Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting)

Paul Holmes Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 35, in clause 60, page 73, line 8, at end insert—

“( ) After section 54D (inserted by section 58 of this Act) insert—

‘54ZE Criminal liability of nominated director or partner to follow requirements

(1) A director or partner nominated by virtue of section 54(3ZA)(c) commits an offence if without reasonable excuse they cause or permit a breach of any requirement imposed under this Part.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine, or to both;

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine not exceeding £500,000, or to both.’”

This amendment provides that the director or partner who has been nominated to be responsible for ensuring compliance with the legal requirements relating to donations commits an offence if they cause or permit a breach of those requirements without reasonable excuse.

Amendment 36, in clause 60, page 77, line 14, after “party” insert

“, any other party, regulated donee (within the meaning of Schedule 7) or candidate (see Schedule 2A to the Representation of the People Act 1983)”.

This amendment would ensure that the amount a company or limited liability partnership can donate to a party must take into account any donations it has already made to other parties, regulated donees (which includes members of parties, members associations and holders of elective offices) or electoral candidates.

Amendment 37, in clause 60, page 77, line 28, after “party” insert

“, any other party, regulated donee (within the meaning of Schedule 7) or candidate (see Schedule 2A to the Representation of the People Act 1983)”.

This amendment would ensure that the amount a company or limited liability partnership can donate to a party must take into account any donations it has already made to other parties, regulated donees (which includes members of parties, members associations and holders of elective offices) or electoral candidates.

Clause stand part.

New clause 13—Permissible donors not to include property development and construction undertakings—

“(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of PPERA 2000 and any other enactment, a person is not a permissible donor to a registered party, recognised third party, regulated donee or permitted participant if they meet the conditions in subsections (2).

(2) The conditions in this subsection are that the person is a property development or construction undertaking as defined under subsections (3) and (4).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a person is a ‘property development or construction undertaking’ if they are a body corporate, partnership, limited liability partnership, or unincorporated association, of such an undertaking which carries out, whether wholly or substantially, activities consisting of—

(a) the acquisition, disposal, or development of land for commercial or residential purposes,

(b) property speculation,

(c) the construction, renovation, or substantial alteration of buildings or infrastructure, or

(d) the provision of construction services as a principal contractor,

and whose principal business activities fall within such Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(4) Further to subsection (3), a ‘property development or construction undertaking’ includes—

(a) any person who is acting on behalf of a property development or construction undertaking,

(b) any person who is funded either directly or indirectly by a property development or construction undertaking, and

(c) any subsidiaries or holding companies of a property development or construction undertaking.

(5) The Electoral Commission may issue guidance for the purposes of determining whether an undertaking is a property development or construction undertaking.”

This new clause would mean that a property developer or construction undertaking would not be a permissible donor to a registered party, recognised third party, regulated donee or permitted participant.

New clause 32—Restrictions on permitted donors: public contracts—

“(1) Section 54 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) An individual who would otherwise fall within subsection (2)(a) is not a permissible donor if that individual—

(a) has significant control of a company which has been awarded a public contract within the previous ten years, or

(b) has significant control of a company which is a parent undertaking or subsidiary undertaking of a company falling within paragraph (a).

(2B) A company which would otherwise fall within subsection (2)(b) is not a permissible donor if that company—

(a) has been awarded a public contract within the previous ten years, or

(b) is a parent undertaking or subsidiary undertaking of a company falling within paragraph (a).’

(3) After subsection (8) insert—

‘(9) In this section—

“public contract” has the meaning given by section 3 (public contracts) of the Procurement Act 2023;

“significant control” has the meaning given by section 790C (key terms) of the Companies Act 2006;

“parent undertaking” and “subsidiary undertaking” have the meanings given by section 1162 (parent and subsidiary undertakings) of the Companies Act 2006.’”

New clause 52—Permissible donors not to include oil and gas companies—

“(1) Section 54 of PPERA 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2)(b) after ‘Kingdom’ insert ‘, subject to the exemption in subsection (2A).’

(3) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) A company is not a permissible donor if it is an oil and gas company.’

(4) After subsection (8) insert—

‘(9) For the purposes of this section, “an oil and gas company” means any company which derives over 50% of its annual revenue from the extraction, acquisition, transportation, processing, supply or disposal of petroleum or natural gas, or a combination of the two.’”

This new clause provides that an oil and gas company would not be a permissible donor for the purposes of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. This is the first time we have met in this Committee, but I know you like good order, so I will be brief.

[Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)]

Hear, hear!

[Paul Holmes]

That is the only time the Liberal Democrats have ever cheered me on, so I am glad we are in agreement.

The Minister gave a comprehensive outline of the proposals in clause 60. I will briefly talk to amendment 34, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) but moved by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove. The Conservatives think the amendment is well intentioned, but one of my big concerns—I think the Minister outlined this, but perhaps she will return to it in winding up—is the burden that would be placed on businesses, which already have quite extensive regulatory burdens placed on them by Government. I think all parties in this Committee have intimated that everybody wants more transparency and wants to talk more about donations to ensure that we really tighten up the regulatory regime on political party donations. However, although I am not averse to being radical, I think amendment 34 is probably a bit over-burdensome and we do not support it, but we are content to support clause 60.

[Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Sir Desmond. In clause 60, we are considering company donations in UK politics, and I ask the Minister to consider outright banning them, as happens, for example, in France and Canada. There is no real reason for companies to be permitted to make donations, particularly when we are concerned, as in this Bill, with ensuring that company donations are not a mechanism for channelling funds from outside the country into British politics. Why not make the situation clear and allow only individuals, whose connection to the country can be clearly tested, to donate? Company donations have been nearly half the size of individual donations in UK politics in recent years. These are really significant sums.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

I will keep my remarks brief. As we start the afternoon sitting, it is worth putting on the record that clause 60 goes a significant distance towards finally tightening up the rules around corporate donations, which many campaigners, including in civil society, would argue have been left unaddressed for far too long. What clause 60 seeks to do is effective.

That said, and I will not repeat in too much detail the points made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, it is worth reflecting on the recommendations in Philip Rycroft’s review around revenue versus profits, and how we can tighten things up. So I am keen to understand how, as the Bill progresses, we can potentially take his recommendations into account.

It is worth remembering some of the big case studies that have been a cause for concern. We therefore know that, in some cases, corporate donations can carry a significant risk of nefarious interference in the democratic process. There was much media coverage and speculation about the idea that Elon Musk, the California-based billionaire, could legitimately make a donation to a UK political party via a UK subsidiary of Tesla.

