Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Ian Roome (North Devon) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford.

Amendment 1 would introduce an exemption from recall to former service personnel who have been discharged due to physical or mental health reasons, to ensure that, even as the Bill seeks to make it easier to recall reservists in times of urgent need, those with long-term injuries or other serious medical conditions can be automatically screened out. Currently, clause 33 updates section 65 of the Reserve Forces Act to alter the terms under which a former serviceperson can be recalled to include reserves, specifying time periods in relation to re-enlistment and tidying up certain terminology.

We feel that section 65(2) should specify that, in addition to the recall provision not applying to anybody over 65 or beyond 18 years after discharge, the exclusion should recognise a medical exemption as standard procedure. That would apply to a medical discharge from either the regular or the reserve forces, closing off the possibility that an individual who might otherwise be medically exempted would be targeted for recall because of their previous service.

The mental health element is particularly significant, given the well-documented prevalence of conditions such as PTSD among veterans, at nearly double the rate of the adult population. This amendment would avoid doing harm to vulnerable individuals, as well as removing the need for the armed forces to go through the process of ruling someone not fit for service a second time.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Before I start, I should probably put it on record that I am on the RARO—Regular Army Reserve of Officers—list as a former Regular Army officer.

I joined my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on the delegation to Ukraine, which was put together by UK Friends of Ukraine and during which we had some very interesting conversations, as he said, about the ability to mobilise reserve forces at a time of pressing threats.

I want to speak very briefly—I am sure other Members will be pleased that my contribution will be brief—on amendments 20 to 24. I will start with amendments 20 and 21, with amendment 21 being consequential on amendment 20. These appear to be sensible technical amendments that would bring the Bill in line with the civilian world. In the light of the facts that the retirement age is likely to be pushed forward as people are living longer, that we need to have a more flexible and resilient reserve force, and that the nature of warfare has changed, with many more technical roles, it seems sensible to increase the age of liability to 67.

On amendment 22, my right hon. Friend set out very clearly the growing threats. It is a daily occurrence for us in this place to be talking about the increasing and ongoing threats facing us across the world. In those circumstances, it seems wise to extend the duration of a recall order from 12 months to 18 months. That does not mean it would have to go up to the 18-month point, but it would provide more flex and resilience in the system.

Amendment 23, again, reflects the realities of life. Many individuals who have served in uniform go into roles that are vital for our defence, albeit are no longer required still to wear the uniform of His Majesty. In those circumstances, to lose their skillset by automatically requiring them to be recalled from those reserved occupations seems counterproductive to the aims we should be seeking to achieve.

Finally, amendment 24 recognises the reality of the situation we live in. We need more flexibility to respond with agility and speed to changing circumstances. Therefore, halving the notice period for recall from 180 days to 90 would seem a sensible and prudent approach.

I promised Members that my contribution would be short this time, and I have delivered on that promise.

[David Reed]

Given that my colleagues have very ably gone through amendments 21 to 24, I will just comment on amendment 20 before handing over to the Minister.

Amendment 20 would increase the maximum age for service in the reserve forces from 65 to 67, which is important in bringing the reserves in line with the age of retirement, which now sits at 67. Parliament has decided that is the threshold at which the working life of a British citizen typically ends, and it makes no obvious sense to retire reservists two years before the age at which we expect the rest of the working population to stop. As the Minister and other colleagues have said, the knowledge of a cyber specialist, a military medic or a logistics officer does not expire on their 65th birthday.

We are legislating at a moment when the security environment is more dangerous than at any point since the cold war, if not world war two. War has broken out across the European continent, and there are wars in the middle east and across Africa. Technological change is speeding everything up, and climate change is increasing volatility. The threats that we face, whether hybrid, cyber or conventional, are growing in scale and sophistication. The Armed Forces Minister himself, in introducing the Bill’s Strategic Reserve measures, said:

“we live in a…fragile environment”,

and the United Kingdom needs

“to be able to recall experienced people faster and more effectively”

should the country need to prepare for war. That is an honest assessment of where we are. If we accept that framing, as I think we should, the case for retaining every capable, willing and medically fit reservist for as long as possible follows directly from it. We should not be narrowing our pool of trained people by two years for no compelling reason.

