(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe EU is actively considering whether the voluntary labelling scheme that has been in existence in the United Kingdom for some time might be extended to other countries. This matter is frequently taken up by our representatives, and discussions are ongoing.
The alarm bells are ringing over President Morsi of Egypt’s vast expansion of powers by presidential decree. A generous interpretation is that he is trying, by hook or by crook, to get the constitution on to the statute book; less charitably, it could be seen as a path to an Islamic state without the involvement of, or consultation with, Christians, liberals or women. What is the Secretary of State’s assessment?
My hon. Friend’s question illustrates the arguments on both sides in Egypt, and we have taken the view that it is not helpful for us to give a day-to-day commentary on a political controversy or struggle within that country. We are, of course, calling for effective dialogue between all the parties involved in Egypt, and we have expressed our concerns about a democratic constitution not being agreed that is satisfactory to most of the country, but there will be a referendum, now scheduled for 15 December, and it is interesting to note that as of yesterday the Salafists, who are on the more strongly Islamic wing of Egyptian politics, are threatening to boycott the referendum because the proposal is not Islamic enough.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberWe are rightly critical of Israel when there are civilian casualties, but we have to bear in mind that for Hamas and other groups firing rockets out of Gaza, the sole intention is to cause civilian casualties; that is the entire purpose of what they do. We are right to stress the responsibilities on Israel and the need to stop settlement building and restart the peace process, but also the responsibility on Hamas to renounce violence, to recognise previous agreements and to recognise the right of Israel to exist. Such things would also be immense steps forward in the peace process in the middle east.
Over the weekend, Israel was widely condemned for a military strike on an international media centre in Gaza in breach of the Geneva convention. Can my right hon. Friend confirm that it was in fact a base for Islamic Jihad and that the only person who lost their life was its military commander?
I have heard that, but I hesitate to confirm the actual fact definitively. Certainly the Israelis explained that, rather than targeting a media centre, they were targeting a different organisation. We have also been in touch with the media organisations concerned. I very much take my hon. Friend’s point.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberAlthough the new agreement signed between north and south is welcome, is the Minister aware that the arms factory just alluded to is supplying arms into Sinai and possibly Gaza, and is Iranian-owned? Does he agree that he should be telling the Sudanese Government that such activity simply has to stop?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments. As he will be aware and as I stated earlier, the Sudanese Government made a request to the UN, and an investigation is now ongoing. We will be watching the thoroughness of that investigation extremely carefully, and will decide what to do once we have received the results.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady makes a good point. I pay tribute to her work and that of other parliamentarians involved in the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. It is indeed the case that the various non-governmental organisations have different skills to apply, and it is important that we learn all the lessons from them. We have learned, as if we needed it told, that each of these countries is different, following slightly different paths and requiring different skills to be applied. The value that this country’s really good NGOs and parliamentarians can provide to the development of the democratic system will stand these countries in good stead. We certainly need to make sure that we have pooled all the lessons learned.
Last year, the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended a political surge in Afghanistan with talks involving all the regional players. The Government response agreed with that. A year later, however, nothing has happened. Despite the turmoil going on in the middle east and political paralysis in Washington because of the presidential elections, is it not time to give fresh impetus to this process and kill off the logjam of momentum caused by the delay?
Despite all the events that have taken place in different parts of the world, the United Kingdom has never ceased to focus on the fact that Afghanistan remains the principal foreign policy issue affecting the Government. The political paralysis that the hon. Gentleman describes is not necessarily there. Political processes continue in Afghanistan, and we continue to encourage both the Government and those whom we wish to enter into talks with President Karzai on the Afghanistan Government’s principles for engagement to maintain their activities. Following the death of the former chairman of the High Peace Council it has been difficult to get the process moving, but we continue to apply pressure, and we are sure that, as time moves on towards the presidential elections in 2014, the reconciliation process will continue.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement, and I share his frustration with the United Nations; this calls into question the influence of the Security Council as far as this matter is concerned. I am disappointed that he is sceptical about a buffer zone. That was a proposal put forward by the Turkish Government and it must be taken seriously. Is his scepticism based on a conclusion that he would be unable to garner political support for the proposal, or would there be a military problem that would render it unenforceable?
My hon. Friend is right about the United Nations on this subject, although I should stress that, although I have very bluntly said that the United Nations Security Council is failing in this matter, that does not mean that it is failing across a whole range of others. In recent months, the Security Council has been doing its job very well in respect of issues involving Somalia and Yemen, for example, but on this subject it is blocked and failing in its responsibilities.
My hon. Friend said that a proposal for a buffer zone had been made by the Government of Turkey. These ideas are floated from time to time by that Government, but Turkey is welcoming refugees. It is of course concerned about the numbers coming in, but it is not suggesting any change to that approach at the moment. We know from bitter experience that we can advocate safe havens or safe areas only if we are absolutely confident that we will be able to protect the people in those areas and the people travelling to them. That would in turn require not only huge military force but the readiness to use that force. The international will to do that and the decision to do that are clearly not there.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThey will of course be involved in determining policy. I stress again that this is a review to establish a proper understanding of the use of EU competences and the balance of those competences with the powers of the United Kingdom. It will then be a matter for the political parties or the devolved Administrations to draw their policy conclusions from it. They will be involved in the way that has been set out in the memorandum. The commitment to undertake this exercise is in the coalition agreement; it is part of what the coalition Government said they would do at the beginning. That agreement is not qualified by, and cannot be diluted by, consultations with the devolved Administrations; we are empowered to do this as a coalition. Of course the devolved Administrations will be involved in determining policy, and I look forward to the representations that they make as part of the review.
As the Foreign Secretary rightly says, Europe is changing, perhaps faster than we realise. Our relationship with Europe will change. In debating that, we must be well informed; there is no substitute in politics for being well briefed. Once the information has been analysed, however, what will be the process of drawing it together to reach a conclusion?
As I explained in my statement, the results of this analysis will be published as we go along. There will be many opportunities for individual Departments to do that; then, during 2014, that work will be drawn together. It is then for us all—for Parliament as a whole, for the Government or for political parties—to draw their policy conclusions and base them on that. That process is up to Parliament, up to the Government at the time and up to political parties.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am delighted that the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report, “UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role”, which was published in April, has been chosen for this debate, and I start by paying tribute to the staff of the FAC who worked hard and long through the night to help the Committee produce the report.
Turkey’s role on the world stage is influenced by its geography. To the west, it looks to the long-established nations of Europe that are swept up in economic turmoil and that note its economic performance with envy, while, to the south and east, it looks to an unstable region with an uncertain future that can only dream of the democracy that Turkey enjoys.
