Flags: Public Buildings

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. I will do my best to do justice to this very important subject in the very short time I have. I begin, of course, by congratulating the hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) on securing this important debate, and on what was a thoughtful and passionate speech about an issue he has cared about for many years. I join him in thanking the flag institution, the College of Arms.

Flag flying is a very British way of showing joy and pride as regions, as communities and as a nation. It brings people together to express shared identities. The Union flag is the primary symbol of our nation and rightly takes central position in flag flying as a source of unity. It appears on the flags of many of the UK’s overseas territories and our fellow Commonwealth members. The Union flag is a joint expression of our history, our national identity and the UK’s place in the wider world. I was especially struck by its importance and meaning when I attended the Liberation Day event in Jersey on 9 May, to which the hon. Gentleman referred. I know he takes a really keen interest in that subject. Of course, that event marked 80 years to the day that the islands were liberated from Nazi occupation, with a re-enactment carried out by Force 135, the British liberating force of 1945, supported by the Royal Marines. It included the raising of the Union flag, as it occurred on Liberation Day on 9 May 1945.

In Wales and Scotland, flag flying on public buildings is a devolved matter. In Northern Ireland, the issue is subject to special regulations set out by Ministers at the Northern Ireland Office.

The Government support state and ceremonial events by helping London look its best for occasions, such as the recent commemoration of VE Day and Remembrance Sunday each year. They often involve flying flags on some of the most highly visible public buildings and spaces in the country. Every year, we adorn the Mall, Horse Guards Parade and Parliament Square with flags for state visits, trooping the colour and other occasions, visible to thousands of people each day. The Cenotaph is the public space where flag flying is at its most sensitive and poignant. It is the national war memorial and focal point for public mourning. Last month, to mark the 80th anniversary of victory in Europe, the Cenotaph was draped in two large Union flags, emulating the way in which it was first revealed to the public in 1920. As I am sure that Members would agree, the results were spectacular.

In addition to the events described, the Government take an active role in promoting public flag flying across Britain. We disseminate an annual list of designated days on which all UK Government buildings are required to fly the Union flag. That ensures that it is flown on some of our nation’s important cultural occasions, including to mark Remembrance Sunday and the anniversary of the King’s accession.

The Union flag has its origin as a royal flag, developed first in 1606 by James I and added to in 1801. For much of its early history, it was flown solely above royal residences, aboard naval vessels and in other specific circumstances. By the 1920s, the practice of flying the flag had been formalised into the list of designated days—such as the sovereign’s birthday, or anniversary of the coronation—on which Government buildings, in addition to royal properties, were expected to fly the flag each year. As a legacy of that practice, until 2008 Government buildings were expected to fly the Union flag only on specific dates. That was consulted on following the 2007 Green Paper entitled “The Governance of Britain”, which highlighted the importance of the Union flag and sought to broaden its use.

As a result, in 2008 the Labour Government, under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, allowed Government buildings to fly the Union flag on any day of the year, rather than solely on royal and ceremonial occasions. That was further expanded in 2021, at the decision of Ministers. Since then, Government buildings have been not only allowed but actively and formally encouraged to fly the Union flag every day. Consequently, more Union flags are now flying from Government buildings than ever before, actively fostering the sense of national unity and pride that we all value so highly. The hon. Member for Romford spoke movingly about the history of the flag flying over Parliament and the important change in 2010. Of course, another important Government duty regarding public flag flying is that in times of national mourning or tragedy, instructions are issued to require the half-masting of the Union flag on UK Government buildings.

The approach taken by Departments to flying flags more generally on their buildings has evolved organically over the last 15 to 20 years under successive Governments. With the approval of Ministers in government at the time, Departments have, in addition to the Union flag, increasingly flown other flags to show support for causes in Britain and throughout the world. For instance, many people will have seen on the way here the Armed Forces Day flag flying proudly from buildings along Whitehall in preparation for the day itself, which is this Saturday. I began this week by attending the flag-raising ceremony at Barnsley town hall to see our Armed Forces Day flag raised and flown as we pay tribute this week to our brave service personnel ahead of Armed Forces Day on Saturday 28 June.

I know that the hon. Member for Romford has long encouraged the Government to fly the flags of the British overseas territories and Crown dependencies to recognise their importance, and I am pleased that although they were not frequently flown in the past, that has become more common. Hon. Members will be aware that those flags are currently flying in Parliament Square, alongside the flags of Commonwealth nations along Horse Guards, and Union flags along the Mall. This is since the 80th anniversary commemorations of VE Day in May, and with the upcoming state visit by President Macron of France, they will continue to fly.

The practice of Departments flying the Pride flag, which the hon. Gentleman referred to, or other LGBTQ+ representative flags, has increased since March 2014, when the Cabinet Office flew the six-stripe rainbow flag to mark the first same-sex weddings taking place in Britain. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, said at the time:

“Raising the rainbow flag on Whitehall is a small symbol to celebrate a massive achievement.” 

After that, more Departments have chosen to fly it. That does come from a conscious decision of the elected Government of the day, but I want to acknowledge that over time the Government approach to decision making for flag flying from Government buildings and the implementation of central guidance have developed organically, following the policies of successive Governments. That has enabled individual Government buildings to select and fly flags whose meaning is rooted in their Department’s specific remit, or that have particular significance.

Although the Government’s primary duty in relation to flag flying from Government buildings is to celebrate and encourage the Union flag as a symbol of the UK as a whole, we are working with officials to consider whether further central guidance to Departments regarding flag flying may be helpful to ensure that decisions and implementation by Departments are as consistent and transparent as possible. That would mirror the approach taken at local level. In the time that I have left, I want to echo the hon. Gentleman’s comments on historic counties and how local decision makers do know best.

In relation to Government buildings, we acknowledge that the individual processes for decisions on flags will vary and could benefit from further accountability and transparency. I am a very passionate believer in the Union flag. I have it displayed in both my offices—here in Westminster and in the constituency. One of my formative memories is of drawing a St George’s flag to fly when England were in the semi-finals of Euro ’96, although sadly it did not have the desired effect. And as Minister for VE and victory over Japan commemorations, I have been encouraging local communities to display Union flag bunting as part of local events. I know the joy that it brings to many.

Flag flying on public buildings is an emotive subject, and we respect the strongly held views of people across the country who want to see it represent our unique strengths as communities, regions and a nation. I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Romford for bringing to the House this important debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Enterprise Act 2002 (Mergers Involving Newspaper Enterprises and Foreign Powers) Regulations 2025

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Wednesday 18th June 2025 General Committees

[The Chair]

Before we start, I take this opportunity to wish my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East a happy birthday—I can think of no finer way of celebrating. Members, including those on the Front Bench, may remove their jackets, if they wish to do so.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Enterprise Act 2002 (Mergers Involving Newspaper Enterprises and Foreign Powers) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I also begin by wishing the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East, happy birthday. These regulations were laid before the House, in draft, on 15 May. This Government are clear in our commitment to a free and pluralistic media where all citizens, in all parts of the UK, can access high-quality news and other information from a range of sources, enabling them to form their own opinions. The public’s continued access to diverse news, views and information is fundamental to the health of our democracy and wellbeing as a nation.

It is therefore vital that the UK has in place strong measures ensuring that foreign states, whether allies or foes, cannot control or influence UK newspapers or news periodicals. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 amended the Enterprise Act 2002, creating a new foreign state influence merger control regime for UK newspapers and news periodicals.

The changes were introduced by the previous Government in response to concerns raised by Parliament about gaps in the UK’s media merger regime. There was wide cross-party support for the principle that all foreign states, including long-standing allies, should not be able to control or influence the policy of UK newspapers or news periodicals. The question on the level of acceptable thresholds for investments made by state-owned investors was not settled, which is of course why we are here today, and these regulations will address that issue.

State-owned investors include sovereign wealth funds and public pension or social security schemes that make long-term investments on behalf of states. In many cases, these are operated at arm’s length. They are global investors, holding interests in a wide range of UK and international companies and businesses. The previous Government consulted on proposals to create exceptions for passive investments made by state-owned investors using powers contained in the amendments to the 2002 Act. These included a complex cap on investments held by state-owned investors, which was set at 5% of shareholdings, but at 10% if the state-owned investor held shares in a UK newspaper indirectly as part of a diverse business.

We have looked carefully at the responses to the consultation. In particular, we have paid close regard to the views of UK newspaper groups. They are concerned that the level of threshold settled on by the previous Government was drawn too tightly and could have a detrimental impact on their ability to raise investment funding that they may need to support future sustainability. In coming to a final view, we have had to carefully weigh up a number of things. First, there is the need for strong measures, which is what Parliament intended when, with Labour party support, it passed the amendments, creating the foreign state influence regime. Secondly, there are the concerns about the unintended effects of the exception regulations, such as risking a chilling effect on investment in the UK newspaper industry.

Having considered that, we have decided to set the threshold for state-owned investment at 15% of shares or voting rights in a newspaper or news magazine, where this is a passive investment. In our view, this is an effective, simple and proportionate approach. The 15% threshold is below the level where the Competition and Markets Authority typically believes that material influence may arise. It is also well below the 25% level, which is the lowest trigger point for mandatory notifications under the National Security and Investment Act 2021.

The changes we have made to the thresholds carefully balance the need for strong protections from foreign state influence, with the need for UK newspapers and news magazines to have access to a range of investment. The changes will also avoid the need for the Secretary of State to refer low levels of investment by state-owned investors to the Competition and Markets Authority where there is no likelihood at all of foreign state influence, such as where state-owned investors acquire shares in newspaper groups that are part of listed companies.

The regulations will, as the previous Government proposed and as permitted by the 2002 Act, come into force with retrospective effect on 13 March 2024. There are three important considerations that relate to the 15% threshold that are relevant to the Committee’s deliberations. First, state-owned investors acting on behalf of foreign powers can benefit from the exception only if the investment is a passive one. The legislation will not permit state-owned investors to acquire rights to directly, or indirectly, appoint directors or other officers of the company, or any rights to direct, control or influence the policy or activities of a UK newspaper.

If the Secretary of State has grounds for suspecting that a state-owned investor has secured, or will secure, the right to direct, control or influence a UK newspaper, they must ask the Competition and Markets Authority to review the case. If the Competition and Markets Authority concludes that the transaction has resulted, or will result, in a foreign state acquiring control or influence, the Secretary of State must take action to unwind the transaction or block such a transaction. The four-month time limit for the Secretary of State to intervene in a completed merger will start running from the point at which facts about whether there is foreign state influence come to light. This means that action can be taken years after the transaction is completed, if relevant information was concealed beforehand, which will act as an important deterrent.

Finally, the legislation includes specific provisions for joint arrangements. These state that if a foreign power and other entities—potentially other foreign powers—own shares in a UK newspaper as part of a joint arrangement, each party is considered to hold the combined shares or voting rights of all. If these provisions applied to a joint arrangement between state-owned investors from different countries, and the total of the state-owned investors’ combined shares or voting rights in a newspaper exceeds 15%, the Secretary of State would again be required to take action.

Our policy intention has always been to prevent any foreign state influence over the affairs and policies of UK newspapers and news periodicals. Although a remote risk, we acknowledge that, in some circumstances, different state-owned investors from different states could, in theory, each acquire up to 15% of a UK newspaper enterprise. They would then be able to organise arrangements so that each was treated as a passive investor with no ability, at least on paper, to influence a newspaper in any way, but still collectively own the majority of the enterprise.

As explained, there are measures in the legislation that mean that the Secretary of State must refer a merger to the Competition and Markets Authority if they suspect that there is a joint arrangement of this kind, and the combined holding of shares or voting rights of the parties to the arrangement exceeds the 15% limit. The Secretary of State is also able to consider the range of relevant public interest considerations in the core media merger regime provided by the 2002 Act.

We also recognise the strong views expressed by Members, and in the other place, that the issue should be put beyond doubt. I can therefore confirm to the Committee that the Government intend to lay, in draft, a second statutory instrument in the autumn to amend the foreign state investment exemptions to put the issue beyond doubt. We have chosen not to withdraw the regulations before us today due to the pressing need to have the main foreign state investment exemptions in place as soon as possible. It is important in order to give UK newspapers and potential investors greater certainty about the overall regime. We will, however, publish a draft of the secondary statutory instrument for consultation by 16 July. This approach will allow time for the detailed provisions to be considered and ensure that the drafting does not create unintended consequences. The second statutory instrument would also be subject to the affirmative procedure, requiring review and approval by Parliament.

I stress that the UK has a strong track record for encouraging investment critical to growth within the media industry. These regulations ensure that the foreign state influence regime operates in a way that minimises the burden for UK newspapers while strengthening the robust regulatory framework that protects press freedom and free speech. Accordingly, I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

This has been an important and interesting debate and I am grateful for the contributions by the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. The debate has shown the wide support across the House for stronger measures to protect UK newspapers and news periodicals. It also highlights the challenge in setting exceptions in a way that balances Parliament’s desires against the legitimate concerns about the ability of UK newspapers to raise investment if restrictions are set too tightly.

Government need to balance the importance of creating certainty and sustainability for our newspaper industry with the need to protect against the risk of foreign state influence by setting a clear threshold for exceptions within the regime at 15%. We believe that we have done that effectively. Safeguards in the legislation will prevent multiple states each investing up to 15% via state-owned investors from acquiring control or influence over the policy of a newspaper enterprise, whether acting alone or in a joint arrangement. We have listened to the concerns, however, and have committed—I commit to this again now—to further legislation to put this beyond any doubt.

To respond to the points made, we have reached a final position on thresholds due to the concerns expressed by newspaper groups about the unintended effects of the strict threshold proposed by the previous Government. We have considered those points, and we agree with the concerns to reset the level of the threshold, which is still below the level at which material influence generally arises in merger cases. The change balances the need to protect our press from foreign state influence against sufficient flexibility to support inward investment by newspaper groups that poses no risk of foreign influence or control.

I will endeavour to follow up on that letter from the shadow Secretary of State. On the question on new powers from the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East, there is now a duty for the Secretary of State to report to the Competition and Markets Authority if there are any concerns or uncertainty. Also, the “state-owned investor” definition will include public pension funds if they satisfy the conditions for eligibility in the legislation. I am happy to continue the conversation with Members from across the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee.

The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop.

The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years.

We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly.

In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.

I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute.

These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that.

The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships.

Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me.

As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it.

Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less.

Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed.

The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop.

We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period. The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period.

Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time.

That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test. The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered.

There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 58 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 57 sets out a basic set of conditions that must be met for a league to be allowed to apply to the regulator and request that the backstop be triggered. The regulator cannot unilaterally trigger the backstop process; it must receive an application from one of the leagues under clause 57. This clause sets out that a regulated league can apply to trigger the process if there are unresolved issues between it and another league in relation to the distribution of relevant revenue. We discussed the definition of relevant revenue when we debated clause 56.

For a league to apply to trigger the backstop, at least one of the four conditions outlined in clause 57 must be met. Those four conditions are as follows: no distribution agreement is in place between the relevant leagues; there has been a material reduction in the amount of relevant revenue received by a relevant league since the last distribution agreement was reached; there has been a material change in circumstances in relation to the relevant revenue received by one or both relevant leagues since the last distribution agreement was reached; and at least five years have passed since the last distribution agreement between the relevant leagues came into force.

Each of the conditions is designed to mitigate a specific risk to the sustainability of the pyramid. Those are a complete absence of any distribution deal; a reduction in distributed revenue; a significant change in the circumstances surrounding distributions; and an old deal no longer fit for purpose but unable to be refreshed because the industry cannot agree. The conditions set an appropriate framework for when a league can apply to trigger the process. They help to avoid vexatious applications or fishing expeditions when a perfectly good, up-to-date industry deal is already in place. That is why clause 57 should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 specifies procedural steps and requirements. The applicant league has to comply with those for its application to trigger the backstop to be valid. Before making an application, the league must first notify the other relevant league and the regulator of its intention. That prevents either league from being blindsided by the process being triggered. The notice must list the issues in dispute, explain why one of the relevant conditions in clause 57 is met, and invite representations from the other specified competition organiser. That act, in and of itself, may help to trigger useful discussion between the leagues, as clearly outlining the issues preventing an agreement from moving forward will bring the leagues closer to compromise. After the other relevant league has had a chance to make any representations, the applicant league may apply to the regulator to trigger the process. It must include the other league’s representations with its application. That ensures that the regulator has the information that it needs from both leagues, so that it can make a considered decision on whether to trigger the backstop. The exchange of representations is also an early opportunity for the leagues to come to an agreement themselves, before the process is triggered. Ultimately, this clause is about creating transparency and promoting dialogue, which sets the tone for the rest of the backstop process.

Clauses 57 and 58 together outline the requirements that must be met for a league to apply to trigger the backstop process. The requirements in clauses 57 and 58 are just the first hurdle that a league has to clear in order for the regulator to consider its application. In order to actually trigger the backstop the regulator then has to assess whether the application meets certain legal tests set out in clause 59, which we will discuss further in a later group. I beg to move that clauses 57 and 58 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Applications under section 57: procedural and other requirements

Amendments made: 30, in clause 58, page 48, line 7, at end insert—

“(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which it is intended the application will relate,”

This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which it is intended the application will relate.

Amendment 31, in clause 58, page 48, line 8, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.

This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate.

Amendment 32, in clause 58, page 48, line 12, leave out paragraph (c)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 30.

Amendment 33, in clause 58, page 48, line 22, at end insert—

“(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which the application relates,”

This amendment provides that an application under clause 57 must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which the application relates.

Amendment 34, in clause 58, page 48, line 23, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.

This amendment provides that the application under clause 57 must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate.

Amendment 35, in clause 58, page 48, line 27, leave out paragraph (c)—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.

Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Decisions by the IFR on applications under section 57

Amendments made: 36, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, leave out “the qualifying football season or seasons” and insert “one or more of the questions for resolution”.

This amendment provides that the IFR must decide whether the resolution process should be triggered in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution to which the application under clause 57 relates.

Amendment 37, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, after “relates” insert “(or a modified version of one or more of those questions)”.

This amendment provides that the IFR may decide that the resolution process should be triggered in relation to a modified version of one or more of the questions for resolution set out in the application under clause 57.

Amendment 38, in clause 59, page 48, line 36, leave out “qualifying football season” and insert “question or questions for resolution”.

This amendment provides that the IFR must be satisfied that the conditions in clause 59(2) are met before deciding to trigger the process in relation to a question or questions for resolution.

Amendment 39, in clause 59, page 48, line 38, leave out “that season” and insert “each season to which the question relates or the questions relate”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 40, in clause 59, page 48, line 41, after “triggered” insert “in relation to the question or questions for resolution”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 59, page 49, line 1, after “(c)” insert

“has exercised any of the IFR’s other functions under this Act in order to resolve the question or questions for resolution and such question or questions remain unresolved, or”.

It is a pleasure to be here with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy. I will pass this over to the Minister. This is just an attempt to slightly clarify and strengthen the role of the regulator and the point of intervention. It would be helpful to see how this fits in with the way that the Minister has reconfigured the clause with her amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We will discuss clause 59 in more detail in the next group. It sets out the tests that must be met for the regulator to justify accepting a league application so that it can then trigger the backstop. The amendment adds to clause 59 to give the regulator an additional basis on which to justify triggering. It could accept an application to trigger the backstop if it has tried and failed to resolve the disputed distribution issues using its other regulatory functions. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the amendment is not necessary. Clause 59 already allows the regulator to accept an application to trigger if it considers that its other functions would not be able to resolve the disputed issues in a reasonable timeframe. That appropriately covers the scenario set out in my hon. Friend’s amendment.

If the regulator has already tried and failed to resolve a distribution issue using its other functions, that would be a reasonable basis for it to conclude that its other functions were not up to task. The existing test in clause 59 could then be met and an application trigger at the backstop could be accepted. It is important to clarify once again that the regulator would not be triggering the process itself. This is simply a clarification regarding a situation in which an application was submitted and the regulator had tried and failed to resolve the issue outlined previously using its other powers. In this situation the regulator would still have the discretion as to whether or not it triggered the process based on whether the application met the other high threshold. I hope this provides some reassurance. We will discuss this a little further in the next group.

[Mr Betts]

We are off to a good start this morning. I am 100% convinced that the Bill already does what I was seeking it to do. I hope we are 100% convinced on the other issues that we debate later on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 41, in clause 59, page 49, line 4, after “triggered” insert “in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 42, in clause 59, page 49, line 10, at end insert—

“(4A) Where the IFR is minded that the resolution process should be triggered, the IFR must consult the Football Association on the question or questions for resolution in relation to which it is minded to trigger the process.”

This amendment requires the IFR to consult the Football Association on the question or questions for resolution in relation to which it is minded to trigger the process.

Amendment 43, in clause 59, page 49, line 15, at end insert—

“(zi) the question or questions for resolution in relation to which the IFR is triggering the resolution process,”

This amendment provides that the notice under clause 59(5) must set out the question or questions for resolution in relation to which the IFR is triggering the resolution process.

Amendment 44, in clause 59, page 49, line 16, leave out “the resolution process relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.

This amendment provides that the notice under clause 59(5) must set out the qualifying football season or seasons to which the question or questions for resolution relate.

Amendment 45, in clause 59, page 49, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (ii)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.

Amendment 46, in clause 59, page 49, line 18, at end insert—

“(iia) how the IFR has taken account of any representations, copies of which accompanied the application under section 57 by virtue of section 58(5)(d), in setting out that question or those questions, and”

This amendment requires the IFR to set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b) how it has taken account of any representations when setting out the question or questions in relation to which it is triggering the resolution process.

Amendment 47, in clause 59, page 49, line 20, leave out “the question or questions for resolution” and insert “that question or those questions”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.

Amendment 48, in clause 59, page 49, line 21, at end insert—

“(5A) Where any of the questions for resolution set out in the notice differ from those to which the application made under section 57 relates, the notice must set out the extent of, and reasons for, those differences.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment requires the IFR to set out the extent of, and reasons for, any differences between the question or questions for resolution set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(ii) and the question or questions for resolution set out in an application under clause 57.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As we discussed on clauses 57 and 58, the backstop can be triggered only in response to an application by a league. Clause 59 sets out how the regulator will assess an application to trigger, how it will decide whether to trigger at all and how it will determine exactly which issues need to be resolved under the backstop. The backstop has been carefully designed to deliver the right outcomes with minimal regulatory involvement. As part of this, it has been designed to be used as a last resort. That is why this clause introduces high statutory thresholds that must be met in order for the backstop to be triggered.

In particular, the clause sets out that the regulator must have reasonable grounds to suspect that its ability to advance at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop were not triggered. The regulator must also consider whether other regulatory tools could be utilised to resolve the issues instead. The regulator must be satisfied that at least one of the conditions in clause 57—which we have already discussed —is met.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

The mediation stage

Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert

“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.

This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).

Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out

“the question or questions for resolution”

and insert

“that question or those questions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.

Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert

“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines.

A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience.

The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons. Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days.

We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 60, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 61

Final proposal stage

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 61, page 50, line 40, leave out

“require any final proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence”

and insert

“require any final proposal to—

(i) be accompanied by supporting evidence;

(ii) be consistent with the resolution of any relevant issues identified in the Regulator's most recently published State of the Game report;

(iii) give effect to the views of any relevant specified competition organiser which has not been invited pursuant to clause 61(4)(c) to submit to the committee a final proposal; and

(iv) advance the Regulator's objectives in section 6, consistent with its general duties and Regulatory principles in sections 7 and 8.”

This amendment would set additional requirements to accompany any final proposal for the resolution process.

This is quite an important issue, because it concerns the principle and basis on which the regulator comes to a decision. My amendment simply sets out certain things that the regulator must have regard to and take into account when making that decision.

First, there should be supporting evidence—that seems straightforward. Secondly, and importantly, we ought to keep anchoring what the regulator does back to the essence of this proposed legislation and the regulator’s purpose. Clause 6 very clearly sets out the regulator’s objectives of promoting the financial soundness of regulated clubs and the financial resilience of English football, and I think we can all agree that that is what the regulator should be doing and seeking to achieve.

Surely, therefore, when we are talking about the detail of how the regulator reaches a final decision on the backstop, we ought to be absolutely clear that it must have foremost in its mind those initial objectives. Otherwise, what is the point of the regulator and its objectives? Why are we in this Committee if not to address the financial soundness of clubs and English football as a whole?

My amendment mentions considering the views of others who may not be formal parts of the backstop mediation process. It provides that the regulator would not have to listen to them, but could

“give effect to the views”

of the Football Supporters’ Association, the Professional Footballers’ Association or others who may have views. Those groups would not determine what the regulator decides to do, but surely the regulator has to take account of their views.

I hope that the Minister gives serious consideration to at least making sure that, when reaching that final and absolutely crucial decision on financial distribution, the regulator’s aim should be to deal with the problems of the financial soundness of clubs and the overall financial soundness and wellbeing of English football.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. Although we are still keen for an industry deal on distributions, part of getting it right is ensuring that the regulator is best placed to act if needed. As the Government amendments that we are due to debate in the next two groups show, we have reflected on many of the same points. We think it is right that any distribution order shows how it aligns with the findings of the state of the game report and with the regulator’s objectives and duties, including the duty to have regard to its regulatory principles.

That is why Government new clauses 3 and 4, which amend the final stages of the backstop, already address these issues. We will discuss the new clauses in more detail shortly, but they clearly require that the regulator sets out any relevant findings from the state of the game report and that any league proposals include evidence about how they address those findings. They will also require that any order the regulator makes addresses the state of the game findings, and they highlight the importance of the regulator’s objectives and its general duties, including the regulatory principles.

I also make clear again that, after we set out the competitions in scope of the regime, the regulator’s objectives, namely to protect and promote the heritage and financial resilience and soundness of English football, will apply to the top five divisions of English men’s football. When creating a distributions order between any two leagues, the regulator must have due regard for the wider impact the order may have on all the clubs and leagues it regulates. The regulator must make an evidence-based decision that takes into account all relevant considerations, and its final decision must advance its objectives.

It is also important to clarify that, while the order will be limited in scope to the questions set out when the process is triggered, it will not be without context. Given the important role a satisfactory distributions order will play in the future of the entire sport, the regulator will need to come to a solution that works for all of football.

For those reasons, I cannot accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, but I hope that his concerns will be appropriately addressed by the Government amendments that we will debate shortly.

[Mr Betts]

I am pleased to see that the Minister actually read my amendment and formulated her new clauses accordingly. What she says is reassuring. As she just said, there is no point in the regulator doing a state of the game report unless it has regard to it when coming to a view about financial distribution. That is absolutely clear from what the Minister has said, and that is what the regulator must do. On the basis of those assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to debate Government new clause 3.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options.

We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime. I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy.

In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.

New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.

League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information.

That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.

[Mr French]

I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it.

The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 62

Distribution orders

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 62, page 51, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(c).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship Sir Jeremy. I remind the Committee of my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Unlike the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, I chose my tie with purpose this morning, to celebrate both the fact that this might be the last day of the Bill Committee and also events in Atlanta last night.

What we have seen is the thin end of the wedge. I am alive to the arguments about the disparity that parachute payments create in the overall economy of football. However, this Bill is undoubtedly the thin end of the wedge. It will come as no surprise to Members that I am a Conservative, and therefore I think the best form of regulator is competition. We all just ought to watch, because if the regulator has parachute payments within its purview, what is next? It will be agents’ fees, TV rights carve-ups, finishing position bonuses and cut prize money. Seeking to run football as some sort of socialist command economy will come unstuck. I put on record my concern that that is exactly what the Bill seeks to do.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The amendments deal with the final stage of the backstop mechanism. I will respond to the shadow Minister, and then I will respond to the wider debate, including to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East.

The final stage of the backstop mechanism is when, if the leagues have not been able to agree a complete deal themselves, the regulator will make an order to resolve whatever issues remain. That stage is set out in clause 62, and Members have tabled amendments relating to their concerns about the existing clause 62. The Government have tabled new clause 4, which would entirely replace clause 62, so the shadow Minister need no longer be troubled by many of the concerns he has set out. He was particularly bothered by clause 62(1)(c), but that will be taken out in its entirety. Our new clause 4 addresses many of the concerns reflected in hon. Members’ amendments, and I hope I can satisfy the Committee that new clause 4 is a positive change to the final stage of the backstop.

We should remember that by this stage of the backstop process the regulator will have assessed an application and representations from the leagues, set out the scope of the backstop by defining the questions of resolution, and highlighted the relevant findings in the state of the game report. The leagues will have been through mediation to resolve those questions. They will have been asked to exchange proposals to solve any questions outstanding after mediation, giving them another opportunity for compromise and negotiation.

New clause 4 sets out how the regulator will create a distribution order as a last resort if, after all those stages, the leagues cannot strike a deal. The regulator will first have 60 days to create a provisional order. We expect that during that period it will engage with the leagues as necessary to keep the process as collaborative as possible. Even at that stage, the regulator can continue to encourage an industry deal. Unlike the binary “winner takes all” model in clause 62, new clause 4 allows the regulator to design its order based on the evidence and drawing on any league proposals submitted.

The order the regulator designs must adhere to clear principles: it must not place an undue burden on league commercial interests; it must observe a delay before any reduction in parachute payments—I will address that in a moment; it must have regard to any duly submitted league proposals; and it must explain how it addresses relevant state of the game findings. The regulator’s objectives and general duties are paramount.

The leagues will then be able to submit representations on the provisional order. That feedback will help the regulator to shape an order that works for industry. The regulator will consider the representations and finalise all that into a full distributions order. That order will take into account any relevant issues raised by the state of the game report, the evidence that the regulator has gathered throughout the process, the engagement it has had with the leagues and any proposals they have submitted. The regulator will be best placed to design a solution that addresses the problems it identifies and delivers on its objectives.

If the backstop reaches that point, it is because the industry has failed to strike a deal, but we still want the solution to be as industry-led as possible. The regulator will be required to have due regard to the league proposals submitted. It can choose to directly lift aspects of the proposals into its order, but it is not required to adopt a league proposal wholesale. That is a slightly more flexible system that moves away from the inherent risk of a “winner takes all” model, and allows the regulator to carefully design a solution.

The model also allows for more evidence-based and data-driven decisions. It gives the regulator enough discretion to ensure that any order is as effective as possible in addressing the core financial issues facing the game. We are confident that the regulator, keeping in mind its objectives to promote sustainability and its duties to avoid adverse effects on growth and sporting competitiveness, can come to a balanced solution.

I thank everyone who has engaged meaningfully with this part of the Bill throughout its passage to help us to reach this version of the model. I am confident that the new approach is the right one. In light of that, I hope that Members will support the addition of new clause 4 and the consequential Government amendments in this group.

On the non-Government amendments, I will first address those tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and then those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. Opposition amendment 125 addresses the regulator’s ability to terminate the distribution process if it does not receive a viable proposal from either league, but Government new clause 4 already gives the regulator discretion to deal with that scenario. As I have said, under new clause 4, the regulator need not accept either league’s proposal wholesale. It can design its own solution, drawing on the league proposals as appropriate. We think that greatly increases the chances that the process will reach a satisfactory conclusion, and ensures that football will not go without a distribution deal. On that basis, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp]

The Minister said that just because the Bill enables the regulator to consider parachute payments, that does not mean that it will. The Minister is in the unique position of being the person who is going to appoint the football regulator, because the Secretary of State has stood down from that decision. Will the Minister ask the person selected to be the regulator whether they would like to exercise the power—whether “can” will mean “will”?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will discuss that in more detail in a moment, but I gently say to the hon. Member that it will not be a personal decision by the regulator; as we have discussed, the regulator will make a decision based on the findings of the state of the game report and will be guided by the regulatory principles. I do not want to get drawn into speculating whether they will or will not do that. We need the state of the game report to be done quickly, so that if the backstop is triggered, the regulator can consider the findings in the whole and make an informed decision.

On amendment 4, as the Government amendments show, the regulator will issue a notice that sets out the relevant findings of the state of the game report, which will need to be addressed by a distribution order, and the order must explain how it addresses those findings. We are absolutely aligned on the intention behind amendment 5. This exact change—to ensure that the regulator need not adopt league proposals wholesale but can instead design its own solution—is core to new clause 4.

Amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, seeks to shorten the transition period for parachute payments. While a timely distribution order is a priority, we must ensure that there are adequate protections for relegated clubs, to prevent a cliff edge. That is why the Bill guarantees that there can be no reduction at all in parachute payments, for an absolute minimum of one year from the end of the first season to which a distribution order applies. Shortening that period would give relegated clubs less time to plan financially, putting them at greater risk of financial trouble. That is, after all, the issue we are seeking to address through the legislation. I know that may not be the answer that my hon. Friend wants, but for those reasons I hope he will withdraw his amendments.

[Mr Betts]

I am still not quite sure how—given that all clubs now know that a regulator will be appointed, that the leagues and clubs know that financial distribution is at the heart of the Bill, and that a club can be promoted during the two-year period—any club can start preparing for that situation. At the beginning of that period, the club would not know whether it was going to get parachute payments, because it could be promoted and relegated in that period. I do not think the idea holds that two years gives certainty to clubs.

I am really worried about the idea of signalling, at this stage, that there will potentially be no change in financial distribution until the end of this Parliament. I do not know how far the Minister has thought that through, but if we want to encourage the Premier League and the EFL to sit down and reach an agreement—if that is the preferred way forward, and I think it is—surely the idea that the process can be extended by not reaching an agreement until beyond the next election is an incentive for the Premier League to do nothing. It is waiting for the pressure to come off, and the way to relieve it is simply to do nothing and hope that it goes away after the election.

Clearly, that pressure will go away if the Conservative party wins the election and implement a Bill with parachute payments not included in the regulator’s remit. That is what will happen. We were all elected to achieve change, and the change that most fans want to see is the addressing of the fundamental disparity within the English game that produces a cliff edge and all the problems in the Championship. We know how those problems need to be addressed: with the regulator’s powers in this excellent Bill. Why sit for two years after the regulator makes a decision and do nothing, when to give a year is fine?

The Minister has heard comments and concerns from hon. Friends today—Committee members who obviously have a great deal of interest in football in general and in their clubs in particular. Will she agree, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham asked, to take the matter away and give it further consideration? I do not want to push the Minister here and now on the words in my amendment, but I do want her to give an understanding that she recognises that there is a problem that needs to be addressed to satisfy her colleagues.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I assure my hon. Friend that I have thought about it carefully—that was a fair challenge. Indeed, when in opposition, I tabled an amendment to the previous Government’s Bill. I think we have very much strengthened the legislation by ensuring that parachute payments are in scope. We thought it odd to have a Bill on the financial sustainability of football without including them. That is why this Government have strengthened the Bill.

I completely acknowledge the strength of feeling on the matter. I say again that the regulator can consider it, but that does not necessarily mean that it will. It will need the evidence in the state of the game report. I appreciate and completely understand why hon. Members have shared examples from their own clubs, and are speculating on the impact of parachute payments, but that is not my role today. It is up to the state of the game report and the independent regulator to come to that decision, if the backstop is triggered.

[Mr Betts]

Would the Minister not therefore give the regulator a discretionary power to decide when it should be implemented, after either one year or two years? We will have a regulator who will be on top of the job and will have seen all the issues and evidence, in detail that we cannot see in Committee. Will the Minister consider giving flexibility and discretionary powers to the regulator?

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.

[Mr French]

Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment.

It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.

[Stephanie Peacock]

We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.

[Mr French]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3)—(Mr French.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. She has generally been very helpful in trying to acknowledge concerns when they have been raised, and in agreeing to have a look at them. I will not press my amendments to a vote at this stage, but I will bring them back on Report.