When we look at some of the research conducted by CenTax or Transparency International, we see that around £1 in every £10 that comes via a company as a donation could be because the individual in question could not donate directly themselves. According to that same research, around a quarter of money donated by companies is completely untraceable. So these measures are really welcome.

[Paul Holmes]

I do not disagree with what the hon. Gentleman is saying; I think he is well intentioned, and his speech is well researched. However, as set out in the House of Commons Library note, the Electoral Commission itself has warned that the provisions in the clause

“would not reduce the risk of foreign money entering British politics through companies”.

What does he say to that? Does he think the Government should do more?

[Lloyd Hatton]

I think there is a difference between corporate and non-corporate donations. However, what would be really interesting is to see how the Bill progresses in taking forward the Rycroft review. That is a really important point, but I will not go over it again, because it has already been well articulated by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire.

To conclude, the Bill takes serious steps forward in addressing some of the foul play we have seen time and again with corporate donations in the past, and there is a huge body of evidence behind that. However, I would welcome any early advice or opinion the Minister can give us on how we can work on the recommendations set out by Philip Rycroft.

--- Later in debate ---

[Samantha Dixon]

This clause strengthens the electoral regime by restoring a clear, objective test for forfeiture: if an individual donor was not actually on an electoral register at the time of the donation, the donation is impermissible and liable to forfeiture. It responds directly to long-standing concerns from the Electoral Commission that the current framework is open to inconsistency. In particular, the 2010 Supreme Court ruling, which allowed courts to consider whether a donor was eligible, rather than actually registered, when assessing impermissible donations and their forfeiture, introduced uncertainty and risked discouraging thorough permissibility checks by campaigners.

The clause removes the ambiguity in electoral law, ensuring that permissibility of an individual is determined on actual electoral registration. It reinstates a simple and objective test that supports consistent enforcement and reinforces the integrity of the electoral regime. Campaigners already must take reasonable steps to verify donor permissibility. The clause simply removes the scope for subjective interpretation of permissibility and strengthens deterrence by ensuring that impermissible donations cannot be retained by campaigners due to ambiguity in the law. By reinforcing the principle that only permissible donors may fund UK politics, the clause provides a clear deterrent for impermissible donations and supports compliance by political parties and campaigners.

[Paul Holmes]

I welcome the Minister’s comments on the clause. It is important that when we have been discussing the nature of this legislation, particularly regarding donations, we have outlined a clear stance that if people want to participate in our political process and make donations, they should have a physical stake in it. Any removal of the ambiguity around campaigners having to look to see whether it is permissible is welcome. It is a reasonable expectation from the Government that there has to be some level of participatory engagement in the political process. We have no problem with the clause; indeed we support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62

Unincorporated associations making political contributions

[Dr Chowns]

I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 62, page 83, line 17, leave out “£11,180” and insert “£500”.

This amendment, together with Amendments 89 to 94, would bring the reporting threshold for donations from Unincorporated Associations in line with the permissibility threshold for donations to political parties.

--- Later in debate ---

For those reasons, the Government believe that the Bill already strikes the right balance of stronger transparency and accountability where UAs engage in significant political financing, without imposing disproportionate burdens on low-risk activity. I therefore invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for her remarks. Once again, I would like to say on the record that the Government are making great strides in this area and are trying to strengthen the legislation and the regulatory regime around donations. We agree with her that the amendments—particularly amendment 88—for the reduction to £500 on the reporting threshold for donations from unincorporated associations is simply too low. There could be a debate on whether it should be lowered from what the Government are proposing; I think actually unifying the regulations between companies and unincorporated associations is a sensible thing to do. It removes ambiguity and creates a more uniform system. The burden placed at £500 would create an unnecessary reporting regime.

[Lloyd Hatton]

It has already been outlined by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, but I am interested to know whether the official Opposition spokesperson agrees that the previous Government’s decision in the Elections Act 2022 to inexplicably increase the threshold for UAs was wrong, and that the intention of this Bill, which is to reduce it, is the right way forward?

[Paul Holmes]

I have already said that I think the Government are being sensible in creating a unified or level playing field between companies and unincorporated associations. I was not an expert on the previous Act when it was passed, but in my view it is sensible for the Government to be taking this action, now that its consequences are clear, because the Act obviously did not work. If Members across the House look at some of my previous remarks on some of the proposals brought forward by the last Government, I am not ashamed to say that sometimes—I only say sometimes—we got it wrong. That is the nature of democracy.

The changes that the Government are making are sensible and my contention is that some of the amendments—especially amendments 88 and 90—use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. They create an overburden compared with the Government’s good intentions and what they want to get out of the proposals.

We would not support amendment 88 and we certainly would not support amendment 90, but we do welcome the strides that the Government, and the Minister, are trying to take in tightening up the regime.

[Dr Chowns]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 79, in clause 62, page 83, line 28, at end insert—

“(h) create offences of—

(i) giving an unincorporated association false information about a gift that may be used to make a political contribution, and

(ii) withholding information about such a gift with intent to deceive.”—(Samantha Dixon.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 85.

Clause 62, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS MAKING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Amendments made: 80, in schedule 9, page 168, line 2, at end insert

“, unless it already has one (see sub-paragraph (6A))”.

This amendment, and amendment 81, amends the new provisions on responsible persons for unincorporated associations to make it clear that an association is not required to appoint a responsible person when it already has one in place, but that the Commission must be notified that the responsible person is willing to continue to act.

Amendment 81, in schedule 9, page 168, line 30, at end insert—

“(6A) Where an unincorporated association would be required by sub-paragraph (2) to appoint an individual to be the responsible person in relation to the association but an appointment of such a person is already in force, the notice under sub-paragraph (3) must inform the Commission that the responsible person is willing to remain as the responsible person in relation to the association (and sub-paragraph (4)(a) is to be read accordingly).”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 80.

Amendment 82, in schedule 9, page 170, line 7, after “within” insert

“any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of”.

This amendment prevents unincorporated associations from being permissible donors in relation to other unincorporated associations: it is intended as an anti-avoidance measure to prevent gifts being channelled through chains of unincorporated associations.

Amendment 83, in schedule 9, page 170, line 20, leave out from “within” to end of line 22 and insert

“any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of section 54(2),”.

