Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Winterton of Doncaster Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 5th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mary Kelly Foy (City of Durham) (Lab) [V]]

Although I have grave concerns about many aspects of this Bill, I will limit my remarks to the amendments in my name, those of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Ian Byrne), and new clause 102.

This Bill needlessly criminalises Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. It will turn civil offences into criminal ones and punish littering and inconvenience with prison and homelessness. The Bill does not target a problem; it targets minority and ethnic communities. It is driven by hatred and division and will serve only to fuel hatred and division. Only last month, the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson) demonstrated this by saying:

“The Travellers I am talking about are more likely to be seen leaving your garden shed at 3 o’clock in the morning, probably with your lawnmower and half of your tools.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 8 June 2021; c. 410.]

Those words racially stereotype Travellers and paint an entire community as criminals. They were racist and repugnant and show the bigotry that this Bill promotes.

On top of this, the draconian powers included in the Bill are being pushed upon police despite their insistence that they do not want or need them. The National Police Chiefs Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners have said that

“trespass is a civil offence and our view is that it should remain so”,

while 93.7% of police bodies support increased site provision as the solution to unauthorised encampments. Both the police and the travelling communities are in agreement on this. I urge the Government to listen and to support new clause 102 and the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby. The Government should be focused on improving society for everyone, yet they have become fixated on attacking an already much persecuted minority at the expense of many and to the benefit of none. In doing so, they are ignoring ready-made solutions. Organisations such as Friends, Families and Travellers have called for increased and improved site provision while highlighting the value of negotiated stopping, because the reality is that if Travellers cannot stop with authorisation, then they must stop without it.

I tabled my amendments because I believe that it is the role of politicians to protect minorities, not persecute them. New clause 51 seeks to address the racism that GRT communities face every day by forcing the Government to review the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crimes against these communities, while new clause 52 would require the Government to provide proper training for the relevant public bodies. Although valuable amendments to this dystopic Bill will undoubtedly fall today, I would like to reassure my constituents that the fight against legislation is not the end—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I have to bring the hon. Lady’s remarks to a close because we are running very short of time.

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[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I rise to speak as co-chair of the justice unions parliamentary group. There is an awful lot that I would like to say about this Bill, but unfortunately I have to restrict my comments to amendment 47.

The amendment seeks to correct an anomaly in the legislation brought by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) in his Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, whereby the only members of prison staff included in the protected category of emergency workers are prison officers and some healthcare workers, while other prison workers, such as teachers or instructors, are not protected. That is simply unfair and increases the risks for those staff: it effectively paints a target on their backs because prisoners are well aware of the law and know that the penalties for attacking a prison officer are way more severe than those for attacking the teacher who might be standing next to them.

The 2019 “Safe Inside” survey conducted by the Joint Unions in Prisons Alliance showed that all prison staff—not just prison officers, but prison educators and teachers as well—are subjected to shocking levels of violence and are routinely exposed to harmful drugs. More than a quarter of staff reported having been a victim of physical violence in the last 12 months. Of those, 14% said that they had been assaulted more than 10 times in that period.

The youth estate, for example, often houses children who are locked up hundreds of miles from family and support. The resulting strain on mental health is a contributing factor towards violence against staff. Of course, in Wales, as education is devolved, things run differently so the Bill’s impact will be felt differently, which is something my hon. Friend the Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) will raise later.

Here is one horrific example from an educator in a young offender institution:

“I turned to press the radio and as I did so I felt the young offender’s arms around my neck and he put me in a headlock and began to strangle me, I managed to say “Assistance” on the radio, but before I could say my location, he had my arm above my head to stop me calling for help, he dragged me down to the ground, he continued to strangle me with his left arm and he hit me repeatedly in the head with the other. As he was doing so, he said he had mental health issues. It felt like longer but, I think the officers arrived in approximately five minutes after the incident began and physically removed him from me.”

No teacher, educator or instructor should be expected to work in an environment where terrifying assaults like those are not treated with the same severity as those against prison officers. For that reason, I urge all Members to show those brave front-line public servants that we prioritise their safety as emergency workers, too.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call Steve Brine, who has 90 seconds.