The strategic defence review is explicit that we need to grow the reserves by 20%, but that ambition runs directly against the policy of letting experienced people go earlier than we need to. At a Royal United Services Institute event in December 2024, General Gary Munch described the current approach as “decommissioning” personnel—the same word that we use for retiring ships. He was making a pointed observation: we would not withdraw a capable platform from service simply because it has accumulated years, and we should apply the same logic to people. The amendment would not impose an obligation on anyone; it would remove an arbitrary ceiling. That is a proportionate ask.

Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Al Carns]

These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—

(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,

(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,

(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and

(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,

(b) must require that—

(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and

(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,

(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.

This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 19, in clause 25, page 44, line 33, at end insert—

““independent” means independent of—

(a) the chain of command, and

(b) any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18 and defines independence for the purposes of that amendment.

Clause stand part.

Clause 26 stand part.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly.

At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.

I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand.

Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.

--- Later in debate ---

I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn, and commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Al Carns]

At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.

Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Al Carns]

Clauses 5 to 7 and schedules 2 and 3 relate to protection orders. The Government are committed to providing safety, justice and real support for all in the defence community, both now and in future, which is why a particular focus of the Bill is on protecting victims of serious sexual and violent crimes.

Currently, the service justice system cannot impose the full suite of protection orders that are available in the civilian criminal justice system. That can create inconsistencies and critical gaps in victim safeguarding, particularly where cases are based overseas and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the service justice system. It means that there are key vulnerabilities, insufficient protection powers in the SJS in comparison with the civilian system and, as existing orders do not convert into civilian equivalents, gaps in protection when a subject leaves service. Those gaps place victims, both in defence and in the wider public, at risk of continued harm. They mean that victims in the service justice system do not always receive the level of protection to which they would be entitled in the criminal justice system.

Clauses 5 to 7 will address those inconsistencies and will be central to providing enduring protection for victims by enabling service courts to make interim and full protection orders and notices that are enforceable even after someone leaves the service. Those service orders include sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection notices and orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders. The clauses will align the justice systems to ensure that no member of the defence community is left with lesser protections than their civilian counterparts. They will empower the service police to apply for interim and full orders and will empower the service courts to impose them, ensuring that victims receive enduring protection from further harm. The powers apply to service personnel and civilians subject to service law both in the UK and overseas, ensuring their worldwide application.

The service police are members of the armed forces who perform broadly the same role for the armed forces, wherever they are in the world, that their civilian counterparts perform in police forces across the UK. Although the service police currently operate in line with the principles of the guidance issued by the Home Office on disclosure of police information, the fact that they have no statutory duty to do so is a disparity with the civilian system. Clause 8 will therefore impose a requirement on the service police to have regard to existing statutory guidance about the disclosure of police information for the purposes of preventing domestic abuse, sexual offending and stalking. It will also amend section 77 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 to include the Ministry of Defence police in the list of police forces that need to have regard to the domestic violence disclosure system. This will better protect potential victims from the risks associated with domestic violence, sexual offending and stalking.

Clause 9 will ensure that offenders who have, for example, been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by a court martial for controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship are automatically supervised under multi-agency public protection agreements. Once those offenders are released from prison, they will be managed in the community in the same way as if they had been sentenced by the Crown court. If offenders under the scope of clause 9 are not managed under MAPPA when released on licence into the community, it may be harder for police, prisons and probation services to work together to protect the public and manage the risk that the offenders pose.

I will speak to new clause 12 in my closing remarks.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system.

It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance.

Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction.

However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary.

New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status.

The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time.

Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes.

Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition.

Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction.

Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect

“as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction”

and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority.

Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachel Taylor]

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling the amendment, and I have just a few things to say. Its impact would be to remove the voice of the victim from the process in deciding the jurisdiction of sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. If a victim does not want their case dealt with in the criminal justice system, it is possible, as is the case with many situations where we see violence against women, that they will withdraw from the process. We have seen lengthy delays in the civilian justice system for dealing with rape and serious sexual offence cases. We have seen many instances of victims removing themselves from the process. The amendment would have the impact of removing the victim’s choice for the matter to be dealt with in the service system, possibly leading to a case where no prosecution was ever pursued. That cannot be right and therefore I cannot support it.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence.

