National Security Bill (First sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

Q You said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that you had a point to make about part 1. I want to give you the opportunity to make that point.

Jonathan Hall: I am slightly uncertain and concerned about the scope of clause 3(2), the foreign intelligence services offence. On the face of it, an offence could be committed inadvertently, and it does appear to cover quite a lot of lawful conduct. The example that I have been debating with officials is the example of someone who sells miniature cameras, which is undoubtedly conduct of a kind that could assist a foreign intelligence service. My concern with clause 3(2) is that it does not seem to have a sufficient mental element, either that the individual who commits the offence is deliberately acting prejudicially to the UK interest, or knows or ought to suspect that there is some foreign intelligence service involvement, so I have a concern about that particular clause.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Q You mentioned that restrictions to legal aid could be counterproductive and could harm rehabilitation efforts. Can you please expand on that?

Jonathan Hall: Not all terrorists are cold, calculating, ruthless killers who will go and commit terrorist acts whatever their circumstances. They may exist, but there are also quite chaotic terrorist-risk offenders. I have certainly come across cases where the terrorist risk from the individual—the chance of their stabbing someone, for example—goes up if they are not taking their medication or if they are homeless.

My concern about the legal aid is that it will make it harder, for example, for a terrorist offender, maybe 10 years after they have been released and who is facing eviction, to get legal aid. That means that you might have less good decisions made and a sense of injustice or grievance on behalf of the terrorist offender, who will perhaps say to themselves, “Why can’t I get legal aid when everyone else in my situation can?” My real concern is people becoming homeless or falling into debt when they might otherwise be able to get legal assistance.

[The Chair]

I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated to the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr Jonathan Hall QC for giving evidence in this session.

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[Damian Hinds]

Q How do you see information operations working? How might foreign states seek to interfere in our democratic processes and public life?

Professor Sir David Omand: If you recall the statement made almost exactly two years ago in the House by Dominic Raab, he said that the Government had concluded that it was “almost certain” that “Russian actors” had “sought to interfere” in our election in 2019; and we had the evidence from the American elections and the French presidential election in 2017. All the techniques were deployed. I do not know whether any members of the Committee have been watching the TV series showing on Channel 4, which is as good a primer as any on how such techniques can be used to pervert our political discourse as well as actually harm individuals. This is the world we are in, these are the harms we face and I think that this Bill is a good start in helping the agencies to address some of those harms.

Sir Alex Younger: On this issue, you are right to focus on the possibility of interference in our democratic process and the potential unintended consequences of what we are talking about here. Of course, one person’s interference is another person’s legitimate intervention. Perish the thought that it should be the Government’s responsibility to say what is true and what is not. That is the difference between us and our opponents.

I can understand the scale of the problem; I have seen it. I had a long chat with the Government about this, and the thing that convinced me that this was an appropriate response was, first, the foreign powers condition—to be clear, that is about people acting on behalf of a foreign power—and, secondly, essentially the use of deception to achieve your aim. It seems to me that if someone is working on behalf of a foreign power, using deception, to distort our political process, we have a pretty clear basis for taking action. That, I think, is as it should be.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q I want to pick up on the foreign interference point in clause 13 of the Bill:

“A person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct…will have”

a negative “effect” on the UK for or on behalf of the foreign power in question. In other areas of law, in particular the criminal law, we have intent and recklessness. Do you think that clause 13 should be expanded to include recklessness?

Professor Sir David Omand: I looked at clause 24, “The foreign power condition”, and there is quite a lot of scope in it for a successful prosecution to demonstrate that the individual who as, as you say, acted recklessly, could reasonably have been expected to know that their act would benefit a foreign power, for example, so I was not so concerned about that particular question.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

So you do not think that it should be included in clause 13?

Professor Sir David Omand: No, I had not concluded that.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Sir Alex?

Sir Alex Younger: I do not have anything to add to that.

[Stewart Hosie]

Q I just want to press further on clause 23. You said that the absence of a carve-out to protect officers could have a chilling effect. Given that we have substantial data sharing, particularly with our closest partners, that the internal safeguards are very robust, and that there is already the defence of acting reasonably—you made the point that this would be on an order to do so—I am not clear yet why the carve-out in clause 23 is as necessary as you suggest it is.

Sir Alex Younger: First of all, “carve-out” means different things to different people, but there is a wild idea that this is a granting of immunity that means we can behave willy-nilly. You will know from your Committee experience that this is not true. I want to make that really clear. The reality at the end of all this—we have had the theoretical versus practical conversation already—is that there exists a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanction for doing their job. I do not think that risk should exist. That is fundamentally where I am. You can decide as politicians that it is better than what is being proposed by the Government, but I am saying that I do not think it is compatible with a healthy sharing regime of the sort that produces the security benefits I have outlined.

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[The Chair]

I bring in Sally-Ann Hart.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q We heard from the previous witnesses about the challenges of online harm—sabotage and dis, mis and malinformation—and the Bill seeks to modernise the espionage regime to meet the challenge of the digital age. Do you think it will achieve that aim and where are the gaps, if any?

Paddy McGuinness: I would expect it to be a dynamic process. I think you will be looking at further legislation; let us hope you have a long life as an MP, but in your time as an MP I would expect you to have to look at this again.

