Robert Neill
Main Page: Robert Neill (Conservative - Bromley and Chislehurst)Department Debates - View all Robert Neill's debates with the Cabinet Office
Northern Ireland Protocol Bill
Robert Neill ExcerptsWednesday 13th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Northern Ireland Protocol Bill 2022-23 View all Northern Ireland Protocol Bill 2022-23 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 13 July 2022 - (13 Jul 2022)
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“(za) comes into effect only in accordance with section 26(2A) to (2D);”.
This amendment is linked to Amendment 2 to clause 26, which would require parliamentary approval for bringing into force any provisions of this Act.
The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 26, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“(za) requires Ministers of the Crown to set out a legal justification for altering the effect of the Northern Ireland Protocol in domestic law”
This is a paving amendment for NC8.
Amendment 31, page 1, line 4, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b).
Amendment 32, page 1, line 14, leave out from “Protocol” to end of line 15.
Amendment 5, page 1, line 15, at end insert—
“(e) provides powers to Ministers of the Crown that may be exercised only after good faith negotiations with the EU (through the mechanisms provided for in the Northern Ireland Protocol) have been exhausted and only with the approval of both Houses of Parliament and, where relevant, the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”
This amendment would give primacy to a negotiated outcome between the UK and the EU and reflect the consent required by both Houses of Parliament and, where relevant, the Northern Ireland Assembly for powers conferred by the Act to be exercised.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 25, in clause 2, page 1, line 17, at end insert—
“(A1) This section is subject to section (Limitation of general implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol: approval of Northern Ireland Assembly).”
This paving amendment is linked to NC7.
Clause 2 stand part.
Clause 3 stand part.
Amendment 6, in clause 15, page 8, line 47, at end insert—
“(1A) In this section “necessary” means the existence of a situation of grave and imminent peril that relates to one or more of the permitted purposes.”
This amendment defines the standard against which a Minister can exercise powers conferred by clause 15.
Amendment 14, page 8, line 47, at end insert—
“(1A) In this section “unpermitted consequence” means an outcome that would constitute a risk to or detrimental on—
(a) Strand Two of the Belfast Agreement including the North-South Ministerial Council, cooperation and action under the Council or consultation and agreements in all its formats, areas of cooperation and agreed implementation bodies;
(b) Strand Three of the Belfast Agreement, the British-Irish Council and cooperation, common policies or common actions on matters of mutual interest for relevant administrations including on issues, and in ways, referenced in that section of the Agreement;
(c) the single electricity market;
(d) Northern Ireland‘s access to the EU Single Market to the fullest extent permitted by the Protocol;
(e) continuing opportunities for institutions, economic operators and civic interests in Northern Ireland to access and participate in EU programmes and frameworks as permitted under and/or alongside the Protocol;
(f) Northern Ireland‘s access to trade deals between the EU and third countries to the fullest extent permitted by the Protocol;
(g) the productivity of businesses in Northern Ireland and the competitive marketability of goods produced there (through costs or complications associated with possible dual route regulatory compliances).”
This amendment provides that a Minister cannot exercise powers for the permitted purposes in Clause 15 in terms that could entail harmful impact on dimensions of the Good Friday Agreement and/or economic interests of Northern Ireland.
Amendment 27, page 8, line 47, at end insert—
“(1A) But subsection (1) is subject to section (Excluded provision: Parliamentary approval).”
This is a paving amendment for NC9.
Amendment 7, page 9, line 8, after “if” insert
“it does not cause one or more unpermitted consequence and if”.
Amendment 8, page 9, line 15, at end insert—
“(d) Article 18 (Democratic Consent in Northern Ireland)”.
This amendment adds Article 18 (Democratic Consent in Northern Ireland) of the Northern Ireland Protocol to the list of articles that a Minister of the Crown cannot exercise powers conferred by subsection (2) to provide cease to have effect in the United Kingdom to any extent.
Amendment 9, page 9, line 15, at end insert—
“(3A) A Minister of the Crown may not exercise the power conferred by subsection (2) until and unless the Minister has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out the Minister of the Crown’s assessment of the necessity to exercise the power for, or in connection with, one or more of the permitted purposes and to state the one or more permitted purposes in question.”
