Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I certainly will check, and will encourage my right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary to check in detail. We should be clear that if we are asked by the UNHCR or by countries bilaterally for greater assistance, we will provide that. We are providing assistance that has been requested, and we will certainly do more if necessary.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

In welcoming the Annan plan, does the Foreign Secretary agree that, ironically, compliance with it entrenches the regime in situ? Is it still his wish that the Assad regime stand down, and how does he think that can be best achieved?

[Mr Hague]

Of course it is our view that the Assad regime should go—that was our stated view from last summer—but as my hon. Friend knows, that is not the united view of the whole United Nations Security Council, so this resolution and the work of Kofi Annan is based on a political process. However, that is a process, as set out in the Annan plan, to lead to a plural democratic political system. Of course, the regime will try to use a ceasefire and a political process to its own advantage; but the more it is a genuine ceasefire and a genuine political process, the less it will be to the regime’s advantage.

Iran

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who is a valued member of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, on securing this debate. He is at least consistent: he voted against the intervention in Iraq, the intervention in Libya and the Foreign Affairs Committee report on Afghanistan, and now he wants to rule out an attack on Iran. I respect his point of view, but I believe that he is underestimating the challenge facing the western world and the civilised world.

The Iranians are tough so-and-sos. As the Foreign Secretary rightly pointed out, they have sacked our embassy in Tehran, they are propping up the regime in Syria, they are undermining peace efforts in Afghanistan and Syria, and they are supporting terrorism around the world. In my view—it is quite clearly also the view of many people in this Chamber—it is critical that we do not blink first. The production or potential production of nuclear weapons has the ability to destabilise the region, with profound global impact. My hon. Friend says that the threat of military action is counter-productive. I am sorry to say this, but I simply do not agree. I believe that if we take this option off the table, the Iranians will go full throttle, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) pointed out, in a speech of lucidity that I can only envy. It ill behoves anyone to quote Chairman Mao in support of their argument, but it was he who said that peace comes from the end of the barrel of a gun. That is particularly pertinent here, and we must keep the option on the table.

There are four ways through the growing mess: diplomacy, sanctions, a military strike or learning to live with a nuclear Iran. Diplomacy has clearly not succeeded, despite countless United Nations resolutions. I remember when the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) was making regular visits to Tehran. I was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, and I remember meeting him there on one occasion. He tried valiantly, but I felt at the time that he should have pushed harder and that we should have threatened sanctions at a much earlier stage. I was left with the feeling that he was trying to do something about the situation without having any conviction as to what it might achieve.

[Mr Straw]

If the hon. Gentleman looks at the record, he will see that we were working in concert with Germany and France, and with the tacit but quite active support of the United States. This was before the E3 plus 3 architecture got going. Those negotiations were tough, but they produced a positive result at the time. That is what followed from the October 2003 negotiations. Furthermore, it is my belief that had President Khatami been allowed to stay in place, with all that that would have entailed, we could have made further progress. It was others in the regime who decided to undermine him and the progress that we had made.

[Richard Ottaway]

I do not want to be unduly critical of the right hon. Gentleman. I recognise that he believed that he was doing the right thing at the time, but, as history illustrates, it was not enough to deter the regime.

A second course of action involves sanctions and, as I have said, I wish that they had been imposed much earlier. It is possible that they might work, and one can only hope, genuinely and passionately, that they will. They must be as tough as possible, and I look with dismay at the slow speed with which our European Union partners wish to impose them. I understand that Greece, of all countries, is holding up their full imposition until it can get its own oil contracts in position. Sanctions can be effective. The United States has the ability to jam up the financial markets and the oil trading markets, which would have a significant and profound impact.

The Iranians have threatened to shut the straits of Hormuz; I believe that to be a completely hollow threat. The straits are defendable. When I served in the Royal Navy in the 1960s, I was based in Bahrain. Even in those days, we had a game plan for the region. Now, the Iranians are faced with the full might of the US sixth fleet, which, I have to say, I would not want to take on in these circumstances.

If sanctions fail, there will be no other choice than between a military strike and learning to live with a nuclear Iran. We are having a debate about intervention. Support for non-intervention is a perfectly respectable point of view that is held by Russia and China and a number of South American states. The common factor for all those regimes is that their democracy is either weak, non-existent or new.