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The list of Members currently certified as eligible for a proxy vote, and of the Members nominated as their proxy, is published at the end of today’s debates.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I understand that the hon. Member for Stockton South (Matt Vickers) does not wish to press new clause 90 to a Division.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton South) (Con)]

Having received commitments from the Government that they will bring forward measures to tackle this issue during the passage of the Bill, I do not wish to press the new clause.

New Clause 91

Review of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971

(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the criminal offences in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

(2) In undertaking the review, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs;

(b) the Scottish Ministers;

(c) the Welsh Ministers;

(d) the Northern Ireland Department of Health, and

(e) any other person the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(3) The Secretary of State must, before the end of the period of 9 months beginning with the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament a report on the review, including any proposals for legislative change.—(Anne McLaughlin.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the criminal offences set out in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

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“, chief officer of police or the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force”.—(Victoria Atkins.)

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We come to group two. After I have called the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) to move new clause 3, there will be a four-minute limit on Back-Bench contributions.

New Clause 3

Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant's sexual history

‘(1) Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) starting in paragraph (b) omit “in cross examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial,”;

(b) at end insert “with anyone other than the defendant”.

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) for “an accused” substitute “a party to the trial”;

(b) in paragraph (a) omit “or (5)”.

(4) For subsection (3) substitute—

“(3) This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case and that issue is not an issue of consent.”

(5) For subsection (5) substitute—

“(a) For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence may be adduced or question asked unless the judge determines in accordance with the procedures in this subsection that the question or evidence has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

(b) In determining that question the judge shall take into account—

(i) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;

(ii) the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process by removing from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;

(iii) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;

(iv) the potential threat to the complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy;

(v) the complainant’s right to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law;

(vi) the provisions of the Victims Code;

and any other factor that the judge considers relevant.”

(6) In subsection (6), for “subsections (3) and (5)” substitute “subsection (3)”.’

This new clause excludes the admission in evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant with a third party, whether by the prosecution or the defence, to show consent, whilst leaving it admissible if it is relevant to any other issue in the case. It sets out the additional requirement that to be admitted the material must be more probative than prejudicial and sets out the considerations the judge must have in regard to considering that extra requirement.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ms Harman [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 4—Definition of “issue of consent”—

‘(1) Section 42 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) For paragraph (b) substitute—

“(b) “issue of consent” means any issue where the complainant in fact consented to the conduct constituting the offence with which the defendant is charged and any issue where the accused reasonably believed that the complainant so consented;”’

This new clause re-defines “issue of consent” for the purposes of section 41, including in the definition the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent, and thus removing it as a reason for the inclusion of a complainant’s sexual history or behaviour.

New clause 5—Admission of evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history—

‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 43 insert—

“43A In any trial or contested hearing to which section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies, if no pre-trial application in accordance with Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules has been made, or if such application has been made and refused in whole or in part, no further application may be made during the course of the trial or before its commencement to call such evidence or ask such question, and no judge may allow such application or admit any such questions or evidence.”’

This new clause would have the effect that no section 41 evidence or questions could be admitted by a judge at trial unless there had been an application before trial in accordance with the practice directions; and the amendment would ban applications from being made immediately before or during the trial.

New clause 6—Complainant’s right of representation and appeal on an application to adduce evidence or questions on sexual conduct—

‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 43 insert—

“43A In any trial to which section 41 applies, where notice is given that there will be an application under Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules for leave to ask questions or to adduce evidence as to any sexual behaviour of the complainant—

(1) The complainant may not be compelled to give evidence at any hearing on the application.

(2) The complainant will be entitled to be served with the application and to be legally represented (with the assistance of legal aid if financially eligible) as “a party” within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Rules in responding in writing to the application and in presenting their case at any hearing on the application.

(3) If the application succeeds in whole or in part, the complainant will have a right to appeal for a rehearing of the application to the Court of Appeal on notice within 7 days of the judgement being delivered.

(4) On any such appeal, the Court of Appeal will rehear the application in full and may grant or refuse it in whole or in part.

