Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 14th April 2026
(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRepresentation of the People Bill 2024-26 View all Representation of the People Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 April 2026 - (14 Apr 2026)
Lloyd Hatton
I think there is a difference between corporate and non-corporate donations. However, what would be really interesting is to see how the Bill progresses in taking forward the Rycroft review. That is a really important point, but I will not go over it again, because it has already been well articulated by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire.
To conclude, the Bill takes serious steps forward in addressing some of the foul play we have seen time and again with corporate donations in the past, and there is a huge body of evidence behind that. However, I would welcome any early advice or opinion the Minister can give us on how we can work on the recommendations set out by Philip Rycroft.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Samantha Dixon)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I will be guided by you, but I do not intend to speak to new clauses 13, 32 and 52 at this stage. However, to respond to a number of points made during the debate, particularly by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire—
The Chair
Just for clarity, if you wish to speak to those new clauses, your only opportunity to do so is now.
Samantha Dixon
In the interests of time, I will continue.
On the other remarks made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, I hear her point about profit and revenue, and it is highlighted in the Rycroft review. As I said many times this morning, we will carefully consider the Rycroft review and respond to it appropriately.
The hon. Members for North Herefordshire and for Hazel Grove both highlighted the Government’s view that the responsibility rests with the donor. The Government strongly believe that. The onus is on the person or organisation receiving the donation to consider its origins very carefully. They can and should decline donations if they cannot satisfy themselves that those have come through the proper and legitimate channels.
Let me turn to the issue of why we should not ban donations from companies altogether. Political parties and other campaigners will remain able to raise sufficient funds because they need to communicate their views to the electorate about protecting our democracy better against those who seek to covertly undermine it. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire referenced the Canadian model. I have had the pleasure of meeting the Leader of the House from Canada. While it is tempting to suggest that there should be a ban on corporate donations, I remind the hon. Lady that 60% of their political campaigning is funded by the taxpayer—and it is a brave politician who would enter that particular plea to the British electorate at this time.
Dr Chowns
I thank the Minister for her engagement with my point. In UK politics, about 22% of donations into politics over the past few years have been from companies. We are not talking about requiring the Government to step in and put 60% of the funding into politics; we are talking about the risks associated with a specific form of donation.
Under the measures the Government is putting forward in clause 60, we are putting in place requirements to ensure that persons of significant control are clearly allowable donors. However, it is possible for a company to restructure so that it just goes underneath that and does not meet the 25% threshold. So that could still be a channel for illicit or foreign funding to come into British politics. Would it not be simpler to require any persons who have significant control in a company and who wish to make political donations to make them as individuals?
Samantha Dixon
The hon. Member has made her point. The Government believe that there is a place for company donations from UK companies. We just feel that we should be much stricter about the arrangements by which they do these things. We have set that out in the legislation, which is what we are discussing this afternoon.
Turning briefly to the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset, I remind all Members that these measures are not designed to prevent a specific individual or company from donating. Those who follow and meet the three tests and successfully meet the “know your donor” and section 54A requirements should be able to enrich our democracy by donating as they do. I therefore commend clause 60 to the Committee—
Samantha Dixon
We will consider those points. The Rycroft recommendations are being considered very carefully. We will respond to them in due course and we will come back to Parliament with our recommendations as they come forward. I hope that gives the hon. Lady the assurance she is seeking.
Lisa Smart
We have had a good discussion of the amendments that I spoke to on behalf of the Chair of the JCNSS, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington. I do not feel a desire in the room to move to a Division, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Forfeiture of certain donations to registered parties etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Samantha Dixon
This clause strengthens the electoral regime by restoring a clear, objective test for forfeiture: if an individual donor was not actually on an electoral register at the time of the donation, the donation is impermissible and liable to forfeiture. It responds directly to long-standing concerns from the Electoral Commission that the current framework is open to inconsistency. In particular, the 2010 Supreme Court ruling, which allowed courts to consider whether a donor was eligible, rather than actually registered, when assessing impermissible donations and their forfeiture, introduced uncertainty and risked discouraging thorough permissibility checks by campaigners.
The clause removes the ambiguity in electoral law, ensuring that permissibility of an individual is determined on actual electoral registration. It reinstates a simple and objective test that supports consistent enforcement and reinforces the integrity of the electoral regime. Campaigners already must take reasonable steps to verify donor permissibility. The clause simply removes the scope for subjective interpretation of permissibility and strengthens deterrence by ensuring that impermissible donations cannot be retained by campaigners due to ambiguity in the law. By reinforcing the principle that only permissible donors may fund UK politics, the clause provides a clear deterrent for impermissible donations and supports compliance by political parties and campaigners.
Paul Holmes
I welcome the Minister’s comments on the clause. It is important that when we have been discussing the nature of this legislation, particularly regarding donations, we have outlined a clear stance that if people want to participate in our political process and make donations, they should have a physical stake in it. Any removal of the ambiguity around campaigners having to look to see whether it is permissible is welcome. It is a reasonable expectation from the Government that there has to be some level of participatory engagement in the political process. We have no problem with the clause; indeed we support it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Unincorporated associations making political contributions
Dr Chowns
The clause contains the welcome measure of preventing donations from impermissible donors being made through the mechanism of unincorporated associations and reducing the level at which they have to register with the Electoral Commission and report gifts. That is very positive. The current situation really cannot continue, so I am pleased that, through these measures, the Government will try to manage and block malicious interference and ensure democratic safety.
Although unincorporated associations are used legitimately by some, they can be an opaque vehicle for funds of unknown origin, so there is potential for them to be used to introduce foreign interference in our political system. Interesting Transparency International research published last year found that, of the £40.4 million in donations made by unincorporated associations since 2010, a huge £38.6 million was unaccounted for. More than 95% of donations from unincorporated associations came from those that have not reported the source of their income, so it is clearly time for change Despite those concerning statistics, the previous Government increased reporting thresholds for unincorporated associations in the Elections Act 2022, so I am very glad that this Government are reversing that decision through the Bill.
