(1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI am very grateful to have secured this debate on the impact of the Cleat Hill pump incident on residents, and I welcome the Minister to her place. As she knows, I have a number of questions, some of which she will be able to answer, and a number of which will be for other Departments—although I am sure that she will be able to pass those on to the relevant Minister.
On Tuesday 2 July, during drilling for the installation of a ground source heat pump in a residential neighbourhood back garden on Cleat Hill in my constituency, a reservoir of gas was encountered at a shallow depth of approximately 100 metres. Subsequently, certain discussions, recommendations and actions were made by various parties in response. On Saturday 19 October, an explosion at the property resulted in the death of two people: Paul Swales and Julia Harris. The blast happened close to where gas from the underground reservoir had been venting. By the time of the explosion, gas had been venting from the shallow reservoir for 109 days.
Approximately 50 households were evacuated from their homes on Saturday 19 October, and for nearly five weeks now my constituents have been living with relatives, friends or, in the majority of cases, in temporary accommodation provided by Bedford borough council. I take this opportunity to commend my constituents for their resilience to the disruption caused to their daily lives, and to the anxiety that has been caused and which continues to be felt by many. I also commend the community and spiritual support offered by St Mark’s church in Brickhill, which has provided facilities, fellowship, food and a focus for residents over these five weeks. I pass my condolences to the families of Paul Swales and Julia Harris.
There are currently a series of investigations, including by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, regarding the period between the encountering of gas on Tuesday 2 July and the gas explosion on Saturday 19 October. Hence, the focus of this debate is on the circumstances and regulations preceding the earlier date and subsequent to the latter date. However, there are some open questions on the minds of my residents regarding the period under investigation, and I believe that they are worth putting on the record in this debate, although I appreciate the Minister will not wish to comment at this stage.
Which agency was in charge of making my residents safe after the discovery of gas on 2 July? Which agency was responsible for signing off the mitigation of venting gas? Who, if anyone, was responsible for the venting of gas for the period between 2 July and 19 October? Did the responsible entity have the requisite expertise to take on those responsibilities? What procedures were put in place to ensure that the venting of gas in a residential neighbourhood remained safe? Were the correct responses made when residents provided concerns about the venting of gas? Which regulations guided the response by agencies from 2 July, and were they sufficient? My residents hope that the various investigations will be able to provide answers to those questions and the many others that they have raised.
I turn to the current situation. The British Geological Survey continues to monitor for gas in both the air and soil in and around the 100-metre cordoned-off area. Recent measurements have been consistently at negligible levels, but monitoring continues to take account of various climatic features—
That may strike some people as odd, but it is the normal Commons procedure.
There will be a further meeting tonight hosted by Bedford borough council. I record my thanks for the leadership shown by Laura Church, the chief executive of the council, and my thanks to Craig Austin and the other staff of the council for their considerable efforts on behalf of residents. The meetings are helpful in addressing immediate concerns, but I will raise some other issues.
First, there is the return of residents to their homes. As might be anticipated, there are differences between residents regarding their confidence in returning to their homes. Many are eager to do so, but many residents have considerable anxiety about a return, with concerns for their safety and that of their children or loved ones. I have spoken to residents, and a major assistance in building that confidence would be an accountable, authoritative voice to underwrite the assertion that it is safe to return. However, it seems that none of the agencies have the combination of expertise and authority to make such a call. In the absence of that, the default may be that the risks of returning will be transferred from a responsible body to each resident, with potential implications for future insurance and other liabilities, which clearly should not happen. What steps can the Minister take to end this Mexican stand-off regarding advice on a safe return for residents to their property? Will she urgently investigate in what form a responsible agency or authority could provide the underwritten reassurance that it is safe for residents to return?
Over this period, Bedford borough council has incurred considerable additional costs and diverted many officers and staff to manage the needs of residents. The exceptional demands for expenditure and human resources came shortly after one of the most significant incidences of flooding in the area; in fact, the Met Office reported that Bedfordshire had its wettest September since records began in 1836. Much of that rain came in the very last part of the month and caused significant flooding. As the Minister is well aware, there is a scheme—the Bellwin scheme—that can be used to support local authorities with covering those exceptional costs. I know that the Department has been in discussions with Bedford borough council and is waiting to hear whether a formal application will be made. I also understand that Ministers are empowered by section 155 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to decide whether to activate a scheme after considering the circumstances of each individual case. There is discretion here. Should the council make a formal application, will the Minister ask the Secretary of State to use the powers granted to her under section 155 to approve the application by Bedford borough council?
The incident at Cleat Hill should also stimulate a review of regulations to see whether they are sufficient or should be updated. It may surprise hon. Members, as it did my constituents, that it is permissible to drill a hole 100 metres deep in a back garden without any permit or notification required. Such boreholes are considered permitted development. Will the Minister review whether the drilling of a 100-metre hole in a residential area should continue to be classified as permitted development, or whether there should be a permitting or notification requirement?
The Cleat Hill incident also raises some questions about the regulation of the installation of heat pumps more generally. More than 30,000 ground source heat pumps have been installed in the United Kingdom, and this is the first known incident in which a gas reservoir has been tapped during the drilling for a ground source heat pump. However, the UK currently plans to roll out many more heat pumps—a large proportion of which will be ground source heat pumps—in its effort to achieve net zero.
We must remember that boreholes are drilled for a variety of reasons, not just for heat pumps, and that the incident at Cleat Hill was about the drilling of boreholes, not the heat pump specifically. However, the Ground Source Heat Pump Association, which is not party to the investigation, wrote to me to say:
“While this is the first incident of its kind in the UK, and is extremely unlikely to be repeated, we do not feel it would be appropriate to simply wait until the formal investigation has concluded.”
It went on to say:
“On that basis, the GSHPA has communicated with all its members advising them to procure gas monitoring equipment, if they do not already possess it. As a precautionary measure, we have instructed members to go above and beyond present regulations and guidance and to follow the procedures given in the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations which apply to Coal Authority Areas when drilling boreholes for ground source heat pump ground loops at all sites.”
In light of this, will the Minister ask the relevant Department to review the geographic scope of the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 and decide whether they should be extended to cover a broader part of the United Kingdom? More generally, will she ask the relevant Minister to engage with the Ground Source Heat Pump Association to review and, where necessary, update the regulations and official guidance on the installation of ground source heat pumps?
As you might imagine, Madam Deputy Speaker, my residents who have been out of their homes for five weeks have some practical questions about insurance and the impact on house values. I would like to put those on the record, although I appreciate that there is limited scope for consideration of official support by the Minister. The first question is about the variation between insurers regarding the number of days that a policy holder can be absent from their home. For some insurers, that number is 30 days; for others, it is 60 days. I wrote to the Association of British Insurers, which advised me that although those provisions remain in place,
“insurers will take a case by case approach and look to respond sympathetically where customers are likely to remain out of their homes beyond the limits provided for in the policy due to the evacuation.”
The second question is about the impact that the discovery of this shallow gas reservoir and the explosion may have on my residents’ future ability to obtain home insurance, and on the premiums attached to such policies. Again, I put those questions to the Association of British Insurers, and I am grateful for its response. The ABI cannot comment on individual pricing or commercial decisions by its members, but added:
“That said, we have raised the concern with our members, and we are not currently aware of any general issues relating to Cleat Hill that would change the general underwriting approach applied to the area. It will be a commercial decision for individual insurers and a range of criteria unrelated to the incident may impact on an individual household’s future risk. These will continue to be assessed by insurers on a commercial and competitive basis.”
On house values, I am grateful for the response to my question from the Minister’s colleague, which states:
“On your question about the effect on property values, it is possible that there could be some diminution of property values, however our expectation is that property values will return relatively quickly to comparable local levels.”
I am grateful to be able to put those points from the ABI and the Minister’s colleague on the record.
I will close by commenting on the importance of gaining a comprehensive understanding. In July, my residents were alerted to the release of gas, but were content to return to their homes because they believed the situation was under control. Now they face a return to their homes in very different circumstances, with many more questions, much greater anxiety and much less trust in taking people at their word. Currently, the size and scope of the gas reservoir at Cleat Hill is not known. An assessment is being made of the costs of a project to provide this information, but it is likely to be beyond the budget of the local authority.
The central issue remains the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the status of the gas reservoir. How significant is it? What is its geographical scope? Did the period of venting create fissures in the layer of rock that had kept the gas from seeping into the soil? Did the 109-day period of venting release such a proportion of gas as to make the rock layer susceptible to collapse from the downward pressure of the 100 metres of soil above? These are all very important questions to be answered.
There is an emerging plan for the gas monitors and alarms to be available to local residents and connected to a 24/7 response centre. This longer-term monitoring plan is designed to provide an early alert to residents should there be any future change in detected methane levels. However, can the Minister advise us of which agency would be responsible for the ongoing monitoring if such a long-term plan were put in place? Can she assure me that the Department will be able to seek expert advice, so that the correct plan is put in place for both the regularity and duration of testing, including of the stability of the closed borehole and of the rock layer containing the gas reservoir?
To remind the Minister, the incidence of breaking a seal on a shallow gas reservoir is historically extremely rare. It is not exactly comparable, but the drilling in 2007 of boreholes for geothermal energy in Staufen in Germany created significant problems a decade later. In that case, water was released, not gas, but I believe the incident reinforces the need to gather a comprehensive understanding of the situation at Cleat Hill. So will the Minister instruct officials in her Department to liaise with Bedford borough council to assess the proposals to conduct a full survey of the scale and scope of the gas reservoir at Cleat Hill, and see whether the cost of that survey can be borne centrally?
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the need to ensure that this regime works. We recognise that there are challenges, which is why we are bringing forward a number of measures.
On the point about existing contracts that have been signed by people purchasing a leasehold property, is it the Government’s view that those were legitimate contracts and that there is therefore a risk in trying retrospectively to reverse the conditions of those contracts? Or is it the Government’s view that those were abusive contracts and that there is therefore a public policy interest in retrospectively eliminating the leasehold element of them?
I hope that I will be able to answer my hon. Friends’ questions in a moment when I run quickly through our amendments. We are banning the sale of leasehold houses in all but unusual circumstances, but for those that are out there at the moment, there must be an ability to ensure that they can buy the freehold and move from the leasehold challenges to a freehold. Let me deal with some specifics that I hope will answer some of the questions that have been raised.
I start by declaring an interest: my wife is the joint chief executive of the Law Commission, whose work in this area I intend to reference in my remarks.
I rise to speak to the amendments and new clauses that stand in my name. Before doing so, I would like to put on record my thanks to all those hon. Members who served on the Public Bill Committee for so ably scrutinising the many technical and complex provisions that the Bill contains. There were, as one would expect, differences of opinion and emphasis, but it was also evident that there is a shared recognition that the Bill can and should be improved further, and an unusual degree of cross-party agreement as to some of the ways that might be achieved.
Despite reams of Government amendments tabled in Committee and for our consideration today, this Bill remains a distinctly unambitious piece of legislation. That is a matter of deep regret to those on the Labour Benches, not only because the Government’s paucity of ambition will see exploited leaseholders wait even longer for the current iniquitous leasehold system to be ended, but because it is also manifestly clear that there is widespread support across the House to go much further than this limited Bill does. Responsibility for the fact that the Bill does not contain so many of the commitments that successive Conservative Secretaries of State have made over recent years, not least in relation to the promised widespread introduction of the commonhold tenure, ultimately lies with Ministers. They had the opportunity to bring forward bold leasehold and commonhold reform legislation, and they made a political decision not to do so.
Although the Opposition appreciate the understandable desire of many leaseholders to see this Bill completely revamped so that it lives up to the many weighty promises made by the Government since 2017, we made clear at the outset in Committee that we did not intend to try to persuade Ministers to radically overhaul it by means of the many hundreds of amendments that would be required to implement all the Law Commission’s recommendations on enfranchisement, right to manage and commonhold. That remains our position. Whether this Bill receives Royal Assent or not before this Parliament is dissolved, a Labour Government will have to finish the job of finally bringing the leasehold system to an end by overhauling it to the lasting benefit of leaseholders and reinvigorating commonhold to such an extent that it will ultimately become the default and render leasehold obsolete. I reassure leaseholders across the country that we are absolutely determined to do so.
We recognise, however, that this limited Bill will provide a degree of relief to leasehold and freehold homeowners in England and Wales by giving them some greater rights, powers and protections over their homes. For that reason, we are extremely pleased it will complete its passage today, but we are determined to send to the other place the most robust piece of legislation that we can. That means rectifying the Bill’s remaining flaws and incorporating into it a select number of measures to further empower leaseholders and improve their rights. With that objective in mind, we have tabled a series of amendments and new clauses for consideration today. That they are almost identical to a number of those we discussed at length in Committee is a deliberate choice that reflects not only the importance we place on the changes they seek to secure, but the distinct lack of convincing responses from the Minister in Committee as to why the Government felt they needed to resist them.