This amendment places a reporting obligation on a Minister exercising powers conferred by section 15 to detail an assessment of why the regulations are necessary and to state the permitted purpose(s) relevant to that assessment.
Amendment 10, page 9, line 15, at end insert—
“(3A) A Minister of the Crown may not exercise the power conferred by subsection (2) before full consultation on proposed changes with, in particular—
(a) the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission,
(b) the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland,
(c) the Committee of representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Northern Ireland and Ireland, and
(d) persons whom the Minister considers appropriate as representatives of business, trade, economic interests and civic groups.”
Clause 15 stand part.
Amendment 40, in clause 16, page 9, line 19, leave out “the Minister considers appropriate” and insert “is necessary”.
This amendment changes the threshold for giving a Minister power to make regulations under this Clause. The threshold is amended to make it objective rather than subjective.
Clause 16 stand part.
New clause 1—Maintaining levels of environmental protection—
“(1) A Minister of the Crown must, before exercising the powers conferred by this Act, make a statement to the effect that in the Minister of the Crown’s view the exercise of the powers would not to any extent have the effect of reducing the level of environmental protection provided for by any existing environmental law.
(2) The Minister of the Crown must seek the views of the Office for Environmental Protection before making a statement under this section.
(3) Any statement under this section must be published in such manner as the Minister of the Crown considers appropriate
(4) The Minister of the Crown must lay a copy of any statement under this section before each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would ensure that the powers proposed to be conferred by this Bill could be exercised only if in the relevant Minister’s view this would not undermine existing levels of environmental protection.
New clause 2—Environmental principles—
“No regulations may be made under this Act unless—
(a) a policy statement on environmental principles has been laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly under paragraph 7(6) of Schedule 2 to the Environment Act 2021, and
(b) paragraph 8 of Schedule 2 to the Environment Act 2021 is in force.”
This new clause would prevent the exercise of any powers proposed to be granted by the Bill until the Department’s policy statement on environmental principles has been finalised and Departments and Ministers are under a statutory duty to have due regard to it.
New clause 3—Meaning of “environmental protection”—
“In this Act “environmental protection” means any of the following—
(a) protection of the natural environment from the effects of human activity;
(b) protection of people from the effects of human activity on the environment;
(c) maintenance, restoration or enhancement of the natural environment;
(d) monitoring, assessing, considering, advising or reporting on anything in paragraphs (a) to (c).”
New clause 7—Limitation of general implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol: approval of Northern Ireland Assembly—
“Section 2 of this Act has no effect unless it has been approved by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”
This new clause would require the approval of the Northern Ireland Assembly before this Act could be used to limit the general implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol.
New clause 8—Publication of legal advice—
“(1) The Prime Minister must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the legal advice considered by the Government in respect to this Act which it received before the day of the First Reading in the House of Commons of the Bill for this Act.
(2) The Attorney General must lay before each House of Parliament the assessment made by Her Majesty’s Government of the doctrine of necessity in relation to the operation of the Northern Ireland Protocol prior to the First Reading in the House of Commons of the Bill for this Act.
(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before each House of Parliament a report on to what extent the Bill for this Act was in accordance with Lord Chancellor‘s constitutional role in relation to the constitutional principle of the rule of law.”
This new clause requires the publication of the legal justification for the Bill for this Act.
New clause 9—Excluded provision: Parliamentary approval—
“(1) A Minister of the Crown may not make regulations that either bring into force any provision of this Act that makes any provision of the Protocol (or any related provision of the Withdrawal Agreement) excluded provision, or that make any such provision excluded provision, unless all three conditions in this section are met.
(2) The first condition in this section is that a Minister of the Crown has laid a statement before both Houses of Parliament setting out reasons—
(a) why, if no safeguard measures under Article 16 of the Protocol have been taken by the United Kingdom, the Minister of the Crown considers it appropriate to exclude a provision or provisions at that time rather than to do so only after the United Kingdom has taken such safeguard measures; and
(b) why and how, in the view of the Minister of the Crown, making the regulations is consistent with the international obligations of the United Kingdom.
