Violence Reduction, Policing and Criminal Justice

Paul Beresford Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con)]

I am very supportive of the policing and criminal justice aspects of the King’s Speech, but being very aware of the time limit on Members, for the benefit of Ministers—from my point of view, at least—I will just touch on one aspect of the Sentencing Bill. The Government press release for that Bill states:

“The Bill will also make sure vile criminals who commit rape and other serious sexual offences face the full consequences of their actions and spend every day of their sentence behind bars”.

To me, and to most people in the street, that is common sense. If a judge says that someone’s sentence is 10 years, that is what is expected, not five years just because that person has behaved quite well in prison.

However, I would like to file that quote down a little more. It refers to

“vile criminals who commit rape and other serious sexual offences”.

Having some experience of the legislation around child sex offences, I rank very many of those convicted of child sexual abuse as criminals so vile that they should be included in that category. Legislation in this country took a big step to protect children against those criminals in 2003, and since then this country’s child protection legislation has been world leading. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 and subsequent developments and improvements have been agreed on a cross-party basis, including the grooming aspects of that Act.

The Act introduced for the first time the biggest step in child protection: the innovation of making child grooming a crime. Even today, few members of the public and probably very few MPs have any real knowledge of just how vile the actions of many paedophiles towards children often are. In Committee on the Sex Offenders Bill in 2003, I became aware that some Members, on both sides of the House, were oblivious to the vile actions that many paedophiles apply to children. Consequently, I arranged an informal cross-party meeting of the Committee with some of the top police from the Met paedophile unit. One MPs asked the superintendent to describe the worst he had come across. He did, and it shattered the Committee members—they were aghast and shocked—and that part of the Bill then went through seamlessly. I will not repeat what the policeman described, suffice it to say that to call it vile is a gross understatement. Those and virtually all other child sex offenders, male or female, can only be described as vile—or worse.

Some years ago, I was saddened to read a short article in a quality UK weekly by a journalist who partially absolved people who collect child sex abuse material. The article’s reasoning was that viewing the photos did not involve their actually touching children. It was appalling. Individuals who collect such photos create a market that induces others to produce them by abusing children. At the other end of the camera is a child being abused.

I hope the Secretary of State for Justice and his Ministers will consider including convicted child abusers among those who should spend every day of their sentence in prison without early release. That includes those who may not have touched a child but who, by collecting what are not infrequently thousands or tens of thousands of images of child abuse pornography, are also culpable, and should hence spend every day of their sentence behind bars, as the judge may decide is appropriate when they are convicted.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Paul Beresford Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading - Day 2
Tuesday 16th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con) [V]]

This is a broad and significant Bill. There are many areas that I would like to discuss, but I have only three minutes, so I will concentrate on the long overdue changes relating to illegal Traveller camping.

My constituency has a number of legitimate Traveller sites. The relationship between the settled communities and the so-called Travellers on official sites is generally harmonious. Surrey County Council and Surrey District and Borough Councils are in the process of setting up a transit site, with facilities, for Travellers. All this is very different from the frequent illegal Traveller invasions. Surrey has had hundreds of these incidents, and my constituency has more than its fair share. Over recent years, the numbers of these illegal land-squatting camps have increased. If access is inhibited by barriers, gates or any form of obstruction, they are broken down or removed, and generally damaged. The Travellers then squat on-site regardless of the ownership, be it common land, parkland, farmland, private land or even a school playground. I note that a number of Members are opposed to change and would prefer that this remained a civil matter. That approach has been an absolute, abysmal failure, with considerable financial loss to the local community or the landowners. The legislative change criminalising this type of illegal camping is exceptionally welcome and has been long awaited. It is for the protection of local people—my constituents.

I note that in certain circumstances a fine can be imposed. Considering the phenomenal mess of human detritus and general waste, often including hardcore, that is almost without exception left behind when the illegal occupiers are removed, it would be helpful if some form of recompense for the cost of returning the site to its pre-invasion state could be available. I realise that that would be technically possible using the Compensation Act 2006, but this would need civil action requiring identification and service of notice on individuals who will have already moved and be able to claim that the mess was no fault of theirs. Hence, I wonder if it would be possible to require the site that has been occupied illegally to be returned to its previous state or to apply an appropriate cost to those who are abusing the site.

There is much in this Bill that I like, but this particular change will be overwhelmingly welcomed by an enormous number of my constituents who have been abused by these people over many years.

Detention under Mental Health Act

Paul Beresford Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con)]

As an ethnic minority immigrant to this country, I am intrigued by the way the House works. We have had two days of a deeply serious international debate, and now an ethnic minority immigrant has an opportunity to put a point on a small but important issue that is almost local by comparison. I am referring to the possibility of a small change in the Mental Health Act 1983 to enable our policemen and women to act somewhat more promptly in the care of any person they find to be in need of mental health assessment and immediate care.

I raised this issue in a ten-minute rule Bill in 2014. I did not proceed, as I was informed that there was an ongoing review. That review has come and gone, and I have read it, but this small point was not referred to in it. However, there will possibly be a negative change—from my point of view—in the Policing and Crime Bill as it progresses through the other place.

I was initially prompted to seek changes having seen the need for them first hand. I was on a police parliamentary scheme in 2014, as part of which I went round Wandsworth on foot or by car. I joined two young uniformed police officers in their response car. The first call was a dash to a flat on the 14th floor of a council residential tower block. The mother of the household nervously let the officers in to see her daughter—aged 22—who was standing on the window ledge and threatening to jump.

It was quickly established that the daughter had a short history of suicide attempts. With the back-up of two plainclothes officers, and with great expertise, the young woman was persuaded to come down. A young female officer sat on the bed beside her, and they calmly discussed the problem. The police officer suggested the young woman might want to go to a place of safety for psychiatric and medical help. That was refused, and when the woman was pressed a little further, it was followed by agitation and threats to jump out of the window.

Meanwhile, police officers outside the flat had contacted the psychiatric unit at St George’s hospital for assistance. After a couple of hours, an individual from the hospital arrived with an ambulance and crew. There was further alarm and rejection, and a struggle ensued, but in due course this sad lady was transported to the hospital as a designated place of safety.

The whole pantomime had occupied five police officers and three NHS staff, and it had taken about three to four hours to sort out. It was obvious from the beginning that the police themselves could have taken care of the young lady very quickly, therefore reducing the police and NHS manpower hours needed and the risk of the young lady leaping out of the window.

I have a second personal case, which involves a Mole Valley resident. A lady in a block of flats has been threatening neighbours with bizarre and often aggressive behaviour to such a degree that some other residents actually fear for their lives, let alone obtain any peace at any hour of the day. Contact between the mental health team and the police has not coincided until very recently. I asked the police officer in charge about section 136. Predictably, I was told the lady’s home was a private place, so no police action was legally possible. From discussions with Met police officers, I have found that that situation is far from unusual.

A more tragic case was the death of Martin Middleton in 2010. He was taken to a Leeds police station by officers who had visited him in his home and noted his serious preparations for committing suicide. The police officers believed they had arrested Mr Middleton under section 136. When they arrived at the police station, the custody sergeant refused to detain Mr Middleton, as the arrest had taken place in his private residence. The police officers therefore had to take him to what they hoped was some form of safety—a relative’s home. Sadly, later that day or the following day, he hanged himself.

