Trade Bill

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, the approach that has now been adopted is, I believe, a fair one, subject to some ironing out that might need to be done in the other place. Yes, it is a good deal for my hon. Friend’s constituents.

After no little discussion over the last few months, I think that the position is now very much improved. Let us keep in mind that a single FTA might have many SIs attached to it, so to have the report laid 10 sitting days in advance of the first SI, setting out all the changes in the proposed deal that will need to be considered, should be more transparent than just attaching a period for scrutiny to the SIs themselves. Furthermore, attaching the 10 sitting days’ time delay to the report will allow any comments that people wish to make to be made before the SI is laid, which is more effective from a review point of view.

I am concerned that these powers could be used multiple times on the same FTA—say, if different trading terms were agreed a couple of years after roll-over. I understand that this is not the Government’s intention and I believe that the effect of these Government amendments would be to prevent that, unless the proposed changes came within the scope of the initial report. However, if they did not come within the scope of the report, Ministers should be required to provide a further report. Clarification on this point, perhaps today from the Minister or in the other place, would be appropriate.

I note the insertion of a provision in new clause 13 saying that Ministers should not have to prepare a report on the proposed FTA in exceptional cases. Apparently the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 contains a similar provision. The Minister has assured me that this provision is unlikely ever to be used, and that if it was, a report would still need to be prepared and there would still be a need for an affirmative resolution. Again, I hope that the Minister will refer to this in his closing remarks.

A further issue is the need to confirm that the scrutiny provisions to be used on these FTAs will be those set out in this Trade Bill and not those in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. This is provided for in my new clause 6. From discussions with the Minister, I understand that he has been advised that all regulations relating to rolled over EU FTAs will necessarily need to be dealt with under the terms of this Bill, but again, clarification would be helpful.

Yesterday we debated the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, which itself contains its own powers to make orders. Although other colleagues have been focusing on that Bill, I remain concerned that the scrutiny system in today’s Bill ties in with that Bill. This is relevant because aspects of an FTA, which are customs related, will be dealt with by yesterday’s taxation Bill rather than by today’s Bill. The regulation provisions may therefore need to work in sync.

All hon. Members from both sides of the House have been involved in this, and I thank those who have supported my amendments. The outcome has not been a victory for any Brexit faction; it has been Parliament that has won this debate in upholding its right to review the actions of the Executive. Having said that, I would point out that more than 40 Government amendments were received within the last week. As welcome as they were, and while the principle of them is agreed, the details deserve a review by the other place. I have mentioned the interconnectivity between this Bill and the taxation Bill, and these would be good topics for further review.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I should like to speak to new clause 20, which is in my name and those of my hon. Friends. I shall also speak to new clauses 22, 23 and 24 and make brief reference to new clause 21. New clauses 20 to 24 combined are an attempt to provide and further strengthen a comprehensive framework for future trade negotiations. This is to ensure that the devolved nations are respected, consulted and fully engaged in trade deals, and that their voices and national interests are properly reflected in trade deals, from determining the negotiating mandate right through to reviewing progress on deals after ratification and implementation.

That is important because although the UK devolution Acts grant Westminster full power over international trade, the domestic impact of many trade agreements extends beyond the competence of Westminster. The devolved Administrations have responsibility for a broad range of policy issues including health, education, agriculture and the environment, and many modern trade agreements include provisions with the potential to lower environmental standards, open up public services to privatisation, expand intellectual property rights or risk increasing the cost of medicines. Those agreements can encroach on the devolved Administrations’ policy space, restricting their ability to make public policy in those areas. That is something that none of us wants to see.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

My hon. Friend is making an important point, and he is not asking to reinvent the wheel. In Canada, the International Trade Committee heard evidence from John Weekes, who is an ambassador to the World Trade Organisation and also a Canadian negotiator. He said that squaring off the provinces of Canada, though adding to complexity, made for better trade deals and a more harmonious Canada. Canada is obviously more interested in keeping itself together than the current United Kingdom is.

[Stewart Hosie]

My hon. Friend the Chair of the International Trade Committee makes an important point. We have already seen the impact of sub-state Parliaments in Europe on previous European trade deal discussions. Indeed, my hon. Friend is right that we have seen the impact of provincial governments in Canada, and we would do well to take that on board here. In a sense, that is what my new clauses are about.

New clause 20 sets the role of the devolved Administrations in helping to approve the negotiating mandate. It suggests that a joint ministerial committee on trade be set up with representatives from all the devolved Administrations, that that committee be required to reach consensus on any draft negotiating mandate, and that it be revisited if the mandate changes during the negotiations. New clause 20 also requires that the consent of the Scottish Parliament and the other devolved Administrations be secured specifically for areas under devolved control that may be affected by a trade deal. That is not a veto, as the Labour Front-Bench team would describe it; it represents responsibility for the areas that the devolved Governments have responsibility for. In short, new clause 20 ensures that any negotiating mandate is first approved by the devolved legislatures and that a joint ministerial committee is created to co-operate and agree the mandate.

