Afghanistan

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a delight to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I congratulate the hon. Member for Broadland (Mr Simpson) on initiating the debate. I am sure that we could have listened to him speak for a lot longer on the subject. His knowledge of present conflicts and others is well known in the House.

It would be wrong not to start the debate by remembering those who have fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those who have been wounded in the service of our country. I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence during the previous Labour Government, and I do not think that anyone takes decisions easily on the things that happen. My hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) said that we should be reminded of the individuals who died. I say to him that if a duty Minister is rung late at night on a dark weekend to be informed that there have been nine casualties, it never leaves them. Irrespective of political party, no one can detach themselves from the individuals, the sacrifice that their families have made, or the circumstances in which they died.

The debate is about Afghanistan, but the hon. Member for Broadland drew out broader questions of strategy. The hon. Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) talked about where we started with Afghanistan, and, of course, it leads back to the response to 9/11. I believe that it all started with the use of the terminology of a war on terror. I thought that that expression was wrong, and I never used it. It gave the impression that the only possible response was a military solution. We all know that the fight against terrorism involved not only the military, but law enforcement and politics, as has been made clear in several contributions today.

The initial invasion of Afghanistan was about dealing with the Taliban, who were the hosts for al-Qaeda. A lot of people forget the attempts that had previously been made by the Clinton Administration and the very early Bush Administration to get the Taliban to give up bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, but that did not happen. I think that there was confusion over policy. Members of special forces who went into Afghanistan in the early days have told me that their first remit was to expel the Taliban, and that there was no notion of nation building. I think that is where the confusion and mission creep came into being. From my dealings with the Bush Administration and senior figures, and as a member of the Defence Committee, prior to the invasion of Iraq the message was quite clear that they did not do nation building; they did war fighting. I do not think that they were committed from an early stage to nation building in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The hon. Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon) has said that he met someone who called the recent wars “Blair’s wars”, and my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West has just described them as Prime Ministers’ wars. However, we must not forget that Parliament took the decision that we should be part of the invasion of Iraq, and there was cross-party support for our mission in Afghanistan. It would be wrong, therefore, to try to apportion blame to an individual or a political party. Should we have questioned some things more? Yes, on some occasions we should have done, and that goes back to the strategic points that the hon. Member for Broadland made. One question we have to ask is about the relationship between politics and the military. The notion of the public, and perhaps the media, is that politicians are bad and the military is good, but we all know that life is not as simplistic as that. That relationship is one of the serious issues that we need to address.

The hon. Member for Newbury mentioned Lord Reid. I have spoken to him on several occasions about the deployment to Helmand, and he was the one who held it up for quite a while. The enthusiasm for going to Helmand clearly came from parts of the military. There is a saying in the Army: “We will crack on.” The military must give clear advice to Ministers, and if things are not doable, Ministers should be told that they are not. In my experience of the military, however, that does not happen, and there is a notion that everything can be achieved.

The hon. Member for Broadland referred to military structures. I would like to reflect a little on that, and especially on the way in which the military operate within the MOD. The hon. Gentleman accepts that there is a difference between the military, the political and the civil service: I used to refer to it as a three-legged stool. The situation in the military is even more complex, because of inter-service rivalry, as I have seen. On one occasion, I attended a meeting of Ministers and chiefs, at which the senior naval officer and the head of the Army shouted and swore at each other across the table. The relationship is not always unanimous or harmonious. Senior military must be joined up and speak with one voice, and I think that they are getting better at that. The movement towards the joint command under this Government is a move in the right direction to try to achieve more joined-up thinking.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

The concern is often expressed that the senior military were speaking with one voice, under pressure from the then Government. Will the hon. Gentleman clarify which senior military generals spoke against the previous Government’s policy and were promoted under that Government?

