across the channel is that right now but, in the absence of robust defence of our borders, it could be in the future, and the MOD therefore has a perfectly reasonable role to play in ensuring that our borders are robustly protected.
My right hon. Friend specifically asked about pay. Clearly this will be a multi-agency effort under Royal Navy command. Where agencies are already doing things in the channel, they will continue to be funded by the Departments that own them.
Success is that we do not allow anybody to land in the UK on their own terms. For how long? Until the deterrent effect is achieved and the cross-channel route for small boats collapses.
There is a limit to my right hon. Friend’s question, which is the role of the Royal Navy and the military within the channel—that is what I am here to answer today—but I completely agree that this is just one part of a wider system. Indeed, he is right to note that the MOD has plenty of equity in providing stability in countries such as Iraq and in the Sahel, where the majority of migrants are coming from, and we are engaged in that.
Nobody is pretending that the presence of a rear admiral and a few extra Royal Navy ships solves this issue. It is regrettable that only part of the Government’s solution should appear in the papers, and I will do my best to answer any questions my right hon. Friend asks.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman and the Labour Front Bench for their support and for the detailed engagement that they have undertaken with the Ukrainians. I know that it has meant a huge amount to them to see cross-party support for their rights. I thank him personally for the effort that he and the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), have gone to.
These are difficult and dangerous times, as the right hon. Gentleman said. It is important to navigate the very thin path between provocation and defence of people who are clearly under threat and intimidation, so that whatever we do cannot be exploited by the Kremlin for its own narratives. I have continued to brief the Opposition and other Members of this House to make sure that they are fully informed.
I will try to answer some of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions. First, the Budapest memorandum is indeed one of the three main treaties that Russia is in breach of or is not upholding. It was a fair deal done between the Ukrainians and Russia, and it is important that we remind Russia—through diplomatic channels first of all—of those obligations. The situation is a stark reminder that we cannot pick and choose from treaties that have been signed up to.
We believe that the subsequent Minsk protocol is something that we would wish to support and for Russia to engage in. It respects some of the concerns around the Donbass, and I hope that that is one of the best paths towards securing a peaceful resolution. It does not seem at the moment that Russia is engaging enough on that. I think that is definitely the treaty to look at. Of course, it is underwritten by France, Germany and the United States through the Normandy format, and we would support the use of that. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary plans to visit Ukraine soon, which is also important. I have spoken to her about it, and I think her office is just working out dates for her visit.
On cyber, I will write in detail to the right hon. Gentleman about the NATO initiative. We have supported Ukraine for a number of years with cyber-defence to ensure that its resilience is improved, taking the lessons that we have here and sharing and working with them. That is why it is so useful that the National Cyber Security Centre is not only domestically but internationally recognised. When its experts come to give advice, it certainly helps with resilience.
On what more we can do, one concern that we have to address is Russia’s sense of encirclement, as I said at the beginning, and a fear that is untrue and based either on a misconception or, indeed, a falsehood. One way to address that is through better transparency. We have had schemes such as the Open Skies scheme, and we have had a number of treaties, some of which have been broken by Russia, which is unfortunate, but I certainly think that more transparency is needed. We often have Vienna inspections in this country; we had some only the other month by Russian military personnel who visited an RAF base. That is one of the best ways to demonstrate the realities on the ground, and that NATO is not an aggressor and we are not planning some offensive.
More work can definitely be done to deal with that situation, and to give Russia its voice. I was delighted that we had the Russia-NATO Council, the first in two years, only last week, because it is incredibly important that we get to hear and meet Russia face to face. I have not met my counterpart, and obviously since the Salisbury poisonings relationships have been at a low ebb. For many years, the Russian Defence Secretary and the British Defence Secretary have not had periodic or routine meetings, and I think it is important we offer that. Whether Russia will accept it is a different issue, but it is important that we reach out, at the very least, and have a discussion, and give each other the respect that I think sovereign nations deserve.
On weapons systems, I concur with the right hon. Gentleman. Absolutely—these weapons are short-range. They are not strategic; they are tactical. They are the sort of systems you use if someone is attacking you. This is an infantry-level type weapons system, but nevertheless it would make people pause and think about what they are doing. If tanks were to roll into Ukraine and invade, it would be part of the defensive mechanism.
I thank the Defence Secretary for not only keeping the House informed, but for working tirelessly behind the scenes to push NATO to do as much as it can, given the limits of that alliance. Talks in Brussels, and indeed Geneva, have reached their conclusion, or inconclusion. Cyber-attacks have now commenced, and we now see that Putin clearly intends to invade as part of his wider strategy to expand Moscow’s sphere of influence, and indeed help to label and retain NATO as the adversary that Russia must stand up to.