Part 1 of the Bill concerns leasehold enfranchisement and extension. In seeking to implement the small subset of reasonable and proportionate Law Commission recommendations, it is almost entirely uncontentious. However, we believe that several provisions in this part are defective. We sought to remedy their deficiencies in Committee and we have tabled a number of amendments in an attempt to do so again.
Amendments 4 and 5 concern arguably the most significant provisions in this part when it comes to ensuring that the process of extending a lease or acquiring a freehold is as cheap as possible for existing leaseholders—namely the proposed new valuation process as provided for in clauses 9 to 11 and schedules 2 and 3. The current valuation method has a number of manifest flaws, and we fully support the new method as proposed in the Bill. However, with the applicable deferment rate becoming the primary driver of price to be paid in enfranchisement or extension claims under the new method, as a result of the abolition of marriage and hope value and the peppercorning of ground rents in the valuation calculation, we believe it is essential that it is set in a way that is fair to leaseholders. While the Government ostensibly agree, there is nothing on the face of the Bill to ensure that that will be the case and we therefore remain convinced that this Government, or a future one, could be lobbied by vested interests to set a deferment rate that will be punitive to leaseholders.
In resisting our efforts to amend the Bill in Committee to guard against such an outcome, the Minister argued that the Secretary of State must have flexibility to make decisions on the rate or rates. We agree; we are not suggesting that we bind the hands of Ministers by prescribing the rate or rates on the face of the Bill, but we do believe that the legislation should be amended to place a clear obligation on the Secretary of State to set a rate or rates with the overriding objective of encouraging leaseholders to acquire their freehold at the lowest possible cost.
The shadow Minister is right that there was a lot of consensus in Committee, so I hope he will not mind me probing him on some of the language he just used about the issue of setting rates. We all want to see what the Government do on deferment and capitalisation rates, but the shadow Minister used the term “punitive to leaseholders”. Does he accept that already embedded in the issues about ground rents and the changes here is a substantial transfer of value from freeholders to leaseholders, that the people who are more likely to suffer from punitive behaviour are those who entered into contracts historically from the freeholder side expecting that those values would be considered, and that it is a public policy decision that will change the value in those contracts?
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, which he made in Committee as well, if I am not mistaken. We very much think the risk is on the other side of the scale—that is, that a Government would be tempted to set a rate that is damaging to leaseholders as a result of being lobbied by vested interests. While there is a balance to be struck, we think it is right that we put on the face of the Bill that the objective in setting the deferment rate as part of the premium calculation must be to ensure that leaseholders acquire their freehold at the lowest possible cost. Amendments 4 and 5 would ensure that that is the case and I commend them to the House.
Part 2 of the Bill makes changes to other rights of long leaseholders. It contains the four clauses in the Bill that implement Law Commission recommendations on the right to manage, several of which we have sought to improve, as well as clause 21, which makes provision for a new enfranchisement right to extinguish a ground rent without having to extend a lease. We still have absolutely no idea how this clause—or clauses 7 and 8, for that matter—will interact with any proposals that might emerge from the recently closed consultation on restricting ground rents for all existing leases. The Minister must provide further clarification on that; it cannot be right that we could be dealing with such a significant issue when we get to ping-pong stage, in due course.
We very much welcome the intent of clause 21 and schedule 7, which it gives effect to. Even if unamended, they will ensure that some leaseholders can enjoy reduced premiums and secure nominal ground rent ownership of their properties without the need to go through the challenge and expense of repeated lease extensions. However, we remain unconvinced by the Government’s proposed conferral of this new right only on those leaseholders with leases with an unexpired term of more than 150 years. In resisting our attempt to remove the 150-year threshold from the Bill in Committee, the Minister essentially made two arguments. The first was that there is a need to
“put a finger on the scale”
somewhere. In other words, the Government take the view that the new right must be restricted based on lease length. The second argument was that in determining the threshold for restriction, the primary consideration should be which leaseholders are
“unlikely to be interested in, or do not need, a lease extension.”––[Official Report, Leasehold and Freehold Reform Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2024; c. 271.]
We do not believe that either argument is particularly strong.
First, any long lease threshold for the new right is ultimately entirely arbitrary, as evidenced by the fact that the Government chose a different threshold from the one recommended by the Law Commission.
Secondly, there is a principled argument that we should trust leaseholders to make decisions based on what is right for them and their individual circumstances, rather than denying a broad category of leaseholders a new statutory right on the basis that Ministers know best what is in their interest—a viewpoint that we would have assumed those on the Conservative Benches would support.
As I put it to the Minister in Committee, there could be all sorts of reasons why someone with a lease shorter than 150 years might want to buy out only their ground rent, including simply that they are unable to afford the premium required to secure a 990-year lease under clauses 7 and 8. Denying them that right on the grounds that other leaseholders might advertently or inadvertently disadvantage themselves by using the new right to extinguish only their ground rent strikes us as overly paternalistic and misguided.
We remain of the view that there is a strong case for simply deleting the 150-year threshold entirely given that the “remaining years” test that applies is arbitrary and that the most common forms of lease are 90, 99 and 125 years. Amendment 8 would do so, thereby making the new right to replace rent with peppercorn rent available to all existing leaseholders. I commend it to the House.
Part 3 of the Bill contains a wide range of measures relating to the regulation of leasehold. We have tabled several amendments designed to strengthen the provisions in it. Arguably, the most important are amendment 10 and new clause 3, concerning litigation costs. Although we support the aim of scrapping the presumption that leaseholders will pay their freeholders’ legal costs when they have challenged poor practice, we believe that, in merely limiting the ability of landlords to do so, the Government are creating an incentive for freeholders to litigate in a way that is likely to erode the general presumption they are seeking to implement.
As we argued in Committee, a far more sensible approach would be to legislate for a general prohibition on claiming litigation costs from leaseholders, and then to provide for a limited number of defined exceptions to that general rule by means of regulations—for example, in cases in which the landlord is a leasehold-owned company, or in which the costs are, in the opinion of the tribunal, reasonably incurred for the benefit of the leaseholders or the proper management of the building. Taken together, amendment 10 and new clause 3 would provide for that approach by leaving out clause 35 and replacing it with a new clause that provides for a general prohibition on claiming legal costs from tenants, and for a power to specify classes of landlord who will be exempted from it. I commend them to the House.
Mr Deputy Speaker, we want to see a number of other changes made to the Bill to provide leaseholders with better protection in law and to pave the way for a commonhold future. To that end, we have tabled amendments and new clauses to, among other things: abolish the draconian rent charge remedies provided for by section 121 of the Law of Property Act 1925; provide for mandatory residents’ management companies in new blocks of flats; establish a right to manage regime for residential freeholders on private or mixed-use estates; bring forward legislative options to facilitate leaseholders in new blocks of flats being granted an automatic share of freehold; and regulate managing agents.
Of particular importance to us is the need to ensure that the Bill abolishes forfeiture and the windfall it provides to freeholders. As we argued in Committee, forfeiture is a wholly disproportionate and horrifically draconian mechanism for ensuring compliance with a lease agreement. Over the course of nearly a century, this House has taken intermittent steps to tighten the laws of forfeiture, yet its continued use and the chilling effect that results from its mere existence continues to put landlords in a nearly unassailable position of strength in disputes with leaseholders.
The Opposition are not suggesting for a moment that this House abolishes the right of forfeiture in relation to residential long leases and replaces it with nothing. There must be effective means of ensuring compliance with a lease agreement, and we are more than willing to work constructively with the Government to determine what alternative arrangements are needed to deal with breaches of covenant or unpaid arrears. But forfeiture operates to the prejudice of leaseholders; it cannot be justified, and we must use the Bill finally to do away with it. We believe there is broad consensus across the House for grasping the nettle and abolishing forfeiture, and new clause 5 would do so, and—notwithstanding the very positive noises that we heard from the Minister—I urge hon. Members from across the House to support it.
Finally, let me turn to the 100 Government amendments to the Bill that were tabled last week, 29 of which were submitted just before the deadline on Thursday. In doing so, I feel I must put on record once again the Opposition’s intense frustration at this Government’s continued practice of significantly amending legislation as it progresses through the House. The sheer volume and complexity of amendments that this Government now routinely table to their own legislation represents a departure from established practice and one that acts as a serious impediment to hon. Members effectively scrutinising legislation, and increases the risk that Acts of Parliament contain errors that subsequently need to be remedied.
The Government amendments that have been tabled for consideration today fall into three broad categories—namely, shared ownership, building safety and new leasehold houses. I will take each in turn, starting with shared ownership. Although I am increasingly personally of the view that there is a growing case—one that is reinforced by the treatment of shared ownership in the Bill—for primary legislation to address various issues arising from shared ownership as a tenure, Government amendments 24 and 29, which relate to it, are not contentious and we support them.
I very much welcome the Bill, which addresses the frustrations expressed by a great many leaseholders in my constituency. I thank Suzy Killip from the Pembroke Park Residents Association and Jo Tapper at The Sigers, both of whom have faced significant challenges while representing their communities and taking forward issues arising from the management and lack of services often provided to them under their lease arrangements.
I would particularly like to thank Ministers, because this legislation takes into account the way that the market has changed. Many years ago I started my career as a financial adviser, dealing with people taking out mortgages. One stark change is the extent to which leaseholds are seen as an opportunity to extract money from people as investments to be traded by freeholders, on the basis of extracting the maximum possible amount rather than ensuring good quality of services. I was involved in cases as a local authority councillor, where part of the planning agreement was that roads, parks and open spaces would be brought up to an appropriate standard to be adopted by the local authority. Once the development was completed, an opportunity was spotted by the developer and, therefore, people who had moved in on the understanding that the local authority would take over—because the roads were built to adoptable standard, for example—found that it did not happen because it was seen as an investment opportunity. That is very much in line with the rip-offs referred to by Members across the House.
I commend Ministers on taking a balanced approach on the need to recognise a link between the arrangements in the Bill and our housing supply. The UK has the oldest housing stock in Europe. The ability of freeholders of larger developments to regenerate sites where properties that have been rented are falling vacant over a period of time could be inhibited if there is a proliferation of small freeholds on those types of sites. If we are to ensure that the quality of our housing, in particular energy efficiency, is brought up to a good standard, it must still be possible for larger sites to be regenerated. We must not inhibit that completely while addressing a different concern about the rights and freedoms of leaseholders.
I mentioned some constituents earlier; the situation in particular at Pembroke Park is a good example of why the reforms in this legislation are so important. The development was constructed on a former military site by Taylor Wimpey, and handed over to be managed by A2Dominion housing association, with a mix of social housing tenants and private leaseholders. There are umpteen issues still more than a decade after the completion of that site, and issues simply getting A2Dominion to respond to problems including insulation that was never installed in buildings to the building regulations standard, a complete failure to ensure that proper ventilation was installed in the buildings, and drains that are completely inadequate. There has been progress, but I would add A2Dominion to the list of companies raised by other Members.
I commend A2Dominion’s relatively new chief executive, Ian Wardle, on the progress that he is making, but it remains a huge challenge to my constituents, and a huge frustration, that as opaque charges rise and rise, the actions of that organisation make it incredibly difficult even to understand whether the basic legal protections that they enjoy under existing legislation are being observed, including how insurance costs are apportioned across a very large property portfolio.
I strongly support the points made around forfeiture provisions. A number of constituents have come to me with significant challenges and justifiable concerns about the rising service charges on their properties. It is completely unacceptable that they would forfeit a significant amount of value that they have paid for and earned—potentially to fall to the developer. That is another opportunity for the shamelessly greedy to rip off our constituents. I am very glad that this legislation and the comments made by Members across the House today will represent a significant step towards ending that practice.
Thousands of homeowners in my constituency and millions across the country who face estate management charges will have their rights substantially increased thanks to the provisions in this Bill. I am extremely grateful to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, the Minister and his predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch (Rachel Maclean), for including estate management charges in this Bill.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 145, in clause 41, page 66, line 28, at end insert—
“(c) only where they are incurred in the provision of services or the carrying out of works that would not ordinarily be provided by local authorities.”
This amendment would mean that services or works that would ordinarily be provided by local authorities are not relevant costs for the purposes of estate management charges.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 150, in clause 41, page 66, line 28, at end insert—
“(c) where they are incurred in the provision of services or the carrying out of works, only where the requirement for those services or works is not the result of defects in the original construction.”
This amendment would ensure that services or works on private or mixed-use estate that are required as a result of defects in its construction are not relevant costs for the purposes of estate management charges.
Clause stand part.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Mark. I remind colleagues that we have moved from the clauses that relate to what was termed the “feudal” system of leasehold to the rather more modern problem of estate management charges, which in large part, although not exclusively, are incurred by those who own their homes. Essentially, the charges have arisen because of issues to do with adoption by local authorities. They are charges for a range of services in what might be termed, but are not necessarily, public areas, and for what might be, but are not necessarily, services or provisions that would normally be provided by a local authority.