The Minister is entirely reasonable and open-minded on these matters, and has engaged in discussion on all sorts of things, but I worry that a handful of clubs in the Premier League are determining what happens with distribution orders, which is disappointing. I will return to this issue in due course, because I do not think the Minister’s approach on this clause has been how she has approached the rest of the Bill. I am disappointed, but I will not press my amendments to a vote.

Clause 62 disagreed to.

Clause 63

Duration and revocation of distribution orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.

Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr French]

I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc

Amendment made: 54, in clause 64, page 54, line 18, leave out “62(8)(b)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(10)(b)”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

For the backstop process to be viable as a regulatory solution, it needs to be legally enforceable. The clause sets out that, once the regulator has made a distribution order, it must keep the relevant leagues’ compliance with the order under review and monitor whether there is any need to take enforcement against the relevant leagues if they do not comply. Without this power, the sustainability issues that the backstop seeks to address will remain present.

Although constructive engagement with clubs will be the regulator’s default first step, the clause references its ability to take enforcement action, as outlined in part 8 of the Bill, to ensure that a distribution order is upheld. Furthermore, the clause allows the regulator to make rules on how costs associated with the backstop are to be paid. That could, for example, allow it to pass on the cost of mediation to the leagues. Finally, the clause also explicitly highlights the ability, at any stage, for the leagues to come to an alternative agreement.

It is important to reiterate that the distribution order is a last resort power, only to be used in cases where football cannot come to an agreement itself. If the leagues reach an agreement to resolve the issues in dispute before the backstop process concludes, the regulator will not impose an order. If they reach an agreement after the backstop has run its course, the regulator must revoke its order. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Power to require information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information.

Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime. The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime.

The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly. Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different.

As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

Reports on clubs by expert reporters

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively.

The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions. For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report.

The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.

We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Meaning of “relevant infringement”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedule 7.

Clause 68 stand part.

Government amendment 65.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 69 to 74 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

This group of clauses and schedules covers the meaning of “relevant infringement”, investigations into any relevant infringements, and the regulator’s investigatory powers.

Clause 67 explains the meaning of “relevant infringement” for the purposes of the Bill by reference to schedule 7. Relevant infringements are breaches of the requirements set out in the Bill and can be investigated and enforced by the regulator. Schedule 7 sets out the cases in which a relevant infringement is committed and the persons who can commit such an infringement, which could be a club or competition organiser, but also senior individuals at a club.

The fan-led review made it clear that it was vital that those in senior positions at clubs—those who make the damaging decisions that hurt clubs—were made subject to sanctions by the regulator. That is why we have ensured that the regulator may investigate and enforce on not only clubs and owners of clubs that may commit a relevant infringement, but officers and senior managers of the club.

In addition to the information offences, which we will debate in due course, the infringements in schedule 7 are a comprehensive and complete list of the possible non-compliance that might occur in relation to the Bill and the regulator’s regime. They include failure by a club to comply with a licence condition; failure by an owner to comply with a direction to cease to be an owner; and failure by competition organisers to comply with a distribution order.

The regulator may apply sanctions in response to a relevant infringement being committed, in accordance with the enforcement provisions in the Bill, but any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action by the regulator. A closed list of possible relevant infringements on the face of legislation provides up-front clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. It also clarifies the limits of the regulator’s enforcement regime.

Clause 68 gives the regulator the power to undertake an investigation if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant infringement has been committed. Powers of investigation are necessary to facilitate effective evidence-based enforcement. Such powers are commonly exercised by regulatory bodies across a wide range of industries. Any enforcement action the regulator takes must be based on sound evidence. The regulator does not need to carry out an investigation before taking enforcement action if it has sufficient evidence through other means. However, the regulator will need to be able to exercise investigatory powers in cases where it does not yet have sufficient evidence to decide whether to take action.

The specific investigatory powers of the regulator are set out in schedule 8. Like the general information-gathering powers in earlier clauses, the powers are exercisable only when the regulator opens an investigation into whether a person has committed a relevant infringement. The powers will enable the regulator to obtain the relevant information that it needs to look into suspected non-compliance with its regime. It has two investigatory powers: the power to ask questions of or interview any individual, and the power to enter business premises under a warrant issued by the courts or the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Those are proportionate powers that are common across other statutory regulators; for example, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and the Competition and Markets Authority all have similar investigatory powers.

Clause 68 also sets out important procedural requirements in respect of an investigation. Specifically, the regulator is required to give notice to a person under investigation explaining the matter being investigated.

Clause 69 sets out the potential outcomes of an investigation by the regulator. When investigating, the regulator must determine whether a relevant infringement has been committed and whether there is a reasonable excuse for doing so. The regulator can close an investigation by issuing a closure notice if no infringement is found to have taken place. The notice must clearly set out the regulator’s decision and the reasoning behind it. If the regulator decides that a relevant infringement has been committed, it can take enforcement action, which we will discuss in the next group.

Clause 70 enables the regulator to accept a commitment from a person under investigation in relation to their behaviour in certain circumstances. That means that, instead of carrying on with the investigation and potential enforcement action, the regulator is able to accept a binding commitment in lieu of the investigation. For example, a club could come forward during an investigation and offer to take certain action itself to rectify a possible infringement. The clause is intended to help facilitate a participative approach in place of formal investigation and enforcement. I want to reassure the Committee that a commitment is not a way that clubs can dodge scrutiny from the regulator, or reach settlements behind closed doors in order to avoid sanctions. The regulator is not obliged to accept a commitment and is still free to investigate different behaviour, even if a commitment is accepted.

Clause 71 is supplementary to clause 70 and sets out further detailed procedures for accepting, reviewing, varying and releasing a person from a commitment. It sets out safeguards, including to keep commitments under review to ensure that they remain effective, necessary and appropriate, as well as to issue notices when taking action on commitments, which may be published in the interest of transparency.

Clause 72 imposes a duty on persons to preserve information that may be relevant to an investigation. That means that a person who knows or suspects that an investigation is being conducted or is likely to be conducted must not destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information. As set out in schedule 9, which we will come to in the next group, failure to comply with the duty could be met by civil or criminal sanctions.

On clause 73, information is crucial to the work of the regulator. I have discussed the powers the regulator will have to obtain the information it needs. However, those powers will not cut across legal professional privilege. The confidentiality between professional legal advisers and their clients is an important protection and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with that. That is why the clause clearly sets out that the regulator cannot require any person to produce, generate or provide it with any privileged communications.

Transparency has always been a key principle when designing the regulatory regime. Clause 74 requires the regulator to publish certain notices related to investigations. The specific requirements in the clause build on the general regulatory principle of transparency in clause 8. Requiring notices to be published will enable transparency and clarity in respect of the regulator’s investigations.

Government amendment 65 to schedule 8 will ensure that the regulator can conduct investigations thoroughly and without imposing unnecessary burdens. At present, if the regulator obtains information when entering business premises under a warrant as part of an investigation, it can only keep that information for three months. On reflection, we think that is an unnecessary and arbitrary restriction. While the regulator must strive to carry out investigations promptly, we do not want the process to be curtailed artificially and risk affecting the quality or thoroughness of the investigation, nor do we want the regulator to be forced to burden clubs with repeat requests for the same information simply because the three-month deadline has passed. It is in the interests of all parties that the regulator follows best practice on the retention of information taken under warrant, including the Home Office powers of entry code of practice. This is why we tabled the amendment to remove the three-month timeframe. I urge the Committee to accept it.

[Mr French]

The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.

Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases?

Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources?

Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs?

Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied?

Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation?

Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions.

Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator.

Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation?

Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.

On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8

Investigatory powers

Amendment made: 65, in schedule 8, page 109, line 14, leave out “a period of three months” and insert “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment provides that information obtained by the IFR under a warrant may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 69 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75

Sanctions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 9.

Clauses 76 and 77 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Together, the clauses and schedule in this group cover the sanctions available to the regulator for a variety of infringements, and the procedure for taking enforcement action. Clause 75 sets out the enforcement actions that the regulator may take and the sanctions that it may impose, by reference to schedule 9. We expect that the regulator will seek to pre-empt and address instances of non-compliance through constructive engagement where possible, but that will not always be appropriate. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to reach for stronger and more direct tools, and gives it the mandate to use them boldly when necessary.

The range of sanctions set out in schedule 9—sanctions of varying type and severity—will help the regulator to deter any non-compliance with its requirements. In particular, they include “name and shame” censure statements, and financial penalties. Where relevant, these sanctions can be applied to individuals making the decisions at clubs, as well as or instead of the clubs themselves. This can act as a better deterrent and avoid indirectly hurting fans. The regulator will also have the ability to appoint a skilled person to a club where relevant, to help the club to return to compliance. This presents a less punitive and more assistive enforcement tool for certain circumstances that call for it.

Schedule 9 also provides for the ultimate sanction—suspension or revocation of an operating licence. That can apply to either a provisional or a full licence, but it has a very high threshold for use, in that one or more of the “aggravating conditions” specified in the schedule must be met. We do not expect the regulator to need to reach for this sanction, particularly given that it can target owners and officers at clubs first. However, it is a necessary part of a licensing system, and a deterrent for the most egregious behaviour—for example, the threat of clubs joining a prohibited breakaway competition.

Clause 76 requires the regulator to give a warning notice before it takes any enforcement action. This is common practice and ensures a transparent and fair process by providing early warning and an opportunity for the target to make representations. Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice once it has considered any representations received on the warning notice. The decision notice will set out whether the regulator has decided to take enforcement action and, if so, what that action is. As set out in clause 80, which we will debate in the coming groups, the regulator is obliged to publish warning and decision notices, to ensure complete transparency.

[Mr French]

Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them.

As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively?

Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified?

Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action?

I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts.

The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities?

The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made.

On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant. That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

Clauses 76 and 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant.

We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators. Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79

Urgent directions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 80 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives.

We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations. There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction.

Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact?

We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?

[Stephanie Peacock]

An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence.

A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Tenth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 66, 67, 68, 71, 69 and 72.

Schedule 10.

Clauses 82 and 83 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review.

Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation. That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system.

Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.

Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers.

Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews. The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review.

I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions. This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal.

Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.

Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority.

I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry.

How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.

[Mr French]

I am happy to receive a response in writing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10

Reviews

Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert

“to trigger, or not to trigger,”.

This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10.

Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22.

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30.

This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.

Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.

Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 85 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.

Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals.

The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own. That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market.

However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.

In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch.

The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 86

Disclosure of information by the IFR

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 87 to 89 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

This group of clauses relates to the disclosure of information both to and from the regulator. Clause 86 will enable the regulator to share relevant information with bodies within the industry and regulators that are dealing with similar and relevant issues. As well as allowing those bodies to benefit from the regulator’s knowledge and information, that should encourage those bodies to reciprocate by sharing relevant information they hold with the regulator. These two-way sharing relationships should help to establish an effective network of communication that strengthens the efficiency of regulation in the industry and across the economy.

Clause 87 concerns the disclosure of information to the regulator, for example by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. It also gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to enable other public authorities to share information with the regulator, if they do not already have the ability to do so. That will help to future-proof the regulator’s regime and ensure that it can obtain information from all the relevant bodies so that it can effectively deliver its functions.

Clause 88 sets out some restrictions and protections on the processing and disclosure of information by and to the regulator. That includes ensuring that a disclosure is in line with data protection legislation and does not prejudice the prevention, investigation or prosecution of a crime. It also prevents the disclosure of certain information, received from the National Crime Agency or HMRC, without their consent. This is to give those bodies confidence that sensitive information can be shared safely. The clause also permits the regulator to exclude information from disclosure that might significantly harm the legitimate personal or business interests of the person to whom the information relates. These are all important safeguards around the treatment of potentially sensitive information.

Finally, clause 89 creates criminal offences and penalties related to the safeguards for HMRC information set out in the previous clause. The penalties for these offences are commensurate with other regulatory regimes and are a proportionate but robust deterrent against the unlawful disclosure of information. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 87 to 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 90

Rules

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Bill provides a clear framework of powers and duties for the regulator to follow. In places, that is a detailed and prescriptive framework to direct and constrain the regulator’s regime more closely, but in other places there is greater room for the regulator to exercise discretion. That approach reflects regulatory best practice, which is to give the expert, independent and better informed regulator the flexibility to adapt regulations to the circumstances of different persons and to changing circumstances over time. Such flexibility will allow the regulator to be light touch where possible but intervene more strongly where necessary.

The ability for the regulator to make rules facilitates that approach. Rules will allow the regulator to fill in the technical and operational details of its regime within the framework afforded to it by this Bill. It could amend, replace or revoke those rules in future to adapt to developments in the market. The clause sets out some procedural safeguards around the making of rules and what these rules may do, including that the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. As outlined previously, this consultation is an important part of the participative approach that the regulator should take to make sure its regime works for the industry.

[Mr French]

Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91

Regulations

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 91, page 74, line 24, leave out subsection (3)(iii).

[Mr French]

Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law.

The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process.

Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions.

Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure.

Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament.

Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs.

That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football?

My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions.

This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles.

Such interference has one clear sanction:

“the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.”

As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational.

Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.

By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.

As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism.

However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power. The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been

“a material change of circumstances”.

Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

We cannot set something in stone and say, “That’s how it’s going to be forever.” Giving that bit of flexibility is right. I was talking to my friend Richard Caborn, who was a previous sports Minister, and he said to me that, when discussions first began about revenue within football, they were concentrated on the television rights to UK matches in the United Kingdom. It has since become apparent, of course, that it is the international rights that are the real driver of resources. That was not thought about when the first distribution was done.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend.

This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Opposition still have major concerns about the powers afforded to the Secretary of State and what we believe to be appropriate parliamentary oversight. We will press the amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 91 sets out the parameters and procedure around the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations under the various provisions of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Minor definitions etc

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 92, page 75, line 17, after “functions” insert

“or give rise to the perception that said person’s functions have been prejudicially affected, including (but not limited to) a situation in which a person is—

(a) employed by or engaged as a consultant by any specified competition organiser or any group undertaking of a specified competition organiser;

(b) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from a specified competition organiser;

(c) connected with a group undertaking of an organisation within the scope of part (ii);

(d) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from any of the organisations listed in parts (ii) or (iii); or

(e) connected (as defined in section 252 of the Companies Act 2006) with an individual within the scope of parts (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) of section 92(1).”

The amendment gives further detail to the definition of “conflict of interest” within this Bill.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Turner, hopefully for the last time—in this Committee, I mean. The amendment is simply trying to make the Bill a bit more specific about what “conflict of interest” might mean. I am sure that the Minister will tell me that the amendment is not quite right in its drafting and wording. Nevertheless, it is at least worth putting on the record that this is an important issue. Maybe we can obtain some clarification about what “conflict of interest” means in practice.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment.

As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.

We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that

“is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”.

I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.

[Mr French]

I am listening very carefully to the Minister’s definition of a conflict of interest. Does she believe that it should be applied to the new chair of the regulator, who has donated to the Labour party?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee.

Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 93 stand part. 

Schedule 11.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clauses 92 and 93 and schedule 11 relate to definitions. Clause 92 defines various terms used throughout the Bill that are not already defined elsewhere. Clause 93 refers to schedule 11, which lists where in the Bill to find definitions or explanations of terms that apply to multiple provisions—for example, “competition organiser,” “football season” and “regulated club.”

Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.  

Clause 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.  

Schedule 11

Index of defined terms

Amendment made: 73, in schedule 11, page 123, line 4, column 2, leave out “62(3)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(9)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Schedule 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 94

Pre-commencement consultation

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 94, page 76, line 14, leave out from “to” to end of line 15 and insert

“—

(a) a provision of this Act which requires the IFR to consult another person;

(b) the provision made by section 10(5)(a) and (b).”

This amendment includes the provision made by clause 10(5)(a) and (b) in clause 94.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 56 to 59.

[Stephanie Peacock]

These amendments relate to a simple administrative change to clause 94, the pre-commencement clause. Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent. That clause was added to ensure that the shadow regulator would be able to begin consultation on its functions, and that, if deemed appropriate by the regulator post Royal Assent, that consultation could be relied on, ensuring no unnecessary delays to the set-up and commencement of the regulator.

The change simply ensures that the clause captures the slightly different wording in the state of the game clause about the regulator inviting suggestions on the report. By making this change, we reduce the operational risk of the regulator not reporting its state of the game report as quickly as possible post Royal Assent, and therefore being up and running as soon as necessary.

Amendment 55 agreed to.

Amendments made: 56, in clause 94, page 76, line 18, leave out “carried out consultation” and insert “did anything”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 57, in clause 94, page 76, line 20, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 58, in clause 94, page 76, line 21, leave out

“consultation had been carried out”

and insert “thing had been done”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 59, in clause 94, page 76, line 23, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent, and for that consultation to satisfy the requirements placed on the regulator in legislation post Royal Assent.

Clause 94, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 95

Offences by officers of clubs and bodies corporate

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 95 makes sure that if a club is found to have committed certain offences under the Bill, such as falsifying or destroying information, the individuals responsible can be held criminally liable.

Question put and agreed to.  

Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 96

Review of Act

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

During Committee in the other place, Peers raised the importance of evaluating the impact, intended outcomes and success of the regulator. The Government absolutely agree that it is good practice for the impacts of regulation to be monitored and evaluated post-implementation. That is why we have added this clause, which will require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the operation of the Act and its impact on industry. That review must be completed no later than five years after the full commencement of the licensing regime.

[Mr French]

Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97

Payments into the Consolidated Fund

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 97 covers situations in which the regulator must return money to the Exchequer and requires the regulator to pay into the consolidated fund amounts received through the levy to recoup its set-up costs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 12.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.

[Mr French]

I have heard what the Minister just said. Can I clarify that the amendments would make the regulator FOI-able?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 99

Extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.

[Mr French]

I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will make that commitment.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Commencement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Bill provides for the majority of provisions to be brought into force by commencement regulations. Different provisions may be brought into force on different days, enabling the new regime to be brought into force in a structured and considered manner. The main exceptions to that are the provisions that establish the regulator and its governance structure. In addition, there are some basic initial functions that the regulator needs to stand up the regime, such as putting rules in place and preparing a state of the game report. These provisions will be brought into force on Royal Assent to enable the regulator to get on with the task of standing up the new regime without unnecessary delay.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Short title

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 101, page 80, line 11, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 101 concerns the short title of the Bill. It makes certain that, once it has passed through Parliament, the Football Governance Bill will be cited as the Football Governance Act 2025. Finally, Government amendment 60 is technical and procedural; it removes the privilege amendment inserted on Third Reading in the Lords to clause 101. This was added in the other place to make it clear that they have not infringed on the financial privileges of this House.

Amendment 60 agreed to.

Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 3

Proposal stage

“(1) This section applies where mediation under section 60 comes to an end by virtue of the occurrence of an event within section 60(6)(b), (c) or (d).

(2) As soon as reasonably practicable after the occurrence of the event, the IFR must give notice to the two specified competition organisers.

(3) A notice under subsection (2) must—

(a) set out the question or questions for resolution,

(b) specify the qualifying football season or seasons to which that question relates or those questions relate,

(c) set out any findings in the IFR’s most recent state of the game report that the IFR considers relevant to that question or those questions,

(d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to submit to the IFR and to each other a proposal as to how that question or those questions should be resolved,

(e) require any proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence (including evidence as to how the proposal addresses the findings set out under paragraph (c)),

(f) specify the day on or before which proposals are to be submitted.

(4) A question for resolution may be set out in a notice under subsection (2) only if it is the question, or one of the questions, for resolution remaining unresolved when the mediation mentioned in subsection (1) came to an end.

(5) Where a notice under subsection (2) sets out a question for resolution that relates to relegation revenue (within the meaning given by section (Distribution orders)(9)), the notice must require the specified competition organisers to explain in a proposal how the proposal will promote the financial sustainability of clubs which operate teams relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser distributing the relegation revenue.

(6) Subsection (7) applies if, on or before the day specified by virtue of subsection (3)(f), a specified competition organiser submits to the IFR a proposal which the IFR considers is not a qualifying proposal.

(7) The IFR may give both specified competition organisers a notice specifying a later day (falling not more than seven days after the end of the day specified by virtue of subsection (3)(f)) on or before which proposals are to be submitted.

(8) As soon as reasonably practicable after—

(a) the initial proposal deadline, or

(b) (if earlier) the day on which the IFR considers that both specified competition organisers have submitted qualifying proposals,

the IFR must give a notice under subsection (9) to the two specified competition organisers.

(9) A notice under this subsection must—

(a) state which of the two specified competition organisers (if any) has submitted a qualifying proposal before the initial proposal deadline,

(b) invite each such specified competition organiser to—

(i) confirm their proposal, or

(ii) make any permitted modifications to their proposal,

and submit the confirmed or modified proposal to the IFR and the other specified competition organiser, and

(c) specify the day on or before which the confirmed or modified proposal is to be submitted.

(10) The IFR may specify in a notice under subsection (2) or (9) the form and manner in which proposals and supporting evidence must be submitted.

(11) In this section—

(a) ‘the initial proposal deadline’ means—

(i) the day referred to in subsection (3)(f), or

(ii) where the IFR gives a notice under subsection (7), the day specified in the notice;

(b) a ‘qualifying proposal’ means a proposal which—

(i) explains how the question or questions for resolution should be resolved, and

(ii) complies with the requirements imposed by virtue of subsection (3)(e) and (5) (if applicable);

(c) a modification to a proposal is ‘permitted’ unless it results in the proposal no longer being a qualifying proposal.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This new clause substitutes clause 61 with a new clause providing for a revised procedure for the proposal stage of the resolution process.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

Distribution orders

“(1) This section applies where the IFR has given a notice under section (Proposal stage)(9).

(2) Before the end of the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the notice under section (Proposal stage)(9) was given, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice of the distribution order it proposes to make.

(3) The IFR may extend the period in subsection (2) by up to a further 14 days if it considers it appropriate to do so.

(4) A notice under subsection (2) must—

(a) give reasons for the proposed distribution order,

(b) explain how the proposed order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8),

(c) explain how the proposed order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c),

(d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to make representations about the proposed distribution order,

(e) specify the period within which such representations may be made, and

(f) specify the means by which they may be made,

and the IFR must have regard to any representations which are duly made.

(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(d) must be a period of not less than 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.

(6) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period specified under subsection (4)(d), the IFR must make an order requiring relevant revenue to be distributed in a way that the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(a) (a ‘distribution order’).

(7) In making a distribution order the IFR must—

(a) apply the principles mentioned in subsection (8), and

(b) have regard to any proposal submitted under section (Proposal stage)(9)(b).

See also section 7 (in particular the IFR’s general duty to exercise its functions in a way that advances one or more of its objectives and to have regard to various matters).

(8) The principles referred to in subsection (7)(a) are that—

(a) the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either specified competition organiser, and

(b) the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made.

(9) For the purposes of subsection (8)—

‘relegation revenue’ means revenue distributed by a specified competition organiser to a club in consequence of a team operated by the club being relegated from a specified competition organised by the specified competition organiser;

‘relevant period’, in relation to a distribution order, means the period of one year beginning with the final day of the first football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be distributed in pursuance of the order.

(10) A distribution order—

(a) must impose on the specified competition organisers such obligations as the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of securing compliance with the requirements set out in the order, and

(b) may, where a distribution agreement is in force between the specified competition organisers in relation to the same qualifying football season or seasons to which the order relates, provide for that agreement to have effect subject to provision contained in the order.

(11) At the same time as making a distribution order, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice—

(a) including a copy of the order,

(b) giving reasons for the order,

(c) explaining how the order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8),

(d) explaining how the order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c), and

(e) including information about the possible consequences under Part 8 of not complying with the order.

(12) The IFR must, as soon as reasonably practicable after making a distribution order, publish the order or a summary of the order.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This new clause substitutes clause 62 with a new clause providing that the IFR may make a distribution order that distributes relevant revenue in the way that the IFR considers most appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 7

Duty not to promote or engage in advertising and sponsorship related to gambling

“A regulated club or English football competition must not promote or engage in advertising or sponsorship related to gambling.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause prevents regulated clubs and competitions from promoting or engaging in gambling advertising or sponsorship.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. We are not calling for a ban on gambling with the new clause, but we are calling for a ban on advertising it through one of our most culturally powerful platforms. The new clause is a proportionate, evidence-led measure to break the link between football and gambling harm. When we consider that 70% of young people are aware of being exposed to gambling advertisements, is it any wonder, when these adverts are emblazoned on football team shirts and plastered on the side of every pitch for everyone to see?

Gambling firms spend a huge amount of money every year on advertising. They do not lack influence or reach. Gambling has much wider impacts than simply in the football stadium. Since 2011, gambling losses in the UK have risen by 80%, and new data from the Gambling Commission indicates that up to 2.5% of adults in Great Britain may be suffering from gambling harms. Football is unique in its reach and influence. Unlike alcohol and tobacco, gambling is still embedded in the game. Club sponsorships, half-time adverts and pundit discussions all feature it. If we do not act here, we send a message that profits matter more than people’s wellbeing. We understand that the Government think this is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is an important discussion for us to have in the context of anything to do with football.

[Max Wilkinson]

It is not about the money that this would take out of football, but the money that is taken out of the pockets of many football fans who are being exploited by predatory gambling companies every day.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. The Government are clear that, wherever gambling advertising and sponsorship appears, it must be socially responsible. The Government do not believe that the regulator should have a role in commercial matters such as sponsorship, which are rightly decisions for clubs and competition organisers. We must be wary of scope creep that sees the regulator straying into matters that should be reserved for the industry, and stepping on the toes of industry authorities such as the FA. What constitutes the promotion of gambling could be interpreted extremely broadly, with significant consequences for clubs, and sport more widely.

For instance, the new clause could be interpreted as meaning that players could not take part in competitions that had gambling sponsors. Clearly, that would have significant unintended consequences for clubs and the sport more widely. All major football bodies have published their joint gambling sponsorship code of conduct, which sets minimum standards for socially responsible gambling sponsorship within football. We are working closely with sporting bodies to review the implementation and impact of the codes of conduct to ensure that they have a meaningful impact. This review will provide key evidence to inform the most appropriate next steps for gambling sponsorship. The Premier League has already made the decision to ban front-of-shirt sponsorship by gambling firms by the end of next season.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the new clause, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

With new clauses 9 and 13, we are calling for an expansion of the crown jewels of sports broadcasting to ensure that key fixtures from the domestic football calendar are made available on free-to-air television. Members will have recently seen some of the coverage about dwindling viewership figures for this year on TNT and Sky. That should give us all cause for concern, particularly those who are involved in the finances of football. Specifically, we are calling for the free-to-air package to include 10 Premier League games a season, the League cup final, and the play-offs for the Championship, League One and League Two, in addition to those already free to air, such as the FA cup, World cup and the Euros.

This is not about undermining private broadcasters, but viewing figures are on the wane. We had a 17% drop in audience numbers last season. At the same time, there are signs that the value of Premier League broadcast rights has plateaued as more live games have been added to recent packages. This is an opportunity for broadcasters and leagues alike to innovate their offering. Our proposals could open the door to new forms of commercial engagement, such as sponsorship tied to mass viewership, broader brand exposure and appointment-to-view opportunities that bring in new audiences. That approach has worked elsewhere across Europe, most notably in La Liga, where one game a week is free to air, keeping the league accessible to all fans, regardless of their ability to pay.

Recent research shows that in general Premier League fans are more likely to come from lower-income backgrounds than those who regularly attend matches. The hon. Member for Spelthorne has referenced the eye-watering cost of his season ticket on a number of occasions in this Committee. For many supporters, attending games is unaffordable, and with the rising cost of living, stacking multiple sports subscriptions is out of reach for too many households. Increasing free-to-air coverage would not just make games more accessible; it would reignite national moments of the kind we see during the World cup or the Euros. Those moments build unity, inspire young people and renew grassroots interest in the game.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling new clauses 9 and 13, which concern the televising of football matches as listed events and free to air. First, I want to be clear that it is not an issue for the Bill or the regulator, but I would like to use this opportunity to set out the Government’s position on the issue.

The Government are keen to ensure that sporting events of national interest are made available to the public as widely as possible. In domestic football, the present arrangements under the listed events regime have protected key moments such as the FA cup final, while ensuring that the Premier League, EFL and FA are able to raise billions of pounds annually, which is invested back into the pyramid. We all want to see more matches being televised free to air, but that must be balanced against that investment, and not risk it.

As for the Bill, there have been strong voices from all sides that the regulator must have a tightly defined remit, and must not intervene in areas where it is more appropriate for football authorities or others to lead. We agree with that, and I am sure the hon. Member will agree that the bar for statutory, regulatory intervention in any market should be very high. It would not be appropriate for the regulator to intervene in commercial decisions between the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. Decisions relating to the number of matches of specific competitions that are broadcast are determined through commercial negotiation and are subject to factors such as rights costs and scheduling considerations. Additionally, we do not feel it is right to expand the regulator’s remit by including it as a body that must be consulted on listed events.

Decisions relating to the coverage of certain sporting and other events of national interest are, again, a matter for the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. A widened regulatory remit considering broadcasting and commercial decisions would distract from the key responsibility of the regulator and widen the scope of the Bill. The regulator will ensure that there are financially viable clubs for fans to watch, both at their grounds and on television. For those reasons, I am unable to support the hon. Member’s new clause.

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 10

Fan representation: mandatory golden share

“(1) A licensed club must, as a condition of holding a licence under section 15, issue a non-transferable golden share to a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan organisation.

(2) The golden share must confer on its holder the right to veto any proposal by the club to—

(a) relocate the club’s home ground outside its current local authority area,

(b) change the club’s name,

(c) materially alter the club’s primary colours or badge, or

(d) enter into or withdraw from any competition not sanctioned by The Football Association, the Premier League, or the English Football League.

(3) A licensed club must—

(a) consult the holder of the golden share on any material changes to the club’s ownership, governance, or strategic direction,

(b) provide the holder with access to relevant financial and governance information reasonably required to fulfil its function, and

(c) facilitate structured and regular engagement between the club and the holder of the golden share.

(4) The Regulator must monitor compliance with this section and may—

(a) issue guidance to clubs and Supporters’ Trusts on the operation of the golden share,

(b) impose licence conditions or financial penalties for non-compliance, and

(c) take enforcement action where a club fails to uphold the rights associated with the golden share.

(5) In this section—

‘Supporters’ Trust’ means a formally constituted, democratic, not-for-profit organisation that is recognised by the Regulator as representing the interests of a club’s supporters;

‘golden share’ means a special share or equivalent legal instrument issued to a Supporters’ Trust, entitling its holder to the rights and protections described in this section.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would give fans a veto on club proposals, exercised through a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan body.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The Hull City example is one I am very familiar with. I call the Minister.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will respond to new clauses 10 and 21 together because they both relate to a “golden share”. The regulator will operate an advocacy-first approach, and the regulatory principles in clause 8 set out a collaborative approach, including with fans. Although we expect that the regulator will welcome any club that feels a golden share is the best approach for it, such an arrangement would require a significant restructure at the majority of clubs. The new clause would place a burden on clubs to make considerable changes, such as establishing a community benefit society if one does not already exist, and amending fundamental legal documents.

Instead, the regulator will give strong, irreversible legal protections to prevent damage to the most important aspects of the club. That will include regulatory protection for club heritage and stadium changes, as well as ensuring fan engagement. As we have discussed, clubs will be required to consult fans on key issues that are important to them. The Bill mandates fan consultation on a club’s strategic direction and business priorities, and on operational and match day issues, which specifically include ticket pricing and matters related to the club’s heritage. Such consultation, along with the protections on stadiums and key points of club heritage such as colours, emblem and name, ensure that fans are put at the heart of their clubs without the burdens that could, as I have just discussed, be associated with a golden share.

For those reasons, I am unable to support the new clause.

[The Chair]

I am afraid I reneged on my duty to call Mr Naish. I think I was too interested in the point about Hull City.

[James Naish]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I want to place it on the record that the Notts County supporters’ trust got in touch with me over the weekend, and it is very much sympathetic to new clause 10. The trust was set up in 2003 to save the club when it was in administration, and it has played an important role in saving the club from being wound up. It fully supports any improvements in supporter representation, and its representatives specifically noted that they would like to see at least one independent supporter director on the board of all professional clubs, which measure would push in the same type of direction as the new clause. I recognise what the Minister has just said, but I thank the supporters’ trust for getting in touch. I also recognise that, where trusts are in existence, they are doing excellent things for their clubs.

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend is a strong advocate for his constituency, and I am pleased that he has been able to represent his local fan trust. The Bill will require fan engagement at all clubs with the adequate and effective means in place to deliver the licensing requirement. The regime does allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at each club, based on what is best in each club’s specific circumstances. A supporter director was considered by the fan-led review and support for the concept was mixed. The review concluded that

“a fan director rarely delivers on fan expectations.”

Clubs are welcome to introduce any additional engagement strategy that they think will be of benefit to them and their fanbases. Many clubs have already responded to the fan-led review, made decisions to push themselves beyond the recommendations, and implemented fan engagement strategies that they think will work best for their club. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that case.

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 11

Protection of assets of regulated clubs

“(1) Where any of the following assets belong to a regulated club, the asset must not be removed from the club’s ownership or used as collateral for a secured loan—

(a) any stadium,

(b) any training facility,

(c) any trophies,

(d) any car park,

(e) any hotel.

(2) But subsection 1 does not apply to a car park or a hotel where—

(a) the regulated club can demonstrate to the IFR’s satisfaction that the asset is causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial sustainability, and

(b) the IFR has provided prior written approval for the disposal of the asset or the use of the asset as collateral.

(3) Where the current owner of a regulated club owns any asset listed in subsection (1)(a) to (c), the owner may not sell the club unless the owner has inserted the asset into the club’s ownership structure.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would ensure that the club assets listed above are recognised as the inalienable property of the club rather than the club’s owners.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We cannot claim to be reforming football unless we tackle one of its most dangerous long-term trends—the creeping financialisation and asset-stripping of clubs. The hon. Member for High Peak has mentioned this on a number of occasions; he has experienced it in his former role as chair of the RamsTrust. New clause 11 would introduce protections to ensure that core assets such as stadiums, training grounds, trophies and, in some cases, commercial properties like car parks and hotels, remain in the club’s ownership, where they belong. Specifically, the new clause would ensure that assets cannot be sold off or used as security for loans without the prior written approval of the regulator; that the regulator may give its approval only if the asset is demonstrably causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial health; and, critically, that if any of the assets are owned by another organisation rather than the club itself, they must be transferred back into the club’s ownership before any sale of the club can proceed.

The current system allows owners to move critical assets out of a club’s hands with little or no transparency. Once that happens, the club often faces high rent obligations to use its own stadium and training facilities, has weakened negotiating power in takeovers and insolvency, and potentially experiences a complete disconnection from its historical home. Derby County are not the only example of where that has happened. We think this concept is worth taking forward, and we hope the Government are listening.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. He and I have a shared aim to ensure that there are sufficient protections for home grounds and other assets. We have already discussed the issue of protections for home grounds, so I understand the intention behind the amendment. However, the Government do not believe that it is a proportionate measure. The amendment would place significant blocks on any action to alter the financial arrangements of a long list of assets, and would substantially interfere with the property rights of clubs.

Clubs should be able to exercise commercial discretion over the use of wider club-owned assets. For example, the sale or refinancing of assets can sometimes be an acceptable and prudent way of improving a club’s liquidity, if necessary, but the amendment would remove that ability. There are other measures in the legislation to protect against the mismanagement of club assets, including the financial regulation provisions, regulatory oversight of financial plans, and an enhanced owners and directors test to ensure that owners are best placed to be the custodians of a club.