I have to confess that I am a reluctant interventionist. I was quite prepared to oppose the intervention in Libya until the United Nations resolution went through. It is hard to oppose a successful campaign in those circumstances. I would hesitate to intervene in Syria without UN backing, although diplomacy is clearly failing. I was not persuaded that the UN resolutions on Iraq gave proper cover for military intervention, and I was against such an intervention until the then Prime Minister stood at the Dispatch Box and persuaded me that the security of the western world was threatened. This illustrates that the only occasions on which we should intervene in such circumstances are those in which we have the backing of a UN resolution or those in which our interests are threatened.

In these circumstances, our interests are threatened by a nuclear Iran. It has been pointed out that there is a possibility of a nuclear arms race in the middle east. I believe that Saudi Arabia will want a bomb, and that it will be in contact with Pakistan to ask it to supply one. What really worries me about Iran having a nuclear weapon is that I am left with the feeling that it might, in certain circumstances, actually use it. Many countries with nuclear powers hold them exclusively for the purpose of self-defence. The Iranians might not use the weapons themselves. They might use them in a proxy manner, supplying terrorists with radioactive material for a dirty bomb to be used in a western capital. Either way, this is going to be messy.

As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington said, if there were to be a military strike, moderate Arab opinion would not be too upset. The hard-liners are now distracted: Syria, Libya and Egypt are out of action, and Russia and China might huff and puff, but I do not believe that they would make a serious move in the event of a strike. I genuinely believe that we would live to regret Iran getting the bomb, and that an attack might be the least bad option.

[Angie Bray]

Does my hon. Friend accept that there are certain movements in Iran, notably the green movement, that are working below the surface for change? What weight does he attach to the argument that too much sabre-rattling could alienate such movements from the pro-western stance that they have been taking?

[Richard Ottaway]

There is a confusing situation in Iran. My hon. Friend is right, however. As the shadow Foreign Secretary pointed out, progress is being made, and negotiations are starting again. I am slightly cynical about how effective they will be at this stage, however. I repeat that an attack is the least bad option, and we can only pray that either sanctions or sanity will prevail, so that this whole debate becomes completely academic.

Afghanistan

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. He rightly pays tribute to the bravery of our armed forces and reflects how sincere those tributes always are in this House, particularly from those of us on both sides who have travelled in Afghanistan and seen the work of our armed services and what happens in field hospitals. We recognise the extraordinary commitment of all involved. He is quite right to point out again—I am grateful to him for it—from the Opposition Benches that those operations enjoy support across the House, and I certainly take his questions in the spirit in which they are obviously intended.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about reconciling what I have said today with what the US Defence Secretary has said over the past couple of weeks. The US Defence Secretary has stressed that US forces will remain combat-capable and ready in Afghanistan to the end of 2014, and he has also said very clearly:

“We’ve got to stick to the Lisbon strategy. The United States has a very strong commitment to Lisbon and to the strategy that was laid out there.”

That strategy involves withdrawing from a combat role after the end of 2014.

Sometimes, in the reporting of different comments, there is confusion between lead responsibility and full responsibility. As I said in my statement, however, we expect Afghan forces to have lead responsibility throughout Afghanistan in mid to late 2013, and I also reflected on how they have lead responsibility for many operations now in Helmand. Full responsibility—that is, full transition to Afghan security control—is from the end of 2014, so we are not conscious of any difference between the approach of the United States, and its intentions for its armed forces, and ours; nor would we want there to be any difference. The right hon. Gentleman is quite right to express alarm at the idea of such a difference, which is not something that the Government intend or would accept.

The leaked document to which he refers should not have too much importance attributed to it. It was actually a collection of the views and various opinions of Taliban detainees held in custody, and it should not be taken as a necessarily accurate reflection of the overall strategic situation. I do not accept, therefore, that a leaked document of Taliban views contradicts everything I have said in this statement about the steady progress that is being made—steady progress always qualified by my saying how fragile it is in some areas, and how the picture has been varied.