The Arab spring, with its tidal wave of anti-Government protests, has unleashed forces of violence and instability, and Syria, whose Government are standing their ground, is sinking further and further into a bloody civil war, yet its neighbour and former ally, Turkey, has not looked on in silence. The force of events has obliged it to abandon its policy of zero problems with neighbours and make an outspoken condemnation of Syria’s brutal response.
Syria’s shooting down of a Turkish jet has raised the stakes, and Turkey is now on red alert, with six F-16 fighter jets positioned near its border with Syria. Given that Turkey has, until recently, been a long-term friend and ally of Syria, this is a remarkable development. I am sure we all welcome President Assad’s announcement yesterday in which he reportedly expressed regret for the downing of the Turkish plane.
The Foreign Secretary attended a meeting of an action group on Syria in Geneva last weekend, and, as colleagues might have noticed, there was a significant development. For the first time, all the permanent members of the Security Council, including Russia and China, reached a consensus on positive steps to support the Annan peace plan. It might turn out to be a turning point in the conflict. In responding to this debate, I would be grateful if the Minister set out what he understands to be Turkey’s intentions with respect to Syria and the risk of armed conflict between the two.
How the crisis will unfold is uncertain, but it is clear that Turkey has an important role in securing democracy, illustrating its importance as a strategic partner for the UK in the middle east. It is no surprise that the Prime Minister visited Turkey shortly after taking office, having placed it after only France, Germany, Afghanistan and the US for his early visits, and we share his view that Turkey is an inspiration that other countries can follow. This has particular resonance since the outbreak of the Arab spring.
The response to the Arab spring has brought Turkey closer to its western allies, and, at the same time, it has maintained strong relations with the Arab League. Having started its democratic path in the 1950s with the army sitting on its shoulder, Turkey has increasingly emerged as a strong democratic force, with the army focusing on security rather than politics, particularly since the 2011 general election.
I want to take my hon. Friend back to the issue of neighbour relations. Is he aware that the European Commission’s 2011 progress report on Turkey’s accession to the European Union concluded that no progress had been made in the previous year on the normalisation of relations with Armenia?
I am aware of that and if I my hon. Friend will allow me, I will discuss extensively the EU accession point in just a minute.
The past 10 years have seen a shift in Turkey’s balance of power. It has moved from the Ataturk-style, secular military regime that suppressed Islamist political groups to a much more healthy partnership, involving an army that can live with a moderate Islamic Government under the Justice and Development party—sometimes known as the AKP—led by Prime Minister Erdogan. Now, Turkey is a good example of a secular democracy in a predominantly Muslim country, and the Foreign Office is quite right to treat it as an inspiration. It is an example that can be followed in the emerging democracies in north Africa and the middle east, and no more so than in Egypt, which has just elected its first non-military leader since 1952. Both countries have Sunni majorities and a long history of military dominance, and we can now welcome Mohamed Morsi, from the Freedom and Justice party, as Egypt’s new President. In conducting its parallel inquiry into the Arab spring, my Committee had the privilege of meeting Dr Morsi, and we wish him well in his task of continuing the transition towards democracy in Egypt. The closer we work with both Egypt and Turkey, the better for Britain and the west.
The current climate presents a great opportunity for Turkey to lead by example in the middle east. Western responses to Prime Minister Erdogan’s Government have often mistakenly been influenced by his party’s so-called Islamist roots. However, we were quite struck by the situation when we visited Turkey last autumn, and our doubts were removed. There was very little evidence that the AKP Government were seeking to Islamicise the Turkish state. The AKP is best seen as akin to a socially conservative Christian Democrat party continuing to govern within a secular state. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Turkey has made an overarching foreign policy realignment away from the west. We should not underestimate the extent to which the increased independence and regional focus of Turkish foreign policy may generate differences between Turkish and UK perspectives and policies. However, as long as its foreign policy efforts are directed towards the same ultimate goals, Turkey can add value as a foreign policy partner precisely because it is distinct from the UK.
The Government are right to continue to support the case for Turkey’s membership of the EU. Turkey’s accession would boost the EU’s economic growth and international weight, and at a time of long-term change across the Arab world, its influence could be invaluable. However, Turkey’s application to join the EU has had a troubled history, as my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr Jackson) has just pointed out. Progress is slow, but the problems can be overcome. Two major stumbling blocks exist: the opposition of other EU countries, predominantly France, and the continued lack of a settlement on Cyprus.
Given that Cyprus has assumed the EU presidency this week, is it not extraordinary that Turkey continues not to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and, in practical terms, does not abide by the customs union by continuing to refuse to allow ships and planes from Cyprus to enter its ports and airspace? Surely, at this time, Turkey needs to show in a practical way that it wants to enter the club by recognising that important agreement.
I am grateful for that intervention. In truth, the argument cuts both ways, and I will come to just that point shortly.
Former President Sarkozy was unequivocal in his opposition to Turkish membership. There are signs that President Hollande might be more open than his predecessor to the idea. Turkey’s ambassador to the EU has hinted that France will lift its block on the talks, and I also understand that President Hollande met Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on the sidelines of the Rio+20 summit last month. Prime Minister Erdogan described the meeting as very good, and President Hollande has agreed to visit Turkey. The omens are promising, although a note of caution should perhaps be struck before we get too enthusiastic.
What sort of Europe would Turkey be joining? My Committee’s impression was that our Turkish partners felt that they could not contribute to discussions about the EU’s future direction unless and until they join it. In my opinion, Turkey should be involved in the discussion of matters that will affect it intimately. The Minister for Europe, who will reply to this debate, told the Committee, when he gave evidence to us, that Turkey was unlikely to join the EU before 2020, and Turkey has made it clear that it would like to be a member by the centenary of the republic in 2023. However, all bets are off on exactly what the EU will look like in 2023. I would be grateful if, in responding to this debate, the Minister gave us his assessment of the extent to which the change of leadership in France is likely to make any difference to Turkey’s accession process.
Does my hon. Friend not agree that Turkey could never accede to the EU while it continues to occupy a fellow EU state militarily?
I am just coming to the issue of Cyprus, but let me make the point that when we produced the report, we looked at Turkey and did not go into the merits of the dispute in Cyprus.
The hon. Gentleman is making great play of the change of Government in France, which may indeed be relevant, although what Monsieur Hollande said in the election was that Turkish membership was not on the cards before the next election—that is, in five years’ time—so he put it off. However, are not the political elites in Germany, Austria and a number of other countries in Europe just as implacably opposed to Turkey joining?
I think it is wrong to say that they are just as implacably opposed. Germany would like a looser relationship than full membership; Austria, I think, is just following in its wake at the moment. In truth, it is France that has led the fundamental opposition to Turkey.