To Sir David’s point, I do not think we should delay for a moment fixing the things that the Bill fixes because of the fact that technologies develop dynamically. There is a lag. I can remember—I think I was actually working at GCHQ at the time—us thinking about what was happening with Facebook as it emerged as a widely used platform. Here we are with the Online Safety Bill, about 13 years later. There is a natural and quite proper lag between rapid technology innovation and slow and considered regulation and legislation, and we are going to have to live with that. I think this is good. It provides a basis, and I think the extraterritoriality is particularly important, as is the way in which sabotage is broadly defined to allow you to deal with the kind of range of things that I have been talking about, given that the opponent will move through those spaces.

[Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)]

Q The other day the director-general of MI5 and the director of the FBI said that most of what is at risk by quantity is not what the state does, but the technology, research and development and commercial advantage developed by our businesses and academic institutions. Does the Bill do enough—I am thinking mainly about the offences part of it—to protect against that risk?

Paddy McGuinness: I think it does a very significant thing in the way in which it criminalises specifically the trade secrets aspect, which covers a very broad range. Again, we may have to return to this. This kind of legislation and the type of work that Sir Alex and his successors in MI5, MI6 and GCHQ are doing has Darwinian effect, so I have no doubt that as companies have got better at certain kinds of protection advised by the interaction with the CPNI and the National Cyber Security Centre, so the opponents have got better at it. And we will have to go on doing it.

It does not feel as though we have quite the same volume of opencast mining of our intellectual property and economic value that we had, as was described previously by General Keith Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency in the US. He described the enormous volume—trillions of value—taken out of our economies. There still is a very high level, though, so there is more work to do on this, and it is a significant challenge to the corporate sector to do the right thing in this space, because of the difficulty that it represents. The Bill provides a really solid basis for that discussion, because of the criminalisation of the trades secrets aspect.

National Security Bill (Second sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Maria Eagle]

Q That is fine. Finally, Mr Armstrong, is there a foreign influence registration scheme out there that you think would be particularly helpful to import into this legislation? What is the best example?

Sam Armstrong: The Australian scheme is by far and away the best example—in my view, the US FARA system is not a good comparator—and it is a shame that we have not taken the opportunity to bring it in sooner. The Australian high commissioner in London was George Brandis, who was the Attorney General who wrote that very Bill, and I know he was keen wherever possible to impress on the Government that he was there and ready to help. I am sure that offer has not dissipated.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Q I have two questions, if there is time. First, Mr Miller, you mentioned people who are employed online and you said that you do not think those people have any idea who is employing them. Clauses 13 and 24 state that

“a person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct”

and

“the foreign power condition is met…if… the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that”

it is a foreign power. Do you think that should be widened to include an element of recklessness or recklessness?

Carl Miller: I think doing anything that might compel any of the services involved to do any kind of due diligence on the people who are employing them can only be a good thing, although the general point I am making is that I don’t think criminalising activity within domestic legislation has been a particularly effective way of changing what people do on the internet, especially when those people are largely concentrated in jurisdictions that do not have any co-operative relationship with British law enforcement.

I remember I spent time with a number of cyber-crime teams across the UK and, in the words of one cyber-crime police officer, “If you are in Russia, the cost or penalty of doing cyber-crimes against British citizens is basically nil.” This is not going to be an effective way of reaching beyond our borders and addressing where we believe a large number of actors doing this kind of thing are; they are not doing this from the UK.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q On that point and the concerns you mentioned earlier about enforcement and deployment, and that the Bill is not enough alone, what would you propose? Will you expand on that point?

Carl Miller: Sure. First, we need to change the intelligence picture slightly. We should integrate SOCMINT—social media intelligence—within the national strategic intelligence picture. We overlooked open-source intelligence—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

But that is not to do with this Bill, is it?

Carl Miller: Sorry, I thought you asked me— Would you like to hear what I think?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Yes, carry on.

Carl Miller: Partly it is to do with changing our national knowledge of where these threats are and who is doing them, so the integration of intelligence. Then, as I said, there should be a national risk register and possibly the creation of powers for parts of the intelligence establishment to undertake direct activity against some of the technical architectures that allow this to happen.

Sorry to delve into the technicalities for a second, but for instance residential proxy IP addresses are a very important way in which this stuff happens. Residential proxy IPs are toasters and fridges and stuff. Basically, they each have an IP address and many of them are hijacked. They are the kind of things you that you use if you want to fool a social media platform into thinking that you are 10,000 people from around the planet when you are not—you are one operator sitting in a particular country. These are criminal architectures that have been amassed and rented out and sold to people, and I am sure they are rented out by some of the actors who seek to do influence operations. These are the kinds of things that we need to target. Putting pressure on that kind of asset is the kind of thing that will probably not get rid of them, but will meaningfully increase the costs of this kind of activity.

[Gary Sambrook (Birmingham, Northfield) (Con)]

Q The Government tabled an amendment to the Bill to make “foreign interference” a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill. Do you think that will go some way towards addressing the concerns you have raised today?

Sam Armstrong: Yes, I think so. Imposing a duty on the social media companies is one of the only immediate tools and levers we can pull. I take Carl’s point; I do not think it is going to be sufficient to deal with the hordes of people overseas who are, frankly, conducting quasi-military-type activities against the UK through cyber means here, because criminal law is not the tool for that. Should they exist and are they necessary? Yes. Are they sufficient? Probably not.

Carl Miller: It is just massively insufficient. The reason why is that the platforms, however rich, clever or large they are, cannot reach beyond the platforms themselves. That is the problem. The way we have tried to respond to this problem so far is to have Facebook take down accounts, but take-down is a very weak response. That is essentially being priced in to those kinds of activities. They have developed methodologies for setting up or acquiring new accounts as they go. In principle, I am not hostile to platform regulation across a range of online threats, but for those problems where we are dealing with a set number of actors who have specific capabilities and tap into a specific and constantly evolving tradecraft, I do not think it is going to be the tool to make much difference.