Under normal regulations, donations to political parties must come from a permissible source if they are over £500, but if the donations are made by an unincorporated association, even with the lower threshold, the reporting requirements are not triggered until donations reach over £11,180 in a calendar year. Even with the new rules, it is possible for an unincorporated association that does not meet the threshold and is therefore not required to register to make donations without any checks. That is clearly an undesirable and unnecessary loophole, so I support the amendments that have been tabled by the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Lauren Edwards), which aim to close this loophole, and I urge the Minister to consider reducing the permissibility threshold for unincorporated associations to £500, equal to the permissibility threshold for other sources of donation.
Samantha Dixon
I will speak now to clause 62 and Government amendments 79 to 87, which were tabled in my name. I will come to the other amendments later.
The clause introduces measures that have long been called for by the Electoral Commission, the National Crime Agency and the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which is now known as the Ethics and Integrity Commission, to tighten the rules around unincorporated associations. Under the current framework, unincorporated associations are permitted to make political contributions provided their main office and activities are based in the UK, but there are no restrictions on the sources of the funds behind those contributions. Existing rules therefore do not provide sufficient transparency or assurance about who is ultimately funding the political contributions made through such bodies.
The clause introduces a strengthened framework to ensure that political contributions from unincorporated associations come from permissible sources and are subject to stricter and more consistent transparency requirements. The clause lowers the thresholds at which UAs must register with the Electoral Commission and report the gifts they receive, ensuring that significant contributors provide the same level of transparency as other regulated campaigners. It also extends transparency rules so that contributions to candidates count towards the registration threshold, and it requires UAs to appoint a responsible person, improving clarity about who stands behind such associations.
Finally, clause 62 introduces new controls to ensure that funds used for political contributions come from permissible sources. UAs will be required to verify political gifts they rely on, and they will be prohibited from using unverifiable or impermissible funds for political activity. I commend clause 62 to the Committee.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 64 stand part.
New clause 10—Guidance on the law relating to digital communication offences in relation to elections—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament guidance on certain digital communication offences, including digital manipulation and artificially generated content in relation to candidates and elected officials.
(2) Any guidance issued under section (1) must include guidance on the following—
(a) the operation of section 106 (false statements as to candidates) of the RPA 1983 in relation to digital communications;
(b) the operation of section 114A (undue influence) of the RPA 1983 in relation to digital communications;
(c) the interaction between the operations of sections 106 and 114A of the RPA 1983 and the duty of providers under the Online Safety Act 2023, including in relation to priority offences during election periods.
(3) Within 12 months of the publication of guidance under subsection (1) and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament either—
(a) a statement that no updates to the guidance are required, or
(b) an updated version of the guidance.
(4) Before issuing—
(a) any guidance under subsection (1) or subsection (3) (b), or
(b) a statement under subsection (3)(a),
the Secretary of State must consult OFCOM and such other persons as they think necessary.
(5) For the purposes of this section “priority offences” means an offence listed in Schedule 7 (priority offences) of the Online Safety Act 2023.”
This new clause would require the Government to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences relating to digital communications as they relate to candidates and elected officials.
New clause 18—Information to be included with electronic material: generative artificial intelligence—
“(1) Section 41 of the Elections Act 2022 (requirement to include information with electronic material) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (3)(b) insert—
“(c) where the electronic material consists of or includes image, audio or video content that has been generated or materially altered by means of generative artificial intelligence, a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used.”
(2A) In this section, "generative artificial intelligence" means a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined prompts or objectives, generate new image, audio or video content.”
This new clause amends the digital imprint rules in the Elections Act 2022 to require that any political campaigning material which contains images, audio, or video generated or materially altered by AI must include a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used.
New clause 24—Repository of digital political advertising—
“(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as set out in subsection (2).
(2) After section 61 insert—
“Part 6A Repository of digital political advertising
61A. Establishing a repository of digital political advertising
(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to require the Electoral Commission to establish a repository of paid-for digital political advertising.
(2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must—
(a) provide for the repository of political advertising to be publicly accessible;
(b) specify that a provider of a Category 1 service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023 must ensure that prescribed information relating to such advertising is submitted to the repository as soon as reasonably practicable, and, in any event, within 72 hours;
(c) set out the types of information to be prescribed; and
(d) provide for material in the repository to be transferred to the National Archives for preservation after a certain period.
(3) Before making any regulations that make provision for the matters under subsection 2(c), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Electoral Commission;
(b) the Information Commissioner’s Office; and
(c) OFCOM.
(4) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.””
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to require the Electoral Commission to establish a publicly available repository of political advertising.
New clause 25—Electoral Commission: powers to obtain information outside of a formal investigation—
“(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as follows.
(2) After Schedule 12, insert—
“SCHEDULE 13: Electoral Commission powers to obtain information outside of a formal investigation
1 The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to allow the Electoral Commission to issue a notice requiring certain information from a regulated user-to-user service or search service, at any time during any regulated election period.
2 Any regulations made under paragraph 1 must specify that a person to whom a notice is given under this paragraph must comply with it within such reasonable time as is specified in the notice.
3 Any regulations made under paragraph 2 must specify the information which may be requested by the Electoral Commission, and include the following where they relate to elections—
(a) information relating to paid-for political advertising;
(b) algorithmic systems;
(c) coordinated inauthentic behaviour; and
(d) automated or bot accounts (whether domestic or foreign).
4 Any regulations made under paragraph 2 must also provide for any safeguards considered necessary by the Secretary of State as regards data protection or commercial confidentiality.
5 Any regulations made under paragraph 2 must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.
6 For the purposes of this Schedule, “user-to-user service” has the meaning given by section 3 (“user-to-user service” and “search service”) of the Online Safety Act 2023.””
New clause 27—Government review of the “regulated periods” in relation to elections—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, commission a review of the adequacy of the current regulated periods for elections and referendums.
