Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Nusrat Ghani
Main Page: Nusrat Ghani (Conservative - Sussex Weald)Department Debates - View all Nusrat Ghani's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill (Fifth sitting)
Nusrat Ghani ExcerptsThursday 24th November 2022
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 View all Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 November 2022 - (24 Nov 2022)
The Minister for Industry and Investment Security (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir George. The clause is a vital part of the Government’s retained EU law reform programme and will make sure that EU rights, obligations and remedies saved by section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 cease to apply in the UK after 31 December 2023.
Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Sir George. Members will note that I am a little hoarse —please do not give me a sugar cube. I hope that means I will not be quite as lengthy as I was on Tuesday.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
Good morning, Sir George. I rise to support the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston. I also think that the debate on the clause sums up some of the practical challenges with the legislation. The retained EU law dashboard has identified just 28 pieces of directly effective retained law under section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act—a mere amuse-bouche of laws that will be affected by the Bill overall. Given that the number is so small in comparison with the at least 2,500 that have been identified, and the possible 4,000, why could the Minister not show us what will happen next? After all, our debates on Tuesday were all about what would happen if we deleted every piece of legislation. There are no guarantees about what would happen next. Rather than assuming that all these pieces of legislation should go at the end of 2023, surely Ministers could commit to reviewing the 28 now and showing us the way ahead—whether some will be retained, amended or indeed abolished. Then the clause would not be required.
All of this does make a difference. For example, on Tuesday the Government gave their very first commitment on what will happen to one of the 4,000 pieces of legislation—the Bauer and Hampshire judgments about pensions. To remind Government Members, who may well have constituents coming to them about this, those are the requirements—the pieces of case law—that mean that if a company goes bust, people are entitled to at least 50% of their pension fund. The Government committed on Tuesday to abolishing those pieces of legislation, but they are affected by the clause.
The 28 pieces of legislation are not insubstantial; they could be the way forward for the Minister. Instead of requiring the clause, she could say, “We’re going to look at the 28 and tell you what we’re going to do with them,” so that people can have confidence that we have an administrative process for these pieces of legislation and the suggestion that there has been scaremongering can be put aside. She could say, “Here are 28 examples of what we’re going to do, and the fact that they are rights under section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act helps us to contain them as a piece of work.”
The Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 are another of the 28. Given that the Government are getting rid of the Bauer and Hampshire judgments, thereby affecting the pension rights and protections of our constituents, could the Minister set out what might happen on that one? She was very kind on Tuesday to set out an example of what will happen to one of the 28. It would be incredibly helpful for us as a Committee to understand the impact of the legislation and to perhaps start, if not to allay our concerns—I think Opposition Members are concerned when people’s pension protections are being not just watered down but, frankly, abolished—then to understand what the Government’s intentions are in using these powers.
I simply ask the Minister to use the clause stand part debate to explain why the 28 pieces of legislation could not have been dealt with in advance of the Bill, given that they stand on the EU withdrawal Act, and to tell us a bit about what will happen to them, to give us an indication of what horrors are to come or perhaps to reassure us. Government Members want to use the term “scaremongering”. I use the term “accountability”. I am looking forward to what the Minister has to say.
Ms Ghani
It is curious that Opposition Members say they do not want to prevent Brexit or accept the supremacy of EU law, but then they come up with every which way to stop these things actually being delivered.
The matters saved by section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act consist largely of rights, obligations and remedies developed in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Many of those overlap with rights already well established by domestic law, and those overlaps can cause confusion. The Bill allows the Government to codify any specific rights that may otherwise cease to apply if they consider it a requirement.
A question was raised about whether we are ending section 4 rights; that is not the case. Section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act incorporated the effect and interpretation of certain rights that previously had effect in the UK legal system through section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. Section 4 rights largely overlap with rights that are already available in UK domestic law, and it is domestic legislation where they should be clearly expressed. This Bill seeks to rectify that constitutional anomaly by repealing section 4 of the 2018 Act. That does not mean the blanket removal of individual rights; rather, combined with other measures in the Bill, it will result in the codification of rights in specific policy.
Ministers in each Department, which will be responsible for their own elements of the Bill, will work with the appropriate bodies to ensure that they share what they will be assimilating, repealing and updating. All of that will provide additional clarity, making rights clearly accessible in UK law. That is why I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Abolition of supremacy of EU law
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 5 and 6 stand part.