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[Barry Gardiner]

I rise to speak to new clause 4, which stands in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends.

The extent to which the Bill encroaches on matters of devolved competence and undermines the power of devolved authorities is of particular concern. I am proud that it was a Labour Government who delivered the devolution settlements. They were established with a presumption of full devolution, except in matters considered reserved to the Government of the United Kingdom. Indeed, amendments to devolution legislation contained in the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017 specifically put that presumption on to a legislative footing, stipulating that Ministers would not legislate on matters that fell within devolved competence without “normally” seeking the consent of the appropriate devolved Government. However, the Bill seeks to do exactly that.

The Public Bill Committee heard in great detail the serious consequences the Bill would have for the United Kingdom and each of the devolved nations and their respective Administrations.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Barry Gardiner]

A little later.

Certainly, my good friend the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland has impressed on me the deficiencies of the Government’s approach, and it is with her strong advice that I have sought, in consultation with the shadow Secretaries of State for Wales and Northern Ireland, to propose a strong new clause that absolutely and even-handedly respects the devolution settlements and the Sewel convention.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Barry Gardiner]

Once I have explained a little bit about what new clause 4 would do, I will happily give way to the hon. Gentleman.

The provisions in clauses 1 and 2, taken with the Government’s latest amendment 34, would allow the Government in Westminster to use Henry VIII powers to modify primary legislation or retain direct EU legislation in areas of devolved competence, such as procurement, agriculture and food standards, without the consent of the relevant devolved authority—even without any consultation. That goes far beyond the convention of not “normally” legislating in matters of devolved competence without such consent.

Just as the Government have erred on one side by proposing in the Bill a disrespectful power grab downwards into areas of devolved competence, so the Scottish National party, in seeking to amend the Bill, have erred in the other direction by failing to respect the boundaries of the devolution settlement and seeking a power of veto and co-decision making in matters that were always reserved to the United Kingdom sovereign Parliament. We must be clear that international trade is a matter of exclusive competence of the UK Government. At no stage has any devolved authority had any competence in respect of matters of international trade, but I will deal with the Government’s amendments first.

Modern trade agreements are so complex and so extensive that there are areas where matters of trade competence do cross over into matters that would otherwise be devolved competence: food standards, animal welfare standards, access to fishing waters, determination of regulatory and oversight bodies, and so on. All these are the substance of international trade agreements, and where such agreements have been negotiated, a devolved authority is entirely right to consider that its consent must be sought prior to regulations to implement the agreement on such matters being made in accordance with the powers in the Bill.

That the Bill allows for Ministers to act in contravention of that convention and without seeking consent from or even consulting the relevant devolved authority is precisely why neither the Welsh nor the Scottish Government have agreed to give the Bill their legislative consent. That is why Labour said in Committee that it would table an amendment to require the convention to be observed, while ensuring that no power of veto was afforded to a devolved Government on matters that were the exclusive competence of Her Majesty’s Government.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Barry Gardiner]

I am just about at the point where I will.

Our new clause 4 would achieve this by setting out that normally the Government must seek the consent of the devolved Governments before making such regulations, ensuring that the convention is protected in the Bill, while similarly allowing the Government to use existing powers where a devolved Government act or—importantly—fail to act in such a way that ensures the UK is in compliance with its legally binding obligations arising from an international trade agreement.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman is getting this completely wrong. The Scottish Government do not want a veto; the Scottish National party does not want a veto. We recognise that trade is a reserved matter. Our amendments simply say that Scottish Ministers should be consulted, or their consent sought, when UK policy intersects with devolved policy. This is not a veto on a reserved matter. It is common sense. It is equality—it is parity—in respect of implications for devolved matters. Labour Members should go back to the drawing board, because they are simply getting it wrong.

[Barry Gardiner]

I note the hon. Gentleman’s objections. We clearly have a different view of the nature of the devolution settlement. I will try to take his amendments in turn and explain to him precisely why I believe that he is mistaken.

Let us imagine circumstances in which a devolved Administration simply failed to introduce implementing regulation to an aspect of a trade treaty that that Administration did not like. It would be the UK Government, not the devolved Administration, who were held to be in breach and subject to any penalties that might be imposed. That is why the relevant devolution Acts provide that—not “normally”, but in such exceptional circumstances—the UK could implement such regulations without consent to ensure that the UK complied with its international obligations.

