Sport England: Tackling Racism

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Wednesday 9th July 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West (Naz Shah) on securing this important debate. She outlined the huge contribution that Onna Ju-Jitsu has made to her area. I join her in thanking that organisation for the contribution that it has made to Bradford and the young people that it works with. I want to say from the outset how awful, concerning and unacceptable the experience is that my hon. Friend has outlined to the House today. I will encourage Sport England to learn and develop processes as a result, and I will go into more detail in the very short time that I have. I am happy to meet her if I cannot cover it all in the time I have left.

Sport unites us all. It transcends boundaries, fosters camaraderie and instils values of fairness, respect and perseverance. It is a mirror to our society, reflecting its strengths and at times its challenges. It is one of the most pressing challenges—racism—that we are discussing today. The Government’s stance is unequivocal: racism has absolutely no place in our society and no place in sport and activity. We are committed to stamping it out, from the elite level to the grassroots, ensuring that sport is truly for everyone, regardless of their background or ethnicity.

My hon. Friend raised a number of concerns in relation to Sport England and its handling of a specific case relating to the British Ju-Jitsu Association. Given the issues raised, I have met Sport England to talk about the specifics of the case and how it addressed it. I want to start by saying that I recognise and appreciate the concerns raised by my hon. Friend on behalf of her constituent. National governing bodies are central to our sporting system, and are responsible for the management, administration and regulation of their sports. As such, they should rightly be held to high standards. In this case, it is clear that the British Ju-Jitsu Association fell short of those standards.

My hon. Friend spoke about how there has been an extensive process over a number of years, which initially led to beginning the process of derecognition of the governing body. As part of that process, and in line with the criteria, the British Ju-Jitsu Association was given a deadline to submit relevant evidence and information showing that it was capable of meeting set policy criteria in order to maintain its NGB status. Following a review in May 2024, the home country sports councils agreed to the continued recognition of the British Ju-Jitsu Association providing it complied with agreed conditions.

It is worth pausing on those conditions, as they remain extremely relevant. First, the governing body needed to publish a commitment to cultural change. Secondly, it needed to establish an equality, diversity and inclusion working group, and monitor processes. Thirdly, it needed to move to being a more inclusive organisation through a plan agreed with Sport England.

I completely appreciate my hon. Friend’s concerns that the change has not been comprehensive. The approach taken by Sport England has given the best chance of delivering long-term change by trying to keep the British Ju-Jitsu Association within its scope rather than cutting it adrift. However, I strongly believe that culture change means action as well as words, so I will be paying close attention to how the British Ju-Jitsu Association rebuilds the confidence of those who take part in the sport, which it has clearly lost.

I will say at this stage that those conditions must be ongoing. It is clear that there remain concerns about the culture at the British Ju-Jitsu Association. I know that Sport England takes its role very seriously in supporting an inclusive environment where participants have confidence in the leadership of sport, so I will continue to engage with it to make sure that scrutiny is maintained, and that action is taken when the British Ju-Jitsu Association does not meet the standards required.

I also want to address the wider situation of sport governance within this context. As a Government, we want to see as many sports clubs and organisations affiliated with their recognised governing bodies as possible. For participants, that is vital information to be aware of. The recognition process ensures that the home country sports councils, including Sport England, have the ability to change behaviour and drive progress. It also allows clubs and other affiliated organisations to apply for public funding. I refer hon. Members to the Adjournment debate last night on safeguarding in combat sports, which shows precisely why we need to use recognition to improve sport and sport safety.

In the case that my hon. Friend has raised, it is entirely right that Sport England continues to use all available levers to drive culture change within the British Ju-Jitsu Association, while maintaining its ability to take all possible actions, including derecognition should that change not be taken forward. In her speech, my hon. Friend raised concerns with how Sport England has handled the case. I recognise that it is always difficult to reach a conclusion that satisfies all parties in such cases, but I have been assured by Sport England that it takes the allegations seriously. I also recognise that, when it comes to assessing individual cases, its powers are limited.

As a result of this case, Sport England is in the process of reviewing the current recognition policy. At the moment, the criteria are very factual and based on whether a governing body has the right policies in place. That does not allow the sports councils to take into account wider factors that are clearly relevant to the confidence that individuals have in the leadership of their sport. The current review will look at those wider issues, including whether the sport has been brought into disrepute. That will allow sports councils to take a broader look at whether it is appropriate for governing bodies to continue to be recognised. A review of that nature, and the ability to consider the leadership and culture of a governing body, is something that I wholeheartedly support and strongly encourage.

I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns regarding the sharing of information, and I know that she has been speaking to the Information Commissioner’s Office about those concerns. As Sport England is a public body, it is for the Information Commissioner’s Office to take an independent view on what needs to happen, but I am sure that those at Sport England will have heard the issues in this debate.

I hope that my hon. Friend and her constituent can take from this debate just how important this issue is to me and the Government. I will be keeping a close eye on developments in British jiu-jitsu, but I am also taking steps to ensure that everyone who participates in sport feels included and welcome. It is a sad fact that racism continues to plague our society, and we must do more to tackle it.

Sport England is at the heart of our sporting system. It is therefore essential that it sets an example and creates the right culture in sport. I have heard at first hand Sport England’s commitment to do so, but given this debate, I will continue to discuss it with the organisation and ensure that it remains a central priority, as there is clearly more to do.

Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 10(6)).

Combat Sports for Children: Safeguarding

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Tuesday 8th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Walton (Dan Carden) for securing this important debate and for his moving speech. The death of his constituent, Alexander Eastwood, as a result of a kickboxing bout is devastating. I know that my hon. Friend cares deeply about child safeguarding and I can reassure him and the House that it is a priority for this Government. He advocates with care and thought for his constituents, making a powerful and moving speech—one that I have heard very clearly. In the time available to me, I will set out the Government’s plans to strengthen safeguarding for children in combat sports. I will begin by outlining key safeguarding issues in those sports; then I will set out the Government’s next steps in addressing this incredibly important issue.

First, I recognise that this is a debate that everyone would have hoped we would not have to have. The tragic death of Alexander Eastwood is something we hoped would never have happened. I am sure I speak for the whole House in extending our deepest sympathies to his family, who are here this evening. As my hon. Friend has said, they have shown incredible courage. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will be meeting Alexander’s family next week, and we are both committed to making sure that meaningful change happens so that no other family has to go through the pain that they have felt.

It is a priority of my Department that the safety and wellbeing of children taking part in sport are paramount. Alexander’s death is such a tragedy, and it has made it very clear that more needs to be done to protect the safety of children in combat sports. Ahead of the inquest into the death of Alexander Eastwood, the assistant coroner for Manchester West filed a regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths. The report highlighted specific areas of concern for children in martial arts. In her response, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport set out plans to work with the martial arts sector to address those concerns.

In considering our next steps, we must take account of the entire martial arts sector and its complexity. The sector is made up of many different disciplines, including judo, taekwondo, kickboxing and more. Many, though not all, of these disciplines have publicly funded national governing bodies. Many providers across the sector have robust safety measures in place. National governing bodies set minimum safeguarding standards for their affiliated clubs and competitions to comply with. These standards are in line with guidance issued by Sport England, our arm’s length body for grassroots sport.

Many clubs and competitions are not affiliated with a publicly funded governing body. However, many unaffiliated providers choose to sign up to the safeguarding code in martial arts. Organisations such as the British Martial Arts and Boxing Association support unaffiliated martial arts providers to adopt the safeguarding code. The code is funded by Sport England, and recognises clubs and associations that demonstrate strong safeguarding practices against a set of minimum standards. Providers with recognition under the code can display a logo on their promotional materials to show participants that their safety measures have been vetted.

The coroner’s report on the case of Alexander Eastwood highlighted specific issues around clubs and competitions that are not affiliated with a national governing body. We are now looking into that as a matter of urgency. The coroner identified that without set standards, clubs and competitions may not have adequate regulations around medical checks and support, the number of rounds and periods of rest, participant welfare checks and critical incident plans. Despite the programmes in place to support robust safeguarding practices in martial arts, unaffiliated providers are not required to meet any shared safety standards. I recognise that coaches and providers work hard to make martial arts available to communities across the country, and I recognise the work done by clubs and associations to comply with the safeguarding code in martial arts, but there must be strong, consistent standards for safeguarding children across all martial arts. Clearly, more must be done.

Clubs and competitions across martial arts should share consistent standards for safeguarding children. Parents and carers should be able to trust that appropriate safety measures are in place, regardless of where their children participate. Existing safety standards for martial arts set by Sport England and its partners must be robust and fit for purpose, but national standards must also translate into strong safety practices across all martial arts. The sector should look to encourage as many clubs as possible to adopt shared safety standards. The Government will consider what more can be done in this space.

Parents and carers deserve to be able to make informed decisions about where their children participate in martial arts. Information on best safety practices and which clubs and competitions meet shared standards should be readily available to participants and their guardians. Of course, the burden of finding information should not only lie with participants and their guardians; clubs and competitions with robust safety practices should be supported to promote the standards they meet. The Government are looking at all these areas to assess what more can be done to safeguard children in combat sports. As promised in her response to the coroner’s report, the Secretary of State will meet the family of Alexander Eastwood to hear about their experiences and views, and to discuss our thinking before we go into more detail publicly. I hope everyone can appreciate why that approach is being taken.

In addition, in response to the coroner’s report on this case, my Department has tasked Sport England with working with the martial arts sector on this issue. It will identify improvements and present a plan in the coming months. That work will include developing guidance for the martial arts sector and reviewing the safeguarding code for martial arts to ensure that it reflects best practice and is fit for purpose. Sport England will also work with the NSPCC to help educate parents and carers on what to look for in choosing where to participate in martial arts. That will involve the NSPCC’s Keeping Your Child Safe in Sport Week—a week of educational programming in October.

My Department is also exploring ways to strengthen safety standards in clubs and competitions that are not affiliated with national governing bodies. We are having conversations with the martial arts sector to understand how we can help parents and carers to be confident that their children will be safe when they participate. Our aim will be to ensure that safeguarding practices in martial arts are consistent, effective and transparent.

[Dan Carden]

I thank the Minister and the Secretary of State, who has been up to see the family in the Gallery this evening and who will meet them next week. I know the family and the solicitors, Leigh Day, will be incredibly grateful for the thorough response the Minister has given tonight, putting a lot of information on the record. These sports and activities for young people are so important for our communities, and we do not want to put any young person off taking up a sport, competing or becoming a professional in that sport. This is about safety; it is about giving parents the safety and security they need, and about something good coming from Alex Eastwood’s death.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am incredibly grateful to my hon. Friend for his work, his moving contribution and for putting that important point on the record. As he said, sport should be a safe and welcoming environment that participants, parents and carers can have confidence in. Many martial arts providers work hard to safeguard children who participate under their supervision, and there are strong safety practices in place across many areas of combat sport, but more must be done to ensure that safety standards are strong, consistent and transparent. Standards of practice should be robust and widely adopted across the sector, and it should be clear to parents and carers which clubs and competitions comply with shared standards and which do not.

Nothing can bring Alexander back, but as the Secretary of State said to me before the debate, we are determined to work with his family to make sure that part of his legacy is real change, so that a tragedy like this never happens again.

Question put and agreed to.

Football Governance Bill [Lords]

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Commons Chamber

Football does not belong to the Government. It belongs to the people who stand shoulder to shoulder in the stands, win or lose. Let us do right by them today.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I am pleased to be responding on Report as the Football Governance Bill enters its final stages in the House of Commons. I begin by sending my condolences to the family of Liverpool’s Diogo Jota, who tragically lost his life last week at just 28 years of age, alongside his brother. I am sure the whole House will join me in sending our thoughts to their loved ones.

English football is one of our proudest traditions. It is more than just a game. Football brings us together, providing a source of local pride and uniting us in victory and in loss. The premier league, the EFL and the national league attract some of the best players in the world. In return, we find fans of English football clubs in almost every country. However, despite the global success story of English football, there are underlying fragilities in the game, and this Labour Government are committed to tackling them, as we are the party on the side of football fans. We have seen too many instances of irresponsible owners, unsustainable financial models and inadequate regulation casting a shadow over too many clubs, as fans of Bury, Derby County and countless others know all too well. The current issues at Sheffield Wednesday and Morecambe need resolving now, and they demonstrate the urgent need for this Bill to become law.

This change has been a long time coming, dating back in this place to the cross-party Culture, Media and Sport Committee report of 2011. The ill-fated super league attempt led, of course, to the fan-led review, and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Dame Tracey Crouch, who pioneered that work.

[Ian Lavery (Blyth and Ashington) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend mentions that Conservative Minister, and Tory Members basically wrote the vast majority of this Bill, but then they decided to vote against it. I am confused about that, but could she explain to me why they think this is a socialist Bill and that football is being nationalised? I think it is absolutely ridiculous.

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point.

“I hope that whoever wins the election on 4 July will see this as a good Bill to crack on with, because it is important for the future of football and, crucially, for the future of football fans.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 23 May 2024; c. 244.]

Those are not my words, but the words of the right hon. Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), for whom I have huge respect and affection. That brings me on to the points made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr French), and the amendments standing in his name.

Amendment 14 is on the issue of listing in primary legislation the competitions in scope of regulation. The approach in this Bill is consistent with similar sports legislation. The Opposition’s amendment would be likely to make this a hybrid Bill, which would mean years of delay, in effect killing off the Bill that they introduced and which was in their manifesto. We have been absolutely clear that the regulator will be operationally independent of Government. It will not exert any influence on the Football Association’s autonomy to govern the game.

The shadow Minister is obsessed with the publication of private communications with UEFA and FIFA. Despite his obsession and what I would say were his quite strong remarks about me at the Dispatch Box, did his Government publish private correspondence? No, of course they did not. I have been very clear throughout that UEFA and FIFA have no issue with the Bill as it is currently drafted.

Amendment 25 is simply scaremongering on the part of the Opposition. It is also curiously at odds with one of their other amendments—amendment 21. The football governance statement, which was also in the previous Government’s Bill, allows the Government of the day to set out their priorities for the regulator. This is no different from the strategic steers that the Government can and do give to other regulators, such as the Competition and Markets Authority, without undermining their operational independence. The statement will be published and laid before Parliament. Parliamentary approval is neither appropriate nor necessary, especially given the need to avoid political interference.

Amendments 24 and 28 on levy exemptions are simply not needed. The cost of regulation should not place an undue burden on clubs and costs should be transparent, as set out in clause 54. The regulator already has the power to exempt clubs from paying the levy through its levy rules.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

We had a long discussion in Committee about assessing how much this regulator was going to cost and how big it was going to be, but all the amendments we put forward were voted down. When will the Minister know that this thing has grown too big and costs too much?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his service on the Bill Committee. He is right that we had a very good debate, and the impact assessment was of course approved by the previous Minister for Sport.

On amendment 18, the governance code on appointments is clear that political activity is not a bar to appointment. David Kogan has been found appointable for the role by a panel that included a senior independent panel member agreed by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, and has now been endorsed by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, adding a further layer of robustness. We will not set a new precedent with the football regulator by going further than the governance code on appointments, as the amendment proposes. More broadly, on amendments 19 and 20 on conflicts of interest, if the interests of a board or expert panel member might prejudice their ability to carry out their functions, the Bill already captures that as a conflict of interest.

On the owners and directors test, membership of a proscribed organisation is an offence under the Terrorism Act 2000, and that offence is included in paragraph 2A of schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. Such offences would already be considered when testing an individual’s fitness, so amendment 15 is not required.

On amendment 17 on the corporate governance code, reporting on equality, diversity and inclusion is a key part of good corporate governance. Clubs will simply have to state what they are doing on the issue.

On amendment 27 on club charities, I know from my area of Barnsley the brilliant work that the Barnsley FC Community Trust does. Through changes made in the other place, the corporate governance code gives a club the flexibility to detail what action it is taking to contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of the community. That can include the work of the club’s official charity or wider work in the community, so the amendment is not needed.

New clause 1 calls for a consultation on lifting the ban on consuming alcohol in view of the pitch. That is outside the scope of the Bill, which focuses on the sustainability of clubs and the game overall. I have raised the issue with the Home Office, which is the policy lead, as I committed to doing in Committee.

[Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree with me and my hon. Friend the Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) that we do need to look at alcohol sales, but that we need to do it with all stakeholders in the round—not just throw it in as a gimmick to this Bill, which is about finance and governance?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend makes a good point, and I have reflected those comments to the relevant Home Office Minister, as I said.

I will turn to the amendments in the name of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson). I thank him for his constructive approach to the scrutiny of the legislation and for his party’s support. Several of his amendments are outside the scope of the regulator, but I am sure that he will put on record some important and valid points.

On free-to-air TV in new clause 3, the Government believe that the current list of events works well and strikes an appropriate balance between giving access to sporting events and allowing sports to maximise broadcasting revenue. In domestic football, the present arrangements under the listed events regime have protected key moments such as the FA cup final, while ensuring that the Premier League, EFL and FA are able to raise billions of pounds annually, which is invested back into the pyramid. We all want to see more matches being televised free to air, but that must be balanced against investment, and not risk it.

On new clause 4 on the golden share, we expect that the regulator will welcome clubs taking any measure to improve fan engagement and protect club heritage, including a golden share, but it will not mandate them to do so. That brings me on to the issue of fan engagement, which has been raised by the hon. Member for Cheltenham and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts) in their amendments. Let me be really clear: the Government have strengthened fan engagement. The previous Government’s Bill required clubs to have a framework in place to ensure that they regularly meet and consult with a representative group of fans on key strategic matters at the club and other issues of importance to supporters. We have improved that by requiring fan engagement to continue even if a club enters into insolvency, and by introducing a requirement for consultation on ticket prices. We have not prescribed a fixed, one-size-fits-all approach to fan engagement. We of course expect the regulator to consult the Football Supporters’ Association where appropriate on fan issues, and I know the shadow regulator is already engaging with it. We do not want to place an unmanageable burden on clubs unnecessarily, which is why new clause 4 is not needed.

The hon. Member for Cheltenham has also tabled amendments on protections for home grounds, which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East has also raised and we have recently discussed. Home grounds are vital assets for clubs, which is why the Bill introduces protections to prevent inappropriate stadium sales and relocations. Clauses 46 and 48 require a club to get approval from the regulator before they sell or relocate their stadium.

On the sale of a home ground, let me first clarify that the legislation uses the term “disposal” rather than “sale” for technical legal reasons. For example, a club might sell a portion of the stadium, rather than the whole stadium. That is because a club might divest a shareholding, or transfer interest, in the stadium without it amounting to a full sale. Under clause 46, the regulator’s approval is needed in all instances for the sale of a stadium by a club. A sale can be approved only if it would not undermine the sustainability of the club. If a sale might mean that the club will have nowhere to play a few years down the line, that means the club may not be sustainable and the regulator is unlikely to approve the sale.

[Mr Betts]

Does the Minister think that the regulator would take on board the views of fans as part of the process of looking at these matters and having to give approval in the normal way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, absolutely, and I would be happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss that further.

I will move on to the issue of player welfare.

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

The Minister might be just about to say the thing I was going to ask her about, as she has addressed a number of the amendments that my colleagues have tabled, which is the issue of footballers suffering from neurodegenerative conditions after their time. I am sure she was about to say something about that, in which case I apologise. As she will know, the proportion of footballers suffering from these conditions is significantly greater than the proportion of the general population. Many former footballers—many without the vast incomes that people assume footballers will have had in their careers—are left in a terrible situation, not supported by their clubs or the Premier League. What can the regulator do to get groups like Football Families for Justice the resources they need to support those who suffer having given their lives to the game?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I really appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s intervention; I know that he has worked very hard on this issue. I am hugely sympathetic to the issue of player welfare. It is important to say that the safety, welfare and wellbeing of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount.

[Ian Lavery]

Neurodegenerative disease is a real concern of many people in the sport. I am not sure whether it should be part of the governance Bill, despite the fact that it is going to be the biggest socialist nationalised Bill there has ever been in our lifetime. [Laughter.] It is a very serious issue, though. Does my hon. Friend agree that it needs to be looked at, and can she assure me that the Government will do so separately to the Bill, because of the urgency and the fact that people up and down this country at different levels of football are suffering greatly, mainly as a result of heading the ball?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am really grateful for that intervention. Again, I know that my hon. Friend has done a huge amount of work on this issue.

I have heard the calls from Members across the House, and indeed from retired footballers, and the Secretary of State and I recently met a small group of affected families and ex-footballers, including individuals associated with Football Families for Justice, to discuss player safety and welfare for those suffering with dementia. The Government are committed to looking further at this issue and supporting the families and football authorities to come together to address the lifelong consequences from concussion, as well as post-career mental health and financial crises. I am afraid that these measures are not within the tight regulatory scope of the Bill, although that does not mean that the Government are not aware and sympathetic to the calls being made on this issue, both in this House and from many former players and their families.

The Bill is focused on the financial sustainability of football clubs up and down the country. Too many fans have watched as their clubs make changes on which they have no say, from selling their stadium and changing club colours to, in the worst case, collapsing under inadequate ownership. This is unacceptable. It is devastating for fans and for local communities.

It is this Bill, delivered by this Labour Government, that will help to protect one of our great sporting assets and ensure that fans can focus on what is happening on the pitch, rather than off it. Today, Members across this House can vote with football fans, or they can vote against them. Today, we can deliver an independent football regulator. I commend this Bill to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

Oral Answers to Questions

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I established the women’s football taskforce in 2024 in response to the Karen Carney review of women’s football. The taskforce aims to achieve a financially sustainable women’s football pyramid, raising minimum standards for players, fans and everyone involved in the game. As the Euros begin, I know the whole House will join me in wishing the Lionesses, and of course Wales, the very best of luck.

[James MacCleary]

I thank the Minister for her response; I know she is aware of some of the financial challenges that my local club in Lewes faces. With England about to start the defence of their European title in Switzerland against France on Saturday, does she share my concern that, despite the phenomenal rise in popularity of the women’s game, domestic prize money for the women’s FA cup still falls woefully short of that for the men’s? It is frankly embarrassing that in 2025 we still tolerate that glaring inequality. Will she support my call for the Football Association and the Premier League to equalise the women’s FA cup prize fund, so that women footballers are rewarded equally for the same achievement as their male counterparts?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I know that the hon. Gentleman is a huge supporter and champion of women’s football, and I look forward to visiting his constituency in September. I have heard the calls from the Liberal Democrat Benches and across the House on the FA cup prize money. The FA has taken steps to increase the total fund for the women’s FA cup and we are paying attention to what happens next.

[Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)]

7. What steps she is taking to help ensure that disabled people have equal access to live events.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

8. What recent assessment she has made of the potential impact of changes to employer national insurance contributions on charities.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

The Government highly value the charity sector and its positive contribution. However, we have had to take a number of difficult decisions on tax, welfare and spending to fix the public finances, fund public services and restore economic stability.

[Sir Desmond Swayne]

The National Council for Voluntary Organisations puts the cost at £1.4 billion. That is right, isn’t it?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I reiterate that we really value the charity sector, but we have had to make some very difficult decisions.

[Jonathan Hinder (Pendle and Clitheroe) (Lab)]

9. What discussions she has had with sports governing bodies on ensuring that they are compliant with the Supreme Court judgment in the case of For Women Scotland v. The Scottish Ministers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jessica Toale (Bournemouth West) (Lab)]

10. What assessment she has made of the potential impact of dormant assets funding on access to sport for young people in Bournemouth.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

The Government recently published their first ever dormant assets strategy, setting out how £440 million will be distributed in England. Some £132.5 million will increase disadvantaged young people’s access to enrichment opportunities in the arts, culture, sport and wider youth services.

[Jessica Toale]

The Henry Brown centre in West Howe, in my Bournemouth West constituency, runs a range of activities for the community, including the Changes Are Made boxing club, which provides positive sport activities for local young people and aims to raise awareness about the dangers of knife crime. Like many community centres and clubs, it would like to expand but struggles to find the funds to do so. Will the Minister tell me how CAM and the Henry Brown centre can access the dormant asset funds to expand the amazing work that they are doing in the local area?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Government will work with the National Lottery Community Fund to decide on the specific programmes, and we will outline how that funding will be allocated shortly. I pay tribute to the organisations in my hon. Friend’s constituency for their work and activities, and I would happily meet her to discuss the issue further.

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

11. What recent progress her Department has made on delivering the creative industries sector plan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Richard Quigley (Isle of Wight West) (Lab)]

T2. While it could be said that the Conservative party could fit into a children’s paddling pool, we in Isle of Wight West take swimming—as well as our issue with ferries—very seriously. [Laughter.] I thought hon. Members would like that one. West Wight sports and community centre is an excellent community-run facility that needs to replace its swimming pool after 50 years. Will the Minister meet me to discuss how it might access grants to do so?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

My hon. Friend is a good champion for his constituency. The Government recognise that sports facilities, including swimming facilities, are incredibly important, and I would be delighted to meet him to discuss it further.

[Liz Jarvis (Eastleigh) (LD)]

T3. My constituency is the home of Hampshire Cricket. Last Thursday, I visited Fair Oak cricket club, which has a fantastic new pavilion and a thriving community of players, coaches and volunteers who are passionate about growing the game. In April 2024, the previous Government announced a £35 million investment in grassroots cricket facilities and widening access to the sport within state schools. Can the Minister confirm when the Government plan to release that funding to ensure that girls and boys in all parts of Eastleigh and across the country have the opportunity to become the next Lauren Bell or Joe Root?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I look forward to attending the cricket at Edgbaston later today, and I know it is hugely important to communities up and down the country. I would be delighted to meet the hon. Member to discuss her question in more detail.

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

Will the Minister join me in praising all the staff past and present, the council’s chief officer for leisure and wellbeing, Tom Kittendorf, and the portfolio holder, Councillor Maggie O’Rourke, on the recent 25th anniversary of the Rugby art gallery and museum? I was glad to attend and pay tribute to staff for the huge contribution they make to the three C’s: creativity, culture and community. Does my right hon. Friend agree that municipally run institutions such as that are gems shining bright in our towns, and that this Government will do all they can to empower them?

Society Lotteries Sales Limits and Prize Draws

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Thursday 26th June 2025 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I am repeating the following written ministerial statement made today in the other place by the Minister for Gambling and Heritage, my noble Friend Baroness Twycross:

Today I am updating the House on the Government position on the statutory limits for society lotteries and on prize draws. Alongside this, I am publishing independent research that the Government commissioned on both the lotteries and prize draw markets.

Society lotteries provide valuable funding for good causes across the country and are required to give a minimum of 20% of proceeds to good causes. The latest data showed record sales for the society lottery sector of over £1 billion in 2023-24, an increase of nearly 12% on the previous year, of which £462 million went to good causes.

In 2020, the then Government increased the annual sales limit on society lotteries from £10 million to £50 million, in response to the challenges that many society lottery operators were facing to operate within the limit. Those reforms were intended to support the society lottery sector as a whole by providing significant headroom for further growth.

In December 2023, the previous Government committed to commissioning independent research to look at the scale of the society lotteries sector, the relationship between society lotteries and the National Lottery, and the impact of any future changes to the sales limit.

The report, published here, found that five operators now have annual sales over the previous £10 million limit, with the current annual sales limit of £50 million only impacting one operator, the People’s Postcode Lottery.

The research found that the current sales and prize limits on society lotteries are not a barrier to society lottery sector growth. Overall sector sales have increased by 27% from 2019-20 to 2023-24, and PPL sales by almost 30% over a similar period. Despite this significant level of growth, there has not been a corresponding growth in returns to good causes. Since 2021, sector prizes have increased by nearly 28%, and expenses by over 25%, but returns to good causes have grown by only 15%.

The research also found that increasing the annual sales limit to £100 million could have several impacts on the National Lottery, with:

a decrease in participation, with players being displaced to society lotteries (National Lottery sales could fall by between £25 million and £148 million); and

less money for National Lottery-funded good causes, which provide a vital source of income to lottery distributor bodies.

The research also found that there was a potential for an overall increase in funding to good causes, driven by higher returns to good causes by society lotteries outweighing losses to the National Lottery.

The Government want a lotteries sector centred on one national lottery—the National Lottery—while continuing to support the hundreds of wider society lotteries that exist. This model has worked successfully for the past 30 years and created the conditions for the National Lottery to flourish and support life-changing projects, alongside a thriving society lotteries sector.

Since it started, the National Lottery has raised over £50 billion for good causes, raising over £1.8 billion in 2023-24 alone. It supports communities in every UK postcode, including local initiatives, heritage sites, iconic institutions, grassroots sport and elite sport. It is a national institution that the Government are proud of and want to protect.

As the research sets out potential negative impacts of increasing the society lotteries limits on the National Lottery, and the current transition to the fourth national lottery licence, the Government have taken the decision not to make further changes to society lottery limits at this time.

Prize draws

I am also updating the House on the Government’s position on prize draws, which is recognised as a significant and growing market. This Government have made it clear that we want people who participate in prize draws to be confident that proportionate protections are in place.

Prize draws and competitions, also known as “free draws”, are products where the outcome, and therefore the allocation of prizes, is determined by chance, and where there is both a paid and free entry route for players to choose between. These prize draws do not currently require a licence under the Gambling Act 2005 because they offer a free entry route. Prize draws are a significant and growing market. It is estimated that the UK prize draw market is worth £1.3 billion annually, with 7.4 million adult participants and over 400 operators.

I am therefore pleased to announce that we will be introducing a voluntary code for prize draw operators later this year. This code will help provide a uniform approach across the sector to strengthen player protections, increase transparency and improve accountability of prize draw operators. My Department has worked closely with the sector over the past six months to start to develop this code. The work is also underpinned by the results of independent research, which the then Government commissioned in 2023, which looked at this growing market. I am grateful to London Economics for this excellent report, which for the first time gives some firm insights into this relatively new sector.

This approach allows us to take swift action collectively with the sector. Although prize draw operators do not currently require a licence under the Gambling Act 2005, as they offer a free entry route, the success of this code will dictate whether this Government decide to take further action, including legislation.

[HCWS743]

Flags: Public Buildings

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. I will do my best to do justice to this very important subject in the very short time I have. I begin, of course, by congratulating the hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) on securing this important debate, and on what was a thoughtful and passionate speech about an issue he has cared about for many years. I join him in thanking the flag institution, the College of Arms.

Flag flying is a very British way of showing joy and pride as regions, as communities and as a nation. It brings people together to express shared identities. The Union flag is the primary symbol of our nation and rightly takes central position in flag flying as a source of unity. It appears on the flags of many of the UK’s overseas territories and our fellow Commonwealth members. The Union flag is a joint expression of our history, our national identity and the UK’s place in the wider world. I was especially struck by its importance and meaning when I attended the Liberation Day event in Jersey on 9 May, to which the hon. Gentleman referred. I know he takes a really keen interest in that subject. Of course, that event marked 80 years to the day that the islands were liberated from Nazi occupation, with a re-enactment carried out by Force 135, the British liberating force of 1945, supported by the Royal Marines. It included the raising of the Union flag, as it occurred on Liberation Day on 9 May 1945.

In Wales and Scotland, flag flying on public buildings is a devolved matter. In Northern Ireland, the issue is subject to special regulations set out by Ministers at the Northern Ireland Office.

The Government support state and ceremonial events by helping London look its best for occasions, such as the recent commemoration of VE Day and Remembrance Sunday each year. They often involve flying flags on some of the most highly visible public buildings and spaces in the country. Every year, we adorn the Mall, Horse Guards Parade and Parliament Square with flags for state visits, trooping the colour and other occasions, visible to thousands of people each day. The Cenotaph is the public space where flag flying is at its most sensitive and poignant. It is the national war memorial and focal point for public mourning. Last month, to mark the 80th anniversary of victory in Europe, the Cenotaph was draped in two large Union flags, emulating the way in which it was first revealed to the public in 1920. As I am sure that Members would agree, the results were spectacular.

In addition to the events described, the Government take an active role in promoting public flag flying across Britain. We disseminate an annual list of designated days on which all UK Government buildings are required to fly the Union flag. That ensures that it is flown on some of our nation’s important cultural occasions, including to mark Remembrance Sunday and the anniversary of the King’s accession.

