Ukraine

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 25th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

The hon. Gentleman asked his question very sincerely, and I know that his experience is shared by many Members. As a constituency MP, I have encountered such cases myself.

We are all keen to see these visas processed as soon as possible. As the hon. Gentleman will know, a significant number have been provided—I think it is more than 107,000 now—but I appreciate that that makes no difference to those who are sitting outside Ukraine with diminishing amounts of money, wanting to come to this country and to a home that is desperate to have them and embrace them. I know that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department—my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who is sitting beside me—recognises that there are issues relating to children in particular; the Home Office is working assiduously to try to get on top of all these issues. In my personal experience, the system seems to be getting faster and better, but we are not there yet, and that work continues to be done by my friends in the Home Office.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Before the Minister moves on to the subject of NATO commitments, may I raise the subject of direct support for Ukraine? As he knows, it has historical debt problems, and the invasion will obviously have a huge economic impact; the statistics are clear to us all. Can the Minister say something about the co-ordination of direct international financial support for Ukraine, and how we can keep the country solvent during a time when that is a very pressing matter for it?

[Jeremy Quin]

We have supplied significant funds directly to Ukraine to help it through this incredibly difficult period. I cannot lay my hands on the exact amount, but the House may be blessed with the figure later in my remarks. We are also working with the G7 and others. Clearly, Ukraine is suffering from extraordinary problems at present, and the international community recognises that. It also recognises that Ukraine is standing up for a cause that means so much to us all, so the hon. Gentleman’s point is well made.

If I may, I will move on to our economic response. We are escalating our sanctions regime still further to stymie the Russian war machine and isolate Putin. The UK has now sanctioned more than 1,000 individuals and 100 entities, including oligarchs with a net worth of more than £100 billion. In recent days we have focused on his inner circle and the shady financial network surrounding him. This is alongside the asset freezes, trade bans and tariffs that we and other G7 nations have imposed in recent months. Over time, this economic contraction and the restriction of access to complex components will have an ever-deepening impact on the Russian war machine. As time goes on, despite their daily dose of propaganda, it will be harder and harder for the Russian people to ignore the evidence that their leaders are betraying them and their interests.

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[Luke Pollard]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I want to see reform of our procurement system to ensure that it is sufficient and agile, and, dare I say it, more cost-effective than it has been to date. That is why I am arguing for a medium-term strategy. The steps that we have taken so far have been important, but, rather than just considering the immediacy of the situation, we need a longer-term look at what we need to do.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Following on from what the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) said, I, too, believe that it will be a long-term conflict. Does the shadow Minister agree that, on top of the containment strategy that we will have to have in place for Russia, we will also need a strategy that offers Russia an alternative path for the post-Putin era, whenever that comes, so that it can resume normal international relations if it respects its neighbours?

[Luke Pollard]

It will be a very hard way back for Russia if President Putin remains in power. The off-ramp option that was spoken about in the early days of the war is now very difficult for President Putin to consider, but in discussing future options for how the war can end, we need to make it very clear that the war will end only when Russia leaves Ukraine in its entirety and returns Ukraine to a peaceful situation in which its people can make their own decisions.

I realise that time is passing, so I will briefly raise the Homes for Ukraine issue. There has been enormous support from the British people in opening up their homes to people fleeing Ukraine. My boyfriend and I have signed up to the Homes for Ukraine scheme, but without a matching service, it is difficult to ensure that we can fill our spare room. There are tens of thousands of people in a similar situation.

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[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is a real pleasure to participate in this important debate. I begin by commending the Ministers on the Treasury Bench for the regular drumbeat with which they bring this subject to the House to allow us to understand what is happening, to take stock and to comment on the clearly very difficult situation in Ukraine.

If invading Ukraine was an effort to rekindle Russian superpower status, it has been a complete flop. There was no clear initial strategy, no effective command and control, no logistical support and absolutely no appreciation of the Ukrainian people’s fearless desire to stay and fight. For Russia, this has been a dismal campaign. The body bags returning to Russia have piled up in their thousands, and dozens of wrecked Russian T-72 tanks now litter Ukrainian roadsides after a failed attempt to take the capital. With international sanctions starting to bite and countries such as Britain replenishing the arsenal of the brave Ukrainian forces with NLAWs and the like, surely Putin knows he cannot win. But sadly, this is far from over. With little care for the accepted rules of war or even for the loss of Russian life, Russian forces have now regrouped in the south-west of the country and have begun bombing entire towns and cities from afar, carrying out barbaric war crimes to gain territory, specifically in the Donbas region, and exploiting the west’s timidity about getting directly involved.