(5) The Secretary of State may, by regulation, set out rules of procedure relating to any hearing or appeal under this section.”’

This new clause would give the complainant a right of representation, with legal aid if they are financially eligible, to oppose any application to admit section 41 material about them. This new clause would also give complainants a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal if the application is allowed in whole or in part. The new clause also provides that the complainant is not compellable as witness at the application.

New clause 7—Collection of and reporting to Parliament on data and information relating to proceedings involving rape and sexual assault—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall collect and report to Parliament annually the following data and information—

(a) The time taken in every case of rape or sexual assault for the case to progress from complaint to charge, from charge to pre-trial plea and management hearing; and from then until trial.

(b) The number of applications to ask questions or adduce evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) made in the Magistrates and Crown Courts of England and Wales, irrespective of whether a trial was subsequently held.

(c) The number of cases which involved questions on or evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant in all rape, sexual abuse and other trials or contested hearings in the Magistrates and Crown courts in England and Wales, irrespective of whether an application was made to admit such questions or evidence in advance of the trial or hearing.

(d) In cases to which section 41 of the 1999 Act applies—

(i) whether Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules was followed in each application and if it was not, how it was not;

(ii) the questions proposed to be asked;

(iii) the evidence proposed to be called;

(iv) whether the prosecution opposed the application and if so the content of their representations;

(v) whether evidence was called to support or oppose the application;

(vi) whether the application was allowed in whole or in part and a copy of the judgement made on the application;

and

(vii) any other material which might assist in an assessment of the frequency, basis and nature of applications for the use of such questions or evidence and the likely impact on any parties to any trial and the trial outcome.

(2) The data and information to be collected under subsection (1) shall include—

(a) all the material from any pre-trial application;

(b) the questions in fact asked and the evidence in fact called about any sexual behaviour of the complainant in the trial;

(c) any application at the start or during the course of the trial to vary or alter any judgement given in any earlier application or any further application to admit such questions or evidence;

(d) whether any material not previously authorised was used in the trial;

(e) whether the prosecution objected; and

(f) any ruling made or action taken by the judge on the further conduct of the trial as a consequence of the admission of questions or evidence under section 41 of the 1999 Act.

(3) The data and information to be collected under this section shall be collected from the date of Royal Assent to this Bill.’

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to collect and report to Parliament data and information on trial delay and section 41 matters.

New clause 8—Training for relevant public officials in relation to the conduct of cases of serious sexual offences—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall, on this Act coming into force, publish and implement a strategy to provide training on the investigation of rape and alleged rape complainants, and the admissibility and cross-examination of complainants on their sexual history to—

(a) the Crown Prosecution Service;

(b) Police Forces;

(c) the Judiciary; and

(d) such other public bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(2) The Secretary of State shall ensure that any judge who is asked to hear a trial where the accused is charged with rape or any other serious sexual offence has attended and completed a training programme for such trials which has been accredited by the Judicial College.’

This new clause ensures that all criminal justice agencies shall be trained and that no judge can hear a sexual offence trial of any kind unless they have attended the Judicial College serious sexual offence course.

New clause 9—Requirement for a pre-sentence report when sentencing a primary carer—

‘(1) Section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3) insert—

“(3A)A court must make inquiries to establish whether the offender is a primary carer for a child.

(3B) If the court establishes that the offender is a primary carer for a child, unless there are exceptional circumstances before sentencing the offender the court must obtain a pre-sentence report containing information to enable the court to make an assessment of the impact of a custodial sentence on the child.”

(3) After subsection (4) insert—

“(5) In this section—

(e) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and

(f) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause amends section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make clear the requirement for a sentencing judge to have a copy of a pre-sentence report, considering the impact of a custodial sentence on the dependent child, when sentencing a primary carer of a child.

New clause 10—Duty of the court to state how it has considered the consequences for the child when sentencing—

‘(1) Section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

“Offenders who are primary carers

(10) A court sentencing a primary carer for a child must state how the best interests of the child were considered in determining the sentence (including, if appropriate, consideration of the views of the child).