[Mr Jones]

This is where the nonsense comes in—where the political line that was taken and the party politics of that line cause confusion. The problem we had was that there was disagreement between the service chiefs at the time on different strategies. If politicians ask the military whether it is possible to do something, there is an in-built response of “Yes, we can,” but I am saying that there has to be a grown-up relationship. When Ministers ask for advice, they must sometimes be told by the military, “No, that cannot be done.” [Interruption.] The hon. Gentlemanhas asked me to give an example. At the tail end of the last Government, certain senior generals acted completely outside their remit by being political, which was not a helpful stance and did not ensure that they were above the party political debate. That was unfortunate.

I return to Helmand and the deployment south, about which the hon. Member for Broadland raised an important issue. Corporate knowledge in an organisation is important, and, like the hon. Gentleman, I fear that we are losing a lot of that. In addition, in our approach to deployment we must not look solely at the military kinetic effects. We should consider, for example, employing anthropologists to inform the debate about what will happen when we deploy somewhere, to ensure that when people are deployed, they have the fullest possible knowledge about the situation.

I have to disagree with what the hon. Member for Reigate said about Iran. I accept his point about the Iranians being against the Taliban, although I think that that was mainly to do with the Taliban murdering Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998. It was a maligned force in Basra and, in the latter days, in Herat in Afghanistan, where it was used in the proxy war against the United States and ourselves. Should we actually engage with them in negotiations? Yes, I think we could.

Finally, one major strategic failing in Afghanistan was the issue of Pakistan. All the emphasis was on rebuilding, and on occasion we treated Afghanistan in isolation, but the real problem was related to Pakistan. When the history books are written, they will say that the Musharraf Government, by speaking both ways, made our job much more difficult in Afghanistan.

2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I had the privilege to serve, albeit briefly, with 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. As a Lancastrian I am well aware of the high regard in which the regiment is held by the local community, which is reflected in its successful levels of recruitment. I fully support the campaign of my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and I will not detain the House by repeating the points that he skilfully made in highlighting the many flaws in the Government’s case. I want to address not the criteria, which my hon. Friend tackled, but the wider decision-making rationale that underpins the Government’s measure and that was at the heart of the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), who is a distinguished former Ministry of Defence Minister, when he sought to justify why this cut is being made.

First, if a measure such as this is to be positioned on the grounds of cost savings, the first thing one might expect is clarity on how much is being saved. However, when I asked the House of Commons Library that question this morning, answer came there none—it could not tell me. A rough estimate might put the figure at £25 million a year, but the least we might expect from the Minister’s closing remarks is some certainty, if the measure is being justified on cost grounds, as to how much is being saved.

Secondly, the MOD suggests that this cut, which is out of step with the criteria applied to other battalions, is needed to address the defence overspend; but the saving is puny in the context of overall MOD spending, when one considers the reputational impact, the history and the esteem of the front-line service that is being cut.

Let me put this in context and draw the House’s attention to some recent National Audit Office reports. Last year the MOD increased its defence inventory at the same time as it was cutting the size of its armed forces, so we are buying more kit for fewer troops, even though we already had, for example, 10 years’ supply of overalls. We have 54 years’ worth of equipment for Nimrod, even though the plane has already been scrapped. The sums of money being wasted are not insignificant. The MOD spent £2.4 billion on non-explosive inventory, even though it already had five years’ worth of such items in stock—we spent £2.4 billion buying things when we already had five years’ worth of supplies. We are now trying to get rid of some—£1.4 billion-worth—of the stock that we bought by mistake. It is costing £277 million a year just to store the stock that we do not want, and which we should never have bought. That puts the saving that is being made by the decision on 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in context.

My second question to the Minister is therefore why, when the National Audit Office report in June—the very time when this cut was being proposed—could identify savings of that order, officials in the Department could not do more to avoid the necessity of cutting this battalion.

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend is making a good point about overstocking. We are bearing down on that enormously. He will understand that, not having been in government between 1997 and 2010, we did not order most of this kit. We are selling off the kit so that we have to spend less money on storage, and we are spending less money on unnecessary kit; but he will also understand that the armed forces need good equipment, especially given the ongoing situation in Afghanistan.