(3) The second condition in this section is that the House of Commons has resolved, on a motion moved by a Minister of the Crown, to take note of the statement under subsection (2).
(4) The third condition in this section is that a motion for the House of Lords to take note of that statement has been tabled in the House of Lords by a Minister of the Crown and—
(a) the House of Lords has debated the motion, or
(b) the House of Lords has not concluded a debate on the motion before the end of the period of five Lords sitting days beginning with the first Lords sitting day after the day on which the House of Commons passes the resolution mentioned in paragraph (a).”
This new clause would, except where the government had already adopted safeguard measures under Article 16, require Ministers to make a statement to the House as to why they thought it appropriate and lawful to treat provisions of the Northern Ireland Protocol or any related provision of the EU Withdrawal Agreement as excluded provisions; and to require a House of Commons vote, and a debate in the House of Lords, before those excluded provisions could be brought into force.
New clause 10—Condition prior to limitation of the Northern Ireland Protocol—
“(1) This section sets out the condition which must be satisfied before a provision of—
(a) the Northern Ireland Protocol, or
(b) any other part of the EU withdrawal agreement,
is excluded provision.
(2) The condition must be either—
(a) the agreement condition (see subsection (3)), or
(b) the Article 16 condition (see subsection (4)).
(3) The agreement condition is that the United Kingdom and the EU have agreed following negotiations that the provision is excluded provision.
(4) The Article 16 condition is that—
(a) the United Kingdom is unilaterally taking appropriate safeguard measures, in accordance with Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol,
(b) before taking those measures, the United Kingdom has followed the procedure set out in Annex 7 to the Protocol (which governs the taking of safeguard measures), and
(c) the safeguard measures being taken necessarily require that the provision is excluded provision.
(5) Where the condition is no longer satisfied, then the provision ceases to be excluded provision, and as a consequence any regulations made dealing with excluded provision lapse to the extent that they relate to provision which is no longer excluded provision.
(6) For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Act remain subject to section 7A(2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, save where a provision of—
(a) the Northern Ireland Protocol, or
(b) any other part of the EU withdrawal agreement,
is excluded provision which has satisfied the requirements set out in this section.”
This new clause is intended to prevent Ministers from deviating from the international agreement that is the NI Protocol unless this has either been agreed to between the UK and the EU, or the UK have followed the procedure set out in Article 16 of the Protocol for unilaterally taking safeguard measures.
Sir Robert Neill
Amendments 1 and 2, the latter of which amends clause 26, relate to the commencement and operationalisation of the provisions in the Bill. I have drafted them in this way because of the nature of the Bill itself. We will come to amendment 2 on day three, but amendment 1 paves the way for it, so it may be convenient if I set out the thinking behind both amendments.
As was debated at some length on Second Reading—I will not repeat everything that was said—this is an unusual and rather exceptional Bill, and not necessarily in a good way. If fully brought into effect, the Bill would lead to the United Kingdom departing unilaterally from an international agreement and therefore breaking its obligations under both customary international law and the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, which is a grave and profound step for any Government to take.
I recognise that there are circumstances in which that step can be taken, and the Government asserted on Second Reading that the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol gives rise, or potentially gives rise, to those circumstances. The essence of it, though, depends on applying a factual evidence base to a legal test. The legal test in this case is essentially the international customary law convention of necessity, which is now enshrined in article 25 of the articles on state responsibility, which were adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 and are recognised by the UN General Assembly, by our Government and by the international community as an authoritative statement of the law. Article 25 sets out that necessity may be invoked if certain tests are met. The point of these amendments is to say that if the Government, or any Government, were to take that step, they should do so upon the most compelling grounds, so that the factual basis for their actions met the legal test. The reputational consequences, politically, internationally and legally, are very significant, so this should be done only when that is thoroughly tested and set before this House to be tested.
Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)
My hon. Friend is referring to certain tests of a reputational character, so I would be grateful if he would tell the Committee what those tests are right now.
Sir Robert Neill
I will be happy to talk about the essential tests of necessity, which are well recognised and well set out, as my hon. Friend knows. But the principle behind the amendment, which I will then go into the detail of, is precisely to say, “If you are invoking that doctrine, a most unusual thing to do, you ought to come to the House and set out the basis upon which you seek to do so.” The House would then have the chance to say whether or not we were prepared, on the basis of what the Government had put before us, to take the very exceptional step of putting ourselves in breach of a treaty obligation. That is the point.
Sammy Wilson
On the question of necessity, does the hon. Gentleman accept, first, that we have dysfunctional government in Northern Ireland, and that the terms of the Belfast agreement have totally broken down and some have been removed? Secondly, does he accept that that has been brought about as a result not of actions by this Government, but by the protocol, the actions of the EU and the way in which it has insisted that it be applied? Thirdly, does he accept that the EU has not even tried to remedy this, because it has refused to negotiate, so necessity has been proved?
Sir Robert Neill
Let me return to that once I have set out the tests, because that is one issue that, with respect to the right hon. Gentleman—I do have much respect for him—the House ought to consider on the factual basis that is set before it. The first test is that departing from the treaty is the only means available to the state party
“to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril”.
I quote from the case law and the text of the convention. Let us just break that down. On “an essential interest”, it might be that the Government could, at some point, make a case to say that the disruption in Northern Ireland, be it economic, societal or political, gets to a stage where it could threaten an essential interest of the UK. I concede that, but I have not, as yet, seen the evidence to justify that.
Sir Robert Neill
Forgive me, but my hon. Friend asked me to set out the tests and I am doing so. The second test is the necessity to safeguard an essential interest against a “grave and imminent peril”. The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has helpfully provided a briefing, setting out that that imports something that very grave indeed—it is a high test—with a degree of urgency to the matter. A possible, contingent or proximate risk does not come within the test of being a “grave and imminent peril”, and that is a risk with the way in which the Bill is drafted at the moment. Again, evidence might be produced to show that it does apply, and the Government might be able to make their case—they ought to do so.
Sir Robert Neill
May I set out the tests, as I was asked to?
The Government need to show that this is also the only means whereby they can safeguard the interest in question. The difficulty they potentially have there is that article 13 of the protocol makes provision for a renegotiation, which most of us would think is the right route to solve these problems, and that in the event of emergency measures, which one might think might be closer to meeting the test of an “imminent peril”, we would then use the unilateral safeguarding provisions under article 16. It might be difficult to argue that necessity is met if we have not attempted and cannot demonstrate that we have attempted those routes first, before moving unilaterally to breaching the protocol.
Robin Millar
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point about necessity, and one that has exercised my mind. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal said that the Acts of Union had been “subjugated” by the protocol. Therefore, what gravity and what imperative does he attach to such an existential threat to the Union?
Sir Robert Neill
It does not avail us in relation to the international law test, and the difficulty with this Bill is that it is seeking to disapply parts of the protocol in domestic law, but in a way that breaches an international obligation. In any event, could it be said that all available means had been taken to rectify that potential difficulty? That comes back to my point that the Government—any Government—should have to come to the House and set that out.
Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
I admire the elegant way in which my hon. Friend has set out the three tests. However, the Joint Committee has been working at this for a long time and it has failed to make progress. At what stage, and in what circumstances, does he envisage that we could proceed on the basis of the provision we are debating at the moment? It seems to me that we have exhausted the possibilities and we are in the position of having to do this now to defend the Good Friday agreement. So why on earth is it necessary to have an amendment that would put another hurdle in the way of Ministers’ trying to resolve this?