Let me turn in some detail to the dispute with Cyprus. Because of the long-running dispute, Cyprus continues to block Turkey’s EU accession process in many areas. When Cyprus became an EU member, an additional protocol was signed obliging Turkey to extend its customs union with the EU to Cyprus. However, Turkey has not implemented it, giving as the reason the EU’s continued isolation of northern Cyprus. Cyprus has just taken on the presidency of the EU Council, from 1 July, and in theory is responsible for presiding over accession negotiations with Turkey. However, Ankara has stated that its relations with the EU Council cannot continue as normal under the Cypriot presidency. As a result, we have a deadlock. EU Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon endeavoured to resolve the matter before Cyprus’s presidency, but failed. [Hon. Members: “EU Secretary-General?”] I beg the House’s pardon: UN Secretary-General.
The Cyprus deadlock is certainly regrettable. We believe that the Government should think creatively about whether the international community could do anything differently that might help the two sides on the island to reach an accommodation. The alternative seems to be continued drift. The Foreign Office could, for example, support the use of prospective revenues from potential gas reserves off Cyprus to facilitate a settlement. However, Turkey is now threatening to boycott energy companies co-operating with the Greek Cypriots, and the situation is getting worse, not better. That has consequences for us all.
Having just been back to Cyprus and on to Turkey and having had conversations on this issue, I do not think we should be too pessimistic or fatalistic. Once the six-month presidency is over and the elections have taken place in Cyprus, there will still be enough good will in Turkey and the Turkish community—in the Turkish republic, so-called, of northern Cyprus—that if the Cypriot Government were willing, there could be significant steps forward next year, with the help and encouragement of our Government and, indeed, a solution. I think that is also the view of the UN Secretary-General’s special representative, Mr Downer, who was in London last month saying similar things and who will be back this month, I hope saying the same things again.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I share his assessment of the situation; I do not think that the process is dead. There was optimism that the question might have been resolved by the end of June, but given the need to work to such a tight deadline, that has proved impossible.
Does my hon. Friend agree that, before we talk about blockages by Turkey on issues such as energy or the recognition of Cyprus, it is important to acknowledge that a blockage to better relations between NATO and the EU is being created when, every time the subject crops up in the EU, it is blocked by Cyprus, which is not prepared to welcome Turkey into EU operations?
I note what my hon. Friend has said. The report is careful not to take sides in the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, but I am sure that the House will have heard his point.
I was talking about how the situation with regard to gas reserves off the coast of Cyprus was deteriorating, rather than improving. Turkey is a rising regional economic power within reach of about 70% of the world’s gas and oil reserves. It forms part of the southern gas corridor, which is critical to reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia as a supplier of gas. Frustratingly, the stalling of Turkey’s EU accession process seems to be losing the EU influence over Turkey’s energy policy decisions. I would be grateful if the Minister addressed that point.
Cyprus is not the only major obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession. Let us turn to the sensitive matter of human rights. Shortcomings in the Turkish justice system are damaging the country’s international reputation. During our visit, we were struck by the country’s economic dynamism and international ambition, but we were taken aback by Turkish legal procedures and by the detention of large numbers of military figures, officials, elected politicians, journalists and activists. Such practices do not accord with the human rights standards that we fight for in the west. We were astonished to hear that, at the time of our inquiry, more journalists were in detention in Turkey than in China. The opaque nature of the system seemed to be part of the problem. Information about legal cases is hard to obtain, and we formed the view that the climate in Turkey was limiting freedom of expression and the media.
Improvements are in progress, however, and we are grateful to the Turkish ambassador for keeping us up to date. Only on Monday, the Turkish Parliament passed an important judicial reform package, which should reduce pre-trial detention and lead to some actions against journalists being dropped. It is clear that the situation is fast moving, and the Foreign Office should help in practical ways to achieve further improvements. That should be done gently and sensitively, however, with quiet reminders that we could support Turkey’s inspirational role in its region more strongly if it improved its democratic and human rights practices.
I acknowledge the package of legal reforms that my hon. Friend has just mentioned, but does he also accept that much more needs to be done in Turkey to prevent violence against women and girls, and to protect the rights of children?
My hon. Friend is a doughty campaigner for the rights of women and children. The report does not focus specifically on that aspect, but I am sure that the House will have heard the point that she has raised.
Turkey has committed to drawing up a new constitution, which presents a significant opportunity to advance reform. It could signal, at home and abroad, a decisive break with the country’s more authoritarian past, but reform is threatened by the continuing confrontation and conflict between Government and opposition, and between the Turkish state and the Kurdish PKK.
There have been civilian casualties on both sides of the Kurdish conflict, and cross-border violence into and out of northern Iraq continues. However, there are grounds for optimism. I understand, for example, that Prime Minister Erdogan held a meeting at the weekend with the leading Kurdish activist and MP Leyla Zana. I would be grateful if the Minister gave us his assessment of the latest prospects for progress towards a settlement for Turkey’s Kurds.
One issue that came up constantly during our visit was that of visas. Although there are considerable challenges, if we want a strategic partnership with Turkey, there are matters within our own gift to help achieve it. The UK’s visa regime for Turkish nationals is a big obstacle to UK-Turkey ties. It is commonly cited by businesses as inconvenient and humiliating. UK trade and academic exchanges suffer from the visa problem. We welcome the fact that the Foreign Office appears to recognise this and is exploring possibilities of easing the acquisition of UK entry visas for Turkish nationals.
An encouraging development is Turkey’s initialling of its long-awaited readmission agreement with the EU, under which it will take back illegal migrants who enter the EU from its territory. We also welcome the Schengen countries’ decision to start a process towards the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish nationals, although this may throw an even stronger spotlight on the UK’s own visa regime. I would be grateful if, in his reply, the Minister reported progress and gave us a sense of the feedback he has received on the new processes being trialled for Turkish applicants for British entry visas.
There is much than can and should be done to improve Turkey’s reputation and profile in the UK, and vice versa. The role of the British Council is critical. We urge it to use its contacts with the young Turkish population to further their awareness of the UK. Rather than risk becoming just an English language-learning operation, the British Council needs to engage the two nations through the soft power of cultural diplomacy. In the year of the London Olympics, for example, the British Council should exploit the fact that Turkey is bidding for the 2020 games—something that we know the British Council is already taking forward.
We remain concerned about the Foreign Office cut to the budget of the BBC World Service, and the service reductions that resulted from it. World Service Turkish radio broadcasts stopped in March 2011, with the loss of 450,000 listeners—a fifth of the World Service’s total audience in Turkey. On the brighter side, however, the World Service says that television and the internet are far more important. About 45% of the Turkish population has access to the internet, and the World Service’s online Turkey service is accessed by almost 500,000 unique users each week.