At the inquest, the coroner had no hesitation in agreeing with Professor Keith Rix, who was called to give expert evidence, that Mr Middleton fell into a category of mentally disordered persons for whom there is no appropriate provision under the Act. Subsequent to raising this issue, I have heard from many front-line police officers and again from Professor Keith Rix, who is an academic psychiatrist and an expert in this area. I still have no doubt that the Act needs amending fully to protect the police and, of course, those suffering a mental illness crisis.

I am reliably informed that in the Republic of Ireland, the Garda Siochana have a clear operational advantage in that, under section 12 of Ireland’s Mental Health Act 2001, where there is

“a serious likelihood of the person causing immediate and serious harm to himself or herself or to other persons”,

a garda can

“enter…any dwelling or other premises or any place if he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is to be found there.”

There are instances recorded in England where the police have had to act outside the boundaries of the law out of concern for the safety of the individual. There are also recognised incidences of the desperate police persuading the person out of their home, and therefore into a public place, to effect an arrest under section 136 and take the person for proper and appropriate care, thus preventing a suicide. Over the 10 years between 1997-98 and 2007-08, admissions to hospital as a place of safety increased from 2,237 to 7,035. The Minister is noted for his quick arithmetic, and he will recognise that that is a threefold increase.

It was calculated that 17,417 people were detained under section 136 in 2005-06. By 2011-12, the overall number of incidences of its use was recorded as 23,500. As I have indicated, although the powers under section 136 are limited to persons who are found by the police in a public place, there is evidence that the powers are sometimes used to remove an affected person from their home. In fact, one London-based social services authority’s audited figures indicated that some 30% of section 136 arrests were recorded as having been made at or just outside the detainee’s home. In other words, in desperation, the police have had to manoeuvre the individual outside their private residence. This is an indication of the desperation of the police to obtain care for disturbed individuals, and hence it supports my desire for a change in the legislation.

Put bluntly, on a strict interpretation of section 136, the admission to hospital of hundreds, if not thousands, of potential suicides is delayed or denied, thus risking their suicide or self-harm, merely because the police, who sometimes have to just observe the situation, cannot act because it is happening in the person’s home or someone else’s home. In many instances, as I found in Wandsworth, the police have to spend considerable time waiting until they can obtain a medical practitioner or a health official to give them the nod to transport the patient to care.

One argument against the amendment that I am suggesting is that the police already have sufficient powers. It is quite clear, from my own observation, that that is basically incorrect. The second argument is that it would extend the right of the police to enter people’s private properties. Clearly, in those circumstances, that is appropriate because somebody is in need of mental health care, and that is the whole point of the change I am seeking. It is already possible for the police to enter an individual’s private home to investigate a possible breach of the peace, assuming that the police would be utilising that eventuality to enter the property. Often, they have to help someone who is clearly suffering mental disorder. In many cases, other residents in the property can allow the police in, but having done so, as in the first case I cited, they are then still unable to act.

In my belief, and in my experience, the police are acting only in the very best interests of the individuals concerned and of the safety of the public, and we should give them the legal mechanism to do so. Doing nothing is not an option. I suggest that a simple solution would be to amend section 136 by simply removing the words

“in a place to which the public have access”.

I am hopeful of a positive answer from the Minister; I know that he is extremely flexible. I would be happy to work with him to seek a ten-minute rule Bill, or take a different direction through a tiny change to the Policing and Crime Bill in another place. If he has a problem with my suggestion, I would be grateful if he met me and Professor Rix to discuss a solution to help the police to save lives and injuries, and not, as the Department appear to be doing, produce exactly the opposite effect.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Minister of State for Policing, Crime, Criminal Justice and Victims, at the Home Office and at the Ministry of Justice, to reply to the debate.

[The Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims (Mike Penning)]

Far be it for me to ever contradict you, Mr Speaker, but I lost crime some time ago and now have fire. The title you gave me is correct, except that I now have no crime, but lots of fire.

I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) that it is a pleasure to respond to this debate. We have met to discuss his concerns before. I have received delegations on the subject and it was discussed extensively during the Committee stage of the Policing and Crime Bill.

To be fair, my hon. Friend does highlight an issue, and I am not going to run away from that. He is absolutely right to say that there are concerns about extending powers into a place of safety that is deemed to be someone’s abode. I have been on patrol with the police when they have encountered very similar situations to the first case that he mentioned. I have also heard people say, long before I got this position, “If only we could get this person outside their home, we could help them under the existing legislation.”

I am sure that all custody sergeants, who do a fantastic job, are as diligent as the one who my hon. Friend has met. I once heard a custody sergeant say that section 136 would not be appropriate when a person was in a public place. I do not think that that is right, either, but police officers are not mental health experts. One of the problems with section 136 is that it is specifically designed as a last resort when all other measures to help an individual have been exhausted. I will touch on other matters relating to the expertise that police officers do not always have, including the street triage initiative and resources for custody suites, and, importantly, the situation outwith officers.

Before we consider changing section 136, we need to ask whether it is being used correctly. We are concerned about the number of section 136 orders that are being used, and the data that I asked for show that forces in some parts of the country almost never use section 136, while others use it extensively.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

It would be interesting to compare and contrast those statistics with the suicide statistics. By law, anyone arrested under section 136 must be seen within 72 hours by a psychiatrist or a medical practitioner with psychiatric training, which represents an enormous safeguard.

[Mike Penning]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We will break down the analysis for information not just on suicides, but on criminal assaults, which are often carried out on loved ones. When I was out on patrol with the Metropolitan police in Camden, we went to what the neighbours described as a “domestic situation”; in other words, someone had allegedly been assaulted. When we arrived at and eventually got into the flat, the one thing that the person who had been assaulted desperately did not want was for their loved one to be arrested and taken to a prison cell, because they were ill. They were ill in a similar way to someone who had broken their leg or who had a medical illness. They were ill and they needed to go to a suitable place of safety.

All too often over the years, that person would have been arrested and ended up in a police cell. If they were not subject to section 136, they would not necessarily have the safeguard of being seen by a medical or psychiatric specialist. That is one of the reasons why the amount of time that someone with a mental illness can be kept in a police cell is massively restricted by legislation.

I would argue that this is a matter not just for the police, but for social services and the NHS in particular. It is not for a police officer to diagnose instantly whether someone having a mental health episode is drunk, has taken illegal drugs, or has had their medication go wrong. I may not be the Minister with responsibility for the police as the reshuffle goes on, but at the moment they are my police officers in England and Wales, and very often they have to make split-second decisions. However, I am desperate to make sure that they are not put in the difficult position of being the first port of stoppage rather than being, as they should be, the last resort for those in desperate need.

