Voting by Prisoners

Robert Halfon Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

Of course my hon. Friend is right. One of the points about laws in a democracy is that they exist with, at the very least, the acquiescence—the consent, we hope—of everybody in that democracy. Between 75% and 90% of the population cannot understand what we are doing even considering this proposal.

Let me go back to the compromises that have been talked about. It is not my aim to put the Government in a difficult position from which they cannot escape; the issue is whether those compromises would work. The proposals put up so far—four years, one year, six months—would not work. They would not escape the threat that we have had held over us of compensation or some other form of penalty against our taxpayers. In fact, one member of the Council of Europe, Austria, did give the vote to prisoners serving less than one year, and it then appeared in the Court and was found against.

Just how ridiculous this is became clear earlier this week, when the European Commissioner for Human Rights appeared on Radio 4. Because he had said that a blanket rule would not work, he was asked what the guideline was, and he said, “A breach of electoral law.” That would put us in the ridiculous position whereby we denied the vote to somebody who broke electoral law, in however minor a way, yet gave it to the rapist and the murderer. It is so ridiculous that I cannot believe he really meant it.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on securing this important debate. Does he agree that it is rather strange that we are being forced to do this by the European Court of Human Rights, many of whose own judges come from authoritarian regimes? Is it not time to withdraw from its jurisdiction?

[Mr Davis]

I am now going to lose the House, because I do not agree with withdrawing from the regime. I will explain why in a moment.

Let me conclude this half of my speech—I am using up too much of my time giving way—by saying that it is clear to me that our current system is appropriate, just, proportionate, simple and well understood, and we should stick with it.

The second substantive issue before us is who should decide—the European Court or these Houses of Parliament? British courts themselves are clear on the matter. They rejected the claims of Mr Hirst, the axe killer, at every stage. The High Court said in terms that this was

“plainly a matter for Parliament, not the courts”.

To those who say, “But we must obey the law”, I say that the historical task of this Parliament is to correct bad law, no matter where it comes from.

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[Mr Shepherd]

The hon. Gentleman should also remember that Lord Jowett and the Labour Cabinet were greatly anxious about another court in the English legal system. The convention was therefore very tightly drawn.

[Robert Halfon]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Shepherd]

No, as I have only three minutes and 49 seconds left.

Moving forward in time, the Hirst case caused a great deal of anxiety in this country. I do not think it the most important case, but we are using it as the means by which we ask questions about the nature of, and what has happened to, the European Court of Human Rights. I think Tyrer v. the UK is more important, because something foreign was then extended to our British legal system: the notion that the Court’s role was to use the law as a living instrument. That is in direct conflict with our common law tradition, and no one in this Parliament or this country signed up to such an important agreement. That is why we are in trouble, and that is what lay behind Lord Hoffmann’s elegant and eloquent introduction to the policy review argument of Professor Pinto-Duschinsky.

At the heart of this matter, we have to grapple with a profound point. I heard my good friend the former Lord Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary et al, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), say that their claim was that we were bringing rights home. The truth is not quite that. The statute was brought in, which I support entirely. It is important, because there could be tyranny; one vote could have given us 90 days of imprisonment without charge. Fortunately, that was defeated by this House, but that episode shows how thin our liberties lie. The question, therefore, is how do we entrench them? That was the purpose of the very subtle piece of legislation called the Human Rights Act 1998.

I believe these matters should be brought home. I think our common law judges can define the points and do that work, but there can be no entrenchment of that. That has always been the problem with the British constitution; we cannot entrench that which is good, because another Parliament can do away with it or a simple majority in this House of Commons can undermine it.

I cited one such great case—that of 90 days without charge—which was put forward as a serious proposition by a democracy and a land that believes in the rule of law. I would therefore like to give this task entirely to the British judges. That is what I see as the remedy to this situation: we bring the law back and it is decided here. We support and salute the endeavours of the Council of Europe, but this Court is a shambles as currently constructed and in the way in which it discharges its duty. I support the motion, for the reasons first argued so eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, and in the underlying struggle to maintain the common law in this country.

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[Robert Halfon]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful case. Is she aware that in 2002, Sweden had a problem with an aspect of the convention and withdrew, then later went back into it? Why cannot we do the same on this issue?

[Priti Patel]

That is a good example. We need to start exercising our rights more vigorously and standing up for Britain and Britain’s interests. This is why Parliament and the Government must stand up to the Strasbourg Court. I fundamentally believe that this Parliament should have the final say on this matter.