That brings me to the right hon. Gentleman’s next question, because he asks about the number of incidents. It has risen over the past year in Regional Command East and Regional Command South West, but it has gone down in Regional Command South, down particularly sharply in Helmand, our own area of responsibilities, and down on average throughout the country. It is true also, nevertheless, that some of those incidents have been considerable attacks and cost civilian lives. About 80% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan are caused by insurgent activity, and that is why the civilian casualty figures are as he cites—something, therefore, that we cannot at all be complacent about.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about the academy, and I can of course assure him that the necessary protection will be in place. The academy will be on the same site as the United States academy, and full protection will be afforded to it.

On the strength of Afghan national security forces, they will be built up, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, to a total strength of 352,000. Decisions will be made—probably at the NATO summit in Chicago, which the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister and I will attend—about the strength of Afghan national security forces in later years, and about what the international community’s financial contribution will be. We certainly expect the United Kingdom to make a significant contribution to those forces after 2014.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about oral statements, but I must gently point out that we introduced the quarterly statements on Afghanistan, having called for them for a long time during the previous Parliament, and indeed a monthly report to Parliament. We will always consider requests for further statements, but we have a great deal more statements on the matter than was the case in the previous Parliament.

On regional efforts, the Istanbul meeting was important, and the forthcoming economic co-operation conference that I mentioned will be important also in binding in the partners, but at the Bonn conference it was striking how the regional partners were committed to economic and development co-operation with Afghanistan, as well as all of us who make such a large security contribution.

It would not be fair to say that a consensus on the future, which the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly looks for in Afghanistan on constitutional arrangements, has yet been reached, but the meeting of the Loya Jirga was important progress, as is the establishment of the Taliban’s political office, although that is at an early stage. It does not indicate necessarily that they have signed up to the idea of reconciliation overall, nor that they are united on it, but it is one indication of progress.

The conduct of forthcoming elections, including the presidential one, will be a very important factor in Afghanistan’s political future and in its stability. We saw in the most recent round of elections—the presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan—an improvement in the holding of free and fair elections conducted in an orderly way. We look for another improvement in the next presidential election.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement. I share his approach to the draw-down of troops, which depends on the conditions on the ground, and I note that the cost of the ANSF post-2015 is still to be resolved but will, I hope, emerge after the NATO summit. Will he say a little more about the ongoing negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar? Those discussions are clearly very important. Is there anything that we can do to give them more impetus?

[Mr Hague]

As I just said, it is too early to say very much about those negotiations, but the United Kingdom has, as my hon. Friend knows, for a long time supported the concept of reconciliation in Afghanistan, including the involvement of the Taliban, provided ultimately that the conditions of their breaking with al-Qaeda and accepting the constitution of Afghanistan can be met. The negotiations are at an early stage and do not necessarily indicate that the Taliban are in favour of reconciliation or have decided collectively to pursue it. It is the possible beginning of a process. We will have to see how that goes, but it is too early to say anything more than that about it at the moment.

Somalia

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on his speech, on the work that he is doing in this regard, and on the establishment of the conference. I congratulate the Secretary of State for International Development on his many visits to Somalia. I also congratulate the shadow Foreign Secretary on his speech, and particularly the passage on piracy, which bore a close resemblance to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on the subject.

Somalia is a country of violence, insecurity and human tragedy. The recent famine resulted in thousands of people being displaced, suffering and dying. In its wake, the famine has brought conflict, insecurity and a slow response from the international community. The cause is weak political leadership. There have been 15 internationally sponsored peace talks but, at the end of the day, their conclusions have failed to produce a settlement. In the view of Saferworld, an excellent non-governmental organisation that spends a lot of time on the ground, that is because the debate revolves around exclusive processes between Somalia’s political elites and foreigners. Local Somalis feel shut out, and a trust deficit has opened up between them and their leaders. It is important that the conference does not go down that route. I quite understand that civil society groups will not be attending a conference of Heads of State, but I hope that there will be close contact with that particular group in the build-up to the conference.

Without security, we cannot address the humanitarian situation or promote longer-term development. Defeating al-Shabaab and piracy will not be enough; we must eliminate local grievances and conflicts within parties. This is not only about peace with al-Shabaab; it is about lower-level conflicts, and I welcome the focus on local areas of stability. We must be careful, however, not to derail the process by putting in too much by way of resources and making unrealistic bureaucratic demands without having a good understanding of local power dynamics. We must promote legitimate representation, which is often different from what is expected internationally. It is grounded in traditional processes, which are sometimes more successful than local elections. This is not easy—even Somalis disagree about it—but important issues of human rights, democracy and the role of women are involved.