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[Antony Higginbotham]

Q Given your role in academia now, do you think the sector would welcome the Bill providing more clarity on the legal position?

Professor Ciaran Martin: I do not mean to be flippant, but obviously there could be as many different opinions as there are academics. I think that Government providing clear frameworks, laws and guidance to universities without infringing on academic freedom is where I would want to be. I do not think that it is fair to rely on universities to police this activity. It is extremely difficult in open and collaborative research environments like universities to be able to identify what is malevolent activity. If they do, it is extremely difficult to know where to go, what the relevant laws are, and so forth. The combination of a clear legal framework and clear guidance to universities is something that I personally would welcome. I imagine quite a few people, particularly in sensitive areas like technological research, would absolutely welcome that.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q You said earlier, looking at the increasing concerns about China and cyber-espionage, that the Bill will be useful against the threat from China, but do you think that the Bill will make the UK safer from the cyber-espionage threat from China, or will we require enhanced offensive capabilities?

Professor Ciaran Martin: They are not mutually exclusive. The thing about offensive capabilities is that they are sometimes seen as almost symmetrical—cyber is a sort of enclosed boxing ring, where you have offence versus defence—but offensive cyber can be used for anything. Our own British Government’s one declared offensive cyber-operation was against so-called Islamic State, not against the cyber-capabilities of another state.

I need to be reasonably careful about what I say here, but if you think that the US’s offensive cyber-capabilities are largely in the Cyber Command and the UK’s in the National Cyber Force, the GCHQ-MI6-Ministry of Defence partnership, one would expect that the operational security of those capabilities to be pretty good and therefore make quite hard targets for other actors. Similarly, some of China and Russia’s offensive cyber-capabilities against us will have quite good operational security, which will make them hard targets. We cannot rely on offensive cyber-capabilities to stop other people, particularly at the top end of the spectrum, at the elite nation- state level.

There is no magic panacea in the Bill, because no magic panacea is available. Even in the areas we were talking about, such as completely remote activity, one of the things that we saw anecdotally—there is some emerging research to support this—was that when the US in particular had a legal framework, where it can prosecute and indict people in absentia, in China and to some extent Iran, that did have some impact for some time. It did not solve everything, but it did affect the behaviour of some actors—they could not travel to the west, most practically, because they were under indictment by the US and therefore all the US’s allies. It meant that the associates of these people, because digital infrastructure is global, could get arrested.

Some people working with Russian groups have been arrested in eastern European countries with which we can co-operate in law enforcement terms. Strengthening that sort of legal framework gives you something. It is probably more incremental than transformative, but it is still something.

[The Chair]

Damian Hinds, very briefly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

Q So you are not saying that you think that lawyers should be exempted from registering? Your objection is specifically about disclosure of documentation.

Rich Owen: Yes. Well, we are looking for something similar to the Australian scheme. The Australian legislation specifically exempts legal professional privilege, as well as seeking legal advice and assistance. That sort of model, which expressly exempts legal professional privilege, would be a suitable way forward for the scheme.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q I just want to look at the provisions relating to arrests without warrant, which is in clause 21 and schedule 3. The provisions relating to that include the ability to delay access to a solicitor and delay notifying a person’s family of their detention. Based on similar provisions for terrorism suspects, do you regard that as proportionate and necessary? Can I go to Dr Hoggard first?

Dr Nicholas Hoggard: You can, although I am afraid I will have to be very boring. Speaking with my Law Commission hat on, we are limited in what we can say with respect to those things that did not form part of the scope, regarding the protection of Government data. I am very sorry; I do not mean to be deliberately unhelpful, but we do not really—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q Can anyone answer that?

Rich Owen: Well, those provisions are modelled on terrorism legislation, when they concern a serious risk to the public, and there are suitable safeguards attached to them as well, so the position of the Law Society is to regard that provision as proportionate.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q Okay, thank you. I would just pick up, Mr Owen, on something that Mr Hinds mentioned about the FIR scheme and legal professional privilege. I was a bit confused; can you clarify if the FIR scheme would help prevent abuse of legal professional privilege, or are you saying that lawyers would be exempt from that?

Rich Owen: I was saying that an exemption on grounds of legal professional privilege, or seeking legal advice and assistance, could not be used for espionage, because you are outwith legal professional privilege. You are seeking to advance a crime, so that does not come within the ambit of legal professional privilege.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q I only ask that because I know that with the sanctions against Russian oligarchs there was a bit of confusion over that generally.

Rich Owen: Yes. There has to be access to justice for everyone, including rich people. They can communicate with their lawyer, and if they need advice on the law, that should be privileged. However, if they are seeking, through their communication with lawyers, to advance a criminal offence, then that is outwith legal professional privilege.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Thank you for the clarification.

[The Chair]

We have a little more time if anyone has any further questions?

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[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

Q I want to touch on the whistleblower issue you raised. There have been some concerns that the Bill might not sufficiently target those with malicious intent. Is there a risk that it potentially criminalises whistleblowers?

Poppy Wood: The role of whistleblowers in society is really important. I know the Government understand that. There are some good recommendations from the ISC about whistleblowers that I do not think have been adopted in this version of the Bill. That is about at least giving some clarity to where the thresholds lie, and giving a disclosure offence and a public interest defence to whistleblowers so they can say, “These are the reasons why.” My understanding is that at the moment it sits with juries and it is on a case-by-case basis. I would certainly commend to you the recommendations from the ISC.