It is worth bearing in mind how rapidly the issue of estate management charges has grown. From being essentially non-existent, or at least very rare, I think the charges now cover at least 1 million or 1.5 million homeowners—perhaps the Minister will tell us it is an even higher number. One issue is that we are essentially creating a two-tier society of council tax payers: people who pay council tax once to cover a range of public services, and residents in parts of our country who pay for those services twice—once through their council tax and again through their estate management charges.
The provisions in part 4 deal with a number of changes that seek to improve the rights of those subject to estate management charges and to improve access to redress. I commend a number of my local residents and councillors, most importantly Councillor Jim Weir of Great Denham, as well as 30 of my Conservative colleagues who wrote with me to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State to ask them to include the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to them for doing so. Most particularly, I thank the former Minister—my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch—and the current Minister for their help and guidance on these matters. The provisions will enable us to make a great amount of progress. However, it is clear—and it was clear from the evidence the Committee received—that there is another path, or at least it is clear that the public also desire to abolish or reduce the current system of estate management charges, rather than improving it and the rights that people have. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve.
At issue is the matter of adoption. In the summary on page 4, paragraph 2 of the Competition and Market Authority report that looks into estate management charges and other issues, it states that
“evidence gathered in our market study to date has shown that, over the last five years or so, amenities on new housing estates that are available for wider public use (ie not for the exclusive use of households on the estate), are increasingly not being adopted by the relevant authority. This appears to be driven by the discretionary nature of adoption, housebuilders’ incentives not to pursue adoption and by local authority concerns about the future ongoing costs of maintaining amenities”.
That gets to the crux of the issue. The decision process for creating estate management charges takes place in a cosy discussion between the developers of new estates and the local authorities, both of which have an interest in ensuring that they are not the ones to carry the cost for a range of communal services. Guess who ends up paying the bill? It is homeowners up and down the country, who have no role in that cosy discussion. I wish to influence that cosy discussion through my amendment.
It is tricky to change the process of adoption, and I think you would consider it out of scope, Sir Mark, if we sought to do so in the Bill. In the evidence session, I heard colleagues talk about some of the risks involved in leaving councils with unadoptable roads and poor-standard infrastructure that the council tax payer has to pay to bring up to standard. No one on the Committee wishes to see that happen. My amendment would not force adoption, then, but essentially take the payer—the householder or homeowner—out of the equation for paying for those costs. It would exclude services or works that would ordinarily be provided by local authorities so that they would not count as costs that could be incurred by estate management charges.
My hope is that the amendment would pour a dose of reality on to developers by saying that they could no longer pass the buck for the costs of poor-standard infrastructure used by the public to homeowners on their estates. They would have to bring them up to standard, and then councils could adopt them.
It is a pleasure to continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill with you in the Chair, Sir Mark. I rise to speak to amendment 150, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Weaver Vale. As we have heard, part 4 of the Bill deals with the regulation of estate management. The hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire provided an extremely comprehensive overview of the problem and its prevalence.
The distinct set of problems faced by residential freeholders on private or mixed-tenure estates that part 4 seeks to address is well known and well understood. Those problems include: excessive or inappropriate charges levied for minimal or even non-existent services; charges imposed for services that should by right be covered by council tax; charges that include costly and arbitrary administration fees; charges hiked without adequate justification; and charges levied when residential freeholders are in the process of selling their property.
In addition to a general lack of clarity and transparency about how estate management charges and fees are arrived at and how they break down—these problems are not dissimilar to those experienced by long leaseholders in respect of service charges—residential freeholders on privately owned and managed estates clearly suffer from inadequate transparency in other unique respects. For example, as I have said in past debates on the subject in the House, it would appear to be fairly common for residential freeholders not to be notified of their future liability for charges early in the conveyancing process; many learn of their exposure only at the point of completion. Even in instances in which residential freeholders are notified about their future liability in good time, many have to confront the fact that their contracts do not specify limits or caps on charges and fees.
There is clearly a distinct problem with management fragmentation on many privately owned estates that have been constructed throughout the country in recent years, with residential freeholders even on relatively new estates frequently having to navigate scores of management companies, each levying fees for services in a way that further exacerbates the general lack of transparency and potential for abuse that they face in respect of charges and fees. Underpinning all those issues of concern is a fundamental absence of adequate regulation or oversight of the practices of estate management companies and the fact that residential freeholders currently do not enjoy statutory rights equivalent to those held by leaseholders.
There has been a broad consensus across the House for some time that residential freeholders on new build private and mixed-tenure estates require greater rights and protections, and the Government have recognised publicly—for at least six years, by my count—that they need to act to address the range of problems that freeholders face. Labour therefore welcomes the Government’s decision to use the Bill to create an entirely new statutory regime for residential freeholders based on leaseholders’ rights and is fully supportive of the intent behind the provisions in this part of the Bill.
Although part 4 sets the broad framework for regulating estate management, much of the detail necessary to bring that framework into force will come via regulations. We take no issue with that, and do not intend to pre-empt the regulations by attempting to prescribe a series of requirements on the face of the Bill. However, we believe that, where possible, we should seek to use part 4 not only to provide greater protection to residential freeholders who live on the estates, but to contribute to a reduction in the prevalence of such arrangements—a point that the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire was driving at.
Although additional protections of the kind introduced under part 4 will almost certainly still be required, in its “Private management of public amenities on housing estates” working paper, published on 3 November last year, the Competition and Markets Authority stated that
“we consider that reducing the prevalence of private management arrangements would be the most direct route to address the root cause of our emerging concerns”.
The CMA made it clear in that working paper that reducing the prevalence of private management arrangements would require a mix of legislative and policy changes more fundamental than the introduction of regulatory protection, and drew attention to the fact that it would result in a wider set of consequential changes, not least the potential for
“significant impact on local authority finances and resources at a time when local authority funding is already stretched.”
That is why, while we very much sympathise with its intent of ensuring that residential freeholders on private or mixed-tenure estates are not charged for services that should by right be covered by council tax, we have reservations about amendment 145. We are concerned that it will, in effect, force local authorities to adopt public amenities on new housing estates, irrespective of circumstance, or—if compulsion is not the intent of the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire—would see those amenities degrade and deteriorate as a result of not being maintained by either the private management company or the local authority.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his detailed look at my amendment. First, will he explain to the Committee where he sees compulsion on local authorities in the amendment? I cannot see it. Secondly, will he explain why his more material concern about the possibility of items degrading and estate management not doing anything would not be addressed by the strengthening provisions that the Government are putting in the Bill on behalf of homeowners?
Under my reading of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, if it is ensured that services or works that would ordinarily be provided by local authorities are not relevant costs for the purposes of charges in this part, who will pick up the bill? If the local authority is not compelled to adopt the amenities, our concern is that no one will maintain them. To address his point directly, I worry that his amendment would not ensure that the private estate management company picks up the charge. I will come to why I think our amendment is a superior way of addressing this very real problem.
We are all driving at the same point. I was very much taken by the CMA’s conclusion that reducing the prevalence of these arrangements requires a combination of the mandatory adoption of amenities and putting in place corresponding common adoptable standards. If we do one without the other, we risk some unintended consequences.
My concern about the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire is that we cannot simply remove from estate charges costs that should in an ideal circumstance be borne by local authorities and then expect the private management company to simply pick them up. I fear that the more likely scenario will be that the amenities are not properly maintained. That is a real concern, and should be for residential freeholders on the estates. As the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire outlined, there are some good reasons why local authorities are reluctant to adopt public amenities on private or mixed-tenure estates.
I would hate to detain the Committee because we have a lot to go through, but let us understand the economic process here. Initially, the local authority and the developer will work out whether to adopt roads. The developer will then have to decide whether to set up an estate management company, which may or may not deliver facilities and services that would normally be covered by council tax. If the amendment is part of legislation, no property manager in their right mind will accept taking on the responsibility because they will not wish to be liable. Here is the flow of responsibility: one cannot lumber home owners with the cost, the property manager will not be lumbered with the cost for the reasons outlined—it may go bust—so the developer will then have to recognise that there is nowhere for it to turn.
We fundamentally disagree on where the logic chain leads. I do not think that, on the basis of the amendment, the developer will be forced to pick up the costs. It is far more likely that they would build below what would be considered a common adoptable standard and then leave residential freeholders to live with substandard amenities. We could debate this further, but that is my take on the hon. Gentleman’s amendment: it would not force the management companies to do that. That is a real concern.
As I said, there are a variety of reasons why local authorities often do not take on responsibility. The most common one is that the public amenities on new housing estates are not built to a determined, adoptable standard. In those circumstances, one can hardly blame the local authority in question for a reluctance to adopt roads and common services that it will have to repair and maintain a great cost. My central argument is that if we are to reduce the prevalence of these arrangements, we must ensure that we introduce a common adoptable standard for public amenities on estates at the same time as we require mandatory adoption, as the CMA advises.
I have listened with interest to hon. Members’ contributions, particularly in respect of my amendment 145. I strongly believe that we need to close down the trend to create two tiers of council tax payers —those who pay once and those who have to pay twice—and ensure that we all pay only once. My amendment would directly address that issue. I would therefore like to put it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 139, in clause 44, page 68, line 31, at end insert—
“(3A) Where the appropriate tribunal has made a determination on an application under subsection (1) or (3) that an estate management charge is not payable because the costs incurred by an estate manager are not relevant costs under section 41(1)(b) (services or works to be of a reasonable standard), the tribunal may impose a penalty on the estate manager which is payable to the residents of affected managed dwellings; and the tribunal may determine how much of the penalty is to be paid to the residents of each affected managed dwelling.”
This amendment would enable the tribunal to impose a financial penalty, payable to residents of affected managed dwellings, where estate management work has not been completed to a reasonable standard.
The clause is an excellent step forward in ensuring that freeholders will have rights to access a tribunal when there are errors and poor provision of services on their estate, so I very much welcome it. Through the amendment, I seek to probe the Minister about whether we have got the balance right to enable effective use of the tribunal. The amendment essentially says that in addition to requiring that poor-standard, poorly provided services are brought up to standard, the tribunal could impose a financial penalty on the management company.
It requires a tremendous effort for people to take cases to a tribunal: they often have to make a collective effort and gather evidence about what has gone wrong, and they may have to go through weeks, months or potentially years to get to the point where they can take a case successfully to tribunal. If the only remedy at the end of that is that those services have to be brought up to standard, where is the incentive not to provide defective services in the first place? By enabling the tribunal to impose financial penalties, the amendment would redress the balance, with the bias more towards those suffering from poor service in the first place.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling this probing amendment. I agree that where works and services are provided and charged for on freehold estates, their costs should be charged to residents only if they are of a reasonable standard. As he indicated, clause 41 makes progress in that regard. Clause 44 allows for the appropriate tribunal to determine whether an estate management charge is payable. Should the tribunal find that services or works charged for have not been carried out to a reasonable standard, it will determine the amount that the homeowner is liable to pay. That is equivalent to the leasehold regime, and I do think that tribunals are the best placed to make that decision.
On whether additionality is required, the appropriate tribunal is not an enforcement body; it is not a weights and measures authority or a district council. If a financial penalty were applied for works not completed to a reasonable standard, the appropriate tribunal would need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that that was the case. My hon. Friend may say—I have some sympathy with the point—that people would probably not go to tribunal, given its complexity. In addition, if people want to sue for defective works and such things, they can do so through other parts of the legal system; that form of redress is available if necessary.
If we were to introduce penalties for works or services not completed to a reasonable standard on freehold estates, the challenge would be in the implications for the tribunal and the equivalent leasehold regime. Therefore, while I have a lot of sympathy with my hon. Friend’s point, I hope that he will consider withdrawing the amendment it on the basis that it would probably move the tribunal too much in one direction and create a whole heap of other consequences that we would need to think carefully about, and which I do not think we can accept at the current time.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 44, page 69, line 6, at end insert—
“(7) The Secretary of State must by regulations provide—
(a) that an estate manager’s litigation costs incurred as a consequence of an application under this section may not be recouped through the estate management charge, except where the tribunal considers it just and equitable for such costs to be so recouped;
(b) for the right of an applicant under this section to claim litigation costs incurred as a consequence of an application under this section from the estate manager, where the tribunal considers it just and equitable in the circumstances.
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) may amend primary legislation.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make regulations preventing estate managers from passing their litigation costs on to residents through the estate management charge, and providing for residents to be able to reclaim their litigation costs from an estate manager.
The amendment, which is in a similar vein to the previous one, is designed to probe the Minister on whether we have got the balance right in the clause to enable effective use of the tribunal by those who would wish to bring a case against estate managers. As we heard when we discussed the clauses on leasehold, one of the biggest concerns that people have is that they will face open-ended litigation costs. In this case, the litigation costs will essentially be cycled back through the estate management charges, and therefore effectively end up being paid by homeowners on the affected estates.