I would be interested to hear from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham), about the two-state solution that was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Alun Michael). I have to confess that I have an open mind on that question, but I find it slightly ironic that a Welsh MP who believes in the United Kingdom should be calling for such a separation in Somalia.

[Alun Michael]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Richard Ottaway]

Yes—I asked for that.

[Alun Michael]

In Wales we believe in the value of being part of the United Kingdom as well as having certain devolved matters. Were that choice available to the Somalilanders, it would be acceptable, but it should be their choice.

[Richard Ottaway]

My comment, made in jest, has produced a serious response from the right hon. Gentleman. Countries that function well should stay together, but those that do not function well obviously do not want to know about each other. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that matter.

We have a long way to go before we achieve stability. The famine conditions are ending, but tens of thousands have died and 1.5 million have been displaced. Al-Shabaab has banned contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross. At the same time, African Union troops are conducting a major offensive, and the Kenyans are establishing a buffer zone on their southern border as they try to cope with large numbers of refugees. Even they are now pausing, however, and trying to find out whether they have the backing of the international community.

As the Foreign Secretary said, there will be an opportunity, when the transitional national Government’s mandate ends, to look at a broader base from which to conduct policy. The essential needs, however, are to deny terrorists a base from which to operate, and to establish stability. The conference must look at the root causes: poverty, human rights issues, security and the need to work with civil society. It must also focus on conflict prevention, the elimination of famine and hunger and the improvement of health. I am the first to recognise that Rome was not built in a day, however, and I think that this will take a generation of input and influence.

The Foreign Affairs Committee recently published a report on piracy, which is one of the headings for the conference. It might seem self-centred to talk about something that affects British interests: shipping comprises 1.8% of our gross domestic product. None the less, piracy is a component part of Somalia’s instability, and it clearly needs to be addressed. As the Foreign Secretary pointed out, 40% of world trade passes through the Indian ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Globally, the annual cost of piracy runs at between $7 billion and $12 billion. The extra costs to shipping include the extra premiums, the ransoms, the extra staff required, the higher wages and the danger money; they all add up to a substantial sum.

Piracy perpetrates instability in Somalia and threatens other economies. Nairobi has seen an increase in criminality, for example. There is a threat to international security, and rumours of links between the pirates and al-Shabaab. There is also the human cost. Some 3,500 hostages have been taken, 62 of whom have been killed. There are up to 3,000 pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. They are a mixture of fishermen and maritime criminals. They are all aged between 15 and 30, and they are uneducated and unskilled. Their operations stretch far into the Indian ocean.

The pirates’ behaviour is the complete opposite of the traditional role of the pirate that we read about in books when we were kids. Then, the pirates captured the ship, threw the crew over the side and sold the cargo. Today, the crew is the valuable item because the cargo is hard to sell. The pirates operate by sailing a single skiff alongside a ship, throwing up a hook and hopping on board. They operate out of mother ships that have a range of some 1,400 miles. They behave in a violent manner; some 15 crewmen were killed in 2011.

The impact of piracy specifically on the UK has been limited. We all know of the case of Paul and Rachel Chandler and their yacht, the Lynn Rival. I am pleased to say that they are now free, and that their yacht is back in their custody. Two ships were affected in 2009—the MV St James’s Park and the Asian Glory—and Judith Tebbutt was snatched from a Kenyan beach. She remains in custody. It is therefore right and proper that the UK should play a leading role in the international response to piracy, and we are all very much involved in that.

The response from ship owners has been good. They recognise the need for self-defence and for best management practices to minimise the risk of attack. Some nations have put vessel protection detachments on their ships. They are troops from the nation state in question. Many ship owners have also started to use private armed security guards. It is a fact that no ship with armed guards on board has ever been pirated; it is a significant and effective deterrent. The Foreign Affairs Committee therefore welcomes the Government’s announcement that private armed security guards will be allowed on British ships. The Government have published interim guidance, but it is thin on detail. It has been left to the ship owners to draw up the rules, and—dare one say it—the responsibility for the outcome has been offloaded on to the shoulders of the owners. The guidance advises use of the minimum force necessary. There is a question to which everyone needs an answer, however. If a skiff is approaching a ship at high speed carrying pirates with rifles or rocket-propelled grenade launchers, can the armed guards on board the ship open fire? The Government must provide clearer direction on this. If Royal Navy troops were on board these ships, they would be given guidance on what to do. That guidance should be made available to private armed security guards.