My Committee also welcomed the increase in the size of the Foreign Office’s diplomatic presence in Turkey. Of the 14 additional staff that the Turkey network is gaining, three are UK based, and they will be required to speak Turkish. This will send a strong signal that this Government are serious about developing strong links with Turkey, although we remain concerned about the deployment of language skills in the embassy generally.
The future shape and direction of the Arab region during a period of huge volatility is hard to predict. We must remain committed to supporting Turkey and its rapidly maturing democracy. We must make its EU accession a top priority and make the most of the opportunities it offers as a strategic partner of growing importance.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe initiatives I have mentioned are all really a continuation or extension of the initiatives that have already been taken. We have not given up the search for an internationally agreed peaceful transition in Syria, but it is vital for such a transition to have the active support of Russia. That is why over recent weeks we have attached such importance to diplomacy with Russia. We will continue with those efforts.
The Foreign Secretary will know from conversations with the Russians that they are accusing us of using their veto as a fig leaf for our lack of policy. Will he nail that once and for all by pointing out that a united international community is far more likely to achieve results than a divided one?
Yes. I think it would be wrong to characterise the Russian veto in that way. The veto exercised by Russia and China in February was against all the other 13 members of the United Nations Security Council, which very much favoured a united international stand on this issue. Nevertheless, Russia has supported the Annan plan and has agreed with the two most recent UN resolutions. That is why we continue to discuss the issues with them and to work with them. I hope we can reach a common position with them on the implementation of the Annan plan or something very close to it.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
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I welcome the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham), who has been dragged back at short notice, for reasons beyond his control, but it is to the benefit of the House that he is here today.
May I raise a point of order, Mr Sheridan? This is a debate on the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which I chair, about piracy off the coast of Somalia. One of the key recommendations was that the guidance for the use of private armed guards on British ships be revised. In its response, the Foreign Office said that the guidance would be coming out in April. Then we were advised that it was coming out in May. I have no quarrel about that, because it is important to get it right. I was informed at 2.25 pm today that the guidance was published at 11 am this morning and we do not have copies of it. We have not seen it. No effort was made to get it to us at 11 am. Would it be appropriate to adjourn for 10 minutes while the guidance is made available, so that we can have a quick look at it?
Unfortunately, we have to proceed with the business of the House. It is extremely discourteous of the Department to treat the Select Committee as it has done and I am sure that the appropriate people will be aware of exactly what has happened. However, I am unclear how that can be remedied at this late stage. Does the Minister wish to say something?
Will the absence of the information impact in any way on the debate?
I appreciate the Minister’s explanation. I gather that the delay was due to the need for clearance by another Department. However, a large section of my speech relating to this matter and posing questions is now, frankly, academic.
Unfortunately, I am advised that we have to keep going. I can only apologise.
Thank you for addressing the point, Mr Sheridan.
The tenth report of the Foreign Affairs Committee is about piracy off the coast of Somalia, a major problem that costs industry and the world economy billions of dollars and threatens lives. The Indian ocean has become a no-go area for small vessels and is dangerous for large ones. The causes of the problem are many. First, at the heart of it is the fact that, despite the introduction of military forces and private armed guards, still the majority of vessels are unarmed. Secondly, there is a willingness to pay ransoms—a controversial point to which I will return. Thirdly, there are too few naval forces. Fourthly, the pirates are able to operate with relative impunity inside Somalia.
The United Kingdom Government are well aware of the problem and are taking a leading role and, although the Committee makes constructive criticisms of that role, we congratulate them on the steps that they are taking. Concerted international action is needed. The number of prosecutions has increased, but 90% of those detained are released. There is greater use of armed guards and we have regulation and guidance for armed guards. Vessels have been following best management practices. There are issues to do with tracing financial flows: the Committee’s opinion is that financial flows can be tracked—some of the most sophisticated equipment for that purpose is available in this country—and that more can be done in this regard. The Committee believes that there should be at least one UK vessel permanently on station. Of course, we have to support development in Somalia. I shall deal with those points in turn.
The UK is a big player in the world shipping industry, and our part of it is based just a mile or two up the road from here. Shipping and its management comprises 1.8% of gross domestic product. Piracy poses a threat to the UK’s economy and the security of British assets transiting through the area. Some 40% of world trade moves through the region of the Indian ocean, around the horn of Africa, into the Red sea. The danger zone now stretches over to the coast of the Indian ocean. Much of the cargo is insured here in the UK. The total cost of addressing the threat to Britain, the assets and the industry is believed to be in the region of $8 billion to $12 billion per annum.
Attacks on vessels in the Indian ocean have decreased in the last quarter. In the first quarter of 2011 there were 102 attacks, 16 of them successful, whereas this year there were only 43 attacks and only nine were successful. That downward trend is welcome. To give an idea of the sums involved, in 2011, ransoms amounted to $135 million. The opinion of some observers and witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee was that some of that money is going to al-Shabaab, which it is believed has connections with al-Qaeda.
Since piracy started in the region, some 3,500 crew members and officers have been taken captive and been held, and in the last four years 62 have been killed. Currently, 12 vessels are held and 178 hostages are still in captivity. That the figure is lower than it was reflects a welcome trend, but it is important to state that the level of detention remains unacceptable. It must not be believed that we have been successful and this situation must not become the status quo.
The peak from which we are coming down was reached in autumn 2011. I think the reason why the trend is now downward is that the self-defence mechanisms are beginning to make progress. The implementation of best management practices is clearly having a serious effect. It is too soon to see if this is a long-term trend, but it is promising. For the benefit of the House, I should say that best management practices involve self-protecting measures, including careful manoeuvring of ships, having safe rooms on ships and using detection equipment. I commend the industry on the implementation of these practices, as does the Committee, and on the results that this is achieving.
Does not this highlight a further problem, which is that it is not so much the cargo or the vessel but the crew that is the main financial inducement? All the measures the hon. Gentleman has mentioned apply to the large multinational, well organised modern fleets, but many smaller operators with smaller vessels are becoming more vulnerable. Those measures, welcome though they are, can therefore only be regarded as part of a package, because they deal with only part of the problem.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. For small vessels the region is, in truth, a complete no-go area. For the piracy of the 17th and 18th centuries, the prize was the cargo, and the crew walked the plank or went over the sides, but that has changed; now, the crew are equally valuable. That attitude of the pirates is causing the problem. That is not to say that the cargo is not still important—shipowners are paying substantial sums to get their cargo out—but as we see particularly when yacht crews are held, in international terms the yacht is worth nothing while the owners still have a high value.