This amendment makes similar anti-avoidance provision to that in amendment 82.

Amendment 84, in schedule 9, page 170, line 24, at end insert—

“(4) Section 162 (meaning of exempt trust donation) applies for the purposes of this paragraph as if, in subsection (2)(a), for ‘27th July 1999’ there were substituted ‘7th April 2026’.”

This amendment modifies the meaning of “exempt trust donation” for unincorporated associations by providing that a trust set up before 7th April 2026 (i.e. the date of tabling this amendment) is a permissible donor to an unincorporated association.

Amendment 85, in schedule 9, page 173, line 11, at end insert—

“(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(3A) A person commits an offence if—

(a) they knowingly give an unincorporated association any information relating to—

(i) the amount of any gift to the association, or

(ii) the person or body making such a gift,

which is false in a material particular, or

(b) with intent to deceive, they withhold from an unincorporated association any material information relating to a matter within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii),

in circumstances where they believe that the unincorporated association may use the gift for the purposes of making a political contribution.’”

This amendment creates a new criminal offence where a person knowingly provides an unincorporated association with false information, or withholds information with intent to deceive, about a gift that they believe the association may use for the purposes of making a political contribution.

Amendment 86, in schedule 9, page 173, line 15, at end insert—

“(b) in sub-paragraph (2)(b)(iii), at the end insert ‘or 3A’.”

This amendment inserts a missed consequential amendment so that paragraph 7(2)(b)(iii) of Schedule 19A to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 refers to the new paragraph 3A inserted into that Schedule by paragraph 9 of Schedule 9.

Amendment 87, in schedule 9, page 174, line 9, at end insert—

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 64 amends section 54 of the Elections Act 2022 to enable the Electoral Commission to make minor corrective changes, such as updating platform names or fixing broken hyperlinks, without requiring the approval of the Secretary of State and Parliament. That will allow the commission to issue timely and accurate guidance, ensuring that regulated entities benefit from clear, up-to-date guidance, while retaining ministerial and parliamentary oversight for substantive changes, such as those involving changes of interpretation or scope.

[Paul Holmes]

Does anyone on the Committee intend to speak to new clauses 10 or 24?

[Dr Chowns]

indicated assent.

[Paul Holmes]

In that case, I reserve my right to speak until after the hon. Member for North Herefordshire.

[Dr Chowns]

I will speak to new clauses 10, 24, 25, 27 and 28—I will rattle through them. First, new clause 10—tabled by the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), whom I thank for her work on this—relates to guidance on the law regarding digital communication offences in relation to elections. We need this clause and, although it is more complex, one word explains why: deepfakes. This new clause is, to a significant degree, about deepfakes.

Tackling deepfakes is complex, but we can take practical steps now to modernise election law and improve our ability to regulate in this area. Both the Electoral Commission and the Crown Prosecution Service have highlighted the need for clearer guidance on whether deepfakes fall within existing election offences. Unfortunately, the law on digital election offences is currently unclear. That uncertainty creates confusion for candidates, platforms and law enforcement, weakens democratic protections and leads to inconsistent enforcement.

New clause 10 would require the Government to address that gap by publishing clear guidance within 12 months of the Bill’s passage, setting out how digital communication offences apply during elections, so that expectations are clear and enforcement is consistent. In terms evidence for why this is needed, we all know that deepfakes and manipulated content targeting politicians are already circulating, including outside election periods. Existing laws may technically cover those harms, but their application in digital context remains unclear.

Recent examples include a deepfake video in October last year of a Conservative MP, the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman), which falsely claimed that he had defected. I was part of an event where he explained that, under the Online Safety Act 2023, he could potentially make a complaint about that, but would have to demonstrate that he was psychologically terribly damaged by it. That is not really what this is about—it is politics that is damaged by the proliferation of such material, so we should take our collective responsibility to deal with it very seriously.

In October 2023, a deepfake audio of our current Prime Minister went viral and has repeatedly resurfaced. In Ireland last year, an AI-generated video disrupted a presidential election. Those cases and many others demonstrate the growing risk. Clear guidance is needed to ensure that the law can be effectively applied during election periods. The new clause is very reasonable. It does not require the Government to commit absolutely to something right now; it simply requires the Government to publish guidance to clarify the situation.

The Government, in their response to the Speaker’s Conference report published recently, said:

“The Government recognises that there are potential issues with Section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. We are reviewing how this legislation should apply in a modern electoral setting. Where necessary, we will take appropriate action to clarify the scope of Section 106, particularly to ensure that it captures emerging technologies (such as deepfakes and other AI technologies) and is future-proofed.”

Where better to do that than in this legislation? This is the point when the Government should action the commitment that they have already made.

New clause 24 proposes a repository of digital political advertising. Such advertising plays a key and increasingly central role in election campaigns, but remains significantly less transparent than traditional campaign materials. Voters are often unable to see who is targeting them, how much is being spent or whether messaging is consistent across audiences. Campaigners are able to use targeting on social media platforms, for example, to make very targeted adverts, so that nobody can see what material is going to whom.

That lack of transparency creates real opportunities for misinformation. It undermines trust in the democratic process and leaves the system vulnerable to manipulation by foreign or domestic actors, as well as opaque funding sources. While the Bill, as it stands, makes progress on digital imprints, it does not go far enough to ensure meaningful, real-time transparency.

New clause 24 would address those gaps by requiring the creation of a comprehensive, publicly accessible repository of digital political advertising and strengthening existing disclosure requirements. The reasons for that are well understood. Digital adverts can be micro-targeted to specific groups without wider scrutiny and there is currently no single public record of what ads are being run, by whom, at what scale or with what funding. International evidence, including from elections in the US and Europe—and, I would argue, in the UK—has shown how online political advertising can be exploited to spread disinformation and obscure funding sources.

That issue was addressed by Philip Rycroft in his very useful report; I note that, on page 47, he says:

“Strictly speaking, this issue of advert libraries strays beyond my remit”,

but that he has

“heard enough evidence to suggest that there would be considerable benefit”

from establishing this practice, and he calls on the Government to take action. I welcome that point and very much hope that the Government will consider this new clause, a practical and proportionate transparency measure that would align digital campaigning more with offline political advertising.

New clause 25 relates to the Electoral Commission’s powers to obtain information outside formal investigations. That is something we heard about in oral evidence and Philip Rycroft speaks about it specifically in his recommendations 9 and 10. The regulation of digital campaigning requires timely access to information, especially during very fast-moving election periods. At the moment, the Electoral Commission can effectively gather information from online platforms only through formal investigations, which can be initiated only once there is sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation there—a significant gap.