When I was fireman, I regularly attended incidents with the local police force. At about a quarter to five on a Friday, social services would phone the police and fire stations to say that they were going home for the weekend, but they had not seen Mary or Jonny—vulnerable people—during the week, so could we make sure that they were okay. Sometimes we had to break into the premises. I argued then and I argue now that that is not the role of the emergency services, and it is certainly not the role of the police. However, that has become the norm in all our constituencies.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley will be pleased to know that an inter-ministerial group is looking at this. When I was disabilities Minister, I sat on the group and argued my point about not just people with mental illnesses, but people with learning difficulties. The two are often confused in this area, because people with learning difficulties can also become very confused as we desperately try to look after them.

If someone has a mental illness, the place of safety that we take them to is not a police cell. We do exactly what it says on the tin and take them to a place of safety, which means a medical setting provided by the NHS or social services.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Paul Beresford Excerpts

Monday 14th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

The new clauses and amendments have been tabled by the Government and the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon and they are best able to comment on that. My understanding of them is that a term of imprisonment of up to five years is applicable if an order is breached. I am asking a genuine question about whether what we want to achieve through the orders will be achieved by having a criminal standard for a civil order. The hon. Gentleman might want to take that up with the Minister when he responds.

I am conscious of time and of the fact that many other hon. Members want to speak so I will raise only a couple of other issues. Will the Minister explain the situation on appeals and rights of review that might be open to people who are put on the orders? With the scrapping of indeterminate sentences, might we have people on the street subject to the orders who in the past might well have remained in prison, and is the Minister satisfied with that situation?

The hon. Member for Mole Valley raises an important issue in new clause 7. It is topical given that at the weekend W. H. Smith had to withdraw information and e-books from its website. It has taken too long to obtain acceptance of the fact that viewing child abuse images is an integral part of the abuse process. Only the abusers deny that now. We know that viewing abuse often triggers behaviours in individuals. We know that Stuart Hazel and Mark Bridger had both been viewing legal pornography simulating violent sex and abuse prior to committing appalling crimes. The new clause, which deals with the written form of that abuse, is worth looking at. I hope that the Minister will comment further on that. We need to be careful, because we do not want genuine literature that describes abuse in a totally acceptable way to be captured.

[Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con)]

If the hon. Lady looks at the new clause, she will see that the second half covers that point, so “Lolita”, for example, would be all right.

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm when he responds that that is the legal advice he has received. On that basis, it is really important that the issue is addressed.

Finally, if the provisions set out in new clause 7 are introduced, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, which is now part of the National Crime Agency, will have more work to do. It already struggles with the images it has to look at, so if it will have to deal with the written word as well. I think that there is a case to be made for the Minister addressing how resources for that will be made available.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

May I begin by apologising to the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood) for not being present for the start of her speech?

I want to contribute briefly to the debate in order to congratulate the hon. Lady on the incredibly effective work she has done on the issue of grooming. She has a constituency interest, of course, as Operation Bullfinch was going on in Oxford and she has been monitoring what has been happening to the victims, but she was also instrumental in beginning the important Childhood Lost campaign, and I was present at its launch with the Minister, who gave a very effective speech. She has decided not to press her amendment to a Division, but instead has urged the House to support what the Government are doing. I am glad that the Government are following the recommendations of the Select Committee. I think all in the House who are concerned about the grooming of children and the crimes being committed against young people and children will want to see effective action being taken. What we have seen in some of the criminal cases is just the tip of the iceberg, and the hon. Member for Keighley (Kris Hopkins), who has now been promoted to Minister in the Department for Communities and Local Government, gave very passionate and effective evidence to the Select Committee.

I support what the hon. Lady has said, I commend her on her marvellous efforts in this area, and I certainly hope the Government will continue to take forward the recommendations of the Select Committee—I see that the hon. Members for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless), who serve on the Committee, are present. We will revisit our recommendations six months after publication of the report, which will be at about Christmas time, when we will see what progress has been made, but I know that in the Minister we have someone who is determined to do something very serious and radical about stopping those who seek to exploit children, and I fully support what the hon. Lady has said.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

I echo those congratulations. One thing I have discovered in this House is that it is possible for Back Benchers with a really good cause to push it and persuade a Government—whatever Government. The other thing to be said about this evening’s debate, at least until 7 o’clock, is that there is cross-House agreement —and, I hasten to add to the Opposition Front Bench, even the Liberal party is on board—and that has been the case on this area for some considerable time.

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is the legislation being changed tonight. Although the Act came in under a Labour Government, I am sure the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), who was a Minister at about that time, would agree that there was huge cross-party support and thinking behind the scenes. Indeed, I was on the Home Office taskforce that did a lot of the work leading up to the child protection part of that Act.

Tonight, however, I want to focus on my new clause 7, which would amend section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, entitled “Possession of prohibited images of children”. Those prohibited images are pornographic images, and they may take various forms, including photographs, pseudo-photographs, cartoons and computer-generated images. They may be moving or still, too. The link between the possession and the viewing and actual action against children is generally accepted, as the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) said from the Opposition Front Bench.

The ludicrous situation is that an individual will be liable for prosecution for possession of photographs, pseudo-photographs, computer-generated images and so on, but not for the written word describing child sex abuse in pornographic, and often lurid, detail. All, including the written word in this form, are designed by the individuals concerned for sexual stimulation over the sexual abuse of children. If an individual wrote from his or her imagination a graphic description of child sexual abuse—which could, and often is, more emotive and more graphic than any picture of any form—even if he or she described one of those pictures or cartoons, that individual could not be prosecuted for the possession of this graphic material, even though for many of these individuals the written word is more powerful.

Let me give a simple example that I gave in speaking to my ten-minute rule Bill last Wednesday. CEOP provided me with the details of a man from Kent who wrote describing his wish to kidnap an early-teenage girl, strip her, sexually abuse her in an exceptionally unpleasant way and then, in an even more unpleasant way which I will not detail, slowly kill this girl. It is horrific, especially as his writings then inspired this individual to actually carry it out. He is in prison, hopefully for a very long time if not for ever, but the teenager is gone. One would have thought that the early discovery of the writings could have helped, but if the police had found them they would have had no power to act. This new clause has developed out of discussions with members past and present of the Metropolitan police paedophile unit and with the team leading CEOP in this area, and is supported by it, including Peter Davies.

CEOP last year published a research document on paedophile cases. It is mentioned in the report, almost as a sideline, that some offenders possess graphic notes or writings of child abuse. The Home Secretary has written to me on this matter stating she is asking for a report from CEOP on the need for this change. As the Minister will recall, some months ago both CEOP and the head of the Metropolitan police paedophile unit joined me in making a presentation to him. They brought some of the literature; I did not. The officers supported the need for this change. They explained that they had seen volumes of material in their search for illegal child abuse photographs. As the possession of such written material is not illegal, they obviously disregarded it, seeking only, at high speed and using computer technology, child abuse images.

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman is clearly talking about some horrific material, and I am listening carefully to his case. He is far more expert in this area than I am. How does this link in with the Obscene Publications Act 1959? Does not that provide some protection in this area?

[Sir Paul Beresford]

No, it does not. I am looking at changes to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, not to the Obscene Publications Act. Otherwise I would wander into deep mire, which I am sure that Liberal Members would help me wallow in further.