New clause 8—Conditions for bringing sections 3, 4 and 5 into force—
“(1) None of sections 3, 4 or 5 may be brought into force unless all the following conditions have been satisfied.
(2) The first condition is that a Minister of the Crown has, after consulting organisations and persons representative of interests substantially affected by, or with expertise in the likely legal effect of, that section on a draft of that report, laid a report before each House of Parliament setting out, with reasons, the Minister’s view as to the likely advantages and disadvantages of bringing that section into force, setting out in particular the effect of that section on—
(a) the rights of and protections for consumers, workers, and businesses, and protections of the environment and animal welfare;
(b) legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law;
(c) the operation of the Trade and Cooperation agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU, and UK exports of goods and services to the European Economic Area; and
(d) the operation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal agreement.
(3) In relation to section 4, that report must take into account any regulation made or likely to be made by a relevant national authority under section 8(1).
(4) The second condition is that a period of sixty days has passed since that report was laid before Parliament, with no account to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.
(5) The third condition is that, after the end of that period, both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section come into force.
(6) If both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section should not come into force unless it is amended in a way set out in that resolution, then the Minister may by regulation amend that section accordingly, and that section may not be brought into force until that amendment has been made.”
This new clause requires Ministers to analyse, and to explain their analysis of, the effect of the removal of retained EU law rights, the principle of supremacy of EU law, and of the general principles. It also includes opportunity for Parliamentary approval and timeframes for laying reports before both Houses.
The Chair
Before I call the Minister to respond, the hon. Lady prayed in aid the Schleswig-Holstein affair. Without interfering in the politics of the debate, I think that a more appropriate comparison might be Zollverein in Germany or Risorgimento in Italy, which were all about the assertion of the rights of nation states.
Ms Ghani
This is turning into a very interesting morning indeed, Chairman.
I rise to resist new clause 8. This new clause seeks to set conditions on the commencement of clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the Bill. I will explain to the right hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston why we are making the changes in these clauses.
Each clause is vital to this Government’s programme to reform retained EU law. That there are still circumstances where retained EU law takes precedence over UK law is not consistent with our status as an independent nation. The principle of EU supremacy must be ended without delay. These amendments would add further delay by requiring the Government to write reports on items to which we have already committed. As set out already, the Government have committed to ensuring that the necessary legislation is in place to uphold the UK’s international obligations, which includes maintaining the UK’s obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement or the Northern Ireland protocol. We will come on to consider an amendment that will allow us to spend more time discussing that issue.
This Bill will not lead to legal uncertainty—to have perfect legal certainty would mean that we would forever keep the same laws. Our approach is to improve accessibility and legal clarity by codifying, where necessary, rights and principles expressly into domestic statute.
With regard to the delegated powers in the Bill, the Government are committed to ensuring robust scrutiny for the secondary legislation made under these powers while ensuring the most effective use of Parliamentary time; I believe, Chairman, that we spent many hours discussing this issue just on Tuesday. This means that legislation made using the delegated powers in the Bill will be subject to either the negative or draft affirmative procedure, depending on the legislation that is being amended and the power used. A sifting procedure will also apply to regulations to be made under the power to restate, which affords additional scrutiny of the use of power.
Clause 4 ends the principle of supremacy of retained EU law in so far as it applies to pre-2021 legislation. The clause establishes a new priority rule, which ensures domestic legislation prevails over retained direct EU legislation where there is a conflict. Thanks to the clause, an Act of Parliament will once again be the foremost law in the land. Clause 5 ensures general principles of EU law will no longer be part of the UK statute book from the end of 2023. Clause 6 establishes that after the end of 2023 all retained EU law preserved from the sunset provisions will be known as “assimilated law”.
In response to some of the questions raised, I put on the record once again that the rulebook does not seek to remove rights. In most instances, those rights already operate and are available in domestic legislation. The rulebook contains provisions to enable the UK Government and the devolved Administrations to safeguard the rights and protections of citizens of the United Kingdom. The Bill includes a restatement power so that Departments can codify rights into domestic legislation.