Amendment 140 is designed to prevent that passing on of litigation costs. It also recognises that many homeowners may wish to take action but not have the wherewithal to pay the litigation costs. Paragraph (b) of the amendment therefore enables residents to claim the litigation costs arising from their application. I am interested in the Minister’s view on the balance of litigation in such circumstances—we have spoken about it in relation to other circumstances. I think we all want the tribunal to work, but for that to happen, people must not be put off by the fear that they may face significant direct or indirect litigation costs.
I rise to support the amendment. We discussed litigation costs in relation to clause 34; we strongly argued for a general prohibition with very limited exceptions. The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the fact, which applies to part 4 as a whole, that we should not replicate the flaws of the leasehold system in the newer system of estate management charges. Our arguments in relation to the leasehold regime therefore apply equally here, and the hon. Gentleman is right to raise the point.
I will try directly to address the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire, to which we are sympathetic. It is important that litigation costs are not passed on. On the leasehold side, there is clear evidence that that is happening, but the question is whether there is clear evidence of it happening in the area of estate management. From speaking to officials, we do not see that clear evidence at the moment. However, if any members of the Committee or others have such evidence, I would welcome it. If it is happening, I am sure that we would be happy to consider the issue as the Bill progresses.
With the Minister’s assurance that he will keep a watching brief on the issue, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44 grants homeowners a new right to apply to the appropriate tribunal for a determination on whether their estate management charge is payable, and if it is, how it should be paid, by whom and to whom it should be paid, and the date by which the payment should be made. Under this provision, the tribunal will enforce the newly established reasonableness principle set out by clause 41, which requires estate management services to be reasonable, and any works or services to be of a reasonable standard.
The clause requires estate management companies to charge the correct fees from the outset, thereby reducing the number of homeowners being overcharged for works and services on their estate or being at risk of legal action. The clause also sets out the circumstances in which an application cannot be made, including when the homeowner has already agreed to, but not paid, the charge, or in which the issue has already been subject to a decision by a court. That will prevent homeowners from bringing unjustified or vexatious claims, which can lead to delays in the payment of valid estate management charges and negatively impact the upkeep and good management of the estate. The clause delivers on a Government commitment to increase protections for existing homeowners, and I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Demands for payment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 141, in clause 49, page 72, line 26, leave out “£5,000” and insert “£50,000”.
This amendment would increase from £5,000 to £50,000 the maximum amount of damages which may be awarded for a failure on the part of an estate manager to comply with the obligations imposed by clauses 45 to 48 (rights relating to estate management charges).
The Minister or shadow Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I believe we covered issues to do with penalties earlier. The intent of this proposal is to ensure that damages in the leasehold and freehold system are the same. I therefore think I ought to ask leave to withdraw my amendment.
Without rehashing the debate on clause 30, I rise briefly to put on record that the Opposition think that the point the amendment is driving at is well made. We need equivalence between the two regimes, but we were concerned, notwithstanding damages versus penalties and all the rest, that the proposed financial penalty is too low to act as a serious deterrent to the type of behaviour that we are trying to do away with.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Meaning of “administration charge”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Currently, freehold homeowners on managed estates have very few protections relating to the cost of administration charges they may be liable to pay. This can leave homeowners paying excessively high administration charges that they are unable to challenge. We will address this issue and give homeowners greater protection. We intend to do that by mirroring the existing framework in place to protect leaseholders.
Clause 50 provides a definition of an administration charge. It is
“an amount payable…by an owner of a dwelling”.
That amount must be in connection with applications or approvals in connection with a relevant obligation, the provision of documents, the sale or transfer of land, a failure to make a payment by the owner, or a breach of a relevant obligation. Subsections (2) and (3) allow the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to amend the definition of an administration charge by regulations, which must be done using the affirmative procedure. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Duty of estate managers to publish administration charge schedules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Homeowners on managed estates can be subject to high and unreasonable administration charges, as I indicated. Part of the problem is the lack of clarity or transparency surrounding them. Clause 51 introduces a duty for an estate manager to publish an administration charge schedule if they expect to impose an administration charge.
Subsection (2) requires that the schedule should include the detail of administration charges that the estate manager considers to be payable and their associated costs. Where the cost cannot be confirmed before a charge is payable, the method of determining the cost should be included. Subsection (3) requires a revised schedule to be published if an estate manger revises the administration charges. Subsection (5) allows the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to prescribe in regulations the form and content of the administration charge schedule and how it is to be provided to homeowners. We will work with all relevant partners to ensure that we obtain the right level of detail in regulations.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire for his amendment 143, which would increase the maximum amount of damages from £1,000 to £10,000. I hope that, potentially, our discussion on the previous clause would apply here, and I repeat that the Government intend to write to all Committee members about this issue in the days ahead.
Amendment 144 seeks to ensure that any damages that the tribunal orders payable under Clause 52 (2)(b) cannot be recouped from residents through subsequent charges. I agree with my hon. Friend that residents should be protected from future charges. An estate manager can only recover costs incurred in estate management. A tribunal order to pay damages would not be regarded as falling within the definition of costs of estate management.
The transparency measures included in clauses 46 and 47, in the form of the annual report and the right to obtain information upon request, would also deter estate managers from attempting to recoup these costs. That is because it would become obviously visible and it would be clear that it was not related to estate management. I note, however, my hon. Friend’s concerns and I am listening carefully on this matter. I hope that he might see fit to withdraw his amendment, having heard the Government’s response.
Finally, clause 52 sets out the enforcement provisions that reinforce the new duty in clause 51 to publish a schedule. A freehold homeowner on a managed estate may make an application to the appropriate tribunal if an estate manager has not published a schedule, or has done so but contrary to any provisions determined by the relevant Ministers.
The appropriate tribunal may order that the estate manager provides a correct schedule within 14 days of the order being made, and it may also order that the estate manager pays damages not exceeding £1,000 to the homeowner. We believe that this is a proportionate and effective enforcement mechanism where an estate manager fails to comply with its obligations. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Many thanks to the Minister, again, for proposing further changes to help homeowners who are affected by estate management charges. I am pleased to hear him reiterate that he will consider the issues raised in my amendment 143 about the appropriateness of charges. The shadow Minister raised similar concerns about those being set at an effective level.
On amendment 144, will the Minister consider writing to the Committee about how, in practice, not passing on damages, fees or charges to residents will work? Great Denham is a new part of my constituency, and in an estate of a few thousand houses, there may be 50, 60, 70 or more property management companies. All of them are discrete limited companies and all were set up as subsidiaries of one or more parent company. We need to be sure, from the Government’s point of view—given that some of these limited companies could go bust—about where the trail leads to. Under corporate law, as I understand it, there is no requirement for a parent company to be liable for the losses of a subsidiary that goes bust, and we want to ensure that liabilities flow upwards to the ultimate holding company.
Presumably, the payment of administration fees or dividends may go from subsidiary companies to the very large companies that are the ultimate parents. Is the Minister able to explain how he sees that working in practice? If not, or if it is too detailed to talk about now, perhaps he could agree to write to give some examples to the Committee in due course.
My hon. Friend highlights an important point. I think it is better that I write, but in principle, the transparency we seek to bring and the requirement to clearly articulate the charges that have been made, either in the annual report or elsewhere, aim to provide the sunlight that means that it is clear who is paying for what, and, if it is not a reasonable charge, there is a process that can be followed. But I will write to him with more on that, if that is helpful, because we all want to get this right.
Turning first to new clause 15, some leaseholders and homeowners on freehold estates do not currently have access to redress outside of the tribunal or the courts. I should note that part 4 of the Bill will give comprehensive rights and protections to homeowners on freehold estates, including access to the relevant tribunal. Though property managing agents are required by law to join a Government-approved redress scheme, there is no such requirement for leasehold landlords and freehold estate managers who manage their property or estate themselves. This means that for issues that fall outside the court or tribunal’s jurisdiction, such as poor communication or behavioural issues, those leaseholders and homeowners on freehold estates can make a complaint only through their landlord or estate manager’s own complaints process. If there is no complaints procedure, or once the leaseholder or homeowner has exhausted it, their access to redress is exhausted.
New clause 15 will fill this gap by providing that leasehold landlords and freehold estate managing agents who manage their property or estate can be required to join a redress scheme. The redress scheme will independently investigate and determine complaints made by a current or former owner. A redress scheme will need to be approved by, and administered by or on behalf of, the “lead enforcement authority”—the Secretary of State or other designated body. The Government have taken powers that will allow us to make exemptions to the requirement in specific circumstances and also a power to amend the definitions in this section. New clause 15 will fill gaps that leaseholders and homeowners on freehold estates currently experience in access to redress. I commend the clause to the Committee.
New clause 16 makes it clear that the redress scheme provided for under this part may act under a voluntary jurisdiction. That means they may allow for members to join the scheme who are not required to join under new clause 15. The scheme may also investigate and determine complaints outside their jurisdiction at their discretion, including complaints by people who are not current or former owners of a relevant dwelling. The scheme may offer voluntary mediation services and allow for certain complaints or circumstances to be excluded from their remit. The voluntary jurisdiction may be subject to the approval conditions that the redress scheme must comply with under new clause 18, which I will come to in a moment.
New clause 17 gives the Secretary of State the power to make payments, including loans, or give financial assistance to establish or maintain a redress scheme. The Government expect the costs of the redress scheme to be funded by the scheme themselves—for example, through charging membership fees. However, there may be some circumstances where the provision of funding is needed. The clause offers flexibility in that instance.
New clause 18 makes provision for the approval and designation of redress schemes. The approval conditions will apply to the future redress scheme and must be satisfied before the redress scheme is approved or designated. The approval conditions will be set out in regulations made by the Secretary of State and will include, but are not limited to, those conditions set out in subsection (3). In addition, new clause 18 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to provide for the process for making applications for the approval of a redress scheme, the time the approval or designation remains valid, and the process for approval or designation to be withdrawn or revoked. It also allows for a scheme to set membership fees to cover the cost of providing the service.
I will now turn to new clauses 19, 20 and 9, and new schedule 1. To ensure compliance from landlords and freehold estate managers who are required to join a redress scheme, we need to ensure that robust enforcement mechanisms are in place. New clause 19 does that by allowing an enforcement authority to impose financial penalties where breaches of regulations by not joining a redress scheme occur. It also allows for the Secretary of State to make regulations to allow for the investigation of suspected breaches, and for co-operation and information sharing between enforcement authorities for the purposes of investigation.
New clause 20 sets out the amounts of the financial penalty that enforcement authorities may impose on landlords and freehold estate managers who do not comply with the requirement to join a redress scheme. An initial penalty for breaching the requirement may be up to £5,000. However, repeated breaches could lead to a penalty of up to £30,000. The new clause also allows the Secretary of State to amend the amount of financial penalty in regulations to reflect changes in the value of money.
New clause 9 provides a route for leaseholders to apply to the tribunal for an order to appoint a manager in place of their landlord if their landlord has failed to join the redress scheme. As with other “reasons”, leaseholders can apply for an order that a manager be appointed, and the tribunal will make one if
“it is just and convenient to make the order in all the circumstances of the case”.
The Minister will be aware of concerns about the practical application of this provision when it is put into practice, and the pressures on the tribunal. Under new clause 9, as I best understand it, homeowners will have the right to go to the first-tier tribunal to ask to change from company A to company B as their estate manager. If that is the case, why does it have to go through a tribunal? Why is it not feasible for people to determine that themselves without referring to a tribunal?
My hon. Friend raises an important point. I recognise the significant body of views in this place and elsewhere about the ability to appoint a right to manage company or a representative directly, and I have certainly heard those concerns. In this case, working within the framework of the proposed legislation, we wanted to ensure that there is a route to allow a manager to be appointed if a landlord refuses to comply. Of course, we would hope that a landlord would not refuse in the first instance.
The Government have also provided in new clause 13 that homeowners on freehold estates can apply to the tribunal for an order to appoint a new manager for the estate if a relevant estate manager has breached the requirement to join a redress scheme. New schedule 1 sets out further provisions relating to the penalties set out in new clause 19. It will require an enforcement authority to give a landlord or freehold estate manager whom they suspect of breaching the requirement to join a scheme a notice of its intention to issue a financial penalty before issuing a final notice. Those who are given a notice by the enforcement authority may make representations. The schedule sets out that where an enforcement authority imposes a financial penalty, it may apply the proceeds towards meeting the costs and expenses incurred in carrying out its functions. Any proceeds that are not so applied will be paid to the Secretary of State.
New clause 21 gives the Secretary of State the power to provide that a future redress scheme provider may apply to a court or tribunal for an order that a decision made under the scheme be enforced as if it were an order of the court. That may be necessary if there is an issue with landlords or freehold estate managers not complying with the redress scheme’s decisions.
New clause 22 makes the necessary provisions for the role of the lead enforcement authority. That is defined by new clause 15 as the Secretary of State, or another person designated by the Secretary of State. New clause 22 provides that the lead enforcement authority will have necessary oversight of the scheme. It also provides that if the Secretary of State decides to designate the role of the lead enforcement authority to another person, the Secretary of State will still have the appropriate power to direct the lead enforcement authority. That includes provisions to make payments and to bring the arrangement to an end.