I would also say—this was a recommendation from the Law Commission and also, I think, from the ISC—that lots of people have to blow the whistle because they feel that they do not have anywhere else to go. There could be formal procedures—an independent person or body or office to go to when you are in intelligence agencies, or government in general or anywhere. One of the reasons why Frances Haugen came forward—she has been public about this—is that she did not really know where else to go. There were no placards saying, “Call the Information Commissioner in the UK if you have concerns about data.” People do not know where to go.

Getting touchpoints earlier down the chain so that people do not respond in desperation in the way we have seen in the past would be a good recommendation to take forward. Whistleblowers play an important part in our society and in societies all round the world. Those tests on a public interest defence would give some clarity, which would be really welcome. Building a system around them—I know the US intelligence services do that; they have a kind of whistleblower programme within the CIA and the Department of Defence that allows people to go to someone, somewhere, earlier on, to raise concerns—is the sort of thing you might be looking at. I think a whistleblower programme is an ISC recommendation, but it is certainly a Law Commission recommendation.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q On malign activity, is there a risk that through clauses 13 and 14 on foreign interference, the Bill could affect free speech, including political speech and journalism? If you think it could, what additional safeguards can be put in place to ensure that only malign activity is captured?

Poppy Wood: I have certainly read and heard concerns about journalism, about the “foreign power” test on civil society and about having Government money being quite a blunt measure for whether or not you might fall foul of these offences. On journalism, I think that is why you should never try to define disinformation: because those kinds of shape-shifting forms are very hard to pin down, particularly with questions like “What is journalism?”, “What is a mistruth?”, “What is a mis-speak?” and so on. We need to be careful about that.

On your specific question, I refer you to Article 19 and others who have really thought through the impact on journalism and free speech. I am sure it would be an unintended consequence but, again, we are seeing Russia using its co-ordinated armies on Telegram and other channels to target Ukrainian journalists. They are saying, “Complain to the platforms that the journalist is not who they say they are or is saying something false, so they are breaking the terms of service. Bombard the platforms so that that journalist gets taken down and cannot post live from Ukraine for a handful of days.”

That is just another example of how these systems are weaponised. This is where you can go much further on systems through the Online Safety Bill and the National Security Bill without worrying too much about speech. But I refer the Committee to other experts, such as Article 19, that have looked really deeply at the journalism issue. I think Index on Censorship may have done some work as well.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q You have mentioned disinformation. In this Bill, the Online Safety Bill, and perhaps the review that Ms Lynch mentioned, which you thought was a good idea, what more do you want to see the Government do to address dis, mis or malinformation and malign foreign influence online?

Poppy Wood: I think that where we are now is much better than where we were last year, but my concern is whether this will all be law when we have an election. If not, what are the backstops that the Government have in place to focus on this stuff? It will get tested only when we have an election, really. If that is before March next year or whenever these laws get Royal Assent, there will be a genuine question of crisis management: if this is not law, what are we doing? I would ask that question of the Government and the civil service.

As I said, the disinformation committee in the Online Safety Bill is years down the line. Bring that forward—there is no need not to bring it forward—and please make sure that it is not chaired by someone from a tech platform. I would write that into the Bill, because otherwise there is a risk that that will happen.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q Why?

Poppy Wood: Why should the committee on disinformation not be chaired by someone from a tech platform? They have a vested interest in this stuff, so I would get an academic or someone from civil society—someone at arm’s length who can take a holistic view. These platforms will want to protect their interests on this stuff, so I would warn against that.

I would like to see the transparency provisions in the Online Safety Bill go much further. This is a bit in the weeds of the Online Safety Bill, if you will forgive me, but there is a very good clause in that Bill, clause 136, which says that Ofcom should ask whether researchers should be given access to data. It is an important clause, but it says, “Ask the question,” and it gives Ofcom two years to do it. I do not think it needs two years; I think we know that the answer is “Yes, researchers desperately need access to data.”

Almost all the stuff that is caught about malign information operations is caught via Twitter’s API. Twitter makes 10% of all the tweets public, and researchers use that to run analysis, so if you ever want to do research on disinformation, you always use the Twitter API. In many cases, that is mapped over to Facebook to identify the same operations on Facebook, but they are always caught in the first instance because of open data. I think that the Online Safety Bill, if this Committee and this Bill want to back it up, could bring that forward and say, “Either do the report in six months or don’t even ask the question.”

By the way, the European legislation that is equivalent to the Online Safety Bill makes that happen as of Tuesday this week, so researchers should, in theory, be able to access data. I would bring the transparency provisions forward, and I would really want the Bill to call out co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for taking the time to give evidence.

Examination of Witness

Dan Dolan gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q We heard from a Law Society witness earlier that the provisions relating to arrest without warrant—in clause 21 and schedule 3—that include the ability to delay access to a lawyer and delay notifying a person’s family of their detention are proportionate and necessary. Do you regard it as proportionate and necessary?

Dan Dolan: I am afraid I might have to give the frustrating answer that our evidence does not cover clause 20. There is clearly a concern there, but I am probably best leaving that to more expert witnesses to answer.

National Security Bill (Third sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

I may dwell on this clause slightly longer than others, because it is the first of a number of clauses regarding a regime to protect sensitive sites in the UK. There has been a range of examples and questions. To the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, the simple answer is yes.