Some 60 marine security companies operate in the area, and it is very difficult to tell which of them are good and which are bad. We must give some consideration to the question of licensing weapons. We must also liaise with port and coastal states surrounding Somalia, to establish an agreement on the transit of weapons used by private armed security guards.

The naval policing of the Indian ocean has been good, but patchy. In response to UN calls, there are now three ongoing international operations. NATO Operation Ocean Shield and the EUNAVFOR—European Union Naval Force Somalia—Operation Atalanta both operate from Northwood, where they are based in adjacent rooms. There is also the combined US multinational taskforce, operating from the Gulf. Several other countries also have their own regimes. There should be a greater degree of co-ordination. Do we really need three different organisations, all regularly travelling to the Gulf to discuss operations? We accept that this is not an immediate priority, but it must be addressed.

The naval response has been effective. Although the number of attacks has risen, the proportion of successful attacks has fallen. This year alone, however, there have been two successful hijackings and Somali pirates have taken 28 hostages. The Royal Navy Fort Victoria engaged in a highly successful intervention, in which 14 pirates were arrested and taken to the Seychelles. It is right that we adopt a cautious approach to military operations, but there is more work to be done in this area.

International co-ordination is particularly important in one respect. There have been nine UN Security Council resolutions and we have established a contact group on piracy, in which the UK is playing a prominent role, but we must now address how to get the pirates to justice. Nine out of every 10 pirates taken are released without trial. The failure to prosecute has been criticised by industry. The Baltic Exchange has said that the

“UK has gained a degree of notoriety”

for failure to prosecute. In the past two years, 21 pirates have been transferred to other nations, but recently there have been practical difficulties in the implementation of such transfers. There are also difficulties in respect of the presentation of evidence at trial, and we must review how we collect evidence.

International maritime law allows pirates to be prosecuted anywhere, and former French Minister Jack Lang has suggested to the UN Security Council that an international piracy tribunal might be established. The Government were right to reject that proposition, which would have been very expensive and complicated, and to focus instead on the transfer agreements to Kenya. Given that such transfers have recently stopped, however, I would like to know what steps the Foreign Office will take to restart them.

The ransoms that have been paid have been eye-wateringly high. In 2007, the average ransom was $600,000, but that figure had grown to $5 million by 2011. The total ransom sums paid in 2011 were $135 million. They are paid by air drop, and owners see them as the price of doing business. Ransom payments are not illegal under UK law but, rightly, Government policy is that ransoms should not be paid and they have nothing to do with ransom payments. However, one is left with the slight feeling that they have been turning a blind eye to the practice.

I have no better suggestion at present, however, other than that we should take a harder look at financial tracking. We have little information about where ransom money goes. Some goes to the pirates, some goes to Somali officials, and one suspects that some goes to terrorist groups and international criminals. We need both more information and more action on tracking. The Serious Organised Crime Agency might investigate the flows of ransom money through the UK financial system, and the Government should establish a mechanism to collect data.

I apologise to the House for having focused almost exclusively on piracy, but it has been a particularly difficult problem. In truth, the Government have not been doing badly, but there is much more to be done. Somalia remains a very troubled region, and I wish the conference well and hope the outcome will be successful.

Syria

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The Assad regime certainly feels that. As we have discussed before, Iran has certainly given active support to the Syrian regime in the form of equipment as well as advice on how to deal with civil disorder and rebellion. There may be many other ways, of which we are unaware, in which the Iranian regime supports the Syrian regime. This is a classic piece of hypocrisy. The Iranians have supported revolution elsewhere in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia; they supported disorder in those countries, but they are against it in Syria. I think that the whole Arab world sees through that, which further widens the current widening separation between Iran and its Arab neighbours.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I share the Foreign Secretary’s approach and urge him to maintain the political, economic and diplomatic pressure that he has set out. The third step that he announced was that he would intensify contact with members of the Syrian opposition. Will he elaborate a little on that: is it on a multilateral or bilateral basis, and is there any limit to the level of resources that he is able to commit to helping that opposition in Syria?