Last Thursday, I set out my understanding that the regulator could prevent the sale of training grounds through the use of discretionary licence conditions. I want to clarify that the regulator cannot directly block the sale of a training ground through licence conditions, but, where appropriate, it can act to discourage a sale and to mitigate any harmful financial impacts of a sale. The regulator can only set discretionary licence conditions in a limited number of areas. As per clause 22, which we have debated already, the regulator can only impose financial discretionary licence conditions that relate to liquidity requirements, debt management and overall cost reductions.

However, the regulator does have the levers to take action to protect a club’s financial sustainability if there ever arises a scenario in which the club intends to sell its training ground. By selling a valuable asset, a club may weaken its balance sheet and increase its financial risk. If there was a problem, the regulator could require the club to take mitigating action. For example, it could place a liquidity requirement on the club. The regulator could also use its powers to discourage the club from selling its training ground in the first place—for example, by indicating that if the club were to sell its training ground, the regulator would have no choice but to impose more significant financial restrictions on the club through discretionary conditions, thereby strongly steering the club away from that course of action. If that scenario were to arise because a bad actor sought to asset-strip the club, the regulator’s owners and directors test would kick in to remove that unsuitable custodian. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Cheltenham to withdraw the motion.

[Max Wilkinson]

I have heard what the Minister said. She seems to be implying that this issue can be dealt with by the Bill, and that the regulator will have an eye on these sorts of things. I am somewhat reassured, but I hope that when the regulator is introduced—and we hope it is introduced—it will be given a strong steer that it ought to make sure that the owners of clubs are not stripping assets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 12

Duty not to stage home matches outside United Kingdom without approval

“(1) A regulated club must not stage any home fixture in a competitive match at a venue outside the United Kingdom without the approval of the IFR.

(2) The IFR may only grant approval under subsection (1) if the fixture is not part of a specified competition.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a ‘home fixture’ means any fixture where the club is designated as the home team by the rules of the relevant competition.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would prevent a regulated club from staging a competitive home fixture outside of the United Kingdom. It will allow regulated clubs to stage non-competitive fixtures outside of the United Kingdom.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

The hon. Member makes an interesting point. The US has a franchise system, so every club can be moved wherever it wants. Someone who is an Oakland Raiders fan would probably also have been an LA Raiders fan. Where else did the Raiders play? There was definitely a third place, at least, in my lifetime, because clubs regularly move around the nation. When there is that franchise problem in America, hardcore elements of a National Football League club campaign against their club moving, and then campaign for it to move back to that city. The LA Raiders are a case in point.

That link between clubs and communities has already been severed in America, so it is less of a concern that the Jacksonville Jaguars are effectively now London’s team. London has taken that club to its heart, just as people across the UK have taken many other NFL and American sports teams to their heart. The hon. Member raises an interesting point, but I am not sure there is a direct comparison.

We risk getting to that point where some English and Welsh football teams go abroad—although Merthyr Tydfil might like the idea of going on tour, if they get up to the level of league where they are regulated. We need to ensure that we do not get into the position where our teams go on tour around the world to play competitive Premier League games. That would clearly be a gross betrayal of what we hold dear as football fans.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling this new clause. I know this is an incredibly important issue for many fans, and I am grateful to be able to address it today, after a number of Members made contributions. FIFA is currently reviewing its position on overseas league matches. It has committed to looking at how that may impact supporters as well as players, along with a number of other valuable considerations.

We appreciate this is an extremely important issue for fans and we do not want to see any developments that undermine the heritage or integrity of the game. It is crucial that fans are consulted and that their view is taken into account on any proposals that would take matches away from the local community in which they usually play.

The Government have spoken about this issue to the FA, which has a right to veto any such future proposals. It has assured us that it agrees that fans’ views must be taken into account when considering this important issue. To be clear, the Bill already ensures that by giving the regulator the power to ensure that clubs consult with their fans on operational and match day issues. We have not tried to list everything that might be considered a match day issue in the Bill, but let me be clear that moving matches abroad would be an operational and match day issue. Fully licensed clubs must have mechanisms in place to adequately and effectively consult their fans about this issue and they must take fans’ views into account when making decisions about it.

Given the importance of this developing issue, the Government will remain in conversation with the relevant governing bodies to ensure that fans’ voices continue to be heard. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

[Max Wilkinson]

Hon. Members are all waiting for it—this was going to be the moment that we were going to force a vote, but given that the Minister has put on record the fact that this will be considered an operational and match day issue for the regulator, so fans must be consulted on it and would probably have a veto, we are content that we do not need to press the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17 

Impact on regulator of changes in Government administration

“If the Department for Culture Media and Sport is abolished, or its functions in relation to football substantially relocated, the Government must automatically review the suitability of the continuation of the IFR and the impact that the abolition or relocation will have on the IFR.”—(Mr French.)

This new clause would require the Government to review the IFR in the instance that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were abolished, or its functions substantially altered.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause suggests that if DCMS were to be abolished, or if football were to be moved out of the Department’s portfolio, that should trigger a review of the regulator. A machinery of government change should have no bearing on whether there is continued need for an independent regulator established by Parliament. Just because circumstances in the sponsoring Department change, that does not mean that the regulator should be subject to a review. Machinery of government changes are common; we saw several of them under the previous Government. We do, however, believe that the regulator should be assessed and reviewed at the right time, as part of important monitoring and evaluation of the regulation.

[Max Wilkinson]

Were DCMS to be abolished, which Department does she think the regulator would end up reporting into?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I could not possibly speculate on such a hypothetical question.

I will say that clause 96, which we have already debated, mandates a review of the Act within five years of the licensing regime being fully commenced. Among other things, the review will look into whether the regulator has been effectively achieving its objectives, or whether those objectives might be better achieved in a different way. There are also other ways in which the regulator can be scrutinised and held to account by Parliament, such as through Select Committee hearings. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause. There has been a lot of debate in the House, including in Committee and in the other place, about letters received from UEFA. There have been particular concerns that the Bill and the regulator should not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and there is a strong feeling that we must not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions through this legislation.

Let me be clear again that the regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert an undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will simply not allow it to do so. That is why both UEFA and the FA have confirmed that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. Indeed, the FA is on the record as supporting the regulator’s introduction.

The new clause would require the publication of all future UEFA and FIFA correspondence received by the regulator or the Government, or correspondence relating to the regulator. Requiring private communications to be made public would serve only to discourage honest and frank conversations with key stakeholders, and would thus stand in the way of constructive relationships with UEFA and FIFA. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling this new clause and all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions. I gently say to him that I think that his claims to end binge drinking would probably be scope creep.

This is a very serious issue. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the legislation in question is owned by the Home Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right that this is a challenging issue, but I recognise that it is important and I will therefore raise it with my ministerial counterparts in the Home Office.

I hope the shadow Minister will appreciate that, as we have made clear throughout the Committee, the Bill seeks to ensure that football clubs are sustainable. It would not be appropriate for the Government to agree to review legislation about alcohol at football matches in the context of this Bill, given the significant public order implications, but I will reflect the comments from across the Committee to my counterparts in the Home Office. On that basis, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.

[Mr French]

I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different.

The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for his new clause. Player welfare is an incredibly important issue, and as we have discussed previously in this Committee, I agree that the welfare of footballers should be safeguarded. But the regulator will have a precise focus on financial regulation, corporate governance, fan engagement and heritage. It will be focused only on the market failures that the industry cannot itself address. The regulator has not been designed to address sporting issues such as player welfare or equipped with the relevant powers and duties. The safety, wellbeing and welfare of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount, and that is why we have committed to looking further at those issues. While it is not appropriate for this Bill, I am fully aware of the importance of prioritising player welfare and ensuring that former players and their families have the support they need.

National governing bodies are responsible for the regulation of their sports, and for ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to protect participants from harm, including head injuries. They are, of course, independent of Government, but the Government expect national governing bodies to make the health and safety of players their top priority. The Secretary of State and I recently met with a small group of affected family members and ex-footballers, including individuals associated with Football Families for Justice, to discuss player safety and welfare for those suffering from dementia. We heard at first hand players’ experiences and the views of groups on how safety and welfare at all levels of the sport could be improved.

On neurodegenerative diseases, we are considering what is required, including how to support football to come together and address the problems raised. We are committed to supporting the families and the football authorities to come together to address the issues raised, and our officials are in the process of arranging meetings to explore that further.

The number of games that footballers play each season is a matter for competition organisers and the Professional Footballers’ Association. It would not be right for the regulator to become involved in those matters, which are not ultimately about the sustainability of clubs.

Before I finish, I commit to writing to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East on ground safety, and to taking that issue away to investigate, as he asks.

[Lincoln Jopp]

The Minister said that the regulator’s purview is the financial sustainability of clubs, but that that was not in any way related to the number of games that teams play in a single season. Surely they are directly related, because clubs will be tempted to thrash their players in order to generate revenues from television and gate receipts?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is a match day issue. I direct the hon. Gentleman and the rest of the Committee to the regulatory principles, which we changed under this Government to explicitly reference players. We think that that is an important change. I am afraid I cannot support the new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players.

While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dillon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 22 relates to a consultation on changes to kick-off times. For football fans across the country, last-minute changes to suit TV schedules have a direct impact on their plans for that sporting event, whether having to procure a hotel because they cannot get home from the game as public transport is not running, or having to change their whole plan and maybe resell their ticket. The 2025 FA cup final had a kick-off time of 4.30 pm, and in the year Wigan beat Man City it was a 5 pm kick-off time. The last train to leave for Manchester from London is at 9.01 pm. So if the FA cup final this year had gone to extra time and penalties, fans would not have been able to make that last train back home to Manchester. As a Manchester United fan, I am not one for protecting City fans, but it just seems ludicrous that for the 2025 FA cup final, the BBC wanted to keep the kick-off at 3 pm because it had Eurovision later that night to schedule and ITV wanted a 5.30 pm kick-off because it knew that would increase its revenue. Both clubs were consulted, the broadcasters were consulted, but the fans were not. This clause seeks for the regulator to have a role in adjudicating on kick-off times.

Listening to the Minister in response to other amendments, I was concerned she may consider ruling out this clause out because it affects commercial activity and broadcasters. I am now hoping it falls under the purview of operational and match day issues, and the regulator will have power to intervene.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Government do not believe that it is appropriate for the regulator to intervene in the sporting calendar, including interfering with match day timings. This clause would widen the scope to cover on-pitch decisions, which is something we wish to avoid. However, I am aware of the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised regarding the impact timings can have on fans. There may be consequential issues such as match day travel and club communication with fans that would be captured by “operational and match day issues” as one of the relevant matters for fan consultation discussed in our debate on part 5. In most cases, however, the kick-off time itself is not always an issue that club have enough control on to adequately consult fans and respond to opinion. To mandate them to do so could therefore be problematic. It is well within the gift of the leagues and the governing bodies to address concerns surrounding kick-off times, and the Government remain in conversation with stakeholders to ensure that fans are engaged properly by those bodies on this issue. For these reasons, I cannot accept the new clause.

[Mr Dillon]

I am disappointed in the Minister’s response. I think it is a crucial aspect. However, noting the numbers in the room, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Duty to create emergency fund

(1) As a condition of purchase of a regulated club the new owner may, if required by the IFR, pay an amount equal to the club's quarterly forecast expenditure into an emergency fund (referred to in this section as “the fund”).

(2) Withdrawals cannot be made from the fund while the person who deposited the fund is the owner of the club.

(3) When a club’s quarterly forecast expenditure increases the owner must increase their deposit into the fund to match the increased forecast.

(4) If an owner does not update the fund to match an increase in the club’s quarterly forecast expenditure the IFR may suspend the regulated club’s operating licence until such time as the required deposit into the fund has been made.

(5) When a club files for insolvency the owner abrogates all claim to the fund and the fund may be accessed to pay club salaries and day to day running costs.

(6) When the owner who deposited the fund sells the club they may withdraw the fund but the fund must first be used to repay any debts accrued during the time period they were the owner.”—(Mr Dillon.)

This new clause gives the IFR an option to require new club owners to establish an emergency fund to provide for club operational costs such as player and staff wages in an emergency scenario.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Dillon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause introduces a duty to create an emergency fund if the regulator has concerns over the financial resources of a particular owner. If a player is not paid for two consecutive months, then under FIFA regulations they have the ability to terminate their contract with 14 days’ notice. However, that still means they are out of pocket. We know that there are real consequences from players not being paid, such as the contract termination that they may go through, the player and the fans having a loss of confidence in that club, and of course financial distress to individuals not paid. Clubs can have point deductions if they do not play players on time and registration embargoes as well. However, that still does not address the issue of the player and staff not being paid. As recently as March this year, the team of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, Sheffield Wednesday, did not pay its players on time. This is a live issue that we see season in, season out. An emergency fund would mean that players could have recourse to be paid on time.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. While I understand the intent of adding this provision and creating an emergency fund, we have been clear that this is not a zero-failure system. Clubs can and do go into administration for many reasons, sometimes beyond their control. This regime tries to minimise the likelihood of that happening and gives them the best chance of being a going concern football club. This means that there is an assumption that a club will continue operating and meet its obligations for the foreseeable future

However, I reassure the hon. Member that the Bill’s strengthened statutory tests on the new prospective owners, as we discussed in the debate on part of 4 of the Bill, will work to deliver the intent behind the new clause. At the point of entry, prospective owners will be required to pass the financial plans and resources test. This will demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to run the club and have considered things such as the estimated running cost. This will help mitigate against any future need for an emergency fund.

On an ongoing basis, if a club is exhibiting an unsustainable level of risk, the financial regulation regime allows for specific discretionary licence conditions, which we discussed when debating part 3 of the Bill, to be put on clubs. Those conditions can relate to debt management, liquidity requirements and restricting the club’s overall expenditure. This is a far more proportionate approach to managing the risk of insolvency, rather than requiring owners to hold money that could be invested into the club to be used by default. This is likely to impact on levels of investment in the game. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

[Mr Dillon]

I thank the Minister for her response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 25

Youth and community projects: duty on the IFR

“(1) The IFR must take steps to encourage regulated clubs to invest in youth and community projects.

(2) The IFR must, in pursuance of the duty in subsection (1), at least once a year report on the extent to which each regulated club has invested in youth and community projects.”—(Mr Dillon.)

This new clause requires the Independent Football Regulator to take steps to encourage clubs to invest in youth and community projects, including through annual publication of a progress report.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Dillon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Many clubs already have excellent community outreach programmes and foundations with which they support their local communities. This is a simple new clause that just seeks the regulator’s ability to report on those involvements. I suspect that it would not push any existing club into having to engage, because I believe that they already engage with their communities. It is more about capturing that and selling to the wider public the benefits from the investment that football clubs make in their communities.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. Football clubs are instrumental in fostering more active and resilient communities. By harnessing the power of sport, this community outreach work promotes social cohesion, improves public health and makes a positive impact on people’s lives. The Government recognise and support the contributions of many clubs in helping to strengthen communities and get more people active, in line with the Government’s own priorities.

That is why we made an amendment to corporate governance provisions in the other place. This addition was explicitly to include a club’s contribution to the economic and social wellbeing of the local community within the definition of corporate governance in the Bill, and so require clubs to report on these contributions as part of the corporate governance statement. This reflects that football clubs are more important to their communities than a typical local business. This reporting could include, for example, whether a club has invested in youth and community projects, and we would expect any club that does so to report on it as part of its corporate governance statement.

I am afraid that I disagree the regulator should be required to encourage a specific type of community investment. As we discussed when debating schedule 5, the Bill is deliberately not prescriptive when it comes to corporate governance. That gives the regulator flexibility to write its code in consultation with the industry, and it gives clubs flexibility to explain how they are applying that code. This is about encouraging best practice and greater transparency around the operations and activities of the club. This should steer all clubs toward better governance, without micro-managing how they are operated.

As we have been clear, the regulator cannot start mandating specific changes to a club’s corporate governance, such as quotas for board members. The same applies to community outreach. Of course, we recognise that it is important and should be encouraged, but we do not believe that it is appropriate to encourage a specific, prescriptive type of community action that all clubs should undertake. That is not in line with the approach that the Bill takes to corporate governance, and would not be in line with the light-touch approach to regulation that we all want to see. That is not to take away from the huge contribution that clubs make, and I take this as an opportunity once again to pay tribute to the Barnsley FC Community Trust.

[Mr Dillon]

I thank the Minister for her response, and welcome the recognition of clubs’ community work in the governance statements. The new clause would add a requirement around youth because, whether on literacy or childhood obesity, football clubs have a unique power to engage young people through their very presence as a shining example to look up to. However, I accept the Minister’s remarks, and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Stephanie Peacock]

On a point of order, Mr Turner. I thank all the Chairs who have presided over this Committee; as always, I am thankful for your guidance and support throughout the sittings. I thank all those who have contributed their views on the Bill, both in this iteration and the version that the previous Government introduced. A number of important stakeholders—players, clubs and many more—have shared their views and enabled us to bring forward the Bill that we see today. In particular, I thank the Premier League, the EFL, the National League, football clubs across the country and the Football Supporters’ Association. Their engagement has been vital, and I am grateful to them for working productively to ensure that the Bill takes steps towards a future where football can be enjoyed for generations to come.

I pay tribute to Dame Tracey Crouch, whose brilliant work on the fan-led review of football led to the introduction of the Bill. Her work and expertise have been invaluable, and I thank her for her dedication to making the game fairer. I also pay tribute to the officials in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, who have been working often very long hours on the preparations for Committee stage; I am grateful for all their help. I pay particular tribute to Adam, Ellen, Charlotte, Kaz, Lucy, Robbie, Conor, Matt, Beth, Leah, Kyle, Lewis, Comfort and Callum for their hard work on the Bill. I also thank those in my private office in the Department for their work to support me in taking the Bill through Committee as the Minister. My particular thanks go to Chris McAlister for all his work on this; the head of my office, Matthew Phillips; and of course Helen Elston. I also thank my parliamentary office, Millie, Karen and Anna, who supported me in opposition, when I was in the shadow Minister’s place.

I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions. It has been excellent to see such strong feeling in the debate. I know that Members have aimed to represent fans and their constituencies in the best possible way. I thank the Committee for such a lively and thoughtful debate throughout the sittings. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham North for keeping us all in check and on time; my opposite number, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup; and the hon. Member for Cheltenham. I also pay tribute to House officials, and thank them for their work to support us as elected representatives. The work that they do in this place is invaluable and I, like I am sure many other hon. Members, are incredibly grateful.

It has been an excellent debate, and I am proud that the Government have delivered on our manifesto commitment by finally bringing in the Bill. I conclude by quoting Dame Tracey Crouch’s last contribution in Committee. She spoke of

“the people who just go and watch the game because they love it and it is important to them deep inside their soul.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 23 May 2024; c. 246.]

It is for those people who love the game that we have proposed these measures. I believe that the Bill introduces much-needed changes that will protect football so that they can continue to enjoy it for generations to come. That is what we have delivered today.

[The Chair]

I, too, thank Dame Tracey Crouch for the work that she did in this House. I also thank His Majesty’s loyal Opposition and the Lib Dems for the constructive way in which this issue has been debated. I thank the learned Clerks for the help that they have given me, and all officials, including our wonderful Doorkeeper.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Draft Casinos (Gaming Machines and Mandatory Conditions) Regulations 2025

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2025 General Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I beg to move,

That this Committee has considered the draft Casinos (Gaming Machines and Mandatory Conditions) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. I am pleased to be speaking to these regulations, which were laid before the House, in draft, on 12 May 2025, and to be talking about this package of measures that will unlock additional investment up and down the country. I will set out the aims of this package, including the linked statutory instruments, how they will benefit the casino sector and what protections will be in place for consumers.

I begin by drawing the Committee’s attention to other linked statutory instruments that have been published in draft in parallel to the regulations being debated today. The other instruments are the Gambling Act 2005 (Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Order and the Gambling Act 2005 (Premises Licences and Provisional Statements) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Regulations. The Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions Order extends existing gaming machine entitlements for converted casinos, meaning those not licensed under the Gambling Act 2005. The regulations that we are debating introduce protections for converted casinos as a result of the extended entitlements and are consistent with the protections provided to casinos established under the 2005 Act.

The Premises Licences and Provisional Statements Regulations amend existing procedures so that a converted casino operator can apply to its licensing authority, usually its local authority, to vary its premises licence to enable it to exercise the extended entitlement. Together, these three statutory instruments will make a number of important changes to the legislative framework for land-based casinos.

While only one of these instruments is being debated today, the other two will follow the negative procedure and were published in draft on 12 May, the same day on which the regulations that we are debating were laid. Given the linkages between these regulations, that was done to provide proper transparency about the range of changes that we are proposing, and to allow for proper scrutiny. If the regulations that have been laid using the affirmative procedure are approved by Parliament, it is our intention to lay the remaining two instruments using the negative procedure so that all three would then come into force on the same day, 22 July 2025.

I now move on to our aims for these measures. The Government are focused on economic growth, and I believe that enabling a responsible gambling sector to grow is compatible with an even safer one. We acknowledge the difficulties that land-based gambling businesses, particularly casinos, have faced since the pandemic. We have already brought forward measures to improve consumer protections, including the introduction of stake limits for online slot games and establishing a statutory levy on gambling operators to fund research, prevention and treatment of gambling-related harm. Therefore, following a consideration of the best available evidence, the time is right now to proceed with a series of reforms for the land-based casino sector.

The gambling landscape has significantly changed since the legislative framework was updated under the Gambling Act 2005. It had not envisaged the rise of online gambling and the unlimited availability of gambling at any time. Given the rise of smartphones, we believe that restrictions on product availability in casinos are now less important for protecting customers than factors such as the product design and quality of monitoring. Casinos are an important part of our late-night economy, provide thousands of jobs and contribute millions of pounds every year to the UK’s tourism economy, but they have been stifled by excessively strict regulations that mean the vast majority of our casinos can offer only 20 gaming machines. That makes no sense in venues that can be thousands of square metres in size and accommodate thousands of people.

While these venues offer a variety of ways to entertain their customers, including bars, restaurants and table games, the current rules mean that people are queueing for machines at peak times, which can mean that customers extend gambling sessions out of fear of losing their place at machines, and casinos miss out on vital revenue. These restrictions, combined with a variety of headwinds for businesses, most notably the pandemic, have seen 17 casinos close since 2020 and a loss of over 750 jobs.

This package of measures will put the casino sector back on a sustainable footing. It will give converted casinos the option of increasing their gaming machine allowance from 20 to 80, if they are sufficiently large. That will align with the different licensing regimes, as small 2005 Act casinos are already allowed to offer 80 machines. For converted casinos that are not able to meet the size requirements to site 80 machines, a sliding scale will apply in line with their size. This will allow slightly smaller casinos to site between 25 and 75 machines in total.

We are already making changes to allow real event or sports betting to take place in all converted casinos. The current rules prohibit these casinos from offering that, whereas venues licensed under the 2005 Act are able to. The prohibition no longer makes any sense, because a casino customer can place a bet on their mobile phone while in the venue, but not with the casino itself. The change will allow converted casinos not only to offer a new gambling product, but to invest in other parts of their venues, such as sports bars, which would be a natural companion to a betting offer.

As the impact assessment sets out, we estimate that allowing a modest increase in gaming machines will make a significant difference for casino operators. We estimate that the changes will increase gross gambling yield by £53 million to £58 million each year once the new rules have bedded in. We also expect much wider benefits across the casino ecosystem. The new rules will provide a boost for gaming machine manufacturers, and we expect a number of venues to be modernised and refreshed. We also anticipate that this capital investment will be spread across the country, not just in London.

It is also important to outline the protections that will accompany any increases in gaming machines under the draft regulations. As I have said, the Government believe that a growing gambling sector is compatible with creating an even safer one. The draft regulations therefore set out a number of requirements concerning table gambling and non-gambling areas, which casinos will have to abide by to access the new entitlement. They are vital to ensuring that customers are offered a mixture of gambling and non-gambling opportunities when they visit a casino.

The strict requirements on how much space can be allocated to each activity mean that, even with an increase in the number of machines, casinos and their customers will not be overwhelmed by an electronic offering. It also means that table games, which are more sociable in nature, and spaces for bars, restaurants and other non-gambling activities will be continue to be central features of our modern casinos. That approach is fundamental to protecting customers and ensuring that casinos provide a wide range of entertainment.

We will also put protections in place for casinos that decide to offer betting. We will restrict the number of separate betting positions or self-service betting terminals that casinos can offer. Casinos licensed under the 2005 Act are limited to a maximum of 40 separate betting positions. We believe that a limit of 40 betting positions is appropriate for casinos with a gambling area of 500 square metres or more, and a lower limit will apply for smaller casinos. That will ensure that there remains a link between gambling space and betting terminals, so that the electronic offering in a casino does not overwhelm the live table offering.

These changes are in addition to the range of measures already in place in casinos. These venues offer substantial supervision and oversight of any player’s activity. A number of features on the machines themselves can also help players to keep track of their play and spending. I also highlight that it will be completely optional for casinos to take up the new entitlements. Operators can choose to stay within their existing allowances or seek to increase the number of machines that they offer.

In addition to the changes for converted casinos, I would like to mention the two changes that the instrument will make to small 2005 Act casinos. Small 2005 Act casinos are currently required to comply with a maximum machine to table ratio of 2:1. That means that for every table that is in use, the casino is permitted to offer a maximum of two gaming machines. This ratio will be updated from 2:1 to 5:1, in order to align small 2005 Act casinos with large 2005 Act casinos and prevent operators from having to provide tables for which there is no customer demand. Small 2005 Act casinos are also currently required to have a minimum table gaming area of 500 square metres. That will change to 250 square metres, amending an anomaly whereby the minimum gambling area and minimum table gaming area were required to be of the same size.

This is a sensible package of measures that will update the outdated restrictions that currently apply to land-based casinos. It strikes the right balance between supporting the sector to grow and ensuring that those who visit such venues will be protected from gambling-related harm. I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the Opposition spokesmen for their contributions. It has been an important debate and I am grateful to Members for their attendance today. It is clear that the official Opposition share our commitment to allowing this historic sector to thrive and to ensuring that those who want to gamble can continue to do so safely, while the public is protected from the risk of gambling-related harm. I appreciate the shadow Minister’s support; as he rightly pointed out, this process began under his Government.

I very much heard the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the Treasury. We continue to engage with the Treasury, and I encourage hon. Members to take part in the current consultation. He also touched on adult gaming centres, and I appreciate that a different approach has been taken to those. The Minister with responsibility for gambling has not ruled out the relevant changes to the 80:20 rule, but intends to look again at the matter later this year.

I simply have to disagree with the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire that the regulations represent a race to the bottom; we simply do not think they do. We think they have been improved and brought into the modern age, given the rise of online gambling, and support our land-based casino sector. Casinos are highly regulated environments and there is a significant amount of player supervision alongside a number of protections on gaming machines themselves. Importantly, the regulations contain a number of protections that will ensure that customers continue to be offered a range of gambling and non-gambling opportunities. That will help reduce the risk of harm. For those reasons, I hope that the Committee will support the regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 37, page 28, line 28, at end insert—

“(fa) whether the individual is a member of a proscribed organisation as per section (3) and schedule (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000.”

This amendment requires that IFR, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms Butler. I welcome all Committee members back for day four. Amendment 110, tabled in my name, requires this Government’s regulator, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Clause 37 sets out the framework under which the Government’s football regulator must assess whether an owner or officer of a football club meets the required standards of honesty, integrity and competence. This is an important part of the Bill. Football clubs are not like ordinary businesses, as we have discussed; they are institutions rooted in community, tradition and even national identity. Those who control them must be held to the highest standards and supporters quite rightly expect that clubs should be fit to uphold those responsibilities.

The Government’s regulator’s task in clause 37 is to ensure that persons in positions of influence over our national game are financially sound and professionally competent. However, the clause as currently drafted leaves the test for honesty and integrity open to interpretation—arguably too open. That is why we have tabled amendment 110, which provides a clear and unambiguous requirement that, in determining whether a person has the requisite honesty or integrity, the regulator must take into account whether that person is or has been a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Let me be clear: this is not about political views, past associations or guilt by implication, but about having a national minimum standard of moral fitness. It should be inconceivable that a person with demonstrable ties to a terrorist organisation could pass the fit and proper person test to own or operate a football club in this country. Football clubs are part of the fabric of British civil society. They are symbols of local pride and national values, and they have international reputations. To allow a person associated with a proscribed group, many of which pose active threats to our national security, public order and democratic way of life, to take a controlling interest in such an institution would be not only morally indefensible, but deeply dangerous.

This is not a hypothetical concern. We live in an increasingly globalised football economy and genuine questions have been raised in recent years about the sources of funding, ownership and political influence across the game. My amendment does not attempt to legislate morality in broad terms; it simply anchors the Government’s regulator’s assessment in existing law, specifically the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides a clear, publicly available list of proscribed organisations that Parliament has already determined pose an unacceptable risk to our way of life.

By incorporating that into clause 37, we do two things. First, we clarify the threshold for what constitutes a failure of the honesty and integrity test, giving both clubs and the regulator a clear reference point. Secondly, we send a signal to not just fans and communities here at home, but investors and foreign Governments abroad, that English football will not be compromised by individuals whose allegiances lie with organisations committed to violence, extremism or the subversion of our national interest.

Football is a global sport, but it must still reflect and uphold our national values. It is not alarmist or over-zealous to say that those who control our clubs must have a character as close to unimpeachable as possible. We are asking them not to be saints—unless, perhaps, they own Southampton FC—but to be the pillars of the community that we already expect them to be.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

That was so bad.

[Mr French]

I have woken everyone up there.

Clause 37 is an important safeguard, but without amendment 110, it lacks a clear and necessary line in the sand. Parliament has already determined that proscribed organisations represent a threat to public safety and national order. That same logic must apply here. I urge the Government to accept this modest but essential amendment and, in doing so, to help to ensure that our clubs are not just well run and financially sustainable, but led by people whose values are consistent with the country, communities and traditions that they are entrusted to serve.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I rise to add my support to the amendment that the shadow Minister discussed very well and clearly.

The point is that the list set out in clause 37(2)(a) to (f), which gives examples of things that would prevent a potential owner from having the requisite honesty and integrity to own a football club, is missing a provision about their being a member of a proscribed organisation such as a terrorist organisation. In football, which is the most international sport and which has very international ownership, it seems particularly sensible to have that provision.

I do not think a terrorist offence is captured by someone being

“convicted of a criminal offence”,

because, as we know, the Terrorism Act 2000 was put in place to introduce various provisions relating to terrorism where it had not necessarily been identified that a perpetrator had committed a criminal offence. The provision in the amendment would therefore be a fair addition to that list.

Of course, clause 37(2)(g) is a catch-all measure that refers to “such other matters”. Nevertheless, the point is that this matter is particularly important and we do not want to leave it to be swept up in a catch-all measure. Of course, if it is argued that it could be swept up in a catch-all measure such as clause 37(2)(g), why have the list in clause 37(2)(a) to (f) at all? I support the sensible and non-controversial amendment.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is a pleasure to serve once again under your chairship, Ms Butler. I echo the welcome back from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, to Committee members.

I will respond to amendment 110. I reassure the shadow Minister that the intent of his amendment is already achieved within the current drafting of clause 37, which lists the matters that the regulator must take into account when it conducts its owners and directors test. We will discuss that in more detail when we consider the next group of amendments, but I will summarise briefly now.

When assessing an owner or officer’s fitness, the regulator must have regard to any criminal convictions and proceedings, in particular those included in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. Membership of a proscribed organisation is an offence under the Terrorism Act 2000, and that offence is included in paragraph 2A of schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007.

The regulator will seek information and expertise from relevant organisations to help it to stay alive to both national and international concerns. The shadow regulator is already building a strong relationship with the National Crime Agency and law enforcement in general to ensure that the regulator is in a strong position to gather the information it needs.

I also reassure Members that the regulator and its staff will have the requisite measures and security clearance to be able to receive information relevant to their functions. Consequently, the current provisions in the Bill deliver the intent of the amendment. On that basis, I would be grateful if the shadow Minister would withdraw it.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments with regard to amendment 110, which I tabled. I have listened carefully to her arguments, but it is still unclear to those of us on this side of the Committee why consideration of the Terrorism Act 2000 was not included in the list of factors set out in clause 37. We believe that is an oversight and, consequently, that the clause lacks the clarity that the amendment seeks to deliver in the Bill and that those who refer to it will seek going forward—in other words, the regulator. We will therefore press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 37 lists the matters the regulator must take into account when it conducts an owners and directors test. That includes what it must consider when determining whether an individual is financially sound, has the requisite honesty and integrity and, for officers only, has the competence needed to do their role—ultimately, to determine whether they are suitable. The matters listed in the clause draw heavily on existing fit and proper person tests applied by other regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority and Bar Standards Board.

For financial soundness, the clause includes past bankruptcies and the financial situation of companies and other bodies they have been responsible for. For honesty and integrity, it includes an individual’s criminal history, legal cases they have been involved in, regulatory or disciplinary action, and whether they are banned from entering the UK or sanctioned by the UK Government. When assessing officers’ competency, it includes qualifications, experience and training.

Those factors are specified because they have a bearing on whether the owner or officer could have a significant detrimental impact on a club’s financial sustainability. That is why the legislation requires that they are taken into account when the regulator is considering someone’s suitability. Listing specific matters also provides greater clarity to the industry about what will be tested, and it constrains the regulator, as the matters listed in the clause are the only things it will take into account when considering their fitness. To future-proof the test, the regulator has the power to use its rules to add further matters it will take into account. That will ensure that the list of matters for fitness tests continues to be relevant over time.

Before using the power, the regulator must consult with the leagues. Suitability should be based purely on an impartial assessment of the individual’s fitness, their source of wealth, and their financial plans and resources. The Government have been clear that the independence of the regulator is vital, which is why they have removed the requirement for the regulator to have regard to His Majesty’s Government’s foreign and trade policy objectives when assessing an owner’s suitability. The clause will ensure that the test can be applied consistently and that it remains fair, transparent and robust and focused on whether the individual is a suitable person to own a football club.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Disqualification orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 39 to 42 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The financial distress experienced by some of English football’s most historic clubs was partly down to unsuitable owners and directors. As we have already discussed, the regulator will be able to conduct strengthened owners and directors tests to tackle that and to help to ensure that each club has suitable custodians. I previously set out what powers the Bill gives the regulator to disqualify a person it finds unsuitable, what happens when an individual is found unsuitable, how they can be removed, how they can be prevented from causing further harm to the club, and the tools the regulator needs to ensure the continued effective operation of the club.

Where the regulator finds someone to be unsuitable to be an owner or an officer at a particular club, clause 38 gives the regulator the power to disqualify that person from being an owner or an officer at any regulated club in the future. In order to ensure that sufficient protections are in place, relevant parties will be allowed to express their views before the regulator makes its decision. Once a decision has been made that takes those views into account, the regulator must publish a notice of that decision, including the rationale behind it. That will help to ensure that those key community assets have suitable custodians who run the club properly.

When the regulator finds an incumbent owner unsuitable, the regulator must begin the process of removing them from the club. Clause 39 therefore gives the regulator the power to direct an unsuitable owner to relinquish ownership of the club. This is the first step in removing an unsuitable owner. They are directed to leave by the regulator and given a deadline, but they have a chance to take steps to leave the club on their own terms before the regulator takes direct action to remove them. For instance, those steps could include selling their stake in the club.

