Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Harman Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 5th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

I have one more minute.

We are trying to tackle harmful behaviour, and Opposition Members need to ask themselves just how much damage, disruption and distress is acceptable for their constituents to bear.

I will quickly deal with the extraction of information. This is an important part of the Bill, because we want to ensure that strong privacy safeguards are in place when dealing with people’s sensitive personal information. This Bill, coupled with the rape review, is an absolutely critical part of that effort.

Mindful that the House will want to vote on these matters, I will conclude. We promised our constituents that we would take measures to make our society safer and to crack down on crime. As my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire Dales (Miss Dines) set out, that is the promise we all made to our constituents. We are delivering on promises made to the electorate and standing up for the decent members of society who do not commit the sorts of crimes that we in this Chamber have sadly had to hear about. I therefore have no hesitation in commending the Bill to the House.

[Ms Harman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We come to group two. After I have called the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) to move new clause 3, there will be a four-minute limit on Back-Bench contributions.

New Clause 3

Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant's sexual history

‘(1) Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) starting in paragraph (b) omit “in cross examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial,”;

(b) at end insert “with anyone other than the defendant”.

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) for “an accused” substitute “a party to the trial”;

(b) in paragraph (a) omit “or (5)”.

(4) For subsection (3) substitute—

“(3) This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case and that issue is not an issue of consent.”

(5) For subsection (5) substitute—

“(a) For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence may be adduced or question asked unless the judge determines in accordance with the procedures in this subsection that the question or evidence has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

(b) In determining that question the judge shall take into account—

(i) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;

(ii) the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process by removing from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;

(iii) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;

(iv) the potential threat to the complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy;

(v) the complainant’s right to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law;

(vi) the provisions of the Victims Code;

and any other factor that the judge considers relevant.”

(6) In subsection (6), for “subsections (3) and (5)” substitute “subsection (3)”.’

This new clause excludes the admission in evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant with a third party, whether by the prosecution or the defence, to show consent, whilst leaving it admissible if it is relevant to any other issue in the case. It sets out the additional requirement that to be admitted the material must be more probative than prejudicial and sets out the considerations the judge must have in regard to considering that extra requirement.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ms Harman [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 4—Definition of “issue of consent”—

‘(1) Section 42 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) For paragraph (b) substitute—

“(b) “issue of consent” means any issue where the complainant in fact consented to the conduct constituting the offence with which the defendant is charged and any issue where the accused reasonably believed that the complainant so consented;”’

This new clause re-defines “issue of consent” for the purposes of section 41, including in the definition the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent, and thus removing it as a reason for the inclusion of a complainant’s sexual history or behaviour.

New clause 5—Admission of evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history—

‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 43 insert—

“43A In any trial or contested hearing to which section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies, if no pre-trial application in accordance with Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules has been made, or if such application has been made and refused in whole or in part, no further application may be made during the course of the trial or before its commencement to call such evidence or ask such question, and no judge may allow such application or admit any such questions or evidence.”’

This new clause would have the effect that no section 41 evidence or questions could be admitted by a judge at trial unless there had been an application before trial in accordance with the practice directions; and the amendment would ban applications from being made immediately before or during the trial.

New clause 6—Complainant’s right of representation and appeal on an application to adduce evidence or questions on sexual conduct—

‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 43 insert—

“43A In any trial to which section 41 applies, where notice is given that there will be an application under Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules for leave to ask questions or to adduce evidence as to any sexual behaviour of the complainant—

(1) The complainant may not be compelled to give evidence at any hearing on the application.

(2) The complainant will be entitled to be served with the application and to be legally represented (with the assistance of legal aid if financially eligible) as “a party” within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Rules in responding in writing to the application and in presenting their case at any hearing on the application.

(3) If the application succeeds in whole or in part, the complainant will have a right to appeal for a rehearing of the application to the Court of Appeal on notice within 7 days of the judgement being delivered.

(4) On any such appeal, the Court of Appeal will rehear the application in full and may grant or refuse it in whole or in part.

(5) The Secretary of State may, by regulation, set out rules of procedure relating to any hearing or appeal under this section.”’

This new clause would give the complainant a right of representation, with legal aid if they are financially eligible, to oppose any application to admit section 41 material about them. This new clause would also give complainants a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal if the application is allowed in whole or in part. The new clause also provides that the complainant is not compellable as witness at the application.

New clause 7—Collection of and reporting to Parliament on data and information relating to proceedings involving rape and sexual assault—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall collect and report to Parliament annually the following data and information—

(a) The time taken in every case of rape or sexual assault for the case to progress from complaint to charge, from charge to pre-trial plea and management hearing; and from then until trial.