[Mr Hague]

That is bilateral and multilateral. I have already mentioned some of the bilateral contact we have had and the fact that we have an ambassador-level representative dealing with the opposition. I also believe that one of the roles for the wider international coalition would be to meet the various groups of the Syrian opposition, which I think would be a catalyst for the opposition to propose their plans, to make clear commitments to a democratic future for their country and to set out their commitment to human rights and, indeed, the protection of minorities. It is also important for them to try to come together, since one of the challenges for the opposition is to develop a single platform and a single agreed body for taking forward their concerns. There is no limit on what resources we can provide. We have already provided training in the documentation of human rights abuses, in strategic communications and so forth. We may be able to do more in the future.

Human Rights

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Westminster Hall

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak for the first time with you in the Chair, Mr Rosindell. As you are a distinguished member of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in your own right, I can think of no one more appropriate to chair this debate.

The Committee has published its report on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2010-11 human rights report. I am delighted that we have the chance to debate it today. Human rights are under the spotlight around the globe, so nothing else could be more important to debate. I welcome the Minister to the Front Bench, having seen him in other incarnations today; he is obviously having a busy day. I pat the Foreign Office on the back for its decision to honour its election pledge to continue publishing its annual report on human rights, albeit in a more cost-effective form.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee was not here for the earlier debate on India, which lasted for one and a half hours. Apparently, we now have only one and a half hours to debate human rights. Will he use his good offices as Chairman to ensure that, in future years, we have a full day’s debate on international human rights? It is simply not good enough for the British Parliament to spend one and a half hours a year on international human rights.

[Richard Ottaway]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I suspect that that point may be made by other hon. Members today, and I agree completely with the sentiment. For that reason, I do not intend to speak for too long, to allow others to speak.

I welcome the fact that the Government are still publishing human rights reports, although in a more modest form than in the past. I am delighted that Amnesty International welcomes that as well and has said:

“It is something that we value enormously…we have real respect for this report”.

I also welcome the fact that the Government continue to update the list of countries of concern online on a quarterly basis and that they have established an advisory group on human rights that includes practising lawyers, academics and representatives of non-governmental organisations, many of whom have eminent positions in the human rights system. Again, Amnesty welcomes that, for the obvious reason that, if experts talk to the FCO, it can produce a more informed report.

The report was based mainly on the period from January to December 2010. Much has happened since then in the human rights field, with the Arab spring, Bahrain, Syria, Russia and numerous other important events. On the Arab spring, the Foreign Affairs Committee will go to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya in two or three weeks’ time. The role of the Foreign Office in recognising and promoting human rights there will be a part of our inquiry as it develops.

I will touch on a couple of countries of concern. The first is Bahrain, about which I suspect we may hear more and where there have been many developments. I will not go through them now, as colleagues will be well aware of them, but it was our view that Bahrain should have been included in the report’s list of countries of concern. In response to the Select Committee’s requests for an update on the situation in Bahrain, the Secretary of State wrote to me saying:

“We do not hesitate to express disagreement with the Bahraini authorities. Although we do not agree on everything, Bahrain is a key ally of the UK and this close relationship allows us to have the frank discussions that often are necessary. We have, therefore, made it clear to the Bahraini Government that the civil rights of peaceful opposition figures, along with the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, must be respected.”

I support that approach. I recognise the Bahraini regime’s dignified response and its establishment of the independent commission of inquiry, but I encourage the Foreign Office to keep on the button as far as Bahrain is concerned, to follow through on the commission’s work and to ensure that the Bahraini Government implement the necessary reforms.

The second area of concern is Libya. Again, I need not remind the House of the developments there, but it is worth quoting the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who addressed the UN Security Council recently. She raised concerns about the detainees being held by revolutionary forces, saying that some 8,500 prisoners were being held in about 60 centres. She said:

“The lack of oversight by the central authority creates an environment conducive to torture and ill treatment.”

The Minister responded by confirming that the Government

“do not lose sight of the victims of this conflict. The conditions of those in detention have been raised by Ministers on visits, and directly with the Libyan Government.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2012; Vol. 538, c. 609.]