The Commission cannot proactively monitor or respond to emerging risks in real time, including the risk of foreign interference or bot activity—a growing problem that we have seen in previous elections. As election campaigns increasingly take place online, that reduces the effectiveness of enforcement. Philip Rycroft has made a clear case for that change, so I do not need to labour the point. I very much hope that that is one of the recommendations that the Government will take away and come back on, and I would welcome some warm words from the Minister on that.

New clause 27 would require a Government review of regulated periods in relation to elections—again, something addressed in the Rycroft report, which covered the need to ensure that transparency requirements apply year round. Philip Rycroft is clearly seriously concerned about the risk of gaming the system. Currently, because regulation applies only within the regulated period, but expenditure applies during the entire year, there are strong incentives for political actors to front-load expenditure just before the regulated period kicks in. There is huge evidence of that; I have seen it from another party in my own area, with huge chunks of spending coming in just before the regulated period. That is a clear loophole.

Philip Rycroft draws attention to that issue, stating that high spending limits,

“combined with unlimited spending possibilities outwith the regulated period, drives a sort of arms race among political parties and actors to out-raise and out-spend their competitors.”

The net effect is extremely problematic for our politics. He goes on to state:

“Reducing the spending limits and introducing such limits across the whole electoral cycle could potentially relieve some of the fund-raising pressure, in turn diminishing the inducement to look to non-permissible sources to stay ahead.”

Rycroft acknowledges that the issue was beyond his direct remit, but it is useful that his report comments on where issues to do with foreign influence overlap with broader questions about how we regulate finance in our system. He states:

“The issue of spending limits and wider caps is one for the political class as a whole to consider if it wishes to restore confidence in the political process and to keep big money out of UK politics. This might be something that could be usefully debated during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill.”

Indeed—so today is our opportunity to debate it. I am saddened that the Bill, as it stands, does not address the need for year-round spending limits or for caps on overall donations—we will come to that a bit later—but this is the moment when we can and should respond to Philip Rycroft’s call to discuss this issue. I challenge the Minister on this: there is a clear need for regulation outwith the regulated period—for year-round regulation of political expenditure—and I hope that she will address that and take it forward.

Finally, new clause 28, also in the name of the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central, is essentially about labelling AI-generated material. Just in the past 24 hours we have seen a global controversy over the use of an AI-generated image, posted by a person who shall perhaps remain nameless. It is clear that AI-generated material is widespread in politics. Sometimes it is easily spottable, as in the case I have just referenced, but at other times it may not necessarily be so. Legislation has not yet caught up with that issue. This new clause, like new clause 18 on the same topic, which I suspect the hon. Member for Hazel Grove may speak to shortly, is a much-needed step to improve transparency so that we know when material is produced using AI.

The Electoral Commission briefing raises some questions about the specifics of how the issue is addressed, and makes the point that there is a need for similar approaches to be taken across digital and non-digital formats. I take that point broadly, but I do not think it is beyond the wit of civil servants to come up with a form of words that will address the issue. The use of generative AI has been particularly prevalent in the digital space, so this is a real opportunity for regulation to catch up. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on all these very useful new clauses.

[Lisa Smart]

I support clauses 63 and 64, and I warmly welcome the comments from my colleague, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, on new clauses 10, 24, 25, 27 and 28, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central. A number of us who have been concerned with the issues that we are talking about today and which the Bill seeks to address were very pleased to see some of the measures that the Government put in the first draft of the Bill. But we were disappointed by what was not there: the lack of discussion of regulated periods, generative AI deepfakes, and mis and disinformation felt like a missed opportunity. On Second Reading, the Secretary of State spoke of the need to ensure that regulation keeps up with digital reality, and this legislation feels like the opportunity to address some of those issues.

I will not repeat what has just been said, but a number of the new clauses overlap slightly, in trying to fill in the gaps that quite a few of us feel are present in the Bill as drafted. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire and I are pleased to be co-vice chairs of the all-party parliamentary group for fair elections, which is the leading organisation within Parliament campaigning for reforming the electoral system—of which there is no mention in the Bill. We spent some time today discussing some measures around getting dark money out of politics, and we hope that the Government move further on that. We look forward to the Minister introducing the Government’s response to the Rycroft review, and also to stopping mis and disinformation in our politics.

I would like to test the mood of the Committee by pushing new clause 18 to a Division. We need to see action on these issues ahead of the next general election, and it feels like this piece of legislation is the opportunity to do that. We have talked repeatedly in this Committee about trust in our electoral processes being already very fragile—too fragile. We have seen years of scandal—of varying sorts—tarnish our political structures. Confidence in our politics and democratic processes is vital, and we should be doing everything that we can to bolster that confidence, which is too low. We should not be allowing new systems to be adopted in these structures and used to undermine our politics. Existing systems can be used to show voters completely fabricated content; some recent examples of AI-generated content that is damaging in different ways have already been mentioned. Transparency is the foundation of democratic legitimacy, and new clause 18 seeks to protect that foundation.

On deepfakes, we are deeply concerned about the increase in AI-generated material that is produced to harm individuals and our broader democracy. We should be ensuring that there is transparency and accountability within political campaigning, and we need to limit the level of mis and disinformation that could be spread through AI-generated material. Requiring that political campaign material be properly labelled when it includes AI material feels like a sensible and moderate step. This is the time for us to protect our election integrity in the digital age, and I hope that the Government accept new clause 18 and take the opportunity before it is too late.

[Paul Holmes]

I hope that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire did not mind that I gave up speaking to enable her to do so, but I wanted to check whether someone would speak to those new clauses. I wanted to allow her to elaborate the argument so that I could come in with some of my thoughts at the end.

As the shadow Minister, I was intrigued, in various meetings that I have had, as we have all had, with outside organisations about the Bill, by the ideas outlined in new clauses 10 and 24. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central for tabling them; they are substantive new clauses that I think are very well intentioned. The number of Members who have supported them on the amendment paper shows the importance of tackling some of these issues in a cross-party and urgent way.