(b) The number of applications to ask questions or adduce evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) made in the Magistrates and Crown Courts of England and Wales, irrespective of whether a trial was subsequently held.

(c) The number of cases which involved questions on or evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant in all rape, sexual abuse and other trials or contested hearings in the Magistrates and Crown courts in England and Wales, irrespective of whether an application was made to admit such questions or evidence in advance of the trial or hearing.

(d) In cases to which section 41 of the 1999 Act applies—

(i) whether Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules was followed in each application and if it was not, how it was not;

(ii) the questions proposed to be asked;

(iii) the evidence proposed to be called;

(iv) whether the prosecution opposed the application and if so the content of their representations;

(v) whether evidence was called to support or oppose the application;

(vi) whether the application was allowed in whole or in part and a copy of the judgement made on the application;

and

(vii) any other material which might assist in an assessment of the frequency, basis and nature of applications for the use of such questions or evidence and the likely impact on any parties to any trial and the trial outcome.

(2) The data and information to be collected under subsection (1) shall include—

(a) all the material from any pre-trial application;

(b) the questions in fact asked and the evidence in fact called about any sexual behaviour of the complainant in the trial;

(c) any application at the start or during the course of the trial to vary or alter any judgement given in any earlier application or any further application to admit such questions or evidence;

(d) whether any material not previously authorised was used in the trial;

(e) whether the prosecution objected; and

(f) any ruling made or action taken by the judge on the further conduct of the trial as a consequence of the admission of questions or evidence under section 41 of the 1999 Act.

(3) The data and information to be collected under this section shall be collected from the date of Royal Assent to this Bill.’

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to collect and report to Parliament data and information on trial delay and section 41 matters.

New clause 8—Training for relevant public officials in relation to the conduct of cases of serious sexual offences—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall, on this Act coming into force, publish and implement a strategy to provide training on the investigation of rape and alleged rape complainants, and the admissibility and cross-examination of complainants on their sexual history to—

(a) the Crown Prosecution Service;

(b) Police Forces;

(c) the Judiciary; and

(d) such other public bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(2) The Secretary of State shall ensure that any judge who is asked to hear a trial where the accused is charged with rape or any other serious sexual offence has attended and completed a training programme for such trials which has been accredited by the Judicial College.’

This new clause ensures that all criminal justice agencies shall be trained and that no judge can hear a sexual offence trial of any kind unless they have attended the Judicial College serious sexual offence course.

New clause 9—Requirement for a pre-sentence report when sentencing a primary carer—

‘(1) Section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3) insert—

“(3A)A court must make inquiries to establish whether the offender is a primary carer for a child.

(3B) If the court establishes that the offender is a primary carer for a child, unless there are exceptional circumstances before sentencing the offender the court must obtain a pre-sentence report containing information to enable the court to make an assessment of the impact of a custodial sentence on the child.”

(3) After subsection (4) insert—

“(5) In this section—

(e) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and

(f) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause amends section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make clear the requirement for a sentencing judge to have a copy of a pre-sentence report, considering the impact of a custodial sentence on the dependent child, when sentencing a primary carer of a child.

New clause 10—Duty of the court to state how it has considered the consequences for the child when sentencing—

‘(1) Section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

“Offenders who are primary carers

(10) A court sentencing a primary carer for a child must state how the best interests of the child were considered in determining the sentence (including, if appropriate, consideration of the views of the child).

(11) A court sentencing a pregnant woman must state how the best interests of the baby were considered in determining the sentence.

(12) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care

responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause amends section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to require a sentencing judge to state how the best interests of a child were considered when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 11—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when sentencing a primary carer—

‘(1) After section 227 of the Sentencing Act 2020, insert—

“227A Restrictions on imposing imprisonment on a primary carer

(1) This section applies where a court is considering imposing a custodial sentence on—

(a) a primary carer for a child, or

(b) a pregnant woman.

(2) The sentencing court must—

(a) consider the impact of a custodial sentence on the child or unborn child, and

(b) presume (subject to victim impact and any other sentencing considerations) that a non-custodial sentence is in the best interests of the child or unborn child.

(3) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause would create a requirement for a sentencing judge to consider the impact of a custodial sentence on a child when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 12—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when determining bail for a primary carer—

‘(1) Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

“(10) Where a court determines whether to grant bail in criminal proceedings to a person to whom this section applies who is a primary carer for a child or pregnant, the court must—

(a) consider the impact of not granting bail on the child or unborn child; and

(b) presume (subject to victim impact or other relevant considerations) that it is in the best interests of the child or unborn child for bail to be granted.

(11) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause would impose a requirement for the judge to consider the impact of not granting bail on a child when determining, in criminal proceedings, whether to grant bail to a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 13—Data collection in relation to prisoners who are primary carers—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish annual data identifying—

(a) how many prisoners are the primary carers of a child,

(b) how many children have a primary carer in custody, and

(c) the ages of those children.