New clause 23 provides for the Secretary of State to issue or approve guidance for enforcement authorities and the administrator of the future redress scheme about co-operation. It makes clear that the Secretary of State will exercise powers under new clause 18 to ensure that the administrator of the redress scheme has regard to guidance issued or approved under the section. Importantly, the amendment also requires the enforcement authority to have regard to the same guidance. New clause 24 makes necessary provision for the interpretation of this part of the Bill, including the definitions used. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the hon. Gentleman for that helpful intervention. I hope that I do have that effect, and that he can use his good offices to persuade the Minister of the merits of adopting new clause 1.
The shadow Minister is making a good point, but to play the cynic on this issue, there is a difference between things that could take place and things that are taking place. What is the evidence? We should probably get rid of this latent power in any case, but how often is the power being used in practice? Is this a real thing that is happening?
I thank the hon. Gentleman. If he allows me to develop my case, I will address that very point, which was well made.
Not only is the potential penalty for a breach incredibly draconian in the circumstances in which it is used, but even in instances in which a lease is not terminated, with the landlord gaining the financial benefit of any capital loans attached to it, the laws of forfeiture can lead to a significant financial loss for leaseholders. Take the following scenario. For whatever reason, a leaseholder accumulates a small arrears—perhaps a demand has not been received—and the freeholder or managing agent issues reminders, which add to the initial debt. That debt is then handed over to a debt collector, whose means of remuneration incentivise them to pursue it aggressively. The leaseholder might then attempt to pay, but they also have to find the money to cover large legal costs. If there is a mortgage, the bank is often drawn in to secure its interest, so a compulsory loan is added to the leaseholder’s account. In our view, it is the lack of any proportionate relationship between a breach of a lease and its consequences that makes forfeiture so unjust.
Since 1925, this House has regularly taken steps to make it more difficult for a freeholder to successfully forfeit a lease. For example, the Housing Act 1996 and the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 introduced prohibitions on the serving of a section 146 notice under the Law of Property Act 1925 in relation to service charges and breach of a covenant, respectively, in instances in which the amount payable has not been determined. Those were not the first attempts to constrain the laws of forfeiture. History shows that Parliament has returned to the matter every few decades in an attempt to mitigate forfeiture’s manifest injustices. Despite the laws of forfeiture being made stricter, a great many freeholders and managing agents still routinely use forfeiture powers as a first resort when seeking to recover alleged arrears of payments from leaseholders, and they rely—this is in some ways the more important point—on the mere threat of forfeiture, and the financial risks it presents, to deter leaseholders from disputing any unreasonable costs and defending claims.
Those who advocate retaining forfeiture often argue that it is a minor issue that does not affect many leaseholders. However, although termination of a lease under forfeiture may be relatively rare—I deliberately use the word “may”, because His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service does not track the number of cases—evidence from across the country shows hundreds of cases and scores of outright forfeitures on average each year. As I said, the threat is as damaging as the use of the power, because it puts landlords in a nearly unassailable position of strength in disputes vis-à-vis leaseholders, which is why forfeiture is routinely threatened in money disputes.
Because the law of forfeiture remains so manifestly unjust, despite successive attempts to render it more palatable, there have been many calls over recent decades for more wholesale reform. For example, hon. Members may know that in 2006 the Law Commission proposed abolishing the current law of forfeiture and replacing it with a statutory scheme for the termination of tenancies. It even drafted legislation, the Termination of Tenancies Bill, to implement that proposal. Yet nothing has been done. Indeed, the relevant section of the Law Commission’s website states—this amused me—that, 18 years on,
“We are awaiting the Government’s response to our recommendations”—
eighteen years and counting.
There is, of course, a need to carefully balance the rights and responsibilities of landlords and leaseholders, and there must be effective means of ensuring compliance with a lease agreement, but those means must be appropriate and proportionate to the breach in question. We can debate precisely what alternative arrangements are needed to deal with breaches of the covenant or unpaid arrears, whether orders of some kind are necessary to sell a property when a debt is not paid, and what kind of measured method is appropriate to removing problem tenants from a building—we heard about that in our oral evidence sessions. The starting point, however, must be that we finally grasp the nettle and abolish forfeiture, and the windfall it provides, once and for all. It operates to the prejudice of leaseholders and it cannot be justified.
The Secretary of State made clear on Second Reading that he was open to this Committee looking at how we end the abuse of forfeiture. I believe there is a broad consensus across the House—indeed across this Committee —that we should consign it to history, even if there is a debate about precisely what replace it with. Following the point made by the hon. Member for Walsall North, I sincerely hope that the Minister will not disappoint us and the many thousands of leaseholders who support the abolition of forfeiture by resisting this new clause out of hand. I very much look forward to his response.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for tabling the new clause.
Let me separate my remarks into two parts. First, am I relatively sympathetic to the hon. Gentleman’s point? The answer is yes: there is a strong case for the measure. It has not been brought forward to date, and we will have to see whether it is possible to do so in the future. I cannot guarantee that, but we are looking at it and listening carefully. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and he made a strong case for it. We will not be able to do everything that we have said throughout this process, in the end, but I assure him that we are interested in this potential area.
However, we will resist the new clause, not because it is the convention to do so but because we genuinely think that it is not the right measure, even if we did agree with the principle. To go back to the Henry VIII powers discussion, this is probably an area in respect of which, if we were to do something—again, there are no guarantees—we would do it on the face of the Bill.
I am listening carefully to the Minister, as I did to the shadow Minister. The current Minister says he is sympathetic to the intentions, but I take his point that it is the wrong new clause, so I will oppose it if it is pressed to a vote. However, the shadow Minister said that the Minister’s predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch, said on the Floor of the House that she was sympathetic to the measure. That is two up. Will the Minister outline what the impediments might be? Will he give some reassurance that by the time we get to Report the Government may have turned sympathy into action? By the way, I think it is empathy, not sympathy.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 35 seeks further to improve the rights of those who will be liable for estate management charges. We know from written and oral evidence that people do not know what they are getting into right at the start of the purchase of a property. My clause asks the Government to make it clear by regulations that purchasers of properties who will get management charges are notified about them. It would ensure that people have access to the latest set of accounts, enabling them not only to understand what charges may be due, but to see what liabilities there were in the past.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire for moving new clause 35. I share his concern that purchasers should know about estate management charges; we talked a little about that issue in our sitting this morning.
There is nothing worse than facing a bill that we know nothing about at a time when we can do nothing about it. That is why the Government have been working with the national trading standards estate and letting agency team to develop guidance for property agents on what constitutes material information. The information must be included in property listings to meet the obligations under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. Estate management charges are considered material if they will have an impact on a decision to purchase. That should mean that purchasers get information on the expected level of estate management charges when they see the property particulars before they even view the property, let alone make an offer.
In addition to the measures that we discussed this morning, we are seeking to include in the Bill a requirement that freehold estate management information be provided to potential sellers, meaning that conveyancers acting on behalf of those sellers can quickly get the detailed information that they need to provide to potential purchasers. That could include accounts, if the estate manager is a resident-owned company, as well as any previous or future charges. With that reassurance in mind, I hope that my hon. Friend will consider withdrawing his new clause.
I think that that reassurance has been provided. The particular issue is that when people buy these homes, the solicitors are usually appointed by the people selling them. It is important that the Minister thinks carefully about that, and it sounds very much as if he is doing so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 36
Asbestos remediation
“(1) The Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 37B, insert—
‘37C Asbestos remediation
(1) This section applies where a claim to exercise the right to collective enfranchisement in respect of any premises is made by tenants of flats contained in the premises and the claim is effective.
(2) The landlord must cause a survey of the premises to be undertaken by an accredited professional to ascertain whether asbestos is, or is liable to be, present in those parts of the premises which the landlord is responsible for maintaining.
(3) Where the survey required by subsection (2) reveals the presence of asbestos, the landlord must, at the landlord’s cost, arrange for its safe removal.
(4) If the removal of asbestos required by subsection (3) is not carried out before the responsibility for maintaining the affected parts transfers to another person under the claim to exercise the right of collective enfranchisement, the landlord is liable for the costs of its removal.’”—(Barry Gardiner.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Minister will be relieved to know that this is genuinely a probing new clause, which I am pleased to move on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Sir Stephen Timms). He is not a member of the Committee, but he certainly wishes to raise the issue on Report.
New clause 36 would address the problems relating to enfranchisement when asbestos has been found, or is liable to be found, in the structure of a building. It requires that a survey be done prior to any enfranchisement process, and sets out that the landlord would be responsible for the remediation if asbestos should need to be cleared from the building. I am laying out the new clause before the Committee so that the Minister can set out his thinking about such problems in buildings, in the full knowledge that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham will speak to it on Report.
I am grateful to the Minister for recognising the need to do something in this area and accepting that there is a problem here that it would be best to resolve. I simply point out that leasehold reform Bills tend to come infrequently before Parliament, and I urge him to come back at a later stage with his best endeavours to resolve the problem. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 50
Control of boards of estate managers
“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations provide for—
(a) every estate manager (see section 39(3)) to be constituted such that a controlling majority on its board is held by an owner or lessor of a managed dwelling (see section 39(5));
(b) the requirement stipulated in paragraph (a) to be in place within two years of the sale or lease of the first managed dwelling.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may amend primary legislation.”—(Richard Fuller.)
This new clause would provide for the Secretary of State by regulations to oblige every estate management company to have a majority of residents on its board within two years of the sale or let of the first house or flat on the managed estate.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am receiving some interesting guidance from the Government Whip that I should seek to speak at length on the new clause, which is contrary to all his earlier exhortations, which were rather of the flavour that I should shut up entirely. I am not getting any further guidance from the Whip, so I will go at my own pace.
New clause 50 is a suggestion to the Minister. We have discussed the general hope that people subject to estate management charges should have much greater control over their estate management companies. They potentially should have the right to self-manage and it should be much easier for them to change from one estate manager to another. At the moment it can take a considerable time for estate management companies essentially to be set up and/or for them to go through what is essentially a transfer to resident control. I think all members of the Committee know this, but I will just inform them that we have had a number of representations from people who have talked about how long they have had to wait, including someone who said that a family had to wait up to 13 years for the right to manage their own estate management company and endured poor service over that entire period.
As the Minister thinks about his options to bring forward on Report or in further deliberations improvements to the rights of people, the new clause suggests that, by law, within two years of the sale or lease of the first building a majority of the directors of the estate management companies should be residents of their community.
This is an interesting new clause that bears a few moments’ consideration, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling it. Obviously, the first challenge is the matter of Henry VIII powers. I will put that aside for the moment, but we have genuine concerns about whether the new clause would get past the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the basis of whether it is proportionate.
That was a very helpful and thoughtful response from the Minister, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Ability to change estate management company
“(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must consider and report to Parliament on the situation of homeowners who have been told that they cannot change their estate management company because they are named on a TP1.
(2) The report required by subsection (1) must include proposals for legislative change to enable such homeowners to change their estate management company where appropriate.”—(Richard Fuller.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Again, this new clause originates from some of the inbound traffic that we have received as we have considered the Bill. I seek clarification from the Minister about the extent of these changes. The Committee was advised by a number of citizens about the status of estate management companies that are written into the deeds or other legal documents that are signed upon purchase. One such citizen wrote:
“Our management company…is named in the TP1, so we have no rights to do this”—
that is, to essentially appoint their own managers.
This is a probing new clause: I just want the Minister to be clear about the impact of the Bill on individuals such as the person whom I just quoted. As a consequence of the Bill’s provisions, will they be able to change their estate management company, or is there some legal trick about the original documents that were signed on purchase that would mean they are not brought into the ambit of those new rights?
As my hon. Friend outlined, the new clause would introduce a requirement for the Government to assess the situation of homeowners with estate management companies explicitly named on their deeds within a three-month timeframe.
I am sympathetic to the concerns that my hon. Friend raised. I know that he recognises that this is a complex area and that there are detailed issues to be worked through. As well as being clear about the nature of the problem, there could be issues about defining the scope of estate management functions and what criteria need to be met. The Law Commission carried out a review of the right to manage for flats, but that is not always directly transferable to freehold estates. It will take some time to carry out a review, and we need to engage with people across the sector. Then, the CMA report is coming. None the less, I recognise my hon. Friend’s concerns that the comprehensive measures in the Bill do not go far enough, and I acknowledge his desire for the Government to go further. I am listening carefully to his concerns on this matter. On that basis, I hope that he might withdraw his new clause.
It is not actually clear that the Minister was addressing new clause 51 as I was expecting; that may be the fault of my hearing. I was seeking clarification about the TP1—transfer of part of registered title—form, which is used by developers when selling a house to explicitly name an estate management company that will be in situ. That may be the norm; I do not know. However, can the Minister clarify, if the way that it is originally set up is not the norm and it is a legal device, whether it has greater legal standing, and whether the rights of people for whom the estate management company is defined in form TP1 will be included in the rights that we are trying to establish with the rest of the Bill? If we introduce changes that increase the right to manage and so on, will they be covered? I may well have missed it, because the Minister is much more knowledgeable about the Bill than I am, even after all our deliberations. However, just to the specific point about the legal forms, will he consider bringing that in as part of this?