On new clause 10, on the guidance on law relating to digital communication offences in relation to elections, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire outlined the problems that we are currently having. Digital communication offences are becoming a bigger problem, and they cause harm to people. The current duty is to demonstrate that the person has been harmed emotionally. She used the example of the deepfake that went out of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Norfolk, showing him saying that he was leaving the Conservative party and going to Reform. Although that has not necessarily been a strange development in the last couple of months, anyone who knows my hon. Friend knows that that is incredibly unlikely. It would also cause a great deal of distress to many of us moderate Conservatives for it to ever be thought that we could go to Reform. There is serious point behind that, which is that for anyone harmed by something like that, there should be laws relating to digital communication offences.

We do not think that new clause 10 would be arduous on the Government. It asks them to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences, and it does not ask for immediate action. It allows the Minister and the Government to go away and provide guidance. The Minister has said many times today that she is considering, for example, the Rycroft review, and that she will come back with suitable guidance and proposals. The new clause is in that spirit. It would allow her to go away and look at what we need to do in this increasingly concerning area of election campaigning. The call from the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central is eminently sensible, and so we will support new clause 10 if it is pressed to a vote because we want that guidance to be brought in.

New clause 24 proposes a repository of digital political advertising. I do not expect Committee members to remember the questioning in the oral evidence sessions—particularly my questions—but I was really quite fascinated by the proposal. Like the hon. Member for North Herefordshire and other members of the Committee, I have met some organisations that have advocated for it. I do not think that we should be fearful, as politicians and members of any political party, or of none, of standing by the things that we put out in elections. Therefore, instead of going in the bin, as some of mine do, they should be kept online to ensure transparency and accountability through a simple repository regime.

The Government have repeatedly proposed to put more burdens—more regulatory responsibilities, I should say—on the Electoral Commission. I do not think this proposal would be a particularly bad burden to place on it. There is a question about resourcing the Electoral Commission, but I know that the hon. Lady and the various organisations that are advocating for new clause 24 are pretty relaxed about who would manage holding the information and transferring it to the National Archives, so I think that is something that the Government should explore.

I was interested that the hon. Lady outlined that she is concerned about misinformation, manipulation and the exploitation of the electoral process by foreign actors. I hope that when we come to new clause 37, she will be equally concerned about the exploitation of votes using foreign languages in electoral literature. I hope she will look as favourably on that proposal as I am on this one, because I believe that is equally exploitative of various communities in the country.

We support new clause 24, which we think is radical, but sensible and transparent. If we stand by what we put out there, we should not fear the people who elect us holding us to account for what has been put out, so I think that is actually quite an exciting prospect for democracy.

That is where the consensus between me and the hon. Members for Milton Keynes Central and for North Herefordshire ends. I have a number of concerns about new clause 27, not because I am opposed to having a general conversation about the regulatory period. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire is right that parties of all colours front-load and send out a lot of stuff before the regulated period starts. The regulated period is inherently there to protect the smaller parties from the bigger parties and to give everybody a level playing field.

I know that when the regulated period starts—and we are all currently going through the start of one—every party has equal right to put out an equal amount of election literature to people in our constituencies, boroughs or counties. All parties are held to the same standard and it can be proved if there has been—I hope not—manipulation of the election expenses. The regulated period is there to protect parties.

Do not get me wrong: in my constituency five Liberal Democrat “in touch” communications go out every year. It drives me mad. I do not like it. I do not like its content, but the Liberal Democrats have every right to communicate with their residents. Putting an annual limit on the amount of literature that can be put out is anti-democratic. It is quite good to have some element of competition, where many parties can put out election communications throughout the year. I worry that having an arbitrary annual cap on the amount of literature that we can put out will harm independent candidates and local parties—they may exist: we have the Eastleigh borough independents, of whom three were successfully elected councillors. They should not be held to the same standard as national parties, which can absorb the cost. I am slightly concerned about the unintended consequences of that.

New clause 27 does not outline whether it covers material related to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which some of we elected representatives, choose to put out. We have a budget to communicate to our constituents. Are we going to be held to the same reporting threshold for those IPSA communications, which are not party political but are elected literature? [Interruption.] Would the hon. Member for North Herefordshire like to intervene to correct me?

[Dr Chowns]

I will pick up the hon. Member’s points in my summing up.

[Paul Holmes]

I am not being adversarial; there is an argument that although the literature that goes out via IPSA is not party political, as an elected official, IPSA is giving me the ability to send out literature that would not be included within the threshold. Other parties that oppose me at the next general election should be entitled to put out resources to match those, and I do not think that should be governed within an annual spending limit.

It worries me that if we get to a period in which we are controlling smaller, larger, regional and local political parties and holding them to the same standard in election spending as national, established parties such as those that hon. Members on the Committee represent, that would start to erode free and fair democratic access to the people who elect us and elect our colleagues in local government across the country. I am uncomfortable with that, although we could have a conversation about the lengths of regulated periods.

[Lisa Smart]

I am genuinely intrigued in several ways by the shadow Minister’s contribution. He talks about a level playing field. Most of us would always agree with a level playing field, in pretty much all circumstances. Does he think that the national spending limits for the larger political parties should be brought down significantly? He expressed real concern about smaller parties, whether localist parties or groups of independents, that do not have a national political machine with a multimillion-pound budget at a general election. If I understand correctly what the shadow Minister says, he would not see that as a level playing field. Does he agree that spending limits for local candidates should probably go up a little but spending limits for national parties should come down significantly because, after all, people put a cross in a box next to an individual’s name, not just a political party?

[Paul Holmes]

We are discussing a new clause that starts a conversation about the regulated period and would create a year’s limit on the amount of literature that can go out, outside of an election period. That seems different from what the hon. Lady is describing, which is the regulations and limits on political parties, and candidates not in a party, during an election period. Those are two very different things. I am quite happy with the fact that I have to raise the money to stand for my seat at a general election, and that national parties have to account for that.

The new clause includes provisions not just for general elections but for outside election periods. What I find concerning is that council groups—such as those of the hon. Lady’s party in Eastleigh, or my party’s in Fareham, Hampshire and all across the country—would have to be accountable for putting out communications to people who end up putting councillors in their jobs. I do not think that we should get in the habit of limiting political parties outside an election period, because I think that is an entirely different prospect, and an entirely different area from how we are governed in an election period.

I am perfectly okay to start talking about funding levels during an election period, but I do not want to do so for candidates who wish to start a campaign before the current regulatory period. As the hon. Lady will know—she is a very successful politician, both locally and nationally—we do not begin to build an election campaign just in the regulated period. Many of us started trying to get involved in politics a long time before we were elected, and I think that limit is a very dangerous thing in today’s democracy.