The Union flag has its origin as a royal flag, developed first in 1606 by James I and added to in 1801. For much of its early history, it was flown solely above royal residences, aboard naval vessels and in other specific circumstances. By the 1920s, the practice of flying the flag had been formalised into the list of designated days—such as the sovereign’s birthday, or anniversary of the coronation—on which Government buildings, in addition to royal properties, were expected to fly the flag each year. As a legacy of that practice, until 2008 Government buildings were expected to fly the Union flag only on specific dates. That was consulted on following the 2007 Green Paper entitled “The Governance of Britain”, which highlighted the importance of the Union flag and sought to broaden its use.

As a result, in 2008 the Labour Government, under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, allowed Government buildings to fly the Union flag on any day of the year, rather than solely on royal and ceremonial occasions. That was further expanded in 2021, at the decision of Ministers. Since then, Government buildings have been not only allowed but actively and formally encouraged to fly the Union flag every day. Consequently, more Union flags are now flying from Government buildings than ever before, actively fostering the sense of national unity and pride that we all value so highly. The hon. Member for Romford spoke movingly about the history of the flag flying over Parliament and the important change in 2010. Of course, another important Government duty regarding public flag flying is that in times of national mourning or tragedy, instructions are issued to require the half-masting of the Union flag on UK Government buildings.

The approach taken by Departments to flying flags more generally on their buildings has evolved organically over the last 15 to 20 years under successive Governments. With the approval of Ministers in government at the time, Departments have, in addition to the Union flag, increasingly flown other flags to show support for causes in Britain and throughout the world. For instance, many people will have seen on the way here the Armed Forces Day flag flying proudly from buildings along Whitehall in preparation for the day itself, which is this Saturday. I began this week by attending the flag-raising ceremony at Barnsley town hall to see our Armed Forces Day flag raised and flown as we pay tribute this week to our brave service personnel ahead of Armed Forces Day on Saturday 28 June.

I know that the hon. Member for Romford has long encouraged the Government to fly the flags of the British overseas territories and Crown dependencies to recognise their importance, and I am pleased that although they were not frequently flown in the past, that has become more common. Hon. Members will be aware that those flags are currently flying in Parliament Square, alongside the flags of Commonwealth nations along Horse Guards, and Union flags along the Mall. This is since the 80th anniversary commemorations of VE Day in May, and with the upcoming state visit by President Macron of France, they will continue to fly.

The practice of Departments flying the Pride flag, which the hon. Gentleman referred to, or other LGBTQ+ representative flags, has increased since March 2014, when the Cabinet Office flew the six-stripe rainbow flag to mark the first same-sex weddings taking place in Britain. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, said at the time:

“Raising the rainbow flag on Whitehall is a small symbol to celebrate a massive achievement.” 

After that, more Departments have chosen to fly it. That does come from a conscious decision of the elected Government of the day, but I want to acknowledge that over time the Government approach to decision making for flag flying from Government buildings and the implementation of central guidance have developed organically, following the policies of successive Governments. That has enabled individual Government buildings to select and fly flags whose meaning is rooted in their Department’s specific remit, or that have particular significance.

Although the Government’s primary duty in relation to flag flying from Government buildings is to celebrate and encourage the Union flag as a symbol of the UK as a whole, we are working with officials to consider whether further central guidance to Departments regarding flag flying may be helpful to ensure that decisions and implementation by Departments are as consistent and transparent as possible. That would mirror the approach taken at local level. In the time that I have left, I want to echo the hon. Gentleman’s comments on historic counties and how local decision makers do know best.

In relation to Government buildings, we acknowledge that the individual processes for decisions on flags will vary and could benefit from further accountability and transparency. I am a very passionate believer in the Union flag. I have it displayed in both my offices—here in Westminster and in the constituency. One of my formative memories is of drawing a St George’s flag to fly when England were in the semi-finals of Euro ’96, although sadly it did not have the desired effect. And as Minister for VE and victory over Japan commemorations, I have been encouraging local communities to display Union flag bunting as part of local events. I know the joy that it brings to many.

Flag flying on public buildings is an emotive subject, and we respect the strongly held views of people across the country who want to see it represent our unique strengths as communities, regions and a nation. I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Romford for bringing to the House this important debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Enterprise Act 2002 (Mergers Involving Newspaper Enterprises and Foreign Powers) Regulations 2025

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Wednesday 18th June 2025 General Committees

[The Chair]

Before we start, I take this opportunity to wish my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East a happy birthday—I can think of no finer way of celebrating. Members, including those on the Front Bench, may remove their jackets, if they wish to do so.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Enterprise Act 2002 (Mergers Involving Newspaper Enterprises and Foreign Powers) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I also begin by wishing the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East, happy birthday. These regulations were laid before the House, in draft, on 15 May. This Government are clear in our commitment to a free and pluralistic media where all citizens, in all parts of the UK, can access high-quality news and other information from a range of sources, enabling them to form their own opinions. The public’s continued access to diverse news, views and information is fundamental to the health of our democracy and wellbeing as a nation.

It is therefore vital that the UK has in place strong measures ensuring that foreign states, whether allies or foes, cannot control or influence UK newspapers or news periodicals. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 amended the Enterprise Act 2002, creating a new foreign state influence merger control regime for UK newspapers and news periodicals.

The changes were introduced by the previous Government in response to concerns raised by Parliament about gaps in the UK’s media merger regime. There was wide cross-party support for the principle that all foreign states, including long-standing allies, should not be able to control or influence the policy of UK newspapers or news periodicals. The question on the level of acceptable thresholds for investments made by state-owned investors was not settled, which is of course why we are here today, and these regulations will address that issue.

State-owned investors include sovereign wealth funds and public pension or social security schemes that make long-term investments on behalf of states. In many cases, these are operated at arm’s length. They are global investors, holding interests in a wide range of UK and international companies and businesses. The previous Government consulted on proposals to create exceptions for passive investments made by state-owned investors using powers contained in the amendments to the 2002 Act. These included a complex cap on investments held by state-owned investors, which was set at 5% of shareholdings, but at 10% if the state-owned investor held shares in a UK newspaper indirectly as part of a diverse business.

We have looked carefully at the responses to the consultation. In particular, we have paid close regard to the views of UK newspaper groups. They are concerned that the level of threshold settled on by the previous Government was drawn too tightly and could have a detrimental impact on their ability to raise investment funding that they may need to support future sustainability. In coming to a final view, we have had to carefully weigh up a number of things. First, there is the need for strong measures, which is what Parliament intended when, with Labour party support, it passed the amendments, creating the foreign state influence regime. Secondly, there are the concerns about the unintended effects of the exception regulations, such as risking a chilling effect on investment in the UK newspaper industry.

Having considered that, we have decided to set the threshold for state-owned investment at 15% of shares or voting rights in a newspaper or news magazine, where this is a passive investment. In our view, this is an effective, simple and proportionate approach. The 15% threshold is below the level where the Competition and Markets Authority typically believes that material influence may arise. It is also well below the 25% level, which is the lowest trigger point for mandatory notifications under the National Security and Investment Act 2021.

The changes we have made to the thresholds carefully balance the need for strong protections from foreign state influence, with the need for UK newspapers and news magazines to have access to a range of investment. The changes will also avoid the need for the Secretary of State to refer low levels of investment by state-owned investors to the Competition and Markets Authority where there is no likelihood at all of foreign state influence, such as where state-owned investors acquire shares in newspaper groups that are part of listed companies.

The regulations will, as the previous Government proposed and as permitted by the 2002 Act, come into force with retrospective effect on 13 March 2024. There are three important considerations that relate to the 15% threshold that are relevant to the Committee’s deliberations. First, state-owned investors acting on behalf of foreign powers can benefit from the exception only if the investment is a passive one. The legislation will not permit state-owned investors to acquire rights to directly, or indirectly, appoint directors or other officers of the company, or any rights to direct, control or influence the policy or activities of a UK newspaper.

If the Secretary of State has grounds for suspecting that a state-owned investor has secured, or will secure, the right to direct, control or influence a UK newspaper, they must ask the Competition and Markets Authority to review the case. If the Competition and Markets Authority concludes that the transaction has resulted, or will result, in a foreign state acquiring control or influence, the Secretary of State must take action to unwind the transaction or block such a transaction. The four-month time limit for the Secretary of State to intervene in a completed merger will start running from the point at which facts about whether there is foreign state influence come to light. This means that action can be taken years after the transaction is completed, if relevant information was concealed beforehand, which will act as an important deterrent.

Finally, the legislation includes specific provisions for joint arrangements. These state that if a foreign power and other entities—potentially other foreign powers—own shares in a UK newspaper as part of a joint arrangement, each party is considered to hold the combined shares or voting rights of all. If these provisions applied to a joint arrangement between state-owned investors from different countries, and the total of the state-owned investors’ combined shares or voting rights in a newspaper exceeds 15%, the Secretary of State would again be required to take action.

Our policy intention has always been to prevent any foreign state influence over the affairs and policies of UK newspapers and news periodicals. Although a remote risk, we acknowledge that, in some circumstances, different state-owned investors from different states could, in theory, each acquire up to 15% of a UK newspaper enterprise. They would then be able to organise arrangements so that each was treated as a passive investor with no ability, at least on paper, to influence a newspaper in any way, but still collectively own the majority of the enterprise.

As explained, there are measures in the legislation that mean that the Secretary of State must refer a merger to the Competition and Markets Authority if they suspect that there is a joint arrangement of this kind, and the combined holding of shares or voting rights of the parties to the arrangement exceeds the 15% limit. The Secretary of State is also able to consider the range of relevant public interest considerations in the core media merger regime provided by the 2002 Act.

We also recognise the strong views expressed by Members, and in the other place, that the issue should be put beyond doubt. I can therefore confirm to the Committee that the Government intend to lay, in draft, a second statutory instrument in the autumn to amend the foreign state investment exemptions to put the issue beyond doubt. We have chosen not to withdraw the regulations before us today due to the pressing need to have the main foreign state investment exemptions in place as soon as possible. It is important in order to give UK newspapers and potential investors greater certainty about the overall regime. We will, however, publish a draft of the secondary statutory instrument for consultation by 16 July. This approach will allow time for the detailed provisions to be considered and ensure that the drafting does not create unintended consequences. The second statutory instrument would also be subject to the affirmative procedure, requiring review and approval by Parliament.

I stress that the UK has a strong track record for encouraging investment critical to growth within the media industry. These regulations ensure that the foreign state influence regime operates in a way that minimises the burden for UK newspapers while strengthening the robust regulatory framework that protects press freedom and free speech. Accordingly, I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

This has been an important and interesting debate and I am grateful for the contributions by the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. The debate has shown the wide support across the House for stronger measures to protect UK newspapers and news periodicals. It also highlights the challenge in setting exceptions in a way that balances Parliament’s desires against the legitimate concerns about the ability of UK newspapers to raise investment if restrictions are set too tightly.

Government need to balance the importance of creating certainty and sustainability for our newspaper industry with the need to protect against the risk of foreign state influence by setting a clear threshold for exceptions within the regime at 15%. We believe that we have done that effectively. Safeguards in the legislation will prevent multiple states each investing up to 15% via state-owned investors from acquiring control or influence over the policy of a newspaper enterprise, whether acting alone or in a joint arrangement. We have listened to the concerns, however, and have committed—I commit to this again now—to further legislation to put this beyond any doubt.

To respond to the points made, we have reached a final position on thresholds due to the concerns expressed by newspaper groups about the unintended effects of the strict threshold proposed by the previous Government. We have considered those points, and we agree with the concerns to reset the level of the threshold, which is still below the level at which material influence generally arises in merger cases. The change balances the need to protect our press from foreign state influence against sufficient flexibility to support inward investment by newspaper groups that poses no risk of foreign influence or control.

I will endeavour to follow up on that letter from the shadow Secretary of State. On the question on new powers from the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East, there is now a duty for the Secretary of State to report to the Competition and Markets Authority if there are any concerns or uncertainty. Also, the “state-owned investor” definition will include public pension funds if they satisfy the conditions for eligibility in the legislation. I am happy to continue the conversation with Members from across the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee.

The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop.

The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years.

We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly.

In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.

I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute.

These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that.

The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships.

Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me.

As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it.

Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less.

Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed.

The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop.

We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period. The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period.

Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time.

That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test. The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered.

There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 58 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 57 sets out a basic set of conditions that must be met for a league to be allowed to apply to the regulator and request that the backstop be triggered. The regulator cannot unilaterally trigger the backstop process; it must receive an application from one of the leagues under clause 57. This clause sets out that a regulated league can apply to trigger the process if there are unresolved issues between it and another league in relation to the distribution of relevant revenue. We discussed the definition of relevant revenue when we debated clause 56.

For a league to apply to trigger the backstop, at least one of the four conditions outlined in clause 57 must be met. Those four conditions are as follows: no distribution agreement is in place between the relevant leagues; there has been a material reduction in the amount of relevant revenue received by a relevant league since the last distribution agreement was reached; there has been a material change in circumstances in relation to the relevant revenue received by one or both relevant leagues since the last distribution agreement was reached; and at least five years have passed since the last distribution agreement between the relevant leagues came into force.

Each of the conditions is designed to mitigate a specific risk to the sustainability of the pyramid. Those are a complete absence of any distribution deal; a reduction in distributed revenue; a significant change in the circumstances surrounding distributions; and an old deal no longer fit for purpose but unable to be refreshed because the industry cannot agree. The conditions set an appropriate framework for when a league can apply to trigger the process. They help to avoid vexatious applications or fishing expeditions when a perfectly good, up-to-date industry deal is already in place. That is why clause 57 should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 specifies procedural steps and requirements. The applicant league has to comply with those for its application to trigger the backstop to be valid. Before making an application, the league must first notify the other relevant league and the regulator of its intention. That prevents either league from being blindsided by the process being triggered. The notice must list the issues in dispute, explain why one of the relevant conditions in clause 57 is met, and invite representations from the other specified competition organiser. That act, in and of itself, may help to trigger useful discussion between the leagues, as clearly outlining the issues preventing an agreement from moving forward will bring the leagues closer to compromise. After the other relevant league has had a chance to make any representations, the applicant league may apply to the regulator to trigger the process. It must include the other league’s representations with its application. That ensures that the regulator has the information that it needs from both leagues, so that it can make a considered decision on whether to trigger the backstop. The exchange of representations is also an early opportunity for the leagues to come to an agreement themselves, before the process is triggered. Ultimately, this clause is about creating transparency and promoting dialogue, which sets the tone for the rest of the backstop process.

Clauses 57 and 58 together outline the requirements that must be met for a league to apply to trigger the backstop process. The requirements in clauses 57 and 58 are just the first hurdle that a league has to clear in order for the regulator to consider its application. In order to actually trigger the backstop the regulator then has to assess whether the application meets certain legal tests set out in clause 59, which we will discuss further in a later group. I beg to move that clauses 57 and 58 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Applications under section 57: procedural and other requirements

Amendments made: 30, in clause 58, page 48, line 7, at end insert—

“(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which it is intended the application will relate,”

This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which it is intended the application will relate.

Amendment 31, in clause 58, page 48, line 8, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.

This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate.

Amendment 32, in clause 58, page 48, line 12, leave out paragraph (c)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 30.

Amendment 33, in clause 58, page 48, line 22, at end insert—

“(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which the application relates,”

This amendment provides that an application under clause 57 must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which the application relates.

Amendment 34, in clause 58, page 48, line 23, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.

This amendment provides that the application under clause 57 must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate.

Amendment 35, in clause 58, page 48, line 27, leave out paragraph (c)—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.

Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Decisions by the IFR on applications under section 57

Amendments made: 36, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, leave out “the qualifying football season or seasons” and insert “one or more of the questions for resolution”.

This amendment provides that the IFR must decide whether the resolution process should be triggered in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution to which the application under clause 57 relates.

Amendment 37, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, after “relates” insert “(or a modified version of one or more of those questions)”.

This amendment provides that the IFR may decide that the resolution process should be triggered in relation to a modified version of one or more of the questions for resolution set out in the application under clause 57.

Amendment 38, in clause 59, page 48, line 36, leave out “qualifying football season” and insert “question or questions for resolution”.