The situation at the moment is pretty dire. Militias are free to roam around, and unlimited weapons are available. We need basic adherence to the fundamental human rights that we consider important. Again, the Committee will consider that.

However, it is not all bad news. Across the globe in Burma, distinct improvements have been made. I like to think that that is a result of pressure by the international community. Changes have been made to the electoral law that allow Aung San Suu Kyi’s party to register for the forthcoming by-elections, political prisoners have been released and moves have been made towards greater media freedom, all of which are important human rights advances that we recognise, welcome and accept. We must work to secure more critical resolutions in the UN and make our concerns known at the highest level with Burma’s neighbours, as well as our expectation that continuing pressure will be kept on the country. I urge the Foreign Office to remain vigilant and press for further reform, but we should recognise that the improvements have come about partly as a result of the Government’s influence.

The next report will consider some cross-cutting issues, subject to the Committee’s agreement. We will be considering involvement in rendition, and we welcome the fact that the UK has examined its own human rights practices in that area. We are looking forward to hearing in more detail why the detainee inquiry chaired by Sir Peter Gibson has been brought to an end. From what I hear, it was clearly the right decision, and I welcome the fact that the Foreign Secretary has kept open the intention to hold an independent, judge-led inquiry after all police investigations have been concluded. That is obviously the right way forward. I hope that the Minister can confirm that.

The Minister’s colleague, the Minister of State with responsibility for soft power, wrote to us in November to say that Ministers have commissioned further work on the strategy and that a final version of the paper has still to be published, but did not include a date. Can the Minister update us on what is causing the delay and what exactly will be published? We touched in our report on the public diplomacy aspects of the Olympic games, so our dialogue with the Foreign Office on that matter has been ongoing.

I shall briefly touch on programme funding and official development assistance for human rights. There seems to be a bit of a dichotomy in that one has to be eligible for ODA funding to qualify for a human rights funding programme. It is conceivable that a country that at first sight may not qualify for ODA funding—the Chair of the Select Committee on International Development has gone now—has a human rights aspect that needs funding. That seems a little odd.

In conclusion, I should like to raise the fact that the World Service is being jammed by Iran and that there are problems with the BBC Persian TV output, which is particularly important in this area. Independent research shows that, in that part of the word, the service is the most trusted, impartial and objective international radio programme, which is probably why the regime is jamming it. I understand that Iran is a member of the International Telecommunication Union, which is a United Nations body. As such, it has committed itself to the free exchange of information and data for the benefit of all. Iran is therefore in breach of its obligations under that treaty. Again, I hope that the Foreign Office can take that up with the regimes.

I will now leave it to other hon. Members to express a view on our report, which we think is particularly important. We will publish another such report this year. I look forward to hearing the contributions of other colleagues.

EU Sanctions (Iran)

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Accommodating the level of interest in this matter will require brevity, which will be exemplified, I am sure, by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s approach. The challenge is how to tighten our grip on the Iranian economy without damaging our own. Has he received assurances from other oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia, that they can up production to replace the oil that will not be coming to Europe?

[Mr Hague]

No. It is a matter for each country to decide whether to change its oil production. This and many other factors affect the oil market. The price of oil is very similar today to what it has been over the past few months. Yesterday, the main benchmark price was $110 per barrel. That is a couple of dollars different from the price in December, which covers the period in which the discussion about sanctions and the strait of Hormuz has been going on. Many other factors affect the oil market. Some countries are increasing their oil production anyway. Iraq is planning huge increases in oil production and some Libyan oil production is coming back on stream. There are many forces at work, both positive and negative, in the oil market. We should not, therefore, exaggerate the effect of this measure.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Tuesday 17th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

We gave a great deal of attention to that at the Bonn conference. The ministerial champion for tackling violence against women and girls overseas attended the civil society events, and I am pleased to say that 50% of the Afghan delegation to the civil society forum were female and a leading female civil society representative presented views at the main conference. The importance of the rights of women and their involvement was centre stage at the Bonn conference, and we assisted in that process.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

The Government’s stated policy objective in Afghanistan is to deny al-Qaeda and other extremists bases from which they can attack the UK and other British interests. In a letter to me of 6 December, copied to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, referring to the threat from al-Qaeda, said that

“while the threat is not on the scale it once was…it does nevertheless remain a serious concern.”