However, I would say to the hon. Lady that I am open to a conversation about election financing. I am looking at my Whip—my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner—who is probably horrified by me saying that, but I am not against that argument or discussion. I just think that this goes a bit too far, and it does not sit well with me. After that rambling oratory, I just say to Green and Liberal Democrat Members that, if they choose to push new clauses 10 and 24 to a vote, the Opposition will support them, but we would vote against new clause 27.

The Opposition also think that the accountability in new clause 18 is very sensible. If we use AI, we should be honest about it—it is as simple as that. If any politician wants to put forward an AI-generated image, I first think there is a question about why they would want to do so anyway. We all think that our constituencies are beautiful, and we would not want to change them. We also all know that politics is acting for ugly people, so why would we want to change the way we look?

I do not understand why someone would want to use an AI-generated image, but if they do, they should actually be big enough and strong enough to own it. Therefore, it is important to have some extra regulation, particularly as some people might not be au fait with AI-generated images, as some are very believable—not the one of Donald Trump pretending to be Jesus, but the more sensible ones. People cannot necessarily pick that up, so if the hon. Member for Hazel Grove chose to push new clause 18 to a vote, the Opposition would also support it.

[Samantha Dixon]

New clause 18 seeks to require digital campaigning material, in scope of the digital imprint regime, that contains images, audio or video generated or materially altered to include a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used. The Government fully recognise the challenges posed by AI-generated content, including deepfakes, and the risks they present to democratic processes and public trust in the online information environment. We agree that helping voters understand the authenticity of digital campaigning material is an important objective.

However, AI technologies are developing at pace, and there is not yet a reliable or widely adopted technical basis for determining when content has been generated or materially altered by AI. That would make enforcement by the Electoral Commission and the police difficult in practice, and it would risk undermining campaigners’ compliance with the rules.

The new clause, as drafted, would also create uncertainty and disproportionate legal risks for campaigners. For example, it would create a new criminal offence for failing to include a statement about AI use, even where the AI involvement may be trivial, automated or outside the campaigner’s knowledge or control. Further consideration would also be needed on how liability for offences should apply to those who republish material.

There would also be a considerable chance of the new clause quickly becoming obsolete. AI is evolving rapidly, so adopting a definition of “generative artificial intelligence” in primary legislation might struggle to keep pace with technological developments and it could quickly become outdated. Although we share the intention to strengthen transparency in digital campaigning, the Government do not believe that the new clause is currently workable or proportionate. The Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology recently announced that the Government will establish a taskforce to put forward proposals for Government on best practice for labelling AI-generated content, with an interim report to be published in the autumn. I urge Members to follow the progress of that taskforce.

I turn to new clause 10 and amendment 4. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central for those and for her commitment to strengthening online protections. I know Members feel strongly about that area. I share the objective of seeing the powers of the Online Safety Act 2023 being fully and effectively utilised. With that in mind, the Government have carefully considered new clause 10, which would require the Government to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences relating to digital communications, as they relate to candidates and elected officials.

Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope service providers are already required to have effective systems and processes in place to identify and remove illegal content. That includes content that amounts to the two offences identified in new clause 10: the “false statements about candidates” offence and the offence of undue influence. Those duties apply equally to AI-generated and manipulated content where such material meets the threshold of either offence.

As the independent regulator, Ofcom issues codes of practice that provide clear guidance on what action providers should take to manage and mitigate illegal content. The codes recommend various measures across risk management, user reporting and content moderation. Ofcom has already produced guidance to assist providers in making judgments about whether certain content is illegal, and such guidance includes usage examples where possible. As the independent and expert online safety regulator, Ofcom, not the Government, is best placed to offer such guidance.

The Government have no plans to widen their role within the Online Safety Act regulatory regime by issuing guidance on matters within Ofcom’s remit. Introducing a new duty for Government to publish parallel guidance on two specific offences, and committing to regularly updating that guidance, would blur the lines between Government and the independent regulator, undermining the model for which Parliament has only recently legislated.

The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that protections keep pace with evolving threats to democracy, and I welcome continued engagement with parliamentarians on that important issue. As Members will know, Rycroft made recommendations in his review supporting the principle of advertising libraries and suggested that the Government could use their convening power to work with social media companies to extend the practice of advert libraries to achieve consistency in how they are presented. That is not the same as setting a legal requirement for a repository of digital political advertising, as intended by new clause 10. None the less, we are carefully considering all of the recommendations in the Rycroft review and will issue a response in due course.

New clause 24 seeks to establish a repository for paid-for digital political advertising. Digital political advertising plays an important role in supporting democratic engagement. It remains one of the most accessible and cost-effective ways for political parties and campaigners to connect with the public and have their message heard. However, the Committee will be aware that the European Commission introduced similar requirements to new clause 24 in 2024, including mandatory transparency notices containing information such as spending and targeting, and the requirement for platforms to upload all political adverts to a European repository.

In response, major platforms such as Meta and Google chose to cease hosting paid political advertising entirely in the EU, citing operational complexity and uncertainty as to whether compliance by platforms and campaigners was realistically achievable. If the UK were to adopt comparable measures without fully understanding their operational impact, we could see similar unintended outcomes here.

The potential removal of political advertising from major platforms in the UK could risk reducing political pluralism online by restricting the ability of political parties, civil society organisations and candidates, many of whom rely on digital platforms to engage effectively with the public. Smaller, newer parties and independent candidates may be disproportionately impacted by such an outcome, losing an affordable channel to reach voters, while larger, well-followed parties and campaigning groups would likely be less affected. That would make campaigning more challenging for newcomers, potentially undermining the level playing field.

The Government agree that transparency in digital campaigning is important, but any reforms must be carefully balanced to protect freedom of expression and avoid placing undue burdens on campaigners and platforms. This is a complex area, and the implications need detailed consideration to avoid replicating the unintended consequences seen in other jurisdictions. In the meantime, we welcome the steps already taken by platforms such as Meta and Google, which have created publicly accessible political advert libraries. We encourage other platforms to do the same.

The measures in the Bill will extend the scope of digital imprint rules and place enforcement on a clearer and more proportionate footing, ensuring that voters can continue to make informed decisions on digital material in elections and referenda. We will continue to keep wider policy relating to electoral campaigning under review.