I want to double-check the valid points made by my hon. Friend. I will commit to writing to him on that specific point to make sure that we are covering in the way that he expects.
That is very kind of the Minister. With that assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Schedule 1
Redress schemes: financial penalties
“Notice of intent
(1) Before imposing a financial penalty on a person under section (Financial penalties), an enforcement authority must give the person notice of its proposal to do so (a ‘notice of intent’).
(2) The notice of intent must be given before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the first day on which the enforcement authority has sufficient evidence of the conduct to which the financial penalty relates.
(3) But if the person is continuing to engage in the conduct on that day, and the conduct continues beyond the end of that day, the notice of intent may be given—
(a) at any time when the conduct is continuing, or
(b) within the period of 6 months beginning with the last day on which the conduct occurs.
(4) The notice of intent must set out—
(a) the date on which the notice of intent is given,
(b) the amount of the proposed financial penalty,
(c) the reasons for proposing to impose the penalty, and
(d) information about the right to make representations under paragraph 2.
Right to make representations
2 (1) A person who is given a notice of intent may make written representations to the enforcement authority about the proposal to impose a financial penalty.
(2) Any representations must be made within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the notice of intent was given to the person (‘the period for representations’).
Final notice
3 (1) After the end of the period for representations the enforcement authority must—
(a) decide whether to impose a financial penalty on the person, and
(b) if it decides to do so, decide the amount of the penalty.
(2) If the enforcement authority decides to impose a financial penalty on the person, it must give a notice to the person (a ‘final notice’) imposing that penalty.
(3) The final notice must require the penalty to be paid within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the notice was given.
(4) The final notice must set out—
(a) the date on which the final notice is given,
(b) the amount of the financial penalty,
(c) the reasons for imposing the penalty,
(d) information about how to pay the penalty,
(e) the period for payment of the penalty,
(f) information about rights of appeal, and
(g) the consequences of failure to comply with the notice.
Withdrawal or amendment of notice
4 (1) An enforcement authority that gives a notice of intent or final notice may at any time—
(a) withdraw the notice of intent or final notice, or
(b) reduce an amount specified in the notice of intent or final notice.
(2) The power in sub-paragraph (1) is to be exercised by giving notice in writing to the person to whom the notice was given.
Appeals
5 (1) A person to whom a final notice is given may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against—
(a) the decision to impose the penalty, or
(b) the amount of the penalty.
(2) An appeal under this paragraph must be brought within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the final notice is given to the person.
(3) If a person appeals under this paragraph, the final notice is suspended until the appeal is finally determined, withdrawn or abandoned.
(4) An appeal under this paragraph—
(a) is to be a re-hearing of the enforcement authority’s decision, but
(b) may be determined having regard to matters of which the enforcement authority was unaware.
(5) On an appeal under this paragraph the First-tier Tribunal may quash, confirm or vary the final notice.
(6) The final notice may not be varied under sub-paragraph (5) so as to impose a financial penalty of more than the enforcement authority could have imposed.
Recovery of financial penalty
6 (1) This paragraph applies if a person fails to pay the whole or any part of a financial penalty which, in accordance with this Schedule, the person is liable to pay.
(2) The enforcement authority which imposed the financial penalty may recover the penalty or part on the order of the county court as if it were payable under an order of that court.
Proceeds of financial penalties
(1) Where an enforcement authority imposes a financial penalty under section (Financial penalties), it may apply the proceeds towards meeting the costs and expenses (whether administrative or legal) incurred in, or associated with, carrying out any of its functions under this Part of this Act.
(2) Any proceeds of a financial penalty imposed under section (Financial penalties) by an enforcement authority other than the Secretary of State which are not applied in accordance with sub-paragraph (1) must be paid to the Secretary of State.”—(Lee Rowley.)
This new Schedule, to be inserted after Schedule 8, would make further provision about the imposition of financial penalties under NC19.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Title
I beg to move amendment 28, in title, line 5, leave out “charges and costs payable by residential”
and insert
“the relationship between residential landlords and”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments to Part 3.
This is a consequential amendment to remove the reference to part 3 in the long title of the Bill. It ensures that it provides an accurate description of the Bill’s contents to reflect the impact of the measures the Committee has brought forward. That includes the amendments to enable the first-tier tribunal to vary or discharge an order to appoint a manager of a premises without an application.
Amendment 28 agreed to.
(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI want to take up the point the hon. Gentleman made about the timing of the ground rent review and the implications for subsequent change in the Bill. Has the Opposition looked at what the potential legal liability might be if we move forward with this Bill without clarity on what happens on ground rent, particularly as this is retrospective legislation, and whether there is a potential liability for the taxpayer if that co-ordination does not work effectively?
We have had access to the advice and opinion of a number of organisations and individuals, which have probably been sent to the whole Committee. We have also sought to engage the opinions of many relevant experts in this area. The honest answer is that we do not know. I think the Minister himself would say openly that there is a sliding scale of risk with each of those options. I fully expect any of those options, if they are introduced, to result in litigation against the Government that seeks to take the matter to Strasbourg under the relevant rules. That has to be factored in. The Secretary of State and the Minister will be getting the relevant advice. That is why I encourage the Minister to be courageous in the option they ultimately choose. We want to strike the right balance by addressing the problem as it exists for leaseholders—that is very clear—but ensuring that whatever option comes forward can stick and is defensible. That is a conversation we will have over the coming weeks and months, because this issue is going to rumble on for some time to come.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am going to include that in my written response, too, because I know that the specifics of the definition of audit are quite different from other aspects of this question. My understanding is that we will prescribe in secondary legislation what needs to be provided. Given that an accountant will be a part of that, they will have to ensure that the audit conforms to their usual codes of practice. I will write on the specifics to ensure that I have given sufficient information.
As the Minister is contemplating what he will put in his letter, including a response to the hon. Member for Brent North, could I gently remind him that auditing is an expensive procedure? There will be a number of instances where these accounts might fall short of what would be required under existing Companies House legislation. There are some metrics and things out there that the Government could use, but he should bear in the mind the cost of auditing.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. One of the reasons why I want to write is that I want to ensure that the specific elements and substantive parts of the concept of audit are represented to the Committee in the most accurate way. We have to strike a balance by ensuring that sufficient information is made available for decisions to be made, but equally we cannot create a process that is so involved, for what I am sure are very good reasons, that it would be disproportionate, and then create a whole heap of new consequences on the other side, which is what we are trying to avoid.
To conclude, new section 21E places an obligation on landlords to provide an annual report. For service charges, that report must be provided within one month of starting a 12-month accounting period, although it can be provided earlier if it is expedient to do so. Both new sections allow the Secretary of State, as we have already discussed, and Welsh Ministers to prescribe the detailed content in secondary legislation. We will work closely with interested parties when we come to do that. Subsections (3) and (4) make consequential changes to the definition of “qualified accountant” under sections 28 and 39 of the 1985 Act to reflect these new sections. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29
Right to obtain information on request
I thank the hon. Gentleman for amendments 19 to 25, with which, as he indicated, he seeks to adds clarity that any sums paid to the leaseholder where there is a failure to comply are a punishment rather than a recompense for loss. As the Committee is aware, clause 30 will replace the existing and ineffective enforcement measures for failure to provide information with new, more effective and more proportionate measures. That includes allowing the leaseholder to make an application to the appropriate tribunal in cases where landlords have failed to provide the necessary service charge information.
It is the Government’s view that the tribunal is the appropriate body to handle such disputes and to determine whether the landlord has failed in their duties, and whether subsequently they are required to pay damages to the leaseholder. In reaching its decision and ordering that damages be paid, the tribunal need only be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the landlord breached the relevant section. If a financial penalty were applied, the appropriate tribunal would need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the landlord had breached the relevant section.
While I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point on the use of the term “damages”, I am advised that its use does not mean that evidence of financial loss is required. Therefore, in aggregate, we consider that financially recompensing the affected leaseholder by way of the payment of damages is both a suitable incentive for the leaseholder to bring the application and a suitable deterrent for landlords, while aligning with the tribunal’s powers.
The Minister speaks quickly and is knowledgeable about this matter; I just want to put it into everyday speak that the rest of us can understand. I think that the intention behind the Opposition’s amendment is to be clear that there is a difference between penalties and damages. They do not want the burden of proof to be on leaseholders, in this case, and there is tremendous merit to that. Whatever we put into law has to be accessible to people. I think the Minister said that if we change the word from “damages” to “penalties”, that would raise the hurdle. Can he assure us of his objection to the proposed amendment in everyday speak,? As the Bill is drafted, the hurdle will be lower, and there will be no burden of proof on the leaseholder for the penalties/damages to take effect.
As best as I understand it, the situation is exactly as my hon. Friend describes. The threshold is lower, and therefore the provisions are more proportionate, and evidence of financial loss is not required. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will withdraw the amendment. I will come to amendment 134 in due course.
Amendments 17 and 18 address our remaining main two concerns about the clause. The first concern, to which we will return when we consider penalties in relation to part 4 of the Bill, is that we are not convinced that a penalty cap of £5,000 is a sufficient deterrent against non-compliance with the requirements in question. For many—not all, but many—landlords, a penalty of £5,000 will be very easily absorbed. The degree to which the sanctions in proposed new section 25A to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 bite would obviously be improved if the penalty cap of £5,000 applied to all leaseholders partaking in any given application, rather than them having to share an amount up to £5,000 between them. My reading of proposed new section 25A(5) is that the fine would apply to each person making an application on grounds that the landlord has failed to comply with a relevant requirement, but I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify that point. Is it a single fine, or is it a fine that would apply to each leaseholder involved?
However, even if a fine of up to £5,000 could be awarded to multiple leaseholders, we still question whether it is sufficient—I think that is a point that is worthy of debate. Labour is minded to believe a more appropriate threshold for penalties paid under proposed new section 25A—I remind the Committee that penalties are awarded at the discretion of the tribunal, so they are not automatic—would be £30,000, thereby aligning penalties in the Bill with other leasehold law, such as financial penalties for breach of section 3(1) of the Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Act 2022. Amendment 17 proposes such a cap, although we would certainly consider an even higher limit, such as the £50,000 proposed by the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire.
Secondly, Labour thinks that the functioning of the new enforcement regime would be improved by specifying a floor on penalties in the Bill. In making clear that non-compliance with the relevant requirements will always elicit a fine, landlords will be incentivised to comply. Amendment 18 proposes that penalties under this section must be at least £1,000, with the implication that the tribunal would determine what award to make between the range of £1,000 and £30,000 for each breach. I look forward to the Minister’s response to each amendment.
I am tempted to frame page 25 of today’s amendment paper, because it includes the shadow Minister’s amendment 17, which would increase the penalties from £5,000 to £30,000, and my amendment 142, which would increase them from £5,000 to £50,000. I thought it was usually the Conservative party that is pro-business and tries to keep costs on business low, but then I recalled that these penalties apply to people doing something wrong, and of course the Labour party is always soft on criminals.
Seriously, though, the shadow Minister and I have a clear intent, which I am sure is shared by the Minister. A lot of the measures in this part of the Bill are trying desperately to unpick complicated things and rebalance them in favour of people who own their own home but do not run a large business, or people with small financial interests, where there are 30 or 40 of them against one person with a significant financial interest that covers all those people. In trying to rebalance things here, we all want to ensure that these measures are as effective as possible and that there is enough encouragement to ensure that the good practice the Government want to see can be done effectively.
The concern that I share with the shadow Minister is that the current levels of penalties just look like a cost of doing business. [Interruption.] Indeed! The hon. Member for Brent North has just slapped himself on the wrist, which is probably how many businesses will see it.
Can I gird the Minister’s loins and encourage him to take up his shield and his sword of righteousness in defence of individual leaseholders and say, “This amount is too low. We shall change the legislation. This party and this Government stand to make the intent of what we will do to truly bite on those who are doing wrong”?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire and the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich for tabling their amendments. I share their basic conceptual desire, and that of other Committee members, for people or organisations that have done the wrong things to be held to account. There should be penalties that recognise that they have done the wrong thing. The challenge is always going to be where we draw the line.
I recognise that there are multiple parts of the menu on offer. Notwithstanding the very valid points that have been made, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the Government are doubling the number from £2,500 to £5,000. Individual right hon. and hon. Members will take different views throughout this process and beyond on whether that is proportionate or whether it should be higher or lower. We think we have struck a proportionate balance.
I will add to the record, for consideration, the importance of the potential for unintended consequences. The response will quite rightly be that it will ultimately be for the tribunal to determine how much to apportion and how to use any changed option. There is a scenario in which the potential penalty on the freeholder, or the party being taken to the tribunal, becomes so great and the hazard becomes so visible that the freeholder starts to oppose it with even more objections, difficulties and the like.