(2) The review must consider the following—
(a) the impact of campaign activity outside the relevant regulated period on elections;
(b) whether the length of the regulated periods are sufficient to tackle the prevalence of—
(i) manipulated content,
(ii) misinformation,
(iii) disinformation,
and their potential influence on elections.
(3) The review may make any recommendations it feels necessary for legislative or regulatory reform as a result of its findings.
(4) For the purposes of this section, “campaign activity” includes—
(a) digital campaigning;
(b) targeted advertising; and
(c) automated content distribution.
(5) For the purposes of this section “regulated period” means any period regulated under the Representation of the People Act 1983.
(6) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament, together with their response to any recommendations for legislative or regulatory reform.”
This new clause requires the government to establish a review of the “regulated periods” in relation to elections which would consider whether the length of the regulated periods are sufficient in relation to the prevalence of manipulated content, misinformation and disinformation.
New clause 28—Information to be included with electronic material: data provenance—
“After Section 41 (requirement to include information with electronic material) of the Elections Act 2022 insert—
“Requirement to include information with electronic material created through generative artificial intelligence
(1) This section applies to electronic material which—
(a) meets the conditions in section 42 (paid for electronic material), or
(b) meets the conditions in section 44 (other electronic material),
and has been generated wholly through generative artificial intelligence.
(2) Electronic material to which this section applies must not be published unless it includes the following information—
(a) a statement that content was wholly generated by a generative artificial intelligence system;
(b) the name of the system used to generate the content.
(3) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, specify—
(a) additional requirements for information to be required under subsection (2);
(b) the form in which the information required under subsection (2) is to be provided.
(4) The form prescribed by regulations under subsection (3)(b) must be a form which can be detected and processed by regulated user-to-user services for the purpose of providing the required information to users of such services.
(5) Any regulations made under subsection (4) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.
(6) For the purposes of this section, “generative artificial intelligence” means computer system or software that—
(a) is capable of producing text, images, audio, video, or other content autonomously, wholly or substantially, based on prompts or instructions provided by a user;
(b) uses machine learning or other algorithmic techniques to generate content that mimics human-created material; and
(c) may produce content that is not pre-existing but is synthesized based on patterns learned from existing data.””
This new clause requires campaign material which has been generated by generative artificial intelligence to include a statement to that effect along with the name of the system used. It creates a power for the Government to make regulations about the information to be included.
Amendment 4, in clause 80, page 100, line 35, at end insert—
“(ha) Section (Guidance on the law relating to digital communication offences in relation to elections)”.
This amendment is consequential on NC10.
Samantha Dixon
Any campaigner wishing to influence the electorate should be prepared to be transparent. Imprint rules play an important role in upholding trust in UK democratic processes by ensuring that voters can see clearly who is behind political campaigning material. Under existing rules, third-party campaigners who spend under a certain threshold are not required to include imprints on their organic digital campaigning material. That creates a loophole allows third-party campaigning groups to disseminate potentially influential content without disclosing its origin, which is concerning when such material is designed to be shared virally, especially if the material is misleading, controversial or intended to manipulate public opinion without accountability.
Clause 63 strengthens the transparency of digital imprint rules by ensuring that third-party campaigning groups spending under a certain threshold are also required to include imprints on their organic digital campaigning material. This requirement will ensure that the rules promote transparency and public trust, while protecting free expression and avoiding undue burdens on individuals simply expressing their political opinions online.
Following consultation with the Scottish Government, it was agreed that applying a single UK-wide regime uniformly will enable voters from across the UK to benefit from a level of transparency and will avoid confusion. The clause therefore also repeals part 8 of the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025 consequentially upon the extension of the UK-wide digital imprint regime.
Turning to clause 64, it is important that campaigners have access to clear and up-to-date guidelines. The Electoral Commission’s guidance on digital imprints plays an important role in helping campaigners to understand and comply with the rules and supports enforcement authorities in maintaining transparency and public trust in UK democratic processes.
Paul Holmes
We are discussing a new clause that starts a conversation about the regulated period and would create a year’s limit on the amount of literature that can go out, outside of an election period. That seems different from what the hon. Lady is describing, which is the regulations and limits on political parties, and candidates not in a party, during an election period. Those are two very different things. I am quite happy with the fact that I have to raise the money to stand for my seat at a general election, and that national parties have to account for that.
The new clause includes provisions not just for general elections but for outside election periods. What I find concerning is that council groups—such as those of the hon. Lady’s party in Eastleigh, or my party’s in Fareham, Hampshire and all across the country—would have to be accountable for putting out communications to people who end up putting councillors in their jobs. I do not think that we should get in the habit of limiting political parties outside an election period, because I think that is an entirely different prospect, and an entirely different area from how we are governed in an election period.
I am perfectly okay to start talking about funding levels during an election period, but I do not want to do so for candidates who wish to start a campaign before the current regulatory period. As the hon. Lady will know—she is a very successful politician, both locally and nationally—we do not begin to build an election campaign just in the regulated period. Many of us started trying to get involved in politics a long time before we were elected, and I think that limit is a very dangerous thing in today’s democracy.
However, I would say to the hon. Lady that I am open to a conversation about election financing. I am looking at my Whip—my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner—who is probably horrified by me saying that, but I am not against that argument or discussion. I just think that this goes a bit too far, and it does not sit well with me. After that rambling oratory, I just say to Green and Liberal Democrat Members that, if they choose to push new clauses 10 and 24 to a vote, the Opposition will support them, but we would vote against new clause 27.
The Opposition also think that the accountability in new clause 18 is very sensible. If we use AI, we should be honest about it—it is as simple as that. If any politician wants to put forward an AI-generated image, I first think there is a question about why they would want to do so anyway. We all think that our constituencies are beautiful, and we would not want to change them. We also all know that politics is acting for ugly people, so why would we want to change the way we look?