The Government initially resisted the establishment of private armed security guards on board British vessels. When the Minister gave evidence to us during our inquiry, the Government’s position was that armed guards would not be welcome. However, the Prime Minister announced in October or November last year that we will now put armed security guards on board British vessels, and that view is echoed by the International Maritime Organisation. The Committee welcomes the U-turn.
The operation of a private armed guard on board a British vessel is subject to British law—the law of the flag applies on board any vessel. The Government published interim guidance, at the heart of which was a policy based on the Crown Prosecution Service policy of lawful self-defence. We were critical of that, because the CPS guidance was not written with piracy in mind. Indeed, it states:
“If a…firearm…was used…this may tip the balance in favour of prosecution.”
To me and to the Committee, that seemed to be off-loading responsibility for the use of armed guards on to shipowners. The simple question we posed in our report was: if armed guards on board a ship see an armed skiff approaching, can they open fire? That is the test. The initial interim guidance contained little to help make a judgment on the use of force.
In the Government response, as I pointed out in my point of order, clarification was promised by April 2012, which then became May, then June. I have no idea why there was a delay, but I like to think that it was because international co-ordination and consultation with the IMO were necessary. Indeed, earlier this year, at the invitation of the Department for Transport, I attended a particularly constructive piracy conference at the IMO. What is important, however, is that the UK plays a leading role in the establishment of any guidance, and that is why I regret the new guidance not being available for us to see, because we cannot really comment. We are in limbo—the guidance is out but we are unable to comment on it today. The UK should be playing a leading role, but the issue is current. I want to ask the Government whether they have been happy with the use of armed guards on ships from implementation up to now. How many applications have been received to establish armed guards on board a ship?
The House might be interested to know about the Italian ship Enrique Lexie, which was carrying two Italian marines on board. Though the facts are in dispute, there was an exchange of armed fire with small vessels and two fishermen were killed. For reasons that are not clear, the Italian vessel then went into an Indian port and the marines were arrested amid a dispute about whether the incident took place in international or territorial waters. The matter is unresolved, but the incident highlights the importance of the need for clear guidance and international agreement on the use of force.
We can see how easily diplomatic incidents can occur in the absence of proper guidance or internationally agreed standards. That is mainly because so many factors are involved in international waters, such as a British ship with a foreign crew going into another country’s waters; several jurisdictions are in play. I was interested to read that the IMO has called for an international standard for the use of armed guards, so I shall read the newly published guidance with interest to see whether such a standard has been established. I hope that a Minister might be able to summarise the guidance when he makes his contribution to the debate.
Order. I have every sympathy with the hon. Gentleman and his predicament, but I am reliably informed that document is winging its way towards us and should reach us in the next 10 minutes or so. At the end of the debate, he will certainly have the opportunity to sum up, by which time he might have had a chance to read the document, as will other Members. I am sure that my co-Chair will be sympathetic to his position as well.
That is very helpful, Mr Sheridan, and I am grateful to all those involved in expediting the availability of the guidance.
To conclude on armed guards, I hope that UK rules can influence the international debate, to the benefit of everyone concerned.
Another issue that we identified is that there are no regulations on the movement of weapons, and in that part of the world, a lot of weapons are moving around. We clearly need to have a regime for such movements, and I welcome the UK’s introduction of a revised licensing regime in February this year, although that does not tackle the difficulty of floating armouries. Believe it or not, some ships out there will lend guns to ships that enter the danger zone and get them back when they leave. All that is outside the control of any organisation, and an international approach to that difficulty would be appropriate.
The naval response has been better than expected—possibly damned with faint praise—but the truth of the matter is that the Indian ocean is not safe, and to have a 30-minute response throughout the ocean would require the deployment of 80 warships at any given moment, which will clearly not happen. The strategic defence review under way in this country can only heighten the impact on the availability of British ships for deployment, but the UK could have a role to play in providing leadership in operations—we have a good record—perhaps with other countries supplying the ships. As reported by the Ministry of Defence, however, last month HMS Westminster foiled three attacks. Can one of the Ministers present tell us what happened to the suspects from those incidents? Were they detained, released or fended off with no detentions? As I understand it, there have certainly been no prosecutions.
What is needed is international co-ordination. We have the successful UN contact group on piracy and recently—established in February this year—the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre in the Seychelles. The centre has to be welcome. It will co-ordinate information on ransoms and target the kingpins in the piracy world.
On the naval response, one of the unexpected side effects is how the international operations have been getting on quite well with one another. We considered a recommendation on whether they should be co-ordinated by a single organisation, but we reached the conclusion that there were bigger fish to fry, rather than having that sort of upheaval at the moment. We have Russian, Chinese, Indian, British and NATO ships there, and given the lack of a big umbrella organisation, the close co-ordination is very welcome.
Turning to convictions, it is difficult to obtain evidence in such situations. Our Committee recommended that more effort should be made, perhaps with the use of video links for witnesses. There are difficulties with various national laws because piracy is a crime in some countries but not others. Implementing such proposals can be expensive for poorer countries.
To date, no suspect has been brought back to the UK for prosecution. We have transfer agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and I welcome the new agreement with Mauritius, as I hope that it will result in more prosecutions of suspects. Will the Minister who responds on the memorandum of understanding with Mauritius indicate the conditions that suspects are held in and whether that is monitored. I wish the Government well with implementation of the memorandum of understanding, which sounds to our Committee to be a pragmatic solution. However, if it fails, I hope that the Minister involved will note that the French are now engaged in their second trial of suspects.
Will the hon. Gentleman, and later a Minister, clarify the position on bringing captured pirates back to the UK for trial, given the real risk of applications for leave to remain? Is it not better—this is why the Mauritius agreement is so welcome—to support efforts in the region?
I cannot go to our precise conclusion quickly, but we believe that it would be a good idea if there were prosecutions in this country, if only to demonstrate that we mean business. The important thing is that there are prosecutions, and if a memorandum of understanding is working effectively, it is a pragmatic solution.
Turning to ransoms, I said earlier that $135 million was paid last year, and in our judgment the Government have been slow to track the flow of money. It might be an effective means of countering piracy if the flow of money were tracked. An international taskforce on ransoms has been established recently, but it is controversial because it attempts to prevent payment of ransoms. It is worth noting that the Chamber of Shipping has expressed concern that the international policy and that of the UK is to try to prevent the payment of ransoms.