I am making quite a nuanced argument, and Members may feel that I am overthinking this, but we have to be cautious not inadvertently to create a process that emboldens freeholders to fight even harder because of the potential hazard and because they feel that they may be exposed to a fine larger than would be reasonable and proportionate. However, I take the point about the challenge of setting the penalty in the right place. The Government’s view is that the increase from £2,500 to £5,000 is a step forward. That is what we are proposing to this Committee. As a result, we will resist the amendments.
I apologise for not covering that point; I intended to do so. It is £5,000 per challenge. There is the ability to bring forward multiple challenges. Should that be the case, similar amounts of damages may be awarded.
Sorry, I am such a pedant, but “per challenge” could relate to person A making the challenge that report x was not done on time, and then person B making the challenge that report x was not done on time. Do those two challenges count as two separate challenges because they are brought by two different people, although they are for the same objection, or as one challenge because they are for the same objection, although they are presented by two different people?
They are two separate challenges. If a challenge goes to the tribunal and it is deemed that a penalty should apply, for whatever reason or whatever poor behaviour, and a penalty of up to £5,000 is apportioned, and then another person makes the same claim about exactly the same instance, one would logically expect the tribunal to allocate the same penalty. Multiple challenges get multiple fines.
The Minister’s response was quite disappointing. I think he has made it clear that it is per challenge per group, so what is the incentive for a large group of leaseholders to press the dispute if the potential amount of the share that they are going to get is £100, or even £50? It might be a low amount. [Interruption.] No, it could be. It is a share of the challenge; if there are 100 leaseholders in the challenge, they get a maximum of £5,000 to share between them unless they make multiple challenges. That is my reading of what the Minister has just said.
I think the shadow Minister is mixing two things up when he says that people get a share. The issue here is about changing the behaviour of the person who is doing wrong, not “I’m going to get this much money out of it.” The incentive is for the person who is doing wrong. Does the shadow Minister agree with the point made by the hon. Member for Brent North about clogging up the system: why would 150 people put one challenge in when they could put 150 challenges in?
I take the point, and I understand what the hon. Gentleman is driving at: there is the very real risk of clogging up the system with multiple challenges if leaseholders are sophisticated enough to understand the provisions of the clause and work out that the best thing they can do is submit multiple challenges. I do not think that most will. There is therefore a detrimental impact on the incentives for leaseholders to try to dispute these matters.
Coming back to the fundamental point of whether this will change the behaviour of landlords when it comes to compliance, though, I think the hon. Gentleman is right: the figure of £5,000 is too low. I have had this debate so many times with Government Ministers. We had it on the Renters (Reform) Bill: the maximum that local authorities can charge for certain breaches of that Bill is £5,000. Most landlords will take that as a risk of doing business.
Clause 40 sets out general limitations with regard to estate management charges. Subsection (1) states:
“A charge demanded as an estate management charge is payable…only to the extent that the amount of the charge reflects relevant costs”—
in other words, purely the costs associated with estate management—and cannot be used to fund wider activities. This means that not every cost incurred by an estate manager is chargeable; an example would be if costs arose from the award of damages against the estate manager or an activity outside the estate by the estate manager that is not regulated. Those costs cannot be passed on.
Subsection (2) goes on to set out more detailed circumstances in which costs that are relevant costs may cease to become relevant costs and hence not payable or only partially payable.
I want to probe a bit more, because of the speed with which we shot through clause 39—with your leave, Chair, I am sure you will find this in order, because clause 40 also relates to relevant costs. Clause 39(10) says that relevant costs,
“in relation to a dwelling, means costs which are incurred by an estate manager in carrying out estate management for the benefit of the dwelling or for the benefit of the dwelling and other dwellings.”
As the Government were considering clauses 39 and 40, the general limitations on what might be a relevant cost, what consideration did the Minister or the Government give to the fact that there are some costs that might be covered within that general limitation that, for some people, are covered by payments they make through their council tax? Therefore, in certain circumstances it may be the case that people are paying twice for the same services covered by what are defined as estate management running costs.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his point. He tempts me, at this relatively late hour, to get into an extremely important conversation that we will come to in the coming days. With his leave, I will limit my response to acknowledging his broader point, which is potentially broader than simply the discussions here on this Bill. Having listened to the evidence given to the Committee last week, I recognise that this is a key area that those impacted by estate management charges would like to debate further. I know that we will come to this in due course. I am putting that down as a marker for further discussion—I am not sure if I can satisfy him with the discussion, but I will put down a marker for it none the less.
To conclude on clause 40, specifically, subsection (2) refers to the provisions in clauses 41 to 43, which cover the requirement for the reasonableness of estate management costs and broader consultation requirements. Clause 40 provides clarity that not all costs incurred by estate managers may be passed on and sets out circumstances when even chargeable costs are not payable. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mr Mohindra.)
(11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI want to speak briefly in support of the third point made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, in which he addressed the interaction of the Bill with the Government’s ground rent consultation. If I heard him correctly, he was asking the Government at least to be clear as to how those recommendations will affect the Bill. He was asking the Government to be clear on their position; I will not go as far as that, because I think the Government have the discretion to decide when they want to announce that or not.
However, there is another issue that the Minister could perhaps consider: the impact assessment on the valuation, which we, as Members of Parliament, are being asked to address in this Bill. As we heard in the evidence sessions, the current impact assessment may potentially omit a significant amount of value that will be taken into account as part of the ground rent reform. If it is the Government’s intention to introduce amendments on that, as the shadow spokesman was asking, it would be useful to have clarity from the Minister on that, but we should also ask the Minister whether an updated impact assessment can be presented to incorporate what the value of those recommendations would be.
I rise briefly to add my support for some of the comments and, most importantly, for the ability of leaseholders to extend their leases. As we know, this is one of the most egregious features of the current system: people buy properties that they then find have short leases, after which they are whacked with massive charges coming out of the blue; they do not understand how those charges are calculated, and they end up having to pay them because they have no choice. They are completely over a barrel. I know that leaseholders will massively welcome this change, which is one of the most important parts of the whole Bill.
Having said that, it is vital that we understand when we will see the Government’s response on the ground rent consultation, as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire and the shadow spokesperson, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, have said. It will, of course, affect the calculations.
I also want to raise with the Committee the number of people who have sat in front of me and asked, “When will you bring this forward? I don’t know whether to extend my lease now or wait another year or for another consultation”. It is a huge number of people. I want to make this point to everybody: if we get this right, it will affect a lot of people very beneficially.
I thank hon. Members for their questions and comments, which I will try to address. There is obviously a desire to understand the interaction of the two clauses with the outcome of the consultation that closed last week. We saw to some extent in our deliberations last week, on the first two days in Committee, when we took evidence, that this is a contested area. As a result and notwithstanding the fact that by convention in this place we have the ability to speak freely, I hope the Committee will understand that I will limit my remarks.
I understand the eagerness, enthusiasm and legitimate desire of the Committee to understand the position that we will seek to provide. We will provide that to the Committee, and publicly, as soon as possible. It will not be possible for me to answer all the questions that were asked today. I accept the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire that there is a difference between process and decision, but some elements of the process could be impacted by the decision and it will therefore be difficult to engage in hypotheticals at this stage. However, we will respond to the legitimate points that the Committee has made as soon as we are able to do so.
I agree with the points made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich and by my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch about the importance of clarifying how quickly the provisions will come into force. Again, that is a difficult one to answer because we need to get through this process. We have no idea what the other place might or might not do or how quickly the process will go. Although we are all grateful for the confirmation from my Labour colleagues that we are seeking to move this as quickly as possible, it is difficult to be able to answer the question at this stage, but I hope to say more in due course.
On the fourth question posed by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, about the competent landlord, my understanding is that we are not changing the law in that regard.
I am listening carefully to the Minister and sort of accept what he says, but may I make a couple of points? First, he has talked about how the Bill has to go through the House of Lords, but we are the democratically elected Chamber. The interaction of the two provisions represents substantial transfers in value between different parts of our community—rightly or wrongly. Decisions should correctly be made with the full information by this House. We should not go through a procedure when information is presented in the unelected House, which then comes back to the Commons. With our remit as Back-Bench Members of Parliament, we are very restricted in what we can do to amend that.
Secondly, the Minister talked about how the points about value are hypothetical. That is the case only because the Government have not made a decision. Once they make a decision, those points of value can be forecast. They are no longer hypothetical but judgmental, so it really is within the Minister’s remit to be able to move from hypothetical to his own forecast. Having said that, I fully accept what the Minister has said so far.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his legitimate points. He is absolutely right that it is important that right hon. and hon. Members have an opportunity to debate at the earliest possible opportunity the complex interaction of what we may or may not choose to do with the consultation. I take his point about hypotheticals. My point was simply that there are a number of different options in the Bill. Some of them are substantially different, as my hon. Friend indicated in some of his questions last week. To go through all the elements of the potential outcomes in all of those different options would be a substantial amount of work and potentially not necessary on the basis that we are likely to choose some rather than all of them. None the less, where I have missed anything out, I will—
(11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWe have just over 10 minutes left. I will bring in Richard Fuller and then we will try to get back to Barry and Andy.
Q
I am interested in your thoughts when it comes to property managers and managing agents, about where you think the interaction is between simplification and regulation, and whether regulation is a matter of regulating the process—“You must provide this set of information by this date”—or of regulating the people—“Thou must have this qualification in order to do x”—or whether it is about the process of redress: being able to get some compensation at the end; because we are going to be wrestling with all those things here. They all have a role to play, to a greater or lesser extent. But we run the risk of just vomiting out a whole new set of what we think is going to be the solution. As you said, Ms Higgins, we have a once-in-20-years chance. I said this to Mr Gardiner on the way in—he goes back to 1993 thinking about this, and he is an MP now.
What are your thoughts? Give us some guidance on simplification and standardisation versus regulation, and then regulation of people, regulation of process and the provision of redress.
Bob Smytherman: I would not reinvent the wheel. I don’t know whether you have had The Property Institute in yet, and Andrew Bulmer from the Association of Residential Managing Agents. They fill the gap as the main membership organisation for managing agents. Andrew will give you the figures, but I believe they represent about 50% of all property managers of leasehold property. That means that 50% of people are not members of ARMA and are not part of their regime, along with the Institute of Residential Property Management—obviously, ARMA and the IRPM have now merged to form The Property Institute.
They have done amazing work to fill the void, where there has been a lack of an independent regulator, and I think working with Andrew and with them would be a really good starting point for the Government to create a regulatory regime. Certainly we would stand ready as an organisation to help with that. I just think that giving leaseholders the confidence that there is an independent body that they can go to when they have disputes with their property manager or their landlord is really important—as people do with Ofwat or Ofgem or other regulators. Having that independent regulator is really, really important.
Ms Paula Higgins: You make a really interesting point, but there are things that I would not want to see happening. We also work in the new homes area. We have legislated for a New Homes Ombudsman—fantastic—but we have not enacted it yet, and we now have a more confusing landscape for people who are buying new homes, who are probably also leaseholders and probably also shared owners; they have another competing code. It is incredibly confusing. That is not what I want to see happening.
Regulation means enforcement. There are a lot of things that estate agents have to do now, and we know from our research that they are not doing what they should be doing. The problem is that people do not have the right of redress if something happens. We have heard about the managing agents, but it is the estate agents, the developers and the housing associations who are selling these dreams. You have seen lots of people on Tuesday who feel they have been mis-sold, and others will continue to be mis-sold. These estate agents are the first port of call for the people going into the process, and we have to remember that people are buying a home, and they have not done it before. They might have bought a couch or something like that, but this is the first time they are doing this, and they can get it so wrong. People need to be protected. The estate agent is the only part of the professional world of property that is not regulated. The estate agent is that person there who is alongside the person trying to get their dream, which could go massively wrong.
Q
Ms Paula Higgins: That is a really good point. I know the RoPA stuff—the regulation of property agents working group; in fact, we gave evidence to it. A tick box is probably not the right thing. Perhaps it is more about a proper single place for redress, but as I think Andrew Bulmer mentioned, that is the ambulance at the bottom, and what matters is what is at the top.
What we don’t want is people doing online qualifications and getting a tick, and then they can jump up as an estate agent and come back down again. So I appreciate the complexities and I look forward to seeing what your deliberations will be.
Sue Phillips: I do not have the expertise to speak directly to the regulation of property management, but I would like to pick up on a couple of related issues from a shared-ownership perspective. The first is that the evidence submitted to the Advertising Standards Authority’s inquiry into Black Friday marketing highlighted the fact that industry sector standards for the marketing of shared ownership are lower than other standards that are out there. For example, shared ownership is currently excluded from the New Homes Quality Board’s code of practice. That simultaneously reflects the complexity of shared ownership but also the fact that shared owners do not have access to the same level of protections as other homebuyers in relation to new build codes. That is slightly off to one side.