To ensure that sufficient protections are in place, the regulator must consult the unsuitable owner, the relevant club and the relevant league before issuing the direction. If an owner does not comply with such a direction, the regulator can escalate to the next stage of making a removal order under clause 43, which we will discuss in the debate on the next group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Member for that valuable contribution and for telling us his experiences as a Derby fan. There are many examples that have been drawn on in various aspects of the Committee’s debates, and I suspect that there will be more going forward. Just to be clear, we are not seeking to press the provision to a Division. The point we are making is that we want the strongest owners and fittest people to run clubs, but we also want to ensure that the regulator is seen to be acting lawfully and in a balanced way at all times, to avoid any issues of impartiality. I understand the point the hon. Member makes, which is why I have always supported strengthening ownership tests, even in the previous Parliament.

We do not believe that exclusion based on reputational judgment or politics should come into these kinds of judgment. The Government must not forget that they are regulating not just football clubs, but people’s lives, reputations and livelihoods. That demands humility, caution and a presumption in favour of freedom and innocence, unless the case for restriction is absolutely clear and overwhelming. Where there is doubt, the Government’s regulator must not fill in the blanks with its own qualifications or prejudices.

The Opposition support the need for disqualification in serious cases, but we continue to press the Government to ensure that the clause is not open to abuse, and that football remains a competitive, plural and fair environment, rather than one policed by the regulator, acting as judge, jury and executioner in uncertain circumstances.

Clause 39 empowers the regulator to give a removal direction in requiring an unsuitable owner to take all reasonable steps to cease being an owner by the end of a specified period. The exception to this requirement is when an owner did not have prior regulatory approval, and the regulator can exercise its power to make an ownership removal order within three months, starting from the determination day. The clause requires the football regulator to inform the owner of the club and relevant competition organiser before giving a removal direction. It also requires the football regulator to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction.

It is because of powers such as these that the regulator must be seen as independent. If a Government regulator is to order the removal of incumbent owners, this could be seen by competition organisations as clear interference, which as we have discussed at length, and could cause many issues for English clubs, especially when competing in UEFA and FIFA competitions. I would be interested to hear some assurances from the Minister about how that might work in practice. If the Government’s regulator is to tell clubs that they must change ownership, how confident is the Minister that that will not breach the rules that we have discussed?

This goes back to a point I made in a previous sitting about something that is a theme of the clauses in this group. Giving the owner or officer of a club notice of a regulatory action that is coming will hopefully allow them the rights of representation and challenge, if they feel that they have been handled wrongfully, but it also opens up issues around insider information, particularly with regard to a club’s valuation. I suspect that all hon. Members appreciate that such a change, particularly at the top levels of ownership, will have a dramatic impact on the valuation of a club. We want to understand how the regulator will deal with that issue to ensure that insider dealing, in particular, does not become a widespread issue where the regulator is trying to enforce its actions, as provided for by these clauses. We want to understand how that will work in practice, to ensure that these clauses do not have unintended consequences.

Clause 40 empowers the regulator either to issue a removal direction to an unsuitable officer, requiring them to take all reasonable steps to cease being an officer by the end of a specified period, or to give such a direction to the relevant club, or both. It requires the independent football regulator to inform the owner, club, and relevant competition organiser before giving a removal direction. It also requires the IFR to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction. I have the same question about this clause as for the previous one: how will the risk of inside information be managed?

Clause 41 empowers the regulator to prohibit an unsuitable owner or officer from carrying out specified activities or exercising specific rights and/or to issue a direction to the club requiring it to ensure that the unsuitable owner or officer does not exercise specified activities or rights. The clause provides a non-exhaustive list of such activities and rights, including any right

“to vote on any matter relating to the…club’s activities”;

appointing, terminating or changing the terms of appointment or responsibilities of any officer or employee; changing the corporate structure; and undertaking any specified actions without obtaining prior approval from the independent regulator.

Clause 41 also requires the IFR to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction. Such action could seriously impair the ability of a club to function while it seeks a new owner or officers, as ordered by the regulator. As we all know, it takes a significant amount of time to find a new owner, and many may be deterred by perceived interference in English football, compared with other nations without a state regulator. Clause 41 may cause more damage to a football club than the owner, who the regulator cannot dismiss. How will the Minister ensure that the regulator uses these powers only if and when deemed strictly necessary?

Clause 42 relates to situations where directions under clause 41 would impede a club’s ability to operate effectively or comply with regulatory requirements. It empowers the IFR to temporarily appoint an officer to carry out a specified function, or redistribute functions among existing officers. It stipulates that those functions must be specified, must be for a specified amount of time, and can be revoked or varied by another order. It specifies that an interim officer is not subject to the duties and requirements placed on officers by the Bill. It also requires the IFR to notify the owner and club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction.

Clause 42 adds to the fear that the regulator could erode the independence of English clubs and how they operate. It empowers the regulator to effectively govern a club while seeking to remove unsuitable officers or owners. Given the time that it takes to find new ownership, that situation could last for a considerable period and cause massive issues on the pitch with regards to investment and transfers—as we discussed in a previous sitting—and how the club functions. It would also leave the regulator wide open to criticism if its actions lead to relegation, for example, for a particular club. Does the Minister think that there is a risk that such a club could be barred from international competitions—as I suggested earlier—or that the Government’s regulator could be left wide open to legal challenge if it directly impacts a club’s performance on the pitch, or its financial performance off the pitch while such considerations, or changes of ownership, take place?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for his points, to which I will respond briefly. There are no changes in the bit of the Bill that we are talking about compared with the previous Bill, other than—as I referenced in my previous contribution—the removal of the requirement for the regulator to

“have regard to the foreign and trade policy”

of the Government. We think that removal strengthens the independence of the regulator, and I reiterate that we do not have any concerns in relation to UEFA.

The shadow Minister asked some specific questions. There are no thresholds in the Bill, but the regulator will need to act fairly and proportionately. There are robust appeals processes through the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The shadow Minister made points about the publication of information. In order to ensure that sufficient protections are in place, relevant parties will be able to express their views before the regulator makes a decision. Once the decision is made, it will take these views into account, and the regulator must publish a notice of that decision, including the rationale behind it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 39 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Ownership removal orders

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 94, in clause 43, page 34, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) following the revocation by the IFR of the club’s operating licence under clause 19 or under paragraph 9 of Part 1 of Schedule 9.”

I am pleased to see you in the Chair again, Ms Butler; it is a pleasure to have you presiding over us. The amendment is fairly simple, and I hope the Minister will consider it. Clause 43 is quite an important clause, because it deals with the removal of ownership. Ownership, in the end, is of a private asset. A club is a public good for the fan base, but in the end, it is owned by an individual or a corporate entity. The clause provides the regulator with a power, not a duty, to remove owners in certain circumstances if appropriate. All my amendment would do is add the revocation of a club’s operating licence to the circumstances in which the regulator can act. In other words, if the club does not have an operating licence, should not that be a factor that allows, but not forces, the regulator to deal with the ownership of the club?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We have seen far too many examples of the damage that can be caused by unsuitable custodians of clubs, and that is why the Bill introduces a strengthened owners and directors test.

I believe that my hon. Friend hopes that the amendment will give reassurance to fans that, where a club fails to comply with regulation and loses its licence as a result, the regulator will be able to remove the owner. The aim is to hold those responsible to account. Let me reassure my hon. Friend that the regulator is already empowered to hold individuals to account for their actions. If the club’s non-compliance or its financial situation gives the regulator concern about the owner’s suitability, it can test them, and they could be failed on that basis. If they are found to be unsuitable, the regulator will have the power to remove them. That ability to isolate and remove unsuitable owners and officers should mean that a club never has to have its licence suspended or revoked on the basis of poor ownership. That means that a club’s fans should not have to suffer the consequences of bad leadership.

The revocation of a club’s licence is the very last resort. We hope the regulator will never have to do that, but I reassure my hon. Friend that if a club is so seriously and consistently non-compliant that the regulator has no choice but to revoke its licence, we would expect the regulator to consider very carefully whether any responsibility for that failure can be laid at the owner’s door, and if the owner is tested and found unsuitable, they can be removed on that basis. We believe that the Bill’s provisions are sufficient to protect fans and hold owners to account where necessary. We hope that they will ensure that a licence is never revoked.

[Lincoln Jopp]

If a club has lost its licence, has it not therefore been taken beyond the purview of the regulator? How is the regulator still empowered to pursue the owner?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will address that point in just a moment.

As a club’s licence is separate from its owners, the licence is held directly by the club itself, not its owners. The removal of an owner will not impact the club’s licence status. This ability to isolate and remove unsuitable and owners and officers should mean that a club never has to have its licence suspended or revoked because of its owner, which means that a club’s fans should not have to suffer the consequences of bad leadership.

We hope that a club losing its licence will be the very last resort, and an unsuitable owner will have to follow the removal order made by the regulator. It will be in the best interests of an unsuitable owner to sell their stake in a club before the regulator has to step in to force divestment and a sale at no minimum price. If the owner fails to comply with this order, the regulator will have enforcement powers that it can use to ensure compliance.

These powers will include a variety of sanctions against the individuals calling shots at the club and, where necessary, directly against the club itself. Where appropriate, the regulator will also be able to seek an injunction from the courts. Having this broad range of tools of escalating severity at its disposal will allow the regulator to take strong action as and when required. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Betts]

Sometimes the Minister has partially satisfied me with her responses; this time she has wholly satisfied me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 44 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As set out previously in the debate on clauses 38 to 42, the regulator will be able to direct an unsuitable owner to leave the club in a specified timeframe and to prohibit them from undertaking certain activities at the club in the interim. However, there is a risk that an unsuitable owner does not comply with these directions. For instance, they may refuse to leave the club or continue to use their position as an owner to damage the club. In these situations, the regulator will need sufficient powers to directly remove the unsuitable owner from the club. That is why clause 43 gives the regulator broad discretion in such cases.

The regulator can make an order containing such provision as the regulator considers appropriate to secure the unsuitable owner’s removal. For example, that could include appointing trustees, empowering the trustees to sell the club and requiring the unsuitable owner, or any other person, to comply with the trustees’ directions. However, the regulator can use this power only against unsuitable owners who have demonstrated that they are willing to flout regulatory requirements, or if they fail to comply with the directions that the regulator has made to protect the club from harm. As set out previously, in certain situations the regulator will have the power to make an ownership removal order containing whatever provision is appropriate to ensure that an unsuitable owner leaves a club.

To ensure that there are sufficient safeguards in place, clause 44 sets out the process that needs to be followed by the regulator. In particular, before issuing an ownership removal order, the regulator must publish a notice that it intends to issue the order and allow a period for interested parties to express their views. After this, the regulator must decide whether to make the order, and must publish a notice of its decision including its rationale. This helps to ensure that the views of those affected are taken into account in the decision-making process. Separately, the regulator may make rules requiring unsuitable owners to pay costs associated with an ownership removal order, such as costs incurred by a trustee appointed by an order. This power helps to ensure that the costs are borne by the unsuitable owner.

[Mr French]

Clauses 43 and 44 set out how ownership removal orders are to be made, and the legal consequences of non-compliance. Clause 43 matters hugely because it allows the regulator to force an individual to sell their ownership stake in a club. That is a serious and intrusive power, so we must ensure that it is used sparingly, lawfully and with robust safeguards. On process and fairness, we welcome the requirement in clause 44 to notify the person and allow representations to be made before an order is issued. However, is that enough? Will representations be meaningful, or will this just be a procedural tick-box exercise?

I have some questions for the Minister. Will the regulator be required to give full written reasons for the proposed removal? Will the owner have access to the evidence relied upon? Is there a statutory right of appeal or review, and if not, why? Secondly, on liability and legal exposure, clause 44(6) imposes the liability for costs incurred by non-compliance with an order on to an owner. What types of loss are envisaged for owners? Are they just financial, or reputational and contractual? Who decides whether a loss is caused by the non-compliance, and is causation clearly defined? Could this lead to vexatious or opportunistic claims in the future? How will this work with ownership groups, when there are multiple owners of a club?

On commercial realities, forcing the sale of a football club is not simple; in most cases, these are not liquid assets. The value depends on market conditions, the timing of the economy and sale, and obviously buyer availability and demand to purchase a football club. I therefore ask the Minister: will the regulator have a duty to ensure fair market value is preserved during a forced sale? What happens if the regulator’s actions or any delays cause the value of a club to fall? Could we see a situation where the regulator is frequently appearing in court on such claims? Fourthly, on the broader principle, the clause is in effect a power to force the sale of a privately-owned business. That is a major constitutional step. Property rights in this country matter, due process matters, and so does the rule of law. We need real safeguards, not just procedural gestures.

We want to keep football in safe hands, but the clause needs to be clearer, fairer and more restrained in its use. It must not give the regulator quasi-judicial power without necessary oversight of Parliament. That is not regulation; we believe it would be overreach. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on my questions.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I echo the shadow Minister’s comments about the power being used clearly, robustly and fairly. I think all of us on the Committee can agree that that is absolutely right. On his question about whether the reasons would have to be written, the regulator will have to give the owner enough reasons for its decision to enable them to understand why it has been taken. That has one of the strongest appeal routes in the Bill; it can go directly to the Competition Appeals Tribunal and be heard on its merits. We think there are robust protections in place here already.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Duty not to operate a team in relation to a prohibited competition

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause is the first in part 5 of the Bill, which deals with duties on clubs and competition organisers. It prevents all regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated in the previous 10 years from having a relevant team participate in a prohibited competition.

The European super league proposed in 2021 posed an existential threat to the English football pyramid. It was an attempt by a small number of clubs to set up a closed-shop league to benefit themselves at the expense of all other clubs and against the wishes of fans. Ultimately, the European super league was stopped by the sheer will of fans around the country and the then Government’s promise to consider legislation. However, the risk of a similar breakaway competition rearing its head in the future remains, which is why we are now bringing forward statutory protections.

The clause will prevent a regulated club, or a club that has been regulated in the previous 10 years, from entering a team into a competition that the regulator has prohibited. The extension to clubs regulated in the past 10 years will stop clubs circumventing the rules by withdrawing from existing competitions to join a new breakaway competition. Similar safeguards against circumvention are found in clauses 46 and 47, which require clubs to gain the approval of the regulator for the disposal of the home ground or the appointment of an administrator. I will speak to them later.

On clause 45, the regulator is expected to prohibit competitions on the basis of a predetermined, proportionate and transparent framework based on the prescribed factors set out in legislation. That will provide up-front clarity to the industry and mean that new competitions will not just be prohibited outright. That is important to ensure that the regulator does not unduly stand in the way of innovation in the market, such as when the old First Division became the Premier League in 1992.

The clause requires the regulator, when deciding whether to prohibit a competition, to consider several factors, including whether the competition is merit-based, operates on the basis of fair and open competition, jeopardises the suitability of English football’s existing competitions or the clubs in those competitions, or harms the heritage of English football. Football belongs to its fans, so the regulator will also determine and consider the views of fans in England and Wales before prohibiting a competition.

As the national governing body for football, the FA will be consulted before the regulator prohibits any competition, and the regulator will also consult anyone else it considers appropriate. For example, we might reasonably expect that to include other competition organisers, clubs and players who might have been involved in the competition that the regulator is considering prohibiting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp]

The hon. Member makes a pertinent point. As I said, the word “competition” seems to refer to the sort of flyaway league we have discussed; are one-off friendlies competitions under the terms of the Bill?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to Members for their contributions and will take their points in turn.

The clause applies both to existing and to new competitions. If any competition breaches the criteria, it can be prohibited, but matters such as scheduling are for competition organisers.

On shadow Minister’s points, we will come on to player welfare, to which we are all very sympathetic, just as we are sympathetic to the 3UP campaign, but it is outside the Bill’s scope and is for organisers. He asked some specific questions on the criteria; that will be for the regulator to determine. It is expected to do so based on a predetermined, proportionate, objective and transparent framework based on factors listed in the clause. For example, if a competition is not merit-based, jeopardises the sustainability of existing domestic competitions, and is not supported by the fans, we would expect it to be prohibited.

[Mr French]

My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne and the hon. Member for Newbury highlighted the issue of friendlies. The Minister has indicated that she will come to that, but I do think we need some clarity as to what that might look like in practice. The end-of-season competitions are normally internationally designed, and although they may be endorsed by UEFA or FIFA, they would breach some of the conditions under the definition the Minister just gave. We need clarity about how this will work, because we do not want to put English football on a collision course with international football.

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, of course we do not. I totally agree. I was coming to that point. As I understand it, friendlies would be out of scope, but I am happy to write to Committee members if they would like greater clarity.

We have discussed the appeals and representations several times. The relevant competition organiser will be given a period in which they can make representations. If the organiser has concerns about the regulator’s decision to prohibit the competition, it will be able to appeal the decision. As has been discussed, the organiser can also appeal to the competition appeal tribunal.

[Mr French]

I thank the Minister for those remarks. I suspect that a letter of clarity would be helpful for all Members. There is a risk that FIFA, or UEFA, as we have seen with the Nations League in recent years, looks to introduce a new competition, whether at club or international level, that would contradict the regulator. As we have spoken about at length, and as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East has described, the different governing bodies of UEFA and FIFA are often in competition with our national competitions. We have to ensure that clubs are not forced to choose between a licence in the English game and partaking in international competitions. We fear that could drive acceleration toward a breakaway league, rather than prevent one.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I completely appreciate the shadow Minister’s comments. As I said in my opening remarks, we do not ban all international competitions automatically. We are mindful of enabling innovation in the market. I am happy to supplement my comments with a letter to Committee members.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will come to amendment 83 later on.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling his amendments. Prior to speaking to them, I would like to let him know that I have raised his points on a similar issue—on assets of community value—with the Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris). I spoke to him following our Committee session on Tuesday, and he has committed to write to my hon. Friend as swiftly as possible, so I will follow up with him in a timely fashion.

Turning to my hon. Friend’s amendments, I hope I will be able to reassure him on the development of the reform. I understand the intention of his amendments, but I will explain why we intend to resist the changes to include specified properties. On extending the scope of clause 46 to include training grounds, among other properties, the legislation has carved out specific protections to safeguard home grounds against risky financial decisions or sales of the grounds. I will speak specifically to the mechanism of clause 46 and the approval process later, but the focus on the home ground is to reflect that it is often the most financially significant asset at the club. That does not mean that other assets such as training grounds or office space are not also important to the club, but that there is a specific consideration necessary for the home ground.

I understand that my hon. Friend’s amendments are likely in response to instances where owners have intended to asset strip or make reckless decisions. Members on the Committee have shared some examples, and we are all familiar with recent ones. I wish to reassure all that there are protections elsewhere in the Bill to safeguard against this. That includes an enhanced owners and directors test that will ensure that owners are prepared to be appropriate custodians of their club and its assets, as we discussed on part 4 of the Bill. If it were to become evident that an owner’s actions were likely to worsen the financial position of the club, the licensing regime gives the regulator power to place licensing conditions on the club. The regulator can also take enforcement action where such a condition has been breached or the financial plan has not been followed. Additionally, the regulator will have oversight of the financial plans and balance sheets of the regulated clubs, ensuring that the club is not putting itself in a risky position unnecessarily.

[Mr French]

On the point about risky situations and the risk-averse nature the Minister is describing, the Bill is clearer on disposable home grounds. I am intrigued to see how the regulator would deem a club either selling its freehold and then having a leaseback option, which we have heard has happened, or looking to move to a ground or stadium that it did not own and pay rent going forward. Would that be seen as a bad financial move or a good one by the regulator? It is not quite clear how it would work for non-disposable treatment of assets.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I do not want to get drawn into hypotheticals. As we previously discussed, there might be a perfectly legitimate reason for a club to move—or to move temporarily, such as for flooding. It is not an absolute power. We want to give the regulator discretion when clubs may need that for legitimate reasons. The amendment speaks to where we think clubs are asset stripping or acting in bad faith.

We would expect the power to include assets remaining in the club’s ownership and any plans to change its financial arrangements. It would be at odds with the sustainability of a football club for there to be no home ground or location to train. It is therefore implicit that the regulator would address that.

[Mr Betts]

Does that mean that if the regulator felt that an owner was proposing to divest themselves or the club of a training ground that could influence the club’s financial sustainability and competitiveness, it could act to prevent that before the sale was completed?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, I believe that there is provision in the Bill to do that. For those reasons, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment.

[Lincoln Jopp]

The Minister knows—I have approached her about this—that a club in my constituency of Spelthorne has gone into administration. It has no home ground, but it does have a training ground, which is a community asset. I am intrigued to know whether, in the potential conflict between the purview of the regulator and the enactment of companies law in dealing with the administration of the company, the provisions in the clause give the regulator power to influence the administrator on the manner of the administration and whether clubs’ training grounds can be bought or sold. What is the hierarchy of legislative authority between companies law and the clause?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Can I write to the hon. Gentleman on that point?

[Mr Betts]

The Minister is doing quite well today: she has satisfied me once again. I am reassured that the regulator does have the power that I sought to put in the Bill, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 83, in clause 46, page 39, line 2, at end insert—

“(ii) in the case of the home ground and training ground, it is satisfied that there are suitable plans in place to ensure the club’s continued long-term use of the home ground or training ground or to secure an alternative home ground or training ground for the next football season;

(iii) in the case of a home ground, it is satisfied that any alternative under sub-paragraph (ii) will have been actively approved by the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales if any of the following non-exhaustive factors represent a significant upheaval of the connection between the fans of a club and the club: proximity to home ground, proximity to other clubs' grounds, journey time for fans and any other factors that the Regulator deems relevant;”

I have a simple question for the Minister. If the regulator decides that a sale can go ahead, is the power there to allow it to be satisfied that there are suitable plans to ensure that the club will have long-term use of a home ground and training ground? That may not be the ground it had before, but there must at least be a replacement. Does the regulator have the power to ensure that?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend tabling the amendment. It seeks a number of things: extending the clause to include training grounds; guaranteeing long-term use of home grounds and/or training grounds; and introducing parameters for home ground relocation. If it is helpful, I will address those briefly, but I appreciate that this debate is similar to the one we just had.

On extending the scope of the clause to include training grounds, the Bill has carved out specific protections to safeguard home grounds against risky financial decisions or the sale of grounds. As I said in the previous debate, that is to reflect the home ground being the club’s most important asset. It does not mean that other assets, such as training grounds or office space, are not important.

I understand that, as we have discussed, the amendment is really focused on asset stripping. As I have alluded to—I will be a bit clearer and perhaps more explicit—the regulator has the power to attach discretionary licence conditions. Therefore, on the point about needing a training ground, I believe that the regulator could apply a temporary or particular licence condition on a club.

[Mr French]

I will not dwell on this point too much, but the implications of this amendment and the ones that we were just discussing are not hypothetical; we have seen real-life examples of where this issue has become a real one for football clubs. So, we seek some clarity from the Minister about how the regulator would act in such scenarios in the future.

As I said in my previous comments, I think the disposal of a ground is probably slightly clearer than the relocation of a ground. However, I will use the example of Coventry City football club. When they moved to the Ricoh Arena, I believe that the stadium was jointly owned by the local council and another group. I assumed that the club moved to a new stadium with the best interests of the club at heart. I had the pleasure of going to Coventry’s old stadium when Charlton played Coventry in the FA Cup, but that is a bit by the by. It was in need of improvements; most people would have thought that.

How would this measure work? We know that Coventry ran into a number of issues with the Ricoh Arena, which I believe is now owned by the Frasers Group. At that point in time, when the club moved, would that move have been deemed to be in the regulator’s purview of an inappropriate action by the previous owners? I ask that question because this is a real-life example of where it is not clear how this legislation would apply. As Parliament, we have to be clear how we intend the regulator to behave in such situations, because, as I say, that was a real-life example of how football clubs might seek to improve their stadia when they do not have the assets to do so themselves.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I draw his attention to the discretionary licensing addition that I have referred to: the regulator can react to different situations. I do not want to be drawn on individual cases, nor do I want to pre-empt the actions of the regulator.

[Mr Betts]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

I really do not understand the way in which the Bill is written at present; perhaps the Minister can help me with that.

We will come on to clause 48, which is about the relocation of a club; of course, that means moving grounds. As set out in clause 48 4(c) and (d), there is a specific requirement on the club to consult with fans. We can have another discussion at some point—we may do—about consultation with which fans and which groups. I still think that this is a challenging issue that we need more clarity about.

Clause 46 is about the disposal of a ground, which is a very emotive subject for fans. It may not be the wrong decision to relocate, and clubs can relocate and take their fans with them, with proper involvement; the Everton example is probably in that category. However, there is no requirement at all to consult the fans on the potential sale of a ground. That seems to be a big omission in the Bill. Fans would not have a veto, because it is understood that sometimes there are very good commercial reasons as to why a club needs to move, which can be accepted and explained to the regulator.

Therefore, I am not saying that the disposal of a ground has to get the full approval of the fans, but surely there should be a measure whereby the fans are at least consulted and their views taken into account before the home ground of a club, where the club may have played for 100 years, is disposed of. That would not be inappropriate.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. Home grounds are a vital asset for all clubs, so I do understand his intent.

Regarding changes to the ownership of a home ground, the potential adverse outcomes are entirely financial. We do not believe that they impact the heritage of the club, which is why clause 46 does not require any heritage consideration or fan engagement. Additionally, decisions about the financial arrangements of a home ground are commercial decisions and therefore we do not think it is appropriate to legislate on them. However, I will reassure my hon. Friend that if the sale of a club’s home ground would result in the relocation of the club, fans absolutely have to be consulted about that, as per clause 48, which we will discuss later. We know how much home grounds matter to fans and communities, but this clause is purely about protecting a club’s financial position.

[Mr Dillon]

I seek some clarity on the relocation of a ground. White Hart Lane was demolished and rebuilt on a similar, but bigger footprint. Obviously, at Old Trafford, Manchester United’s owners are talking about building on land next to the stadium. Personally, I would not class either of those moves as the relocation of a ground. However, in the Bill would they count as relocation, because those new stadia are not on the same footprint as the original stadium?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will double-check that point, but I believe they would. I also refer to the points we discussed earlier in the Committee: clubs may want to move for a particular, legitimate reason—to improve their ground, or because they have to due to flooding in adverse weather, for example. We appreciate that these are not all bad actors and it is not all bad faith, but I will double-check that point and come back to the hon. Gentleman. We know how much home grounds matter to fans and communities; this clause, together with the owners and directors test, is about protecting the club’s financial position and its balance sheet from asset stripping by bad actors.

[Mr Betts]

Is the Minister saying, then, that a club owner could sell the ground without even consulting the fans—just present it as a fait accompli—and then, because there would not be a home ground to play on and the club might have to relocate, at that point they could say to the fans, “Well, the ground’s gone; we’re now going to ask you whether you want to move.”? There seems to be a gap in the thinking somewhere.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate that point, but the sale of home grounds is a primarily financial decision, separate from the decision about where the club actually plays its games. That is why there is currently no requirement to consult or obtain approval. If the club has not actually relocated, it would be caught in clause 48 and would be required to consult fans. We will come on to discuss that later.

[Mr French]

I must admit that—like other members of the Committee, to judge from their facial expressions—I am slightly confused by the reasoning the Minister has given in response to the hon. Member for Sheffield South East on this clause, and where the distinction lies between the ultimate decision to relocate the ground and the sale of the ground. The decisions are clearly interlinked, and I would argue that fans would have strong concerns if a club owner was seeking to sell the ground, which would in a number of instances lead to either a relocation or an impact on the club’s heritage. The sale, for example, could lead to the renaming of a stadium, and the fans would clearly have a view on how that would impact their support for the club.

I ask the Minister to reflect on the hon. Gentleman’s points, because the clause seems to lack clarity on how that distinction is being made. I understand the point she is making about the financial considerations of owners, but the Government should reflect carefully on the argument against this clause, because it is not very clear to members of the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the comments that have been made, and I will take them away and reflect on them, but I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East at this point to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Betts]

The Minister has taken a very sensible approach. I accept that accepting an amendment here and now, out of the blue, is not how Government operate; but there is a lack of consistency between the two clauses, so I appreciate her agreeing to go and have a look at them. She has not committed to a change, but she has agreed to have a look, and that is very helpful. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As discussed during the debate on the previous amendments, clause 46 serves as an important protection for the home ground of a club. It requires clubs to gain the approval of the regulator prior to any sale or use of the home ground as collateral. A home ground is often one of the most vital and valuable assets a club can own. If it is used as collateral for debt or sold off, that can impact a club’s financial position by weakening the balance sheet. Not owning the stadium may also threaten a club’s long-term financial sustainability.

This clause requires clubs who own their ground to obtain the approval of the regulator prior to any sale or use as collateral. The regulator will consider the risk to the financial sustainability of the proposed transaction and block any potentially financially damaging sale of a club’s home ground. This applies to regulated clubs and also to any club regulated within the last five years, which prevents bad actors from being able to circumvent regulation by leaving regulated leagues in order to skirt protections and strip assets. It recognises the important role that football grounds play in the financial sustainability of clubs and adds protections against bad actors.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Duty not to appoint administrator without approval

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

This clause sets out the duty on regulated and formally regulated clubs not to appoint an administrator without approval from the regulator. This is to ensure that administration is transparent, acts in the best interests of the club and its creditors and avoids any perceived or actual conflicts of interest. This will give all stakeholders, especially fans, confidence in the administration process.

As with clause 46, this applies to regulated and formally regulated clubs to avoid any risk of circumvention of the rules. The regulatory framework is not a zero-failure regime, so it is possible that football clubs may enter administration despite the best efforts of the regulator. There is already a legal framework for companies, including football clubs, to enter into administration, which is detailed in the Insolvency Act 1986. In many cases, the existing framework has enabled clubs to go into administration and re-emerge as solvent.

However, there are occasions where the administration of a club is not initiated by the creditors but the club itself, so it does not require a court to sanction the appointment in advance. In these circumstances, there have been occasions when some have had cause to question a relationship between the insolvency practitioner appointed as administrator and the football club. This is why, in specific circumstances, the appointment of an administrator requires the regulator’s approval to ensure that the process is transparent, and to avoid conflicts of interests or perceived bias in the appointment. By doing so, all stakeholders, particularly fans, should have more confidence that the outcome is the best one available in the circumstances for the individual club.

[Mr French]

Clause 47, as the Minister has just outlined, creates a new legal duty on clubs not to enter administration without the prior approval of the regulator. This is an unprecedented intervention: a regulator potentially blocking access to what is, in most sectors, a standard insolvency mechanism. We understand the intent to prevent abuse of administration as a means of dodging financial responsibility and to help protect club continuity. However, this clause raises serious concerns about the balance between corporate law and football regulation going forward.

As drafted, subsection (1) says,

“as soon as reasonably practicable after the body considers that there is a reasonable prospect of an administrator of the body being appointed”.

I would therefore naturally ask the Minister: what constitutes “reasonably practicable” and “a reasonable prospect”? We all appreciate that, in most examples, an owner’s wealth is generated not by the club itself but other business interests. It may become very difficult to determine what is “a reasonable prospect” if we are looking at business interests far from football.

Administration is recognised as part of UK insolvency law, which the Minister referred to, and it exists to help distressed businesses rescue viable parts and protect creditors where possible. Blocking access to administration could make things worse, not better, specifically if it delays actions or deters future buyers. Why are the Government confident that the regulator is better placed than insolvency professionals to determine when administration is appropriate?

On some of the practical risks, insolvency situations often develop quickly, and clubs may need to act fast to avoid a complete liquidation of assets. A duty to obtain the regulator’s approval would therefore add delay and could risk total collapse where speed might be essential. We have seen that in a number of club takeovers over the years. Will there be an emergency approval process for an administrator? Within what timeframe does the Minister expect the regulator to respond? Is there a default route if it does not respond in a quick enough time?

On consistency with company law, clause 47 effectively overrides the Companies Act 2006, creating a two-tier insolvency regime for football clubs. That is not a small step. It sets a precedent for sector-specific interference into commercial law. What discussions has the Minister’s Department had with the Insolvency Service and the Department for Business and Trade on this specific clause and mechanism going forward? Are there any comparable sectors in the UK where companies would be forbidden from entering administration without the regulator’s consent?

Lastly, on unintended consequences, could this provision make distressed clubs less attractive to investors who fear regulatory delays? I fear that it may. It may also push clubs to delay taking action, making outcomes worse for creditors, fans and staff in the longer term. It could also expose clubs to legal risks, if creditors challenge a failure to act promptly to directors. The Opposition support strong oversight, but clause 47 must not become a regulatory roadblock in moments of crisis. Football clubs must be able to act swiftly to protect their future. The football regulator should be a safeguard, not a barrier to survival. We urge the Minister to have a close look at some of those questions and hopefully provide some answers today. We fear that this clause, as drafted, may have a number of unintended consequences.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I do not know whether the Minister has ever run a company that was approaching either administration or insolvency, but had she, she would know that a number of incredibly onerous and important duties are placed on the directors of such companies, which are literally minute by minute, in terms of them being shown to be acting responsibly. That can include, potentially, having multiple board meetings during a day, which are minuted, in order to revisit the “going concern” statement that the company does indeed have sufficient resources to meet its obligations as they fall due.

The penalties for failing to act responsibly and in accordance with the Insolvency Act 1986 in such circumstances can include being barred as a director of any company by the Secretary of State for a number of years, whereas the jeopardy in this Bill is possibly losing the ability to own a football club or to be an officer thereof. On the basis that we can all become millionaires or start-up billionaires and buy a football club, it is very concerning that we are putting in law the ability to override the directors of said companies’ obligations under the Insolvency Act. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether the Government have taken any legal advice on the specific question about the potential conflict between obligations on directors under the Insolvency Act and obligations on owners and officers under the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I will respond to the points made by the shadow Minister and then come to those from the hon. Member for Spelthorne. The appointment of an administrator would not delay a club entering administration, as that is a separate process from the appointment of a specific administrator. My officials have met both relevant teams in the Insolvency Service and the Department for Business and Trade to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not impinge on the existing insolvency processes. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Spelthorne.

As for the shadow Minister’s other questions on precedent, special administration regimes exist for various purposes, such as the water utilities or energy suppliers. They have distinct processes for entering administration. The provision in the Bill does not go as far as that. Ideally, the provision will not need to be used frequently, if at all, but if it is, it will look to ensure that fans can feel more confident than they do now. It works alongside the requirements but it still stands alone, so I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Duty not to relocate without approval

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 48, page 40, line 18, at end insert—

“(e) if the arrangements would represent a significant upheaval of the connection between the fans of a club domiciled in England and Wales and the club (taking into account the following non-exhaustive factors: proximity to home ground, proximity to other clubs’ grounds, journey time for fans and any other factors that the IFR deems relevant) the club’s fans have actively approved the arrangements.

(4A) In order for the Regulator to be satisfied with subsection (4)(b), a regulated club must take reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales do not consider the arrangements to constitute significant harm to the heritage of the club.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

I hope that everyone is appropriately refreshed after the lunch break. I will not seek to go to VAR to rehash any of the debates we had before lunch, but we have great sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We also believe that fans should have a strong say if clubs seek to move ground, as we have debated. The obvious questions, which we will come to in the next set of debates, are about what fan consultation and approval would look like. I know that that will be part of our heritage discussion in a moment, so I will not proceed on that now.

In thinking about some of the hon. Gentleman’s examples—Wimbledon being the most obvious one—I recall that as a teenager, or a bit younger, I would watch Wimbledon play at Crystal Palace, at Selhurst Park. They were the Crazy Gang in south London at that point, and they would often play there. So I understand his point, especially about the move to Milton Keynes and the controversy that that caused. As he highlighted, thankfully, we have not had too many examples that are similar to the American franchise system, where, in the National Football League, the Raiders have moved a number of times over the years, to different cities, depending on the financial attraction of each state.