Sir Robert Neill
With respect, I do not think the amendment would put another hurdle in the way, because it would not prevent the Bill from proceeding and it would not prevent what I know my right hon. Friend wants to see, which is a negotiated settlement. By far the best thing, which everyone in this Committee wants, is for the protocol to be renegotiated. I concede at once that the protocol is not working properly or as it was intended. I also readily concede that part of that is due to a rather intransigent stance taken by the European Commission and its refusal, for example, to give greater flexibility to Vice-President Šefčovič in his negotiating mandate. This is not an issue where all the fault is on one side at all. The EU has not acted wisely or helpfully in these matters, but that is not the same as saying that the international law test is therefore automatically made out as of now.
Sir William Cash
I think that would be fine at this stage. My hon. Friend refers to “grave and imminent peril”. Does he not agree that at the heart of this entire problem lies the issue of the democratic deficit? I will not go into it now, but I will explain later that I think this is about the manner in which legislation is pouring into Northern Ireland from every side, like a tsunami, as we said in our European Scrutiny Committee report; we talked about starting with a small number of cars and turning into a motorway. The bottom line is that that is a grave and imminent peril, because of the constant and perpetual legislation, week in, week out, with no time or opportunity for people in Northern Ireland to say anything at any time.
Sir Robert Neill
The difficulty that my hon. Friend has is that that is an assertion. I am not sure that, as yet, we have had set out to the House the evidence base that the Government say they have and are working on. I referred the Foreign Secretary to that point on Second Reading, asking when we would see the evidence base that will set out the Government’s case and their reasoning.
Jesse Norman (Hereford and South Herefordshire) (Con)
My hon. Friend will recall that the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) raised the issue of the necessity standard applying in a context where a state has not contributed to that state of necessity. Does he feel that that provision has been activated or in some sense triggered by the present situation?
Sir Robert Neill
That is, of course, the fourth limb of the five-limb tests—that an essential interest of the EU member states should not be imperilled. I have to say that I do not think an essential interest is imperilled by this Bill, because it is clear that the risk of leakage into the EU single market has been minimal, even with the way the protocol is operating—or partially operating—now. That is probably the strongest ground that the Government have. But there is then the argument as to whether the party that invokes the doctrine of necessity has in some way contributed to the situation. I think that is more finely balanced, in fairness. I have seen the briefing from the Bingham Centre that suggests that that test is not met either. I am more prepared to give the Government some slack in that regard, but we need the evidence for that as well. After all, at the end of the day, the Government agreed the protocol—not long ago, in 2020—and did so on the basis of intending to operate it in good faith. That, of course, is a rather important reputation that this country has. My right hon. Friend is right to flag up those stages, but even before we get to them, I am not at all sure that we yet have the evidence before the House to justify the provision.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the knowledge and experience that he brings to the House, which we all very much appreciate. Does he agree with me, and probably others on the Opposition Benches, that Northern Ireland has been used as a bartering tool between the EU and the UK in trying to sort out some of the problems? Examples include whenever the vaccine was stopped for us and was then made available, all the tariffs, and regulations and red tape. All those things show that the process quite clearly is not working. Northern Ireland does not want to be a bartering tool between the UK and the EU; we want to be part of the UK. Does the hon. Gentleman understand why these issues are so important to us? I think he does, but I would like to hear his opinion.
Sir Robert Neill
I do understand that, which is why I have made it clear from the beginning that I am as much in favour of changes to the protocol as anyone else. Of course, the protocol had provisions written into it to enable those changes to take place, and that is what we would all want to see.
Let us be blunt: there will be a change of Prime Minister soon, and a change of personnel under those circumstances may—I hope it does—make negotiations easier. There has been a degree of strain in relations with the EU and the heads of some major Governments in the European Union. I very much hope that one consequence of what has happened is that it may be easier to rebuild and repair relationships and trust, and that could lead to a negotiated change, which would mean that this legislation was never necessary. Nobody would be more delighted than I—or, I suspect, anyone else in this House, including those on the Treasury Bench—if that were to be the case, but if the Bill is taken forward, we need proper safeguards to ensure proper parliamentary and democratic oversight of the way it is taken into force.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful speech. Of course, Henry VIII only had six wives; this Bill has 19 delegated powers within 26 clauses. Does he agree that if we set a precedent that such legislation could be written here, it may be tempting for some Ministers to expand that precedent to other forms of legislation, so it is important that we confine whenever delegated powers are used—not just in this legislation, but to ensure that we uphold the primacy of this Chamber?