I do not understand why someone would want to use an AI-generated image, but if they do, they should actually be big enough and strong enough to own it. Therefore, it is important to have some extra regulation, particularly as some people might not be au fait with AI-generated images, as some are very believable—not the one of Donald Trump pretending to be Jesus, but the more sensible ones. People cannot necessarily pick that up, so if the hon. Member for Hazel Grove chose to push new clause 18 to a vote, the Opposition would also support it.
Samantha Dixon
New clause 18 seeks to require digital campaigning material, in scope of the digital imprint regime, that contains images, audio or video generated or materially altered to include a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used. The Government fully recognise the challenges posed by AI-generated content, including deepfakes, and the risks they present to democratic processes and public trust in the online information environment. We agree that helping voters understand the authenticity of digital campaigning material is an important objective.
However, AI technologies are developing at pace, and there is not yet a reliable or widely adopted technical basis for determining when content has been generated or materially altered by AI. That would make enforcement by the Electoral Commission and the police difficult in practice, and it would risk undermining campaigners’ compliance with the rules.
The new clause, as drafted, would also create uncertainty and disproportionate legal risks for campaigners. For example, it would create a new criminal offence for failing to include a statement about AI use, even where the AI involvement may be trivial, automated or outside the campaigner’s knowledge or control. Further consideration would also be needed on how liability for offences should apply to those who republish material.
There would also be a considerable chance of the new clause quickly becoming obsolete. AI is evolving rapidly, so adopting a definition of “generative artificial intelligence” in primary legislation might struggle to keep pace with technological developments and it could quickly become outdated. Although we share the intention to strengthen transparency in digital campaigning, the Government do not believe that the new clause is currently workable or proportionate. The Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology recently announced that the Government will establish a taskforce to put forward proposals for Government on best practice for labelling AI-generated content, with an interim report to be published in the autumn. I urge Members to follow the progress of that taskforce.
I turn to new clause 10 and amendment 4. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central for those and for her commitment to strengthening online protections. I know Members feel strongly about that area. I share the objective of seeing the powers of the Online Safety Act 2023 being fully and effectively utilised. With that in mind, the Government have carefully considered new clause 10, which would require the Government to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences relating to digital communications, as they relate to candidates and elected officials.
Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope service providers are already required to have effective systems and processes in place to identify and remove illegal content. That includes content that amounts to the two offences identified in new clause 10: the “false statements about candidates” offence and the offence of undue influence. Those duties apply equally to AI-generated and manipulated content where such material meets the threshold of either offence.
As the independent regulator, Ofcom issues codes of practice that provide clear guidance on what action providers should take to manage and mitigate illegal content. The codes recommend various measures across risk management, user reporting and content moderation. Ofcom has already produced guidance to assist providers in making judgments about whether certain content is illegal, and such guidance includes usage examples where possible. As the independent and expert online safety regulator, Ofcom, not the Government, is best placed to offer such guidance.
The Government have no plans to widen their role within the Online Safety Act regulatory regime by issuing guidance on matters within Ofcom’s remit. Introducing a new duty for Government to publish parallel guidance on two specific offences, and committing to regularly updating that guidance, would blur the lines between Government and the independent regulator, undermining the model for which Parliament has only recently legislated.
The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that protections keep pace with evolving threats to democracy, and I welcome continued engagement with parliamentarians on that important issue. As Members will know, Rycroft made recommendations in his review supporting the principle of advertising libraries and suggested that the Government could use their convening power to work with social media companies to extend the practice of advert libraries to achieve consistency in how they are presented. That is not the same as setting a legal requirement for a repository of digital political advertising, as intended by new clause 10. None the less, we are carefully considering all of the recommendations in the Rycroft review and will issue a response in due course.
New clause 24 seeks to establish a repository for paid-for digital political advertising. Digital political advertising plays an important role in supporting democratic engagement. It remains one of the most accessible and cost-effective ways for political parties and campaigners to connect with the public and have their message heard. However, the Committee will be aware that the European Commission introduced similar requirements to new clause 24 in 2024, including mandatory transparency notices containing information such as spending and targeting, and the requirement for platforms to upload all political adverts to a European repository.
In response, major platforms such as Meta and Google chose to cease hosting paid political advertising entirely in the EU, citing operational complexity and uncertainty as to whether compliance by platforms and campaigners was realistically achievable. If the UK were to adopt comparable measures without fully understanding their operational impact, we could see similar unintended outcomes here.
The potential removal of political advertising from major platforms in the UK could risk reducing political pluralism online by restricting the ability of political parties, civil society organisations and candidates, many of whom rely on digital platforms to engage effectively with the public. Smaller, newer parties and independent candidates may be disproportionately impacted by such an outcome, losing an affordable channel to reach voters, while larger, well-followed parties and campaigning groups would likely be less affected. That would make campaigning more challenging for newcomers, potentially undermining the level playing field.
The Government agree that transparency in digital campaigning is important, but any reforms must be carefully balanced to protect freedom of expression and avoid placing undue burdens on campaigners and platforms. This is a complex area, and the implications need detailed consideration to avoid replicating the unintended consequences seen in other jurisdictions. In the meantime, we welcome the steps already taken by platforms such as Meta and Google, which have created publicly accessible political advert libraries. We encourage other platforms to do the same.
The measures in the Bill will extend the scope of digital imprint rules and place enforcement on a clearer and more proportionate footing, ensuring that voters can continue to make informed decisions on digital material in elections and referenda. We will continue to keep wider policy relating to electoral campaigning under review.
I turn to new clause 25. The Government absolutely recognise the importance of protecting our elections from online interference, including concerns about how algorithms, such as recommender systems, can amplify harmful or misleading content. The current legal framework to tackle online electoral mis and disinformation has the Online Safety Act 2023 as its core pillar. New clause 25 would risk creating overlap and confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act.
Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope services must take action in relation to any content that amounts to existing election offences during an election period. The Online Safety Act already provides Ofcom with extensive powers to gather information from services and scrutinise how algorithms operate as well as a mandate to require services to conduct illegal content risk assessments. That includes assessing the likelihood of users encountering illegal content through algorithms, how systems may exacerbate or mitigate those risks, and what safeguards are required. From 2027, categorised services will also be required to report information about their algorithms, including how they influence the display, promotion or recommendation of content. Creating overlap or confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act also increases the risk of regulatory uncertainty. For those reasons, we cannot accept the new clause.
That said, the Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the tools it needs to enforce compliance with the regulatory framework it is responsible for enforcing. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference.
As Members know, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose, including recommendations relating to the Electoral Commission’s investigatory powers. We will revert with a full Government response to the review and consider whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work.
New clause 27 would require the Government to establish a review to consider the adequacy of regulated periods of elections and referendums. More specifically, it would consider whether they are of sufficient length to combat mis and disinformation, and the impact of digital campaigning outside regulated periods.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I have a lot of sympathy for what the Minister is saying. It seems to me that there is a risk of a “may contain nuts” kind of solution emerging: campaigners could simply put, “This may contain artificially generated imagery” on every item of digital campaigning and comply with the law, but that would not tell us whether what is being represented has been materially altered. In the light of her earlier comments about the autumn timeline, will she give the Committee a clear commitment to work not just with political parties but with industry, with a view to ensuring that we have effective copywriting and watermarking, which we know many of these organisation are already developing, so that anybody looking at political content can be confident that what they are seeing is genuinely what was said by that politician, candidate or party?
Samantha Dixon
The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. As I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology announced that the Government have established a taskforce to take forward proposals for Government on best practice for labelling AI-generated material. With the interim report due to be published in the autumn, I think it is timely that I should write to the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology to outline the concerns that have been debated in the Committee—I am looking to my officials to ensure that we pick this up—because I think it will be very informative for the taskforce’s work. If the hon. Gentleman is happy for me to do that, I will do so.
Finally, the Government recognise that there are potential issues with section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, which the hon. Member for North Herefordshire mentioned. We are reviewing how that legislation should apply in a modern electoral setting and, where necessary, we will take appropriate action to clarify the scope of the section, particularly to make sure that it captures emerging technologies such as deepfakes and other AI technologies and is future-proofed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Decriminalisation of certain requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Schedule 10.
Clause 66 stand part.
Schedule 11.
Clauses 67 to 69 stand part.
New clause 41—Electoral Commission: civil penalties and enforcement—
“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).
(2) In Schedule 19C, in paragraph 1, after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
‘(1A) When deciding whether to impose a fixed monetary penalty under this Act, the Commission must have regard to whether the penalty will—
(a) change the behaviour of the offender;
(b) eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance;
(c) be appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue;
(d) be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused;
(e) restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and
(f) deter future non-compliance.’”
This new clause would put the ‘Macrory principles’ for regulators on to a statutory footing as regards the Electoral Commission.
New clause 46—Power of Electoral Commission to require disclosure from financial institutions—
“In Schedule 19B of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (investigatory powers of Commission), after paragraph 1 insert—
‘Power to require disclosure from financial institutions
1A (1) The Commission may give a disclosure notice to a financial institution requiring the institution—
(a) to produce, for inspection by the Commission or a person authorised by the Commission, any documents which—
(i) relate to the income and expenditure of an organisation or individual to which paragraph 1 applies, and
(ii) are reasonably required by the Commission for the purposes of carrying out their functions; or
(b) to provide the Commission, or a person authorised by the Commission, with any information or explanation which relates to that income and expenditure and is reasonably required by the Commission for those purposes.
(2) A financial institution to whom a disclosure notice is given shall comply with it within such reasonable time as is specified in the notice.
(3) In this paragraph, “financial institution” has the same meaning as in Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 6 of that Schedule).’”
This new clause gives the Electoral Commission the power to require information from a financial institution relating to the income and expenditure of political parties and associated individuals.
New clause 53—Electoral Commission: pre-investigation decision notices—
“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).
(2) In Schedule 19B, paragraph 3, subparagraph (5), at end insert—
‘or;
(b) relevant to determining whether to start an investigation.’”
This would enable the Electoral Commission to require information before launching a formal investigation.
New clause 57—Electoral Commission fining power—
“(1) Schedule 1, paragraph 5, to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010 is amended as set out in subsection (2).
(2) For ‘is £20,000’, substitute ‘is the greater of—
(a) £500,000, or
(b) 4% of the total campaign expenditure incurred by the person or organisation during the relevant regulated period.’
(3) At end of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 16 of Schedule 19C to PPERA 2000 insert—
‘(1A) Notwithstanding sub-paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may only make a supplementary order which amends the percentage of campaign expenditure incurred by the person or organisation during the relevant regulated period which can be used as a maximum monetary penalty by the Electoral Commission, if the condition in sub-paragraph (1B) has been met.
(1B) The condition in this sub-paragraph is that a recommendation for the amendment has been made to the Secretary of State by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission.’”
This new clause amends the Electoral Commission’s power to fine, increasing its maximum from £20,000 to £500,000 or 4% of campaign spending, whichever is higher. It further prevents the percentage used being changed through Order unless a recommendation has been made by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission.
The Chair
While it was convenient to debate those new clauses with the last group, it will not be convenient to reach a decision on them until much later in our proceedings.
Samantha Dixon
I will speak to clauses 65 to 69 before turning to the new clauses tabled by hon. Members.
Under the current enforcement framework, most political finance offences, regardless of their severity, are treated as possible criminal offences, even when they amount to minor administrative breaches, such as the late submission of campaign expenditure reports. While criminal investigation and prosecution for such offences is rare, key stakeholders, including the Electoral Commission and the Ethics and Integrity Commission, have expressed concerns that the possibility of criminal prosecution for minor errors can deter participation in campaigning. Clause 65 and subsequent secondary legislation will address this by decriminalising administrative offences under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, so that they will be punishable only through civil sanctions by the Electoral Commission rather than criminal prosecution.