My constituents constantly make the point that they are outraged. They feel that the rights of criminals, as opposed to the rights of victims, are constantly discussed and put first. I was not sent to the House by the voters of Witham slavishly to nod through laws and accept every diktat that comes from Europe or the Strasbourg Court. I was elected to this House to defend the national interest, to support my constituents and to hold law-makers to account. It would be a great disservice to the British people if we were to say that the authority of this House and this Parliament is now so denuded, so irrelevant, that we are powerless to act, stand up, speak out and do the right thing in this Chamber. This is a democratic and sovereign Parliament, which has done more to promote democracy and the rule of law than any other. We should not be forced to bow down on this issue, and I urge all hon. Members to put Britain and the law-abiding majority of this country first by sending a clear and unequivocal message to Europe by supporting the motion.

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[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

We have had an interesting debate and a number of ideas have come forward from both the Front and, most notably, Back Benches. In the spirit of the invitation of the Attorney-General, who made his remarks in the middle of the debate, I think that it is incumbent on us all to come up with constructive suggestions on how we move forward. Before doing so, I want to say that the debate epitomises the age-old tension between the judiciary and the legislature. It is not something we should apologise for; frankly, it is entirely natural.

There are times when the concept that politicians make the laws and judges merely enforce them comes under severe strain, and this is one such occasion. Often, the fault lies here, with politicians, because of poor and unclear drafting of legislation. Judges will often have the difficult task of interpreting unclear provisions—I pray in aid the Criminal Justice Act 2003, for example—and will do their best to clear up the spilt milk that we politicians have left them. However, there are times when the hand of judicial activism can be seen. Nowhere is that more true, I am afraid, than in the European Court of Human Rights.

We have heard much about the original conception of fundamental rights and freedoms, and I associate myself with those remarks. What has clearly occurred is a move from a concept of the guardianship of fundamental liberty to one of pettifogging interference with the mechanisms of liberty itself.

[Robert Halfon]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Buckland]

I will not, because other hon. Members wish to speak, and I do not want to eat into their time.

In this country, the concept of human rights has become associated not with the far-sighted words of Sir Winston Churchill or the careful drafting of Lord Kilmuir, but with the rather grisly spectre of ambulance-chasing lawyers, scuttling around our prisons, encouraging inmates to think not about the right to vote, but about the prospect of compensation. We should all reflect on that; it is a sad reflection of where human rights have sunk to in the public’s perception.

We need to return to the concept of basic rights. The right to vote is not in my view a fundamental freedom of itself. It is the expression of a freedom, of a constitutional right, but it is not of itself a fundamental human right. The suffrage is age-restricted, for example; it depends on electoral registration; and it is a mechanism for expressing our freedom, not the very freedom itself. That is where I am afraid the hon. Member for Solihull (Lorely Burt) gets it wrong. There is a distinction to be made, but it is a distinction that the European Court has blurred—and blurred dangerously through its majority decision in the case of Hirst.

I said that the right to vote is an ancillary to freedom, and equally the loss of the right to vote by a prisoner is an ancillary consequence of incarceration. The punishment is the deprivation of the fundamental freedom that is liberty; one consequence is the loss of the right to vote. They go hand in hand, and the eloquent words of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) cannot be improved on. Much has been said about the misnomer of a “blanket ban”, and that point needs to be reinforced.

I should like to make a suggestion, which I think my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) presaged, but whom I forgive. It is an observation based on the majority decision in the Hirst case. The criteria that troubled the majority there were the nature or gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances. We should move away from worrying about the length of the sentence and look at where we deal with the case. We deal with our most serious cases in the Crown court, and there should be a presumption of the loss of the right to vote for all defendants who are dealt with in that higher court.

We could observe the reverse to be true in the lower or magistrates court. I am reluctant to support the concept of judicial discretion, which brings judges into the political sphere and leads to an effective reduction in the loss of the right to vote. For all those reasons, I support the motion.

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[Mr Raab]

In the year 888, he was translating “The Consolation of Philosophy” from Latin and he asked a basic existential question: are we determined by fate or do we possess free will? He answered in favour of free will. When he translated the Latin word “libertas”, he used the word “freedom”—“free” as in free from bondage, and “dom”, for which we would now say “deem”, meaning “conscious” of being free. Freedom was linked to free will and the basic idea that we take responsibility for our actions. That is how the word “freedom” entered our language in the first place, and it is what today’s debate is about.