[Mr Buckland]

The Obscene Publications Act was very much on my mind as well. Very often this material is generated by the offenders themselves and is privately retained, so I think it would fall foul of some of the definitions in that rather elderly piece of legislation. The material that is obtained can sometimes be used as incriminating evidence to help prove the general character and intent of individuals with an interest in child abuse, who are sadly far too prevalent. Do the police find difficulty in using that material as incriminating evidence, or do they want more information?

[Sir Paul Beresford]

My hon. Friend goes halfway towards putting the case. He is right, but the police tell me that they do not really use that Act. They need this one tiny change in the legislation to add to the opportunities for prosecution and to use when they bring these individuals to court.

I was told that I needed to tweak the wording, so I did something absolutely outrageous: I invited the Attorney-General for a cup of coffee, not even a glass of wine, and he ran a cursory glance, if Attorney-Generals run cursory glances over anything, at the wording and seemed to feel that it was satisfactory. I am not going to hold him to that, as it would probably cost me a glass of wine.

[Paul Goggins (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman has given the House a valuable insight into how, for at least 10 years, he has followed these issues through with successive Ministers and very persuasively engaged them in the merits of his argument. I would be very happy to support his new clause, because graphic and extreme written material about child abuse is every bit as abusive as an image of child abuse. He is absolutely right to try to ensure that this loophole in the law is closed so that this is a very clear and separate offence.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman. I am delighted to have his support. When he was a Minister he was receptive to many of the changes that I suggested. He tweaked them so that they went through to another place without my name attached, but the effect was still the same.

Some have questioned whether genuine, legitimate literature such as “Lolita” would be covered by section 62(5) of the 2009 Act. To be completely clear, the written material that I am targeting can be as shocking as images described as level 5 based on the classification used by the courts. The section refers to prohibited images that it describes as

“pornographic…grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise…obscene”

and

“of such a nature that it must be reasonably assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal.”

In certain cases, that description, which is applied to photographs, can, as the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) said, be applied equally to the written word. Such material is quite different and it is horrific. Its distribution is prohibited, and so should be its possession.

[Mr Andrew Smith (Oxford East) (Lab)]

I strongly support the remarks of and the campaign by my friend, the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood). Her initiative and that of the Childhood Lost campaign, which I have strongly supported, will be especially warmly welcomed by my constituents and hers, who are horrified at what was uncovered by the Operation Bullfinch investigation and prosecutions in Oxford. They are very worried that it was not possible to stop these crimes happening earlier and that even now there are people it has not been possible to bring to justice before the courts because of the difficulty in giving evidence. Anything that can be a step forward in stopping these horrific crimes must be greatly welcomed.

I want to underline an enormously important point that the hon. Lady made about the strength and clarity of guidance that is given on the use of these orders and the importance of each local area having the wherewithal to carry them into effect. In the wake of Operation Bullfinch, in Oxford we have had established the Kingfisher unit, which she and I jointly visited. It brings together all the relevant agencies and undertakes preventive and educational work as well as helping to bring cases to justice. We need such units in every part of the country. There has to be the strongest guidance to ensure that these orders are going to be used. I look forward to an assurance from the Minister that there will be close reporting and monitoring on the extent and areas of their use so that this House can see the progress that we all very much hope the bringing into law of these orders will represent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Green]

That is a valid point. To deal with the practical point, once an order is made, the supervision of it will be in the hands of the local police. It is sensible for them to be on the front line of making any application to vary the order. Obviously, the NCA will make it a habit to work closely with local forces when they are working together in specific areas, as they will be in this case. It should become entirely habitual for the NCA to pass evidence to local forces. I know that the leadership of the NCA is determined to do that. There needs to be better connections between policing at the national and local levels, and we are seeking to address that problem. My hon. Friend should rest assured that she is not the only person who will be watching closely to ensure that that co-operation takes place.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) explained, new clause 7 seeks to extend the offence of possessing a prohibited image of a child in section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. That offence is committed when a person possesses a pornographic non-photographic image of a child that is grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise obscene. My hon. Friend, together with the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), wants to extend that offence to include the written word. I add my thanks to the many that have been given this evening to both Members for their personal efforts in the fight to protect children from abuse. Their motivation for the new clause is entirely laudable, and it is quite right for the House to have the opportunity to discuss it.

Written material that describes the sexual abuse of children is undoubtedly distasteful and disturbing. As my hon. Friend said, he and I have had many discussions and meetings on the matter, and I put it to him that criminalising the possession of the written word in any context is a significant step, and we should pause before taking it. In our view, it is a step that should be taken only once we know the full extent of the problem. In this case, there are two particular requirements. First, there must be evidence that possession of such material is causing harm to children. Secondly, it must be practical for the police—in this case CEOP—to go through all the material on people’s computers. It is much more difficult to do that with the written word than with images. As my hon. Friend said, there is special technology that allows speedy checks of images. We are working on improving that technology, but it is more difficult in the case of the written word. If, after considering those caveats, we conclude that there is a case for changing the law, we will need to ensure that we go about it in the right way so that it has some practical effect and improves child protection.

New clause 7 touches on a number of sensitive issues, and any changes that we bring about need to be both proportionate and effective. I cannot commend it to the House today, but I absolutely assure my hon. Friend and the right hon. Gentleman that we intend to continue considering thoroughly whether the law should be changed in the way that they suggest. As my hon. Friend said, CEOP has already provided some information, and my officials continue to work with it to investigate the issue further and get the full body of evidence that is necessary if we are to take the drastic step suggested. As soon as we reach a conclusion on that, we will decide what action to take. I know that my hon. Friend will continue to play a role in gathering evidence and discussing it with Ministers, but I hope that he will agree not to press new clause 7 to a Division.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon on her commitment and her drive to ensure that we have the necessary powers to protect children from sexual harm. I now know that she and the House agree that the Government amendments will deliver what new clause 5 was intended to achieve, and more, so I commend them to the House.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

No, you do not get another opportunity to speak, Sir Paul, but I assume that you do not wish to press new clause 7.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

A reasonable assumption.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Thank you. Maybe next time it would be helpful to make a point of order.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders, etc

‘(1) Schedule [Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003] (amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003) has effect.

(2) In section 142 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (extent etc)—

(a) in subsection (2) (provisions that extend to Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales), for paragraph (c) there is substituted—

“(c) sections 80 to 88, 89 to 91, 92 to 96, 96B to 103, 122F and 130 to 136ZB;

(ca) Part 2A;”;

(b) after that subsection there is inserted—

“(2A) Sections 110, 117A, 119 and 123 to 129 extend only to Northern Ireland.”

(c) In subsection (3) (provisions that extend to Scotland, as well as England and Wales) for paragraph (a) there is substituted—after that subsection there is inserted—

“(a) sections 80 to 88, 89 to 91, 92, 94 to 96, 97 to 103, 122F, 130 to 132 and 133 to 136ZB;”;

“(3A) Sections 88A to 88I, 96A, 111A, 117B, 120 and 121 extend only to Scotland.