This amendment provides that the IFR must be satisfied that the conditions in clause 59(2) are met before deciding to trigger the process in relation to a question or questions for resolution.

Amendment 39, in clause 59, page 48, line 38, leave out “that season” and insert “each season to which the question relates or the questions relate”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 40, in clause 59, page 48, line 41, after “triggered” insert “in relation to the question or questions for resolution”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 59, page 49, line 1, after “(c)” insert

“has exercised any of the IFR’s other functions under this Act in order to resolve the question or questions for resolution and such question or questions remain unresolved, or”.

It is a pleasure to be here with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy. I will pass this over to the Minister. This is just an attempt to slightly clarify and strengthen the role of the regulator and the point of intervention. It would be helpful to see how this fits in with the way that the Minister has reconfigured the clause with her amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We will discuss clause 59 in more detail in the next group. It sets out the tests that must be met for the regulator to justify accepting a league application so that it can then trigger the backstop. The amendment adds to clause 59 to give the regulator an additional basis on which to justify triggering. It could accept an application to trigger the backstop if it has tried and failed to resolve the disputed distribution issues using its other regulatory functions. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the amendment is not necessary. Clause 59 already allows the regulator to accept an application to trigger if it considers that its other functions would not be able to resolve the disputed issues in a reasonable timeframe. That appropriately covers the scenario set out in my hon. Friend’s amendment.

If the regulator has already tried and failed to resolve a distribution issue using its other functions, that would be a reasonable basis for it to conclude that its other functions were not up to task. The existing test in clause 59 could then be met and an application trigger at the backstop could be accepted. It is important to clarify once again that the regulator would not be triggering the process itself. This is simply a clarification regarding a situation in which an application was submitted and the regulator had tried and failed to resolve the issue outlined previously using its other powers. In this situation the regulator would still have the discretion as to whether or not it triggered the process based on whether the application met the other high threshold. I hope this provides some reassurance. We will discuss this a little further in the next group.

[Mr Betts]

We are off to a good start this morning. I am 100% convinced that the Bill already does what I was seeking it to do. I hope we are 100% convinced on the other issues that we debate later on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 41, in clause 59, page 49, line 4, after “triggered” insert “in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 42, in clause 59, page 49, line 10, at end insert—

“(4A) Where the IFR is minded that the resolution process should be triggered, the IFR must consult the Football Association on the question or questions for resolution in relation to which it is minded to trigger the process.”

This amendment requires the IFR to consult the Football Association on the question or questions for resolution in relation to which it is minded to trigger the process.

Amendment 43, in clause 59, page 49, line 15, at end insert—

“(zi) the question or questions for resolution in relation to which the IFR is triggering the resolution process,”

This amendment provides that the notice under clause 59(5) must set out the question or questions for resolution in relation to which the IFR is triggering the resolution process.

Amendment 44, in clause 59, page 49, line 16, leave out “the resolution process relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.

This amendment provides that the notice under clause 59(5) must set out the qualifying football season or seasons to which the question or questions for resolution relate.

Amendment 45, in clause 59, page 49, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (ii)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.

Amendment 46, in clause 59, page 49, line 18, at end insert—

“(iia) how the IFR has taken account of any representations, copies of which accompanied the application under section 57 by virtue of section 58(5)(d), in setting out that question or those questions, and”

This amendment requires the IFR to set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b) how it has taken account of any representations when setting out the question or questions in relation to which it is triggering the resolution process.

Amendment 47, in clause 59, page 49, line 20, leave out “the question or questions for resolution” and insert “that question or those questions”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.

Amendment 48, in clause 59, page 49, line 21, at end insert—

“(5A) Where any of the questions for resolution set out in the notice differ from those to which the application made under section 57 relates, the notice must set out the extent of, and reasons for, those differences.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment requires the IFR to set out the extent of, and reasons for, any differences between the question or questions for resolution set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(ii) and the question or questions for resolution set out in an application under clause 57.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As we discussed on clauses 57 and 58, the backstop can be triggered only in response to an application by a league. Clause 59 sets out how the regulator will assess an application to trigger, how it will decide whether to trigger at all and how it will determine exactly which issues need to be resolved under the backstop. The backstop has been carefully designed to deliver the right outcomes with minimal regulatory involvement. As part of this, it has been designed to be used as a last resort. That is why this clause introduces high statutory thresholds that must be met in order for the backstop to be triggered.

In particular, the clause sets out that the regulator must have reasonable grounds to suspect that its ability to advance at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop were not triggered. The regulator must also consider whether other regulatory tools could be utilised to resolve the issues instead. The regulator must be satisfied that at least one of the conditions in clause 57—which we have already discussed —is met.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

The mediation stage

Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert

“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.

This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).

Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out

“the question or questions for resolution”

and insert

“that question or those questions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.

Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert

“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines.

A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience.

The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons. Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days.

We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 60, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 61

Final proposal stage

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 61, page 50, line 40, leave out

“require any final proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence”

and insert

“require any final proposal to—

(i) be accompanied by supporting evidence;

(ii) be consistent with the resolution of any relevant issues identified in the Regulator's most recently published State of the Game report;

(iii) give effect to the views of any relevant specified competition organiser which has not been invited pursuant to clause 61(4)(c) to submit to the committee a final proposal; and

(iv) advance the Regulator's objectives in section 6, consistent with its general duties and Regulatory principles in sections 7 and 8.”

This amendment would set additional requirements to accompany any final proposal for the resolution process.

This is quite an important issue, because it concerns the principle and basis on which the regulator comes to a decision. My amendment simply sets out certain things that the regulator must have regard to and take into account when making that decision.

First, there should be supporting evidence—that seems straightforward. Secondly, and importantly, we ought to keep anchoring what the regulator does back to the essence of this proposed legislation and the regulator’s purpose. Clause 6 very clearly sets out the regulator’s objectives of promoting the financial soundness of regulated clubs and the financial resilience of English football, and I think we can all agree that that is what the regulator should be doing and seeking to achieve.

Surely, therefore, when we are talking about the detail of how the regulator reaches a final decision on the backstop, we ought to be absolutely clear that it must have foremost in its mind those initial objectives. Otherwise, what is the point of the regulator and its objectives? Why are we in this Committee if not to address the financial soundness of clubs and English football as a whole?

My amendment mentions considering the views of others who may not be formal parts of the backstop mediation process. It provides that the regulator would not have to listen to them, but could

“give effect to the views”

of the Football Supporters’ Association, the Professional Footballers’ Association or others who may have views. Those groups would not determine what the regulator decides to do, but surely the regulator has to take account of their views.

I hope that the Minister gives serious consideration to at least making sure that, when reaching that final and absolutely crucial decision on financial distribution, the regulator’s aim should be to deal with the problems of the financial soundness of clubs and the overall financial soundness and wellbeing of English football.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. Although we are still keen for an industry deal on distributions, part of getting it right is ensuring that the regulator is best placed to act if needed. As the Government amendments that we are due to debate in the next two groups show, we have reflected on many of the same points. We think it is right that any distribution order shows how it aligns with the findings of the state of the game report and with the regulator’s objectives and duties, including the duty to have regard to its regulatory principles.

That is why Government new clauses 3 and 4, which amend the final stages of the backstop, already address these issues. We will discuss the new clauses in more detail shortly, but they clearly require that the regulator sets out any relevant findings from the state of the game report and that any league proposals include evidence about how they address those findings. They will also require that any order the regulator makes addresses the state of the game findings, and they highlight the importance of the regulator’s objectives and its general duties, including the regulatory principles.

I also make clear again that, after we set out the competitions in scope of the regime, the regulator’s objectives, namely to protect and promote the heritage and financial resilience and soundness of English football, will apply to the top five divisions of English men’s football. When creating a distributions order between any two leagues, the regulator must have due regard for the wider impact the order may have on all the clubs and leagues it regulates. The regulator must make an evidence-based decision that takes into account all relevant considerations, and its final decision must advance its objectives.

It is also important to clarify that, while the order will be limited in scope to the questions set out when the process is triggered, it will not be without context. Given the important role a satisfactory distributions order will play in the future of the entire sport, the regulator will need to come to a solution that works for all of football.

For those reasons, I cannot accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, but I hope that his concerns will be appropriately addressed by the Government amendments that we will debate shortly.

[Mr Betts]

I am pleased to see that the Minister actually read my amendment and formulated her new clauses accordingly. What she says is reassuring. As she just said, there is no point in the regulator doing a state of the game report unless it has regard to it when coming to a view about financial distribution. That is absolutely clear from what the Minister has said, and that is what the regulator must do. On the basis of those assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to debate Government new clause 3.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options.

We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime. I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy.

In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.

New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.

League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information.

That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.

[Mr French]

I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it.

The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 62

Distribution orders

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 62, page 51, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(c).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship Sir Jeremy. I remind the Committee of my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Unlike the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, I chose my tie with purpose this morning, to celebrate both the fact that this might be the last day of the Bill Committee and also events in Atlanta last night.

What we have seen is the thin end of the wedge. I am alive to the arguments about the disparity that parachute payments create in the overall economy of football. However, this Bill is undoubtedly the thin end of the wedge. It will come as no surprise to Members that I am a Conservative, and therefore I think the best form of regulator is competition. We all just ought to watch, because if the regulator has parachute payments within its purview, what is next? It will be agents’ fees, TV rights carve-ups, finishing position bonuses and cut prize money. Seeking to run football as some sort of socialist command economy will come unstuck. I put on record my concern that that is exactly what the Bill seeks to do.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The amendments deal with the final stage of the backstop mechanism. I will respond to the shadow Minister, and then I will respond to the wider debate, including to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East.

The final stage of the backstop mechanism is when, if the leagues have not been able to agree a complete deal themselves, the regulator will make an order to resolve whatever issues remain. That stage is set out in clause 62, and Members have tabled amendments relating to their concerns about the existing clause 62. The Government have tabled new clause 4, which would entirely replace clause 62, so the shadow Minister need no longer be troubled by many of the concerns he has set out. He was particularly bothered by clause 62(1)(c), but that will be taken out in its entirety. Our new clause 4 addresses many of the concerns reflected in hon. Members’ amendments, and I hope I can satisfy the Committee that new clause 4 is a positive change to the final stage of the backstop.

We should remember that by this stage of the backstop process the regulator will have assessed an application and representations from the leagues, set out the scope of the backstop by defining the questions of resolution, and highlighted the relevant findings in the state of the game report. The leagues will have been through mediation to resolve those questions. They will have been asked to exchange proposals to solve any questions outstanding after mediation, giving them another opportunity for compromise and negotiation.

New clause 4 sets out how the regulator will create a distribution order as a last resort if, after all those stages, the leagues cannot strike a deal. The regulator will first have 60 days to create a provisional order. We expect that during that period it will engage with the leagues as necessary to keep the process as collaborative as possible. Even at that stage, the regulator can continue to encourage an industry deal. Unlike the binary “winner takes all” model in clause 62, new clause 4 allows the regulator to design its order based on the evidence and drawing on any league proposals submitted.

The order the regulator designs must adhere to clear principles: it must not place an undue burden on league commercial interests; it must observe a delay before any reduction in parachute payments—I will address that in a moment; it must have regard to any duly submitted league proposals; and it must explain how it addresses relevant state of the game findings. The regulator’s objectives and general duties are paramount.

The leagues will then be able to submit representations on the provisional order. That feedback will help the regulator to shape an order that works for industry. The regulator will consider the representations and finalise all that into a full distributions order. That order will take into account any relevant issues raised by the state of the game report, the evidence that the regulator has gathered throughout the process, the engagement it has had with the leagues and any proposals they have submitted. The regulator will be best placed to design a solution that addresses the problems it identifies and delivers on its objectives.

If the backstop reaches that point, it is because the industry has failed to strike a deal, but we still want the solution to be as industry-led as possible. The regulator will be required to have due regard to the league proposals submitted. It can choose to directly lift aspects of the proposals into its order, but it is not required to adopt a league proposal wholesale. That is a slightly more flexible system that moves away from the inherent risk of a “winner takes all” model, and allows the regulator to carefully design a solution.

The model also allows for more evidence-based and data-driven decisions. It gives the regulator enough discretion to ensure that any order is as effective as possible in addressing the core financial issues facing the game. We are confident that the regulator, keeping in mind its objectives to promote sustainability and its duties to avoid adverse effects on growth and sporting competitiveness, can come to a balanced solution.

I thank everyone who has engaged meaningfully with this part of the Bill throughout its passage to help us to reach this version of the model. I am confident that the new approach is the right one. In light of that, I hope that Members will support the addition of new clause 4 and the consequential Government amendments in this group.

On the non-Government amendments, I will first address those tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and then those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. Opposition amendment 125 addresses the regulator’s ability to terminate the distribution process if it does not receive a viable proposal from either league, but Government new clause 4 already gives the regulator discretion to deal with that scenario. As I have said, under new clause 4, the regulator need not accept either league’s proposal wholesale. It can design its own solution, drawing on the league proposals as appropriate. We think that greatly increases the chances that the process will reach a satisfactory conclusion, and ensures that football will not go without a distribution deal. On that basis, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp]

The Minister said that just because the Bill enables the regulator to consider parachute payments, that does not mean that it will. The Minister is in the unique position of being the person who is going to appoint the football regulator, because the Secretary of State has stood down from that decision. Will the Minister ask the person selected to be the regulator whether they would like to exercise the power—whether “can” will mean “will”?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will discuss that in more detail in a moment, but I gently say to the hon. Member that it will not be a personal decision by the regulator; as we have discussed, the regulator will make a decision based on the findings of the state of the game report and will be guided by the regulatory principles. I do not want to get drawn into speculating whether they will or will not do that. We need the state of the game report to be done quickly, so that if the backstop is triggered, the regulator can consider the findings in the whole and make an informed decision.

On amendment 4, as the Government amendments show, the regulator will issue a notice that sets out the relevant findings of the state of the game report, which will need to be addressed by a distribution order, and the order must explain how it addresses those findings. We are absolutely aligned on the intention behind amendment 5. This exact change—to ensure that the regulator need not adopt league proposals wholesale but can instead design its own solution—is core to new clause 4.

Amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, seeks to shorten the transition period for parachute payments. While a timely distribution order is a priority, we must ensure that there are adequate protections for relegated clubs, to prevent a cliff edge. That is why the Bill guarantees that there can be no reduction at all in parachute payments, for an absolute minimum of one year from the end of the first season to which a distribution order applies. Shortening that period would give relegated clubs less time to plan financially, putting them at greater risk of financial trouble. That is, after all, the issue we are seeking to address through the legislation. I know that may not be the answer that my hon. Friend wants, but for those reasons I hope he will withdraw his amendments.

[Mr Betts]

I am still not quite sure how—given that all clubs now know that a regulator will be appointed, that the leagues and clubs know that financial distribution is at the heart of the Bill, and that a club can be promoted during the two-year period—any club can start preparing for that situation. At the beginning of that period, the club would not know whether it was going to get parachute payments, because it could be promoted and relegated in that period. I do not think the idea holds that two years gives certainty to clubs.

I am really worried about the idea of signalling, at this stage, that there will potentially be no change in financial distribution until the end of this Parliament. I do not know how far the Minister has thought that through, but if we want to encourage the Premier League and the EFL to sit down and reach an agreement—if that is the preferred way forward, and I think it is—surely the idea that the process can be extended by not reaching an agreement until beyond the next election is an incentive for the Premier League to do nothing. It is waiting for the pressure to come off, and the way to relieve it is simply to do nothing and hope that it goes away after the election.

Clearly, that pressure will go away if the Conservative party wins the election and implement a Bill with parachute payments not included in the regulator’s remit. That is what will happen. We were all elected to achieve change, and the change that most fans want to see is the addressing of the fundamental disparity within the English game that produces a cliff edge and all the problems in the Championship. We know how those problems need to be addressed: with the regulator’s powers in this excellent Bill. Why sit for two years after the regulator makes a decision and do nothing, when to give a year is fine?