With regards to the Pokémon examples of the hon. Member for Halifax, the answers again are about—this very much determines the whole scope of the clause—prejudicial interest and people doing something accidentally. To fall foul of the clause, someone needs to have prejudicial interest against the UK. In the examples, people have wandered in and done something accidentally; they would not be prosecuted under the clause.

The right hon. Member for North Durham gave the example of strapping a camera to an eagle; if that is something that someone can do, fair play to them. However, if that camera strapped to the eagle were then to record activity in the place, and that was prejudicial to the UK, the person would be prosecuted. If they just wanted to strap a camera to an eagle to see what happened, the intelligence services have the opportunity not to prosecute someone, because, given the protections throughout the Bill, the Attorney General would have to sign off on whether to prosecute, and the Crown Prosecution Service on whether that was in the public interest.

I understand the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on ability to have lawful protest, and for lawful protest not to be restricted. It has been reflected by other Members and I raised it with the Department last week.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

It is absolutely right that people have the right to protest, but the attention of the Minister and that of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to the recent cases in which, for example, Extinction Rebellion protestors were found not guilty of criminal damage, despite the judge directing jurors that there was no defence in law. Likewise, the protestors who toppled the Colston statue were found not guilty. We have to be careful: jurors might find people not guilty, but we have to protect the ambitions of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

The Bill is specific about procuring “photographs, videos or other”. I understand why they are included: they are modern. If we pass the Bill, will sketches still be covered? Would it not be better to repeat that bit of the 1911 Act?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

rose—

[Stephen McPartland]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and am happy to give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Does my hon. Friend not agree that “other recordings” would include a sketch?

[Stephen McPartland]

Sketches are included, because a sketch would have to be inspected. The question was: are sketches included? The answer is yes.

National Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 15 criminalises conduct that is preparatory to some of the offences we have debated. It is fair to say that this is another amendment that I might have approached slightly differently had I been able to draft it in the light of the evidence session on Thursday, rather than in advance of it. Obviously, this clause was widely welcomed at that evidence session, and I accept that evidence.

I thought Sir Alex Younger made an interesting observation when he said:

“The bottom line is that we have to get in front of this stuff…We need to solve it before it has happened, and that raises a set of ethical and legal dilemmas where it is important to be striking the right balance”.––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 19, Q38.]

While he welcomed how the issue was treated in the Bill, he recognised that there are ethical and legal dilemmas.

I am another one of those lawyers who seem to overrun this place. [Laughter.] Thanks very much. Punishing preparatory conduct is not something I can recall from my dim and distant past as a law student, although that is probably as much to do with my memory as anything else. However, the serious point is that various crimes are set out and designed to punish certain acts; after that, other inchoate crimes such as attempts or conspiracy attach themselves to those basic criminal laws.

I absolutely appreciate that criminalising preparation allows enforcement and prosecution at an even earlier stage than an attempt, but the sort of legal and ethical questions raised by it come sharply into focus when we realise that the maximum sentence for such preparatory conduct is life imprisonment. What is particularly striking is that some of the completed offences do not attract that sentence. That seems pretty odd. If somebody guilty of completing the actual offence faces a maximum sentence that is lighter than the maximum sentence for somebody who is simply convicted of preparing for that offence, that seems a bit of an inconsistency.

Preparatory conduct offences also attach themselves, of course, to offences that I have already argued might be worded quite broadly. When we debated clauses 1 and 4, I made various points about the foreign power condition, national interest and so forth. For example, on clause 4, I expressed concerns about protesters operating in the vicinity of a naval base. The idea of life imprisonment for preparing for a blockade at Faslane naval base seems quite extreme. I appreciate that, for various reasons that we discussed, clause 4 does not attach in that way, but that is why we should take adding a preparatory offence to arguably already wide offences very seriously and be very cautious about it.

Indeed, in the clause the notion of preparatory conduct is pretty vaguely defined, I would say. It refers to

“any conduct in preparation for”.

Not to be flippant—particularly in relation to jackets, which everyone has taken off—but if someone puts their jacket on before heading along to a peaceful protest, is that preparatory conduct? I accept that that will not lead to life imprisonment—we hope—but what exactly do we mean by preparatory conduct? The amendment suggests that it must materially contribute to the offence.

The ethical point is that we need to leave people able to change their mind and not end up incentivising them just to carry on and complete the act. If they will already get life imprisonment for preparing, they might arguably say, “Well, I’ve gone this far. I might as well just carry on and complete the act.” Where is the incentive of saying, “Well, okay, you’re going to get punished for your preparatory conduct, but the consequences will be much less severe if you stop now rather than carry on and complete the act”?

If someone sits for three days with a confidential document on their desk in an envelope addressed to a Russian agent, does not the threat of life imprisonment for having stuck the document in an addressed envelope and put a stamp on it effectively encourage them to go through with that act?

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is talking about acts in preparation for an offence. A person engaged in preparing for an act of this type, even if they fail, could still be prosecuted, because they have been preparing for something. Who assesses material assistance? It could be a very small thing, but small things can be very incremental and lead to something bigger. Perhaps he could highlight that a little.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is a perfectly legitimate question and I suppose that ultimately it would be down to the judge to decide what is meant by a material contribution. As I say, putting a jacket on—again, I do not want to be flippant—could be about anything. Does it bring whatever is planned closer to fruition? I do not know. It could be more readily argued that purchasing equipment materially takes forward what was in contemplation, for example. However, as I say, that is a perfectly legitimate question.

The point that I was coming to was that the amendment seeks to put us in a place where we encourage people to change their mind, essentially, and not to put people away for life even if they are on the verge of engaging in conduct that would thoroughly merit that sentence. It would give them an out that will still attract punishment—possibly—but will give them that choice, basically.