On Tuesday, we spoke at length about scrutiny, the sifting process and the role that Parliament will play, so I am not sure what further response I can make today. That programme has been made clear. The Government recognise Parliament’s significant role in scrutinising statutory instruments to date and are committed to ensure appropriate scrutiny of any secondary legislation made under the Bill’s delegated powers.
Changes in the law can give rise to litigation—that is normal—but we would never change the law if people wanted no change whatsoever. The risk will be mitigated in areas where Departments use the Bill’s powers to maintain the effect of our current law, if necessary, for desired policy outcomes. In other cases, proactive management of the removal of retained EU law will allow a controlled and positive introduction of a new legal regime that seeks to mitigate any risks posed by increases in litigation. For instance, the Bill contains powers allowing the Government to retain the current legislative hierarchy between specified pieces of legislation. The effects of repealing supremacy will only be considered relevant to matters arising after the enactment of policy. The change is not retrospective, and cases that have already been concluded will not reopen. Upon finding that pre-2021 domestic law is incompatible with retained EU law, courts may place conditions in the incompatibility order to mitigate the effect of that finding.
Justin Madders
I did posit in my opening remarks the principles of EU law that will be jettisoned. In the example of legal certainty and equal treatment, does the Minister consider that those principles should no longer be part of UK law?
Ms Ghani
That assumes that we would not be treating people equally and fairly, and that is not the case when we legislate in the UK. I do not buy the idea that without EU law we are incapable of governing fairly in the UK. We are all elected to Parliament to represent our constituents, and we want to go home and tell our constituents, regardless of who they are and where they are from, that we are legislating fairly for everybody.
Why are we removing the principle of EU supremacy? That principle means that pre-2021 domestic law must give way to some pieces of retained EU law when the two conflict. That ensured legal continuity at the end of the transition period, but it is constitutionally anomalous and inappropriate, as some domestic laws, including Acts of Parliament, are subordinate to some pieces of retained law. That is the nub of the issue. We either accept the supremacy of the EU or accept the supremacy of this place. We can go round and round, but only one can prevail, and the Government believe that this Parliament should be supreme.
On the protection of fundamental rights and the equality principle, the principle of fundamental rights is generally not the exclusive preserve of the EU. We are proud of the history of the UK legal systems in which common law principles and legislation are well established to protect fundamental rights. For example, the principle of equality before the law is rooted deeply in British law. It was in 1215 that Magna Carta first acknowledged that British people had legal rights and that laws could apply to kings and queens too. The Equality Act 2010 has, to date, brought together more than 116 pieces of legislation into a single Act—a streamlined legal framework to protect the rights of individuals and to advance equality of opportunity for all. There is no equivalent to that Act in EU law, which shows how important it is that we are able to express principles such as equality before the law in a UK statute rather than relying on principles of EU law.
Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend not agree that a particular strength of our domestic legal system is the principle of stare decisis, whereby there is a strict rule that cases are followed in terms of precedent, which does not apply in the case of EU law?
Justin Madders
I will first address the intervention of the right hon. Member for Clwyd West. The point of clause 4 is that it removes the ability of the courts to refer to precedents from any decisions that have been taken in accordance with EU law, so it is worrying that the right hon. Member makes such comments.
The Minister said that we must decide whether we accept the supremacy of Parliament. We absolutely do, which is why so many of the amendments that we have tabled are about giving Parliament back control, not handing power to Ministers or, in the case of this clause, handing power to lawyers and judges to decide how our law moves forward.
I thank the Minister for promoting me to a right hon. Member—that was very kind of her. She also said that new clause 8 would delay matters. It will not. If the Government are on top of things, which I would like to think they were, they should be doing this work anyway. They should be doing this analysis in a way that enables Parliament to scrutinise the effect of the Bill.
Stella Creasy
Does my hon. Friend recognise that the Minister did not utter the words “Northern Ireland”, and did not at all address the question of how supremacy will be resolved in Northern Ireland, which follows both EU and UK legislation? I see that she is being given a note, so perhaps she can do us the courtesy of responding to that question.
The Chair
The Minister might care to intervene on the hon. Member who is speaking. That does not require a point of order.