(11) A court sentencing a pregnant woman must state how the best interests of the baby were considered in determining the sentence.

(12) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care

responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause amends section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to require a sentencing judge to state how the best interests of a child were considered when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 11—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when sentencing a primary carer—

‘(1) After section 227 of the Sentencing Act 2020, insert—

“227A Restrictions on imposing imprisonment on a primary carer

(1) This section applies where a court is considering imposing a custodial sentence on—

(a) a primary carer for a child, or

(b) a pregnant woman.

(2) The sentencing court must—

(a) consider the impact of a custodial sentence on the child or unborn child, and

(b) presume (subject to victim impact and any other sentencing considerations) that a non-custodial sentence is in the best interests of the child or unborn child.

(3) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause would create a requirement for a sentencing judge to consider the impact of a custodial sentence on a child when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 12—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when determining bail for a primary carer—

‘(1) Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

“(10) Where a court determines whether to grant bail in criminal proceedings to a person to whom this section applies who is a primary carer for a child or pregnant, the court must—

(a) consider the impact of not granting bail on the child or unborn child; and

(b) presume (subject to victim impact or other relevant considerations) that it is in the best interests of the child or unborn child for bail to be granted.

(11) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause would impose a requirement for the judge to consider the impact of not granting bail on a child when determining, in criminal proceedings, whether to grant bail to a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 13—Data collection in relation to prisoners who are primary carers—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish annual data identifying—

(a) how many prisoners are the primary carers of a child,

(b) how many children have a primary carer in custody, and

(c) the ages of those children.

(2) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial

care responsibilities for a child.’

This new clause would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the number of prisoners who are the primary carers of a child and the number of children who have a primary carer in custody.

New clause 17—Maximum sentences for causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death—

‘(1) Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (7), for “a term not exceeding 14 years” substitute “life”, and

(b) in subsection (8), for “10” substitute “14”.

(2) Schedule 19 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended by the insertion of the following after paragraph 20—

“Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004

20A An offence to which section 5(7) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies.”’

This new clause seeks to increase sentencing levels under section 5 of the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death) by raising the death offence to life imprisonment, and the “serious injury” offence to 14 years.

New clause 18—Custody for own protection or own welfare—

‘(1) The Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.

(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.

(3) In Part 1A of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences to which Part 1 does not apply) omit paragraph 5.

(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of non-imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.’

This new clause would repeal the power of the criminal courts to remand a defendant into custody for their own protection (or in the case of a child, for their own welfare) pending trial or sentence.

New clause 19—Justice impact assessment for Wales—

‘(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or regulations made under this Act, which impacts on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.

(2) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the date on which they are made, issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue an assessment of the impact of the Bill on devolved policy and services in Wales within six months of it passing, and to issue such an assessment of any further changes to regulations under the Bill within one month of making them.

New clause 20—Failing to stop or report accidents involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury—

‘(1) After subsection 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, insert—

“(4A) A person who fails to comply with subsections 170(2) or 170(3) when he knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, is guilty of an offence.”

(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts), after the entry relating to an offence under RTA subsection 170(4), insert the following—

[Ms Harman]

New clause 3 would deal with a problem that the Government have acknowledged: that on the question of rape, the justice system lets women down and lets men off the hook. There are many problems that contribute to that, but one that the Government have rightly identified is that the process focuses on the complainant rather than on the defendant. The investigation becomes an investigation of the complainant—her mobile phone, what she was doing, her attitudes—and not of the suspect. The trial becomes the trial of the complainant, not of the defendant, in one very material way: the use by the defendant of the complainant’s previous sexual history by bringing it into evidence.

It has been acknowledged since as long ago as 1999 that the complainant’s previous sexual history is not the issue, and it is wrong for the defendant to try to use it to deter her from supporting a prosecution for fear that all her dirty washing will be washed in public, in open court, or that it will undermine her standing and credibility in the eyes of the jury. That was supposed to be outlawed in 1999, but it has become clear that a loophole was left when we changed the law.