(2) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial

care responsibilities for a child.’

This new clause would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the number of prisoners who are the primary carers of a child and the number of children who have a primary carer in custody.

New clause 17—Maximum sentences for causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death—

‘(1) Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (7), for “a term not exceeding 14 years” substitute “life”, and

(b) in subsection (8), for “10” substitute “14”.

(2) Schedule 19 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended by the insertion of the following after paragraph 20—

“Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004

20A An offence to which section 5(7) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies.”’

This new clause seeks to increase sentencing levels under section 5 of the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death) by raising the death offence to life imprisonment, and the “serious injury” offence to 14 years.

New clause 18—Custody for own protection or own welfare—

‘(1) The Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.

(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.

(3) In Part 1A of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences to which Part 1 does not apply) omit paragraph 5.

(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of non-imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.’

This new clause would repeal the power of the criminal courts to remand a defendant into custody for their own protection (or in the case of a child, for their own welfare) pending trial or sentence.

New clause 19—Justice impact assessment for Wales—

‘(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or regulations made under this Act, which impacts on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.

(2) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the date on which they are made, issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue an assessment of the impact of the Bill on devolved policy and services in Wales within six months of it passing, and to issue such an assessment of any further changes to regulations under the Bill within one month of making them.

New clause 20—Failing to stop or report accidents involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury—

‘(1) After subsection 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, insert—

“(4A) A person who fails to comply with subsections 170(2) or 170(3) when he knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, is guilty of an offence.”

(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts), after the entry relating to an offence under RTA subsection 170(4), insert the following—

[Ms Harman]

New clause 3 would deal with a problem that the Government have acknowledged: that on the question of rape, the justice system lets women down and lets men off the hook. There are many problems that contribute to that, but one that the Government have rightly identified is that the process focuses on the complainant rather than on the defendant. The investigation becomes an investigation of the complainant—her mobile phone, what she was doing, her attitudes—and not of the suspect. The trial becomes the trial of the complainant, not of the defendant, in one very material way: the use by the defendant of the complainant’s previous sexual history by bringing it into evidence.

It has been acknowledged since as long ago as 1999 that the complainant’s previous sexual history is not the issue, and it is wrong for the defendant to try to use it to deter her from supporting a prosecution for fear that all her dirty washing will be washed in public, in open court, or that it will undermine her standing and credibility in the eyes of the jury. That was supposed to be outlawed in 1999, but it has become clear that a loophole was left when we changed the law.

In a third of all rape cases now, one way or another, the defendant brings into court the complainant’s previous sexual history. When the Victims’ Commissioner was a police and crime commissioner, she conducted research that showed that in one third of rape trials observed, the previous sexual history of the complainant was brought into evidence. That research is backed up by work done by the Criminal Bar Association.

The Victims’ Commissioner gives the example of a complainant who had her parents in court to support her. They did not know that she had had an abortion, but the defendant brought that into evidence in order to undermine her and throw off her ability to give her evidence—there were her parents, sitting in court, and they did not even know that she had had an abortion. Another report was of a case in which the jury were told, “This is a woman who has had adulterous affairs,” thereby trying to undermine her. Of course, that is not relevant to the issue of whether or not a rape has been committed, so we need to tighten up the law.

I have drafted a perfectly good, watertight clause to tighten up the law so that where the question of previous sexual history is relevant, especially if it is with the same partner in respect of whom the rape is alleged, it is allowed in evidence with the permission of the judge, but where it is not relevant, it is not. However, our Front Bench and the Government in their rape review have said that they are minded to send it to the Law Commission to look at. I would have preferred the Government to legislate in the Bill, which is after all the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, but they have decided not to do that; they say that they will refer to the Law Commission the whole question of the focus on the complainant, so I make two requests in that respect.

First, I think that the Law Commission should sit with an independent reference group. I have a great deal of respect for the Law Commission, but quite frankly we cannot leave it to get on with it on its own. We need an expert, independent reference group that is steeped in understanding of the issue and that can help the Law Commission. I suggest that Rape Crisis England & Wales should be on that group, and so should the Victims’ Commissioner.