Does that, which can only be interpreted as a downgrading of the threat in Afghanistan, have any impact on the timetable for withdrawal?

[Mr Hague]

We hope all the time that we are making progress against the threat in Afghanistan, and there is no doubt that in recent times al-Qaeda has suffered very serious damage and setbacks in Afghanistan and its vicinity. That threat is not over, as my hon. Friend was saying, but our efforts to improve security in Afghanistan continue, and it is a combination of our assessment of that threat and the need for continued political progress in Afghanistan to stabilise its regions. It is our assessment of a combination of all those factors that leads to our decisions on troop levels, with a decision for 2012, which we recently announced.

British Embassy (Tehran)

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Wednesday 30th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who has joined in the condemnation of these completely unacceptable acts and the commendation of our ambassador and his staff. He asked about the locally engaged staff. Other than security staff, locally engaged staff were not in the embassy compound yesterday because, in anticipation of the demonstrations, we had asked them not to come to work, so they were not involved in the violence and danger. We will, of course, look after them financially and have a continuing concern for their welfare, although it must be pointed out that, as former Foreign Secretaries will remember, our locally engaged staff in Tehran have unfortunately always been at some degree of risk because of previous unacceptable behaviour by the Iranian regime.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to remind us of the wider context of the IAEA report and the action the Chancellor announced last week to sever financial links between our financial institutions and those of Iran. He asked how dialogue is to be maintained. Clearly these events make that more difficult. We do not take such decisions at all lightly, but after the events we have come to the conclusion that no assurance the Iranian regime could deliver on the safety of our staff could be believed. We have an overriding duty of care for those staff.

It is still possible in other forums to pursue dialogue with Iran where appropriate and meaningful. We are part of the E3 plus 3 process—the six nations that wish to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear programme—as is the United States, which does not have an embassy in Tehran. We meet the Iranians at various multilateral forums and organisations. I met the Iranian Foreign Minister at the UN General Assembly earlier this year. As I have said, we are not advocating the severing of all diplomatic relations. It is important that dialogue about these issues can continue, but it is not possible to maintain an embassy under these circumstances and in the light of these threats and actions.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about bellicose rhetoric. Of course, that is something that comes from Iran, not the United Kingdom. We heard that on Sunday in the Iranian Parliament there were chants of, “Death to Britain”, and it is unimaginable that we would ever treat any country in that way in our deliberations here in the House of Commons. It is the bellicose rhetoric coming from Iran that should come to an end. I am of course open to making other statements to the House in future and more wide-ranging considerations of our future policy towards Iran.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I share the Foreign Secretary’s sense of outrage and welcome his statement and the steps he is taking. Iran is propping up the regime in Syria, undermining peace efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and supporting terrorism in a number of arenas around the world. Does he agree that there is only one language these people understand: the language of the firmest possible action? Yet does he agree that we must somehow maintain a degree of dialogue somewhere along the line?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend is right that there have been no rewards for anything other than firm dealings with Iran. Many efforts have been made to induce the Iranians into a more substantial dialogue than we have enjoyed in recent years. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), when Foreign Secretary, made valiant efforts to do so, to which we should pay tribute, but his efforts and those of other European Foreign Ministers have not been successful at any stage. It is important to respond firmly to such provocations and attacks, but to continue to seek meaningful negotiations on the nuclear programme, and that remains our position.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

There have been initial proposals from Palestinians, but both sides are required to present more substantive proposals by 26 January. If that does not happen and the Quartet process does not succeed, the peace process will be entering a new crisis and a very troubling and concerning phase. I do not want to anticipate now how we will react to that in future at the United Nations. I set out our current position in my statement of 9 November.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

In view of the complete lack of trust between Israel and Palestine, we have to dig deep to find common ground between the two sides. Does my right hon. Friend agree that in the short term we should focus on confidence-building measures to provide a platform for the resumption of negotiations in the future?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, all confidence-building measures will be welcome; indeed, the Quartet and its representative Tony Blair have often worked on them. We would welcome such measures alongside the Quartet process of which I have been speaking, but we still have not seen any such measures in recent times.