[Stephen Barclay]

I am willing to recognise the big strides that the Government have taken in making those savings. However, we are spending vast sums of money on kit of which we have five years of supplies. The Minister says that this is about equipping our troops better, but we are not addressing that point by buying a higher specification of kit if we are buying things that we do not need. That was one of the key findings of the National Audit Office report.

If Ministers are not convinced that more could be done on logistics and supplies, perhaps I could put this saving of about £25 million in the wider context of our defence procurement. Again, I am willing to acknowledge the huge strides that have been taken by Ministers to get to grips with procurement. However, the 15 largest defence projects have overspent their initial budgets by £6 billion. The saving from this cut is a fraction of 1% of that, although we cannot know exactly how much it is because we have not had the figure. It is a tiny amount, and yet it is hitting the front line—our fighting units.

The case that I put to colleagues today is that surely more could be done, notwithstanding the efforts that are being made, to increase the scale, intensity and speed of implementation of the savings in logistics, supply and procurement. This decision does not provide value for money. It is too modest, it uses flawed criteria and the scope of delivering savings elsewhere means that it would be a mistake for the Government to go ahead with it. That is reflected in the comments from Members from all parts of the House today.

I have never voted against my Government, but I support my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and will do so if the motion is put to a vote. I hope that Ministers will listen to the strength of the arguments, look at the findings of the National Audit Office and deliver the required savings from other areas of the defence budget.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

If I may, I will cover my hon. Friend’s points as they were made in his speech. My responses are written down here, and it is better that I give him a detailed analysis rather than provide one off the top of my head.

While our armed forces might be smaller than before, they will still be able to reach across the world and operate across the full range of capabilities. We are reducing the size of the regular armed forces, but we are increasing the reserves, including an integrated element of the total land force of 120,000, with an extra £1.8 billion of investment in reserves, training and equipment.

The Army has been both pragmatic and imaginative in responding to this very real challenge. The blueprint was decided upon by the Army and announced by the Defence Secretary on 5 July. This project we call Army 2020. For the first time, this provides a pathway to a fully integrated Army of regular and reserve forces that will be configured for high-end conflict, rapid reaction, UK engagement and upstream conflict prevention.

[Stephen Barclay]

Will my right hon. Friend address the point that the value of the defence inventory is currently £40.3 billion? Just this June, the National Audit Office said:

“the Department is spending money on unnecessary levels of stock, which could be spent elsewhere in government.”

We are talking about such a modest sum of money; can it not be found elsewhere?

[Mr Robathan]

I have to confess to my hon. Friend that I do not deal with procurement measures. We have a defence reform project going on, which I think he will find addresses his point. I will ensure that he receives a letter from the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, setting out a proper response.

I think it would be better if we stuck with the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, because that is what people have come to speak about. Today, we have heard arguments about the withdrawal of 2RRF from the Army’s order of battle. Neither my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State nor I take any pleasure in the removal of any unit from the Army. I can assure hon. Members that we did not come into politics to reduce our armed forces. There is not a battalion or regiment in the current order of battle that does not have a proud history and significant battle honours. If, however, we are to create an affordable and balanced Army offering serious military capability into the future, a small number of those proud units and battalions will have to be withdrawn from the line.

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has been made aware of the reasons behind the Army Board’s decisions—and they were Army Board decisions, endorsed by Ministers. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate these reasons for the benefit of the House.

Military Covenant

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman knows that not to be the case. Stuart Tootal made his position very clear at the weekend.

I do not doubt the sincerity of Ministers’ words. I have made that plain at each and every turn when I have spoken from the Dispatch Box. However, there is real confusion and concern about their actions. The reason for the growing anger is that they know that the Government’s actions are sometimes enormously unfair, and, in the case of defining the covenant in law, utterly confused.

Let me explain why I think that the Government’s position is flawed. In the Armed Forces Bill, the Government have provided for an annual report on the covenant, explicitly using the term “covenant”. However, Ministers are choosing to overlook the fact that there is no legally binding definition of the term to accompany its use, which means that Ministers can themselves determine how it is interpreted.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

In his evidence to the Public Accounts Committee last month, the most senior official in the Treasury, Sir Nick Macpherson, said that

“there was a point in the middle of the last decade where the MOD lost control of public spending.”