We have not have very much in the way of written evidence, but we did receive some interesting written evidence from Dr Kendall at the University of Queensland. She makes the argument, as I have tried to, that the sentence is too harsh. She also argues that the Bill could be better worded. Furthermore, she makes the point that we should probably put in the Bill that someone cannot be convicted of an inchoate preparatory conduct offence. Basically, she is worried that someone might be found guilty of attempting to prepare, which takes us a step further back and complicates the picture even further. In her written evidence, she suggests that it should be made clear that someone cannot be charged with an attempt to prepare, which will take us too far through the looking glass.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

I understand what the hon. Lady is saying—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Clause 13 on foreign interference refers to a person committing an offence

“if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part”

so that would include preparatory conduct, because it is a course, so the conduct goes from beginning to end. There will be preparatory conduct. Does my hon. Friend agree that that might scoop up the relevant particular point?

[Stephen McPartland]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. At the end of the day, my understanding is that the offences are designed differently, which is why we were unable to capture the relevant preparatory activity as part of the offences themselves. I am not a lawyer, but effectively those offences are designed differently, and that is where we are.

Amendment 52 seeks to raise the threshold of that which be proven to show the preparatory nature of the clause. Those who intentionally engage in preparatory conduct, as specified under clause 15, pose a significant risk to national security, and that will be true regardless of whether or not their actions materially assist the ultimate outcome. For example, if a security guard in the employment of a foreign power leaves a door open to facilitate access into a prohibited place by a hostile actor, that would constitute a preparatory act. If the hostile actor then used an alternative route to access the site, for example, cutting through a fence, the guard’s act would not have materially assisted them and his acts would go unpunished. I am sure that the Committee would agree that that would be an unacceptable outcome.

Furthermore, the offence enables disruptive action to be commenced at an early stage, to provide the greatest chance of avoiding the harmful activity occurring. It will not always be possible to determine the end goal of a person’s conduct, and thus whether their preparations are of material assistance. Indeed, in some cases, an individual may not even have decided the precise harmful acts that will result from their conduct, but rather will have the intent that their preparatory conduct will bring out harmful activity in general. However, in order to be caught by this offence the individual must have the intent that their conduct will bring about one of the relevant harmful outcomes. I hope that reassures the Committee that the offence cannot be used to prosecute those who undertake actions without any awareness or intent that it could support the commission of a relevant act.

The amendment would undermine the utility of what is otherwise a key preventive tool. Therefore, I do not support it, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who is a member of the ISC, for clarifying that. For that reason, I am not dead set in my opposition to the clause by any stretch of the imagination—I am open to persuasion. However, we need evidence through the ISC that there is a problem and that clause 23 is the best way to solve it. As matters stand, I cannot say that I have been persuaded of either of those things.

First and foremost, it remains difficult to see how officers of the services in question can commit an offence under the 2007 Act unless they intend an offence to be committed, or, secondly, unless they have a belief that their action will assist an offence. That is a high threshold, even before defences kick in.

We have heard already that the section 50 defence of acting reasonably applies. Given the “purpose” and “authority” under which any action of information sharing would take place, it surely seems very likely that that defence could easily be made out. That point has already been made by a member of the ISC this afternoon. It almost looks like that defence, in section 50(3) of the 2007 Act, was designed with employees of the agencies in mind. The Minister has asserted that the defence is vague, but they seem to be a perfect fit for some of the circumstances that we are considering.

Even if the Minister is correct, perhaps the better response would be to amend the defence, rather than disapplying schedule 4 altogether. It is not clear why it can be argued that the reasonable defence is any more vague than the concept in this clause of

“the proper exercise of any function”.

It is not clear to me what conduct that concept is and is not supposed to cover. We need clear explanations and I do not think we have been given them.

Will the Minister give an example of conduct that is a proper exercise of any function of the services, but that is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore be saved by the Bill? Why is such conduct not able to get over the threshold of the reasonable defence already? Why, as has been asked, is such conduct not able to be authorised under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994? What type of data sharing is subject to this chilling effect and what causes that effect? Is it the remote possibility of data being used for a very serious crime or the significant chance it could be used for a less serious crime? Is it both? Is it neither? It is very hard to get a handle on what precisely the provisions are aimed at.

The Minister knows that concerns were raised on Second Reading about the potential for the clause to have a much more significant effect on actions that could, for example, support rendition or torture. He has set out today and in correspondence that domestic and international law means that such action would not be protected by clause 23. We will give that further consideration, but, in my view, the Government have much more to do to persuade us that there is a real problem here, and one that requires legislative intervention.

Even if a problem does have to be addressed, I am still to be convinced that this is the right response. Are there other options we could look at? Of course there are. For example, in last week’s evidence there appeared to be the suggestion that it was not so much the risk of conviction that was feared, but the risk of an investigation and being dragged to the courts and having to establish a defence of reasonableness. That was one of the problems.

Different things could be done. The clause could be moved around so that it is not a defence, where the burden lies on the person accused. We could make it an intrinsic part of the offence in the first place, so that nobody is dragged to court and has to establish the defence. There are other things that could be done—for example, requiring certain authorisations for prosecutions and so on.

Let us have that discussion, assuming that we can be persuaded that there is a problem here. Are there different ways to address it? For the moment, we remain a little bit in the dark on what precisely the nature of the problem is, and are unconvinced that the provisions in the clause are the best way to resolve any problem that does exist.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Our intelligence and security services are this country’s frontline of defence, and we need to ensure that they remain the best and most professional in the world. To do that, they need to know that if an individual makes a decision in good faith and in accordance with all relevant procedures, to keep us safe, that individual should not be at risk of criminal liability. That responsibility must lie with the organisation.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

In a moment.