We have worked closely with the Electoral Commission to determine which offences under PPERA should be decriminalised. Broadly, they relate to failures to comply with reporting requirements, such as failing to deliver a campaign expenditure return within the statutory time limit or failing to deliver a proper statement of accounts. Serious breaches, including intentional or reckless misreporting, will remain criminal offences and will continue to be investigated by the police and subject to criminal prosecution.
This will provide much-needed clarity that the Electoral Commission is responsible for enforcing such administrative breaches, allowing police resources to be directed towards tackling more serious criminal offences and clamping down on foreign money entering politics. In addition, by removing the threat of criminal prosecution for minor infractions, the clause will encourage participation by individuals and organisations that wish to campaign, while ensuring more proportionate enforcement of the rules.
Turning to clause 66, robust and proportionate enforcement of political finance law is essential for sustaining trust in our democracy. However, there is currently an enforcement gap in electoral regulation. Since 2010, to provide for more flexible and encompassing enforcement, the Electoral Commission has been able to impose civil sanctions for certain offences committed by political parties, third-party campaigners and referendum participants. In contrast, offences committed in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners are subject only to criminal sanctions and enforcement by the police. Practically speaking, this means that breaches of the rules can be addressed only through police investigation and criminal prosecution, even where a breach is minor or unintentional. Yet criminal prosecution for minor infractions is frequently considered disproportionate to the offence and not in the public interest, which means that breaches of the rules often go unaddressed and unsanctioned.
This enforcement gap risks undermining public trust in the integrity of the electoral system by creating the perception that the rules are not being enforced and that campaigners are not complying with them. At the same time, it can create a fear of criminal prosecution for candidates, election agents and recall petition campaigners, who could face police investigation for relatively minor breaches of the law.
Clause 66 is intended to close that gap by extending the Electoral Commission’s enforcement remit, including its investigatory and civil sanctioning powers, to cover offences in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners. Criminal prosecution will remain available for the most serious offences involving intentional or reckless breaches of the rules, but the EC will also now be able to apply its considerable knowledge and expertise to the enforcement of breaches across the political finance framework, providing for a more encompassing, proportionate and robust regime.
Clause 67 removes the statutory cap on the maximum fine that the Electoral Commission can impose for certain offences. Currently, where an offence is punishable on summary conviction by a fine, the penalty imposed by the EC may not exceed that which can be imposed by the court. The maximum fine that can be imposed by a court in such instances is unlimited in England and Wales, but £10,000 in Scotland and £5,000 in Northern Ireland.
The purpose of removing these restrictions is to ensure that the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine can be applied uniformly across all relevant offences around the UK. We will be increasing the maximum fine level in secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Electoral Commission’s new maximum fine provides a meaningful deterrent against violations of the rules across the UK, no matter where the offence is committed.
As the regulator, the Electoral Commission is invaluable in upholding trust in our democracy. That is why we are expanding the commission’s role and powers, including extending its enforcement remit and increasing its maximum fine. We intend for the Electoral Commission’s expanded role and powers to apply UK-wide at all elections, including parliamentary and local government elections.
Samantha Dixon
As I understand it, we will be setting the maximum fine in secondary legislation, but I will confirm that, because I have almost lost the thread of what I was saying.
Paul Holmes
I apologise to the Minister for making her lose her trail. I also am at that stage in the afternoon where things are not going in as well as they probably were this morning. I asked the question because, at the moment, the courts have an unlimited maximum fine. I just got confused about whether the Minister was setting a maximum fine through secondary legislation, which she has now clarified. As we on the Committee are discussing the changes to the Electoral Commission’s responsibilities, which the Minister has been clear about throughout the day, would she give us an indication of what that maximum fine might be? Why is she waiting until secondary legislation to set the level of that fine?
Samantha Dixon
It is our intention to increase the maximum fine level in secondary legislation, as I stated earlier. Its level will be debated at that time. We will debate it in secondary legislation, but it needs to remain proportionate, and we need to move towards it in a considered way and debate it then.
David Simmonds
I think there is a high degree of political agreement that this is the right direction of travel. Could the Minister say a little bit more about the assessment that the Department will have done about the resource implications for the Electoral Commission? We are all conscious that regulatory enforcement can come at an enormous cost to the regulator, especially where bad actors have specifically structured arrangements to evade rules and enforcement.
We have seen examples in other jurisdictions where political action committees, fake political parties and short-term political parties have been set up specifically to get around the regulations set out in light terms in the Bill. Given that that is likely to be partially funded by a costs award in the event of somebody having been found to be in breach, alongside the fine, could the Minister indicate what she thinks the cost implications are for the Electoral Commission? That is especially given that we have seen regulators in multiple jurisdictions face enormous costs for the legal process required to enforce their judgments.
Samantha Dixon
My officials work very closely with the Electoral Commission and would not have acted without consideration and with consultation with it. I remind the Committee that decisions about the resourcing of the Electoral Commission fall to the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. That is the route by which it is funded. We would not want to make regulation too burdensome, but correspondingly, the Electoral Commission reports to the Speaker’s Committee regularly about its resourcing needs. Indeed, mostly recently, it returned money to the Speaker’s Committee that it did not feel it needed. To reassure Members, officials work closely with it to ensure there is sufficient resource.
Our policy ambition is for these legislative changes to be consistent across reserved and devolved elections and to be commenced in a way that provides clarity to campaigners on how the rules will be enforced across all elections. Clause 68 provides for that, as it allows the Secretary of State to make provisions that could otherwise be made by Scottish or Welsh Ministers, but only with the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers. In practice, subject to the agreement of the devolved Governments, that will enable us to introduce a uniform set of changes to the role and power of the Electoral Commission in relation to local government elections in Scotland and Wales.