Can the Minister explain what impact that has had on the military covenant?

[Mr Murphy]

At the same time the hon. Gentleman’s party was demanding more spending on the Army, more spending on the Navy, more spending on the Royal Air Force, more aeroplanes and more ships. When there was real concern about funding, his party was demanding ever more spending. He cannot be in denial about that.

I would rather rely on the evidence of one of the hon. Gentleman’s own Ministers in the debate on the Armed Forces Bill. He was very clear, and the Secretary of State must be clear as well in terms of meaningful commitment. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), the veterans Minister, said that the Government had no intention of placing in law a legal definition of a covenant.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Murphy]

That is probably going to be the hardest question I am asked all day. Just why have the Government U-turned on this issue, given that it was not a pre-election promise, but a post-election commitment? It is for the Secretary of State and his Ministers to articulate the reasons for their Government’s action.

I come back to the point about principle rather than statutory obligations.

[Stephen Barclay]

rose—

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Murphy]

I know that for the hon. Gentleman’s party it is always someone else’s fault. The sacking of soldiers by e-mail was the Army’s fault, then it was the civil servants’ fault and by the end of the day it was the Labour Government’s fault.

[Stephen Barclay]

rose—

[Mr Murphy]

I give way again, but I hope that at least one Conservative Member will say whether they are going to vote to detail the principles involved in a definition of the military covenant.

[Stephen Barclay]

The right hon. Gentleman suggested that Conservative Members were pointing the finger elsewhere. Does he not agree with his parliamentary colleague, the right hon. Member for Barking (Margaret Hodge), who, as Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, agreed with the following finding:

“The Department has failed to develop a financial strategy identifying core spending priorities”?

The report in question also said:

“The Department’s poor financial management has led to a…shortfall of…£36 billion”.

Does he agree with his parliamentary colleague? Why was the military covenant not part of his Government’s core spending priorities?

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman is confused. The fact is that his party was demanding ever more spending on the armed forces in the midst of the recession and the financial crisis.

Oral Answers to Questions

Steve Barclay Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

I should correct the hon. Gentleman by saying that the meeting in question took place at RAF Kinloss. What I said to the Moray Task Force, whom I was meeting at the time, was that the costs of moving the in-depth maintenance facilities from Marham and, indeed, paying to relocate the staff of the contractors involved would be so prohibitive that it would potentially undermine any savings that might accrue from closing a base. The economics of moving the in-depth maintenance facilities for Tornado at this stage in Tornado’s life cycle would, as I said on Thursday last, be very questionable indeed.

[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

11. What steps his Department is taking to increase the effectiveness of project management for its major projects.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

The National Audit Office’s recent major projects report shows that the well-documented problems with some of the largest procurement projects have generally been caused by poor and deliberate policy decisions, and that project management itself is improving. But we are doing more to improve project management, including: running a programme to increase skills; forming a major projects performance board to review our most significant projects regularly; and appointing Bernard Gray as Chief of Defence Matériel, where he will build on the improvements made by his predecessor.

[Stephen Barclay]

Following numerous Select Committee recommendations, the Department’s own guidelines run to eight pages in setting out what should be included in project histories, yet the £4 billion Nimrod project history runs to just two pages; makes no mention of senior responsible owners or senior staff changes; and took the Department seven weeks to produce, even though it already has this document, which is marked unclassified and had no redactions. Will the Minister write to me within the next month listing all the major defence projects that do not comply with the Department’s own guidelines on documentation and what the gaps in documentation are?

[Peter Luff]

I am reluctant to turn this into a diary session for my diary secretary, but I think it would be very helpful to discuss this important issue with my hon. Friend. Departmental good practice guidance on maintaining project histories allows scope for project team leaders to interpret it and decide what best meets the needs of their project depending on its size, complexity and nature. The format and content are not mandated and, frankly, the problems with the Nimrod MRA4 project are about the most well-documented of any major procurement programme we have.