Beyond the Man United and Everton examples, which we have discussed, there are other clubs who have moved. The one I first think of, which is closest to where I am from, is the Arsenal move a number of years ago from Woolwich Arsenal in south-east London to Islington. It is an interesting point, because a lot of the fans in south-east London are still strong supporters of Arsenal because of their generational links. For example, my brother-in-law’s grandfather was an Arsenal fan, so he is an Arsenal fan. The London example is probably not the best one, because it is simple to argue that fans can get across London fairly easily. It would be more dramatic if a club were being moved to the other end of the country, which is the point he is making—he is nodding in agreement.

I will be interested to know how the Minister and the Government view the amendments and how this issue might impact the regulator’s operations. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments, and I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Welcome back to the Committee after lunch, Ms Butler. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling the proposals, which seek to strengthen the protections on club heritage. The safeguarding of football heritage will be a key priority for the regulator, and there are a number of provisions in the Bill to uphold that key objective. It is vital that fans can have their voices heard at their clubs, especially regarding key heritage assets that can play a significant role in community identity and history.

That is why, as we will discuss in relation to clause stand part, clause 48 requires clubs to consult their fans and have regard to their views on a proposed relocation of a home ground. It is also why the regulator will determine whether the relocation will result in significant harm to a club’s heritage. This is not a binary decision, however, and in lots of cases will require a holistic approach and for the regulator to consider a number of factors, including not just the views of current fans, but the club’s history and the ability of fans to get to the ground. We would expect the regulator to engage and consult fans of the club, because it would be necessary to do so to ascertain the impact on club heritage. As the shadow Minister touched on, we will discuss this further in a little bit.

Amendment 91 would require the club to take reasonable steps to establish the views of the majority of supporters, rather than allowing the regulator to take the multifaceted approach that the Government think is best suited to the nuanced issue of club heritage. The importance of fan voices being heard is why the regulator spells out a number of protections for heritage assets, such as the home brand and home shirt colours, among others. Any breach of these duties would qualify as a relevant infringement by the club. Although we expect that the regulator will take an advocacy-first approach, a range of sanctions will be available.

Although the Government understand that the intention behind new clause 14 is to further entrench these duties, this legislation has been designed so that the duties apply across the clubs, with the regulator ensuring compliance. Amending articles of association can be resource-heavy and require shareholder agreement. It also does not guarantee that there will be compliance. This is not something that the Government see as an appropriate or necessary step to require all clubs to take. Instead, the Bill will protect fan consultation through other means. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments.

[Mr Betts]

I thank the Minister for the reply—I think. That was a bit of a reply about new clause 14 but she did not really address amendment 91 and the regulator being required to take account of factors such as relocation over distance and where fans live. In some ways, I think that is the strongest part of this discussion, because it is the thing that worries fans the most.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I talked about taking a holistic approach, and I said that the regulator must consider a number of factors—not just the current views of fans but the club’s history and how fans get to the ground. I acknowledge some of the examples that my hon. Friend has given, and I was really pleased to visit the new Everton stadium a few months ago. We obviously recognise that sometimes it is very legitimate, and other times it is not. That is why we have gone for the holistic approach.

[Mr Betts]

So does the Minister expect that the factors in amendment 91 would be taken into account by the regulator in reaching a decision?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, and I have obviously drawn attention to some of them in my remarks. That is why we do not want to be prescriptive; we want the regulator to be able to take a holistic, case-by-case approach.

[Mr Betts]

I think that was a yes, so the regulator would be expected to take them into account. Am I right in thinking that?

[Stephanie Peacock]

It was. I gave some examples in my contribution about history—

[Mr Betts]

And it would include these.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, it would—I have given some examples.

[The Chair]

Order. Both of you are standing; I might have to go to VAR.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 48 places a duty on clubs not to relocate from their home ground without approval from the regulator. As we just discussed, home grounds play an important role in the history of a club and are often the club’s most valuable asset. These grounds are where many thousands of fans watch their teams play every weekend. Relocating them to areas that have no connection to the heritage and history of a club can have a significant impact on those supporters and the local area, as we saw when Wimbledon moved to Milton Keynes, which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East just spoke about.

The impact of a home ground relocation on fans and the club is why we are legislating for the regulator to pre-approve any proposal in that regard. As subsection (4) of the clause sets out, the regulator must be satisfied that the proposed relocation would not “undermine the financial sustainability” and significantly harm the heritage of the club. This Government have added a requirement for the regulator to be satisfied that the club has taken

“reasonable steps to determine the views of… fans”

and taken those views into account.

The Government do not want to stifle development where it brings value and aligns with the heritage of the club. The clause makes the important and necessary recognition of the vital role that home grounds play in communities and adds an extra layer of protection to them while leaving room for clubs to evolve and continue to develop. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval

[Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 49, page 40, line 31, at end insert—

“(1A) A regulated club must notify the IFR if it is considering making any material changes under subsection (1) and the IFR must monitor the reasonable steps taken to independently establish that the changes are supported by a majority of the club’s fans.”.

This amendment would require the IFR to take steps to independently oversee a club’s fan consultation process on the material changes specified.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments to clause 49. We will discuss the clause in more detail in the clause stand part debate, so I will reserve some of my comments until then. To summarise, however, the clause places a duty on regulated clubs not to make changes to key items of club heritage without the support of the majority of the club’s fans and approval by the Football Association.

As set out in clause 7(4), the regulator is already required to monitor compliance with obligations. However, we do not think it appropriate for the regulator to be directly involved in every instance of a heritage change. As a light-touch regulator, we do not expect it to intervene where clubs are already meeting what is required of them. Instead, it will be able to have a wide view, and intervene where there are concerns.

Any change to heritage assets will necessarily come under significant scrutiny by fans and the public, as well as the FA through its existing fan engagement standards. Additionally, in any case of non-compliance, the regulator will have sufficient enforcement options at its disposal. The process is therefore appropriately safeguarded without the need for direct regulatory involvement each time.

Turning to amendments 111 and 92, club names are a vital part of the club’s heritage. The legislation therefore introduces legal protections for that heritage asset. The FA has a long track record of being able to take a considered approach to name changes, listening to fans and heritage concerns, and taking appropriate action. That was demonstrated in the case of Hull City: the FA blocked multiple attempts to change the name to “Hull Tigers”. The FA, with oversight of all levels of football, is also in a good position to ensure that name changes do not have unintended implications for clubs that are outside the regulator’s scope.

The Government therefore believe that the FA is in the best position to take into account fan opinions and all the other relevant considerations, with the regulator acting as an enforcement backstop. That is in addition to any mandatory licensing requirement for clubs to consult their fans on any matters relating to the club’s name, among other heritage assets.

The shadow Minister asked which fans will be consulted. For the most part, clubs will be in the best position to understand the demographics of their fans. The regulator will be able to provide guidance for clubs for on how best to consult fans. Clubs in the lower leagues will tend to have a more local fanbase, whereas larger clubs will have fanbases from across the world, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East pointed out. That is why we want to implement proportional and flexible proposals.

[Mr Betts]

We all feel concerned about this issue. It is not about the clubs that already consult well; it is about those that do not consult, but will be compelled to consult by the legislation, and will not really want to—they will find ways around it. The regulator can give guidance, but if a club does not follow that guidance, what will the regulator’s likely course of action be?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We will come on to enforcement, but a range of enforcement options will be available to the regulator, if it feels that a club is not doing what it asked the club to do.

[Mr French]

To add to the point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, if a club—the Minister gave the example of Hull—decided that it wanted to go ahead and change its name to “Hull Tigers”, but the regulator felt that the fans had not been consulted thoroughly enough, could the regulator deduct points from a club?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, there are no sporting sanctions in the Bill. Those are not in scope. To take the point about the FA further, it has a long track record of being able to take a considered approach to name changes, to listening to fans and heritage concerns, and to taking appropriate action.

[Lincoln Jopp]

I welcome the fact that the Minister is saying, “Let’s trust existing organisations to do it”, rather than bringing it within the purview of a higher regulator. On the basis that the FA has exercised such responsibilities when it comes to names, why cannot it be trusted to have the same consideration for emblems and colours?

[Stephanie Peacock]

As I said, the FA, with oversight of the levels of football, is in a good position to ensure that name changes do not have unintended implications for clubs that are outside the regulator’s scope. It has done that point on names well. That is why we want to leave it to do the good job it is doing.

[Mr Dillon]

I thank the Minister for her response. Although the Bill tackles financial sustainability, it has a real ability to rebuild trust between fans and football clubs. I feel that all three amendments are still worthy of being pressed to a vote, and I commend amendment 140 to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 49 requires a club to establish that a majority of domestic supporters approve any material change to its emblem, crest or predominant home shirt colours. A club’s name, home shirt colours and emblem are intrinsic parts of its heritage, intertwined with decades of club and supporter history. The decision to materially change any of them therefore requires considered thought and consultation. The clause means that changes can still be made, but only if, and once, fans have voiced their support. In practice, we expect that could take place through a formal survey of fan opinion, as we saw last season with Bristol Rovers, where supporters opposed the final proposal that was put to them, resulting in the club halting the redesign of their emblem.

The clause also requires clubs to get FA approval prior to changing the name that the club’s team plays under. The view of supporters is a significant factor in the FA’s decision making. However, the FA may also need to balance wider considerations regarding to a name change. That might include whether there would be any adverse effects on other clubs throughout the pyramid. The existing FA rule has been used to prevent name changes, which have been proposed in the past against the wishes of fans, as I mentioned with the example with Hull City. Codifying this as a legal duty will mean there are additional powers to ensure clubs do not make changes without proper approval and allow the regulator to respond to instances of non-compliance. The clause serves one of the key objectives of the regulator: protecting the heritage of English football. I commend it to the Committee.

[Mr Betts]

I am still a bit uneasy about those clubs that are not going to enter into the spirit of the really important part of the Bill: proper fan consultation. I come back to Sheffield Wednesday and its owner, who thinks sitting down for 10 hours of deliberation with hand-picked fan groups and not answering any questions amounts to a consultation—it does not.

I was interested in what the Minister said about how the regulator will have the right to issue guidance about how consultation should happen, and then there can be enforcement if the guidance is not followed, which means the guidance effectively becomes a requirement. I hope that we can elaborate on that later in the Committee’s discussions, as she indicated we would, because, without those backstop powers, there will be some club owners who regard the club as their personal possession and believe that no one has a right to interfere in how they run it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Names interact with other clubs in the pyramid, which is not the case with shirts and colours, and we think there are strong provisions in the Bill for fan consultation.

[Mr Betts]

I hear what the Minister said, but I want to think about that. I know what her good intentions are, but I also know there may be some people out there with bad intentions; it is about making sure that they come in line with the Minister’s good intentions. I am holding back to see what further discussions we have, but this is really important. It is a wider issue: there are so many clubs with so many disparate fan groups, and owners will pick and choose if there is not certainty. That is why I raised the issue, which I think we ought to come back to, of a clear role for the Football Supporters’ Association, the body that oversees fan groups in this country. It has a neutral view of which groups are the most important and relevant in different clubs, and it can help the regulator enormously in what, in some cases, will be a challenging process of trying to identify the fan groups who really speak for fans in those clubs.

[Mr French]

I will not put the hon. Member for Sheffield South East at risk with his own side by talking too fondly about the comments he just made—I will not make it sound like we are trying to do a double act—but we have heard a lot of concern in our debates on the clause, and the amendments tabled to it, about how it will work. The hon. Member mentioned that some club owners—one would hope only a minority of them—would seek to expose loopholes in the Bill. That is why we tabled amendment 111, which would introduce a safeguard by requiring a clear vote and the approval of the majority of fans.

There are a number of risks for the Government with this Bill, but one of the biggest is this: if it does not protect the things it is designed to protect—in this case, the heritage of a football club and a say for fans—what is its purpose at all? If one of the examples we have discussed plays out in future, that question will be asked of the Government. In our future debates on the Bill, perhaps they can provide more clarity about their thinking, and perhaps they will incorporate some of the arguments we have made today.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions. We believe that we have strengthened measures in the Bill to put fans and communities back at the heart of the game and to protect football heritage. All regulated clubs will now be required to have an effective framework in place to meet and consult regularly a representative group of fans on the specified relevant matters, including any proposal to relocate the home ground and some of the issues we have just discussed. We expect that the regulator will be best placed to understand the circumstances of individual clubs across the country. It will produce guidance to support clubs in meeting its requirements, and it will take into account things like precedent and ensuring proportionality.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs to notify the regulator of any material change in circumstances that is relevant to the regulator’s functions, as soon as reasonably practicable. The regulator will need a complete picture of each club in order to effectively regulate. Full transparency and timely updates will allow the regulator to stay up to date on any relevant changes in real time.

The duty to notify in the clause is an ongoing duty on regulated clubs. By contrast, the annual declaration mandatory licence condition applies to licensed clubs only. The annual declaration is about creating an annual touchpoint for clubs as part of the licensing regime, rather than requiring an annual licence renewal. It will allow clubs to declare a summary of any matters that they notified, or should have notified, over the past year.

[Mr French]

I will not rehash the Minister’s description of the clause, but it raises a number of questions about the interpretation of the clause and the requirements on clubs. What guidance will be provided to clubs to determine what constitutes a “relevant” change in circumstances, because that is very open to interpretation? What might such a change look like? We are not trying to micromanage, but we think clubs might find it helpful to understand, even if it is via a list of frequently asked questions from the regulator, what constitutes a change of circumstances so that they do not accidently fall foul of well-intentioned drafting.

Could the duty to notify a change in circumstances be accidentally disproportionate to lower league clubs? We have discussed at length that those clubs generally do not have the same administrative resources as the big clubs. Will the regulator look to have a more flexible approach to clubs lower down the pyramid that may not have the ability to notify as quickly as those at the top?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We expect the regulator to look at this on a case-by-case basis. As we have said throughout, we very much intend for the regulator to be proportionate depending on where a club sits in the pyramid.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Duty to keep fans informed of insolvency proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs in relevant insolvency proceedings to keep fans informed of the progress of the proceedings. Any fan that has experienced their club going into administration can attest that it is a worrying and often confusing time. Although the regime will look to best protect clubs, it cannot be zero-failure. However, the clause is intended to make the process more transparent for fans when the worst happens. The duty will apply only as far as is reasonable and will not fall on the administrators or any body not regulated by the football regulator. The clause was added to the Bill in order to mitigate unnecessary worry and confusion for fans.

[Mr French]

I have a few questions. How will the regulator assess whether a club has sufficiently fulfilled its duty to keep fans informed? Could the requirement to disclose information during insolvency proceedings create additional reputational or financial risks for clubs? How will the clause be applied consistently while respecting confidential obligations to creditors? We have spoken a lot about insider information. If the Minister does not have the answers today, it would be helpful to get them in writing in order to understand how some of these complex legal matters might work.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am happy to write to the shadow Minister. I appreciate that we added this clause; it was not in the previous iteration of the Bill. That is why I was keen to talk about reasonability. We appreciate that insolvency is a complex, fast-paced, changing and challenging situation, but we also appreciate—Members have talked about different clubs that have gone into administration—the worry for fans, so we want to keep them as informed as reasonably possible. The shadow Minister asked me for something further in writing and I am very happy to provide that.

[Lincoln Jopp]

Again, I am concerned about the clash of duties. The Minister has already told us that her team and the insolvency team have met and considered this issue. In a period of liquidation, not putting additional debt into a company, or indeed spending cash, is one of the directors’ responsibilities, but this will undoubtedly cost the club. Has the Minister sought and received reassurances that this approach is consistent with the Insolvency Act?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Perhaps I will add the answer to that question to my letter to the shadow Minister, and I will copy it to the hon. Member for Spelthorne. The clause is clear that the duty will apply only as far as possible, because we do not want to add a burden at an already difficult time. As this is quite a complex but important point, I am happy to write to both hon. Gentlemen.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Duty to publish a personnel statement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause requires licensed clubs to prepare a personnel statement and submit it to the regulator for approval. Alongside the statement, clubs must provide an explanation as to why they consider it to be accurate. The owners and officers who control and run football clubs are vital to their sustainability. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who is running the show behind the scenes in order to implement its regime effectively.

A personnel statement must outline each of the club’s owners and its ultimate owner, as we have discussed; its officers, with a job description for each; and its senior managers and their roles. Once the statement has been submitted, the regulator will review it and decide either to approve it or to modify it. Any modification to the statement must be made in consultation with the relevant club to ensure that the statement is accurate. Once the statement is approved by the regulator, the club must publish it online, increasing transparency and accountability in football. Subsequent statements must be submitted to the regulator if an old statement becomes out of date—for example, after the departure or hiring of an officer.

Let me also highlight the role of the Secretary of State’s guidance in providing clarity to owners about who meets the definition of someone who exercises significant influence or control. We committed in the other House to producing the Secretary of State’s guidance before clubs are required to identify owners who meet that definition to the regulator. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53

Duty to pay a levy

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 133, in clause 53, page 42, line 3, at end insert—

“(1A) But the IFR may not require a club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees to pay the IFR a levy in respect of a chargeable period during which the club is a licensed club.”

This amendment would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from having to pay the levy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dillon]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. New clause 24, tabled in my name, seeks to introduce a fair and transparent exemption procedure for football clubs in administration. When a football club enters administration, it is not merely a financial event; it is often a crisis that rocks the entire community, as we saw in Bury. Supporters, many of whom have been lifelong followers, are left facing uncertainty and fear for the future of their club, which is often the heartbeat of their town or city.

New clause 24 seeks to strike a vital balance by maintaining the integrity of the levy while allowing compassionate and evidence-based interventions when a club is on its knees. It would ensure that exemptions are not handed out indiscriminately, and that the regulator must assess each case on its merits and satisfy itself that the club’s financial difficulties are not a calculated move to evade its levy responsibilities. Most importantly, the new clause would give clubs a chance.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for his amendment, and I thank the hon. Members for Cheltenham and for Newbury for their new clauses. I acknowledge the intent behind them.

We will shortly discuss the levy in more detail when I speak to clauses 53 and 54, but in short, the Bill gives the regulator the power to collect a levy to recover its running costs from football clubs that hold an operating licence. I will outline why the Government intend to resist this amendment and these new clauses before directly answering some of the specific points that hon. Members have put to me.

The levy arrangement follows the precedent of other regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. As the regulator is designed to improve the financial sustainability of English football, it is vital that the associated costs do not burden clubs, especially those further down the pyramid.

Amendment 133 and new clause 5 seek to address similar issues relating to ensuring that small or lower-league clubs are not burdened by unaffordable costs as a result of this regulation. I assure the Committee that the Bill is already designed with National League clubs in mind. The regulator will be tasked with improving the financial sustainability of football, and placing an undue burden on small clubs would be completely contradictory to that aim.

Clause 53(10) introduces a statutory requirement for the regulator to have regard to each club’s individual financial circumstances, and the league in which it plays, when setting the levy. Given that requirement, we expect that the levy will be proportionate, with the Premier League—specifically the six clubs with the highest revenues—covering the majority of the cost. That solidarity will reduce the burden on clubs lower down the pyramid. No club should be charged more than it can afford.

Through its levy rules, the regulator will also have the power to exempt clubs from paying the levy. That power, provided by clause 53(8), ensures that there is a mechanism to avoid burdening clubs. If certain conditions set by the regulator through rules are met, the regulator has the discretion to exempt clubs from paying the levy—that answers the shadow Minister’s question. The power will work in conjunction with the requirement on the regulator to consider each individual club’s financial resources, and the competition in which it plays, when setting the levy, as well as the requirement to consult all regulated clubs on its levy rules.

On new clause 24, I agree wholeheartedly that the regulator should not place an undue burden on a club that has already entered administration. I reassure the hon. Member for Newbury that the regulator will set out its levy methodology, including the discretion to set the levy according to a club’s individual circumstances, and to exempt a club completely if specified conditions are met.

The regulator has a core objective of improving the financial sustainability of English football, and I am confident that it will be cognisant of the impact that the levy could have on any club, and especially a club in administration or other financial distress. The Bill’s provisions, such as the regulator’s discretion to exempt certain clubs from the levy, if necessary, account for that core objective.

In response to the shadow Minister, I note that there is no cap, but the regulator can set costs related only to its functions. As I have just outlined, under the powers granted to the regulator by the Bill, it could exempt small clubs from the levy, if that is deemed necessary. However, we do not think that mandating a complete exemption in legislation is appropriate. Exempting a whole league before an assessment has been made of whether clubs in that league can afford the levy would be disproportionate.

[Lincoln Jopp]

I want to clarify whether the Minister is entirely comfortable that the Government are in no way able to control the amount of money spent by the regulator. If, in fulfilling its duties, the regulator decided it was important to fly business class to meet UEFA and FIFA once a month—if I were the regulator, I could probably make the case that I was fulfilling my duties by doing that—it would create a huge cost and involve hiring additional staff. Are the Government really prepared to give the regulator a blank cheque?

[Stephanie Peacock]

There is no cap. However, I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the regulatory principles we addressed earlier in the Bill. Obviously, the regulator needs to be proportionate and reasonable. The regulator will guide its operations according to those principles.

[Mr Dillon]

On the allocation of the levy, the Minister said that the top six teams would cover the majority. Can she point to where that is in the Bill? Is it the top six financially or in league positions?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking the words out of my mouth, because I was going to conclude by drawing the Committee’s attention to a letter placed in the Libraries of both Houses when the Bill was in the other place. The letter, dated 6 March, was sent by Baroness Twycross, who took the Bill through the Lords. I will not detain the Committee by reading out the letter—Members can look at it—but it breaks down the proportions. Obviously, costs are based on the impact assessment and are indicative, so they are not meant to be prescriptive; it is meant to be an indicator. The letter may be helpful if the Committee would like more detail.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s arguments, and she has made some helpful clarifications. However, due to the lack of a cap, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it is difficult to rely on the letter for what club certainty might look like in the future. We have discussed at length how well-intentioned plans can easily spiral, which is why we believe amendment 133 is important in helping to safeguard the clubs with the smallest means and those lowest down the pyramid.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Decisions on the new clauses will be made at the end of the Committee’s considerations.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 53, page 42, line 8, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 19 to 26.

[Stephanie Peacock]

These amendments will make all regulatory functions under the Bill fundable through the levy. As drafted, the Bill sets out the specific functions that will be funded through the levy, making a distinction between the funding of leviable and non-leviable functions—I will discuss those concepts in greater detail shortly. Currently, the former would be funded via the levy and the latter via rules set by the regulator.

These amendments would make the funding mechanism simpler and more reliable by clarifying and ensuring that the regulator will be able to recover litigation costs related to non-leviable functions. If the regulator were unable to recover those costs, there is a risk that it would either be unable to use some of its powers or have to seek Government financial assistance to fund them. That is why we propose these changes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation of these amendments, which have been introduced at a fairly late stage. I hope she can provide some clarity on a number of questions.

First, was it always the Government’s intention to have these separate streams of funding, as she has described, or is this a way of expanding the IFR’s powers to charge the levy? I am unclear about why the change has happened now, because we have obviously been through a lot of consultation and the Bill has been in the other place for some time. It is not necessarily clear why these changes have come about at this stage, so I would appreciate an answer.

Lastly, when the Minister described the charges as non-leviable, the natural question was, “Who picks up the bill?” Are we talking about taxpayers, and if we are, what are those costs? Exposure to risk would obviously be a major concern for taxpayers and, I suspect, a number of Government Departments following the spending review. I appreciate her comments about how the Government believe that the functions may not be used or required, but there needs to be an answer about the risk of those non-leviable payments and what that might look like in the future.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister. First, it is certainly not about expanding, and we have been very clear that we do not want scope creep. He asks “Why now?” We have always maintained that we want the best legislation and the best outcome. We very much listened to the debate in the other place. We reflected on that, and we believe that this is just a simpler, less complex way of going about it.

On his last question, I can very much assure him that it is quite the opposite. By making these changes, the costs will not have an impact on taxpayers. We are clear about that.

[Mr French]

I am still unclear on that point, but I am happy to have the answer in writing. Who will pick up the bill when the levy cannot be charged to clubs, and what will that bill look like? I am not at all clear about how that will play out in practice. I am not sure whether I am misunderstanding the Minister, and I am happy to have it in writing, but I am not clear what it means.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I say gently that I think the shadow Minister is misunderstanding, and I am happy to write to him. The amendment means that all functions can now be covered by the levy, whereas previously there were two funding mechanisms in the Bill. It is a technical change.

[Lincoln Jopp]

I agree with the Minister—my understanding of what she just said is the same—but that leaves a tiny bit of clarity still to be given. Will all the normal running costs of the regulator be met by the levy, and none by the taxpayer?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, that is the intention.

Amendment 18 agreed to.

Amendments made: 19, in clause 53, page 42, line 13, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

Amendment 20, in clause 53, page 42, line 14, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

Amendment 21, in clause 53, page 42, line 19, leave out “leviable”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

Amendment 22, in clause 53, page 42, line 26, leave out subsection (4).—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment removes the definition of “leviable functions” so that the IFR may charge a levy for all of its functions under the Act.

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 53, page 42, line 42, at end insert—

“(6A) Once the IFR has established a levy under subsection (1) and made the required payments under section 96, the IFR must only fund its functions under this Act through its own revenue streams.

(6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) the IFR’s ‘own revenue streams’ are any amounts payable to the IFR from regulated clubs under subsection (1).”

This amendment requires the IFR to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury.

The amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury, so that it is entirely self-sustaining. That is not unreasonable; taxpayers are already being squeezed by this Government, so it would be ludicrous to suggest that they should foot the bill for the Labour Government’s regulator. That is why I tabled the amendment, which seeks to place a clear financial obligation on the regulator to ensure that, after covering its start-up and establishment costs, it becomes entirely self-funding through the industry levy.

The principle behind the amendment is simple: if we are to create an independent regulator for football, its independence must extend beyond structure to include financial independence from the taxpayer. The clause gives the Secretary of State discretion to determine the mechanics of the levy, but it leaves unanswered an essential question: who ultimately pays—we have had a bit of discussion about that—and for how long? The amendment provides a clear and reasonable answer: the taxpayer may support the regulator’s launch, as might be expected, but once that is done, the regulator should stand on its own two feet.

Let us not forget the purpose of the Bill: the regulator is intended to be arm’s length, neutral and shielded from political interference. However, the Government have gone to great lengths to compromise that independence through their appointment, as we have discussed, and the principle would be fully compromised if the regulator remained financially reliant on the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, or the Treasury for that matter. Independence is not just about who makes the appointments, but about who signs the cheques.

If the regulator is to carry out its duties credibly—overseeing financial discipline, enforcing ownership standards and planning across the football pyramid for the long term—it must operate free from any perception of ministerial influence. That means being self-funding. The idea that the British taxpayer should continue to fund the ongoing operations of this new body is simply not justifiable, particularly at a time when families are feeling the squeeze and public services are under pressure. If clubs need a regulator—and the Government have decided that they do—then clubs, not pensioners in Bexley or shop workers in Barnsley, should pay for that regulator.

The amendment would also introduce discipline into the regulatory model. It would ensure that the Government’s regulator lives within its means, plans sustainably and operates efficiently, just as it will expect clubs to. We must avoid the slow drift we have seen with other public bodies, where what begins as temporary state support gradually hardens into permanent public subsidy with no sunset clause or accountability.

By requiring the regulator to repay its start-up costs and then operate independently, we would make a clear distinction between initial public investment and long-term industry responsibility. It is not unreasonable to ask that football, having accepted the need for regulatory oversight, for which many have lobbied, now contributes to that oversight on a permanent and self-sustaining basis.

That gives rise to a number of questions for the Minister. Is there a timeline for when the regulator is expected to be self-funding, or will it continue to draw on the public purse for a number of years? What provision, if any, has been made to recover the taxpayers’ outlay once the regulator begins to collect levy income? I would be grateful, as would taxpayers across the country, for reassurances from the Minister that those issues are being addressed, and that the taxpayer will not be left to subsidise the industry without a clear exit plan.

My amendment would protect the principle of independence. It would safeguard the public purse and ensure that those who arguably benefit from oversight are the ones who pay for it. Football is told that it will get a strong, credible and financially sound regulator, but taxpayers deserve clarity, discipline and fairness in how that regulator is funded. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment and make the regulator accountable to the industry it oversees, not dependent on the Government that created it. Let us build something that is self-sustaining, responsible, and fit for the future.

[Stephanie Peacock]

During our debate on the technical changes proposed by the Government, we discussed the removal of the non-leviable functions. That means that everything will be levy-funded, so there will be no cost to the taxpayer. We absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman’s points about the regulator being self-sustaining and self-funding. The Government also agree that the regulator should not be able to borrow money at its own discretion, which is why it is already prevented from doing so in paragraph 37(2) of schedule 2, which sets out that the regulator cannot borrow money unless explicitly permitted to as part of the financial assistance from the Secretary of State. We expect that that would occur only if absolutely necessary and in extreme circumstances, and would be provided only subject to conditions set by the Secretary of State.

There is no need for the restriction to be duplicated. We absolutely agree that the regulator should be fully funded through the levy, and that is exactly what the levy is designed to do. I will come on to that in more detail when we discuss the levy under clause 53 stand part. The Bill ensures that the regulator’s source of funding for all regulatory functions is the levy. Any financial penalties it imposes through enforcement action can also be used to offset any litigation costs and reduce the burden on compliant clubs.

[Mr French]

I appreciate that the Minister said that she will come on to that subject in a later debate, but can she be clear about start-up costs and their recovery for taxpayers? How is it envisaged that those costs will be repaid? I appreciate the point she makes about levy contributions, but how will the start-up costs that have been incurred now, along with the cost of the shadow football regulator, be recovered, if at all?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I would like to address that later, if possible. I have heard the question, and will make sure the hon. Gentleman gets an answer. For the reasons I have set out, I hope he will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but it is very difficult to withdraw an amendment without clarity about the questions that we are posing. On that basis, I am afraid that we will not seek to withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 53, page 43, line 35, after “club” insert

“and in particular that the starting point for calculation of the levy payment applicable to a particular club should be a percentage of annual revenue”.

This amendment would require the IFR to have regard to a football club’s percentage of annual revenue when calculating a levy payment.

I encourage the Minister to say whether she thinks that the levy payment should relate to the income of clubs. Some clubs are clearly mega-rich—multi-million pound businesses, every year—but other clubs’ income is down in the few thousands of pounds. My amendment is probing, really, but will the Minister confirm whether clubs’ income is the basic building block on which the levy will be formulated?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling his amendment. The Government completely understand the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate and offering value for money. That must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility to respond to industry developments in the future. I will come on to discuss the levy in detail, but I will set out the key points now for clarity, in relation both to this amendment and to how the Bill ensures the levy is affordable for clubs.

The regulator must set out in levy rules how the annual levy payments will be calculated. The Bill explicitly requires the regulator to have regard to the club’s financial resources and position in the pyramid. That would include revenue. It should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. Premier League clubs are expected to shoulder the majority of costs, reducing the financial burden on smaller clubs.

It would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology for charging the levy in legislation, as doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other possibly more effective and proportionate methods of charging. That would be counter to the agile and independent regulator we want to create. For example, a club might have a relatively low organic revenue, but its owners might have very deep pockets. The regulator might want to take that into account to ensure that charges are fair, proportionate and relative to circumstances.

I also want to highlight that there is a statutory requirement for the regulator to consult industry on the levy. Every regulated club will be consulted. That transparency means that no club will be surprised by the changes asked of them. That will be sufficient to ensure the levy is fair and proportionate. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendment.

[Mr Betts]

I accept the Minister’s explanation, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Before I speak on clause 53, I draw the Committee’s attention to a procedural matter. In preparing for the debate, officials identified some inconsistencies in the impact assessment published on the Bill’s parliamentary web page and gov.uk. It appears that as figures were updated during the development of the impact assessment, they were not reflected in the summary of costs on one page at the beginning of the paper, which was related to the compliance cost and operational cost. The figures are correct in the main body of the impact assessment, and the total cost that those figures added up to is still correct. The inconsistencies also featured in the version submitted by the previous Government. For full accuracy and transparency, we have now corrected it, and the impact assessment on gov.uk was updated last night. We have notified the Public Bill Office to ensure the parliamentary website is updated as soon as possible, and there will be an updated version in the Library shortly.

Having provided that clarification, I will now discuss clause 53, which enables the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running cost. That follows the precedent of other regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. The levy methodology is an operational assessment that the regulator is best placed to make independently. By making football clubs more sustainable in the long term, the regulator will be providing a service to the industry. It is only fair that as a wealthy industry, football, as opposed to the taxpayer, should cover the cost of regulation, as has been well discussed by the Committee this afternoon.

The cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of football’s more than £6 billion annual revenue. The industry will also benefit from regulation, which will deliver a more stable pyramid of sustainable and resilient clubs, and so help protect the commercial value of English football. The legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. It is clear in the clause what the levy covers and how the money will be used, ensuring the regulator’s transparency. As I alluded to in the discussion on Government amendments 18 to 26, all costs can now be funded through the levy.

However, the regulator will not have a blank cheque. It will be subject to numerous safeguards including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. That and other safeguards, such as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s responsibility as a sponsor, will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.

In addition, as I set out when we discussed the previous group of amendments, the clause also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position when setting the levy charge. Specifically, that covers the financial resources of a club and the league in which it plays. That should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. That will be aided by the requirement for the regulator to consult all licensed clubs, which I will speak to in more detail in the debate on the next group of amendments. In addition, once operational, the regulator will have a legal requirement to set out its levy charges annually and consult all regulated clubs on its methodology.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Section 53: consultation and publication

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 102, in clause 54, page 44, line 7, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would remove the ability for the IFR not to consult on changes to the levy rules if the IFR considered them to be minor.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling his amendments. Amendment 102 would require the regulator to consult every regulated club, the Secretary of State, the Treasury and others that the regulator considers appropriate, for minor changes to the levy rules. Clause 54 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other appropriate stakeholders, on its levy rules. However, clause 54(2) sets out that consultation is not needed for minor changes to the levy rules. This is intended to allow the regulator to make immaterial amendments or corrections such as typos or minor rewording without excessive bureaucratic burden.

The amendment would add a layer of unnecessary process that is unjustified given the extensive consultation requirements on substantial changes. It is not in anyone’s interest, especially the regulator’s, to stretch the definition of minor, which is a well-recognised legal term. If the regulator does not consult on a change that has made a material impact on a club, it could face a legal challenge through a judicial review. That will ensure that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.

[Lincoln Jopp]

I do not know whether the Minister has ever conducted a judicial review, but we could not get one done for £9,000.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but refer gently to my earlier comments. We are talking about typos and very minor changes. I give that example to show that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.

On amendment 103, requiring the regulator to publish the information on costs laid out in clause 54(4) six months before the chargeable period would create an operational challenge and would simply not work in practice. The regulator would have to estimate its costs for a chargeable period, having only half a year’s costs to base it on. That could lead to inaccurate levy charges, which could see the regulator underfunded or clubs needlessly burdened. The current requirement to publicise charges as soon as reasonably practicable strikes the right balance between adequate notice for clubs and operational flexibility for the regulator to ensure an accurate and appropriate levy charge.

For the reasons I have set out, I cannot accept the amendments.

[Mr French]

I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, which was fairly limited. I do not have enough confidence in her replies to withdraw the amendments. We are concerned about the impact on clubs and about the loophole in the interpretation of minor changes. I am not clear on the regulator’s accountability to stop scope creep. I suggested a number of options that the Government might look to adopt instead and did not hear any response to them. On that basis, and linked to some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, I wish to press the amendments to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 54 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other appropriate stakeholders, on its levy rules. This requirement to consult on draft levy rules will ensure that the views of clubs are considered as the regulator determines its charging methodology.

The statutory requirement in the clause to consult the Secretary of State and the Treasury will provide further scrutiny and assurance that the regulator’s proposed methodology is fair and proportionate. Allowing the regulator to propose its own charging structure within the strict safeguards outlined in clause 53, and with consultation requirements, enhances its independence and allows for greater scrutiny and accountability of the regulator.