Last week, Sir Alex Younger, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, said the issue was a point of principle. Contrary to some alarmist news reports and those opposed to clause 23, Ministers and spies will not be given immunity from committing crimes overseas. Clause 23 does not have any effect on any other criminal offences that might apply to an individual’s actions.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I have finished, thank you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Let me give an illustration of the issue. If my hon. Friend saw someone in need of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the floor, would he give them mouth-to-mouth and pump their chest? Is that something he would do? Would he do it if he thought he could be prosecuted for causing grievous bodily harm if he broke a rib? That would be his defence. That is a simplistic example to illustrate the issue.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I do not think I would be any good at giving anybody CPR. However, I understand the spirit in which she made the intervention and am grateful for that.

National Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

For that reason, we will be following their use carefully and will await a proper assessment of the use of polygraphs in the next annual review; I hope the Minister can be clear about how he envisages them working.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

There have been several reviews of polygraph accuracy, and they are accurate about 80% to 90% of the time. Although they are far from foolproof, they can detect lies, thoughts and intentions to deceive. They are already used in the UK for probation purposes, and their use can encourage people to tell the truth. Along with the other measures in the Bill, they will have their use.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, set out, clause 32 introduces the power to impose STPIMs on an individual via a part 2 notice, and schedule 4 sets out the types of measure that can be imposed.

As I argued on Second Reading, none of us should ever feel comfortable about curtailing people’s liberties via administrative civil orders rather than as punishment for crimes that have been proven through trials. None the less, we acknowledge that such prevention and investigation measures are a necessary and useful part of combating terrorism, and our position on TPIMs has been to focus on trying to clip their wings, improve oversight and limit their invasiveness, rather than to oppose their use altogether.

We think that the balance of evidence shows a similar case for STPIMs. However, we should again be careful in our scrutiny of them, and not permit interference in people’s liberties without proper justification and appropriate limits and oversight. We welcome, for example, that the residence measures in paragraph 1 to schedule 4, which are among the most restrictive measures set out in that schedule, apply only to individuals who are thought to be involved in the most immediately serious activity. Some of the measures are broad, but they seem to be curtailed and properly restricted by the provisions in clause 33—which we will discuss shortly—ensuring that they cannot go beyond what is necessary, although we have some concerns about the various tests that the Secretary of State has to require before applying the measures.

As the Committee has heard, amendment 57 would take out paragraph 12 of schedule 4, on the use of polygraph tests as a means of assessing compliance. Our view is that as polygraph tests remain too unreliable and lack an evidence base, they are inappropriate tools for measuring compliance with STPIMs, especially in the light of the all the other means at the Secretary of State’s disposal, including the monitoring measures in paragraph 15 of schedule 4, as well as the full range of investigatory powers that the services have at their disposal. It is hard to see what paragraph 12 will add. As the shadow Minister said, polygraph tests are not currently used at all.

If there is a case for the use of polygraph tests and the Minister is keen to retain the power to impose such a condition, I ask him to consider removing their applicability in Scotland. There is a precedent for that: polygraphs were introduced for TPIMS in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, but during the Act’s passage, the Scottish Government indicated that they would not promote a legislative consent motion for polygraphs on the basis that, because polygraph testing is not currently used at all in the criminal justice system in Scotland, the fundamental change of introducing them should be a matter of principle to be determined by the Scottish Parliament.

The SNP welcomed the decision by the then Justice Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland), who is now the Secretary of State for Wales, to remove the provisions on polygraphs that applied to Scotland. Following that concession, a legislative consent motion was eventually approved at Holyrood. If I recall correctly, the Northern Ireland Executive expressed similar concerns. We see no case for polygraphs, but we assume that the Minister does, and if he wishes to retain their inclusion in the Bill, we respectfully ask that he take the same approach as his right hon. and learned Friend by not applying the provisions to Scotland.

National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

Throughout this Committee, a lot of people have been called on to comment on what is going on internally on the Government Benches. I may be less qualified than others, but I suspect that what my right hon. Friend says about the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton may well be true. I wish him the best of luck on the Back Benches.

I will move on to the amendment. I have heard what the Minister has graciously said about the Bill not intending to come in the way of people who are caught up in acts of terrorism. However, its drafting leaves that open. I also hear what he says about proposing further amendments in this space.

Amendment 59 seeks to protect innocent bystanders, or even victims of crime, from being excluded from seeking damages for harm caused by the state. The Bill provides for a duty on the court, in cases where evidence is related to the intelligence services, to consider reducing damages that could be paid in a claim against the state. Potentially, the whole amount can be denied. While we of course support the concept that public money via damages should not be used to fund terrorism, the drafting of the clause is incredibly broad. The potential consequences of such loose and opaque language are disturbing and must be taken seriously if we are not to undermine the values we seek to uphold with this legislation.

I will demonstrate the issues—as I am sure nobody here will be surprised to hear this—through a gendered lens. In the discourse on security and terrorism, we commonly forget about women. In the assessment, analysis and debate, the impact and experiences of women do not often play a central role. I will use the platform I have to unpack the issues through consideration of how they will affect a victim of gendered violence.