The Minister has heard comments and concerns from hon. Friends today—Committee members who obviously have a great deal of interest in football in general and in their clubs in particular. Will she agree, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham asked, to take the matter away and give it further consideration? I do not want to push the Minister here and now on the words in my amendment, but I do want her to give an understanding that she recognises that there is a problem that needs to be addressed to satisfy her colleagues.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I assure my hon. Friend that I have thought about it carefully—that was a fair challenge. Indeed, when in opposition, I tabled an amendment to the previous Government’s Bill. I think we have very much strengthened the legislation by ensuring that parachute payments are in scope. We thought it odd to have a Bill on the financial sustainability of football without including them. That is why this Government have strengthened the Bill.

I completely acknowledge the strength of feeling on the matter. I say again that the regulator can consider it, but that does not necessarily mean that it will. It will need the evidence in the state of the game report. I appreciate and completely understand why hon. Members have shared examples from their own clubs, and are speculating on the impact of parachute payments, but that is not my role today. It is up to the state of the game report and the independent regulator to come to that decision, if the backstop is triggered.

[Mr Betts]

Would the Minister not therefore give the regulator a discretionary power to decide when it should be implemented, after either one year or two years? We will have a regulator who will be on top of the job and will have seen all the issues and evidence, in detail that we cannot see in Committee. Will the Minister consider giving flexibility and discretionary powers to the regulator?

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.

[Mr French]

Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment.

It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.

[Stephanie Peacock]

We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.

[Mr French]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3)—(Mr French.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. She has generally been very helpful in trying to acknowledge concerns when they have been raised, and in agreeing to have a look at them. I will not press my amendments to a vote at this stage, but I will bring them back on Report.

The Minister is entirely reasonable and open-minded on these matters, and has engaged in discussion on all sorts of things, but I worry that a handful of clubs in the Premier League are determining what happens with distribution orders, which is disappointing. I will return to this issue in due course, because I do not think the Minister’s approach on this clause has been how she has approached the rest of the Bill. I am disappointed, but I will not press my amendments to a vote.

Clause 62 disagreed to.

Clause 63

Duration and revocation of distribution orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.

Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr French]

I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc

Amendment made: 54, in clause 64, page 54, line 18, leave out “62(8)(b)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(10)(b)”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

For the backstop process to be viable as a regulatory solution, it needs to be legally enforceable. The clause sets out that, once the regulator has made a distribution order, it must keep the relevant leagues’ compliance with the order under review and monitor whether there is any need to take enforcement against the relevant leagues if they do not comply. Without this power, the sustainability issues that the backstop seeks to address will remain present.

Although constructive engagement with clubs will be the regulator’s default first step, the clause references its ability to take enforcement action, as outlined in part 8 of the Bill, to ensure that a distribution order is upheld. Furthermore, the clause allows the regulator to make rules on how costs associated with the backstop are to be paid. That could, for example, allow it to pass on the cost of mediation to the leagues. Finally, the clause also explicitly highlights the ability, at any stage, for the leagues to come to an alternative agreement.

It is important to reiterate that the distribution order is a last resort power, only to be used in cases where football cannot come to an agreement itself. If the leagues reach an agreement to resolve the issues in dispute before the backstop process concludes, the regulator will not impose an order. If they reach an agreement after the backstop has run its course, the regulator must revoke its order. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Power to require information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information.

Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime. The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime.

The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly. Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different.

As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

Reports on clubs by expert reporters

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively.

The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions. For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report.

The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.

We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Meaning of “relevant infringement”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedule 7.

Clause 68 stand part.

Government amendment 65.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 69 to 74 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

This group of clauses and schedules covers the meaning of “relevant infringement”, investigations into any relevant infringements, and the regulator’s investigatory powers.

Clause 67 explains the meaning of “relevant infringement” for the purposes of the Bill by reference to schedule 7. Relevant infringements are breaches of the requirements set out in the Bill and can be investigated and enforced by the regulator. Schedule 7 sets out the cases in which a relevant infringement is committed and the persons who can commit such an infringement, which could be a club or competition organiser, but also senior individuals at a club.

The fan-led review made it clear that it was vital that those in senior positions at clubs—those who make the damaging decisions that hurt clubs—were made subject to sanctions by the regulator. That is why we have ensured that the regulator may investigate and enforce on not only clubs and owners of clubs that may commit a relevant infringement, but officers and senior managers of the club.

In addition to the information offences, which we will debate in due course, the infringements in schedule 7 are a comprehensive and complete list of the possible non-compliance that might occur in relation to the Bill and the regulator’s regime. They include failure by a club to comply with a licence condition; failure by an owner to comply with a direction to cease to be an owner; and failure by competition organisers to comply with a distribution order.

The regulator may apply sanctions in response to a relevant infringement being committed, in accordance with the enforcement provisions in the Bill, but any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action by the regulator. A closed list of possible relevant infringements on the face of legislation provides up-front clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. It also clarifies the limits of the regulator’s enforcement regime.

Clause 68 gives the regulator the power to undertake an investigation if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant infringement has been committed. Powers of investigation are necessary to facilitate effective evidence-based enforcement. Such powers are commonly exercised by regulatory bodies across a wide range of industries. Any enforcement action the regulator takes must be based on sound evidence. The regulator does not need to carry out an investigation before taking enforcement action if it has sufficient evidence through other means. However, the regulator will need to be able to exercise investigatory powers in cases where it does not yet have sufficient evidence to decide whether to take action.

The specific investigatory powers of the regulator are set out in schedule 8. Like the general information-gathering powers in earlier clauses, the powers are exercisable only when the regulator opens an investigation into whether a person has committed a relevant infringement. The powers will enable the regulator to obtain the relevant information that it needs to look into suspected non-compliance with its regime. It has two investigatory powers: the power to ask questions of or interview any individual, and the power to enter business premises under a warrant issued by the courts or the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Those are proportionate powers that are common across other statutory regulators; for example, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and the Competition and Markets Authority all have similar investigatory powers.

Clause 68 also sets out important procedural requirements in respect of an investigation. Specifically, the regulator is required to give notice to a person under investigation explaining the matter being investigated.

Clause 69 sets out the potential outcomes of an investigation by the regulator. When investigating, the regulator must determine whether a relevant infringement has been committed and whether there is a reasonable excuse for doing so. The regulator can close an investigation by issuing a closure notice if no infringement is found to have taken place. The notice must clearly set out the regulator’s decision and the reasoning behind it. If the regulator decides that a relevant infringement has been committed, it can take enforcement action, which we will discuss in the next group.

Clause 70 enables the regulator to accept a commitment from a person under investigation in relation to their behaviour in certain circumstances. That means that, instead of carrying on with the investigation and potential enforcement action, the regulator is able to accept a binding commitment in lieu of the investigation. For example, a club could come forward during an investigation and offer to take certain action itself to rectify a possible infringement. The clause is intended to help facilitate a participative approach in place of formal investigation and enforcement. I want to reassure the Committee that a commitment is not a way that clubs can dodge scrutiny from the regulator, or reach settlements behind closed doors in order to avoid sanctions. The regulator is not obliged to accept a commitment and is still free to investigate different behaviour, even if a commitment is accepted.

Clause 71 is supplementary to clause 70 and sets out further detailed procedures for accepting, reviewing, varying and releasing a person from a commitment. It sets out safeguards, including to keep commitments under review to ensure that they remain effective, necessary and appropriate, as well as to issue notices when taking action on commitments, which may be published in the interest of transparency.

Clause 72 imposes a duty on persons to preserve information that may be relevant to an investigation. That means that a person who knows or suspects that an investigation is being conducted or is likely to be conducted must not destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information. As set out in schedule 9, which we will come to in the next group, failure to comply with the duty could be met by civil or criminal sanctions.

On clause 73, information is crucial to the work of the regulator. I have discussed the powers the regulator will have to obtain the information it needs. However, those powers will not cut across legal professional privilege. The confidentiality between professional legal advisers and their clients is an important protection and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with that. That is why the clause clearly sets out that the regulator cannot require any person to produce, generate or provide it with any privileged communications.

Transparency has always been a key principle when designing the regulatory regime. Clause 74 requires the regulator to publish certain notices related to investigations. The specific requirements in the clause build on the general regulatory principle of transparency in clause 8. Requiring notices to be published will enable transparency and clarity in respect of the regulator’s investigations.

Government amendment 65 to schedule 8 will ensure that the regulator can conduct investigations thoroughly and without imposing unnecessary burdens. At present, if the regulator obtains information when entering business premises under a warrant as part of an investigation, it can only keep that information for three months. On reflection, we think that is an unnecessary and arbitrary restriction. While the regulator must strive to carry out investigations promptly, we do not want the process to be curtailed artificially and risk affecting the quality or thoroughness of the investigation, nor do we want the regulator to be forced to burden clubs with repeat requests for the same information simply because the three-month deadline has passed. It is in the interests of all parties that the regulator follows best practice on the retention of information taken under warrant, including the Home Office powers of entry code of practice. This is why we tabled the amendment to remove the three-month timeframe. I urge the Committee to accept it.

[Mr French]

The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.

Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases?

Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources?

Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs?

Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied?

Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation?

Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions.

Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator.

Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation?

Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.

On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8

Investigatory powers

Amendment made: 65, in schedule 8, page 109, line 14, leave out “a period of three months” and insert “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment provides that information obtained by the IFR under a warrant may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 69 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75

Sanctions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 9.

Clauses 76 and 77 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Together, the clauses and schedule in this group cover the sanctions available to the regulator for a variety of infringements, and the procedure for taking enforcement action. Clause 75 sets out the enforcement actions that the regulator may take and the sanctions that it may impose, by reference to schedule 9. We expect that the regulator will seek to pre-empt and address instances of non-compliance through constructive engagement where possible, but that will not always be appropriate. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to reach for stronger and more direct tools, and gives it the mandate to use them boldly when necessary.

The range of sanctions set out in schedule 9—sanctions of varying type and severity—will help the regulator to deter any non-compliance with its requirements. In particular, they include “name and shame” censure statements, and financial penalties. Where relevant, these sanctions can be applied to individuals making the decisions at clubs, as well as or instead of the clubs themselves. This can act as a better deterrent and avoid indirectly hurting fans. The regulator will also have the ability to appoint a skilled person to a club where relevant, to help the club to return to compliance. This presents a less punitive and more assistive enforcement tool for certain circumstances that call for it.

Schedule 9 also provides for the ultimate sanction—suspension or revocation of an operating licence. That can apply to either a provisional or a full licence, but it has a very high threshold for use, in that one or more of the “aggravating conditions” specified in the schedule must be met. We do not expect the regulator to need to reach for this sanction, particularly given that it can target owners and officers at clubs first. However, it is a necessary part of a licensing system, and a deterrent for the most egregious behaviour—for example, the threat of clubs joining a prohibited breakaway competition.

Clause 76 requires the regulator to give a warning notice before it takes any enforcement action. This is common practice and ensures a transparent and fair process by providing early warning and an opportunity for the target to make representations. Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice once it has considered any representations received on the warning notice. The decision notice will set out whether the regulator has decided to take enforcement action and, if so, what that action is. As set out in clause 80, which we will debate in the coming groups, the regulator is obliged to publish warning and decision notices, to ensure complete transparency.

[Mr French]

Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them.

As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively?

Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified?

Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action?

I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts.

The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities?

The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made.

On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant. That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

Clauses 76 and 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant.

We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators. Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79

Urgent directions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 80 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives.

We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations. There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction.

Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact?

We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?

[Stephanie Peacock]

An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence.

A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Tenth sitting)

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 66, 67, 68, 71, 69 and 72.

Schedule 10.

Clauses 82 and 83 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review.

Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation. That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system.

Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.

Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers.

Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews. The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review.

I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions. This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal.

Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.

Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority.

I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry.

How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.

[Mr French]

I am happy to receive a response in writing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10

Reviews

Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert

“to trigger, or not to trigger,”.

This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10.

Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22.

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out

“a committee of the Expert Panel”

and insert “the Board”.

This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.

Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30.

This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.

Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.

Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 85 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.

Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals.

The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own. That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market.

However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.

In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch.

The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 86

Disclosure of information by the IFR

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 87 to 89 stand part.

[Stephanie Peacock]

This group of clauses relates to the disclosure of information both to and from the regulator. Clause 86 will enable the regulator to share relevant information with bodies within the industry and regulators that are dealing with similar and relevant issues. As well as allowing those bodies to benefit from the regulator’s knowledge and information, that should encourage those bodies to reciprocate by sharing relevant information they hold with the regulator. These two-way sharing relationships should help to establish an effective network of communication that strengthens the efficiency of regulation in the industry and across the economy.

Clause 87 concerns the disclosure of information to the regulator, for example by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. It also gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to enable other public authorities to share information with the regulator, if they do not already have the ability to do so. That will help to future-proof the regulator’s regime and ensure that it can obtain information from all the relevant bodies so that it can effectively deliver its functions.

Clause 88 sets out some restrictions and protections on the processing and disclosure of information by and to the regulator. That includes ensuring that a disclosure is in line with data protection legislation and does not prejudice the prevention, investigation or prosecution of a crime. It also prevents the disclosure of certain information, received from the National Crime Agency or HMRC, without their consent. This is to give those bodies confidence that sensitive information can be shared safely. The clause also permits the regulator to exclude information from disclosure that might significantly harm the legitimate personal or business interests of the person to whom the information relates. These are all important safeguards around the treatment of potentially sensitive information.

Finally, clause 89 creates criminal offences and penalties related to the safeguards for HMRC information set out in the previous clause. The penalties for these offences are commensurate with other regulatory regimes and are a proportionate but robust deterrent against the unlawful disclosure of information. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 87 to 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 90

Rules

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Bill provides a clear framework of powers and duties for the regulator to follow. In places, that is a detailed and prescriptive framework to direct and constrain the regulator’s regime more closely, but in other places there is greater room for the regulator to exercise discretion. That approach reflects regulatory best practice, which is to give the expert, independent and better informed regulator the flexibility to adapt regulations to the circumstances of different persons and to changing circumstances over time. Such flexibility will allow the regulator to be light touch where possible but intervene more strongly where necessary.

The ability for the regulator to make rules facilitates that approach. Rules will allow the regulator to fill in the technical and operational details of its regime within the framework afforded to it by this Bill. It could amend, replace or revoke those rules in future to adapt to developments in the market. The clause sets out some procedural safeguards around the making of rules and what these rules may do, including that the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. As outlined previously, this consultation is an important part of the participative approach that the regulator should take to make sure its regime works for the industry.

[Mr French]

Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91

Regulations

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 91, page 74, line 24, leave out subsection (3)(iii).

[Mr French]

Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law.

The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process.

Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions.

Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure.

Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament.

Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs.

That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football?

My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions.

This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles.

Such interference has one clear sanction:

“the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.”

As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational.

Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.

By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.

As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism.

However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power. The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been

“a material change of circumstances”.

Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

We cannot set something in stone and say, “That’s how it’s going to be forever.” Giving that bit of flexibility is right. I was talking to my friend Richard Caborn, who was a previous sports Minister, and he said to me that, when discussions first began about revenue within football, they were concentrated on the television rights to UK matches in the United Kingdom. It has since become apparent, of course, that it is the international rights that are the real driver of resources. That was not thought about when the first distribution was done.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend.

This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Opposition still have major concerns about the powers afforded to the Secretary of State and what we believe to be appropriate parliamentary oversight. We will press the amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 91 sets out the parameters and procedure around the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations under the various provisions of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Minor definitions etc

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 92, page 75, line 17, after “functions” insert

“or give rise to the perception that said person’s functions have been prejudicially affected, including (but not limited to) a situation in which a person is—

(a) employed by or engaged as a consultant by any specified competition organiser or any group undertaking of a specified competition organiser;

(b) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from a specified competition organiser;

(c) connected with a group undertaking of an organisation within the scope of part (ii);

(d) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from any of the organisations listed in parts (ii) or (iii); or

(e) connected (as defined in section 252 of the Companies Act 2006) with an individual within the scope of parts (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) of section 92(1).”

The amendment gives further detail to the definition of “conflict of interest” within this Bill.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Turner, hopefully for the last time—in this Committee, I mean. The amendment is simply trying to make the Bill a bit more specific about what “conflict of interest” might mean. I am sure that the Minister will tell me that the amendment is not quite right in its drafting and wording. Nevertheless, it is at least worth putting on the record that this is an important issue. Maybe we can obtain some clarification about what “conflict of interest” means in practice.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment.