The Foreign Affairs Committee is worried about that. In our view, the only way to recover vessels is to pay ransoms, which is particularly appropriate when the use of force is ruled out. In all honesty, there is no other way for shipowners to recover their property. The position can be likened to a mugging of a man in the street. If he were subject to a violent attack, no one would tell him not to pay anything because it will only encourage more muggers. I invite the Government to take a hard look at the matter and to say whether Government policy is unchanged.
British hostages have been taken as victims of piracy, and the Committee welcomes the release of Judith Tebbutt. We did not refer to her in our report because she was still in captivity while we were drafting it, and we concluded that it would be too sensitive to comment. We are delighted that she has been released. We understand that there are prosecutions in Kenya and that a ransom was paid. I would be interested to know from a Minister whether that payment was tracked and whether a prosecution is expected. We also took evidence from the Chandlers, and we are delighted to hear that only last week they set off to continue their voyage around the world, but I am reliably informed that they will avoid the Indian ocean.
At heart, the solution to the problem lies not offshore, but onshore in Somalia. There is no easy solution for that troubled country. African Union troops are clearly making progress. We have had two excellent conferences on Somalia. One was here in the United Kingdom in February, which I believe is producing results, and I congratulate the Foreign Office on putting it on. The other was in May in Istanbul, Turkey, at which I gather serious progress was made. The Department for International Development is putting in £83 million, of which £6 million will go on counter-piracy.
We treat the subject very seriously. Our report is important.
I apologise for not having had the chance to read the Select Committee’s report, but I look forward to doing so. I take it that the hon. Gentleman did not have an opportunity during the Committee’s examination of the evidence to speak to welfare organisations such as the Mission to Seafarers and Apostleship of the Sea, which have dealt with some of the hostages before, during and afterwards.
The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to see that we took written evidence from seafarers, and we quote some of it in our report.
In conclusion, I look forward to hearing how colleagues view this difficult subject.
No. I think that paying is profoundly irresponsible. There are even more extreme cases than that of an employer. It is difficult to tell someone whose loved one has been kidnapped—it would be difficult for me if one of my loved ones had been kidnapped—and other members of the family, “You should not pay.” That is a terribly difficult thing to say to someone, face to face. However, in the bigger picture, people are kidnapped because other people have paid ransoms, which paid for the boats and mother-ships and the lifestyle of the pirates that makes future ransoms, kidnaps and piracy much more likely. We must try to disrupt that business model. Trying to find a simple military solution is only half the answer. I am afraid that I think that the Government’s instinct is right.
What does the hon. Gentleman think would have happened to Judith Tebbutt and Mr and Mrs Chandler if no ransoms had been paid?
As I said, it is a horrendously difficult thing to say to an individual family or a company, “You should not pay,” but Governments must consider the larger picture and the fact that ransoms fuel the whole situation and that every payment of a ransom supports future piracy.
To use the illustration of a mugger, does the hon. Gentleman think that the best advice to give a mugging victim is, “Don’t hand over your wallet, because that will stop mugging in the future.”?
That is the police advice—[Interruption.] The police advice is to co-operate, I know, but that is where someone is at imminent risk themselves. The right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling set out the situation: it is a balance of risk and reward. The Government and the international community are addressing the risk element, because they are stepping up self-defence measures, and there is greater international co-ordination and increasing provision of private armed security forces and armed guards. The risk element is therefore increasing slightly, but the rewards are stupendous—hundreds of millions of dollars—and we must try to reduce the rewards or the economic model behind piracy will thrive.
I am afraid that this situation is the classic philosophical prisoner’s dilemma, where the individual action may be difficult to take, but the result on a larger scale is clear. Saferworld says clearly in its briefing, from its research on the ground in Somalia, that the continued payment of ransoms fuels and exacerbates the problem. We want to tackle those things and want people to be safer.
The hon. Member for Falkirk (Eric Joyce) asked what would happen to British ships in that situation and whether British hostages would be more at risk. I suspect that Somali pirates are quite good business men and can spot a red ensign, a white ensign or whichever British flag happens to be flying. If Britain acquired a reputation for not paying ransoms, it would balance out the risks and rewards of attacking a British vessel and they might think that it would be better to attack somebody else’s.
The principle has been established in other fields. It used to be more common practice for ransoms and payments to be made when hostages were taken in international terrorist situations, such as airfields. There was a concerted international drive to stop any hostage payments being made in those situations, and that form of terrorism has largely disappeared. It has sadly been replaced by many others. It is critical that we disrupt the business model of piracy. That was not the only issue that I was going to address; I will move quickly on.
On the military front, the moves towards international co-ordination are good. I note the existence of the European naval force. We ought to agree between these four walls not to tell the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) about it. It is very effective, and a British operational commander is in place. The rejection of the catch-and-release approach was rightly highlighted by the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is important that that approach is abandoned, so increasing the risk that pirates face. We need more effective action to prosecute, using every available international or national legal jurisdiction that we can find. The British Government are taking a lead in that.
The report highlighted other issues, rightly including the disappointing progress to date in tracking financial flows—tens of millions of pounds are being trafficked. The Government and, indeed, the international community have been slow to provide ways to track it down and disrupt the flow. It is an important step in disrupting the pirates’ business model. It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s view.
The Foreign Affairs Committee is a little inclined always to want Britain to be the country taking the lead. These are global problems. Likewise, it insists that Britain plays the leading role in the naval operation. Although Britain is an important naval power, perhaps given our financial situation and the fact that it is a global problem affecting global business and threatening the lives of nationals of all countries, it is not absolutely necessary to have at least one British naval vessel on operation all the time. This must be done through international co-ordination.
On the prosecution of pirates when they are visible, the report says:
“Gathering evidence to secure a successful prosecution for piracy is clearly challenging, but when pirates are observed in boats with guns, ladders and even hostages, it beggars belief that they cannot be prosecuted.”
That is exactly right. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on progress on the international front.
I think that the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling was a little uncharitable in his comments on the use of force by private armed security forces. The UK legal situation is pretty clear. The Library briefing quotes an international law firm called Ince and Co., which says that
“the use of force in deterring or preventing what is a criminal act”
is justified. It continues:
“In the UK…lethal force is normally only allowed where there is serious and imminent threat to life. The decision to use lethal force must be reasonable and the force used proportionate.”
Further clarification on the exact definitions and terms will be obviously welcome whenever it arrives through the door today, and Government are working to provide that. Ince and Co. goes on to make the point that rules on the use of force need to be internationally agreed and as standardised as possible. That is required internationally. The IMO ought to be taking a lead, but it is possibly the slowest organisation in the world at doing almost anything.
In deference to other Members, because we were distracted, I will move swiftly to a conclusion. It is imperative to tackle the situation on the ground and provide different economic models. We should use the example of Somaliland positively to look at fisheries and try to present an alternative way of providing prosperity in the longer term for the people of Somalia, so that this appalling trade does still not offer the attractions that it does now.