The regulator can be held directly accountable for its charging decisions and the outcomes they produce. The levy is of course an operational matter that should be determined independently by the regulator, in consultation with those it will affect. The regulator will have the necessary information to design a levy based on a robust financial assessment of clubs to ensure that charges are fair and evidence-based. Giving the regulator the discretion to set charges reinforces operational independence and mirrors the approach of other regulators, such as Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55

Duties to notify and consult the IFR

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

To achieve its objectives, which include a club financial soundness objective, a systemic financial resilience objective and a heritage objective, the regulator will need information from the relevant competition organisers. The clause places a duty on the competition organisers to provide that information, and in the event that they do not, they would be liable to be sanctioned.

A competition organiser must notify the regulator if there is a risk that the regulator may not fulfil its objectives. That is with regard to the club financial soundness objective or the regulator’s systemic resilience objective. In addition, the organiser will need to notify the regulator if it is in breach of a commitment it made as an alternative to a financial discretionary licence condition, or if a club has breached the rules of a specific competition run by the organiser.

The organiser will also have to consult the regulator if it proposes to change its own rules. That is necessary given the interaction between the regulator’s regulation and that of a specified competition organiser. The regulator wants its own regulation to be necessary and proportionate and not to overburden the clubs. It is therefore important to understand any changes in other rules that clubs need to abide by, given that they may increase or decrease the financial risk of clubs.

In all cases, the relevant information will act as an additional source of data to inform the regulator of risks within the industry and whether the regulator needs to impose additional regulation or proceed to enforcement and sanction to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the industry. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The clause sets out a series of duties that require various football stakeholders, including leagues and governing bodies, to notify and consult the Government’s new regulator in certain circumstances. At its core, the clause is intended to improve co-ordination and to prevent regulatory surprises, which in principle is reasonable. We all agree that where the governance of the game affects financial sustainability or club integrity, the Government’s regulator should be aware and engaged.

I will focus on subsection (6), which is a far more consequential provision than it might first appear. I believe it strikes at the very heart of one of the most sensitive and important issues in football governance: the independence of sport from Government control. Subsection (6) imposes a statutory duty on specified competition organisers to consult the regulator when they either add or remove a relevant rule of a specified competition, or vary a relevant rule of a specified competition. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about when the regulator is involved in a competition and when it is not, with regard to the FA Cup. Some clarity on that would be much appreciated.

In short, the provision means that competitions such as the Premier League, the EFL and the FA Cup would be required—based on the wording of this part of the Bill—to consult the Government’s football regulator every time they change or amend a rule deemed to be relevant by the regulator itself. That might sound innocuous, but let us be clear about what it means in practice: for the first time, a politically appointed regulator, accountable to the Secretary of State, who has received donations from that regulator, would be given a formal, statutory role in the internal rule-making processes of English football competitions.

This is not a light-touch oversight mechanism; we fear it might end up being a direct institutional influence. As we know, it is not compatible with UEFA’s requirements on the non-interference of Government. UEFA statutes are clear that national football associations and their affiliated leagues and competitions must be free from political or Government control. The relevant rule is article 7bis (2) of the UEFA statutes, which states:

“Member Associations shall manage their affairs independently and with no undue influence from third parties.”

Article 9 goes on to state:

“A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that...it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory”.

It is pretty clear that the FA will no longer be considered fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory should the Bill pass with this provision. Moreover, FIFA echoes that approach in its regulations, particularly in article 14 of the FIFA statutes, which ensures that member associations, such as the FA, remain autonomous and free from governmental or political influence. Article 15 of the FIFA statutes further requires members to be neutral in matters of politics and religion, to be independent, and to avoid any forms of political interference.

Subsection (6) brings us dangerously close to the line, if not across it. Unfortunately for the Minister, the Government seem to be on the wrong side of that line. I will press the Minister on that point, because however carefully the clause may have been worded in terms of consultation, in reality it inserts the Government’s new regulator into the core rule-making processes of the football pyramid. Once that principle is established, the scope can grow.

We know that there are international concerns about scope creep, as I mentioned when speaking to amendment 97.

“UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep within the IFR. While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas”.

Those are not my words.

Will the Minister confirm whether UEFA has been consulted on the drafting of the clause, and whether the Government have received written assurances that this level of regulatory involvement is compatible with UEFA’s independence rules? If she has, will she place a copy in the Library? If she has received any correspondence to the contrary, will she also place that in the Library so that the Committee has confidence ahead of Third Reading and can scrutinise the provision properly? What safeguards are in place to prevent this from being interpreted—either in Brussels or somewhere else—as a breach of sporting autonomy?

This is not theoretical—it is a real and dangerous risk for English football. Let us remember, in recent years, that other countries have faced disciplinary threats or warnings for perceived interference in football. We have seen federations sanctioned before. National teams and clubs have been threatened with exclusion from competitions. For example, Greece was briefly suspended from international football in 2006 after the Greek Government passed a law that interfered—that was the term used—with the autonomy of the Greek football federation, in violation of UEFA and FIFA regulations. In 1999, Moldova’s clubs and national team faced a ban from UEFA competitions, after it was deemed that there was political interference in the running of its football federation. In 2002, FIFA suspended Zimbabwe and Kenya from international competitions due to perceived Government interference in the football administrations of those countries.

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 55, especially subsection (6), opens a door that we believe should remain very much closed. We support the responsible regulation that we know is going to pass. We support transparency and accountability, but we do not and cannot support a regime that places the Government’s regulator at the heart of football’s competitive rule making. The Minister must clarify how she will make sure that her regulator will not inadvertently or deliberately influence English football in a way that UEFA or FIFA deem to be a breach of their rules. Otherwise, the Government risk doing irreversible harm to the integrity, autonomy and international standing of English football.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for his points. Clubs will be subject to a number of rules from different football authorities. Failure to comply with them may indicate that the club is in some financial difficulty and may prompt the regulator to assess the risk profile of the club. Changes in a competition’s rules may lead to clubs taking additional risks or may threaten the financial soundness of the system. The regulator therefore needs to be aware of such changes so that it is in a position to reassess the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and whether, as a result of the rule change, additional regulation is needed.

The shadow Minister did accept that there is no veto in the clause. I reiterate once again that UEFA are happy with the Bill as drafted. He drew the Committee’s attention to a specific line in the Bill, but I remind him that it has not been changed from the previous iteration of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56

Part 6: overview and interpretation

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 56, page 45, line 39, after “organisers” insert

“or by a regulated club”.

[Max Wilkinson]

Clubs in the English football pyramid currently barter as a collective for funding from broadcasters, but it is not hard to imagine a future in which Liverpool, Manchester City, Arsenal, Chelsea—the hon. Member for Spelthorne has now gone so I can say that—or other big clubs decide that they are going to barter alone. That has happened in other European countries. In fact, Spain had to legislate to stop Barcelona and Real Madrid cashing in on their massive marketable machine that massively distorted the Spanish game.

These amendments are fairly simple. They build in a future failsafe to stop the threat of that happening. If it does happen, the revenue gained by those clubs will be taken into account in the redistribution of funds in the game. It seems like a logical failsafe to introduce to the Bill, which we hope will be accepted.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendments. We understand the intent behind them but believe that the drafting of the Bill sufficiently captures the current primary sources of revenue in the game. We will discuss clause 56 more fully during the clause stand part debate, but to summarise briefly, among other things, it defines which revenue streams are in scope of the backstop process. Revenue in scope is called “relevant revenue” and is limited in the Bill to revenue received by a league for broadcast rights to league matches.

Broadcast revenue is undisputedly the main source of revenue in English football, but we acknowledge that that may not always be the case. Football’s financial landscape is dynamic and its economic model may not remain static. That is why the Bill already allows for the definition of “relevant revenue” to be amended if necessary. The Secretary of State can amend the definition by making regulations, but only after consultation with the leagues, the regulator and the FA. That flexibility future-proofs the definition of “relevant revenue” against potential changes in the structure of the industry while ensuring that the definition remains firmly rooted in the current reality.

We expect that, throughout the distributions process, the leagues will effectively represent the interests of their constituent clubs. However, the backstop process, including the final proposal stage, is ultimately about resolving distributions between the leagues. It is about how money earned by the leagues flows from one league to another, not between individual clubs. It is therefore right that, given how finances currently flow, it is revenue received by the leagues as a whole, not individual clubs, that should be considered. I am therefore unable to accept the amendments.

[Max Wilkinson]

We recognise the numbers—although we Liberal Democrats now outnumber the official Opposition—so we will not press this to a vote. However, it is worth considering that, in future, we might end up in a situation where some of our bigger clubs start to try to negotiate on their own for their broadcast revenue. The Minister did not reassure me that that could not happen. As I understand it, we do not have legislation that would stop that. There is nothing in the game to stop that apart from Arsenal, Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City deciding to play together nicely.

Although we are not reassured, there is no point in forcing this to a vote. But we hope that the comments may be taken forward and taken into account by the regulator in future, and perhaps we will have this discussion again as and when those big clubs decide that they are going to kick up a stink and try to ruin the rest of football for everyone else. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s experience with Derby, and I understand his point. That is why I said there are a number of opinions, and this a very controversial subject. I have engaged with EFL clubs as part of this process, and we get a variety of opinions, even before we get to asking the Premier League clubs for their opinion, so I absolutely understand his point. This amendment is about trying to exclude parachute payments from this part of the Bill, rather than trying to take a decision on what parachute payment levels should be in any shape or form. That is the distinction we seek to make with the amendment, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for the amendment, as it gives me the opportunity to speak to one of the key changes made in the new version of the Bill that this Government introduced. The amendment would take parachute payments out of the scope of the backstop, as they were in the previous Government’s Bill. The regulator needs to be able to consider all relevant revenue sources as part of the backstop process to get an accurate picture of any proposal’s impact on financial sustainability. That is why it was right to amend the definition of “relevant revenue” to ensure parachute payments could be considered as part of the backstop if necessary.

The shadow Minister pointed out that I supported the Bill when in Opposition, but I draw his attention to an amendment I put down then to this effect. We have had a clear and consistent view on this issue throughout the passage of both Bills through Parliament. We believe that allowing the regulator to make more informed decisions, rather than restricting what it can consider, will help to achieve the best possible outcome for the future of the game.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 39

Ayes: 2

Noes: 10

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 56, page 46, line 27, leave out

“means an order under section 62(1) or (3)”

and insert

“has the meaning given by section (Distribution orders)(6)”.

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

The amendment is consequential on Government new clause 4, which we will debate later. Although it depends on that later change, the amendment would change clause 56, which is why we are discussing it now. We will also discuss clause 56 in more detail later, but one of the things it does is set out key definitions of key terms used throughout the backstop provisions. One of those defined terms is “distribution order”, which is the order made by the regulator at the end of the backstop process. It is designed to resolve the questions for resolution if the leagues have not managed to do so during mediation. Currently, the Bill’s definition of “distribution order” refers to clause 62, but we propose to remove clause 62 and replace it with new clause 4. New clause 4 completely changes the final stage of the backstop process. I met the shadow Minister and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham, to discuss this ahead of the Bill Committee. It moves the backstop away from a binary, winner-takes-all model, and allows the regulator discretion to design a solution to distribution issues.

We will have a chance to debate that fully when we debate clause 62, so I will withhold some of my comments until we get to that point. This simple amendment just updates the definition of “distribution order”, so that it appropriately refers to new clause 4 instead of clause 62. It is vital that we make these sorts of consequential changes, to ensure that the legislation remains coherent. Therefore I hope that Members will support this amendment.

[Mr Betts]

As the Minister said, we will come on to debate these issues later, but again, I just want to place it on the record that she has been really listening to concerns that have been raised about the pendulum nature of the previous backstop. This is a much better process, which we will come on to discuss in more detail. Thanks to the Minister, we will discuss it further, but it is a much better framework that we will now be putting in place for the regulator to decide on any disputes or failures to agree between the leagues.

Amendment 27 agreed to.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 56, page 46, line 42, leave out subsection (7).

This amendment removes the definition of “the question or questions for resolution” which is now superfluous.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 29 to 51.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I begin by acknowledging the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. I appreciate him putting that on the record. Of course, we will have a fuller debate on the broader change later, so as I said, I will reserve my wider comments till we get to that point.

The backstop aims to ensure that where the industry cannot resolve the issue, revenue is distributed between the leagues in a sustainable way that furthers the regulator’s objectives. As I will set out in more detail when we debate clauses 57 and 58, it allows the leagues to apply to the regulator to intervene and help them to resolve specific issues that are in dispute between them. The issues that need resolving are referred to in the Bill as the “questions for resolution”. We will further discuss the process for triggering the backstop when we come on to debate clauses 57 to 59.

Put briefly, the triggering process requires a league applying to the regulator, showing that certain conditions listed in clause 57 are met, and putting forward a set of proposed “questions for resolution”. The other relevant league has a chance to respond to that proposal. The regulator will then consider the application and the response, and will decide whether to trigger the process. If it decides to trigger, it also decides exactly which questions must be taken forward and resolved through the backstop process. Therefore, the questions for resolution are set out at the very beginning and carry through, determining the scope of the whole process. They are the questions that the leagues discuss in mediation, as we will see when we debate clause 60, and they limit the scope of any regulator distribution order—something that we will discuss further when we come on to debate Government new clauses 3 and 4—to issues of financial sustainability.

Setting the questions for resolution is therefore a very important step that demands a clear statutory process and a rigorous approach by the regulator. That is even more important in the light of the proposed changes that Government new clauses 3 and 4 will make. Those new clauses propose a new model for the backstop—a staged regulator determination. They move away from the binary, winner-takes-all, final-offer model and increase the regulator’s discretion to devise its own solution for distributions. Because of that increase in discretion for the regulator, it is important that the scope of the distributions process is well defined from the outset, so that all parties are clear about what the regulator will and will not rule on if the leagues ultimately cannot agree to an industry solution themselves.

These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for—[Interruption.]

[Mr French]

You’ve lost the room!

[Stephanie Peacock]

I have indeed—clearly.

These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for setting the questions for resolution. They highlight the importance of a league proposing specific questions for resolution when it applies to the regulator. They emphasise that if the regulator agrees to trigger the backstop, it will not take a sweeping approach and try to rule on every possible aspect of distributions. It must set out specific questions that it will resolve, and its powers are then restricted to resolving those questions.

These amendments make it clear that questions must meet certain tests in order to be resolved through the backstop. Those tests are twofold. First, the regulator must consider that leaving the questions unresolved presents an apparent threat to the regulator’s objectives. Then they must consider that the questions could not be resolved within a reasonable time by the regulator exercising any of its other functions.

The amendments clarify that the regulator need not take forward all the questions proposed and that the regulator can modify the proposed questions. They will also require the regulator to take into account representations from the other league that accompany the application. That will give the regulator the flexibility to pick out which questions it is appropriate and within its remit to address, without forcing it to either accept every element of an application or reject the whole application outright.

The amendments also set out procedural requirements. They require the regulator to consult the FA before setting the questions for resolution, ensuring that the national governing body has a chance to raise any views about the scope of the backstop process. They will also ensure that the regulator transparently sets out what questions it has chosen and how it made that decision. The questions for resolution will then be taken forward into the mediation phase. That will ensure that all parties understand the specific aims of the mediation stage.

[Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)]

The Minister is setting out how important it is to get the distribution arrangements right. This is the part of the Bill that may be the most critical in ensuring that the pyramid is sustainable, which is the objective. It is great that the Government are working hard to get the backstop arrangements right, as she said. Does she agree that, once the regulator is in place, it will be important to have the state of the game report already in place—with an analysis of what is going wrong in the financial distribution and how it could be put right—before a distribution agreement is made and the backstop powers are used to bring that about?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he touches on something we will discuss later. It is important that the state of the game report takes place swiftly. That is an important part of the Bill. Of course, it is a backstop, and we are keen that a football-led solution is the priority and that people get round the table. I often quote Dame Tracey Crouch, who was one of my predecessors as sport Minister, and obviously we know how involved she was in the Bill. In the previous Bill Committee, she made a short but very focused speech, which I encourage hon. Members to read, on how the backstop should be a backstop. I often quote that speech.

For the reasons I have set out, the amendments are vital for supporting our new backstop model, and I hope that they will be accepted. I commend them to the Committee.

Amendment 28 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 56 is the first clause of part 6, which relates to financial distributions and the backstop mechanism in its totality. I understand the desire on both sides to apply appropriate scrutiny to a part of the Bill that could significantly impact the future financial landscape of football, and I hope through this debate to demonstrate that the approach taken in part 6 is the most proportionate and effective one.

These backstop powers have been introduced to help ensure that an agreement can be reached between the leagues on the distribution of revenue from the selling of TV broadcast rights. If the leagues cannot agree a deal, it will allow the regulator to step in as a last resort and impose one. A solution to this issue is vital to ensure the future financial sustainability of the football pyramid. The process has been designed to encourage an industry solution while providing the assurance that, should one not be reached, the regulator can ensure that one is put in place.

The Government have listened to industry, to members of both this Committee and its equivalent in the last Parliament, and to concerns raised in the other place. We have taken on board the points raised regarding the original distribution model in the Bill, and we have therefore tabled targeted amendments to improve the mechanism. As I have said more than once, I will set out the detail in a later group. We are confident that the regulator will have the powers necessary to ensure a timely, satisfactory distribution order, while not unduly inhibiting the ability of industry to resolve the issue itself.

Clause 56 sets out an overview of the backstop powers and outlines some key definitions that are important for clearly setting out the scope of these powers, including “relevant revenue”, which I will come on to in just a moment. Importantly, this clause also makes clear right at the outset in subsection (1) that the regulator can impose a distribution order only if the leagues are unable to reach an agreement during the backstop process. In other words, even after the process has been triggered, a regulator-imposed solution remains a last resort, only to be used if industry fails to strike a deal.

One of the key terms defined in this clause is “relevant revenue”. It expressly includes broadcast revenue because this is the predominant source of revenue for the relevant leagues, and this is the revenue that underpins the financial flows between the leagues. This clause also allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This is simply to future-proof the policy; for instance, if broadcast revenue is no longer the main source of income for the leagues. However, there are safeguards on the use of this power. The Secretary of State must consult the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues, and can use this power only when there has been a material change of circumstances. Any use of the power will be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament.

The previous Government’s version of the Bill explicitly excluded parachute payments from the definition of “relevant revenue”. Our version of the Bill no longer makes this distinction, allowing the inclusion of parachute payments where appropriate. This change was made to ensure that the regulator can consider all relevant aspects of revenue distribution as it makes a financial assessment of the game. Parachute payments can be included in the backstop only if the regulator considers that issues relating to parachute payments present an apparent threat to its objectives, such as the sustainability of the pyramid.

Another important definition in this clause is the “qualifying football season”. This determines which seasons can be in scope of the backstop. In effect, it limits the regulator’s power to only the next six football seasons, which prevents excessively long regulator orders or premature applications for seasons far in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 56, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jon Pearce]

Absolutely. As a Derby fan, for once I can probably agree with a Notts Forest fan. It is vital that fans have a say. Fans will always want their clubs to do better and to drive forward, and there will be cases where it is right for a club to move; but where there is malign interest, the fans need to have the ability to keep their stadia and clubs together.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to once again serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I look forward to day three of Committee. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for the amendments; I am never fed up of hearing from him and I know he is very passionate about this issue.

The Government recognise the intent behind the amendments to ensure that football continues to be played at a club’s home ground. The Bill already has a number of strong protections to safeguard home grounds against reckless sales or ill-thought-out relocations. I will respond to a couple of points made in the debate and will then outline why we will not be accepting the amendments.

Fan consultation was mentioned. Clubs must consult their fans on any plans to change or move their home ground as per the fan engagement threshold condition. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, made an important point about how it will sometimes be necessary for clubs to relocate their home ground, for a number of reasons, such as the ground being too small, facilities no longer working or the ground being sold. We recognise that we need flexibility in that approach, but fans will have a say.

For clubs that do not own their stadium or have already sold the stadium, due to the scope of the Bill and existing property law, it is not always possible for home grounds that are not owned by the club to have the same protections as home grounds that are. This point was recognised in the fan-led review. However, alongside the fan engagement requirements, there are also protections under the national planning policy framework for sports grounds and existing assets of community value, and there is work under this Government, as well as an ongoing Law Commission review of security of tenure that has the scope to address sports grounds. Those powers will all work alongside the soft powers and levers of the regulator to look to protect home grounds, as far as possible.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East also referred to the fact that leagues have requirements for tenure, and clubs are prevented from entering the league if they do not meet them. Leagues also have enforceable standards regarding the quality of the grounds. These vary from league to league and can get into the specifics of grass length on matchdays, for example. Given those requirements, we do not feel it is necessary for the regulator to duplicate rules. Instead, it will work alongside the leagues.

It should be noted that clubs may not own their home grounds—I have responded on that point—and therefore they would require the agreement of their landlord to meet the additional licensing requirement we believe that the amendments would lead to. These amendments would place a requirement on clubs to guarantee something that may not be within their control, as well as duplicating pre-existing league requirements for home grounds.

We recognise that the fan-led review recommended that the Government explore the viability of introducing security of tenure property rights for football clubs. I hope I have explained why we do not feel we can do that.

The Law Commission is now in the process of reviewing the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, including an assessment of security of tenure for all commercial properties, including football clubs. Following the review, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will consider the recommendations and publish a full response.

For those reasons, I am not able to accept my hon. Friend’s amendments and would ask that he withdraws them.

[Mr Betts]

I am still not quite sure why my amendments would cause so many problems. I understand the difficulty where a club does not actually own the ground but leases it, but the amendment is about security of tenure. There does not have to be ownership; it could be a secure lease, as the English Football League requires, for a 20-year period. That is implied by the amendment.

I was not quite sure what the Minister was saying about how the review by the Law Commission and implementation by MHCLG Ministers would secure the position for football clubs, and what else is being looked at in terms of the planning framework. Is she able to say any more on those points to get on the record what further safeguards might be in place?

[Stephanie Peacock]

On the point in the amendments about 20 years, we appreciate that not all the leagues go that far, but we think that the point is addressed by the league rules. On the consultation by MHCLG, it might be helpful if I ask my counterpart there to write to my hon. Friend and to share that letter with the Committee, because that ongoing work falls in that Department.

[Mr Betts]

The Minister often completely convinces me—on this occasion, she goes a little way towards being convincing. I want to read what MHCLG is going to say. In the end, it is not how we do it, but what we achieve in terms of the safety and security of grounds for the fans. That is what this is about. If what MHCLG is going to do moves us in that direction, as the Minister indicates it will, I am happy to await that correspondence from it before pushing this further. I hope that we can get a response from MHCLG Ministers before Report—if the Minister could encourage them to write in that time period, it would be helpful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is a disappointment that I am not able to convince my hon. Friend fully. Not all of what he asks is in my gift, but I commit to the Committee that I will do my very best to get a response from the Department before Report, and if possible earlier.

[Mr Betts]

On that basis, with the Minister going as far as she can this morning, I am happy not to press the amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will begin with a couple of brief points in response to the shadow Minister. However, as Sir Jeremy has just outlined, some of the shadow Minister’s points relate to schedule 4 more broadly, which falls under group 38, and the points on fan engagement fall under group 48. I will make some quick comments, but I am happy to take some points away and elaborate further when we come to those groups.

The shadow Minister asked a specific question about what constitutes “adequate” and “effective”. The Bill is intentionally designed to allow for each club to have its own approach to fan engagement. That is why a specific form of fan engagement is not mandated in order to meet the benchmark of adequate and effective. Instead, we expect that the regulator will look at a number of factors to assess fan engagement at clubs, and publish guidance for clubs on what will be expected. Across all of that, the regulator will look to uphold proportionality, taking into account the size and make-up of each club and what is appropriate. We will revisit those issues when we move on to groups 38 and 48. Of course, the debate on ticket pricing has been well rehearsed. This Government added an obligation to consult fans on ticket prices, which will strengthen the fan voice on that issue.

Amendment 104 seeks to add a requirement for a club to consult fans on any political statements or positions that it makes or takes, and new clause 16 seeks to mandate fan approval prior to any political statement or political activity being made by the club, its players or staff. It is not the place of a statutory regulator tasked with financial sustainability to limit or add additional approval processes for political speech or action. Clubs and leagues here and abroad take positions on a variety of issues that could be deemed political, and that is their right.

However, it is not appropriate for an independent statutory regulator to take subjective positions, or opine on the positions of others, in the same way—especially not a regulator tasked only with a tight mission of financial sustainability, to which political statements bear no relevance. It may be that clubs wish to consult their fans in this regard as part of their regular fan engagement. We would not expect the regulator to have any issue with that, but it is not something that it will require of clubs.

The Bill is intended to ensure that fans have a voice in key decisions regarding their club, but we must ensure that this is proportionate. That is why we have not listed every possible issue on which clubs should engage their fans in minute detail. We also do not want to inhibit the free speech of players or any representatives of the club. It is also notable that many sporting personalities have used the attention that the sport gets to protest relevant issues that concern them. We do not want to inhibit the free speech of any of those individuals.

[Max Wilkinson]

Is the Minister concerned about inhibiting the free speech of Members of the House of Lords, for example Baroness Brady, who made significant and very valuable comments in the debate on the Bill in the other place, and then repeatedly made similar statements in the press and other media? She is, of course, a representative of West Ham and the Conservative party, as was noted by the hon. Member for Portsmouth North. Would we seek to retain her freedom of speech and freedom of expression by voting down new clause 16?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman puts his point on the record. We had a full debate in the other place, in which many Members took part.

Ultimately, the amendments have no relevance to the regulator’s purpose and will not help it to deliver its objectives. Rather, they would serve only to stifle freedom of speech. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw them.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. I must admit, as a long-term football fan, that I have never heard a player say that he kissed the crest of his club when celebrating a goal. The footballing term is as accurate as the legal one, as he highlights.

This may seem a modest amendment, but it speaks to something bigger: the importance of precision, respect for history and an understanding of football not just as a product but as a tradition. If we are going to regulate the game, let us do it properly with the right words and the right respect.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Member’s amendment follows the extensive debate regarding heraldic terminology in the other place. I can reassure him that the Government have worked closely with the College of Arms to ensure that the term “crest” is used consistently with heraldic law, and with the FA to ensure accuracy and cohesion with industry norms, as the term “crest” is the key term within its existing heritage rules. The Government amendments made in the other place make sure the legislation remains in step with both the FA and heraldic law, and that is in addition to changes to the explanatory notes, to further clarify the point.

Although the word “crest” is used colloquially in the industry, “crests” have a very specific meaning in heraldic law. Crests can only be granted by the College of Arms and only a select few clubs have been granted one. For that reason, the legislation refers to crests, but also needs to capture other clubs and circumstances. That is why the Bill uses “emblem”.

When making these changes, the Government explored the use of “badge” instead of “emblem”. However, it was felt that “badge” would risk unintentionally only capturing the image on shirts. In examples such as Arsenal or Liverpool, the shirt features only one element of the club’s emblem, such as the cannon or the liver bird. In those instances, “badge” might capture only those elements and thereby not deliver on the policy intent of protecting the heritage associated with the entire emblem. Given those comments, I ask that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Schedule 4 sets out the three threshold requirements—financial resources, non-financial resources and fan engagement—that clubs will have to meet in order to be granted a full operating licence. As I set out last week, to apply for a licence, a club must submit a business plan and a personnel statement. These are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete. As I have made clear, the regulator will support them with their applications wherever needed.

Before discussing the requirements for a full operating licence, I would like to correct a point I made last week regarding the hypothetical scenario where a club is not granted a provisional licence. I want to clarify that once a provisional licence is in force, a club must have a licence to be able to play in a specified competition.

As I have set out, to receive a provisional licence, a club must submit a business plan and a personnel statement. We think these are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete, and the regulator will support them with their applications where needed.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

The Minister mentioned the two criteria of the business plan and the personnel statement. I thought from our discussions last week that giving the regulator any form of information that the regulator so requested was an additional condition.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The two I mentioned are the basic points. The regulator has the ability to ask for further information should they want it. I think I gave the example that if the regulator is unsure about the source of funds, or whether there is enough, it could ask for more information. That will be at the discretion of the regulator—we had a well-rehearsed debate on that point last week.

We think that the requirements for a provisional licence are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete. As I was really keen to stress in the debate last week, the regulator will be keen to work with clubs to do everything it can to help them to meet those requirements.

The regulator needs to be satisfied that a club will be able to meet the mandatory licence conditions and duties on clubs once it has been granted a licence. This is a forward-looking “would comply” test. The expectation is that the provision of information and documentation, as well as the engagement with clubs as part of the application process, will be sufficient to satisfy the regulator. It should be straightforward for all clubs to obtain a provisional licence. Once they are in the regulatory system, a club will have time to improve standards up to the necessary requirements for a full licence, with the support of the regulator as needed.

[Mr French]

One of the points we were slightly unclear about when we had the discussion of provisional licences before was what would happen if a club decided it did not want to apply for a provisional licence. There are several clubs that are very publicly concerned about the regulator. What would happen if they were to form, say, a union and go against the regulator and refuse to apply for a provisional licence? How would that work in practice? Would they be kicked out of the league?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Government envisage that licence refusal or the revocation of a licence would be in extreme circumstances, but there will come a point when the regulatory system switches on and a licence will be needed in order to play. That is the point that I am keen to clarify. Yes, ultimately a club can be stopped from playing if it does not apply for a licence, but I stress that, with the provisional licence, it does not have to be meeting it; it has to be willing to meet it.

The regulator will do everything it can to work with clubs, because it is in no one’s interests for a club to be unable to play—that would be completely contrary to the purpose of the Bill. The purpose of the Bill is to improve club sustainability once the regime is in force. There must be a consequence for extreme cases, which is the point that the shadow Minister is making, but the club must be given every opportunity to meet the standards if it has failed to do so. Once a club is licensed, the regulator will have a range of other escalating enforcement tools. We will come on to enforcement, so I will not elaborate on that now—I do not want to test your patience, Sir Jeremy.

I turn now to the threshold requirements in schedule 4. There are three main areas of the regulator’s licensing regime that build on the freestanding duties in the mandatory conditions. Meeting the threshold requirements will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently operate sustainably in its financial, non-financial and fan-engagement areas and will continue to do so.

Although the threshold requirements are principles set in legislation, what each club must do to meet the threshold will not be the same. For example, what constitutes appropriate financial resources for a Premier League club will be very different to a League One club. A club may already meet the threshold requirements, for example, through naturally good operations or by complying with competition laws. In such cases, the regulator will not need to directly intervene. But if not, the regulator can apply discretionary licence conditions to bring the club up to the required threshold, which was the point that the hon. Member for Spelthorne referred to.

The structure will allow for a proportionate, light-touch system, with requirements tailored to clubs. The threshold requirement for financial resources means that clubs need an appropriate level of financial resources to support their long-term financial sustainability. The regulator will be able to consider any relevant factors to determine whether the club’s financial resources are appropriate relative to its circumstances and the risks it faces. For example, that might include which competition the club competes in, its financial relationship with its owners, and the wider economic context that it operates in. In particular, the regulator should take into account the club’s financial plan, and its contingency plan for dealing with financial shocks.

In essence, a club must have the financial resources to match the business it is operating—and plans to operate. If a club does not have the finances to back up its plans, or does not have plans in place for how it would manage foreseeable risk, it would need to do one of two things: either demonstrate that it has access to the necessary funding, or reconsider its plans and risk appetite. If it does not, then the regulator can impose discretionary licence conditions to bring the club’s finances back in line with its operations and risk level.

For non-financial resources, a similar threshold requirement and process applies. Non-financial resources could include things such as internal control systems and policies, as well as the information and people that a club has available to it. Although not financial in nature, these are important resources for any well-run club and need to be adequate. When assessing whether these resources are appropriate, the regulator might consider the skills and experience of senior managers, its plans, and its corporate governance arrangements.

The financial and non-financial resources of a club both need to be appropriate. For example, a club needs to have the financial means to back up its plans, and on the non-financial side it needs to have a contingency plan and risk-management processes to mitigate potential financial shocks.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

Is it the Government’s expectation that financial and non-financial resources will be proportionate to the size of the club?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend makes an important point; it will be proportionate. I have met with all the leagues a number of times, and this was of particular concern to the National League. It will be proportionate, and the regulator will take that approach when dealing with the different clubs and leagues.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments about proportionality; we will look to review that as the Bill goes forward. One question I have is about how the regulator will interact with the existing rules. The most obvious ones that come to mind are the financial fair play rules that are already in existence in the Premier League. What analysis of, and crossover with, the existing league investigations and restrictions to clubs will there be?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Those will be an issue for the leagues; where the leagues have rules, clubs will continue to comply with them. That is not something that the regulator will be involved with. Where there are league rules, that is for the leagues to enforce. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman to outline that further.

[Mr French]

If the Minister could outline that further, it would be really helpful. At the end of the day, we are keen to ensure that there is no confusion in the regulations for clubs, nor any duplication of purpose for the regulator. We would like to understand how that will work in practice, and I would appreciate that in writing.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Spelthorne.

[Lincoln Jopp]

I am sure that the Minister realises that one of the variants in a club’s business plan is whether its matches are selected for being televised. It is an incredibly haphazard process and difficult to predict, because they are decided within season. What guidance will the Minister give, as the appointer of the regulator, as to reasonable assumptions in the business plan regarding expected television revenue in season?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I think that it is an issue for the leagues, but I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman. I will check that point, but I am pretty confident that it would be left to the leagues. It is similar to what they deal with now. I will write to the hon. Members for Spelthorne and for Old Bexley and Sidcup further to their points, because it is helpful to get clarity in writing. Where there are league rules, they are for the leagues to enforce, but I will add further detail in writing, if that is helpful.

I would like to move on to the final point, about the requirement for clubs to adequately and effectively consult and consider the views of fans when making decisions relating to certain specified matters. Those relevant matters are listed in the Bill and cover key “off pitch” decisions, which the fan-led review highlighted as important to fans across specified leagues. The Government have made it explicit that that will include ticket pricing, as mentioned already, which is an issue of importance for many fans.

The threshold requirement is designed to work in tandem with the fan consultation mandatory licence condition. Through that condition, all clubs must regularly consult with a representative group of supporters to discuss the relevant matters listed in the Bill. That must be in place by the time a club is granted a provisional licence. Appropriate fan engagement will look different at every club and will partly be based on the size and complexity of the club’s fanbase, as I touched on in my earlier contribution.

[James Naish]

This point is slightly tangential, but it is related to fan engagement. England are playing Senegal in Nottingham later today. With the support of the FA, we have run a competition for primary and secondary school children to design a new England shirt. Would the Minister be happy to congratulate Albie, Dylan, Joshua and Mikey on their contributions?

[The Chair]

Order. That is not slightly tangential; it is very tangential. Just a brief answer, Minister, and then we must return to the schedule.

[Stephanie Peacock]

With the indulgence of the Chair, I will speak to the hon. Gentleman after today’s sitting. I would like to write to those who took part in such a wonderful competition.

I would like to complete my remarks by talking briefly about the threshold requirement, which has been designed to allow the regulator to recognise the inherent variation between clubs, while ensuring that standards are raised where necessary. It also allows the regulator to impose discretionary licence conditions on clubs relating to fan consultation.

Fans are the foundation of any club, and putting in place a supporter engagement threshold requirement recognises that they must be consulted on key decisions that affect their club. The Government have also looked to protect fan views, even in the worst-case scenario of a club entering administration. That includes the addition of a requirement to continue taking the views of fans into account when making decisions in insolvency proceedings, as long as the club retains the power to make decisions about the relevant matters.