Sir Robert Neill
The hon. Lady makes a fair point. Those of us who have served as Ministers know that, frankly, all Governments use Henry VIII powers. We all tend to criticise them when we are in opposition and use them a bit when we are in government, if the truth be known. But the reality is that there are Henry VIII powers and Henry VIII powers; and this is Henry VIII, the six wives, Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell all thrown in together, as far as I can see. The powers are almost Shakespearean or Wagnerian in their scope and breadth. That is the problem, and it is why we need some greater hold on how they are used.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) raised another important point. Very wide Henry VIII powers have been criticised by the Hansard Society and in the other place—and for good reason, because part of the whole objective of what we have done is recent years has been to restore parliamentary sovereignty. The danger is that that becomes restoring power to the Executive, rather than to Parliament. I say to my hon. Friends on the Conservative Benches, we all know that Governments come and go, and once we set a precedent that gives sweeping powers to a Government with whom we may happen to agree, inevitably—as night follows day—there will be a day when a Government with whom we do not agree come in and use those powers in a way to which we might wish to object; it is better not to set too wide a precedent, anyway.
There is another difficulty with the powers. Clause 15 gives Ministers powers to add to excluded provisions. Not only is that extremely wide, but the clause refers to excluded provisions for “a permitted purpose”, without any further definition. In other respects, there is a test where the Minister may take any such measures in relation to the protocol as the Minister “considers appropriate”. That is an extraordinarily low test. Essentially, it lacks any kind of objectivity; it is a purely subjective test. Giving Ministers delegated powers to act in a purely subjective manner without requiring them to demonstrate the evidential basis on which they exercise those powers is a dangerous and difficult precedent to set.
In fairness, this Bill could not have been foreseen, but therefore could not be put in my party’s manifesto for the general election. It will be interesting to see—I know Ministers are well aware of this point—precisely what view the other place, which is anxious to examine the extent of delegated powers, takes on the matter. It might therefore be in the Government’s interest to progress the Bill to think about ways in which we can get a better balance, and ensure that there is a proper and proportionate hold on the powers.
I have covered the essence of what I needed to say. It comes down to whether the Government have a case—without going into the rest of the legal argument, I concede that they might be able to make that case—and whether that case might have grounds in law. I would say to my clients in the old days, “Just because it’s lawful doesn’t mean it’s a wise thing to do; just because you’ve got a case that you might argue, it might not necessarily be a good idea for you to go and argue it.” Sometimes litigation is best avoided and sometimes sweeping legislation is best avoided, if it is possible to find a better route.
It seems to me that if need be, it would not be unreasonable for the Government to come back to the House and make their case in relation to the specific items where they seek to disapply an international treaty. If they have a good enough case, the House will support them and they can get on with it; it can be done quickly and need not cause undue delay. That would at least ensure that we have acted within a reasonable and proportionate legal framework. At the same time, we could demonstrate that we are seeking, in good faith, to renegotiate. If we cannot do that, I suggest it would be prudent at the very least to invoke the article 16 safeguard provisions, either before or perhaps in parallel with those matters; we could show again that we have acted in good faith to do all that we could within the framework that exists, which is one of the important parts of a necessity test.
I hope that the Government will take on board those arguments, because they are pretty fundamental to the Bill itself and would not obstruct the objectives of the Bill—that is, getting the protocol changed or getting devolved government working in Northern Ireland, both of which we wish to see—but would enable them in a proportionate and constitutionally sound manner.
Several hon. Members rose—
Sir Robert Neill
I respect what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. He referred to the importance of an objective test. Does he agree that that may not be enough for proper parliamentary scrutiny, which we must have for the regulations, and that before the Bill completes its passage in this House, the Government ought to produce the evidence base that might support the ground that he asserts—that the necessity test is met? That might make it easier for many people to accept the provisions of the Bill, rather than giving a blank cheque, which is the concern, as I am sure he will understand. That might make the passage of the Bill through the other place easier, because at the moment enactment could be a long way off. If the situation in Northern Ireland is so grave, would we wait until enactment or some other measure?
Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson
Of course that is a matter for the Government, but I am all in favour of proper scrutiny of this Bill. That is why we welcome the fact that the Committee stage will take place over three days on the Floor of the House. I commend the Government for the way in which they have handled this. They are not running away from scrutiny. I invite the hon. Member to come to Northern Ireland, when he has time, and I will gladly introduce him to the businesses that are being harmed by the protocol. He can meet consumers who find real difficulties in purchasing goods from businesses in Great Britain. Indeed, some businesses in Great Britain—many of them, now in the hundreds—have decided no longer to trade with Northern Ireland, because it is all too difficult.
Michael Ellis
I will give way in due course, if I may, because I will come on to the specific amendments, and it might be more prudent to give way at those points to the individual Members.
Clause 16 supports the functioning of the Bill by granting the power to make new arrangements in any cases where it becomes necessary to use the powers contained in clause 15. That means that new law can be made via regulations, if appropriate to do so, in relation to any element of the protocol or withdrawal agreement that has become excluded provision as provided for in the regulations made under clause 15. Clause 16 is vital to ensure the functioning of the Bill and prevent any gaps in the arrangements established underneath it. Without it, there is a risk of not being able to address properly any new issues arising from protocol provisions.
I thank Members for their contributions. The Government are committed to ensuring that the Bill goes through the appropriate scrutiny, with 18 hours set aside before the summer recess, while balancing the need for urgent action to ensure that protocol issues are rectified as soon as possible. Amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), amends clause 1 and paves the way for his amendment to clause 26, which we will debate next week and which reflects a desire for Parliament to approve in a vote the provisions in this Bill before they can be commenced. I am cognisant of the fact that it was not two years ago that he famously introduced a similar amendment to another Bill, of which the Government broadly accepted the substance. However, the situation is not the same as it was two years ago.
Now, we face an urgent and grave situation in Northern Ireland, not a hypothetical one. We know that, as it stands, the EU is not prepared to change the protocol to resolve the problems we face—we have tried that repeatedly—and that there is no prospect of seeing a power-sharing Government restored in Northern Ireland if we are unable to tackle those problems. It is a simple fact. We need to be able to move swiftly, using the powers in the Bill to deliver the changes we propose and enable the protocol to operate sustainably.
Sir Robert Neill
I understand what my right hon. and learned Friend is saying, and I am grateful to him. However, if there is a need to act urgently, it is likely to be many months before the Bill completes its parliamentary passage. With respect, that is a contradiction. He is actually making a compelling case for using the article 16 safeguarding procedure.
Jim Shannon
Thank you, Dame Eleanor, for the opportunity to speak for all of a minute or thereabouts.
The Bill is not perfect in any way, but it is the Bill before us. We have to support it, because it makes us as British as England, Scotland and Wales, which at the moment we are not. I am very mindful that Northern Ireland has been the football that everybody has kicked about, so it is important for us to see a Bill coming forward that gives us a chance to make a change. All my local businesses, or 99.9% of them, say that they are disadvantaged by what is in place. The fishing fraternity in Portavogie, Ardglass and Kilkeel says the same thing about tariffs, bureaucracy and red tape, and so does the farming community.
Many hon. Members have said today, mischievously, that this is about Brexit. For us, it is about being British. I want to be as British as every Member on either side of the Committee who wants to be British, but it is more important for me to see a Bill coming forward that will make that happen. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to agree to go forward and support us in Northern Ireland, because this is the way to do it.
Sir Robert Neill
This has been a most useful debate. I will not press my amendment 1 to a vote tonight, because amendment 2, which is scheduled for debate on the third day of Committee proceedings, will permit the Committee to revisit the topics if matters develop.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 26, in page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“(za) requires Ministers of the Crown to set out a legal justification for altering the effect of the Northern Ireland Protocol in domestic law”.—(Layla Moran.)
This is a paving amendment for NC8.
Question put, That the amendment be made.