It has been a great pleasure to listen to this wide-ranging, rich and varied debate. I pay particular tribute to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), for his work. As we stated in our response to the report, we are grateful to the Committee for examining this important subject in such detail. Obviously, we entirely accept that there is still a lot to do.
We welcome many of the Committee’s conclusions. We recognise the important contribution that the inquiry has made and we will continue a close dialogue and discussion. As the Committee has noted in its report, piracy is not new but a type of criminality that has existed for many centuries. Indeed, as the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mike Penning), who is the Minister with responsibility for shipping, pointed out, it has been going on since about 2000 BC. However, the recent evolution of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa has had a big impact both on the region and worldwide.
In this globalised world in which millions rely on the 23,000 ships that sail through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian ocean each year, the impact of Somali-based piracy is felt here and throughout the global economy. The World Bank has estimated that the total cost to the world economy, through extra costs placed on shipping and higher insurance premiums, is about $7 billion.
The right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) mentioned the impact on Mombasa. Recently, I visited Mombasa and saw the situation for myself. We had a seminar on board HMS Westminster, where many of those representing the tourism and hospitality industry made the point that no cruise ships visit Mombasa now. The right hon. Gentleman gave the correct figures, but he might have pointed out that the one ship that visited Mombasa last year came under pirate attack.
The cost of piracy is huge. Of UK gross domestic product, £10.7 billion comes from the shipping industry. Since 2008, Somali pirates have hijacked about 175 vessels, taken 3,000 seafarers captive and received more than £200 million in ransom payments. As my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South pointed out, the crisis peaked in autumn 2011. We cannot be complacent, but it is important to note that, although the tempo of attacks has not changed, the number of attacks resisted has greatly increased, so much so that only seven vessels and 214 hostages are currently under pirate control. Those figures come from research by EUNAVFOR—the European Union Naval Force Somalia.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Warley that it is essential that the UK continues to take a leading role in the international community and that the international community continues to work closely together to tackle and end the threat of attack by pirates. It is rarely the case that UK nationals are affected by such attacks, but one of the first duties of a Government is to protect our citizens. As my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South said, the Committee looked carefully at the handling of the case of Paul and Rachel Chandler, who suffered a terrible ordeal. I spoke to Rachel Chandler after her release, and I know how horrendous the experience was. As we set out in our response, we will continue to work on all the options available to us to ensure that those behind their ordeal are brought to justice. We have also conducted a full review of the handling of their case to see what lessons can be learned, including on the need to ensure that the early engagement offered by the UK mission responsible for co-ordinating our response on the ground is actually provided. The results of that review are annexed to our response. The Government are committed to providing the best possible support to those who fall victim to piracy and their families, tailored, of course, to the families’ wishes.
Similarly, the Government are committed to continuing to take a leading role in the international community, including through the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. We continue to lead the working group responsible for naval co-ordination and regional capacity-building activity, working with our partners to minimise duplication and encourage the widest possible participation by the international community. An unprecedented number of nations have engaged in the international naval response in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian ocean—sharing information, co-ordinating operations and remaining steadfast in the face of the challenge.
As I think two speakers today pointed out, an encouraging dimension of that activity is the number of non-aligned countries taking part, including China and Russia, for example. We have Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Open Shield and the Combined Maritime Task Force. We welcome that, and we will continue to lead from the front by providing the operational commander for EUNAVFOR and the headquarters at Northwood of both the EU and the NATO operations for the duration of their mandates. To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Warley, this is indeed a key defence strategy. I share his belief that one of the most important responsibilities and duties of the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Navy is the protection of British interests, but not only from a little Englander perspective. When there are threats further afield, where we have the resources and platforms from which to tackle them, we will do so. That is why the Royal Navy has been prominent in providing vessels for the operations.
In Kenya, I had the chance to visit HMS Westminster when she was moored in Mombasa on a courtesy visit, and to be briefed by the captain on the operations that his forces had carried out. I can inform the House they had indeed intercepted three separate groups of pirates and were able to capture a lot of equipment—in fact, a skiff captured from the pirates was on board. Unfortunately, not enough evidence was available to guarantee a successful prosecution in those cases. One of the most important points to remember is that it is not only a question of having enough evidence to prosecute. Until now, we have taken a robust line on whether the evidence would stand up in court, but one of the drivers has been lack of detention and prosecution facilities in the region. I shall return to that in a moment, because we have made substantial progress.
Naval forces continue to have a positive impact. The recent action by EUNAVFOR to target onshore pirate logistics dumps was a welcome step forward in the evolving rules of engagement of our naval forces in the region. It was a further demonstration that those behind piracy cannot act with impunity at sea or on land. It was also a good example of how the EU is delivering concrete results in the implementation of a common security and defence policy. The action was short and sharp—I understand that it took seconds rather than minutes in terms of the firepower used—but it did substantial damage and took out a large amount of equipment. That sent a strong signal. On the other hand, there is no question of any logistics dumps being targeted unless there is sufficient intelligence—obviously, aerial photography and satellite intelligence are needed. As the right hon. Member for Warley pointed out, it is important that all countries engaged in the operations use their assets to the maximum possible advantage so that we can pool information. Indeed, that is what is happening. I very much hope that that action sent an extremely strong signal that there is nowhere for these people to hide. Although we will be very cautious to avoid loss of life or injury to people, when we can target assets onshore, we will.
The Committee has recognised the role that the industry can and does play in protecting vessels against pirate attacks, and the success of the self-protection measures in reducing ships’ vulnerability to attack. We continue to encourage the shipping industry to maximise adherence to best management practice, and welcome the high level of compliance that we see among the UK flagged fleet. I pay tribute to the work done with the shipping industry by my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister. As soon as he came into office, he made it clear to the industry that part of the solution lay in its hands and that it really had to drive forward best management practice and ensure that it was used absolutely uniformly. The statistics show that of ships that have been successfully attacked by pirates, very few have been those that adhered to best management practice, and none had private armed security personnel on board. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for his work in pushing that agenda.
Following the Government’s announcement last autumn that we would allow the use of privately contracted armed guards on board UK flagged vessels, the Committee looked carefully at the issue. As the Chairman of the Committee pointed out, the Department for Transport published before Christmas last year interim guidance for UK flagged vessels on the use of armed guards to defend against the threat of piracy in exceptional circumstances. The guidance included a section on the use of force in the case of an attack. Since then, we have revised the guidance on the rules on use of force.