Earlier this year, a case hit the headlines. The BBC claimed that an MI5 informant—I shall call him X—used his status to abuse his partner. I will share just a few of the details from the investigation. Beth—not her real name—a British national, met the MI5 informant online. As time passed, she became aware that he collected weapons, and he made her watch terrorist videos of violence. She realised he was a misogynist and extremist. Beth claimed he sexually assaulted her, was abusive and coercive, and used his position in the British security forces to terrorise her. She said:

“He had complete control. I was a shadow of who I am now,”

and:

“There was so much psychological terror from him to me, that ultimately culminated in me having a breakdown, because I was so afraid of everything—because of how he’d made me think, the people that he was involved with, and the people who he worked for.”

Beth says X told her he worked as a covert human intelligence source, infiltrating extremist networks. Beth claimed he told her that his status meant she could not report his behaviour:

“It meant that I couldn’t speak out about any of his behaviour towards me, any of the violence I went through, sexual or physical, because he had men in high places who always had his back, who would intervene and who would actively kill me, if I spoke out”.

In a video filmed on Beth’s phone, X threatens to kill her, and attacks her with a machete. She is screaming as the video cuts out. A few hours later, Beth says he tried to cut her throat. X was arrested and charged, but the case was dropped, and the BBC claims its investigation uncovered serious issues with the police response to this incident. That is an entirely different speech for an entirely different day. Heartbreakingly, Beth had a mental breakdown and was hospitalised.

Another previous partner—we will call her Ruth—says that X also abused and terrorised her. He threatened her life and that of her child:

“He said he would be able to kill me and my daughter, too, and then put our bodies somewhere and no one would ever know who I am.”

Ruth was unable to speak due to trauma and was also admitted to hospital. She said:

“I was psychologically broken, really broken”.

There are many issues to discuss around this case, regarding how the state and intelligence services should balance the need to safeguard individuals and the need for informants who infiltrate the darkest circles of society. What I want to outline, however, is the horrendous, hellish experience of those two women at the hands of this man X: the trauma, the violence, the abuse, the isolation, and how the man exploited his position to terrorise those women, who had done nothing wrong. Under the clause, if those women had sought damages for harm caused by the state, those damages could have been limited, or reduced to zero.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that it is not the state doing harm, but the individual?

[Jess Phillips]

There is almost certainly always going to be an ideological difference between the hon. Lady and me on personal responsibility and the responsibility of the state. It is of course the individual doing harm, but it is the state that intervenes to protect the parties, or the state that allows cases to be closed. The idea that the state does not have a responsibility for the human rights of a victim of crime such as this when it comes to how they are treated when they try to interact with the state is, I am afraid, for the birds. Almost every single rape victim I have ever met—I have met thousands—tells me that the initial trauma they were put through is almost nothing compared with the trauma of going through any particular state system.

The provisions of the clause, as it stands, mean that if the women had sought damages for harm, those damages would be limited, potentially, to zero. These are completely innocent bystanders, victims of crimes in which the intelligence services and their power were weaponised to abuse and control them. These women could be denied redress even if wrongdoing by the state was proven. This case, where a man was videoed attacking a woman with a machete, was then closed. Even if it were found and proven that the state was responsible, the woman would still not have a claim. The current drafting does not require that the matter over which damages are sought is directly related to terrorist activity.

I have used this case—a covert human intelligence source case—as an example, but the concerns apply to many other situations and many people whose actions will have had nothing to do with criminal activity. That cannot be right. The provisions are simply too broadly drawn.

The amendment would mean that the limitations to seeking damages apply only to those who have committed wrongdoing involving terrorism. I have made my feelings clear about part 3 of the Bill, but this is simply an amendment to make sure that innocent people definitely do not fall within the scope of the provisions when they are caught up in a terrible situation, which I am very glad the Minister has recognised. The Bill must include this constraint.

There are other broad, loose elements in the Bill that are concerning. I raise them now and urge clarification from the Minister. Seeking damages is a tool to hold the state accountable. The clauses apply only when courts have already found the UK Government liable for wrongdoing. How are the Government going to ensure the provisions in these clauses are not used to allow the Government to evade being held accountable for their actions?

The current drafting seems to suggest that, if there is any evidence related to national security or the intelligence services, the damages for harm could be reduced or erased. The Law Commission has highlighted that that could create a perverse situation where the state could introduce pointless or insignificant national security evidence in order to avoid paying damages under the provisions in the Bill. How will the Government safeguard against that situation? It is a perfectly reasonable to want to have safeguards against that situation in place.

Reprieve has argued that clauses 57 to 60 could limit the ability of victims of torture to seek legal redress for harm done. The state could claim, for example, that in becoming complicit in torture or abuse, the UK was seeking to prevent or limit some other risk of harm, and so reduce or erase damages for a claimant.

Clause 57 rightly excludes from the definition of “national security proceedings” any claims under the Human Rights Act 1998. Our concern is the breadth of the clauses. They potentially enable the state to avoid paying out for UK complicity in torture and abuse under UK civil law. Most survivors of torture seek redress through ordinary civil claims. I will not go into details because it is sub judice, but the case of Jagtar Singh Johal, which was debated in the House yesterday, springs to mind.

We seek reassurance that the clauses will not be used to evade accountability and redress for complicity in abuse. Furthermore, the involvement of the intelligence services in other countries is covered by the Bill, but how do the Government intend to ensure that conduct is legal and ethical under UK law? What safeguards exist around that?

Many concerns and questions remain about the drafting of this part of the Bill, and we urge that our amendment be included in it. We will seek to vote on this issue at the next Commons stage of the Bill’s passage should we not be satisfied, but I have heard the Minister’s words and I thank him.