In a third of all rape cases now, one way or another, the defendant brings into court the complainant’s previous sexual history. When the Victims’ Commissioner was a police and crime commissioner, she conducted research that showed that in one third of rape trials observed, the previous sexual history of the complainant was brought into evidence. That research is backed up by work done by the Criminal Bar Association.

The Victims’ Commissioner gives the example of a complainant who had her parents in court to support her. They did not know that she had had an abortion, but the defendant brought that into evidence in order to undermine her and throw off her ability to give her evidence—there were her parents, sitting in court, and they did not even know that she had had an abortion. Another report was of a case in which the jury were told, “This is a woman who has had adulterous affairs,” thereby trying to undermine her. Of course, that is not relevant to the issue of whether or not a rape has been committed, so we need to tighten up the law.

I have drafted a perfectly good, watertight clause to tighten up the law so that where the question of previous sexual history is relevant, especially if it is with the same partner in respect of whom the rape is alleged, it is allowed in evidence with the permission of the judge, but where it is not relevant, it is not. However, our Front Bench and the Government in their rape review have said that they are minded to send it to the Law Commission to look at. I would have preferred the Government to legislate in the Bill, which is after all the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, but they have decided not to do that; they say that they will refer to the Law Commission the whole question of the focus on the complainant, so I make two requests in that respect.

First, I think that the Law Commission should sit with an independent reference group. I have a great deal of respect for the Law Commission, but quite frankly we cannot leave it to get on with it on its own. We need an expert, independent reference group that is steeped in understanding of the issue and that can help the Law Commission. I suggest that Rape Crisis England & Wales should be on that group, and so should the Victims’ Commissioner.

My second request is that there should be a time limit on the Law Commission’s work. The Law Commission goes into things very deeply, but we do not want this to go on and on for years—it has been a problem for years, so we do not want it to go into the long grass with a never-ending Law Commission investigation. We want the findings to be ready for when the Government are thinking of bringing forward their victims Bill, which they will consult on shortly and which arises out of the violence against women and girls consultation. If we are not going to accept this today, and the Government are not, let us have the Law Commission looking at it, with an independent reference group and with a time limit. Then, the Government will have done more than just apologise to rape victims for justice not being done; they will make sure that in future justice is done.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We now go to the Chair of the Justice Committee, Sir Robert Neill, and the four-minute time limit comes into force for Back Benchers at this point.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) [V]]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and to talk on these important matters. Although I understand the motives behind the series of amendments standing in her name, I must start by disagreeing with the fundamental approach in some respects. I think it is right that this does go to the Law Commission, because these are potentially very important changes and they affect, inevitably, the balance that must be achieved in a criminal trial between the proper protection of the interests of any witness and the right of any defendant to have a fair trial in which all relevant issues—I stress that—are ventilated. Frequently, the issue of consent would not be relevant to the defence, but there are circumstances in which it is and we should not be making substantive changes here without very careful consideration. The same applies in respect of a number of the other amendments that the right hon. and learned Lady and others have tabled. Again, I understand the reasoning, but, for example, changing the definition of “consent” in relation to recklessness would make a significant change to the substantive criminal law in this area, and that should not be undertaken via an addition to an already large Bill, with limited scrutiny.

There are significant arguments to be considered on both sides, and the Law Commission is the right route for all of these matters. In my experience, and that of the Select Committee, the Law Commission is well able to move swiftly given the resources and the support to do so. I hope that we can leave this on the basis of having a proper look at what are very significant matters, affecting not just the question of the protection of victims, but the right of any defendant to a proper airing of the evidence. Although I am clear that there are still areas where complainants in such cases do not receive the treatment that they should, the position both in the courts and in the investigation of such offences is very much improved from where it was. We can always continue to do more, but inevitably now cases of this kind are tried by highly experienced and senior judges. My experience of having both prosecuted and defended in many such cases is that the courts are robust and swift in dealing with such matters and in rejecting inappropriate applications to stray beyond the relevant issues.