Alex Sobel (Leeds North West) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert—
“(d) the undesirability of disturbing settled understandings of the law, on the basis of which individuals and businesses may have made decisions of importance to them;
(e) the importance of legal certainty, clarity and predictability; and
(f) the principle that significant changes in the law should be made by Parliament (or, as the case may be, the relevant devolved legislature).”
This amendment adds further conditions for higher courts to regard when deciding to diverge from retained EU case law.
I will not speak for as long as I did on Tuesday, when I recited many different chemicals and species. I will also disappoint my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow by not mentioning killer shrimp. My contributions from now on will be pointed, seeking clarity from the Minister.
Through amendment 79, for which we are indebted to the Bar Council, we seek to expand clause 7 to make clear the important legal and constitutional principles that will be taken into account by the courts. The amendment directs higher courts, when deciding whether to depart from retained EU case law, to consider the well-established and, we hope, uncontroversial principles of legal certainty and regulatory stability. It would be helpful if the Minister could say whether she and the Government accept those legal principles and, if so, whether she agrees that higher courts should have regard to them when deciding whether to depart from retained EU law.
The amendment aims to safeguard the important constitutional principle that a significant change to the law, including a change to established case law, should be made by Parliament or the relevant devolved legislature. Again, does the Minister accept that fundamental constitutional principle and, if so, that it should guide the courts’ decisions under clause 7? She may not be in a position to accept the amendment, but I hope that she can make a simple and straightforward statement that she and the Government agree that the three legal constitutional principles set out in it must be maintained and respected by the courts.
Ms Ghani
I rise to resist amendment 79, which puts in place too high a bar for UK courts to depart from retained case law, including judgments made and influenced by the EU courts. Clause 7 will free our courts to develop case law on retained EU law that remains without being unnecessarily constrained by the past judgments of these new foreign courts. The clause introduces a new test for higher courts to apply when considering departure from retained EU case law. The test gives higher courts greater clarity on the factors to consider, and greater freedom to decide when it is appropriate to depart from retained EU case law. The amendment, however, would reinforce the excessive influence of the European courts and judgments on our domestic courts, and limit judges’ ability to decide to depart from retained EU case law, as should be their right and responsibility. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Alex Sobel
We will not push the amendment to a vote, but the Minister did not give us sufficient clarification. I am sure that when we progress we will continue to hear the opinions of other bodies in relation to retained case law. That is really important as the Bill progresses through the House and into the other place.
Brendan O’Hara
Anyone sufficiently interested in knowing the list of amendments I am addressing can read them in Hansard. As we have heard, clause 7 seeks to relax domestic rules on judicial precedent, which will make it easier for appellate courts across the UK to depart from retained case law. The clause also delivers a mechanism by which courts of first instance can depart from otherwise binding retained case law. I therefore very much welcomed the Labour party’s amendment 79, and supported its efforts to tidy up this section of the Bill. Labour Members are right to point out that the Government’s proposals are driven by ideology, and that they have not considered the legal uncertainty and complications that will now almost certainly prevail.
We heard from Professor Catherine Barnard in an evidence session, who warned that:
“The way in which the legal system has worked and has run successfully over the decades is on the basis of incremental change rather than this really quite remarkable slash and burn approach proposed”––[Official Report, Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Public Bill Committee, 8 November 2022; c. 15, Q26.]
That is exactly what this is: slash and burn. It is another example of how the now-departed brains behind this whole operation were moving with undue haste, total disregard for the consequences of what they were doing, and the obvious fear that a more considered approach would reveal the multitude of problems that will come with this plan.
Indeed, Alison Young, professor of public law at Cambridge University, warned us of the extreme uncertainty that could come from these new legal arrangements, saying:
“Those carrying out business and trade need legal certainty, so that they have an understanding of the rules, now and going forward.”
She added that
“the issue is that those carrying out business will not necessarily be 100% sure whether things will be retained in the long term. If so, how they will be retained? Has everything that might be revoked been listed? They are not 100% sure whether it has been revoked or not.”––[Official Report, Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Public Bill Committee, 8 November 2022; c. 14, Q25.]
That is a recurring theme throughout these proceedings.
It is against that backdrop that we have tabled these amendments, which, although plentiful in number, are all intended to do the same thing: remove Scots law wholly and entirely from this part of the Bill. I make no apology for repeating that this is not our Brexit. Scotland did not vote for Brexit. We did not vote for this reckless piece of legislation and, quite simply, we want nothing to do with it.