(3B) Sections 104 to 109, 111, 112 to 117, 118 and 122 extend to Northern Ireland and Scotland but not to England and Wales.”’.—(Damian Green.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Saving and transitional provision

‘(1) In this section—

“the 2003 Act” means the Sexual Offences Act 2003;

“existing order” means—

(a) a sexual offences prevention order under section 104 of the 2003 Act;

(b) a foreign travel order under section 114 of that Act;

(c) a risk of sexual harm order under section 123 of that Act;

“new order” means—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order (made under section 103A of the 2003 Act, inserted by Schedule [Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003]);

(b) a sexual risk order (made under section 122A of that Act, inserted by that Schedule);

“old order” means—

(a) a restraining order under section 5A of the Sex Offenders Act 1997;

(b) a sex offender order under section 2 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

(2) The repeal or amendment by this Act of sections 104 to 122 or sections 123 to 129 of the 2003 Act does not apply in relation to—

(a) an application made before the commencement day for an existing order;

(b) an existing order (whether made before or after that day) applied for before that day;

(c) anything done in connection with such an application or order.

(3) The following sections of the 2003 Act inserted by Schedule [Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003] apply (as appropriate) to an old order as they apply to a new order—

(a) section 103E (variation, renewal and discharge of sexual harm prevention order);

(b) section 103I (offence of breach of sexual harm prevention order);

(c) section 122E (variation, renewal and discharge of sexual risk order);

(d) section 122H (offence of breach of sexual risk order).

(4) As from the commencement day there may be no variation of an existing order or an old order that extends the period of the order or of any of its provisions.

(5) At the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the commencement day—

(a) in relation to any existing order or old order that is still in force, sections 103E and 103I of the 2003 Act or sections 122E and 122H of that Act (as appropriate) have effect, with any necessary modifications (and with any modifications specified in an order under section 152(6) of this Act), as if the provisions of the order were provisions of a new order;

(b) subsections (2) and (3) cease to have effect.

(6) In this section “commencement day” means the day on which this section comes into force.’.—(Damian Green.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 1

‘SCHEDULE

Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003

Introduction

1 Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (notification and orders) is amended as set out in this Schedule.

Sexual harm prevention orders

2 After section 103 there is inserted—

“Sexual harm prevention orders (England and Wales)

103A Sexual harm prevention orders: applications and grounds

(1) A court may make an order under this section (a “sexual harm prevention order”) in respect of a person (“the defendant”) where subsection (2) or (3) applies to the defendant.

(2) This subsection applies to the defendant where—

(a) the court deals with the defendant in respect of—

(i) an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5, or

(ii) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5 by reason of insanity, or

(iii) a finding that the defendant is under a disability and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5,

and

(b) the court is satisfied that it is necessary to make a sexual harm prevention order, for the purpose of—

(i) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(ii) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(3) This subsection applies to the defendant where—

(a) an application under subsection (4) has been made in respect of the defendant and it is proved on the application that the defendant is a qualifying offender, and

(b) the court is satisfied that the defendant’s behaviour since the appropriate date makes it necessary to make a sexual harm prevention order, for the purpose of—

(i) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(ii) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(4) A chief officer of police or the Director General of the National Crime Agency (“the Director General”) may by complaint to a magistrates’ court apply for a sexual harm prevention order in respect of a person if it appears to the chief officer or the Director General that—

(a) the person is a qualifying offender, and

(b) the person has since the appropriate date acted in such a way as to give reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary for such an order to be made.

(5) A chief officer of police may make an application under subsection (4) only in respect of a person—

(a) who resides in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) who the chief officer believes is in that area or is intending to come to it.

(6) An application under subsection (4) may be made to any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—

(a) any part of a relevant police area, or

(b) any place where it is alleged that the person acted in a way mentioned in subsection (4)(b).

(7) The Director General must as soon as practicable notify the chief officer of police for a relevant police area of any application that the Director has made under subsection (4).

(8) In this section “relevant police area” means—

(a) where the applicant is a chief officer of police, the officer’s police area;

(b) where the applicant is the Director General—

(i) the police area where the person in question resides, or

(ii) a police area which the Director General believes the person is in or is intending to come to.

103B Section 103A: supplemental

(1) In section 103A—

“appropriate date”, in relation to a qualifying offender, means the date or (as the case may be) the first date on which the offender was convicted, found or cautioned as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3) below;

“child” means a person under 18;

“the public” means the public in the United Kingdom;

“sexual harm” from a person means physical or psychological harm caused—

(a) by the person committing one or more offences listed in Schedule 3, or

(b) (in the context of harm outside the United Kingdom) by the person doing, outside the United Kingdom, anything which would constitute an offence listed in Schedule 3 if done in any part of the United Kingdom;

“qualifying offender” means a person within subsection (2) or (3) below;

“vulnerable adult” means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from physical or psychological harm is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise.

(2) A person is within this subsection if, whether before or after the commencement of this Part, the person—

(a) has been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 3 (other than at paragraph 60) or in Schedule 5,

(b) has been found not guilty of such an offence by reason of insanity,

(c) has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him in respect of such an offence, or

(d) has been cautioned in respect of such an offence.

(3) A person is within this subsection if, under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom and whether before or after the commencement of this Part—

(a) the person has been convicted of a relevant offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),

(b) a court exercising jurisdiction under that law has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,

(c) such a court has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence, or

(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a relevant offence.

(4) In subsection (3), “relevant offence” means an act which—

(a) constituted an offence under the law in force in the country concerned, and

(b) would have constituted an offence listed in Schedule 3 (other than at paragraph 60) or in Schedule 5 if it had been done in any part of the United Kingdom.

For this purpose an act punishable under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.

(5) For the purposes of section 103A, acts, behaviour, convictions and findings include those occurring before the commencement of this Part.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), on an application under section 103A(4) the condition in subsection (4)(b) above (where relevant) is to be taken as met unless, not later than rules of court may provide, the defendant serves on the applicant a notice—

(a) stating that, on the facts as alleged with respect to the act concerned, the condition is not in the defendant’s opinion met,

(b) showing the grounds for that opinion, and

(c) requiring the applicant to prove that the condition is met.

(7) The court, if it thinks fit, may permit the defendant to require the applicant to prove that the condition is met without service of a notice under subsection (6).

(8) Subsection (9) applies for the purposes of section 103A and this section.

(9) In construing any reference to an offence listed in Schedule 3, any condition subject to which an offence is so listed that relates—

(a) to the way in which the defendant is dealt with in respect of an offence so listed or a relevant finding (as defined by section 132(9)), or

(b) to the age of any person,

is to be disregarded.

103C SHPOs: effect

(1) A sexual harm prevention order prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(2) Subject to section 103D(1), a prohibition contained in a sexual harm prevention order has effect—

(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or

(b) until further order.

(3) A sexual harm prevention order—

(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;

(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions.

(4) The only prohibitions that may be included in a sexual harm prevention order are those necessary for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(5) In subsection (4) “the public”, “sexual harm”, “child” and “vulnerable adult” each has the meaning given in section 103B(1).

(6) Where a court makes a sexual harm prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.

103D SHPOs: prohibitions on foreign travel

(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a sexual harm prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.