The revised guidance was published this morning, and I apologise to the Committee and the House for its not being made available earlier. That it was not published sooner is due to the fact that a substantial amount of extra work involving the devolved Administrations was needed, as was final sign-off from the Ministry of Justice. It was not for want of my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister pushing the matter very hard indeed. I am sorry that we did not let the Chairman and members of the Committee have a copy of the revised guidelines when they were made available at 11 o’clock this morning. There are lessons to be learned from that. I wonder whether it will be possible, perhaps in Government time, to have a further short debate specifically on the revised guidelines.
The revision published this morning provides greater clarity on what UK law says on the use of force. As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) pointed out, the starting point must be our current common and statute law, which is pretty clear about what one can and cannot do. Obviously, companies must seek independent legal advice as necessary when developing the rules on use of force.
In the revised rules we go into a lot more detail, making it clear, for example, that it is
“illegal to use force for retaliation or revenge.”
That might be perfectly obvious, but the guidance continues:
“If the threat ceases, the defences of self defence, defence of another…no longer apply”,
and if a private security detachment
“believes a threat is imminent, it is not necessary for them to wait for the aggressor to strike the first blow before using reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves”.
Again, that is clear. It is part of a graduated response. Earlier today, I was talking to experts in the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence, and they believe that we have struck a much better balance. We make a lot more information available. For example, we make it clear that if
“armed guards sighted a pirate skiff”—
a skiff that might be equipped to undertake acts of piracy—
“but there was nothing to indicate that the skiff was actively undertaking an act of piracy, it would be illegal for armed guards to use force against them.”
However, that would not, of course, preclude firing warning shots. All the evidence is that the pirates are cowards. They value their lives—they are not suicide merchants—and the indications are that when warning shots are fired they scarper off pretty quickly.
We have made it clear, and I say again to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South that this is work in progress. The revised guidelines are an important step forward in response to his Committee’s work. We will listen to what people in the industry say about the revised guidelines, and we will obviously listen to what the Committee says, and if we need to make further amendments, my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister has made it clear that he will do so.
The Minister has gone right to the heart of the changes to the guidelines, and has pointed out that paragraph 8.13 states that if armed guards sight a skiff but there is nothing to indicate that it is actively undertaking an act of piracy it will be illegal for armed guards to use force. Can he confirm the corollary that if there is evidence, that is effectively a green light to use force in retaliation and self-defence?
Yes, indeed. It is about a graduated response, and about the members of the armed detachment using their intelligence. If they believe that they or the vessel they are protecting is threatened, they can of course use force. They would probably start by firing a warning shot. If the skiff then disappeared, all well and good, but if it came closer and it was obvious that there were weapons on board, it is perfectly clear from the revised guidelines that the armed guards would not have to wait until a shot was fired at them or in their direction. We go a long way to giving the clarification that is need.
I am grateful to the Minister for the very detailed response that the subject deserves.
I will not detain the Chamber for long. I have three quick points. The right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) intervened to ask about the Committee’s position on prosecution policy. I happily confirm that the Committee’s position is as I, and the Minister, set out. It is preferable for a prosecution to be successfully dealt with locally, otherwise it should come back to the United Kingdom.
We have had interesting divisions on ransoms. The truth of the matter is that there is no answer; both arguments are right. There is merit in both sides of the argument. Frankly, it is better to focus on preventing capture than on paying a ransom. There is a difference between corporate interest and the private interest of the yachtsman.
I will conclude with some comments on the guidance. I am grateful to the Department for Transport for providing the guidance during the debate. I have had a brief chance to look at it. There are clearly substantial changes, which are welcome. The Minister is right to say that it is not as much as we were calling for. It is probably best to say that in the preparation of our report, we have had legal advice and I will run the guidance past our lawyers. I recognise, however, that there are important changes. I also note that the Crown Prosecution Service guidance is still incorporated. I suspect that there is no alternative, because that is the law of Britain. Perhaps therein lies the problem—if we are to have a separate law out in the Indian ocean, it would require primary legislation that may not currently be in the coalition’s plan.
The guidance has also thrown up an interesting distinction in devolved law, distinguishing Scottish law and the law of England and Wales. I am not quite sure exactly which applies when the red duster is flying on a ship. However, it is interesting to note, under footnote 15 of paragraph 8.10, that the use of lethal force in Scotland will only be justified in defence of life, or by a victim resisting rape. That is quite a high bar.
I am very proud to represent the red duster for the UK; this is not a devolved matter. If someone is on a British-registered red duster ship, UK law prevails over international law.
I am grateful for that intervention, which begs a question about the need for a footnote about distinguishing Scottish law and the law of England and Wales. [Interruption.] That is very interesting; piracy off Scotland will have to be investigated.
Clearly, a lot of questions need to be considered, and the Committee will do that. The Minister’s suggestion that we have a further short debate on this subject is constructive. It may not be inappropriate for the Shipping Minister to debate it, but I leave that to others to decide.
Mr Brady, I am very grateful to you for chairing the debate, which has been particularly constructive.
Question put and agreed to.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe whole House has just been discussing how to persuade Russia to change its position. I do not think that it is a question of sticks and carrots, which is the wrong way to analyse this. In any case, the pressure on Russia in this regard is what will happen if there is no implementation of the Annan plan, which would be very destructive of Russian interests as well as the broader interests of international peace and security, so I think that doing our utmost to work with them and asking them to work with us to implement the Annan plan is the best way forward, and we will do that. As the hon. Gentleman may have gathered from my earlier comments, I do not shrink from criticising Russia, but it is also my job as Foreign Secretary to pursue this with Russia in a diplomatic way, which I will continue to do until the possibility of reaching success has been exhausted.
On that point, the Foreign Secretary is right to continue his support for the Annan plan, but he must recognise that we are very close to having to acknowledge that it is not working and he is quite right to have all options on the table. May I press him a little on the international conference proposed by the Russians? In my view, it is well worth persevering with, but what would his attitude be if an invitation were extended to Iran? Would that deter him from attending, or would he be encouraged by that as something that might lead to a change on the ground of the sort he envisaged?
No, I would not be encouraged by that. As I said in my statement, in any such international conference it would be important that all countries involved are ready to be part of the solution, which of course is a reference to Iran, in particular, which has been part of the problem so far. By sending equipment and technical advice to the Syrian regime—it might have helped in other ways that we are not familiar with—Iran has been assisting with the terrorising and subjugation of the people of Syria, which is not a very good starting point to come to an international conference designed to sort this out. We will see what can be agreed on this. The United States has objected very strongly to any notion of Iran being included in such a conference. I have said that Iran’s inclusion would probably make it unworkable, so it would be far simpler if we agreed that the conference did not include Iran.