I turn to clause 69. The Electoral Commission currently lacks an explicit statutory gateway to disclose information to other regulators and law enforcement bodies. The lack of an explicit legal basis for information sharing forces the commission to rely on incidental powers or bespoke memorandums of understanding to disclose information. Those arrangements create unnecessary complexity and delays, and make information sharing more burdensome than it ought to be. They have embedded unnecessary friction into the system, slowing co-operation between regulators on important cross-cutting regulatory issues, and frustrating the very bodies charged with upholding the integrity of our democratic processes.
To underpin our wider reforms to strengthen enforcement, the clause provides a clear legal basis for information sharing, enabling the commission to disclose information to specified regulators and enforcement bodies. It will nurture an environment of collaboration between relevant bodies on cross-cutting issues such as foreign interference, data protection and digital campaigning. To ensure that the information-sharing gateway remains effective as the regulatory landscape evolves, the list of bodies can be amended by the Secretary of State, following consultation with the Electoral Commission and subject to parliamentary approval via the affirmative procedure.
The Government note that one of the recommendations of the Rycroft report is to build on this measure and make the information-sharing gateway reciprocal, to provide clarity that the Electoral Commission can also receive information from relevant bodies. We are carefully considering all the recommendations from the Rycroft review. We will issue a full Government response in due course, and, where appropriate, we will introduce new amendments to the Bill.
With those assurances, I commend clause 69 to the Committee. I will allow other Members to speak to the new clauses and I will respond to them in due course.
The Chair
I reinforce that this is the only opportunity that the Committee will have to debate those new clauses.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister again for—I am not being facetious—her comprehensive explanation. We have been here for most of the day. These are very complicated issues, and she has been speaking an awful lot because of the importance of this legislation. I do not envy her. I will speak to new clause 41 in my name, to be voted on at another point. We welcome clause 65, but we have some questions on clause 67.
As the Minister outlined, clause 65 and schedule 10 decriminalise certain offences in PPERA. They relate to administrative requirements for political parties and others regulated by that legislation and the commission. For example, it is currently an offence for a party treasurer to fail to deliver annual accounts or reports of election expenses to the commission. The provisions will also make the necessary consequential amendments to allow the requirements to come under the commission’s civil sanctioning regime.
Clause 66 is a fairly simple clause, which extends the Electoral Commission’s remit to be the primary enforcer of all imprint rules. I would like to pick up on a theme from my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, which I also brought up earlier: the impact on the Electoral Commission’s ability to do its job properly, in relation to what it currently does compared with what the Government will ask it to do after the legislation passes.
The Minister has made it clear that officials are working with representatives of the commission. I know that she works with them as well, and they have not necessarily said that they are unhappy about receiving this new responsibility. However, my general experience from working in the public sector and serving as a local authority councillor is that, in this world of organisations that are often controlled by Treasury spending budgets, or, as the Minister outlined, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, no one says no to extra responsibility if they think they are going to get some more dosh—let us put it that way.
Will the commission get enough cash to be able to manage the regulatory burdens that the Government are placing on it? I am beginning to worry that with the plethora of new responsibilities, we will have to see quite a large uplift in the commission’s budgets. I have not heard convincing defences that the Electoral Commission has verbally or formally remarked to the Government that it is content to receive that much responsibility. I am sure that the Minister will come back to talk about that.
Clause 67 will increase the maximum fine that the commission could impose in a civil sanction for some summary offences. We have concerns about the size of the proposed increase in Electoral Commission civil sanction fines. The courts already have powers to levy unlimited fines. At the very least, the Macrory principles on proportionate regulatory enforcement should be embedded in law—that is what we aim to achieve in new clause 41. The Electoral Commission’s strategy and policy statement recommends the application of the Macrory principles, including
“the use of requests for improvements before resorting to fines and the need to conduct investigations in a timely manner.”
The Electoral Commission has civil sanctioning powers that apply to national referendums and elections. More serious criminal matters can be—and are—referred to the police and Crown Prosecution Service, and are then considered by a court of law. The courts already have the power to levy unlimited fines and criminal sanctions. Unlimited fines are potentially a heavy, significant punishment. That is why it would be appropriate for a judicial check and a fair hearing in a court of law. Indeed, such massive civil fines would likely be challenged via lawyers in the courts anyway, as we have seen with the Information Commissioner and general data protection regulation fines.
In relation to the Minister’s opening remarks about setting the level of the Electoral Commission fine at secondary legislation, I am concerned that that is because of, quite frankly, the unpreparedness of the Government. They have put a lot of legislation forward without properly consulting the Electoral Commission and are rushing, as we have said all along in this legislation, to try and legislate without necessarily thinking things through.
Samantha Dixon
Opposition Members did ask about the level at which we would set the fine. I have now consulted my notes; we intend, through secondary legislation, to increase the limit to £500,000 per offence. That will be done through secondary legislation.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister for that; that clarity is welcome. I still question why that needs to be done at secondary legislation. If the Minister knows the maximum fine limit for the Electoral Commission today, she could have put that in the legislation or brought forward an amendment to be discussed in Committee. She has chosen not to do that; I am interested to know why she has chosen not to do that and is waiting for secondary legislation to do so. Perhaps she will come back and tell the Committee why that is the case.
My point still stands. The fact that she is looking to set the fine at the secondary legislation stage outlines that, once again, the Government are asking the Electoral Commission to do a great number of things that it currently does not do. I am not convinced, unless the Minister can reassure me in writing or come back after this Committee, that the Electoral Commission has been properly consulted. Let us not forget that it was the Electoral Commission that criticised the Government for not consulting it on trying to postpone the elections. That was a process where the Government were found to be unlawful—by the Secretary of State on the Floor of the House.
I am concerned that, as we have gone through this legislation, a huge amount has been asked of the Electoral Commission in terms of its responsibility and purview, and the Minister has not reassured me that it is happy with that. I am not convinced that the resource that it currently has would allow it to conduct its operations or, if necessary, investigations on its current physical envelope.