My second request is that there should be a time limit on the Law Commission’s work. The Law Commission goes into things very deeply, but we do not want this to go on and on for years—it has been a problem for years, so we do not want it to go into the long grass with a never-ending Law Commission investigation. We want the findings to be ready for when the Government are thinking of bringing forward their victims Bill, which they will consult on shortly and which arises out of the violence against women and girls consultation. If we are not going to accept this today, and the Government are not, let us have the Law Commission looking at it, with an independent reference group and with a time limit. Then, the Government will have done more than just apologise to rape victims for justice not being done; they will make sure that in future justice is done.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We now go to the Chair of the Justice Committee, Sir Robert Neill, and the four-minute time limit comes into force for Back Benchers at this point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Buckland]

The hon. Lady would be interested to see the note that I have here—it says, “Remember the families.” I am grateful to her for reminding me of that, and, of course, I will undertake to put a suitably phrased letter in the Library of the House. I hope that assures hon. Members that I am taking the necessary steps. I absolutely recognise the importance of those concerns.

I listened with care to the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), who charted her own deeply distressing recent experience of when a photograph was entirely inappropriately taken of her without her consent and in circumstances that all of us would deeply deprecate and deplore. We all want to do something about this, which is why, some time ago, we asked the Law Commission to review the law around the taking, making and sharing of intimate images without consent to identify whether there are gaps in the scope of protection that is already offered to victims.

Importantly, we and the Law Commission are looking at whether recording and sharing images of events such as breastfeeding should be captured as intimate imagery for the purposes of any reformed criminal law. It has completed a public consultation and is developing final recommendations for the Government. It is certainly my intention to act. I want to make sure that the law is resilient and comprehensive and that, when it is drafted, we do not inadvertently create loopholes that people could take advantage of. I gently remind the hon. Lady that the public nuisance reforms are precisely those of the Law Commission, and it is in that tradition of careful consideration that we have already undertaken and started this work.

I am grateful to all hon. Members for their continued dedication to improving the way in which the system handles sexual offences cases, and that dedication is clearly behind the amendments concerning the use of evidence, including section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. However, we have to remind ourselves that section 41 already provides a very comprehensive prohibition on the defence adducing any evidence or any questions relating to previous sexual behaviour. The hon. Lady is right to refer to our undertaking in the rape review action plan to ask the Law Commission to examine the law, guidance and practice relating to the use of evidence in prosecutions. The Law Commission will be very happy to meet the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) about her concerns to take on board the proper observations she makes. Let us not forget that the wider issue about rape myths will also be part of its work.

On the issue of penalties for those who disclose the identity of anonymous complainants, I think we can go one better. There are a number of other offences—modern-day slavery and female genital mutilation come to mind—where anonymity is a legal requirement. When we redraft the legislation, it is essential that we cover all offences where anonymity is a requirement and also assess the interplay between the criminal offence and contempt of court. As a Law Officer, I police that particular divide regularly. Clearly, the Law Officers already have the power to pursue wrongdoers for contempt of court where serious wrongdoing has been evidenced. I am grateful that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General has invited the Law Commission to undertake a thorough review of the law in this area with a view to strengthening it so as to meet the ambitions of all of us in this House.

I am grateful, as ever, to the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) for her steadfast and consistent work in the support of victims. We already, through the victims code, have a number of entitlements relating to parole. A root-and-branch review of the Parole Board is ongoing. The observations and concerns that she has outlined are being fully embraced by that, and further work will be done on victims law.

On pet theft, it is vital that the underlying seriousness of this type of criminality is fully reflected by the law. That is why, since its launch on 8 May, the pet theft taskforce has been working to look at the wider issues. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his work on this. As a pet owner myself, I understand the depth of feeling that exists. I am able to say in the strongest terms that we will act to drive out this pernicious crime. His new clauses address some of the issues at the heart of where we will take action. I give him, and others, the assurance that it is our intention to make any necessary changes to this Bill in the Lords before it returns to the Commons once we have finalised the detail of exactly what is needed, using a range of powers, including primary legislation. The effect of these changes will, I believe, help to achieve what he and other hon. and right hon. Members are seeking to achieve today.

On road traffic, I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for North Cornwall (Scott Mann) and for Truro and Falmouth (Cherilyn Mackrory), who are working hard to raise awareness about these important issues. I can assure them, and the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), that my ministerial colleagues at the Department for Transport are working to explore options with my officials about how these offences will work in the wider context. I take on board the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) about the particular context in which people seek to evade the law and evade responsibility. While we have the common law offence of perverting the course of justice available, more work needs to be done to identify that class of driver who manipulates the system and evades responsibility in a way that clearly outrages the community and offends the wider public.

On the matters raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), we both share a passion for the issue, and I have been proud to spearhead reforms on child cruelty in the past. I will work with him and, as he knows, we are looking at the issue more widely. Indeed, we hope to bring concrete reform forward as soon as possible.

As time reaches the witching hour, I simply say that tonight is an opportunity for hon. Members to unite in common cause to strengthen the fight against crime and to make our communities safer. The opportunity is there. The gauntlet is laid down to Labour Members. I ask them to take it up.

[Ms Harman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.