(2) A “prohibition on foreign travel” means—

(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,

(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or

(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.

(3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under section 103E.

(4) A sexual harm prevention order that contains a prohibition within subsection (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—

(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or

(b) within a period specified in the order.

(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a sexual harm prevention order containing a prohibition within subsection (2)(c) (unless the person is subject to an equivalent prohibition under another order).

(6) Subsection (5) does not apply in relation to—

(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.

(7) In this section “passport” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.

103E SHPOs: variations, renewals and discharges

(1) A person within subsection (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a sexual harm prevention order.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the defendant;

(b) the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) a chief officer of police who believes that the defendant is in, or is intending to come to, that officer’s police area;

(d) where the order was made on an application by a chief officer of police under section103A(4), that officer.

(3) An application under subsection (1) may be made—

(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with rules of court;

(b) in any other case, by complaint.

(4) Subject to subsections (5) and (6), on the application the court, after hearing the person making the application and (if they wish to be heard) the other persons mentioned in subsection (2), may make any order, varying, renewing or discharging the sexual harm prevention order, that the court considers appropriate.

(5) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions on the defendant, only if it is necessary to do so for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

Any renewed or varied order may contain only such prohibitions as are necessary for this purpose.

(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and—

(a) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, that chief officer, or

(b) in any other case, the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides.

(7) Subsection (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.

(8) In this section “the appropriate court” means—

(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the sexual harm prevention order, the Crown Court;

(b) where a magistrates’ court made the order, that court, a magistrates’ court for the area in which the defendant resides or, where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes any part of the chief officer’s police area;

(c) where a youth court made the order, that court, a youth court for the area in which the defendant resides or, where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any youth court whose commission area includes any part of the chief officer’s police area.

103F Interim SHPOs

(1) This section applies where an application under section 103A(4) (“the main application”) has not been determined.

(2) An application for an order under this section (“an interim sexual harm prevention order”)—

(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or

(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.

(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim sexual harm prevention order, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(4) Such an order—

(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;

(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.

(5) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim sexual harm prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.

103G SHPOs and interim SHPOs: notification requirements

(1) Where—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order is made in respect of a defendant who was a relevant offender immediately before the making of the order, and

(b) the defendant would (apart from this subsection) cease to be subject to the notification requirements of this Part while the order (as renewed from time to time) has effect,

the defendant remains subject to the notification requirements.

(2) Where a sexual harm prevention order is made in respect of a defendant who was not a relevant offender immediately before the making of the order—

(a) the order causes the defendant to become subject to the notification requirements of this Part from the making of the order until the order (as renewed from time to time) ceases to have effect, and

(b) this Part applies to the defendant, subject to the modification set out in subsection (3).

(3) The “relevant date” is the date of service of the order.

(4) Subsections (1) to (3) apply to an interim sexual harm prevention order as if references to a sexual harm prevention order were references to an interim sexual harm prevention order, and with the omission of “(as renewed from time to time)” in both places.

(5) Where—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order is in effect in relation to a relevant sex offender (within the meaning of section 88A), and

(b) by virtue of section 88F or 88G the relevant sex offender ceases to be subject to the notification requirements of this Part,

the sexual harm prevention order ceases to have effect.

(6) On an application for a sexual harm prevention order made by a chief officer of police, the court must make a notification order in respect of the defendant (either in addition to or instead of a sexual harm prevention order) if—

(a) the applicant invites the court to do so, and

(b) it is proved that the conditions in section 97(2) to (4) are met.

(7) On an application for an interim sexual harm prevention order made by a chief officer of police, the court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim notification order (either in addition to or instead of an interim sexual harm prevention order).

103H SHPOs and interim SHPOs: appeals

(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a sexual harm prevention order—

(a) where the order was made by virtue of section103A(2)(a)(i), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;

(b) where the order was made by virtue of section103A(2)(a)(ii) or (iii), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;

(c) where the order was made on an application under section103A(4), to the Crown Court.

(2) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court against the making of an interim sexual harm prevention order.

(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under section 103E, or the refusal to make such an order—

(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;

(b) in any other case, to the Crown Court.

(4) On an appeal under subsection (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the Crown Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(5) Any order made by the Crown Court on an appeal under subsection (1)(c) or (2) (other than an order directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates’ court) is for the purposes of section 103E(8) or 103F (5) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought (and not an order of the Crown Court).

103I Offence: breach of SHPO or interim SHPO etc

(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, does anything that the person is prohibited from doing by—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order,

(b) an interim sexual harm prevention order,

(c) a sexual offences prevention order,

(d) an interim sexual offences prevention order, or

(e) a foreign travel order,

commits an offence.

(2) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under section 103D(4).

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years.

(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional discharge.

103J  SHPOs and interim SHPOs: guidance

(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to chief officers of police and to the Director General of the National Crime Agency in relation to the exercise by them of their powers with regard to sexual harm prevention orders and interim sexual harm prevention orders.

(2) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under subsection (1).

(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Sexual offences prevention orders and foreign travel orders

3 (1) Sections 104 to 122 (sexual offences prevention orders and foreign travel orders) are repealed.

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Sexual risk orders

4 Before section 123 there is inserted—

“Sexual risk orders (England and Wales)

122A  Sexual risk orders: applications, grounds and effect

(1) A chief officer of police or the Director General of the National Crime Agency (“the Director General”) may by complaint to a magistrates’ court apply for an order under this section (a “sexual risk order”) in respect of a person (“the defendant”) if it appears to the chief officer or the Director General that the following condition is met.

(2) The condition is that the defendant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Part, done an act of a sexual nature as a result of which there is reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary for a sexual risk order to be made.

(3) A chief officer of police may make an application under subsection (1) only in respect of a person—

(a) who resides in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) who the chief officer believes is in that area or is intending to come to it.

(4) An application under subsection (1) may be made to any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—

(a) any part of a relevant police area, or

(b) any place where it is alleged that the person acted in a way mentioned in subsection (2).

(5) The Director General must as soon as practicable notify the chief officer of police for a relevant police area of any application that the Director has made under subsection (1).

(6) On an application under subsection (1), the court may make a sexual risk order if it is satisfied that the defendant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Part, done an act of a sexual nature as a result of which it is necessary to make such an order for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(7) Such an order—

(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order;

(b) has effect for a fixed period (not less than 2 years) specified in the order or until further order.

(8) A sexual risk order may specify different periods for different prohibitions.

(9) The only prohibitions that may be imposed are those necessary for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(10) Where a court makes a sexual risk order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.

122B  Section 122A: interpretation

(1) In section 122A—

“child” means a person under 18;

“harm” from the defendant means physical or psychological harm caused by the defendant doing an act of a sexual nature;

“the public” means the public in the United Kingdom;

“vulnerable adult” means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from physical or psychological harm is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise.

(2) In that section “relevant police area” means—

(a) where the applicant is a chief officer of police, the officer’s police area;

(b) where the applicant is the Director General of the National Crime Agency—

(i) the police area where the person in question resides, or

(ii) a police area which the Director General believes the person is in or is intending to come to.

122C  Sexual risk orders: prohibitions on foreign travel

(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a sexual risk order must not be for a period of more than 5 years.