Government amendment 5 is another example of the UK Government completely failing to understand Scotland or our legal system. Although I welcome the amendments in so far as they go to repair the poorly drafted first version of the Bill, with the Lord Advocate now having his or her proper place in the functions of it, it pains me that Scotland has been dragged into this mess at all. Indeed, so great is the concern about the impact of the Bill on Scots law that I understand our amendments have been directly communicated to the Secretary of State by the Scottish Government’s Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture, Angus Robertson. I hope that, in that spirit, the Government will now accept them.
Ms Ghani
There is too high a bar for UK courts to depart from retained case law, including judgments made and influenced by EU courts, so I rise to resist amendments 38 to 42 and 44 to 47. Clause 7 will free our courts’ developed case law and retained EU law that remains in force, without being unnecessarily constrained by the past judgments of these foreign courts. The clause will introduce new tests for higher courts to apply when considering whether to depart from retained EU case law and retained domestic case law. Lower courts will also be given greater freedom. They will be able to refer points of law relating to retained case law to higher courts for a decision, which, if successful, could result in the lower court departing from retained case law where it would otherwise be bound by it, enabling a faster and more dynamic evolution of our domestic case law away from the influence of EU law.
The clause also provides UK Government Law Officers and Law Officers of the devolved Administrations with the power to refer points of law arising on retained case law to the higher courts where proceedings have concluded. It will give Law Officers the power to intervene in cases before the higher courts and present arguments from them to depart from retained case law. This will ensure the appropriate development of the law as we move away from the influence of EU case law and the rules of interpretation.
The amendments would remove the Scottish courts and Law Officers from the lower to higher court reference procedure and from the Law Officer reference procedure. However, consistent with EU exit legislation, these measures in the Bill will apply to the whole UK. This will give courts in all four of our great nations greater freedom to develop case law unimpeded by the excessive influence of the European courts. In addition, amendment 47 would give Law Officers of the devolved Administrations the power to intervene in reserved matters, which is not constitutionally appropriate.
Proposed new section 6C of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, established in clause 7 of the Bill, gives Law Officers the power to intervene in cases before the higher courts and present arguments for them to depart from retained case law following the new tests for departure in the Bill. These provisions are framed so that Law Officers may exercise the intervention powers on behalf of their respective Governments in cases where other Ministers or the Government as a whole have a particular view on the meaning and effect of relevant pieces of retained EU law for which they are responsible.
In the light of a new test for departure from retained case law, the powers will allow the Law Officers to bring such matters before a higher court for a decision after hearing the relevant Government’s view on the correct interpretation of relevant retained EU law. Consequently, it is right that the intervention power is not available in relation to points of law that concern the retained functions of the Lord Advocate as a prosecutor. Those functions concern legislation that is reserved to Westminster. The structure of the Law Officers’ powers is consistent with the established position of the Lord Advocate within the Scottish Government, as in other contexts the structure rightly allows the Lord Advocate to represent the Scottish Government’s views on the interpretation of devolved legislation, but not legislation that is reserved to Westminster.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
It is clearly not for me to comment on the best way for a Department for domestic English affairs to rule on what English courts and English Law Officers can do and must do. Equally, it is not for anybody here, including those of us from Scotland, to change the rules on what the Law Officers and courts of Scotland can do and must do—that is exclusively for the Parliament of Scotland.
Given the importance that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland repeatedly attached yesterday to the need for consensus when considering any change to the relationship between our two nations, will the Minister confirm that the consensus principle works in both directions, and that no changes will be made to the powers and responsibilities of Scotland’s Law Officers or Scotland’s courts without the explicit consent of the Scottish Government?
Ms Ghani
As I just said, the structure of the Law Officers’ powers is consistent with the established position of the Lord Advocate within the Scottish Government, as in other contexts the structure rightly allows the Lord Advocate to represent the Scottish Government’s views on the interpretation of devolved legislation, but not legislation that is reserved to Westminster. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendments.