[Mr Betts]

On a general point, when we talk about fans and fan groups, who defines who they are and the relevant ones? That is a really important point. Coming back to our club, Sheffield Wednesday, we have more than 20 different fan groups. That is also true of other clubs. Talk to the EFL, because it often struggles to engage or know who actually represents fans, as opposed to two or three people who have got together to name themselves as a group. How are we going to deal with that? As fans become an integral part of the process, who decides who the relevant groups are?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate that point. We will come on to discuss that in relation to schedule 5, and I will give a fuller response then.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 4 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 19

revocation and cessation of operating licence

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 106, in clause 19, page 13, line 19, at end insert—

“(c) inviting the club to make representations about the proposed revocation, and

(d) specifying the means by which, and the period within which, such representations must be made, which must be a period of not less than one month beginning with the day on which the notice under subsection (3) is given.”

This amendment allows clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.

Clause 19 concerns the revocation and cessation of an operating licence granted to football clubs. That is understandably a crucial provision that goes to the heart of how the Government’s new regulator will exercise its most serious power, the ability effectively to remove a club from the regulated football pyramid by taking away its licence to operate. Let me clear from the outset that we support an independent regulator that can intervene when standards are seriously breached but, as with all powers of this kind, the devil is in the detail. Our task in this Committee must be to ensure that the regulator’s powers are proportionate, transparent and accountable.

Clause 19 provides that the regulator may revoke a licence if the club in in breach of licence conditions or if there are grounds to believe that the licence should never have been granted. In principle, that is entirely reasonable, but the consequences of revocation, for clubs, fans and communities, are potentially devastating. This is not the revocation of a licence to sell alcohol or to host events late into the night; it is the revocation of a licence to participate in the life of a community—in many cases, the cultural soul of a town or city. That power should not be exercised lightly, so I must raise several matters with the Minister.

First, what thresholds and safeguards are in place to ensure that revocation is used only as a last resort? Will the Government’s regulator be required to consider less draconian alternatives—such as conditional compliance periods, fines or a change in ownership—before resorting to the total revocation of a licence? Secondly, what procedural protections exist for clubs facing this threat? As it stands, there is no right of appeal, which is why I tabled amendment 106, which would allow clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.

These are serious matters. The Government’s regulator is empowered to act in the interests of the game and to uphold high standards of governance, transparency and financial responsibility. But with such powers must come robust safeguards, and that is where the clause as drafted falls short. As it stands, there is no explicit requirement for the regulator to notify a club of its intention to revoke the licence, or to invite the club to make representations, before such action is taken. In effect, the regulator could move straight to revocation, without a formal process that allows the club to defend itself, explain its actions or offer remedial steps. That is not due process, it is not natural justice, and in any other regulated sector such an approach would be wholly unacceptable.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The hon. Gentleman was sneaking slightly into clause stand part territory.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As you say, Sir Jeremy, we will speak in detail about the revocation or suspension of an operating licence when we debate clause 19 stand part, so I will save my detailed remarks for then.

To respond directly to the shadow Minister’s questions, there is an appeals process, and clubs can make representations; I will outline how. I thank him for his amendment, but the Bill already provides sufficient opportunity for a club to make representations ahead of its provisional licence being revoked. If a club persistently fails to meet the test for a full licence, clause 18(4) requires the regulator to give it notice inviting it to make representations.

There is a high bar for the revocation of a provisional licence under clause 19. The regulator must be satisfied of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and, finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if it is given more time. In the unlikely circumstance that that high threshold is met, clause 18 sets out requirements to notify the club and allow it to make its case one last time. Specifically, if the regulator is minded to revoke a club’s provisional licence, it must give the club notice explaining why and invite it to make representations.

Only after that, if the regulator is still convinced that there is no reasonable prospect that the club will obtain its full licence, even given an extension, it can revoke the club’s provisional licence. In every case, the club will have been given adequate opportunity to make formal representations on the issue, in addition to the informal constructive engagement that we expect the regulator to have with the club regularly throughout this period. It is not necessary or proportionate for the club to be given another opportunity to make further representations as the amendment proposes.

If, after all that, the club believes that the regulator has taken the wrong course of action, there is further recourse through the appeals process. The club will be able to request that fresh decision makers at the regulator reevaluate the decision through an internal review. Alternatively, the club may appeal directly to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. If the tribunal decides to hear the appeal, it will do so on the merits of the case, so it will reconsider the evidence and may substitute its own decision for that of the regulator; it may, therefore, reverse the decision to revoke the club’s licence. That is another way that the regulator can be held to account and its decisions can be scrutinised. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

The Minister has outlined the initial process before revocation is determined by the regulator. As I explained in my lengthy speech, which I will not seek to repeat, the amendment would give clubs a say if they believed a decision reached by the regulator was wrong. The Minister was clear about the tribunal approach if a club is not happy with a decision, but as I have outlined previously, my fear is that clubs will end up spending more time in court than they will focusing on the pitch and on the game. The official Opposition believe that an appeal process at that point would be more beneficial than a legal route.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As I said, clubs can make representations to the regulator and ask the regulator to look again, and beyond that there is the appeals process. As with all aspects of appeals process, the key considerations are the expertise of the judiciary, the tribunal’s experience and familiarity with the policy, speed and cost. We think the Competition Appeal Tribunal is the best option for balance. It is an internationally well-respected tribunal which offers time and cost-efficient options, with flexible case management to expedite urgent cases and bring in appropriate expertise. We believe that that avenue and the internal review process make adequate provision in the Bill and that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment simply is not needed.

[Mr French]

I thank the Minister for that lengthy response. To be blunt, I disagree, and rather than delay the Committee any longer, I will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 19 details revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, and a licence ceasing to have effect. For the revocation to occur, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should engage with the club throughout this period. We expect that, through constructive dialogue, a solution can be found that avoids this drastic step in all but the most serious of cases.

The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. Revocation must not take place before the end of the current season, to reduce as much as possible the impact on ongoing sporting competitions. A licence automatically ceases to have effect only when a club stops operating a team in specified competitions, the most likely cause being that the club is relegated from the specified competition and is therefore no longer in scope of the regulator.

[Mr French]

I am trying to get clarity. Again, I will happily accept it in writing if the Minister does not have the answer today. Waiting until the end of the season before revoking a licence is entirely sensible, but what would that mean for relegation and promotion? For example, if a club is mid-table and the regulator decides its licence should be revoked, that will have a direct impact on the competitive nature of the league. Has any thought been put into whether, for example, that may mean only two teams are relegated that season, because one has lost its licence? How might it work in practice?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Where possible, we want to reduce any impact on ongoing sporting competitions. The hon. Gentleman presents me with a hypothetical scenario. I think it would be best if I respond in writing to him.

Regarding the circumstances when a licence automatically ceases to have effect, it will only happen when the club stops operating a team in specified competition. The most likely cause of that is a club having been relegated and therefore no longer being in scope. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I will not rehash the debate we have already had on the amendment. We were seeking greater transparency and a greater say for clubs at risk of losing their licence, which, as I have explained, is the ultimate sanction and would cause enormous damage to clubs and the communities in which they operate through job losses, and impact on the game and on fans. I would appreciate the Minister giving more clarity on how this will work in practice. These situations are hypothetical, but realistic, and would have serious consequences for not just the individual clubs, but the leagues and how they operate.

We believe strongly that promotion and relegation should be based on competition on the pitch. However, in the extreme example of a club breaching the licence so significantly that it is revoked, which might more realistically happen at the lower end of the pyramid, we need to have a greater understanding of what that means for relegation. All clubs deserve transparency in that regard. We have seen much speculation in recent years around change of ownership—I will not mention the clubs involved as some of the legal cases are ongoing—what that might mean for relegation and the significant financial consequences it may have for other clubs. It would be greatly appreciated if the Minister provided guidance on that in writing so that all Members can have a greater understanding of how it will work in practice.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister say whether a good licensing regime and, if necessary, revocation of licences would prevent clubs from going into full administration—as in the example of Derby County that my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak described—and the knock-on effect of that on supporters, suppliers and the local community? A licensing regime should prevent full administration and be able to deal with problem clubs at a much earlier stage.

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend raises an important constituency point. I do not want to comment on particular clubs and predict the action the regulator may or may not take. We hope that the Bill will raise the bar across the board and prevent clubs from getting into difficulty, but I do not want to be drawn on the specifics.

We have been clear that this is not a zero-fail regime. I will endeavour to write to the shadow Minister regarding the complex, but important, hypothetical situation he has proposed.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister committing to that. The example just mentioned by the hon. Member for Derby South needs fleshing out as well, because clubs get into financial difficulty as a matter of course; points are therefore deducted mid-season, as we have seen, or, in the worst cases, the club goes into administration. The tests for the licence are about financial prudence and sustainability, so the hon. Gentleman makes a fair challenge.

What would happen if a club went into administration? Would the regulator seek to change the owner to allow the operating licence to continue, for example, or would the club, having lost the licence, then reapply via a new owner? The consequences would be dramatic. One would automatically assume that a club that no longer had a licence would have to start at the bottom of the football pyramid and come back up again, as we have seen in the past. Can the Minister add clarification of that important example to her letter?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Absolutely. We will come on to the owners and directors test later in the Bill Committee; perhaps we can explore this further at that point. The one point I would make to the shadow Minister and to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby South is that the aim of the regulator is always to minimise disruption to ongoing sporting competitions. I will add clarification on that when I write to the shadow Minister about the complex scenario he proposed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Mandatory licence conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause requires the regulator to attach full mandatory licence conditions to the provisional and full operating licences for all licensed clubs. These are basic and fundamental requirements of the whole regime and so apply to all licensed clubs, regardless of their individual circumstances.

The mandatory conditions vary in their aims. They are set out in schedule 5, so we will cover them in more detail, but to summarise briefly, the conditions on financial plans and annual declarations are about ensuring that the regulator has the relevant and timely information it needs to regulate effectively. That includes financial risk assessments, plans for managing financial risks, details on income and expenditure, and contingency plans in the event of a shock such as relegation.

The corporate governance condition introduces basic requirements to report against the club corporate governance code of practice published by the regulator. This reporting mechanism will mean that clubs are transparent about board structures, decision making processes and equality, diversity and inclusion.

The fan consultation condition establishes a baseline level of fan engagement that requires clubs to consult fans on specified matters. This will ensure that clubs have a framework in place to regularly meet and consult a representative group of fans on key strategic matters at the club, and on other issues of interest to supporters. This will work in tandem with the freestanding duties, such as those protecting club heritage and other key areas.

The annual declaration condition requires the club to submit a declaration on any matters that should have previously been notified, or to confirm that there are no such matters. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As outlined by the Minister, clause 20 requires the IFR to attach four mandatory licence conditions to the each club’s operating licence, whether provisional or full. This includes a requirement for the club to submit a financial plan, either annually or at more frequent intervals. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on how frequent she believes is reasonable; is that semi-annually, for example?

The club must also submit and publish a corporate governance statement explaining how it is applying the IFR’s corporate governance code, and regularly consult its fans. I think we need some clarity about how that will work in practice. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East raised the example of Sheffield Wednesday and multiple fans’ groups claiming to represent the club. I think that that needs some fleshing out so that the regulator is clear about what that consultation looks like. Obviously, that will be different for each individual club, which should, hopefully, know its fans better than anyone else.

Last, there is a requirement to submit an annual declaration of any material changes in circumstances affecting the club. Again, we would argue that that needs to be very clear to clubs, particularly if there is any—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the shadow Minister’s comments. I will address them in detail when we come to the relevant debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5

Mandatory Licence Conditions

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 7, in schedule 5, page 100, line 19, at end insert “(e) an enforcement condition.”

See explanatory statement for Amendment 8.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

They would, and therefore the club disappears. No one wants to see that. The whole purpose of the Bill is to stop clubs disappearing, to stop what happened to Bury, and so there is a gap in the legislation, because what happens in that situation? It nearly happened at Reading—the club nearly disappeared, but in the end it was a last-minute sale. If the owner had not sold it at the last minute, however, the EFL has no powers to deal with it, and the regulator will not either. The regulator has the power to say: “You shouldn’t be owning the club. You shouldn’t have a licence to operate the club, because of what you have done, you haven’t got the funds, your source of funds is inappropriate”—all those things—but then what happens?

I am saying to the Minister that the whole intention of the Bill is to ensure that the clubs that fans have supported for years, for generations—for communities, it is their club—do not disappear, go out of business or lose their place in the competition they are playing in. Clubs might get relegated, that is fine, but they should not lose their place because they have an owner who is not fit and proper, and does not meet the test. We have to find way of dealing with this, which the Bill does not do as drafted.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for moving the amendment and tabling amendment 8. To be the owner of a football club is to be the custodian of a treasured and historic community asset. That should be an honour, but it also comes with great responsibility. We recognise that in the past, however, it has typically been the actions of unsuitable custodians that have put our historic clubs at risk of collapse. It is vital that the regulator has the necessary powers to protect clubs and their fans from such owners. We therefore completely recognise the intent behind the amendments—to ensure that the regulator has the necessary enforcement mechanisms to back up its regime and guarantee protection from unsuitable owners.

I reassure my hon. Friend that the Bill already suitably achieves that. The regulator already has the power to require a club to make constitutional changes if the regulator considers that that is an appropriate way to secure an unsuitable owner’s removal. It has a range of strong powers to enforce against any non-compliance. The powers include the imposition of sanctions, such as financial penalties, all the way up to forcing divestment, which would force an owner to divest their stake in the club at no minimum price, directing them to take no part in the running of the club in the meantime. If necessary, the regulator can appoint an interim officer to assist the club operating effectively in the owner’s absence.

To respond to the point made by the hon. Member for Spelthorne in an intervention—a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East a number of times—that ability to isolate and remove unsuitable owners and officers should mean that a club never has to have its licence suspended or revoked. A clubs’ fans should therefore not have to suffer the consequences of bad leadership. To be clear, because the licence is separate from the owner, the removal of an owner will not impact the club’s licensed status. We will come on shortly to discuss owners and directors, so I shall reflect on my hon. Friend’s comments ahead of that debate. I hope to provide him with reassurance, but we will not support his amendment.

[Mr Betts]

Is the Minister saying that the regulator has the power to direct that someone else should be in charge of running a club and having operation of the licence that the club needs to compete in the competition, even if the owner is not a fit and proper person?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am saying that the regulator may—I am not saying definitely will, because I do not want to get into hypotheticals of what it will do or not—appoint an interim officer to assist a club to operate effectively in the owner’s absence. To be clear, the club’s licence is separate from its owner, so the removal of the owner does not impact the club’s licensed status.

[Mr Betts]

In further debate, we will come back to the issues of owners and directors, to which the Minister referred. As I said at the beginning, this was an exploratory amendment for discussion of the whole issue, which is important, but with her reassurance. at this point I will not press the amendments to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

Assets of community value have been looked at in a number of different ways over time. Some clubs are already in this situation because their fans have moved to do this. That is true at Sheffield Wednesday, where fans moved some time ago to have the ground designated as an asset of community value. It does not provide a complete safeguard against an owner, who wants to cause mischief and upset for fans and the club, transferring the ground for another purpose, but it provides more of a safeguard than simply having it as a ground without any particular protection, as is currently the case.

The Minister referred to what the MHCLG might be doing in this area on the rules around planning. Is she prepared to look at using assets of community value to give further protection and to comfort fans that football grounds hold a different status to other assets that owners, from time to time, might want to change for another purpose?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. I know we have discussed this issue a number of times; it has always been a pleasure to do so, and I recognise its importance. Home grounds are often the most important asset that a club owns, so that is why I want to thank my hon. Friend for placing a real focus on them.

The significant financial and heritage value that grounds hold is why the Bill has strong protections to prevent home grounds being sold, used as collateral or relocated without the necessary considerations. Asset of community value status is another mechanism that a number of clubs and supporter groups have obtained for their home grounds. We would expect the regulator to welcome any club that wishes to gain community value status for an asset as another way to protect their home ground.

However, we are confident that the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns and keep these important assets protected without mandating this status. Additionally, while assets of community value have proven beneficial for many clubs where no other protections have been in place, these amendments may place an unnecessary burden on clubs. As currently drafted, they would require clubs to either go through what can be a lengthy process with the relevant authority or make structural changes to the constitutional document of a club. Given that significant protections are already in place in the Bill that deliver the necessary safeguards, it is difficult to justify any additional measures for all regulated clubs, especially as a mandatory licence condition.

I really want to reassure my hon. Friend, as I know that home ground protections are of particular importance to him, that the Government have already committed to asset of community value reform in our manifesto, and this is something that the recent English devolution White Paper from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government commits to.

[Mr French]

I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. The Minister argues that this does not need to be addressed through the regulator, but will guidance be published for those fan groups who are keen to ensure the long-term future of their grounds? What guidance will be published to ensure that any fans in this situation have clear advice from the Government on the best routes to protect their ground?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am saying that I am confident the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns, but I also draw the Committee’s attention to the work of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on the specific issue of assets of community value. Of course, that does not fall into my portfolio, but I am very happy to commit to speaking to my relevant counterpart and adding to the letter that I have earlier committed to writing. This is something that I am sympathetic to, but I do not have the ability to make that commitment today. I believe that the work the Ministry is doing is very interesting and relevant to what we are discussing. For that reason, I am unable to accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, and I ask that he withdraws it.

[Mr Betts]

I thank the Minister for that reply; it is helpful in moving the discussion in the right direction. I appreciate that she cannot commit on behalf of another Department and other Ministers, but she has indicated that work is going on in this area. Again, it would be helpful if she could encourage her colleagues in the MHCLG to come forward with that further information before we get to Report. If they are going to write to us about the other issue, they could write to us about this as well. It would be extremely helpful if that could be done, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

As I have made clear, we believe that some of these issues are important, but we believe that they should be addressed on a voluntary basis, which is what has driven progress in the game. We do not believe that it should be mandated in statute at arm’s length by the Government. I have been clear in making that distinction in my comments.

Requiring clubs to report annually on their EDI action is not a proportionate or effective way to achieve those broader aims. It amounts to moral licensing, encouraging clubs to go through the motions rather than to take meaningful steps to foster a welcoming culture in ways that make sense for them.

My amendments would restore clarity to the regulator’s remit. They would ensure that schedule 5 is focused on what really matters: clear lines of accountability, proper oversight of directors and owners, and a robust governance structure that protects clubs from the kind of catastrophic mismanagement that we have seen in the past. Football has always been about community; it is in the dressing rooms, on the terraces and in the shared heritage of our towns and cities that the game’s values are lived. Let us not fall into the trap of thinking that they can be legislated for by line item in a regulator’s reporting requirements. It is for that reason that I tabled these amendments. I urge the Minister to reflect seriously on whether this part of schedule 5 is truly consistent with the aims of the Bill and the traditions of our national game, which is inclusive by default.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendments, but I disagree with the attempts to remove the references to EDI from the Bill. I will outline why and then, towards the end of my contribution, I will respond to his specific questions.

The Government believe that equality, diversity and inclusion is a key part of good corporate governance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes outlined, it is common practice. Research shows that diversity on boards and in organisations promotes better governance, decision making and transparency, all of which, in turn, contribute to improved financial sustainability. The relationship between diversity and better corporate performance is recognised by the Financial Reporting Council and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants.

The industry is already taking action in this space, and the shadow Minister shared some examples, which I will not repeat. In November 2024, the FA published its four-year equality, diversity and inclusion strategy, titled “A Game Free from Discrimination”. It set out a long-term commitment to celebrate and promote diversity in English football, as well as an ambition to tackle all forms of discrimination in the game.

At a club level, in May this year, Chelsea’s incredible work in that area was recognised, with the Premier League awarding them the advanced level of its equality, diversity and inclusion standard—the highest level that can be awarded. All clubs in the Premier League, and some that have since been relegated from it, engage with the Premier League equality, diversity and inclusion standard initiative.

The Bill does not put EDI in football—it is already there and it is being celebrated by the industry. It is therefore right that, as a regulator that will be introducing a corporate governance code and requiring clubs to report against that, it covers EDI. The regulator will look to work co-operatively with stakeholders, draw on the expertise of the sector and add industry initiatives.

As with fan engagement, this will be a statutory baseline. Clubs that already champion equality, diversity and inclusion will not have an additional burden placed on them, other than having to periodically report on those things. Under the corporate governance code, clubs will simply be required to explain how they are applying the code and what actions they are taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion—and nothing more. That is not onerous; it is a very helpful transparency measure, and it speaks to the question that the shadow Minister posed. I want to be very clear: the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets and quotas on EDI. That is simply not the role of the regulator and would cause a significant burden to both the regulator and clubs. Ultimately, this is only a reporting requirement that all clubs should be able to meet.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the clarity provided by the Minister in outlining what she believes the regulator should or should not do. On quotas, can we be absolutely clear that the Government’s intention is not for there to be a mandated quota for clubs to have certain elements and different parts of the community on the board? Is that the clear intention in what the Minister is saying?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Absolutely. I will repeat the wording I just used in the Committee: to be very clear, the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets or quotas on EDI. We will have that in Hansard twice now, so the intention should be very clear. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Member will seek to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the clarity that the Minister provided on quotas, because that particularly concerns Opposition Members. As I have mentioned—I will not seek to repeat my comments—we are concerned about mission creep and scope creep of the regulator and what the Bill is designed to do. I made it clear earlier that I believe that football is inclusive and that it has done amazing work, when we compare the state of football 20 or 30 years ago with where we are today. We see that on the terraces at most clubs every single week, and we certainly see that with the national team, which most of the country comes together to support, particularly in big tournaments.

Mandating EDI reporting and turning it into a bit of a tick-box exercise—that was highlighted in some of the Minister’s comments—moves away from what we believe to be the valuable part of this work, which is to drive forward inclusivity in clubs and increase the fan base, which is good for clubs, by expanding beyond some of the traditional support of the game. We fear that having this provision in the corporate governance code, in the way it is written, will lead to unintended consequences. It will drive certain agendas, and we fear that clubs will walk into a number of traps accidentally.

We have tabled these amendments because we believe that EDI reporting, especially in certain areas where it is contested, should not be put on clubs in this way. The voluntary scheme in football has worked much more powerfully over the years, and that is proven in the experiences at football grounds around the country.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. He made some important points in his contribution, including his reference to the Kicks programme. He also pointed out an event in his area where he was able to see the Premier League trophy; that is a fantastic tour involving lots of grassroots and other clubs. I was really pleased to visit one such club in Mr Speaker’s Chorley constituency, and I will take this opportunity to wish Mr Speaker a very happy birthday. I am sure that other Committee members will join me in putting that on the record.

We do not believe, however, that the change in amendment 137 is necessary. I will outline why and respond throughout my speech to some of the hon. Gentleman’s points. As drafted, the Bill gives flexibility to a club to detail what action it is taking to contribute

“to the economic and social well-being of the local community with which it is associated”.

This provision was introduced through a Government amendment made in the other place to allow the regulator to include clubs’ community contributions in its corporate governance code. The regulator will work with the industry to design the code to ensure that it is relevant to clubs, the challenges they face and the unique nature of the responsibilities associated with custodianship of a football club.

If a club details, in its statement, its work with or through its official charity, that would of course be accepted by the regulator. That is the opposite of what the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup said. He referred to scaling back charity work, but that is absolutely not what we will see as a result of the proposals.

Let me detail some of the specifics. If a club is donating to or funding bodies that are not its official charity, that is also a contribution to the community and could be included. We have tried to keep this as broad as possible. To share something from my constituency and town, Barnsley FC Community Trust is a great example of a charity that is closely connected to a club. The community trust held its conference on Monday, and I was pleased to send them a message. One purpose of that conference was to raise the charity’s profile across Barnsley. It helps between 10,000 and 15,000 people each year, who range in age from two to 100 years old. I will not detain the Committee by outlining the work that the trust does, but it ranges from education to health, social inclusion and sports participation, not just in and around the centre connected to Oakwell, but across the whole of Barnsley and my Barnsley South constituency.

Barnsley FC could use their work with the trust to show how they contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of their community, and I put on record that they very much do that in my area. But it is not just Barnsley FC that do such work; many clubs carry out great work in their communities, whether through their official charities or not. Portsmouth FC’s Pompey in the Community and the Sheffield Wednesday FC Community Programme are just two examples; I am sure that hon. Members across the Committee have examples from their communities. It is important to shine a light on those contributions to the local community, and that is why a club’s report on their corporate governance will be published online to allow public scrutiny, so that they can be held accountable for their actions, or inaction. We believe that this will encourage transparency and, as with the approach to corporate governance more widely, encourage greater action in this space.

Above all, that approach will allow flexibility for each club to comply in accordance with their resources and size in a way that is suited to the needs of their local community. Additionally, when the regulator publishes its corporate governance report on clubs, best practice can be shared with the industry. We therefore believe that the Bill, as drafted, sufficiently allows clubs to demonstrate the actions they contribute to their communities. I hope that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a privilege to speak again under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate you and the city of Hull on the Challenge cup victory at the weekend, which probably does not please Mr Speaker on his birthday, but such is sport.

Moving back to football, before the lunch break, I explained why the Opposition felt the need for amendment 137. It is a technical amendment that would make it very clear that the official charities and trusts of the clubs would count towards the corporate governance structure. I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and appreciate the feedback that she has given. However, we would still like to see the amendment made to provide clarity to clubs, so we will press it to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Before we move on, there are one or two points I want to raise. First, we are expecting Divisions on the business in the main Chamber. If there is a Division, we will suspend the Committee for 15 minutes for the first Division, and 10 minutes’ injury time thereafter if required. Secondly, it is a bit warm in this room, so Members are welcome to take off their jackets.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment 131. Football is a worldwide industry, and the activity of football agents continues to be a significant contributor to the financial pressures on English football, as well as internationally. We recognise that this is a key issue, which is frequently raised by the industry. Agent fees are a significant cost pressure, particularly on clubs in the Premier League and the Championship. The largest fees are often paid in international transfer activity, where regulation is especially difficult without a global framework. There are also concerns about dual representation and conflicts of interest, which can further inflate costs.

However, the regulator cannot be the solution for all of football’s woes. The Bill establishes a club licensing regime with a tightly defined scope, in which agents are not included. The fan-led review recognised that and recommended pursuing an international and game-wide solution to football agents, rather than trying to address the issue in isolation. Acting unilaterally may end up being disadvantageous to English football. It is right that we follow the review’s recommendation not to try and address the issue in isolation, which reflects the unique scale and complexity of English football’s place in the global game.

I want to make it clear that the Government acknowledge the importance of this issue, and will continue to work with the industry on agents and fees. We will work closely with governing bodies to support full compliance once legal proceedings conclude in the courts, and to drive forward our shared ambition for transparency, integrity and best practice across the game. We will keep this issue under review, but for those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and acknowledge a number of the points that she made. The purpose behind the amendment was to have the discussion about the impact of fees on the game. I accept some of her points about the international nature of the transfer market. I would like to continue discussing this with her and the regulator once in situ, because I think there is something we can do here, either formally or informally, to move the game along so that it stops losing so much money to agents’ fees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 64, in schedule 5, page 103, line 18, after “specified” insert

“from time to time by the IFR”.

This amendment clarifies that the IFR may specify certain elements of the mandatory licence conditions from time to time.

The regulator will attach four mandatory licence conditions—the financial plan, the corporate governance statement, a fan consultation and an annual declaration—to the operating licence, both provisional and full, of each club. This means that all licensed clubs will need to comply with those requirements.

While the mandatory conditions are basic requirements that apply to all licensed clubs as standard, elements within them can be varied. For example, the regulator can specify when a club must submit and update a financial plan, or require that a plan contains additional information. As another example, the fan consultation condition can require that clubs consult plans at specified periods, which speaks to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East raised earlier.

Government amendment 64 simply makes it explicit that the regulator can respecify these elements to the mandatory licence conditions from time to time. The licensing regime is designed to be flexible and proportionate, and the mandatory licence conditions are no different. For instance, a Premier League club’s financial plan is likely to be more detailed than one for a National League club. If a club’s circumstances change—for instance, if it gets promoted or relegated—the regulator should have a chance to respecify the mandatory licence condition to ensure that it remains proportionate.

The regulator also needs to be able to keep pace with developments in the industry and changes in best practice —for example, if there are innovations in financial plans or mechanisms for fan engagement. Government amendment 64 simply makes that explicit in the Bill.

Amendment 64 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The schedule outlines the mandatory licence conditions that the regulator will attach to all licences as standard, regardless of the club’s circumstances. Those conditions are related to core areas of financial management, corporate governance, fan engagement, and reporting. They will form the foundations for the overall improved standards and sustainability of a club. Long-term financial sustainability is at the heart of the Bill, and is vital to making clubs more resilient to financial difficulties.

The financial plan condition requires clubs to present a plan that allows the regulator to understand the risk profile of the club and its plans for mitigating risks if necessary. That will include contingency planning and plans to wind a club back to a sustainable state if it faces unexpected financial difficulty. Those are not overly onerous requirements, but basic business planning that most well-run clubs will already be doing. It is anticipated that the regulator will help clubs update their plans if they exhibit unmanaged risk. If the updated plan still exhibits excessive risk, the regulator can place discretionary licence conditions on a club to help them meet the financial resources threshold requirement. That ensures that clubs can be ambitious but, equally, that failing to achieve those ambitions does not put the long-term financial sustainability of the club at risk.

A key tenet of a well-run business is good corporate governance, and the regulator will look to instil that into all licensed football clubs through the mandatory condition. Corporate governance standards in the industry need improving, with many clubs lacking even the most basic of good governance arrangements, such as a proper, functioning board. In consultation with the Football Association and other relevant stakeholders, the regulator will prepare and publish a code of practice about the corporate governance of regulated football clubs. Through that condition, licensed clubs will be required to submit a statement detailing how they are applying the code of practice. That will include what action they are taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion.

Given the rich variety of clubs and fanbases, good supporter consultation will look different from one club to another. The fan engagement licence condition has been designed to reflect that, empowering the regulator to impose specific requirements on the form and frequency of supporter consultation where necessary. That mandatory licence condition works in tandem with the fan engagement threshold requirement, which is in schedule 4. The mandatory licence condition will be the minimum requirement for all clubs.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will address some of my hon. Friend’s points, if he bears with me for a moment. If I do not, I will be very happy to give way.

All clubs must regularly consult a representative group of fans or a group elected by the club’s fans to represent them on the relevant matters listed in the Bill. The regulator can specify that the group is formed via fan elections—an additional measure the Government added to ensure the fan group can be independent from the club. The threshold requirement in schedule 4 then empowers the regulator to go further on fan engagement, if needed. It allows the regulator to impose discretionary licence conditions on clubs relating to fan consultation. There are several types of fan engagement that could be used to meet that requirement. No one way has been specified on the face of the Bill in order to allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at each club. We expect, however, that we would likely look to utilise existing structures where appropriate. Those would likely be organisations such as supporters’ trusts or fan advisory boards, which are often key independent fan bodies.

To address the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, for the most part, individual clubs will be in the best position to understand the demographics of their fans. The regulator will be able to provide guidance for clubs on how best to consult fans, which will include how to approach consulting across a widespread fan base. It is, however, vital that they engage with a representative group of fans, and therefore, if a section of the fan base has not been engaged with, the regulator has the ability to specify the club should meet with them. That will ensure that clubs have an appropriate framework in place that allows them to meet regularly and consult the group on key strategic matters and supporter interest.

Clubs in the lower leagues will tend to have more a more local fan base, whereas larger clubs will tend to have fans from across the world. That diversity is part of the reason why the English football pyramid is so special. It is also why we want to implement proportional and flexible proposals that work for clubs across the pyramid. The regulator will implement a minimum requirement for fan engagement, which the regular fan consultations will be a significant part of, alongside protections for club heritage. I hope that answers my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. I am happy to give way if not, or he can contribute to the debate.

[Mr Betts]

I will contribute to the debate.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Perfect. The annual declaration condition requires a club to submit an annual declaration to the regulator, which sets out all the notifications that the club has made, or should have made, to the regulator in the preceding 12 months. Broadly speaking, these notifications relate to changes in the circumstances affecting the club that the regulator needs to know about to regulate effectively. That includes any non-compliance related to the club. A club will also have to issue a statement even if there are not any matters to notify the regulator about. That will create a formal touchpoint each year in lieu of any licence renewal; the emphasis will be on clubs to declare all relevant changes in circumstances and compliance against which they can then be held accountable.

[Mr Betts]

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair, Mr Turner. The Minister is doing all she can to deal with situations that will apply to most clubs. The problem is those owners that do not want to engage. They will try to avoid this responsibility because they see it as an infringement of their right to run their club in the way they want.

I have to come back to Sheffield Wednesday because Mr Chansiri has a track record on this. He set up an engagement panel with fans, but he invited the fan groups he wanted to invite. Worse than that, once someone goes into a meeting with him, they have to sign a statement to say that they will not divulge any of the things that happen in that meeting. It is a closed shop.

I sat down with a myriad of different groups including the supporters’ trust, which is the biggest fan group by a long way, and several other groups, including the women’s group and the 1867 group. We formed an umbrella group to try to bring all the fan groups together. The club spoke to the groups and said, “If you get involved in the umbrella group, you will not be allowed on the engagement panel.” It is either/or because that is seen as an attack on the club and the chairman. You could not make it up—well, you can make it up, because we can see how the club is run. That is the problem.

How do we get around that situation? I was told the other day, “The chairman engages with fans. He has actually had two meetings of five hours each with fans.” But he does not answer any questions. When I asked one of the officers at the club why he will not answer questions, they said, “Well, they wanted to know what his business plan was.” It is not a bad question to ask, and that is exactly what the regulator is going to have the powers to do.

I am still not absolutely certain on what happens when the club tries to control the situation. Does the regulator then arbitrate? Does the regulator come in and say what they think good fan engagement looks like? It would be very helpful if the Football Supporters’ Association were to be given some role in that, because it understands fan engagement and fan involvement better than anyone. It knows what happens on the ground, it knows the tricks that the clubs pull and it knows how genuine fan engagement can be developed and implemented. I am not sure a new regulator will necessarily have all that intrinsic knowledge about what happens at clubs. Some role for the FSA in this would be helpful. In particular, it would help when problems arise of the sort that I have just explained.

I am sure Sheffield Wednesday are not the only club where owners do not really want fans around—they just want them to turn up, pay their money and go away. The Chair probably cannot get involved in the debate, but I can see you nodding, Mr Turner, because I am aware that there have been a few problems at Hull in that regard in the past. I ask that the Minister provide a bit more of an explanation and flesh this out further. In particular, sub-paragraph 8(2) reads:

“So far as the condition requires consultation with persons within sub-paragraph (1)(a), the condition may require the club to constitute a group of such persons”.

I know immediately how some clubs will constitute that group, and it will not be proper fan consultation.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution. We would obviously expect the regulator to build on relevant expertise internally and via consultation. I have worked with and met representatives of the FSA a number of times. I pay tribute to the work they do, and I am sure that is the sort of group that the regulator will very much draw on.

My hon. Friend will completely understand why I am slightly reluctant to comment on live examples. That does not mean that I am not sympathetic to the points he makes on behalf of his constituents. I draw his attention to my remarks about how, if a section of the fanbase is not being engaged with, the regulator has the ability to require a meeting with the club. Where an owner or a club are not engaging, or not engaging effectively, the regulator will be able to intervene.

[Mr Betts]

It is helpful of the Minister to have elaborated on that. Would she go a bit further and say whether she anticipates that the regulator will engage with the Football Supporters’ Association when difficulties arise and there needs to be an independent look at fan engagement with a club?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We have talked about the regulator engaging with a wide range of stakeholders. We anticipate throughout the Bill—in lots of clauses, not just this one—that it will absolutely engage with relevant stakeholders.