(2) A “prohibition on foreign travel” means—

(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,

(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or

(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.

(3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under section 122D.

(4) A sexual risk order that contains a prohibition within subsection (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—

(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or

(b) within a period specified in the order.

(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a sexual risk order containing such a prohibition (unless the person is subject to an equivalent prohibition under another order).

(6) Subsection (5) does not apply in relation to—

(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.

(7) In this section “passport” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.

122D  Sexual risk order: variations, renewals and discharges

(1) A person within subsection (2) may by complaint to the appropriate court apply for an order varying, renewing or discharging a sexual risk order.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the defendant;

(b) the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) a chief officer of police who believes that the defendant is in, or is intending to come to, that officer’s police area;

(a) where the order was made on an application by a chief officer of police, that officer.

(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), on the application the court, after hearing the person making the application and (if they wish to be heard) the other persons mentioned in subsection (2), may make any order, varying, renewing or discharging the sexual risk order, that the court considers appropriate.

(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions on the defendant, only if it is necessary to do so for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

Any renewed or varied order may contain only such prohibitions as are necessary for this purpose.

(5) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 2 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and—

(a) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, that chief officer, or

(b) in any other case, the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides.

(6) Section 122B(1) applies for the purposes of this section.

(7) In this section “the appropriate court” means—

(a) the court which made the sexual risk order;

(b) a magistrates’ court for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes any part of the officer’s police area.

122E  Interim sexual risk orders

(1) This section applies where an application for a sexual risk order (“the main application”) has not been determined.

(2) An application for an order under this section (“an interim sexual risk order”)—

(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or

(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.

(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim sexual risk order, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(4) Such an order—

(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;

(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.

(5) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim sexual risk order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.

122F  Sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders: notification requirements

(1) A person in respect of whom a court makes—

(a) a sexual risk order (other than one that replaces an interim sexual risk order), or

(b) an interim sexual risk order,

must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date of service of the order, notify to the police the information set out in subsection (2) (unless the person is subject to the notification requirements of this Part on that date).

(2) The information is—

(a) the person’s name and, where the person uses one or more other names, each of those names;

(b) the person’s home address.

(3) A person who—

(a) is subject to a sexual risk order or an interim sexual risk order (but is not subject to the notification requirements of this Part), and

(b) uses a name which has not been notified under this section (or under any other provision of this Part), or changes home address,

must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which that happens, notify to the police that name or (as the case may be) the new home address.

(4) Sections 87 (method of notification and related matters) and 91 (offences relating to notification) apply for the purposes of this section—

(a) with references to section 83(1) being read as references to subsection (1) above,

(b) with references to section 84(1) being read as references to subsection (3) above, and

(c) with the omission of section 87(2)(b).

122G  Sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders: appeals

(1) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court—

(a) against the making of a sexual risk order;

(b) against the making of an interim sexual risk order; or

(c) against the making of an order under section 122D, or the refusal to make such an order.

(2) On any such appeal, the Crown Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(3) Any order made by the Crown Court on an appeal under subsection (1)(a) or (b) (other than an order directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates’ court) is for the purposes of section 122D(7) or 122E(5) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought (and not an order of the Crown Court).

122H  Offence: breach of sexual risk order or interim sexual risk order etc

(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, does anything that the person is prohibited from doing by—

(a) a sexual risk order,

(b) an interim sexual risk order,

(c) a risk of sexual harm order,

(d) an interim risk of sexual harm order,

(e) an order under section 2 of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005 (risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland), or

(f) an order under section 5 of that Act (interim risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland),

commits an offence.

(2) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under section 122C(4).

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years.

(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional discharge.

122I  Effect of conviction etc of an offence under section 122H etc

(1) This section applies to a person (“the defendant”) who—

(a) is convicted of an offence mentioned in subsection (2);

(b) is found not guilty of such an offence by reason of insanity;

(c) is found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him in respect of such an offence; or

(d) is cautioned in respect of such an offence.

(2) Those offences are—

(a) an offence under section 122H or 128 of this Act;

(b) an offence under section 7 of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005 (contravention of risk of sexual harm order or interim risk of sexual harm order in Scotland).

(3) Where—

(a) a defendant was a relevant offender immediately before this section applied to the defendant, and

(b) the defendant would (apart from this subsection) cease to be subject to the notification requirements of this Part while the relevant order (as renewed from time to time) has effect,

the defendant remains subject to the notification requirements.

(4) Where the defendant was not a relevant offender immediately before this section applied to the defendant—

(a) this section causes the defendant to become subject to the notification requirements of this Part from the time the section first applies to the defendant until the relevant order (as renewed from time to time) ceases to have effect, and

(b) this Part applies to the defendant, subject to the modification set out in subsection (5).

(5) The “relevant date” is the date on which this section first applies to the defendant.

(6) In this section “relevant order” means—

(a) where the conviction, finding or caution within subsection (1) is in respect of a breach of a sexual risk order or a risk of sexual harm order, that order;

(b) where the conviction, finding or caution within subsection (1) is in respect of a breach of an interim sexual risk order or an interim risk of sexual harm order, any sexual risk order or risk of sexual harm order made on the hearing of the application to which the interim order relates or, if no such order is made, the interim order.

(7) In subsection (6) “risk of sexual harm order” and “interim risk of sexual harm order” include orders under sections 2 and 5 (respectively) of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005.

122J Sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders: guidance

(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to chief officers of police and to the Director General of the National Crime Agency in relation to the exercise by them of their powers with regard to sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders.

(2) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under subsection (1).

(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Risk of sexual harm orders

5 (1) Sections 123 to 129 (risk of sexual harm orders) are repealed.

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Application etc of orders

6 After section 136 there is inserted—

“136ZA   Application of orders throughout the United Kingdom

(1) In this section “relevant order” means—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order;

(b) an interim sexual harm prevention order;

(c) a sexual offences prevention order;

(d) an interim sexual offences prevention order;

(e) a foreign travel order;

(f) a sexual risk order;

(g) an interim sexual risk order;

(h) a risk of sexual harm order;

(i) an interim risk of sexual harm order;

(j) an order under section 2 of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005 (risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland);

(k) an order under section 5 of that Act (interim risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland).

(2) For the purposes of sections 103I, 113, 122, 122H and 128, prohibitions imposed by a relevant order made in one part of the United Kingdom apply (unless expressly confined to particular localities) throughout that and every other part of the United Kingdom.

136ZB   Order ceases to have effect when new order made

(1) Where a court in England and Wales makes an order listed in the first column of the following Table in relation to a person who is already subject to an order listed opposite it in the second column, the earlier order ceases to have effect (whichever part of the United Kingdom it was made in) unless the court orders otherwise.

Police (Surrey)

Paul Beresford Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Westminster Hall

[Mr Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend. He is absolutely right. As someone who worked in local government before becoming an MP, he knows the details far better than me. That basic logic and flow cannot be right. It cannot be right that we keep paying more and more and get less and less back. It is unsustainable.