Peter Grant
I do not know whether the Minister fully understood the significance of my question. We have not tabled the amendments because we think that the power is being given to the domestic Law Officers and courts of England—that is not for us to comment on. It is not even that we think that what is being proposed is wrong for the domestic Law Officers and courts of Scotland. However, what is completely wrong is for the domestic Parliament of England to legislate on the legally separate legal system of Scotland against the clear objections of the domestic Parliament of Scotland, which speaks on behalf of the sovereign people of Scotland.
If the Minister is convinced that what is proposed in the Bill is in the best interests of justice in Scotland, and if she can persuade the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government and the Scottish Law Officers that that is the case, there is no question but that the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament will legislate on those terms. However, on the day after the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland insisted that the relationship between our nations must be based on consensus, the Minister is proposing to drive a coach and horses through that consensus by insisting that this Minister and this Parliament have the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of another nation in this Union. That is a serious breach of the guarantees contained in article 19 of the Treaty of Union, and it is not acceptable.
I invite the Minister to come back, should she so wish, and advise the Committee. In preparation for the Bill, has she had any advice whatsoever on the application of article 19 of the Treaty of Union? Does she know what it says?
Peter Grant
The comments I made in relation to the last group of amendments are equally, if not more, applicable here. I appreciate that many members of the Committee would not have thought that the submission from the Law Society of Scotland was relevant to the interests of their constituents, nor should it be. The legal systems of the two nations are entirely separate. They are required to be in perpetuity by the Treaty of Union. That is not my favourite piece of legislation, but while it is there it is incumbent on this Parliament to comply with it.
The Law Society of Scotland wanted the whole of proposed new section 6B to be deleted in its entirety. It raised a number of serious concerns in principle, many of which will apply to the application of the legislation to English courts and Law Officers as well. Proposed new section 6B changes the way in which some civil law can be challenged in the courts without changing the way in which other civil law can be challenged in the courts, so the concept of the unity of a single body of civil law starts to be weakened. The legal profession will be extremely concerned about that.
The legal profession is also concerned about the idea that after a civil case has been concluded, when the time for any appeal has passed and the case is settled, Law Officers who are not a party to the case can then intervene, effectively to act as an appellant in a case in which they have no direct interest. That process rightly applies in relation to criminal law, because almost every criminal prosecution involves the Law Officers acting in the name of the Crown on behalf of the public interest.
In fact, in Scotland nobody but the Law Officers is allowed to take a prosecution in the public interest. Bodies such as the Post Office and the Health and Safety Executive are not allowed to prosecute cases in Scotland’s criminal courts. After a case has been concluded, it is perfectly in order for the Law Officers to appeal against the leniency of a sentence, for example, because they were an interested party in prosecuting the case in the first place. That does not apply if it is a civil case, so there is a legal precedent created here that the Law Society of Scotland has raised serious concerns about, as well as very possibly the Law Society of England and Wales.
The clause again threatens compliance with the Treaty of Union—that is how serious it is, Mr Howarth. Passing the clause threatens to be in breach of article 19 of the Treaty of Union, because it makes the Law Officers of England superior to the Law Officers of Scotland. It makes the domestic courts of England superior to the domestic courts of Scotland. Why do I say that? It explicitly allows the Law Officers of England to step in and interfere in a civil case that applies only in Scotland, between two parties who are resident in Scotland and subject to the law of Scotland, where a case has been considered through due process in the domestic courts of Scotland and settled with finality as a matter of Scottish law. At that point, the Law Officers of England are allowed to wade in and interfere in a legal system that has nothing whatsoever to do with them—not on a matter of reserved legislation or one that is within the remit of domestic law in England.
The equivalent power does not apply to the Law Officers of Scotland. There are no circumstances in which Scotland’s senior Law Officers can come in and interfere in a civil case that has been heard in English courts. However, there are circumstances in which the Law Officers of England can interfere after the event in a domestic case in Scotland’s court. That is not equal treatment of the two legal systems. That is not recognition of the right of the Scottish legal system to operate independently of interference from this place. I will take advice on that and I will be interested to hear if the Minister has. That would appear to me to be a deliberate breach of one of the articles of the Treaty of Union. As many will be aware, when one article of a treaty is broken, either party has the right to consider the treaty to have been brought to an end.