As NATO leaders head to the Madrid summit in June, there are lessons for the west to learn. Step back from events in Ukraine and we begin to realise that this is not just about Ukraine; it is another turning point in our history—indeed, in European security. We have had it quite easy over the last 30 years, since the end of the cold war, but the next few decades will be extremely bumpy indeed. State-on-state aggression is clearly back. If we do not help to put this fire out in Ukraine, it will spread to other parts of Europe, yet today it seems we are doing only enough to ensure that Ukraine does not lose, and not enough to guarantee that Ukraine can win. Putin may have misjudged Ukraine’s resolve to hold ground and fight, but he was spot-on in believing that NATO would have no appetite for getting directly involved.

Putin’s invasion did not come out of the blue. His vice-like grip on his own media has, over decades, convinced the majority of Russians that the west—specifically NATO—is a threat and must be confronted. He has publicly expressed a desire to regain control of those countries that were once governed by Stalin. And now, he is sidling ever closer to China, which shares Russia’s disdain for western standards and values.

This is indeed a dangerous turning point in our history, and the threat picture is certainly beginning to change fast. I put it to the House that how we conduct ourselves over the next few months—how we regroup and how we choose to stand up to this growing authoritarianism across the world—could have major implications for how things play out over the next decade. I recall speaking when Parliament was recalled after we decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. I made the statement that our departure could well be the high-tide mark of western liberalism since the second world war. I fear that if we do not get Ukraine right, I might be right in that analysis.

If we are to do things correctly, we face three big tasks, which I put to the Minister today. First, on Ukraine itself, we must agree on what exactly victory looks like. Even in the debate so far this afternoon, there has not been disagreement, but there have been different views on what success actually is. For me, it is the flushing out of all Russian forces from mainland Ukraine—I park Crimea, because it is a more complex issue to be revisited at a later date. Ultimately, I encourage President Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces to clarify that that is what they want to do, because that then makes clear how we can fully support them.

There must be clarity of that mission, because there seems to be a little disagreement taking place across our European allies. France and Germany are suggesting that a chunk of the Donbas could remain in Russian hands. We need to agree what that mission is, because that then helps to define operations, tactics and the equipment that is required. Eastern Ukraine, for those not familiar with it, is open, flat, tank terrain. It is perfect for that form of mobility and firepower. That indicates the sort of equipment we need to give.

The second task—slightly bigger, and stepping back from Ukraine—is to rekindle those cold war statecraft skills and the ability to react robustly to events without assuming that we will lose control of the escalatory ladder and trigger a nuclear war when dealing with Russia. NATO, let us not forget, remains the most formidable military alliance in the world. It is no wonder Sweden and Finland both want in. Yet future generations may ask why NATO formally sat on its hands while a democracy on its doorstep was partially destroyed. Let us remember what happened in 1938 when we hesitated. Too often, we have been spooked by Putin’s rhetoric. We should be shaping events, not reacting to them.

In fairness to the west and in particular to Britain, we have come a long way since our initial hesitance to answer President Zelensky’s pleas for help. Thankfully, NATO allies are catching up with the scale of Britain’s military support for Ukraine, which actually began way back in 2014. However, NATO refuses to formally get involved. It is consensus-driven, and it is clear that some countries do not want to lean forward. It is time therefore to form a coalition of like-minded nations, working together to better co-ordinate military support for Ukraine, increasing the quality and quantity of equipment and assisting with supply chains and training, all united by a mission to see Ukraine push Russian forces entirely out of its mainland.

We must be proactive in limiting the economic harm that Russia is causing. We should establish a humanitarian corridor around the key port of Odesa, so that the grain that much of the world depends on can continue to reach international markets. That is in our interests, because it will help directly tackle the cost of living crisis affecting us here, too.

Our final task is to form a strategy to handle an ever-assertive Russia-China axis that is attempting to exploit our fragile world order. Putin would not have invaded Ukraine if President Xi had not given his backing and support. Both countries share a common goal of building an illiberal alternative world order where authoritarian states can flourish, and Ukraine is just the start of that new axis of autocracy flexing its muscles. We must recognise that the last 30 years have been a walk in the park compared with what lies ahead. All NATO countries must increase defence spending to a minimum of 3% and the recent cuts to our troop numbers, fighter jets and ship numbers must be reversed.

[Jonathan Edwards]

The right hon. Gentleman speaks with great authority and knowledge. Given the emergence of the axis between China and Russia, how concerned is he about reports of a joint military exercise in the last few days over the Sea of Japan?

[Mr Ellwood]

I look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. I will focus on what happens in the European theatre of operations, but he raises an important question about the tilt to the Pacific, which was mentioned earlier, and what is happening in Ukraine. If we now recognise that Russia and China are working together, we must also appreciate that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is in China’s interest, because it has kept us, Europe and the United States busy and distracted so we have not kept an eye on what is going on in other parts of the world. We need to recognise that we must lean into what is happening in the South China sea. I would like to see a development of the Quad—Japan, India, United States and Australia—with Britain and France being invited into that strategic partnership to look after and take a greater interest in the security of that part of the world. I hope that the Government will look forward to that in the discussions at NATO.