Of course, other amendments have been tabled on these issues. New clause 20, tabled by SNP Members, calls for the devolved authorities to have a right to vote on whether Her Majesty’s Government may exercise what is currently the Government’s exclusive competence to begin trade talks. Our new clause states that negotiating mandates should be formulated transparently and with formal engagement with key stakeholders, including the devolved authorities. However, a right of veto on whether trade talks can begin is a power that no legislature in the country—including the House of Commons—currently has, and it would constitute a substantial new power for the devolved authorities.

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[Barry Gardiner]

I am pressed for time. I know that you want me to conclude my remarks very shortly, Madam Deputy Speaker.

While other amendments are about consent before the making of regulations implementing obligations arising under a trade agreement, that clause would prevent the trade agreement from ever having legal effect, as it could not be ratified unless the devolved authorities had consented. It has been carefully worded, but its intent is clear: it is not limited only to matters of devolved competence, but covers all trade agreements in their entirety even if no aspect of that agreement would touch on devolved competence and even if absolutely no regulations were required to implement that agreement. New clause 23(3)(b) would ensure that any trade agreement

“having an impact within the territory over which the devolved authority presides”

was subject to this consent power. Quite clearly, every single trade agreement will be, as there will be exporters across the UK who can trade under the terms of that agreement. It is a thinly veiled attempt at securing the Wallonian veto power that the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) told us in the Committee was his intention.

The Committee took many more pieces of evidence. I will not detain the House with them today, but simply say that new clause 4 absolutely respects the devolution settlement. It sets out the right relationship so that Government cannot overreach into devolved competence nor the devolved authorities reach up into powers that are reserved for this sovereign Parliament.

I also support new clause 19, but I will not detain the House any longer.

[Stewart Hosie]

I shall speak to amendment 25 in my name and to amendments 26, 27, 28 and 29. New clause 21 is in this group, but I referred to it earlier so will not do so again now.

First, however, let me make an observation about the Labour party’s position. It seems to rely on the new form of words that the UK Government would not normally legislate or do this or do that in relation to anything that was a devolved competence. If we were talking about normal, reasonable people in normal, sensible times when they did not interfere at all except in extremis, perhaps we could accept that. However, they have taken the Scottish Government to court to undermine a democratic decision of the Parliament, so, of course, we accept the principles of devolution, but to make them work there now must be formal arrangements and consent must be sought. We can no longer rely on the formulation of the UK Government not normally doing x, y or z.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

Does it not also show, sadly, a centrist approach from the Labour party, which cannot adopt the maturity of Trudeau’s Canada and scoffs at the fact that Belgium is not such a control-freak state that it can allow Wallonia some say in the governance of Belgium?

[Stewart Hosie]

“International” only goes so far—perhaps just to the white cliffs of Dover.

The Trade Bill among other things ensures that the UK can implement any procurement obligations that arise from it being a member of the GPA—agreement on Government procurement—in its own right and ensures that agreements with partner countries corresponding to the EU’s free trade agreements are in place prior to Brexit. If that is all the Bill did, and it maintained all the rights and responsibilities, it might not be great, but it would make sense and probably go through on the nod. The problem is that it goes further than that: it carries on from the provisions in the EU withdrawal Bill limiting the actions of the Scottish Government and other devolved Administrations in areas that are, or ought to be, devolved, and—this goes to the first point about the GPA—that includes procurement.

That is why when the Scottish Government lodged a legislative consent motion in the Scottish Parliament initially, it explained their objections to the Trade Bill with the recommendation that Parliament could not consent to it being introduced. While they welcomed the powers being conferred on Scottish Ministers, the LCM made it clear that they could not accept the constraints placed on the use of those powers, which were analogous to those in the EU withdrawal Bill.

Legislative consent is required for part 1 of the Bill, but is not required for some of the other parts. Specifically, consent is required for the purposes within the devolved competence of the Parliament, which is that the Trade Bill seeks to maintain continuity in the UK’s trade and investment relationships through two implementation powers: implementation of the agreement on Government procurement as an independent member of the WTO; and assisting in the transition of current trade arrangements by enabling, so far as may be required, the implementation in UK domestic law of trade agreements the UK intends to conclude after withdrawal from the EU. These powers may be exercisable within devolved areas, and that is why this is important.

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[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I want to be able to understand whether this is a real problem. Can the hon. Gentleman give me a specific example of where he thinks the UK Government might assert a power that they should not assert, and how that might arise?

[Stewart Hosie]

That is a reasonable question, and I will answer it properly. Clearly we cannot tell precisely where the problems will arise, because we do not yet know precisely what the UK Government might do. Having said that, the Bill gives back to Ministers discretionary powers over procurement. In Scotland, because of the actions taken there, 78% of publicly procured contracts go to small and medium-sized enterprises, 60% to Scottish SMEs. The UK Government figure is 20%. If that power is taken back, and if oversight is retained by Westminster, there would be a real risk that we could lose that economic diversity and that fantastic achievement in a real-life area. That is a real concern that I hope the right hon. Gentleman will share.