I expressed my concerns in the previous sitting of the Committee that the Minister might be about to accidentally repeal hundreds of bits of legislation by mistake. I am tempted to say that we should not interrupt our opponents when they are making a mistake. If this place wants to take the risk of repealing the Treaty of Union by mistake, I will not stand in its way. However, I think I should bring it to hon. Members’ attention so that at least they cannot afterwards say they did not know what they were doing.
Ms Ghani
I will try to address all the points raised because I know how seriously they are taken by Opposition Members. The Committee should reject amendments 35, 36, 37, 48 and 93 as they would give Law Officers of the devolved Administrations the power to intervene in reserved matters, which is not constitutionally appropriate.
Amendments 35, 36 and 37 concern proposed new section 6B, established by clause 7 of the Bill, which provides UK Government Law Officers and Law Officers of the devolved Administrations with the power to refer points of law arising from retained case law to the higher courts, when proceedings have concluded, for consideration against the new test for departure set out by the same clause.
Amendments 48 and 93 concern new section 6C, which gives Law Officers the power to intervene in cases before the higher courts and present arguments for them to depart from retained case law following the new test for departure in the Bill. It is right that references and interventions by the Lord Advocate are restricted to the points of law within the devolved competence of the Scottish Government. The provisions are framed so that Law Officers may exercise the reference and intervention powers on behalf of their respective Governments in cases where other Administrations have a particular view on the meaning and effect of a relevant piece of retained EU law for which they are responsible.
The powers allow Law Officers to bring the matters before a higher court, in the light of the new test for departure from retained case law, for a decision after hearing the relevant Government’s view on the correct interpretation of a relevant retained EU law. That will allow Law Officers and the Lord Advocate to ensure an appropriate development of the law as we move away from the influence of EU case law and the rules of interpretation. It would consequently be inappropriate for the Lord Advocate, on behalf of the Scottish Government, to exercise the reference and intervention powers where the points of law relate to reserved legislation. That includes points of law that concern the retained functions of the Lord Advocate as a prosecutor, as those functions concern legislation that is reserved to Westminster.
We consider the structure of the Law Officer powers to be consistent with the established position of the Lord Advocate within the Scottish Government. As in other contexts, the structure rightly allows the Lord Advocate to represent the Scottish Government’s views on the interpretation of devolved legislation but not legislation reserved to Westminster. For those reasons, we ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw his amendment.
Brendan O’Hara
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Glenrothes for his very thoughtful contribution. Again, that goes to the heart of the Bill and the bonfire that the Government are setting if they get it wrong, time and again. There are dangers in treating this state as one country—that is what happens when one does not consider the devolution settlement properly. But on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ms Ghani
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 7, page 9, leave out lines 5 and 6 and insert—
“(2) The following are entitled to notice of the proceedings—
(a) each UK law officer;
(b) the Lord Advocate;
(c) the Counsel General for Wales;
(d) the Attorney General for Northern Ireland.”
This amendment and Amendment 6 leave out the definition of “devolved law officer” from subsection (5) of new section 6C of EUWA and instead mention each devolved law officer in subsection (2) of that section.
Ms Ghani
I will be brief. Conservative colleagues will be keen to know that we are accepting amendments 5 and 6, which will remove references to a “devolved law officer” and replace them with the specific titles of the law officers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland where appropriate. This is a policy-neutral change requested by the Scottish Government and tabled by this Government in the spirit of collaboration and co-operation.
Amendment 5 agreed to.
Amendment made: 6, in clause 7, page 9, leave out lines 20 and 21.—(Ms Ghani.)
See the statement for Amendment 5
Brendan O’Hara
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 7, page 9, line 33, at end insert—
“(11) Within three months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament an assessment of the impact of this section on the commitment of the UK enshrined in article 2(2) of the Northern Ireland Protocol.”
This amendment has been tabled in my name and in that of my hon. Friend the Member for Glenrothes. A recurring theme with this Bill has been a lack of attention to detail to either the drafting or to fully understanding the consequences—unintended or otherwise—for great swathes of the UK’s Governments, the economy and wider society. It is breathtaking. The impact of the massive changes that will be brought about by the Bill has been at best an afterthought, and at worst completely ignored. It is reckless, and some could reasonably argue that it is a dereliction of duty on the Government’s part.