If a person commits a serious enough crime to be sent to prison, they forfeit the right to vote, along with their liberty, for the limited period of their incarceration. We have come a long way since the year 888, but our tradition of liberty sustains the basic idea that with freedom comes responsibility. When the European convention on human rights was negotiated in 1949, that remained a guiding principle, so when the French proposed including a right to vote it was rejected because the draft contained the words “universal suffrage”. The British delegate, Sir Oscar Dowson, a former Home Office legal adviser, stated:

“In no State is the right to vote enjoyed even by citizens without qualifications. The qualifications required differ from State to State…And it is our view that the variety of circumstances to be considered may justify the imposition of a variety of qualifications, as a condition of the exercise of suffrage”.

[Robert Halfon]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for his important point. Does he agree that the founders of the European convention on human rights, who did what they did because of what had happened in world war two, would never have wanted to give Rudolf Hess and Albert Speer the vote?

[Mr Raab]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, and of course he is absolutely right.

The context of Sir Oscar Dowson’s comments is that when the convention was negotiated Britain barred peers, felons and the insane from voting. The British argument was accepted and the French proposal withdrawn, and when the right to vote reappeared in the protocol, not the convention, two years later, the words “universal suffrage” had been deleted. There can be absolutely no doubt that the protocol was explicitly designed to allow states to ban prisoner voting and impose other restrictions. As a matter of international law and a basic canon of treaty interpretation, Strasbourg should have taken that into account if there were any doubt, but it failed to do so. In doing so, it undermined international law.

Of course, that was not a one-off case. From the time of the Tyrer case against Britain in 1978, Strasbourg started referring to the European convention as a “living instrument”. The Court said that its job was not just to interpret and apply convention rights but to expand and update them. The judges assumed the powers of legislators, without any mandate or any basis in the convention, and in defiance of international law and the basic democratic principle that states are bound by the international obligations to which they freely sign up.

From then on, in the UK alone, Strasbourg rewrote the law of negligence as it applies to the police in the Osman case; created novel fetters on our ability to deport criminals and terror suspects in the Chahal case and a whole series of article 8 cases since; and overturned both a British jury and the will of Parliament to dictate the rules governing how parents may discipline their children. There are many other examples. Let me be clear about this: Members may reasonably disagree on all those difficult policy and ethical questions, but all democrats must agree that they are questions to be answered by this House—by elected law makers.

One concern expressed in the debate has been about the idea of Britain defying a court, undermining the rule of law. As a public international lawyer, trained and practised, I pay close attention to that matter. However, there is another factor to consider. Impartiality and independence are the pillars of the judicial function, and they begin to crumble if judges are both interpreting and creating human rights law at the same time. That is now a far greater threat to the rule of law, the separation of powers and our basic notions of democratic accountability.

The motion is not about pandering to some populist agenda. I fully support prison reform, as other Members throughout the Chamber have said they do, including more drug rehabilitation, more training and more work in prisons. Nor is it anti-judge. Some of our most senior judges are now openly criticising Strasbourg—the Lord Chief Justice, the President of the Supreme Court and Lord Hoffmann, who until recently was our second most senior Law Lord. Lord Hoffman did so not just in the recent Policy Exchange report, but way back when he complained that Strasbourg had proved

“unable to resist the temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and to impose uniform rules on Member States. It considers itself the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States, laying down a federal law of Europe.”

That was back in 2009.

The fact is that we face a serious abuse of power—there is no other word for it. I therefore want to put this question to the House: how perverse would a Strasbourg ruling have to be before we, as British lawmakers, stood up for the national interest and our prerogatives as democratic lawmakers? If not now, on prisoner voting, when? I make this prediction: if we do not hold the line here, today, there will be worse to come—far worse—in the years ahead.

What happens if we agree to the motion? Strasbourg could rule against us and we could face compensation awards. However, the architects of the convention introduced a vital safeguard: Strasbourg cannot enforce its own judgments. The worst that can happen is that we remain on a very long list of unenforced judgments to be reviewed by the Committee of Ministers—there are about 800 such judgments at the moment. There is no risk of a fine and no power to enforce compensation, and absolutely no chance of being kicked out of the Council of Europe.

A number of compromise solutions have been mooted, and I have paid careful attention to each and every one. The problem is that giving the vote to prisoners sentenced to six months or less or a year or less is not a compromise, because it is bound to be rejected by Strasbourg. The Court made that crystal clear in the Frodl case last year, and the Council of Europe commissioner for human rights, Thomas Hammarberg, stated that unequivocally on Radio 4 last Saturday. Such so-called compromise proposals are the worst of all worlds. We buckle and accept the erosion of our democracy and Strasbourg rejects the compromise anyway.

It is time that we drew a line in the sand and sent this very clear message back: this House will decide whether prisoners get the vote, and this House makes the laws of the land, because this House is accountable to the British people. I commend the motion to the House.

Question put.