Samantha Dixon
The reality is that the Electoral Commission already imposes fines; it is just that they are not big enough. I argue that, by not setting the level in primary legislation but doing it in secondary legislation, it can be responsive should it need to be changed in the future, which it may need to be. We have talked about the revolving nature of foreign interference; in similar ways, the offences and their gravity may change over time. To be able to respond to that through secondary legislation is important, and we should not be hidebound by requiring primary legislation.
The Electoral Commission is accountable to Parliament, not to Government. It is a very important point to make that the consideration of its comfortableness, abilities or capacity is a discussion for Parliament. My officials work with it collaboratively, and I meet with it regularly. It is comfortable, but we must always remember that it is accountable to Parliament, not to Government.
Samantha Dixon
I will speak to each of the new clauses, beginning with new clause 41, which seeks to place the Macrory principles on a statutory footing in relation to the Electoral Commission’s use of civil sanctioning powers.
We fully recognise the importance of the Macrory principles and agree that regulatory enforcement should always be flexible, transparent and proportionate. These principles were designed to guide the construction of regulatory systems and sanction regimes. As such, the Macrory principles directed the development of the Electoral Commission’s regime of civil sanctions, which was introduced by the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 and therefore is already embedded in the commission’s regulatory practices. That includes the ability to issue fines for a wide range of offences, the use of stop notices and enforcement undertakings, and provision for representations and appeals.
The Electoral Commission is also required to publish guidance on its use of such powers, which it must have regard to when exercising its functions. It does this through its enforcement policy. Therefore, fairness and proportionality are already central to how the Electoral Commission operates. Indeed, the commission’s enforcement policy explicitly states that it will impose sanctions where appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. For that reason, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to apply the Macrory principles as the new clause proposes. The Electoral Commission is, and must remain, an independent regulator. It is vital that it retains the flexibility it needs to decide how best to use its enforcement powers, rather than being tied to a rigid statutory checklist for individual enforcement decisions.
The Government have been clear in our commitment to strengthening the Electoral Commission’s independence, including through the repeal of the strategy and policy statement, which the commission was previously required to consider in the exercise of its functions. Introducing further statutory requirements of this kind risks cutting across that principle and altering the balance of the commission’s operational autonomy. There is a very real risk that amending PPERA to codify these principles in this way is unnecessarily duplicative and could lead to legal uncertainty. Enforcement decisions could become a quagmire of legal challenge, which would delay action and weaken the commission’s overall effectiveness as a regulator. Having given these assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley will not press new clause 41.
I turn now to new clause 53, which seeks to provide the Electoral Commission with powers to request information from any person where such information is relevant to determining whether to open an investigation. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the right tools it needs to make informed decisions about potential breaches of political finance rules. The commission already has substantial information-gathering powers to support its regulatory functions, including the enforcement of political finance and imprint rules. That said, the Government recognise that we cannot be complacent, which is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference.
Although we do not support the amendment, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review that reinforce measures already included in the Bill to ensure political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose. There will be a full Government response to the review, and we will consider whether further amendments to the Bill are appropriate in the light of that work. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.
New clause 57 seeks to increase the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine from £20,000 per offence to a new maximum of £500,000 or 4% of campaign expenditure, whichever is greater. It also requires that any order seeking to amend the suggested percentage can be made only if recommended by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has robust enforcement powers. A strong and proportionate civil sanctions regime is essential for securing compliance with the rules and upholding trust in our democracy.
The current maximum fine of £20,000 does not provide a meaningful deterrent against rule breaking. The Electoral Commission has argued for a long time that it risks becoming a mere cost of doing business for the largest political parties and campaigners. The Government agree that increasing the maximum fine is essential, so that sanctions reflect the scale of modern political campaigning and ensure that all campaigners, no matter how large, face significant repercussions when the rules are broken. That is why we intend, through secondary legislation, to increase the commission’s maximum fine significantly to up to £500,000 per offence.
The reason why the change will be made through secondary legislation is that Parliament has already provided the Secretary of State with the power to make supplementary orders in relation to the Electoral Commission’s civil sanction regime. Any such order is subject to parliamentary approval under the affirmative procedure. It was through the exercise of that power, and through that process, that the existing maximum fine was established in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010, which is referenced in the new clause. It is therefore appropriate to follow the same process for making changes to the commission’s regime of civil sanctions where it is already provided for in legislation.
In terms of adding statutory requirements that must be met before the Secretary of State can make a supplementary order, the Government have seen no evidence that such conditions are necessary. We have worked closely with the Electoral Commission through the development of the measures in the Bill, and we will continue to work collaboratively as we develop the detail of proposals for increasing the maximum fine that it can impose. Those details will be set out in secondary legislation in due course, and at that time Parliament will rightly have the opportunity to scrutinise and debate the Government’s approach and consider whether to approve the legislation. For those reasons, and with those reassurances in place, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.
Samantha Dixon
We have considered it, and we have decided to opt for a fine of £500,000. However, when we introduce the secondary legislation, the debate may flesh out that argument, and the figure may change, should secondary legislation and the debate lead to that conclusion. However, at this stage, we will not accept the amendment.
New clause 46 seeks to give the Electoral Commission powers to compel financial institutions to disclose information related to income and expenditure of regulated entities, such as political parties and candidates, where it is reasonably required by the commission to carry out its functions. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the tools it needs to enforce compliance with political finance rules. The commission already has substantial information gathering powers to support its regulatory functions, including the enforcement of political finance and imprint rules.
That said, the Government recognise that we cannot be complacent, which is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference. As Members know, we are considering the relevant recommendations of the review that could reinforce measures already in the Bill to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remains robust and fit for purpose. I note that new clause 46 draws on a recommendation from the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy and covers very similar ground to one of Mr Rycroft’s recommendations. We will revert with a full Government response to the review and consider whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11 agreed to.
Clauses 67 to 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Deirdre Costigan.)