This lack of attention to detail will be most acutely felt in Northern Ireland, and in the impact that clause 7 could have on the protocol. Given that the primacy of EU law will be removed by this Bill, but it has been retained and reaffirmed in the Northern Ireland protocol, will the Minister explain how the two pieces of legislation are expected to interact with each other? The Government have committed to there being
“no diminution of rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity”
in Northern Ireland.
What mechanisms have been established to assess and monitor how that is working? The very least that the people of Northern Ireland deserve is a thorough and detailed assessment of the Bill’s exact impact on the protocol. That is why we ask the Secretary of State to, within three months of the Bill passing,
“lay before both Houses of Parliament an assessment of the impact”
that the Bill has had
“on the commitment of the UK enshrined in article 2(2) of the Northern Ireland Protocol.”
Ms Ghani
The Government have already committed to ensuring that the necessary legislation is in place to uphold the UK’s international obligations, including the Northern Ireland protocol. The UK is committed to ensuring that rights and equality protections continue to be upheld in Northern Ireland. I therefore ask the Committee to reject this amendment.
Article 2’s reference to
“no diminution of rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity”
demonstrates the UK Government’s commitment to ensuring that the protections currently in place in Northern Ireland of the rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity provisions set out in the relevant chapter of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement are not diminished as a result of the UK leaving the EU. The provisions in the Bill enable the Government to ensure that the retained EU law that gives effect to article 2 of the protocol is preserved beyond the sunset, or that an alternative provision is created to meet such requirements. The restatement power will also allow the UK and devolved Governments to codify case law and other interpretative effects where it is considered necessary to maintain article 2 commitments.
Clause 7’s provisions concerning case law do not apply in relation to obligations under the protocol. Section 6(6A) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act continues to apply, so that our new test for departing from retained EU case law is subject to the rights and obligations in the protocol. The House already has its usual robust and effective scrutiny processes in place to hold Ministers accountable in relation to the Government’s commitments under the Northern Ireland protocol. In addition, these are bespoke arrangements in relation to the EU Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee where the UK and EU jointly oversee each other’s implementation, application and interpretation of the withdrawal agreement, including the Northern Ireland protocol—for example, the publication of the annual report of the Joint Committee to aid Members’ scrutiny.
Adequate processes are already in place, and the introduction of a new statutory reporting requirement is not an appropriate use of Government or parliamentary time. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendment.
Stella Creasy
It would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could clarify what she said about bespoke arrangements for Northern Ireland. Under article 2 of the protocol we have an obligation to uphold the institutions, including the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. Is she therefore saying that there are instances in which EU law will be retained because of the Northern Ireland protocol? Is she committing to upholding EU law where those institutions propose that it is part of upholding the Good Friday agreement? She said they were bespoke arrangements. Can she clarify that? It is quite an important point.
Ms Ghani
The preservation and restatement powers in the Bill or other existing domestic powers, such as section 8C of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, will ensure that retained EU law that gives effect to article 2 rights is either maintained beyond the sunset or the alternative provision is created to meet such requirements. The delegated powers in the Bill, particularly the restatement powers, will provide the ability to recreate the effects of secondary retained EU law, including the interpretative effects of case law and general principles of supremacy where it is necessary to uphold article 2 rights. That provides a mechanism through which national authorities might implement article 2 obligations. As I said earlier, I asked the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendment.
Brendan O’Hara
I will not push the amendment to a vote, but we will return to it on Report. I remain completely unclear, given the timeframe, how EU law will be removed by the Bill, but be maintained and reaffirmed in the protocol. I am unclear how that actually works.
Brendan O’Hara
I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady. Such muddled thinking and the unintended consequences of pushing it through so quickly go to the heart of the Bill. There are consequences to setting a ridiculously unachievable sunset clause. The thinking time that should have gone into the Bill has not happened. Although I will not push the amendment to a vote now, I strongly urge the Government to work on it to be able to explain on Report exactly how the measure will work. It is far too important to the people of Northern Ireland to let it wither on the vine and hope it does not come back. This is hugely important, but I will not press it a vote.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Ms Ghani
The bar for the UK courts to depart from retained case law in the judgments of EU courts is too high, and there continues to be an overriding desire for our judicial decisions to remain in line with the opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Clause 7 will free our courts to develop case law and retained EU law that remains in force without being unnecessarily constrained by the past judgments of these now foreign courts.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)