Russia has now amassed the land forces, weapon systems, and even the field hospitals to allow an invasion to take place. Will the Secretary of State say when the anti-armour weapon systems that he is providing will be operational in Ukraine? If Putin gives the green light to invade, what additional military support does the Secretary of State believe NATO could provide or offer to Ukraine to help to thwart Russian aggression east of the Dnipro river?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his comments. There is still a way to go. We still have NATO, we still have our alliances, and we still have the international community and its efforts to try to find a diplomatic solution. We will carry on doing that until the very last moment. I think that President Putin has still not made a final decision, but I hope that that is enough to ward the Kremlin off. A united front on sanctions, which is what we are developing, is prepared and ready if something were to happen, and the strong resilience in Ukraine should, at the very least, give people pause for thought. On the wider issues about the systems, the first systems were delivered today in country, and the training will take place. As I have said, these are not major strategic weapons systems, so therefore they are fairly simple and the training package will not be drawn out. As I have said, the trainers will then return.
If Russia attacks militarily, the first and foremost response will be, as we have said, in the areas of sanctions and diplomacy, and in the consequences that President Putin would face as a world leader in what could potentially be a very bloody war, triggered by an invasion that is neither within international law nor what anyone wants in this world. First, reputationally, economically, and militarily we would of course explore whatever we could in those areas, but as I have previously made clear, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and British troops will not be deploying to fight Russians.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe United Kingdom has uniquely at its disposal a strong partnership with the United States, and a partnership also with the EU and indeed in NATO. We are working all those avenues to make sure that we present a united and strong front. This week, I will visit a number of countries in eastern Europe and Scandinavia, many of which are very, very worried about what has been happening. We have continued with the diplomatic track. In 2019, I extended Operation Orbital to continue to help build Ukraine’s capability to defend itself, which is incredibly important. All of us should call out those false narratives to make sure that, should anything happen, we have a package of sanctions ready to deliver to make sure that Russia’s bad mistake is punished.
Putin’s ultimatum in December, placing unrealistic demands on NATO’s forced presence in eastern Europe and giving Russia licence to invade Ukraine, was clearly designed to be rejected. Will the Secretary of State confirm that we will not concede to Russia’s threats; that NATO’s defence posture in eastern Europe, and in the Baltic states in particular, will not change; and that we will commit to a long-term strategy of supporting Ukraine through joint training exercises, arms sales and the eventual inviting of Ukraine to join NATO?
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI call the Chair of the Defence Committee.
I commend the focus that the Minister brings to the situation, which is very refreshing indeed. However, he speaks of a troubled programme with cultural and systematic failures and of commissioning a senior legal figure to investigate. The project is a complete mess. Indeed, our whole land warfare programme is now operationally suboptimal as we cut our tank numbers, all our armoured fighting vehicles and our recce vehicles and introduce Boxer—a wheeled vehicle but with no substantial firepower—and Ajax. As we have discussed, it is a £5 billion project that was expected in 2017, but only a dozen vehicles have arrived, and people are being sent to hospital because of the vibration problems. The MOD is fortunate that the west—sadly, this includes the UK—is now so risk-averse as we would struggle today to send appropriate hardware into Ukraine in a move that, in my view, would deter Putin from invading.
The real scandal is the cover-up and dishonesty that led to the integrated review hiding those very problems with Ajax that the Minister spoke about so that it would not be axed. I spoke to a number of four-star generals, and nobody expected it to survive the integrated review. It makes it difficult for me to call for defence spending to be increased to 3% to improve our defence posture because of the threats coming over the horizon when money is spent so poorly. I call on him to set a date in February when, if the procurement issues are not resolved, the project will finally be closed down.
I thank the Chair of the Defence Committee for his comments. Last year, his Committee produced a helpful report on armoured vehicles that made absolutely clear the requirement to invest more in that part of our defence. The Committee was right to do that and to highlight those concerns, and it should be reassured by the investment that we are putting into Boxer and Challenger. A £41 billion programme of investment in equipment and support is going into the Army in the next 10 years, and £8 billion of that is new. We differ, however, on the requirement for a recce vehicle of this nature. We need such a 24-hour vehicle that can operate in all weathers and all conditions to provide that critical ground reconnaissance, and that is what we are procuring via Ajax.
We must make certain that we have all the facts, because decisions are best made with all the facts. The root cause analysis on noise and vibration is in process, and we are doing that at pace. I am determined to drive answers on that. My right hon. Friend is right to ask searching questions, but, as I said, we are in a far better position than we were six months ago to understand what is going on. I hope that, early next year, we will know far more and be able to say, “Yes, this is a capacity that we can bring in and will work.” I am hopeful that we will get there, but it depends on the analysis that we do.