I also wanted to pick up on the matter of transparency of service charges. Transparency is clearly essential: people should know what they are paying for. However, shared owners and other leaseholders should not have to effectively take on an audit function where it falls upon them to scrutinise accounts. They should be able to place some degree of reliance on the accuracy and proportionality of the accounts that they receive. I cannot speak to how that will be achieved, but I think that the onus should be on the providers of services and service charge accounts to be better, rather than leaseholders and shared owners having more and more obligations to scrutinise and take whatever action is required if problems are identified in those accounts.
Q
Ms Paula Higgins: I fully agree with that. It is a bit like the situation where, if you are getting building work done in your home and the building work is not completed or whatever, you withhold money. That happens in all of the construction industry. The stuff in relation to the forfeiture is very disproportionate, is it not?
Q
Professor Hodges: Very briefly: modernise, because we are still living in the past; simplify, because we can easily do that on a comprehensive basis; and get it done so that people can plan, retrain and know what they have to do. You then get good behaviour throughout the system. I am very tempted to repeat facetiously the “Get it done” slogan, which crops up a lot.
Q
Professor Hodges: As far as the detail of the Bill is concerned, looking technically at what is in there without expressing a view as whether it is a good or a bad idea substantively, it seems to me to be fine. You asked a wider regulatory question earlier on—
I will come to that in a minute. But just in here, on this Bill, is there anything that we should look out for?
Professor Hodges: As far as the detail is concerned, there is nothing that stands out to me, as a regulatory expert, that says, “This is a problem”.
Okay, so more generally then, on regulators—Ofgem on energy prices and Ofwat on sewage and water—that approach seems not to provide the outcomes that perhaps were originally indicated when the legislation was passed. What are your thoughts about the political use of regulation? Is there anything from those general principles that you think might apply here?
Professor Hodges: I sat on Lord Best’s RoPA—regulation of property agents—working group, and there was strong consensus around the room that you need regulation of agents. Since then, how we do regulation has evolved. Regulation, in the broadest sense, is an all-encompassing idea, and looking at the problems with Ofgem, Ofwat and so on, there are two aspects that strike me. First, one historically gave specific regulatory bodies certain remits that turned out to be not wide enough, and there were not enough people involved in the conversation; they were not regulated or contributing to good behaviour.
Secondly, the traditional way within which regulation is thought of, in the way that Parliament works, is that you make a number of requirements, rules and procedures. You then identify breaches of those rules and requirements and you then enforce. You can do that through traditionally public or private ways. Public ways in the property sector would be through trading standards authorities or environmental health locally, not a national regulator, as such. The private ways would be through the courts, but that has evolved in relation to the alternative dispute resolution ombudsmen being the best model at the moment and an integration between the tribunal and ombudsman, which is on the cards and may well occur. However, that is not enough because enforcement does not affect behaviour as such. We like to think that it does, but it is a myth, and there is an enormous amount of psychology and evidence published showing that it is not enough.
Therefore, if one stands back and says, “How do we get an effective regulatory system?”, it is about how one does it. That involves getting all the stakeholders together —again, that goes back to the first point about how it is not just a regulator telling people what to do, like an Ofgem or Ofcom—and saying, “How are we going to behave and how are we going to do it?” You need the rules, but you also need codes and systems involving data and support.
Rules, codes, systems, data, penalties, redress, different organisations—this is your answer as a better solution to caveat emptor?
Professor Hodges: Yes, absolutely. Now, let me give you one example only—
In all circumstances or specifically on this Bill? Well, we ought to stick to the Bill. I just want to be clear: you have just outlined the solution—this Bill is going part of the way to that—but the old way was, “I have personal responsibility,” “I am responsible for the decision I make,” “This is a very big decision about what I buy,” and so on. I just want to make sure that we are not trying to put too much faith—one of the last witnesses made some very good points on shared ownership and the fact that people may not have the encompassing knowledge—but I just want to make sure, from your expertise on regulation, that, in this field, you cannot see any damaging consequences for the principles of caveat emptor and personal responsibility by this regulatory structure that you have outlined?
Professor Hodges: Not at all. The most striking example—
Please answer briefly if you can, because I want to get some more people in.
Professor Hodges: There are various regulatory systems in this country that are now modernising. In many ways, the most outstanding example, which has been there for several decades, is aviation safety. Everyone works together, and they call it an “open and just culture”. They are actually collaborating. They have lots of rules, but you have almost no enforcement, because the Civil Aviation Authority does not need to do it—everyone is doing something.
There are various sectors where you do need public enforcement, and where I would say you need a national system regulator. But you can do a lot through ombudsmen, codes and support. That is now emerging in, say, information and data protection, food standards and various other areas. It is absolutely ideal for property and housing.
(11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
I know that you are going to get to your final report in February. This Bill, helpfully in some ways, seeks to plug some of those gaps in the protection of people who own homes, but would it not be better for us to ban the lack of adoption right at the start? Should we not go to the source and find a solution as to why councils and housing estate developers are ripping off my constituents, and I am sure many others, who own their own homes? What can be done about that in this Bill?
George Lusty: Again, in our November working paper, we pointed to that very issue of there not being enough adoption by local authorities of those facilities. We put forward possible ways for that to be fixed, either through more mandatory adoption of those amenities or through some common adoptable standards that could be followed to inform the types of amenity that were suitable for adoption more broadly. As I say, we have not issued our final recommendations, but we have already said something about the options that might be available if there was a desire to try to tackle that now.
Q
George Lusty indicated assent.
Thank you. A very quick question with a very quick answer, please. Barry Gardiner.
Thank you very much. In order to preserve both our reputations, I will not say that you agreed with me and I trust that you will not say that I agreed with you.
Q
James Vitali: I think a lot of the reforms proposed in this Bill are an attempt to reflect better the fact that when the leaseholder purchases the leasehold, they are acquiring the majority value of the asset. In market terms, sure, I suppose marriage value is significant and substantive, but as it stands it seems to me that a leaseholder acquires the majority of the value of an asset when they acquire the leasehold, and that is slowly eroded. I think that is the thing that is wrong in the process.
Q
James Vitali: Tricky question. If you were to acquire some property that you have genuine rights and responsibilities for the management of, the ability to benefit from in the future and the ability to control, then that form of property would be greater than if you were subject to charges and ground rent. On the point about the £1.9 billion transfer value from freeholders to leaseholders, I did take a cursory look at the impact assessment. I do think that is a legitimate decision for you as parliamentarians to make about 10-year property rights in the UK. I think it is justified.
Q
James Vitali: I think that is where the dividing line lies between you and Mr Gardiner, and perhaps you and I and Mr Gardiner.
Oh, it is much wider than that.
James Vitali: Indeed. I think a balancing act needs to be struck in this Bill between spreading genuine property rights more widely and compensating those existing freeholders. If you seek to diffuse property ownership, but in the process undermine or dilute property rights, you are undermining the thing that you are trying to spread more evenly. That is a technical question for the way that you finesse this Bill, but I do not think it is a substantive issue with the desire to give leaseholders greater control and rights over their property.
Q
James Vitali indicated assent.
Q
Philip Rainey: In a sense, that is a conceptual question.
You are a lawyer.
Philip Rainey: Yes, and one tends to avoid the philosophical points. Clearly, from a legal perspective the Bill interferes in an extremely significant way with property rights. Whether that is the right thing to do is a value judgment.
One thing that is sometimes overlooked—I am not defending the leasehold system; I am on record as being in favour of commonhold, which is inherently a more satisfactory system for holding flats—is that a lot of people will be disappointed when commonhold comes in. They will still find that they are not allowed to remove the supporting walls in their flat or to have a noisy party on a Friday night, because their neighbours do not want that. A lot of the things you find in leases and the restrictions when living in flats are because, if you live communally in a block of flats, you owe duties to your neighbours. There are responsibilities, in communal living, that do not apply if you live in a small house in a field, 500 yards from your neighbours. The restrictions in the leasehold system are not as unique to leasehold as you might think; I would suggest otherwise. To go back to your basic point, clearly the Bill alters property rights. It is a value judgment as to whether that is the right thing to do.
Philip Freedman: I have heard a number of cases where the property industry is concerned about the transfer of value that will be effected by capping ground rents, removing marriage value and so on, in relation not just to the benefit to leaseholders but to the burden on those landlords that are pension funds and other organisations that will find that they are deprived of rental income that they have banked on and have thought will be reliable income over many years. They bought leases that were perfectly lawful, were not, so far as one can tell, entered into under any mis-selling, and the provisions for the ground rent are not necessarily unconscionable; the ground rents were invested in in good faith.
We must not lose sight of the fact that if there are winners, there are always losers. Some provisions of the Bill, which are fine, are to say that if the tenants are enfranchising, they do not have to buy the commercial bits of the building. Those can be left with the landlord under a leaseback, and therefore the value remains with the landlord. Both parties win: the landlord keeps the value and the tenants do not have to pay as much money. But where you are transferring value, there is always a loser, and there are lots of investors who appear to have bought in good faith and were not expecting retrospective legislation. Lawyers always do not like retrospective legislation. It is up to Parliament to decide whether the social benefit is sufficient to outweigh the concern about pension funds, and so on, that have invested in ground rents. The Law Society does not take sides between landlords and tenants, or different types of clients. We just want to make sure that Parliament focuses on the issue and makes the decision in the public interest.
Q
Philip Rainey: Yes. In a sense, that is the downside. It is possible to create what you might call commonhold-lite. It is a leasehold system—it is so encrusted with restrictions and requirements, although you own the freehold, that it is very similar. It would be only a staging post, because one of the problems with the current system is that it creates a “them and us” situation. You see it even when tenants own the freehold. Somehow they still think, “Well, it’s ‘my’ lease and it’s ‘them’”, which is them under another hat as the freeholder. Commonhold should eliminate that.
Q
On a point of order, Dame Caroline. I am wondering whether my colleague, Mr Gardiner, is getting to a question rather than just expressing a view.
Order. We have time for only one more question, Barry. Can I move on to Richard Fuller, please?
Q
Jack Spearman: This is a bit of an issue we have with the way the impact assessments have worked, because the impact assessment for the leasehold and freehold Bill did not take consideration of the consultation impact assessment that came out on ground rent. They are not working together. That is part of the issue of you not being able to scrutinise the impact assessment within the ground rent consultation, where the Secretary of State is on record as saying he wants a peppercorn ground rent; in that it says the impact would be £27.7 billion. If you add that to the £3.2 billion in the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill impact assessment, that is where you get to.
Q
Jack Spearman: I think it is a bit more, actually. Is it not £3.17 billion in this one?
Exactly—you have added them all up. I just did the first section.
Jack Spearman: Indeed.
But a bit like an iceberg, the transfer of wealth from group A to group B is somewhere else; it is not here in the impact assessment.
Jack Spearman: Agreed. Also, in terms of the people it is being transferred to and from, remember that while a lot of leaseholders are homeowners, there are also a lot of buy-to-let investors in that group—over 50% in our membership, of leaseholders are buy-to-let investors. That is a transfer from business to business being overseen by this Bill.
Very good. Does anyone else want to come in? I had another question, unless we have no more time.
Q
Jack Spearman: Yes. It is very important that, at the very least, the primary legislation sets out what reference the Minister should look to—something dynamic would be helpful, so that you don’t have these ridiculously long periods of time where one party is out or in. I think people have talked about looking at some long-term ideas, whether that is the National Loans Fund rate or the longest Treasury gilt. You obviously don’t want to make it too dynamic, so that it is always shifting around, but I think it should clearly reflect market value. It should be done on a no-act principle. It should be enabled to be dynamic so that, as I said, you do not have this problem of the Secretary of State having to arbitrarily change it—it should be able to move with the market. It should be something that is available for reference.
Thank you. That brings us to the end of that session. I thank our witness on behalf of the Committee.
Examination of Witness
Giles Grover gave evidence.
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI know, given the nature of the debate on this Bill, that a number of colleagues would like to intervene; I will try to answer questions briefly, because I know a number of colleagues would like to take part in the debate.
Hypotheticals are not always helpful, but I beg my right hon. Friend’s indulgence in this hypothetical on that particular point about the interaction between clause 3(7) and UK foreign policy. UK foreign policy is clear that illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are against international law. This Bill would provide that, if a pension fund were given an investment policy for expanding, say, an infrastructure fund proposal in the occupied territories, it would have no moral basis for refusing to invest, although that investment would be expanding Israeli policies contrary to UK foreign policy. Can the Secretary of State explain how to unpack that so that what he has just said is what I believe is true?
It is specifically the case that public bodies, including the local government pension scheme and local authorities, should not be taking decisions that conflict with UK Government foreign policy, and we are absolutely clear that it would conflict with UK Government foreign policy if they were to engage in freelance activity of that kind. However, it is perfectly open to any representative, including any elected representative, to express their personal disapproval of the activities of the Israeli Government or any organisation that operates within the settlements.