That message was borne out in no small part by a 2009 review conducted by Oxford Economics of local application of the central funding formula. Surrey loses out under that formula for various compound reasons. For example, the funding formula takes into account daytime net flows of traffic, but not total traffic or total accidents, which are disproportionately high in Surrey compared with the other indices. It takes into account average deprivation, which is relatively low in Surrey, but ignores our proximity to areas of high deprivation, taking little account of cross-border criminals who may target the county. My borough, which is in the north-east, has a lot of that kind of crime. Nor does it take into account the impact of our proximity to Heathrow and Gatwick, which is also linked to crime levels.

[Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that no account is taken of traffic through the county? That is a crucial point. As I understand it, data are available to show that through traffic relates to crime.

[Mr Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend. He is absolutely right. Oxford Economics considers the issue of flow in some detail. I commend the report to the Minister if he wants to examine the detail of what we are discussing.

Other elements, such as our proximity to high population areas, have also been proven relevant to levels of crime but are not factored into the funding formula, which measures only population levels within the county. Those shortcomings are mitigated by the damping arrangements. It is therefore unfair to remove or revise one without considering the other.

Surrey police do an outstanding job, which is reflected in the public’s 90% confidence rating. Today’s report by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, “Policing in Austerity: One Year On”, breaks down the situation by individual forces, showing the progress that the Surrey police have made in dealing with austerity.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Nick Herbert)]

Welcome to the Chair, Mr Bone. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) on his forceful speech and on securing the debate and the support of his colleagues. I take Members who represent Surrey constituencies seriously when they hunt in a pack, as they have done today, and will pay the closest attention to what they say.

I join my hon. Friend in paying tribute to the Surrey force, which is ably led by its new chief constable. It emerged with a good review, from the report issued yesterday by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, of how it is dealing with the inevitable reductions in spending that the Government have asked police forces to make. The review said that the force has a good history of bringing down costs and changing how services are delivered. It began to transform how it operates in 2009, before the 2010 comprehensive spending review. As a result, it is in a good position to achieve its savings target by 2015.

The force has plans in place that, if delivered, will achieve 100% of the £27 million-worth of savings that it is required to make between 2011 and 2015. In making those savings, and in contrast to every other force, Surrey plans to increase the number of police officers by 50—that is a 3% increase compared with other forces, which are losing officers. It is the only force in the country able to do that over the spending review period. Within that total, the force is reducing the number of officers in more senior ranks by not replacing retiring managers, and increasing the number of constables by up to 200. Surrey also plans to increase the number of police community support officers by 50, while reducing the number of police staff by some 8%.

That all means that, by 2015, 80% of Surrey’s work force will be on the front line, which is a considerably higher proportion than most other forces, where the average is about two thirds. In common with other forces, Surrey is increasing the proportion of its police officers on the front line from 78% to 90%, which is exactly what I think the public want to see.

On outcomes, crime is still decreasing in Surrey, although at a slightly lower rate than in England and Wales as a whole. It is important that the force maintains its focus in adapting to the changed spending environment and continues to deliver a high-quality service to the public and to reduce crime, which is, of course, the most important outcome for members of the public. My hon. Friend drew attention to the particular circumstances of Surrey’s funding and set out the ways in which he believes Surrey is disadvantaged. First, he mentioned that Surrey has raised a much higher proportion of its funding from its local precept than other forces; indeed, I think it raises more of its money from the local precept than any other force in England and Wales. There is a greater call on local taxpayers than in other parts of the country, but equally, Surrey has been relatively protected from the reduction in central Government funding. The forces that raise less money from their precept have suffered a proportionately greater reduction in funding than those that raised more, such as Surrey. That is merely a statement of the fact.

Let me elaborate. By 2012-13, the current financial year, Surrey was raising nearly half its overall funding from the precept. When we were allocating the funding for all forces in England and Wales at the beginning of the spending review period, a question arose. Since other forces were going to be affected to a greater extent by not raising more money from the local precept, should they have a lower reduction in their spending than forces such as Surrey? It was argued, including in this Chamber, by various hon. Members whose constituencies are policed by the forces concerned, that it would be wrong to penalise them when forces such as Surrey were more able to withstand the reduction in central funding.

The Government took the view that it was not right in principle to penalise local taxpayers for the fact that they were already contributing more for their local policing service. At the time, forces, police authorities and chief constables were expecting a 20% reduction in central Government funding. We had not indicated or confirmed that it would be an even 20% reduction for each force, so it was open to us to adjust the amount according to the money that was raised through the precept. Through the damping mechanism, we decided that the equitable solution, taking all factors into account, was to do what they expected us to do, which was to use the damping mechanism to achieve an even reduction in funding for all forces, including Surrey. From that point of view, I do not believe that Surrey was disadvantaged by our decision.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

The Minister will be aware that after Labour entered government in 1997, the tendency to shift money away from the south and south-east was to such a degree that even the Audit Commission commented on it. That included local government, schools, the national health service and the police. His argument is based on a funding formula that we want reviewed because it is flawed. We feel that we need a review. The damping stays, and after the review, he will have to have another form of damping, because he will have the arguments much the same way, but at least Surrey will be getting what we anticipate to be a fair share of the cake.

[Nick Herbert]

I hear what my hon. Friend says, but I disagree that the formula is not fit for purpose. It allocates funding according to need. The Government’s position is that we wish to move towards a full application of the formula. The question is not whether we do that, but at what rate and how. It would have been a great deal easier for the previous Government to move to full application of the formula and away from the distorting effects of damping when there were increases in funding for all forces. It is a great deal harder to do that when funding for forces is declining. Had we done so, some forces that benefit from damping, including Surrey—to the extent of an additional £3.2 million in the current financial year, as my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton pointed out—would have seen a greater reduction in central Government funding.

For the reasons that I have set out, we felt that the equitable approach was not to move away from damping towards full application of the formula in the first two years of the spending review. However, we reserved our position in relation to years three and four. I have just consulted police authorities about what we should do regarding damping in those years. That consultation has just closed, and we will analyse the responses carefully. I will not prejudge our decision, but the points expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Esher and Walton and for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) are well made.

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims (Amendment) Bill

Paul Beresford Excerpts

Friday 21st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

This is a little Bill, although it is considerably larger than it was on Second Reading, but it is now fit for purpose, as the Minister might put it. I thank individuals on both sides of the House, including Opposition Front-Bench Members and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt), and his team I also thank the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children for quiet support. Sometimes quiet support is best.

Finally, and most important, I thank the recently retired Met police officer, Detective Chief Inspector Dave Marshall. He has worked with me on a successful run of legislative changes to enhance the protection of children: six down, one to go—or one and a half to go.

The Bill will assist the prosecution of people who hurt children or vulnerable adults and those who stand by and allow such acts. It means that when a child is seriously physically harmed, or when the actual cause of death is not specifically identified, those who carried out the abuse or stood by can be prosecuted. The defence of passing the blame will go. If I have had one regret during what I hope will be the speedy passage of the Bill, it is that the maximum sentence is only 10 years, but I accept that it is appropriate when other sentences are available and can be considered.

Assuming that this is the last hurdle, I hope that the Bill’s progress through the other place is speedy.