As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.

We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that

“is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”.

I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.

[Mr French]

I am listening very carefully to the Minister’s definition of a conflict of interest. Does she believe that it should be applied to the new chair of the regulator, who has donated to the Labour party?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee.

Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 93 stand part. 

Schedule 11.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clauses 92 and 93 and schedule 11 relate to definitions. Clause 92 defines various terms used throughout the Bill that are not already defined elsewhere. Clause 93 refers to schedule 11, which lists where in the Bill to find definitions or explanations of terms that apply to multiple provisions—for example, “competition organiser,” “football season” and “regulated club.”

Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.  

Clause 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.  

Schedule 11

Index of defined terms

Amendment made: 73, in schedule 11, page 123, line 4, column 2, leave out “62(3)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(9)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.

Schedule 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 94

Pre-commencement consultation

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 94, page 76, line 14, leave out from “to” to end of line 15 and insert

“—

(a) a provision of this Act which requires the IFR to consult another person;

(b) the provision made by section 10(5)(a) and (b).”

This amendment includes the provision made by clause 10(5)(a) and (b) in clause 94.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 56 to 59.

[Stephanie Peacock]

These amendments relate to a simple administrative change to clause 94, the pre-commencement clause. Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent. That clause was added to ensure that the shadow regulator would be able to begin consultation on its functions, and that, if deemed appropriate by the regulator post Royal Assent, that consultation could be relied on, ensuring no unnecessary delays to the set-up and commencement of the regulator.

The change simply ensures that the clause captures the slightly different wording in the state of the game clause about the regulator inviting suggestions on the report. By making this change, we reduce the operational risk of the regulator not reporting its state of the game report as quickly as possible post Royal Assent, and therefore being up and running as soon as necessary.

Amendment 55 agreed to.

Amendments made: 56, in clause 94, page 76, line 18, leave out “carried out consultation” and insert “did anything”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 57, in clause 94, page 76, line 20, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 58, in clause 94, page 76, line 21, leave out

“consultation had been carried out”

and insert “thing had been done”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 59, in clause 94, page 76, line 23, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent, and for that consultation to satisfy the requirements placed on the regulator in legislation post Royal Assent.

Clause 94, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 95

Offences by officers of clubs and bodies corporate

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 95 makes sure that if a club is found to have committed certain offences under the Bill, such as falsifying or destroying information, the individuals responsible can be held criminally liable.

Question put and agreed to.  

Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 96

Review of Act

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

During Committee in the other place, Peers raised the importance of evaluating the impact, intended outcomes and success of the regulator. The Government absolutely agree that it is good practice for the impacts of regulation to be monitored and evaluated post-implementation. That is why we have added this clause, which will require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the operation of the Act and its impact on industry. That review must be completed no later than five years after the full commencement of the licensing regime.

[Mr French]

Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97

Payments into the Consolidated Fund

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 97 covers situations in which the regulator must return money to the Exchequer and requires the regulator to pay into the consolidated fund amounts received through the levy to recoup its set-up costs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 12.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.

[Mr French]

I have heard what the Minister just said. Can I clarify that the amendments would make the regulator FOI-able?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 99

Extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.

[Mr French]

I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will make that commitment.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Commencement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Bill provides for the majority of provisions to be brought into force by commencement regulations. Different provisions may be brought into force on different days, enabling the new regime to be brought into force in a structured and considered manner. The main exceptions to that are the provisions that establish the regulator and its governance structure. In addition, there are some basic initial functions that the regulator needs to stand up the regime, such as putting rules in place and preparing a state of the game report. These provisions will be brought into force on Royal Assent to enable the regulator to get on with the task of standing up the new regime without unnecessary delay.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Short title

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 101, page 80, line 11, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 101 concerns the short title of the Bill. It makes certain that, once it has passed through Parliament, the Football Governance Bill will be cited as the Football Governance Act 2025. Finally, Government amendment 60 is technical and procedural; it removes the privilege amendment inserted on Third Reading in the Lords to clause 101. This was added in the other place to make it clear that they have not infringed on the financial privileges of this House.

Amendment 60 agreed to.

Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 3

Proposal stage

“(1) This section applies where mediation under section 60 comes to an end by virtue of the occurrence of an event within section 60(6)(b), (c) or (d).

(2) As soon as reasonably practicable after the occurrence of the event, the IFR must give notice to the two specified competition organisers.

(3) A notice under subsection (2) must—

(a) set out the question or questions for resolution,

(b) specify the qualifying football season or seasons to which that question relates or those questions relate,

(c) set out any findings in the IFR’s most recent state of the game report that the IFR considers relevant to that question or those questions,

(d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to submit to the IFR and to each other a proposal as to how that question or those questions should be resolved,

(e) require any proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence (including evidence as to how the proposal addresses the findings set out under paragraph (c)),

(f) specify the day on or before which proposals are to be submitted.

(4) A question for resolution may be set out in a notice under subsection (2) only if it is the question, or one of the questions, for resolution remaining unresolved when the mediation mentioned in subsection (1) came to an end.

(5) Where a notice under subsection (2) sets out a question for resolution that relates to relegation revenue (within the meaning given by section (Distribution orders)(9)), the notice must require the specified competition organisers to explain in a proposal how the proposal will promote the financial sustainability of clubs which operate teams relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser distributing the relegation revenue.

(6) Subsection (7) applies if, on or before the day specified by virtue of subsection (3)(f), a specified competition organiser submits to the IFR a proposal which the IFR considers is not a qualifying proposal.

(7) The IFR may give both specified competition organisers a notice specifying a later day (falling not more than seven days after the end of the day specified by virtue of subsection (3)(f)) on or before which proposals are to be submitted.

(8) As soon as reasonably practicable after—

(a) the initial proposal deadline, or

(b) (if earlier) the day on which the IFR considers that both specified competition organisers have submitted qualifying proposals,

the IFR must give a notice under subsection (9) to the two specified competition organisers.

(9) A notice under this subsection must—

(a) state which of the two specified competition organisers (if any) has submitted a qualifying proposal before the initial proposal deadline,

(b) invite each such specified competition organiser to—

(i) confirm their proposal, or

(ii) make any permitted modifications to their proposal,

and submit the confirmed or modified proposal to the IFR and the other specified competition organiser, and

(c) specify the day on or before which the confirmed or modified proposal is to be submitted.

(10) The IFR may specify in a notice under subsection (2) or (9) the form and manner in which proposals and supporting evidence must be submitted.

(11) In this section—

(a) ‘the initial proposal deadline’ means—

(i) the day referred to in subsection (3)(f), or

(ii) where the IFR gives a notice under subsection (7), the day specified in the notice;

(b) a ‘qualifying proposal’ means a proposal which—

(i) explains how the question or questions for resolution should be resolved, and

(ii) complies with the requirements imposed by virtue of subsection (3)(e) and (5) (if applicable);

(c) a modification to a proposal is ‘permitted’ unless it results in the proposal no longer being a qualifying proposal.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This new clause substitutes clause 61 with a new clause providing for a revised procedure for the proposal stage of the resolution process.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

Distribution orders

“(1) This section applies where the IFR has given a notice under section (Proposal stage)(9).

(2) Before the end of the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the notice under section (Proposal stage)(9) was given, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice of the distribution order it proposes to make.

(3) The IFR may extend the period in subsection (2) by up to a further 14 days if it considers it appropriate to do so.

(4) A notice under subsection (2) must—

(a) give reasons for the proposed distribution order,

(b) explain how the proposed order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8),

(c) explain how the proposed order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c),

(d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to make representations about the proposed distribution order,

(e) specify the period within which such representations may be made, and

(f) specify the means by which they may be made,

and the IFR must have regard to any representations which are duly made.

(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(d) must be a period of not less than 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.

(6) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period specified under subsection (4)(d), the IFR must make an order requiring relevant revenue to be distributed in a way that the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(a) (a ‘distribution order’).

(7) In making a distribution order the IFR must—

(a) apply the principles mentioned in subsection (8), and

(b) have regard to any proposal submitted under section (Proposal stage)(9)(b).

See also section 7 (in particular the IFR’s general duty to exercise its functions in a way that advances one or more of its objectives and to have regard to various matters).

(8) The principles referred to in subsection (7)(a) are that—

(a) the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either specified competition organiser, and

(b) the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made.

(9) For the purposes of subsection (8)—

‘relegation revenue’ means revenue distributed by a specified competition organiser to a club in consequence of a team operated by the club being relegated from a specified competition organised by the specified competition organiser;

‘relevant period’, in relation to a distribution order, means the period of one year beginning with the final day of the first football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be distributed in pursuance of the order.

(10) A distribution order—

(a) must impose on the specified competition organisers such obligations as the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of securing compliance with the requirements set out in the order, and

(b) may, where a distribution agreement is in force between the specified competition organisers in relation to the same qualifying football season or seasons to which the order relates, provide for that agreement to have effect subject to provision contained in the order.

(11) At the same time as making a distribution order, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice—

(a) including a copy of the order,

(b) giving reasons for the order,

(c) explaining how the order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8),

(d) explaining how the order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c), and

(e) including information about the possible consequences under Part 8 of not complying with the order.

(12) The IFR must, as soon as reasonably practicable after making a distribution order, publish the order or a summary of the order.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This new clause substitutes clause 62 with a new clause providing that the IFR may make a distribution order that distributes relevant revenue in the way that the IFR considers most appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 7

Duty not to promote or engage in advertising and sponsorship related to gambling

“A regulated club or English football competition must not promote or engage in advertising or sponsorship related to gambling.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause prevents regulated clubs and competitions from promoting or engaging in gambling advertising or sponsorship.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. We are not calling for a ban on gambling with the new clause, but we are calling for a ban on advertising it through one of our most culturally powerful platforms. The new clause is a proportionate, evidence-led measure to break the link between football and gambling harm. When we consider that 70% of young people are aware of being exposed to gambling advertisements, is it any wonder, when these adverts are emblazoned on football team shirts and plastered on the side of every pitch for everyone to see?

Gambling firms spend a huge amount of money every year on advertising. They do not lack influence or reach. Gambling has much wider impacts than simply in the football stadium. Since 2011, gambling losses in the UK have risen by 80%, and new data from the Gambling Commission indicates that up to 2.5% of adults in Great Britain may be suffering from gambling harms. Football is unique in its reach and influence. Unlike alcohol and tobacco, gambling is still embedded in the game. Club sponsorships, half-time adverts and pundit discussions all feature it. If we do not act here, we send a message that profits matter more than people’s wellbeing. We understand that the Government think this is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is an important discussion for us to have in the context of anything to do with football.

[Max Wilkinson]

It is not about the money that this would take out of football, but the money that is taken out of the pockets of many football fans who are being exploited by predatory gambling companies every day.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. The Government are clear that, wherever gambling advertising and sponsorship appears, it must be socially responsible. The Government do not believe that the regulator should have a role in commercial matters such as sponsorship, which are rightly decisions for clubs and competition organisers. We must be wary of scope creep that sees the regulator straying into matters that should be reserved for the industry, and stepping on the toes of industry authorities such as the FA. What constitutes the promotion of gambling could be interpreted extremely broadly, with significant consequences for clubs, and sport more widely.

For instance, the new clause could be interpreted as meaning that players could not take part in competitions that had gambling sponsors. Clearly, that would have significant unintended consequences for clubs and the sport more widely. All major football bodies have published their joint gambling sponsorship code of conduct, which sets minimum standards for socially responsible gambling sponsorship within football. We are working closely with sporting bodies to review the implementation and impact of the codes of conduct to ensure that they have a meaningful impact. This review will provide key evidence to inform the most appropriate next steps for gambling sponsorship. The Premier League has already made the decision to ban front-of-shirt sponsorship by gambling firms by the end of next season.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the new clause, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

With new clauses 9 and 13, we are calling for an expansion of the crown jewels of sports broadcasting to ensure that key fixtures from the domestic football calendar are made available on free-to-air television. Members will have recently seen some of the coverage about dwindling viewership figures for this year on TNT and Sky. That should give us all cause for concern, particularly those who are involved in the finances of football. Specifically, we are calling for the free-to-air package to include 10 Premier League games a season, the League cup final, and the play-offs for the Championship, League One and League Two, in addition to those already free to air, such as the FA cup, World cup and the Euros.

This is not about undermining private broadcasters, but viewing figures are on the wane. We had a 17% drop in audience numbers last season. At the same time, there are signs that the value of Premier League broadcast rights has plateaued as more live games have been added to recent packages. This is an opportunity for broadcasters and leagues alike to innovate their offering. Our proposals could open the door to new forms of commercial engagement, such as sponsorship tied to mass viewership, broader brand exposure and appointment-to-view opportunities that bring in new audiences. That approach has worked elsewhere across Europe, most notably in La Liga, where one game a week is free to air, keeping the league accessible to all fans, regardless of their ability to pay.

Recent research shows that in general Premier League fans are more likely to come from lower-income backgrounds than those who regularly attend matches. The hon. Member for Spelthorne has referenced the eye-watering cost of his season ticket on a number of occasions in this Committee. For many supporters, attending games is unaffordable, and with the rising cost of living, stacking multiple sports subscriptions is out of reach for too many households. Increasing free-to-air coverage would not just make games more accessible; it would reignite national moments of the kind we see during the World cup or the Euros. Those moments build unity, inspire young people and renew grassroots interest in the game.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling new clauses 9 and 13, which concern the televising of football matches as listed events and free to air. First, I want to be clear that it is not an issue for the Bill or the regulator, but I would like to use this opportunity to set out the Government’s position on the issue.

The Government are keen to ensure that sporting events of national interest are made available to the public as widely as possible. In domestic football, the present arrangements under the listed events regime have protected key moments such as the FA cup final, while ensuring that the Premier League, EFL and FA are able to raise billions of pounds annually, which is invested back into the pyramid. We all want to see more matches being televised free to air, but that must be balanced against that investment, and not risk it.

As for the Bill, there have been strong voices from all sides that the regulator must have a tightly defined remit, and must not intervene in areas where it is more appropriate for football authorities or others to lead. We agree with that, and I am sure the hon. Member will agree that the bar for statutory, regulatory intervention in any market should be very high. It would not be appropriate for the regulator to intervene in commercial decisions between the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. Decisions relating to the number of matches of specific competitions that are broadcast are determined through commercial negotiation and are subject to factors such as rights costs and scheduling considerations. Additionally, we do not feel it is right to expand the regulator’s remit by including it as a body that must be consulted on listed events.

Decisions relating to the coverage of certain sporting and other events of national interest are, again, a matter for the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. A widened regulatory remit considering broadcasting and commercial decisions would distract from the key responsibility of the regulator and widen the scope of the Bill. The regulator will ensure that there are financially viable clubs for fans to watch, both at their grounds and on television. For those reasons, I am unable to support the hon. Member’s new clause.

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 10

Fan representation: mandatory golden share

“(1) A licensed club must, as a condition of holding a licence under section 15, issue a non-transferable golden share to a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan organisation.

(2) The golden share must confer on its holder the right to veto any proposal by the club to—

(a) relocate the club’s home ground outside its current local authority area,

(b) change the club’s name,

(c) materially alter the club’s primary colours or badge, or

(d) enter into or withdraw from any competition not sanctioned by The Football Association, the Premier League, or the English Football League.

(3) A licensed club must—

(a) consult the holder of the golden share on any material changes to the club’s ownership, governance, or strategic direction,

(b) provide the holder with access to relevant financial and governance information reasonably required to fulfil its function, and

(c) facilitate structured and regular engagement between the club and the holder of the golden share.

(4) The Regulator must monitor compliance with this section and may—

(a) issue guidance to clubs and Supporters’ Trusts on the operation of the golden share,

(b) impose licence conditions or financial penalties for non-compliance, and

(c) take enforcement action where a club fails to uphold the rights associated with the golden share.