In the time available, may I also touch on some of the other amendments? I would be troubled at anything that fetters the discretion of the courts in relation to minimum sentences. At the end of the day, all aggravating features can properly be set before the courts. The Government and this House have increased maximum sentences in a number of areas, and I have a concern in principle at the imposition of minimum sentences, which have the potential in certain circumstances to tie the hands of the courts. There is an amendment on the representation of families of the deceased at inquests in certain circumstances. I do not think this Bill is the right place for that, but I strongly commend to the Lord Chancellor, whom I am glad to see on the Treasury Bench, the Justice Committee’s report on this, and I hope that in his response we will be given a constructive way forward to deal with those matters.

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Our constituents demand that we take action now. We must protect them and their pets. Dogs are not bicycles, they are not items, they are beloved animals that offer succour and support all the way through people’s lives, and we must therefore treat them as such. I argue clearly to my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor that it is high time the Government stepped up to the plate on this. I accept tonight that these may not be the right technical amendments, so I ask my right hon. Friend, when he gets the Dispatch Box, to give us the undertaking that, by the time the Bill returns, this provision will be in law, improved, and that the thieves will be targeted and those who own pets will be protected.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I have absolutely no problem with interventions, but it may be that we can get everybody in if people still stick to four minutes, even if they take interventions.

[Sir John Hayes]

Politics is about values. It always has been, actually, but in the modern age too many politicians —perhaps timid of inspiring or of their capacity to do so, or frightened of causing contumely—have retreated into a drear, dull, mechanistic discourse. Tonight, this Bill and these amendments are a chance to break free of that—a chance to change—because the Government are at last responding to the will of the people who, for a very long time, have believed that the criminal justice system was not weighted in favour of victims or law and order, but too heavily weighted in favour of making excuses for those who commit crime.

The world is a dangerous place. In fact, unimpeded, evil men and women will impose their cruel will upon the innocent. C. S. Lewis said that in living the reality of human imperfections,

“the art of life consists in tackling each immediate evil as well as we can.”

Law-abiding Britons do their everyday part in keeping the fire of social solidarity burning bright, yet too many with power appear to have forgotten how to tackle the evil that seeks to snuff out civilised order. Instead, those who see crime as an ill to be treated have held too much sway for too long. Evil too often receives a slap on the wrist, a stern telling off, and the public’s desire for retributive justice goes unheeded.

We must never forget, as was said earlier, that we serve here at the pleasure of our constituents. Public order and faith in the rule of law depend on popular confidence in the justice system—a confidence that must be earned. People’s sense of right and wrong has changed little over the decades. In 1990, four out of five Britons thought sentencing was too lenient. Today, four out of five Britons think the same. With the number of custodial sentences for sexual offences, theft and criminal damage all falling, it is time for this place to listen. Our constituents despair of having violent deviants freed to hurt again, of seeing non-custodial sentences for yobs and thugs, and of halfway automatic release for some of the most violent people in our society. Many gentle, peaceful people are appalled at all of this. Soft sentencing allows rapists, paedophiles and violent offenders to walk free having served only half their sentence. Given the pain of victims, that is an insult to decency.

This Bill, in seeking to ensure that the most despicable criminals face their just deserts behind bars, is welcome. That may shock the liberal establishment, filled by doubts and fuelled by guilt, but it is much yearned for by the silent majority of Britons and it is long overdue. Shame on those who wish to use the Bill for narrow ends. However, I will not go into the amendments on abortion because you would not let me, Madam Deputy Speaker, but you know what I mean.

Disraeli said:

“Justice is truth in action.”

That is not a relative individual truth but an extension of absolute virtue that people intuitively understand and to which this Bill gives life. Amendments to tackle the wicked scourge of pet theft affirm that truth, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) made clear.

The Bill before us today begins to signal that the Government are no longer distracted by the plight of the guilty. It proudly declares that we are devoted to the cause of the innocent and to the pursuit of justice. We must never be timid about being fierce in defence of the gentle, for in being so we stand for the majority of law-abiding Britons. I commend the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), which, in laying down the truth that I have described, further reinforce a good Bill. It is a start: the beginning of a fightback on behalf of the silent majority.