I turn to new clause 25. The Government absolutely recognise the importance of protecting our elections from online interference, including concerns about how algorithms, such as recommender systems, can amplify harmful or misleading content. The current legal framework to tackle online electoral mis and disinformation has the Online Safety Act 2023 as its core pillar. New clause 25 would risk creating overlap and confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act.

Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope services must take action in relation to any content that amounts to existing election offences during an election period. The Online Safety Act already provides Ofcom with extensive powers to gather information from services and scrutinise how algorithms operate as well as a mandate to require services to conduct illegal content risk assessments. That includes assessing the likelihood of users encountering illegal content through algorithms, how systems may exacerbate or mitigate those risks, and what safeguards are required. From 2027, categorised services will also be required to report information about their algorithms, including how they influence the display, promotion or recommendation of content. Creating overlap or confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act also increases the risk of regulatory uncertainty. For those reasons, we cannot accept the new clause.

That said, the Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the tools it needs to enforce compliance with the regulatory framework it is responsible for enforcing. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference.

As Members know, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose, including recommendations relating to the Electoral Commission’s investigatory powers. We will revert with a full Government response to the review and consider whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work.

New clause 27 would require the Government to establish a review to consider the adequacy of regulated periods of elections and referendums. More specifically, it would consider whether they are of sufficient length to combat mis and disinformation, and the impact of digital campaigning outside regulated periods.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I am sorry to ask this question, because it is completely and utterly about my ignorance—could the Minister believe it? Is she setting a maximum fine at secondary legislation, or is she removing the maximum fine?

[Samantha Dixon]

As I understand it, we will be setting the maximum fine in secondary legislation, but I will confirm that, because I have almost lost the thread of what I was saying.

[Paul Holmes]

I apologise to the Minister for making her lose her trail. I also am at that stage in the afternoon where things are not going in as well as they probably were this morning. I asked the question because, at the moment, the courts have an unlimited maximum fine. I just got confused about whether the Minister was setting a maximum fine through secondary legislation, which she has now clarified. As we on the Committee are discussing the changes to the Electoral Commission’s responsibilities, which the Minister has been clear about throughout the day, would she give us an indication of what that maximum fine might be? Why is she waiting until secondary legislation to set the level of that fine?

[Samantha Dixon]

It is our intention to increase the maximum fine level in secondary legislation, as I stated earlier. Its level will be debated at that time. We will debate it in secondary legislation, but it needs to remain proportionate, and we need to move towards it in a considered way and debate it then.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I reinforce that this is the only opportunity that the Committee will have to debate those new clauses.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister again for—I am not being facetious—her comprehensive explanation. We have been here for most of the day. These are very complicated issues, and she has been speaking an awful lot because of the importance of this legislation. I do not envy her. I will speak to new clause 41 in my name, to be voted on at another point. We welcome clause 65, but we have some questions on clause 67.

As the Minister outlined, clause 65 and schedule 10 decriminalise certain offences in PPERA. They relate to administrative requirements for political parties and others regulated by that legislation and the commission. For example, it is currently an offence for a party treasurer to fail to deliver annual accounts or reports of election expenses to the commission. The provisions will also make the necessary consequential amendments to allow the requirements to come under the commission’s civil sanctioning regime.

Clause 66 is a fairly simple clause, which extends the Electoral Commission’s remit to be the primary enforcer of all imprint rules. I would like to pick up on a theme from my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, which I also brought up earlier: the impact on the Electoral Commission’s ability to do its job properly, in relation to what it currently does compared with what the Government will ask it to do after the legislation passes.

The Minister has made it clear that officials are working with representatives of the commission. I know that she works with them as well, and they have not necessarily said that they are unhappy about receiving this new responsibility. However, my general experience from working in the public sector and serving as a local authority councillor is that, in this world of organisations that are often controlled by Treasury spending budgets, or, as the Minister outlined, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, no one says no to extra responsibility if they think they are going to get some more dosh—let us put it that way.

Will the commission get enough cash to be able to manage the regulatory burdens that the Government are placing on it? I am beginning to worry that with the plethora of new responsibilities, we will have to see quite a large uplift in the commission’s budgets. I have not heard convincing defences that the Electoral Commission has verbally or formally remarked to the Government that it is content to receive that much responsibility. I am sure that the Minister will come back to talk about that.

Clause 67 will increase the maximum fine that the commission could impose in a civil sanction for some summary offences. We have concerns about the size of the proposed increase in Electoral Commission civil sanction fines. The courts already have powers to levy unlimited fines. At the very least, the Macrory principles on proportionate regulatory enforcement should be embedded in law—that is what we aim to achieve in new clause 41. The Electoral Commission’s strategy and policy statement recommends the application of the Macrory principles, including

“the use of requests for improvements before resorting to fines and the need to conduct investigations in a timely manner.”

The Electoral Commission has civil sanctioning powers that apply to national referendums and elections. More serious criminal matters can be—and are—referred to the police and Crown Prosecution Service, and are then considered by a court of law. The courts already have the power to levy unlimited fines and criminal sanctions. Unlimited fines are potentially a heavy, significant punishment. That is why it would be appropriate for a judicial check and a fair hearing in a court of law. Indeed, such massive civil fines would likely be challenged via lawyers in the courts anyway, as we have seen with the Information Commissioner and general data protection regulation fines.

In relation to the Minister’s opening remarks about setting the level of the Electoral Commission fine at secondary legislation, I am concerned that that is because of, quite frankly, the unpreparedness of the Government. They have put a lot of legislation forward without properly consulting the Electoral Commission and are rushing, as we have said all along in this legislation, to try and legislate without necessarily thinking things through.

[Samantha Dixon]

Opposition Members did ask about the level at which we would set the fine. I have now consulted my notes; we intend, through secondary legislation, to increase the limit to £500,000 per offence. That will be done through secondary legislation.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for that; that clarity is welcome. I still question why that needs to be done at secondary legislation. If the Minister knows the maximum fine limit for the Electoral Commission today, she could have put that in the legislation or brought forward an amendment to be discussed in Committee. She has chosen not to do that; I am interested to know why she has chosen not to do that and is waiting for secondary legislation to do so. Perhaps she will come back and tell the Committee why that is the case.