(5) In this section—

‘Supporters’ Trust’ means a formally constituted, democratic, not-for-profit organisation that is recognised by the Regulator as representing the interests of a club’s supporters;

‘golden share’ means a special share or equivalent legal instrument issued to a Supporters’ Trust, entitling its holder to the rights and protections described in this section.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would give fans a veto on club proposals, exercised through a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan body.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The Hull City example is one I am very familiar with. I call the Minister.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will respond to new clauses 10 and 21 together because they both relate to a “golden share”. The regulator will operate an advocacy-first approach, and the regulatory principles in clause 8 set out a collaborative approach, including with fans. Although we expect that the regulator will welcome any club that feels a golden share is the best approach for it, such an arrangement would require a significant restructure at the majority of clubs. The new clause would place a burden on clubs to make considerable changes, such as establishing a community benefit society if one does not already exist, and amending fundamental legal documents.

Instead, the regulator will give strong, irreversible legal protections to prevent damage to the most important aspects of the club. That will include regulatory protection for club heritage and stadium changes, as well as ensuring fan engagement. As we have discussed, clubs will be required to consult fans on key issues that are important to them. The Bill mandates fan consultation on a club’s strategic direction and business priorities, and on operational and match day issues, which specifically include ticket pricing and matters related to the club’s heritage. Such consultation, along with the protections on stadiums and key points of club heritage such as colours, emblem and name, ensure that fans are put at the heart of their clubs without the burdens that could, as I have just discussed, be associated with a golden share.

For those reasons, I am unable to support the new clause.

[The Chair]

I am afraid I reneged on my duty to call Mr Naish. I think I was too interested in the point about Hull City.

[James Naish]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I want to place it on the record that the Notts County supporters’ trust got in touch with me over the weekend, and it is very much sympathetic to new clause 10. The trust was set up in 2003 to save the club when it was in administration, and it has played an important role in saving the club from being wound up. It fully supports any improvements in supporter representation, and its representatives specifically noted that they would like to see at least one independent supporter director on the board of all professional clubs, which measure would push in the same type of direction as the new clause. I recognise what the Minister has just said, but I thank the supporters’ trust for getting in touch. I also recognise that, where trusts are in existence, they are doing excellent things for their clubs.

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend is a strong advocate for his constituency, and I am pleased that he has been able to represent his local fan trust. The Bill will require fan engagement at all clubs with the adequate and effective means in place to deliver the licensing requirement. The regime does allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at each club, based on what is best in each club’s specific circumstances. A supporter director was considered by the fan-led review and support for the concept was mixed. The review concluded that

“a fan director rarely delivers on fan expectations.”

Clubs are welcome to introduce any additional engagement strategy that they think will be of benefit to them and their fanbases. Many clubs have already responded to the fan-led review, made decisions to push themselves beyond the recommendations, and implemented fan engagement strategies that they think will work best for their club. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that case.

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 11

Protection of assets of regulated clubs

“(1) Where any of the following assets belong to a regulated club, the asset must not be removed from the club’s ownership or used as collateral for a secured loan—

(a) any stadium,

(b) any training facility,

(c) any trophies,

(d) any car park,

(e) any hotel.

(2) But subsection 1 does not apply to a car park or a hotel where—

(a) the regulated club can demonstrate to the IFR’s satisfaction that the asset is causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial sustainability, and

(b) the IFR has provided prior written approval for the disposal of the asset or the use of the asset as collateral.

(3) Where the current owner of a regulated club owns any asset listed in subsection (1)(a) to (c), the owner may not sell the club unless the owner has inserted the asset into the club’s ownership structure.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would ensure that the club assets listed above are recognised as the inalienable property of the club rather than the club’s owners.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We cannot claim to be reforming football unless we tackle one of its most dangerous long-term trends—the creeping financialisation and asset-stripping of clubs. The hon. Member for High Peak has mentioned this on a number of occasions; he has experienced it in his former role as chair of the RamsTrust. New clause 11 would introduce protections to ensure that core assets such as stadiums, training grounds, trophies and, in some cases, commercial properties like car parks and hotels, remain in the club’s ownership, where they belong. Specifically, the new clause would ensure that assets cannot be sold off or used as security for loans without the prior written approval of the regulator; that the regulator may give its approval only if the asset is demonstrably causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial health; and, critically, that if any of the assets are owned by another organisation rather than the club itself, they must be transferred back into the club’s ownership before any sale of the club can proceed.

The current system allows owners to move critical assets out of a club’s hands with little or no transparency. Once that happens, the club often faces high rent obligations to use its own stadium and training facilities, has weakened negotiating power in takeovers and insolvency, and potentially experiences a complete disconnection from its historical home. Derby County are not the only example of where that has happened. We think this concept is worth taking forward, and we hope the Government are listening.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. He and I have a shared aim to ensure that there are sufficient protections for home grounds and other assets. We have already discussed the issue of protections for home grounds, so I understand the intention behind the amendment. However, the Government do not believe that it is a proportionate measure. The amendment would place significant blocks on any action to alter the financial arrangements of a long list of assets, and would substantially interfere with the property rights of clubs.

Clubs should be able to exercise commercial discretion over the use of wider club-owned assets. For example, the sale or refinancing of assets can sometimes be an acceptable and prudent way of improving a club’s liquidity, if necessary, but the amendment would remove that ability. There are other measures in the legislation to protect against the mismanagement of club assets, including the financial regulation provisions, regulatory oversight of financial plans, and an enhanced owners and directors test to ensure that owners are best placed to be the custodians of a club.

Last Thursday, I set out my understanding that the regulator could prevent the sale of training grounds through the use of discretionary licence conditions. I want to clarify that the regulator cannot directly block the sale of a training ground through licence conditions, but, where appropriate, it can act to discourage a sale and to mitigate any harmful financial impacts of a sale. The regulator can only set discretionary licence conditions in a limited number of areas. As per clause 22, which we have debated already, the regulator can only impose financial discretionary licence conditions that relate to liquidity requirements, debt management and overall cost reductions.

However, the regulator does have the levers to take action to protect a club’s financial sustainability if there ever arises a scenario in which the club intends to sell its training ground. By selling a valuable asset, a club may weaken its balance sheet and increase its financial risk. If there was a problem, the regulator could require the club to take mitigating action. For example, it could place a liquidity requirement on the club. The regulator could also use its powers to discourage the club from selling its training ground in the first place—for example, by indicating that if the club were to sell its training ground, the regulator would have no choice but to impose more significant financial restrictions on the club through discretionary conditions, thereby strongly steering the club away from that course of action. If that scenario were to arise because a bad actor sought to asset-strip the club, the regulator’s owners and directors test would kick in to remove that unsuitable custodian. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Cheltenham to withdraw the motion.

[Max Wilkinson]

I have heard what the Minister said. She seems to be implying that this issue can be dealt with by the Bill, and that the regulator will have an eye on these sorts of things. I am somewhat reassured, but I hope that when the regulator is introduced—and we hope it is introduced—it will be given a strong steer that it ought to make sure that the owners of clubs are not stripping assets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 12

Duty not to stage home matches outside United Kingdom without approval

“(1) A regulated club must not stage any home fixture in a competitive match at a venue outside the United Kingdom without the approval of the IFR.

(2) The IFR may only grant approval under subsection (1) if the fixture is not part of a specified competition.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a ‘home fixture’ means any fixture where the club is designated as the home team by the rules of the relevant competition.”—(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would prevent a regulated club from staging a competitive home fixture outside of the United Kingdom. It will allow regulated clubs to stage non-competitive fixtures outside of the United Kingdom.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

The hon. Member makes an interesting point. The US has a franchise system, so every club can be moved wherever it wants. Someone who is an Oakland Raiders fan would probably also have been an LA Raiders fan. Where else did the Raiders play? There was definitely a third place, at least, in my lifetime, because clubs regularly move around the nation. When there is that franchise problem in America, hardcore elements of a National Football League club campaign against their club moving, and then campaign for it to move back to that city. The LA Raiders are a case in point.

That link between clubs and communities has already been severed in America, so it is less of a concern that the Jacksonville Jaguars are effectively now London’s team. London has taken that club to its heart, just as people across the UK have taken many other NFL and American sports teams to their heart. The hon. Member raises an interesting point, but I am not sure there is a direct comparison.

We risk getting to that point where some English and Welsh football teams go abroad—although Merthyr Tydfil might like the idea of going on tour, if they get up to the level of league where they are regulated. We need to ensure that we do not get into the position where our teams go on tour around the world to play competitive Premier League games. That would clearly be a gross betrayal of what we hold dear as football fans.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling this new clause. I know this is an incredibly important issue for many fans, and I am grateful to be able to address it today, after a number of Members made contributions. FIFA is currently reviewing its position on overseas league matches. It has committed to looking at how that may impact supporters as well as players, along with a number of other valuable considerations.

We appreciate this is an extremely important issue for fans and we do not want to see any developments that undermine the heritage or integrity of the game. It is crucial that fans are consulted and that their view is taken into account on any proposals that would take matches away from the local community in which they usually play.

The Government have spoken about this issue to the FA, which has a right to veto any such future proposals. It has assured us that it agrees that fans’ views must be taken into account when considering this important issue. To be clear, the Bill already ensures that by giving the regulator the power to ensure that clubs consult with their fans on operational and match day issues. We have not tried to list everything that might be considered a match day issue in the Bill, but let me be clear that moving matches abroad would be an operational and match day issue. Fully licensed clubs must have mechanisms in place to adequately and effectively consult their fans about this issue and they must take fans’ views into account when making decisions about it.

Given the importance of this developing issue, the Government will remain in conversation with the relevant governing bodies to ensure that fans’ voices continue to be heard. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

[Max Wilkinson]

Hon. Members are all waiting for it—this was going to be the moment that we were going to force a vote, but given that the Minister has put on record the fact that this will be considered an operational and match day issue for the regulator, so fans must be consulted on it and would probably have a veto, we are content that we do not need to press the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17 

Impact on regulator of changes in Government administration

“If the Department for Culture Media and Sport is abolished, or its functions in relation to football substantially relocated, the Government must automatically review the suitability of the continuation of the IFR and the impact that the abolition or relocation will have on the IFR.”—(Mr French.)

This new clause would require the Government to review the IFR in the instance that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were abolished, or its functions substantially altered.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause suggests that if DCMS were to be abolished, or if football were to be moved out of the Department’s portfolio, that should trigger a review of the regulator. A machinery of government change should have no bearing on whether there is continued need for an independent regulator established by Parliament. Just because circumstances in the sponsoring Department change, that does not mean that the regulator should be subject to a review. Machinery of government changes are common; we saw several of them under the previous Government. We do, however, believe that the regulator should be assessed and reviewed at the right time, as part of important monitoring and evaluation of the regulation.

[Max Wilkinson]

Were DCMS to be abolished, which Department does she think the regulator would end up reporting into?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I could not possibly speculate on such a hypothetical question.

I will say that clause 96, which we have already debated, mandates a review of the Act within five years of the licensing regime being fully commenced. Among other things, the review will look into whether the regulator has been effectively achieving its objectives, or whether those objectives might be better achieved in a different way. There are also other ways in which the regulator can be scrutinised and held to account by Parliament, such as through Select Committee hearings. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause. There has been a lot of debate in the House, including in Committee and in the other place, about letters received from UEFA. There have been particular concerns that the Bill and the regulator should not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and there is a strong feeling that we must not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions through this legislation.

Let me be clear again that the regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert an undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will simply not allow it to do so. That is why both UEFA and the FA have confirmed that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. Indeed, the FA is on the record as supporting the regulator’s introduction.

The new clause would require the publication of all future UEFA and FIFA correspondence received by the regulator or the Government, or correspondence relating to the regulator. Requiring private communications to be made public would serve only to discourage honest and frank conversations with key stakeholders, and would thus stand in the way of constructive relationships with UEFA and FIFA. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling this new clause and all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions. I gently say to him that I think that his claims to end binge drinking would probably be scope creep.

This is a very serious issue. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the legislation in question is owned by the Home Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right that this is a challenging issue, but I recognise that it is important and I will therefore raise it with my ministerial counterparts in the Home Office.

I hope the shadow Minister will appreciate that, as we have made clear throughout the Committee, the Bill seeks to ensure that football clubs are sustainable. It would not be appropriate for the Government to agree to review legislation about alcohol at football matches in the context of this Bill, given the significant public order implications, but I will reflect the comments from across the Committee to my counterparts in the Home Office. On that basis, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.

[Mr French]

I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different.

The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for his new clause. Player welfare is an incredibly important issue, and as we have discussed previously in this Committee, I agree that the welfare of footballers should be safeguarded. But the regulator will have a precise focus on financial regulation, corporate governance, fan engagement and heritage. It will be focused only on the market failures that the industry cannot itself address. The regulator has not been designed to address sporting issues such as player welfare or equipped with the relevant powers and duties. The safety, wellbeing and welfare of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount, and that is why we have committed to looking further at those issues. While it is not appropriate for this Bill, I am fully aware of the importance of prioritising player welfare and ensuring that former players and their families have the support they need.

National governing bodies are responsible for the regulation of their sports, and for ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to protect participants from harm, including head injuries. They are, of course, independent of Government, but the Government expect national governing bodies to make the health and safety of players their top priority. The Secretary of State and I recently met with a small group of affected family members and ex-footballers, including individuals associated with Football Families for Justice, to discuss player safety and welfare for those suffering from dementia. We heard at first hand players’ experiences and the views of groups on how safety and welfare at all levels of the sport could be improved.

On neurodegenerative diseases, we are considering what is required, including how to support football to come together and address the problems raised. We are committed to supporting the families and the football authorities to come together to address the issues raised, and our officials are in the process of arranging meetings to explore that further.

The number of games that footballers play each season is a matter for competition organisers and the Professional Footballers’ Association. It would not be right for the regulator to become involved in those matters, which are not ultimately about the sustainability of clubs.

Before I finish, I commit to writing to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East on ground safety, and to taking that issue away to investigate, as he asks.

[Lincoln Jopp]

The Minister said that the regulator’s purview is the financial sustainability of clubs, but that that was not in any way related to the number of games that teams play in a single season. Surely they are directly related, because clubs will be tempted to thrash their players in order to generate revenues from television and gate receipts?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is a match day issue. I direct the hon. Gentleman and the rest of the Committee to the regulatory principles, which we changed under this Government to explicitly reference players. We think that that is an important change. I am afraid I cannot support the new clause.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players.

While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dillon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 22 relates to a consultation on changes to kick-off times. For football fans across the country, last-minute changes to suit TV schedules have a direct impact on their plans for that sporting event, whether having to procure a hotel because they cannot get home from the game as public transport is not running, or having to change their whole plan and maybe resell their ticket. The 2025 FA cup final had a kick-off time of 4.30 pm, and in the year Wigan beat Man City it was a 5 pm kick-off time. The last train to leave for Manchester from London is at 9.01 pm. So if the FA cup final this year had gone to extra time and penalties, fans would not have been able to make that last train back home to Manchester. As a Manchester United fan, I am not one for protecting City fans, but it just seems ludicrous that for the 2025 FA cup final, the BBC wanted to keep the kick-off at 3 pm because it had Eurovision later that night to schedule and ITV wanted a 5.30 pm kick-off because it knew that would increase its revenue. Both clubs were consulted, the broadcasters were consulted, but the fans were not. This clause seeks for the regulator to have a role in adjudicating on kick-off times.

Listening to the Minister in response to other amendments, I was concerned she may consider ruling out this clause out because it affects commercial activity and broadcasters. I am now hoping it falls under the purview of operational and match day issues, and the regulator will have power to intervene.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The Government do not believe that it is appropriate for the regulator to intervene in the sporting calendar, including interfering with match day timings. This clause would widen the scope to cover on-pitch decisions, which is something we wish to avoid. However, I am aware of the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised regarding the impact timings can have on fans. There may be consequential issues such as match day travel and club communication with fans that would be captured by “operational and match day issues” as one of the relevant matters for fan consultation discussed in our debate on part 5. In most cases, however, the kick-off time itself is not always an issue that club have enough control on to adequately consult fans and respond to opinion. To mandate them to do so could therefore be problematic. It is well within the gift of the leagues and the governing bodies to address concerns surrounding kick-off times, and the Government remain in conversation with stakeholders to ensure that fans are engaged properly by those bodies on this issue. For these reasons, I cannot accept the new clause.