I shall turn briefly to the amendments. Amendments 25 and 26 seek to address an issue in the Bill that has a direct read-across to clauses in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that confer powers on UK Ministers in devolved areas without any form of devolved consent. No amendments have been made to the Act to alter that approach or to require the consent of Scottish Ministers when UK Ministers make regulations in devolved areas. Amendments 25 and 26 seek to ensure that the UK Government seek consent from devolved Ministers before amending legislation in devolved areas.

Before I move on, I meant to say that I recognise that Government amendments 64 and 66, and consequential amendments 65 and 67, now require Scottish Ministers only to consult and not to seek consent in certain areas. However, the number of areas is limited, and the amendments do not address all the problems.

Amendment 27 requires the Secretary of State to consult Scottish Ministers before deciding whether, or for how long, to prolong the period during which implemented powers can be used. That is important because there is no equivalent provision in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and because no amendment has been made to the existing provisions in the Trade Bill that allow the UK Government unilaterally to alter the powers of Scottish Ministers in relation to grandfathering trade arrangements for further periods of up to five years at a time.

At present, it is envisaged that the powers in the Trade Bill relating to the grandfathering of existing free trade arrangements with third countries would have to be used in only a very small number of cases that could not be dealt with under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act—for example, for reasons of timing. However, with so much uncertainty around the ease with which existing agreements will be rolled over, it is possible that this restriction could have a more significant impact, not least because many of the 24 areas likely to be subject to the clause 11 regulations—that is, the power grab—are highly relevant to the world of trading and trade deals. If left unamended, or amended only along similar lines to the amendments in the withdrawal Act, this provision in the Trade Bill would in effect allow the UK Government to change the law in devolved areas to allow for the implementation of these arrangements, which might not necessarily remain exactly as they are at present. In essence, that is close enough to having an ability to implement a new trade Bill with almost no consultation or consent at all. Our amendment 28 deals with that problem.

Amendment 29 is small and seeks a direct read across from the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. It would replace the need for consent from UK Ministers in certain circumstances with the need only to consult. As I said, I note the Government amendments in that regard.

We are not arguing for vetoes for Scotland nor for any sense of Scottish exceptionalism; we are simply looking at the facts, understanding what is going on and what needs to happen. If Scottish Ministers are required to consult or seek consent when Scottish parliamentary responsibilities intersect with UK responsibilities, we are simply arguing that UK Ministers should be under the same obligation to consult or seek consent where UK policy responsibilities intersect with those of the devolved Administrations. It was said in the last debate that that happens with the Parliaments of Belgium, and it also happens with the Canadian provinces. The world does not collapse when proper respect and statutory weight is given to the rights and responsibilities of sub-state administrations. It is common sense. We are trying to improve the situation to make it work and to ensure that our voices and our national interests are protected and that the rights of the devolved Administrations are respected.

Time is short, and we do not want many votes on this group so as to allow time for the last group, particularly new clause 18, which needs to be properly debated, but I hope to press amendment 25 to a vote.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I will not speak for long because our Front-Bench spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) has covered the issues well, but I want to talk briefly about why it is important that the Scottish Parliament, Scottish Ministers and the Scottish people in general should have more of a say in deals going forward than is proposed by the UK Government.

In recent times, the UK Government have not had responsibility for signing off and negotiating trade deals. They have not been the key player. Therefore, they have not been able to undertake some of the practices that we think they could undertake, so it is understandable that the Scottish people are worried given that we have been monumentally badly served by the UK Government over decades. Just look at the roll-out of universal credit, the bedroom tax, the rape clause and the passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018—legislation that happened despite the Scottish Parliament refusing consent. All those things show the ways in which the UK Government are badly serving Scotland.

Until I was an MP, I genuinely thought that the UK Government were, at times, probably trying their best. When I got elected to this place, I discovered that when the UK Government propose legislation and we say to them, “Have you thought about how this will affect Scotland?” the answer is not that they are trying to do anything bad, it is just that they forget we exist. They just do not even consider the views of Scotland or the differences in Scotland. Look at how the common fisheries policy has been negotiated by the UK Government, for example. The way that the Government negotiated swaps removed quota rights from Scottish fishermen to the benefit of fishermen in the south of England. Such choices made by the UK Government have a direct negative impact on Scottish people. On that basis, it is understandable that we are worried that the UK Government will not take decisions in Scotland’s best interests because they may simply forget that we exist.