If a certain group of fans feel that they are being ignored or excluded, or that the owner is not engaging in good faith or appropriately, the regulator has the ability to step in and specify that they should be engaged with more frequently, and sanctions may be imposed if the owner is not behaving correctly. There are enforcement powers that the regulator can draw on. We are clear that, although the approach is flexible and bespoke for different clubs, the voices of fans should be heard.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 5, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Clause 21

Discretionary licence conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause relates to the discretionary licence conditions. Where needed, the regulator will use discretionary licence conditions to bring a club up to the required level of compliance with the threshold requirements. That will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently operate sustainably, and will be able to continue to continue to do so, in the financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas. Those conditions will be in addition to the standardised mandatory licence conditions. When applied, they will be tailored to the club’s specific circumstances and identified financial risk.

If a club is already meeting the threshold requirements set by the regulator, there will be no need to attach any discretionary licence conditions to that end. That means that the regulator can be light touch where appropriate, and that it does not need to directly intervene if a desired outcome is already being met.

Discretionary licence conditions could also be used to protect and promote the financial resilience of the football system. They will be used to resolve risks that might not threaten any one club significantly, but whose aggregated, correlated or multiplied effects may pose a significant risk to large parts of the football system or the pyramid as a whole. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator.

Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed?

If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size?

Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states:

“The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”.

However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence.

We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. Throughout this process, we have been keen to reiterate that discretionary conditions must be proportionate to the club’s size and the league it plays in. We absolutely expect the regulator to engage thoroughly with a club before applying any discretionary licence conditions. Perhaps I could just draw on the conversation that we had in the previous debate in terms of fan engagement: I am hesitant to get into hypothetical scenarios, but it might be that, if a club is not effectively engaging with fans, that could be a discretionary licence condition if there is an obvious gap in what the club is doing. If the club does not believe the regulator has made a correct decision, it does have recourse through the appeals process, which is set out in part 9.

We want this to be a flexible regime so it can be light touch where appropriate. If the regulator does not need to attach extra conditions, it will not, but it will have that ability to make sure that all clubs are meeting the conditions they need to.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 22, page 14, line 35, leave out subsection (a).

This amendment prevents the IFR from being able to set licence conditions relating to internal controls.

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[Mr French]

I rise to speak on clause 22 of this important Bill, which provides the Independent Football Regulator with powers to attach, amend and remove discretionary licence conditions for individual football clubs. At face value, this clause offers the regulator flexibility to respond to particular risks or circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, as with all regulatory discretion, the true implications lie in how such powers may evolve over time, be interpreted, or be expanded.

In this Committee, it is our role to ensure that what begins as a sensible framework for tailored intervention does not become the thin end of a wedge that risks overreach, centralisation and, ultimately, the erosion of club autonomy. I believe strongly that English football does need reform in certain areas, but I also believe in restraint, clarity of purpose and fidelity to the principle that football clubs, however commercial they may have become, are civic institutions first and foremost. They belong to their communities, not to Whitehall, not to arm’s length bodies, and certainly not to ministerial discretion.

Clause 22, as drafted, gives the Independent Football Regulator a wide and open-ended ability to impose additional conditions on individual clubs—conditions that are not part of the baseline threshold requirements in the Bill, but which the regulator may, in its own judgment, decide are appropriate. We should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which such powers might be necessary. For example, where a club has narrowly avoided insolvency, has a particularly opaque ownership structure, or is operating under unusual financial pressures, the regulator may wish to impose temporary conditions to help safeguard the public interest, protect creditors or ensure better transparency.

That flexibility has its place. However, it must be anchored in the principles of proportionality, accountability and predictability. It is for that reason that I want to speak to three amendments that have been tabled in my name, each of which I believe would help materially improve the Bill by preventing mission creep, protecting the distinct role of the leagues, and ensuring that Parliament, not the Executive, retains the ultimate authority over the scope of regulation.

The first amendment would prevent the regulator from imposing discretionary conditions relating to a club’s internal controls—that is, the systems and procedures by which a club governs itself, monitors risks, approves spending and safeguards assets. These are matters properly for the board of directors, who have legal duties under company law, are accountable to shareholders and fans, and must answer to independent auditors.

To allow the regulator to second guess those internal arrangements and dictate how a club structures its finance team or risk-management processes would be a significant intrusion into corporate governance territory. Let us be clear: there is a distinction between requiring that a club has adequate systems and mandating the precise nature of those systems. The former is reasonable; the latter, we believe, is excessive.

We must also be mindful of the danger that the regulator could, perhaps with good intentions, begin to substitute its own preferred model of governance over the perfectly legitimate models that clubs themselves decide to adopt. For example, what works for a large Premier League club with international operations may not be appropriate or affordable for a League Two club or a community-owned side. Discretionary licensing conditions must not become a one-size-fits-all instrument that penalises innovation, tradition or diversity in club structures.

I support this amendment because it would help ringfence those areas of internal decision making that are rightly matters for the club’s board—subject to transparency and good practice but not for centralised prescription.

The second amendment that I have tabled would prevent the regulator from imposing licensing conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. Amendment 108 would prevent the regulator from imposing licence conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. This is a fundamental issue. English football operates within a competitive ecosystem, as we have discussed. Decisions about how much to invest in players, infrastructure, academies or commercial operations are matters of strategic importance for clubs. They should be driven by ambition, fan demand and commercial opportunity, not by the regulator’s view of what is appropriate spending.

We must not fall into the trap of conflating good financial regulation with financial central planning. The role of the Independent Football Regulator should be to monitor solvency, ensure robust business plans, enforce transparency and intervene when there are clear risks of harm. It is not the regulator’s job, and it should never become its job, to determine how much a club is allowed to spend. There is a world of difference between assessing whether spending is sustainable and attempting to control outright the volume of that spending.

Let us remember that the leagues themselves already impose cost controls. The Premier League has profit and sustainability rules. The English Football League enforces squad salary caps and financial fair play frameworks, and now has the new financial review panel. The regulator is not meant to replace those roles. It is not a shadow competition authority, nor should it seek to override club investment decisions, which often have complex justifications and long-term returns.

Amendment 108 would help to ensure that the regulator cannot use its discretionary power to micromanage investment levels. Such a step would go beyond the spirit and the letter of what the Bill intends to achieve. The goal is to protect clubs from existential risk, not to homogenise them or stifle ambition.

Amendment 109 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of discretionary licence conditions by regulation. This is not a technical point; it goes to the constitutional heart of the Bill. The Independent Football Regulator must be just that: independent. Its scope, duties and powers must be defined by Parliament and subject to oversight. We cannot accept a model in which future Secretaries of State, by regulation and with minimal scrutiny, can expand the areas the regulator may interfere with. That would allow a future Government of any colour to alter the regulatory perimeter at will. Today, it might be internal controls; tomorrow, it might be club ticket pricing, political messaging or hiring policies. The clause must be narrowed to ensure that any expansion of discretionary licence conditions comes through primary legislation that is debated and approved by both Houses.

Regulatory stability is vital not only for clubs but for fans, leagues and the broader football economy. Clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues, need to be able to plan over multiple seasons. Uncertainty about what new regulatory burdens might be imposed, or fears that the regime could be altered mid-season by ministerial decree, will have a chilling effect on investment, sponsorship and ambition. Regulation must be predictable and principled, not politicised or ever-shifting. Amendment 109 would safeguard its integrity.

Clause 22 presents a risk of regulatory overreach, however well-intentioned it may be. The amendments would not strip the regulator of useful tools. They would simply place guardrails around its discretion and ensure that decisions of fundamental importance to club governance, financial independence and regulatory scope remain where they belong: with clubs, fans and Parliament.

We need a regulator that enforces minimum standards, upholds transparency and ensures financial resilience. What we do not need is a regulator that micromanages club affairs or displaces the judgment of boards and owners. Football clubs must remain free to compete, to innovate and to fail or succeed on their own merits—within a fair framework, yes, but not under constant intervention.

The amendments reinforce that principle. They are not ideological; they are practical, measured and consistent with the values that underpin the Bill. I urge the Committee to support them and, in doing so, to send a clear signal that we are legislating not to control football but to support it firmly, fairly and with the long-term interests of the game at heart.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the amendments, which I will take in turn in responding to the points that he made.

Broadly, amendments 107 and 108 concern integral powers for a financial regulator. Limiting those powers by reducing the scope of the regulator’s discretionary licence conditions would jeopardise its ability to achieve its objectives. On internal controls, the conditions cover areas such as the completeness and accuracy of reporting and information from a club, and continued compliance with the rules and regulations. If the regulator had no power to intervene to improve those areas where it was deemed necessary, it would not be able to bring a club up to its non-financial threshold requirement, and therefore the club would be unable to obtain a full operating licence.

Similarly, not allowing a financial regulator to require a club to limit its future expenditure to a sustainable amount, for example, would be self-defeating. This is a financial regulator, and it should have the power to intervene in a club’s finances if necessary, but—to respond directly to one of the points made by the shadow Minister —while it can direct the club to reduce expenditure, it cannot specify exactly how that is done, which is for the club to decide.

The regulator may only set licence conditions in such areas if a club is not meeting its threshold requirements. Any condition must be proportionate to the issue identified. The regulator must also have regard to whether the requirement or restriction is necessary and to whether a similar outcome could be achieved by a less burdensome means, as per the principles.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 21 outlined the use of discretionary licence conditions, which can be used to bring clubs up to the threshold requirements for a full operating licence, if necessary. They can also be applied to clubs with a full licence if there is a risk that they might drop below the threshold requirements.

Clause 22 sets out the scope of powers that the regulator will have to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition. Under the financial resources threshold requirement, discretionary conditions may address only four areas: debt management, liquidity requirements, restricting a club’s overall expenditure and restricting a club’s ability to receive illicit finance. The fourth area, which enables the regulator to restrict a club’s ability to access funding if it has reasonable grounds to suspect it is connected to serious criminal conduct, is integral. It will empower the regulator to limit illicit finance, which is inherently unsustainable for a club.

Under the non-financial resources threshold requirement, conditions may relate to only one of three areas: internal controls, risk management and financial reporting. As outlined in clause 21, the regulator can also attach discretionary licence conditions to advance its systemic financial resilience objective. That objective is specifically to address systemic risks or structural issues by applying conditions to multiple clubs, or even to all licensed clubs. Clause 22 limits the scope of such conditions to those that relate to debt management or liquidity requirements, and those restricting a club’s overall expenditure.

In order to future-proof the regulator’s regime, the Secretary of State will have the power to amend the areas that discretionary licence conditions may relate to. However, as we have discussed, that can be done only if the regulator makes a request in writing to the Secretary of State, having carried out a consultation first, explaining why an amendment is needed by reference to the purpose of the Act. We have also made it explicit in the legislation that the regulator must consult all regulated clubs and each specified competition organiser before requesting any amendments. That means that the Secretary of State will not be able to amend the regulator’s powers to attach discretionary conditions on their own initiative and against the wishes of the regulator, which, as I said, will limit the risk of unwanted, politically motivated scope creep in the future. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 24 stand part.

Schedule 6.

Clause 25 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 23 sets out the procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions on clubs, which ensures that clubs and competition organisers are notified and given the appropriate opportunity to engage in advance when the regulator considers that a discretionary licence condition is needed. Where appropriate, the regulator will look to allow the relevant club and league to address identified issues and risks, so that the regulator does not have to formally intervene itself. That will allow the potential for the football industry to respond to issues, reducing regulatory intervention and producing a better regulatory response and outcome. The industry may be best placed to address specific issues within the overall context of a league’s own regulatory framework.

Before any action is taken by the regulator, there will be a period in which leagues and clubs are able to make representations, and the competition organiser will also be able to give a commitment to take action in lieu of the condition being attached or varied as proposed by the regulator. Clause 24 explains in further detail the mechanism for commitments in lieu of discretionary financial licence conditions. It is a final, formal opportunity for competition organisers to offer a self-regulatory solution to a problem identified by the regulator, so that the regulator does not have to step in. It is another important aspect of the regulator’s approach, which emphasises engagement and working with the industry to minimise formal intervention where possible. The regulator will still have powers to step in if the issue is not resolved, but the mechanism will give a competition organiser the chance to present a football industry-led solution to an identified risk.

The regulator can accept a commitment if it concludes that it should achieve the same results as the proposed discretionary licence condition and it does not conflict with the regulator’s objectives. The regulator does not have to accept the commitment, although, if it does not, it must provide reasons why. If a commitment proposed by a league will not achieve the regulator’s desired outcome, the regulator can reject it, and it will retain the power to intervene directly by imposing a discretionary licence condition on a club where any accepted commitment proves ineffective.

Schedule 6 expands on clause 24 by outlining the procedure where a competition organiser gives a commitment that the regulator is minded to accept, or requests a variation to a commitment in force, in lieu of the regulator’s attaching a financial discretionary licence condition to a club. The intention, as I referenced earlier, is for commitments to provide a less burdensome solution for all parties and still address the identified risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator, and the schedule sets out that procedure in further detail. Clubs can make representations to the regulator before accepting a commitment from a competition organiser, as well as before a competition organiser is released from a commitment.

Clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition relating to the non-financial resources threshold requirement or the fan engagement threshold requirement. The regulator must notify the club and give it a period of no less than 14 days to make representations, but the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious: if it thinks that giving a club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately and without prior notice. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant.

Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated.

The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made?

Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks.

Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful.

Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.

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Football oversight needs to be proportionate, predictable and principled; it does not need arbitrariness, conditionality or creeping micromanagement. We support the intention behind the clauses, but we will continue to scrutinise their use and press for guardrails that ensure that clubs are not subject to undue interference and that the English game remains open, competitive and self-confident, both on and off the pitch.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 23 already tightly constrains the regulator’s ability to set discretionary licence conditions, and the shadow Minister’s earlier amendment sought to tighten that further, but it would have left the regulator unable to act as necessary to ensure financially sustainable clubs. It would have been unable to manage unsustainable debt or spiralling spending.

The regulator must act in accordance with its objectives and duties at all times, which include transparency and consistency. It can tailor regulation to clubs that will not breach UEFA statutes. I draw hon. Members’ attentions to page 14 of the Bill, which outlines in detail the scope of the powers to attach or vary licence conditions. Of course, a discretionary licence condition relating to the financial resource threshold requirement may only, as I said earlier,

“relate to debt management…relate to liquidity requirements…restrict the club’s overall expenditure, or…restrict the club’s ability to accept or receive funding which the IFR reasonably suspects to be connected to serious criminal conduct.”

We expect the regulator to work with clubs. If they are acting in good faith, we have said all along that the regulator will work with them. I think that answers the shadow Minister’s points.

In my opening remarks on this clause, I outlined in detail that there is a process available to come to a football-led solution. If the regulator thinks that giving a club notice or allowing for representations would jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the licence condition immediately, without prior notice. However, there is scope within the Bill and the regulator’s powers to reach football-led solutions in which it works together with clubs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Part 4: overview and interpretation

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 26, page 19, line 20, at end insert—

“(c) respects and promotes the protection of human rights and prevents modern slavery (as set out in section [Human rights and modern slavery considerations]).”

This amendment is linked to NC8.

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[Joe Robertson]

I have sympathy with the aims of the amendments, but I also have a few questions. I wonder whether the wording in the Bill about “requisite honesty and integrity” might cover the issue that the hon. Member for Cheltenham is trying to deal with in new clause 8. I note that amendment 75 would do more that protect against owners with a record of human rights abuses, because it would require them to promote human rights. I obviously have no problem with people promoting human rights, but the amendment would put a duty on an owner to do something positive to show that they are fit and proper. I wonder whether that is really the hon. Member’s intention.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is once again a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling his amendments. It is absolutely right that clubs should have suitable owners, which is why the new statutory owners and directors test is a key focus of the regulatory regime. Because we have provided the regulator with statutory powers, including information-gathering powers and information-sharing gateways with other government agencies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the regulator will be better placed to apply all elements of its tests than the relevant leagues. Unlike the tests used by the leagues, the regulator will assess owners’ and officers’ suitability in the round, as well as any relevant mitigating circumstances, leading to a better determination of whether an individual is suitable.

A core part of the owners and directors test is the fitness test, which the hon. Gentleman’s amendments seek to expand. The individual ownership fitness test criteria—honesty and integrity, and financial soundness—have been carefully designed. The relevant matters the regulator must consider are listed in clause 37, which I will speak to in a later sitting. They are based on precedent, and are specifically relevant to whether someone is suitable to be an owner of a football club.

All individuals will be tested against the same criteria. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that much of what his amendments seek to achieve is already delivered by the Bill as drafted. In line with the relevant matters listed in clause 37, if an individual has had legal proceedings brought against them, whether civil or criminal, including in the international courts, the regulator must have regard to that.

The regulator will also look at whether the individual has had regulatory or disciplinary action of any kind brought against them. If that action has a bearing on their honesty or integrity, the regulator must take that into account and could potentially find them unsuitable on that basis. That means that offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 or equivalent legislation, whether in the UK or elsewhere, are already captured by the Bill’s owners and directors test, as are any behaviours that have given rise to legal, regulatory or disciplinary action against the owner in any forum, as well as egregious actions committed outside the UK that can be proven and that would have been criminal if done here. In addition, the regulator will consider whether any individual is sanctioned by the UK Government—for example, because of their connection to a foreign state. The regulator will take those things very seriously.

Where the amendments go further than existing drafting, however, we believe they are not appropriate. New clause 8 gives the regulator absolute discretion to determine who is “complicit” in violations, but complicity is not a clear legal test. That would fundamentally undermine the general principle of how the test is applied, and would lead to a subjective decision. The Bill, as drafted, ensures that any negative determination the regulator makes must be evidence-based. It will test every individual against the same criteria. It is crucial that it remains that way. The new clause also states that the regulator can establish a committee to help make decisions about owners. We agree that it is important that the regulator can do that, which is why it is already possible under schedule 2, so there is no need for the amendment.

The shadow Minister also spoke about appeals, which we will come on to when we debate clause 28. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Cheltenham to withdraw his amendment and not to move the new clause.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15.

[Stephanie Peacock]

We have seen too many instances of unsuitable custodians mismanaging clubs, taking risks that jeopardise a club’s long-term future, and disregarding the interests of fans and communities. It is evident that the industry’s existing tests have not been effective enough at screening and rooting out bad actors. Existing tests are conducted on a self-declaration basis, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham just mentioned. Consequently, those tests have allowed in owners who have long histories of business bankruptcies, and owners have later been imprisoned for crimes including money laundering.

That is why part 4 of the Bill establishes strong, new statutory owners and directors tests, including by giving the regulator the power to test the suitability of prospective new owners and officers before they can enter regulated clubs, as well as the power to test incumbent owners and officers in certain circumstances. The clause provides an overview of part 4 and signposts to the rest of the clauses in this part of the Bill. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr Dillon]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones) for tabling new clause 15. It is the result of close co-operation between local parliamentarians and the Supporters Trust at Reading, which I have mentioned previously. I thank it for its constructive approach to the Bill.

The new clause mandates that individuals must notify the IFR if they are aware of any evidence that indicates a change in circumstances that could affect the ability of club owners or key personnel who are essential to the management and survival of football clubs to meet the statutory fitness criteria set forth in clause 26. It is widely recognised that whistleblowing is a vital tool for public scrutiny and accountability of individuals, and that wrongdoing and bad practice need to be called out. It is therefore essential that there are protections to encourage people to speak out. The new clause seeks to flesh out formal whistleblowing routes with regard to football ownership. Although I welcome and recognise the detail already included in the Bill on that, we need to go much further.

We need to expand the list of groups and stakeholders who would be required to report any concerns that they have about the suitability of owners or officers, including the governing body for the relevant league, the football supporters’ trust and the Football Supporters’ Association. It is often the case that those stakeholders have more knowledge about the day-to-day operations inside a club than fans, due to their proximity to the club’s inner workings. As many fans do not have the same connection or influence as such organisations, it is vital to provide a strong and accessible voice for them when issues arise, particularly when evidence concerning the survival of a club comes to light.

It is essential that the individuals listed in new clause 15 have the opportunity and route to escalate their concerns when necessary. If we take as an example my local EFL club, Reading, there may have been some people in the EFL and in the club itself who had suspicions about the deteriorating situation at the club long before those problems came to the surface and to the attention of the fanbase. If this new clause had been in place, it would have given stakeholders a formal route to raise such concerns and ensure that Dai Yongge was scrutinised properly. That could have gone some way to resolving the situation before the club ended up teetering on the brink; it is only recently that it has been sold and been able to recover.

To conclude, new clause 15 would enable accountability and monitoring of owners during their time in charge. Football club owners are temporary custodians of heritage assets that are vital to our communities; at the very least they should face regular scrutiny. It is for those reasons that I hope new clause 15 is accepted.

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club.

Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do.

Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Wokingham for tabling new clause 15 and the hon. Member for Newbury for speaking to it, but it is already open to anyone, including all those listed in the new clause, to share relevant information with the regulator. That is in addition to the existing requirements on clubs, owners and officers, which the new clause unnecessarily duplicates.

I assure the Committee that the regulator will take credible reports about unsuitable owners or officers very seriously, whether they come from a whistleblower inside the industry or any other source. We do not need to create a separate obligation in the Bill for individuals to report information to the regulator. In fact, new clause 15 would place regulatory obligations on new individuals and organisations, thereby extending the effect of the regulator’s regime. It would take things a step further and create a duty—beyond the relevant owner, officer or club—for club employees, competition organisers, supporters trusts, the FSA and Fair Game to notify the regulator. As matters stand, anyone including owners, officers, club employees, competition organisers, the Football Supporters’ Association, trusts and supporters can notify the regulator if they have information regarding an individual’s suitability to be an owner or an officer. There is no need for any specific legislative provision to enable that. As the regulator will only regulate clubs, owners, officers and competition organisers, we believe that it would not be appropriate to obligate other persons to report any changes to the regulator. The new clause would extend the scope of the regulator.

The key point is that we do not think that that should be a duty. It is of course open to all those whom I have listed, and indeed any others, to approach the regulator, which as I say will take any reports seriously.

[James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the clarification, which I hope is helpful to the hon. Member for Newbury. In essence, is she saying that it is important for regulators to create an atmosphere of confidence, where individuals who have that type of information can share it with the regulator directly, irrespective of new clause 15?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, absolutely. We very much want that confidence to be established. We simply do not think that regulating junior employees, supporters trusts or the FSA is appropriate or proportionate. On that basis, I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Newbury did not press the new clause to a vote.

[Mr Dillon]

Given the assurances of the Minister, I am happy not to move new clause 15. I thank the hon. Member for Rushcliffe for seeking clarification about the atmosphere that will be created.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Duties to notify IFR of prospective new owner or officer

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The regulator’s owners and directors test has been designed to prevent unsuitable custodians from running or owning clubs. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who a club’s prospective new owners and officers are before they buy or join a club so that they can be tested.

Clause 27 places duties on a person to notify the regulator when there is a reasonable prospect of them becoming a new owner or officer of a regulated club. This will ensure that the regulator receives advance notice that an application should be coming, and it will help the regulator prepare to act quickly when it receives the application. The clause also places the same duty on regulated clubs themselves, as another means of ensuring that the regulator will be notified.

The regulator needs to know a person’s role at the club so that it can prepare to assess whether they are suitable to be an owner or officer of that club. That is why, where the notification relates to an officer, the notification must state their proposed job title or job description, and any senior management functions they will carry out.

Enforcement measures, such as censure statements or financial penalties, are available to the regulator should it determine that this requirement has not been complied with without reasonable excuse. That will deter those who do not wish to comply with the regime. I commend clause 27 to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible.

I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As with everything throughout this Bill, we would expect the regulator to act proportionately. Where there is a reasonable prospect, it is obviously very helpful for the regulator to be informed of that, because that will, of course, allow them to move as speedily as possible. We therefore think this is an appropriate provision. The hon. Gentleman tempts me to get into other examples, but I will resist that, if he does not mind.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Determination of suitability required for new owner

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 29 to 32 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As we have heard throughout the passage of the Bill, football clubs hold unique importance to their fans and local communities, and it is these fans who lose out when clubs are exploited or mismanaged by unsuitable owners and officers. Clause 28 prohibits a person from becoming a new owner of a club unless the regulator has determined they are suitable to own that club beforehand. Prospective new owners will be required to provide an application containing information about how they propose to run a club and where club funding will come from. This will better ensure that prospective owners are clear from the outset about how they would deliver their plans for a club.

Once a complete application has been provided, the regulator can only pass the individual owner if the following requirements are met. First, the individual must meet the individual ownership fitness test. This means that they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound. Secondly, they must have sufficient financial resources. Finally, the regulator must not have grounds to suspect that the individual has any source of wealth that is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. This will better mitigate against illicit finance in the game by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test. Clause 28 will prevent unsuitable custodians from ever becoming owners.

Clause 29 prohibits individuals from becoming a new officer of a regulated club unless the regulator has determined that they are suitable beforehand. Once the prospective officer has provided a complete application to the regulator, it will assess them to ensure they meet individual officer fitness criteria. That means they must possess the requisite honesty, integrity and competence, and be financially sound. If the regulator is satisfied that the individual meets those requirements, it must find them suitable to be an officer of the club; otherwise, it must find them unsuitable. When making this determination, the regulator will take into account the matters listed in clause 37. By requiring new officers to undergo the regulator’s test, this clause will stop unsuitable individuals from becoming officers.

It is possible that someone might take up a position at a club without first having undergone the owners and directors test. That may be a blatant and deliberate breach of the requirement to undergo the test before joining the club. A prospective owner may act in bad faith, hoping that once they are “in”, the regulator would be more hesitant to fail them. However, in some circumstances a person may fall within the definition inadvertently or have some other relatively innocent reason for the breach. This may occur, for example, when a person inherits significant equity in a football club. Alternatively, a person may dispute in good faith whether their actions bring them within the Bill’s definition of an owner.

Therefore, where a person becomes a new owner or officer without the regulator having determined their suitability, clause 30 gives the regulator the power to respond decisively but flexibly. When the regulator becomes aware this has happened, it has two options: to either notify the new owner or officer that they are automatically treated as unsuitable, or require them to submit an application as though they were a prospective applicant. The regime cannot be allowed to be abused; the regulator must have the discretion and the teeth it needs to address harm to the sector. Clause 30 is an important step to achieving this aim.

If the regulator is minded to fail a new or prospective owner officer, clause 31 requires the regulator to give that person and the relevant club the opportunity to make representations. This must take place before the regulator makes its final decision. That will allow a new owner, officer or relevant club an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. This ensures the regulator has all relevant information available to it, allowing it to make better decisions so that the regime is more effective.

Football is a fast-paced industry where clubs operate within constraints such as league seasons and transfer windows. Timely decisions about the suitability of new owners and officers is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision. The regulator will need to conduct a thorough level of scrutiny of new owners and directors, but it also needs to make decisions in an appropriate timeframe to ensure clubs are not unnecessarily impacted.

That is why the regulator will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of new prospective owners and officers, which clause 32 sets out. When a complete application is provided, the determination period starts. By the end of that period, the regulator must find an applicant suitable or unsuitable. As well as providing certainty to the industry, the deadline will incentivise new owners and officers to provide the necessary information the regulator needs to assess suitability in a timely manner.

If the regulator cannot decide before the initial deadline is met, it can extend the determination period, and this will provide it with the necessary flexibility to gather more information to make well informed but timely decisions. The determination period, including the maximum amount of extra time, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. This will ensure the regulator is bound by it—but there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in the future. If the regulator cannot make the decision before the period expires, the person is automatically determined to be unsuitable. This means that only owners or officers that the regulator is confident are suitable will be allowed to get involved with clubs.

The measures set out in the group of clauses will form a key part in ensuring our clubs have suitable custodians, which in turn will help to safeguard the financial sustainability of football over the long term. Therefore, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee.

The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first.

What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership?

Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club.

It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable?

Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions.

There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario?

Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine?

Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. I reiterate, as I said in an earlier intervention, that the licensing is separate from the ownership. On some of his points about the extension, we have talked throughout proceedings about being collaborative and working with owners and clubs; if the regulator needs more information, it has the ability to provide an extension. Of course we would expect it to provide appropriate information of approaching deadlines or expected timelines. I will not repeat what I said in my main contribution on this group, but I did try to set out some examples where a breach is a genuine accident or someone has inherited equity, versus somebody trying to circumvent the regime. The regulator has that flexibility and a regime with teeth so that it can respond to both scenarios.

The shadow Minister posed a number of questions, so I will double-check Hansard and, if I have not answered them all, I will write to him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 to 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 34 to 36 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is important for sustainability that incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable custodians of their clubs. That is why the Bill gives the regulator the power to test incumbents if it has grounds for concern about their suitability. That will help mitigate the risk of harm from individuals already in the system.

Clause 33 places a duty on incumbent owners and officers, as well as regulated clubs, to notify the regulator where they consider there to have been a relevant material change in circumstance. Notably, this is a change of circumstances that could have an impact on whether the regulator would find the individual suitable to be an owner or officer of the particular club—for example, if an officer became subject to criminal or relevant civil proceedings that the regulator was not previously aware of, or if an owner’s source of wealth had changed in some way that is relevant to whether it is connected to serious criminality.

The notification must explain the material change in circumstances and its relevance to an individual’s suitability. If this information gives the regulator grounds for concern about the incumbent’s suitability, it has the power to test them under clauses 34 or 35. Ensuring that the regulator is aware of relevant material changes will better enable it to ensure that incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable.

Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners already in place in clubs where there is concern about their suitability. This allows the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable owners already within the industry.

[Mr Betts]

I just want to be clear about the grounds on which the regulator can investigate or intervene. We talked about the source of wealth being criminal, which has been clearly laid out. However, if the source of wealth is one that has diminished substantially, so the owner cannot now show that they can continue to run the club, is that a reason for the regulator to consider intervening?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

There are different thresholds for new owners and incumbent owners; with new owners, it is grounds for suspecting, but with incumbent owners, it is the balance of probabilities. Of course, the latter is a higher bar, given the existing owner’s property rights. I do not know whether that fully answers my hon. Friend’s question, but I can write to him with some further detail.

[Mr Betts]

It would be helpful if the Minister could write to me because this is a big question in football. There are owners who promise the world and then find that they cannot deliver it; indeed, they can deliver very little. I come back to Sheffield Wednesday, but there have been other owners, such as Ken Bates at Oldham, who set up a structure that could not then be financially maintained. It is important to understand whether the regulator has power in that circumstance to intervene.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Absolutely, and I refer back to some of our earlier conversations. If we take the regulatory regime as a whole, at the very basic level, owners need to have a business plan, consult their fans and be fit and proper—those three things work together. As we spoke about earlier, if the business plan does not match the source or amount of funds, the regulator can go back and direct them. Perhaps that provides a little more clarity, but I am very happy to add more detail.

[Mr Betts]

I think the Minister and I are getting there. Obviously, the business plan and the source of funds come with a new owner and then continue. However, with an owner already in place, does that still apply? Can the regulator say, “Wait a minute. I need to see a business plan and a source of funds to ensure that you are a fit and proper person”?

[Stephanie Peacock]

In certain circumstances. I am hesitant to use the word “new” information, because the information may not be new. However, if relevant information comes to light for the regulator, which may be new or pre-existing but relevant, the regulator can look at it. I draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the difference in the threshold between new owners and existing owners.

[Mr Betts]

I will make just one more point—I think it is important that we understand precisely what this means. Clause 33 talks about an owner or club having a responsibility to notify the regulator. Surely that does not mean that nobody else could notify the regulator, if relevant information came to them. Could they then pass it on for the regulator to look at?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, absolutely. That goes back to the discussion that we had earlier on new clause 15. The regulator will take credible information seriously.

Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners—those already in place—of clubs, where there is a concern about their suitability. It will allow the regulator to tackle any risk to clubs from unsuitable owners within the industry, while recognising that there are suitable owners already in the system who do not need to be tested. We want to ensure that the approach is not overly burdensome for the regulator, and we do not want to deter investment in the game. Incumbent owners can be assessed to ensure that they have the requisite honesty and integrity, and are financially sound enough, to own a club. If the regulator has information that gives it grounds for suspicion, incumbent owners can also be tested on their source of wealth. The regulator will need to establish if wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking or fraud. The regulator will not remove incumbent owners because of a mere suspicion about their source of wealth. Rather, an incumbent owner must be treated as unsuitable if the regulator is more sure than not that their source of wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test incumbent owners where a risk of harm arises.

Clause 35 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent officers—those already in place—of clubs, where a risk of harm arises. As with the provisions for owners in clause 34, testing of officers is limited to cases where there is concern about suitability. It allows the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable officers already in the industry. Incumbent officers can be tested to ensure that they have the requisite honesty, integrity, competence, and are financially sound enough, to continue in their role.

The Government are aware that finding an incumbent owner or officer unsuitable would bring about significant consequences for that person, and may cause concern for clubs or fans. That is why, when the regulator is minded to fail an incumbent owner or officer, clause 36 gives the individual and the club concerned an opportunity to make representations before the regulator makes its final decision. That allows an officer or owner an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. The regulator has the ability to test or re-test incumbent owners and officers, which will prevent unsuitable custodians from harming clubs over the long term, not just at the point of entry. That will help to ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term, benefiting football now and into the future. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced.

The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”? The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that

“Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”.

That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that

“new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality”

also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified.

The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations? If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime.

Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach. Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong.

Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations. We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion.

Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33. Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means?

What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA. I would appreciate a response to that point today.

Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners?

Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers?

Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account. The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important.

There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective. It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will begin with the subject of UEFA. Once again, I can reassure the shadow Minister that UEFA is content with the Bill as drafted. He will note that, in answer to his written question, I detailed my last meeting with UEFA, which was after the Bill was published, and said that we continue to engage with officials on a regular basis.

The shadow Minister asked a long list of questions to which I will respond in writing to ensure accuracy, as I did not get a chance to note them down. We have spoken about some of the points he touched on around appeals and enforcement and will come on to debate them in further detail.

I draw the shadow Minister’s attention to the fact that, as I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, the bar is set differently for existing and new owners. I outlined points on new owners, grounds to suspect, incumbent owners, the balance of probabilities and the higher bar given existing owners’ property rights.

The shadow Minister also asked a number of questions on what information would be relevant. A parking ticket, certainly, would not be relevant, but serious legal issues or an investigation or action by a regulator—things of that nature—would be relevant. The regulator will not immediately test information in every case just because it comes in. It will make its own decision about whether the information reaches a high enough threshold for it to take action.

Information that gives the regulator grounds for concern could come in lots of forms. It does not need to be new information, as I outlined in my response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, but it has to call into question whether the individual is still suitable to be an owner or officer of a club. The information may be relevant if the club gets into difficulty or fails to comply with the regime. Information that is in the public domain or held by external organisations about incumbent owners could be considered grounds for concern to test an individual. It will be up to the regulator to decide whether the information meets the threshold for the incumbent to be tested.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 34 to 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Contingencies Fund Advance: Independent Football Regulator

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Monday 9th June 2025 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I would like to notify the House that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has obtained approval for an advance from the contingencies fund of £3,470,000. The independent football regulator is being set up in parallel to the passage of the Football Governance Bill to help ensure that the regulatory regime is delivered as quickly as possible once the IFR is established in law. We have identified the need for targeted spend on delivery activity prior to Royal Assent of the Bill.

Parliamentary approval for additional £1,920,000 capital and £1,550,000 resource for this new service has been sought in a main estimate for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £3,470,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the contingencies fund.

[HCWS688]