[Mr Dillon]

I am disappointed in the Minister’s response. I think it is a crucial aspect. However, noting the numbers in the room, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Duty to create emergency fund

(1) As a condition of purchase of a regulated club the new owner may, if required by the IFR, pay an amount equal to the club's quarterly forecast expenditure into an emergency fund (referred to in this section as “the fund”).

(2) Withdrawals cannot be made from the fund while the person who deposited the fund is the owner of the club.

(3) When a club’s quarterly forecast expenditure increases the owner must increase their deposit into the fund to match the increased forecast.

(4) If an owner does not update the fund to match an increase in the club’s quarterly forecast expenditure the IFR may suspend the regulated club’s operating licence until such time as the required deposit into the fund has been made.

(5) When a club files for insolvency the owner abrogates all claim to the fund and the fund may be accessed to pay club salaries and day to day running costs.

(6) When the owner who deposited the fund sells the club they may withdraw the fund but the fund must first be used to repay any debts accrued during the time period they were the owner.”—(Mr Dillon.)

This new clause gives the IFR an option to require new club owners to establish an emergency fund to provide for club operational costs such as player and staff wages in an emergency scenario.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Dillon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause introduces a duty to create an emergency fund if the regulator has concerns over the financial resources of a particular owner. If a player is not paid for two consecutive months, then under FIFA regulations they have the ability to terminate their contract with 14 days’ notice. However, that still means they are out of pocket. We know that there are real consequences from players not being paid, such as the contract termination that they may go through, the player and the fans having a loss of confidence in that club, and of course financial distress to individuals not paid. Clubs can have point deductions if they do not play players on time and registration embargoes as well. However, that still does not address the issue of the player and staff not being paid. As recently as March this year, the team of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, Sheffield Wednesday, did not pay its players on time. This is a live issue that we see season in, season out. An emergency fund would mean that players could have recourse to be paid on time.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. While I understand the intent of adding this provision and creating an emergency fund, we have been clear that this is not a zero-failure system. Clubs can and do go into administration for many reasons, sometimes beyond their control. This regime tries to minimise the likelihood of that happening and gives them the best chance of being a going concern football club. This means that there is an assumption that a club will continue operating and meet its obligations for the foreseeable future

However, I reassure the hon. Member that the Bill’s strengthened statutory tests on the new prospective owners, as we discussed in the debate on part of 4 of the Bill, will work to deliver the intent behind the new clause. At the point of entry, prospective owners will be required to pass the financial plans and resources test. This will demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to run the club and have considered things such as the estimated running cost. This will help mitigate against any future need for an emergency fund.

On an ongoing basis, if a club is exhibiting an unsustainable level of risk, the financial regulation regime allows for specific discretionary licence conditions, which we discussed when debating part 3 of the Bill, to be put on clubs. Those conditions can relate to debt management, liquidity requirements and restricting the club’s overall expenditure. This is a far more proportionate approach to managing the risk of insolvency, rather than requiring owners to hold money that could be invested into the club to be used by default. This is likely to impact on levels of investment in the game. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

[Mr Dillon]

I thank the Minister for her response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 25

Youth and community projects: duty on the IFR

“(1) The IFR must take steps to encourage regulated clubs to invest in youth and community projects.

(2) The IFR must, in pursuance of the duty in subsection (1), at least once a year report on the extent to which each regulated club has invested in youth and community projects.”—(Mr Dillon.)

This new clause requires the Independent Football Regulator to take steps to encourage clubs to invest in youth and community projects, including through annual publication of a progress report.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Dillon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Many clubs already have excellent community outreach programmes and foundations with which they support their local communities. This is a simple new clause that just seeks the regulator’s ability to report on those involvements. I suspect that it would not push any existing club into having to engage, because I believe that they already engage with their communities. It is more about capturing that and selling to the wider public the benefits from the investment that football clubs make in their communities.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. Football clubs are instrumental in fostering more active and resilient communities. By harnessing the power of sport, this community outreach work promotes social cohesion, improves public health and makes a positive impact on people’s lives. The Government recognise and support the contributions of many clubs in helping to strengthen communities and get more people active, in line with the Government’s own priorities.

That is why we made an amendment to corporate governance provisions in the other place. This addition was explicitly to include a club’s contribution to the economic and social wellbeing of the local community within the definition of corporate governance in the Bill, and so require clubs to report on these contributions as part of the corporate governance statement. This reflects that football clubs are more important to their communities than a typical local business. This reporting could include, for example, whether a club has invested in youth and community projects, and we would expect any club that does so to report on it as part of its corporate governance statement.

I am afraid that I disagree the regulator should be required to encourage a specific type of community investment. As we discussed when debating schedule 5, the Bill is deliberately not prescriptive when it comes to corporate governance. That gives the regulator flexibility to write its code in consultation with the industry, and it gives clubs flexibility to explain how they are applying that code. This is about encouraging best practice and greater transparency around the operations and activities of the club. This should steer all clubs toward better governance, without micro-managing how they are operated.

As we have been clear, the regulator cannot start mandating specific changes to a club’s corporate governance, such as quotas for board members. The same applies to community outreach. Of course, we recognise that it is important and should be encouraged, but we do not believe that it is appropriate to encourage a specific, prescriptive type of community action that all clubs should undertake. That is not in line with the approach that the Bill takes to corporate governance, and would not be in line with the light-touch approach to regulation that we all want to see. That is not to take away from the huge contribution that clubs make, and I take this as an opportunity once again to pay tribute to the Barnsley FC Community Trust.

[Mr Dillon]

I thank the Minister for her response, and welcome the recognition of clubs’ community work in the governance statements. The new clause would add a requirement around youth because, whether on literacy or childhood obesity, football clubs have a unique power to engage young people through their very presence as a shining example to look up to. However, I accept the Minister’s remarks, and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Stephanie Peacock]

On a point of order, Mr Turner. I thank all the Chairs who have presided over this Committee; as always, I am thankful for your guidance and support throughout the sittings. I thank all those who have contributed their views on the Bill, both in this iteration and the version that the previous Government introduced. A number of important stakeholders—players, clubs and many more—have shared their views and enabled us to bring forward the Bill that we see today. In particular, I thank the Premier League, the EFL, the National League, football clubs across the country and the Football Supporters’ Association. Their engagement has been vital, and I am grateful to them for working productively to ensure that the Bill takes steps towards a future where football can be enjoyed for generations to come.

I pay tribute to Dame Tracey Crouch, whose brilliant work on the fan-led review of football led to the introduction of the Bill. Her work and expertise have been invaluable, and I thank her for her dedication to making the game fairer. I also pay tribute to the officials in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, who have been working often very long hours on the preparations for Committee stage; I am grateful for all their help. I pay particular tribute to Adam, Ellen, Charlotte, Kaz, Lucy, Robbie, Conor, Matt, Beth, Leah, Kyle, Lewis, Comfort and Callum for their hard work on the Bill. I also thank those in my private office in the Department for their work to support me in taking the Bill through Committee as the Minister. My particular thanks go to Chris McAlister for all his work on this; the head of my office, Matthew Phillips; and of course Helen Elston. I also thank my parliamentary office, Millie, Karen and Anna, who supported me in opposition, when I was in the shadow Minister’s place.

I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions. It has been excellent to see such strong feeling in the debate. I know that Members have aimed to represent fans and their constituencies in the best possible way. I thank the Committee for such a lively and thoughtful debate throughout the sittings. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham North for keeping us all in check and on time; my opposite number, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup; and the hon. Member for Cheltenham. I also pay tribute to House officials, and thank them for their work to support us as elected representatives. The work that they do in this place is invaluable and I, like I am sure many other hon. Members, are incredibly grateful.

It has been an excellent debate, and I am proud that the Government have delivered on our manifesto commitment by finally bringing in the Bill. I conclude by quoting Dame Tracey Crouch’s last contribution in Committee. She spoke of

“the people who just go and watch the game because they love it and it is important to them deep inside their soul.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 23 May 2024; c. 246.]

It is for those people who love the game that we have proposed these measures. I believe that the Bill introduces much-needed changes that will protect football so that they can continue to enjoy it for generations to come. That is what we have delivered today.

[The Chair]

I, too, thank Dame Tracey Crouch for the work that she did in this House. I also thank His Majesty’s loyal Opposition and the Lib Dems for the constructive way in which this issue has been debated. I thank the learned Clerks for the help that they have given me, and all officials, including our wonderful Doorkeeper.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Draft Casinos (Gaming Machines and Mandatory Conditions) Regulations 2025

Stephanie Peacock Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2025 General Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I beg to move,

That this Committee has considered the draft Casinos (Gaming Machines and Mandatory Conditions) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. I am pleased to be speaking to these regulations, which were laid before the House, in draft, on 12 May 2025, and to be talking about this package of measures that will unlock additional investment up and down the country. I will set out the aims of this package, including the linked statutory instruments, how they will benefit the casino sector and what protections will be in place for consumers.

I begin by drawing the Committee’s attention to other linked statutory instruments that have been published in draft in parallel to the regulations being debated today. The other instruments are the Gambling Act 2005 (Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Order and the Gambling Act 2005 (Premises Licences and Provisional Statements) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Regulations. The Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions Order extends existing gaming machine entitlements for converted casinos, meaning those not licensed under the Gambling Act 2005. The regulations that we are debating introduce protections for converted casinos as a result of the extended entitlements and are consistent with the protections provided to casinos established under the 2005 Act.

The Premises Licences and Provisional Statements Regulations amend existing procedures so that a converted casino operator can apply to its licensing authority, usually its local authority, to vary its premises licence to enable it to exercise the extended entitlement. Together, these three statutory instruments will make a number of important changes to the legislative framework for land-based casinos.

While only one of these instruments is being debated today, the other two will follow the negative procedure and were published in draft on 12 May, the same day on which the regulations that we are debating were laid. Given the linkages between these regulations, that was done to provide proper transparency about the range of changes that we are proposing, and to allow for proper scrutiny. If the regulations that have been laid using the affirmative procedure are approved by Parliament, it is our intention to lay the remaining two instruments using the negative procedure so that all three would then come into force on the same day, 22 July 2025.

I now move on to our aims for these measures. The Government are focused on economic growth, and I believe that enabling a responsible gambling sector to grow is compatible with an even safer one. We acknowledge the difficulties that land-based gambling businesses, particularly casinos, have faced since the pandemic. We have already brought forward measures to improve consumer protections, including the introduction of stake limits for online slot games and establishing a statutory levy on gambling operators to fund research, prevention and treatment of gambling-related harm. Therefore, following a consideration of the best available evidence, the time is right now to proceed with a series of reforms for the land-based casino sector.

The gambling landscape has significantly changed since the legislative framework was updated under the Gambling Act 2005. It had not envisaged the rise of online gambling and the unlimited availability of gambling at any time. Given the rise of smartphones, we believe that restrictions on product availability in casinos are now less important for protecting customers than factors such as the product design and quality of monitoring. Casinos are an important part of our late-night economy, provide thousands of jobs and contribute millions of pounds every year to the UK’s tourism economy, but they have been stifled by excessively strict regulations that mean the vast majority of our casinos can offer only 20 gaming machines. That makes no sense in venues that can be thousands of square metres in size and accommodate thousands of people.

While these venues offer a variety of ways to entertain their customers, including bars, restaurants and table games, the current rules mean that people are queueing for machines at peak times, which can mean that customers extend gambling sessions out of fear of losing their place at machines, and casinos miss out on vital revenue. These restrictions, combined with a variety of headwinds for businesses, most notably the pandemic, have seen 17 casinos close since 2020 and a loss of over 750 jobs.

This package of measures will put the casino sector back on a sustainable footing. It will give converted casinos the option of increasing their gaming machine allowance from 20 to 80, if they are sufficiently large. That will align with the different licensing regimes, as small 2005 Act casinos are already allowed to offer 80 machines. For converted casinos that are not able to meet the size requirements to site 80 machines, a sliding scale will apply in line with their size. This will allow slightly smaller casinos to site between 25 and 75 machines in total.

We are already making changes to allow real event or sports betting to take place in all converted casinos. The current rules prohibit these casinos from offering that, whereas venues licensed under the 2005 Act are able to. The prohibition no longer makes any sense, because a casino customer can place a bet on their mobile phone while in the venue, but not with the casino itself. The change will allow converted casinos not only to offer a new gambling product, but to invest in other parts of their venues, such as sports bars, which would be a natural companion to a betting offer.

As the impact assessment sets out, we estimate that allowing a modest increase in gaming machines will make a significant difference for casino operators. We estimate that the changes will increase gross gambling yield by £53 million to £58 million each year once the new rules have bedded in. We also expect much wider benefits across the casino ecosystem. The new rules will provide a boost for gaming machine manufacturers, and we expect a number of venues to be modernised and refreshed. We also anticipate that this capital investment will be spread across the country, not just in London.

It is also important to outline the protections that will accompany any increases in gaming machines under the draft regulations. As I have said, the Government believe that a growing gambling sector is compatible with creating an even safer one. The draft regulations therefore set out a number of requirements concerning table gambling and non-gambling areas, which casinos will have to abide by to access the new entitlement. They are vital to ensuring that customers are offered a mixture of gambling and non-gambling opportunities when they visit a casino.

The strict requirements on how much space can be allocated to each activity mean that, even with an increase in the number of machines, casinos and their customers will not be overwhelmed by an electronic offering. It also means that table games, which are more sociable in nature, and spaces for bars, restaurants and other non-gambling activities will be continue to be central features of our modern casinos. That approach is fundamental to protecting customers and ensuring that casinos provide a wide range of entertainment.

We will also put protections in place for casinos that decide to offer betting. We will restrict the number of separate betting positions or self-service betting terminals that casinos can offer. Casinos licensed under the 2005 Act are limited to a maximum of 40 separate betting positions. We believe that a limit of 40 betting positions is appropriate for casinos with a gambling area of 500 square metres or more, and a lower limit will apply for smaller casinos. That will ensure that there remains a link between gambling space and betting terminals, so that the electronic offering in a casino does not overwhelm the live table offering.

These changes are in addition to the range of measures already in place in casinos. These venues offer substantial supervision and oversight of any player’s activity. A number of features on the machines themselves can also help players to keep track of their play and spending. I also highlight that it will be completely optional for casinos to take up the new entitlements. Operators can choose to stay within their existing allowances or seek to increase the number of machines that they offer.

In addition to the changes for converted casinos, I would like to mention the two changes that the instrument will make to small 2005 Act casinos. Small 2005 Act casinos are currently required to comply with a maximum machine to table ratio of 2:1. That means that for every table that is in use, the casino is permitted to offer a maximum of two gaming machines. This ratio will be updated from 2:1 to 5:1, in order to align small 2005 Act casinos with large 2005 Act casinos and prevent operators from having to provide tables for which there is no customer demand. Small 2005 Act casinos are also currently required to have a minimum table gaming area of 500 square metres. That will change to 250 square metres, amending an anomaly whereby the minimum gambling area and minimum table gaming area were required to be of the same size.

This is a sensible package of measures that will update the outdated restrictions that currently apply to land-based casinos. It strikes the right balance between supporting the sector to grow and ensuring that those who visit such venues will be protected from gambling-related harm. I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the Opposition spokesmen for their contributions. It has been an important debate and I am grateful to Members for their attendance today. It is clear that the official Opposition share our commitment to allowing this historic sector to thrive and to ensuring that those who want to gamble can continue to do so safely, while the public is protected from the risk of gambling-related harm. I appreciate the shadow Minister’s support; as he rightly pointed out, this process began under his Government.

I very much heard the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the Treasury. We continue to engage with the Treasury, and I encourage hon. Members to take part in the current consultation. He also touched on adult gaming centres, and I appreciate that a different approach has been taken to those. The Minister with responsibility for gambling has not ruled out the relevant changes to the 80:20 rule, but intends to look again at the matter later this year.

I simply have to disagree with the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire that the regulations represent a race to the bottom; we simply do not think they do. We think they have been improved and brought into the modern age, given the rise of online gambling, and support our land-based casino sector. Casinos are highly regulated environments and there is a significant amount of player supervision alongside a number of protections on gaming machines themselves. Importantly, the regulations contain a number of protections that will ensure that customers continue to be offered a range of gambling and non-gambling opportunities. That will help reduce the risk of harm. For those reasons, I hope that the Committee will support the regulations.

Question put and agreed to.