My point still stands. The fact that she is looking to set the fine at the secondary legislation stage outlines that, once again, the Government are asking the Electoral Commission to do a great number of things that it currently does not do. I am not convinced, unless the Minister can reassure me in writing or come back after this Committee, that the Electoral Commission has been properly consulted. Let us not forget that it was the Electoral Commission that criticised the Government for not consulting it on trying to postpone the elections. That was a process where the Government were found to be unlawful—by the Secretary of State on the Floor of the House.

I am concerned that, as we have gone through this legislation, a huge amount has been asked of the Electoral Commission in terms of its responsibility and purview, and the Minister has not reassured me that it is happy with that. I am not convinced that the resource that it currently has would allow it to conduct its operations or, if necessary, investigations on its current physical envelope.

[Samantha Dixon]

The reality is that the Electoral Commission already imposes fines; it is just that they are not big enough. I argue that, by not setting the level in primary legislation but doing it in secondary legislation, it can be responsive should it need to be changed in the future, which it may need to be. We have talked about the revolving nature of foreign interference; in similar ways, the offences and their gravity may change over time. To be able to respond to that through secondary legislation is important, and we should not be hidebound by requiring primary legislation.

The Electoral Commission is accountable to Parliament, not to Government. It is a very important point to make that the consideration of its comfortableness, abilities or capacity is a discussion for Parliament. My officials work with it collaboratively, and I meet with it regularly. It is comfortable, but we must always remember that it is accountable to Parliament, not to Government.

[Paul Holmes]

I absolutely accept the Minister’s point that it is accountable to Parliament, but her party and her Government have a majority in this Parliament, and her Government are asking the Electoral Commission to do a huge amount more. She says that it has been consulted, but all I would say is that, in other areas, it was not consulted when the Government have arbitrarily gone ahead and decided to do what they want to do.

The Minister is also correct, and I thank her for her correction, that the Electoral Commission already issues fines. I do not dispute that, but this Government, through schedule 10 and clause 65, are trying to remove some of the fine elements from the judicial system and place more responsibility on the Electoral Commission. That is my concern about the extra responsibility it would have, which has been taken away from the judicial system, as well as some of the other responsibilities that it is being asked to take on, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.

[David Simmonds]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, when we look across the system, we see other regulators—Ofcom probably comes to mind—where fines have been issued through a civil process like the one this legislation envisages. We know that Ofcom is currently engaged in a battle with 4chan, which it has fined a very significant sum for failing to meet legal requirements in the United Kingdom for age verification checks for online pornography. 4chan’s response has been to refuse to pay the fine and to counter-sue in the courts of the United States, arguing that, because it has a headquarters in the US, it is effectively a restraint on trade by the British Government and a breach of its rights under US legislation.

Clearly, there is a significant possibility, given that civil courts have a different burden of proof than criminal courts, that this could end up entangling the Electoral Commission in all sorts of long-running and extremely expensive disputes in a way that is not currently envisaged. We need to foresee that risk and plan for it appropriately.

[Paul Holmes]

I agree. I am all in favour of streamlining and making things more efficient, but I am worried that the unintended consequence of essentially removing the judicial oversight element is that the Electoral Commission cannot actually enforce—or, if it does try to enforce, adherence can simply be refused. The Government have done this in another organisation, Natural England, through measures in the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025. They gave Natural England—an organisation that has limited finances—an enforcement role in legislation, but with no teeth. Therefore, I share my hon. Friend’s concern that this simply will not work.

I have said what I have to say on those clauses, and I would like to press new clause 41 to a vote. We will not oppose any of those clauses, but I warn again that we are concerned about the Electoral Commission’s ability to undertake its responsibilities, and I know that the Minister has responded to that.

[Lisa Smart]

I should start by reminding the Committee that I am a member of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, so I have been a part of some of the discussions the Minister mentioned. I also met the chief exec of the Electoral Commission to talk about what is in the Bill, what the Electoral Commission welcomed and worked with officials on, and what it would have liked to have seen more on. That was a useful and productive meeting. The commission made some public comments, and I cannot remember the exact wording used, but it was underwhelmed at some elements, I think.

I am particularly keen to speak to new clause 46 and new clause 53, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Guildford. New clause 46, in the name of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), has drawn attention to Electoral Commission comments about a Catch-22 in its powers to investigate suspicious transactions:

“Despite our statutory duty to monitor and take all reasonable steps to ensure compliance…we currently have no ability to obtain any information from financial institutions that we can use to monitor and independently verify provenance or the permissibility of funds, unless we open a full investigation. This is a weakness: to open such an investigation needs clear evidence—but we can’t always obtain that in the first place.”

The Government said that they would keep the Electoral Commission’s powers under review, and noted that they were increasing planning powers per offence to provide a greater deterrent. However, the report emphasised that the Electoral Commission can impose fines only if it can prove an offence has occurred in the first place. The fact that it often cannot do so is precisely the problem and underpins the need for stronger information-gathering powers. New clause 46 would increase the commission’s powers to require financial institutions to provide it with information in relation to the permissibility of donations.

New clause 53 is complementary to new clause 46. It would enable the Electoral Commission to require information before launching a formal investigation. When I met the commission’s chief executive with my hon. Friend the Member for Guildford, who tabled the new clause, we talked about exactly that issue. The Rycroft review, which has been mentioned many times today, states that the Electoral Commission, unlike the other regulators, cannot demand information outside a formal investigation, meaning that it cannot work in real time to head off offences. The review recommends extending powers so that the commission can require information from relevant bodies and persons.

By comparison, the Charity Commission has the option of a regulatory inquiry, which gives information-obtaining powers without the necessity of enacting a lengthy statutory inquiry. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy report, describing the Catch-22, recommends powers for the Electoral Commission to compel information, deployable in appropriate cases outside formal investigations. The Committee on Standards in Public Life’s 2021 review recommended extending the commission’s powers to compel document information and explanation outside an investigation.

Election-related harms are increasingly amplified online. The Electoral Commission evidence to the Speaker’s Conference explicitly links disinformation and platform algorithms to harassment and intimidation, and it describes concrete candidate harms, including deterrence and avoidance. The Speaker’s Commission earlier called for electoral law review, including addressing the disinformation that can fuel abuse and intimidation, and a number of people involved in the democracy sector and the implementation of the enforcement of electoral law would welcome looking at a review of all the many Representation of the People Acts that have taken place over time, so that we can look at where they complement one another and where, on occasion, they do less than that.

The last point to make is that if platforms can micro-target voters in real time, surely the regulator must be able to obtain basic information in real time. On that note, I commend new clauses 46 and 53 to the Committee.