I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route.

I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it.

My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment.

The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies.

This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations.

Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended.

I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

Depriving rights to certain property makes absolute sense for commanding officers. Aligning the ability to administer justice across the single services and across ranks makes life far easier.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?

[Al Carns]

As someone goes across the single services and joint staff colleges, there will be different sections where they are trained on administering justice and the rights of a commanding officer. Importantly, there will be joint standing procedures produced around the clause, which everyone who becomes a commanding officer will have to read and ensure that they adhere to.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Qualification for membership of the Court Martial

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Francois]

I again place on record our thanks to you, Mr Efford, and to our excellent Clerks and the team who organised a very good visit down to Portsmouth, where I think we learned a lot about the operation of the service courts in practice—I certainly did. A number of issues were raised in that discussion, not least about the operation of juries in courts martial, and who serves on those jury panels, how they are selected and why. I will give two or three examples of the issues that came from that and then talk to the amendment.

The current practice, when an officer is being tried for an offence, is that only officers may serve on a jury panel in a court martial. Some people raised questions with the briefers that day about why that should be, and it is an interesting issue. The book answer from the Department was that officers should be tried by a jury of their peers, and therefore it should be other officers who serve on that panel. There is an issue that follows from that about the rank of the officer being tried and the rank of the officers that then serve on the panel. We learned about a practical constraint, which is that if a relatively senior officer is being tried, let us say a colonel or above—to take an Army example—there is only a relatively small pool of people who could be trawled to sit on that panel to pass judgment on that officer.

In the civilian world, we would not have a system where, if a professor were being tried, only graduates could sit on the panel. The civilian system is that people are chosen entirely at random from the electoral roll and are asked to do jury service, which they are mandated to do, with certain exceptions set out in statute. In the civilian world, people are not tried by people of—how can I put it?—an equivalent educational or social status. As the saying used to be, it is a jury of 12 good men and true; now it is, rightly, a jury of good men and women and true who assess someone’s guilt or innocence. In the military, we still carry out the process in this ranked, structured way.

Let us say that we had a lance corporal who was being tried for being drunk and disorderly—perhaps he had got into a bar brawl after the end of an exercise; he had gone out at the weekend, had let off a bit of steam and this had led to him allegedly committing an offence. At present, as I understand it, only senior non-commissioned officers of the rank of the equivalent of colour sergeant or above could pass judgment on that lance corporal. That raises an interesting question: why should another corporal or lance corporal, who likes a night out on a Friday as well, not be allowed to serve on that panel? Why does it have to be a colour sergeant or equivalent?

Forgive me, Mr Efford, I am using Army ranks because that is what I am most familiar with from my service, but the point holds good across all the services. Why should only a colour sergeant or above be allowed to pass verdict on a lance corporal or even a private soldier? A number of such issues cropped up from our visit. Also, as in the old saying that the Minister reminded me of, time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This was a good example of that practice.

The amendment was drafted specifically to address one of those issues—the potential shortage of officers to serve on court martial panels, especially if a relatively senior officer is being tried, when by definition the pool of available serving officers to serve on a panel is limited. We have tried to come up with a practical suggestion, which is to use retired officers of equivalent rank. I am also interested to hear what other members of the Committee think of the wider issue, which is, does this have to be as hide-bound by rank as it is at the moment? I am interested in the Minister’s view as well, not least because he has been a commanding officer.

If we are to keep the system in essence as we have it at the moment, however, would it not make sense to be able to draw on a pool of retired officers of the required rank, who might have a little more time on their hands? We would not be taking anyone away from ongoing operations, and we could take time from their lives in order for them to continue to serve in a military context in the important task of administering service justice. That, in essence, is the intention of the amendment, but we also tabled it to provoke, I hope, a wider debate—I am looking at one or two Labour Back Benchers in particular, because they were vocal about this when we were in Portsmouth, so now is their chance—about why we do things in the way that we do them, and whether there is some potential for change, but if not, why not?

I hope that I have laid out the issue fairly clearly for the Committee.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment.

Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial.

At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.

[Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)]

Has the hon. Gentleman made any assessment of whether the capacity savings from serving officers not having to serve on the court—because under the amendment they would be replaced by retired officers—are perhaps exceeded by the burden on the service justice system of having to track and maintain some kind of database of the retired officers that it would call on to serve?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.

[Mr Francois]

In my experience, retired officers, particularly retired senior officers, are keenly aware of their pension entitlements. If we are paying them a pension through the armed forces pension scheme, we presumably know who they are and where they live. Via that database, it would not be particularly onerous to come up with a list of retired senior officers who could at least be invited. We are not suggesting that this should be mandatory, but we are suggesting that they may want the opportunity to serve. Via their pensions, we know where they are.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service.

Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority.

The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability.

Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed.

That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system.

I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.

[Mr Foster]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the majority of courts martial involve non-commissioned individuals? Although senior commissioned officers are subject to court martial at times, they are in the minority. The majority are non-commissioned officers.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.

[Al Carns]

Is the hon. Gentleman talking about a lack of capacity of senior officers to sit on a court martial board, or inefficiency on the court martial board?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing.

It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered.

There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. I gently remind hon. Members that interventions should be slightly shorter than that.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance.

There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers. That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen.

I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective. Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused.

I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach.

I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof.

This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension. We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both.

Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.

[Ian Roome]

It is important that we take on board the evidence from our visits. Otherwise, what is the point of going on them? That point was brought up when we debated a previous amendment, with reference to the use of the civilian or military justice system.

The hon. and gallant Member for Solihull West and Shirley made an excellent speech about using retired officers. We heard from those who are recruiting that there are delays. We heard during a visit that a senior officer had struggled to find a panel, and the process had been delayed because permission from the then Secretary of State was needed to use an officer of a lower rank. We also heard that it would be much easier to find officers. It is difficult to find officers of an equivalent rank, particularly among the higher ranks, who have not served or trained together or do not know each other, and to be sure that they do not have any relevant interest in protecting someone or perverting the course of justice. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford also made a good point about who constitutes the panel. I support amendment 9, because what is the point of our going on visits if we do not act on what we have been told is an issue?

We also heard a point that has not been mentioned today, which is that those in the non-commissioned ranks, such as warrant officers who have 25 or 30 years’ experience in the job, could also sit on the panels. It is not addressed in the amendment, but we heard evidence that those with years of military service and a lot of experience could be used on the panels too.

Armed Forces Bill (First sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 24th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Ian Roome]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. Published guidance can be interpreted differently from authority to authority. It is about how they put that into action.

Local NHS services have a mad patchwork of transfer rules depending on where someone moves from across the country, which can make access to medical care difficult, as I am sure some of us have experienced—I have, because I have a large garrison in my constituency, and I receive casework from serving personnel about the difference that they have experienced around the country. That is part of what we are trying to fix.

We should expect the Secretary of State to put specific protocols in writing for local bodies across the country. That would be fairer to our service personnel, but it would also make the Government’s responsibilities clearer—it would end our discussion now, where we are asking what due regard means—if local bodies fail to uphold what is being asked for in the Bill. The amendment would require a standardised set of protocols to be produced by the Secretary of State within six months of the Bill passing, require local bodies to act accordingly, and require the protocols to be brought back to Parliament when the procedures need to be revised.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is an enormous pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford.

I want to focus my remarks on amendment 8, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East set out, seeks to provide a clear and practical definition of due regard in the Bill. If Parliament is placing a legal duty on public bodies to have due regard to the armed forces covenant, it is only right that it should be clear what that duty requires in practice.

The Bill places a duty on specified public bodies to have due regard to the principles of the armed forces covenant when exercising certain functions, as set out in proposed new section 343AZA(5) of the Armed Forces Act 2006, including in areas such as healthcare, housing, education, transport and pensions. However, the term “due regard” itself is not defined in the Bill or elsewhere, which creates a very real risk of inconsistent interpretation or application.

Amendment 8 would resolve that uncertainty by defining due regard as requiring public bodies to

“think about and place an appropriate amount of weight on the principles of the Armed Forces Covenant when they consider all the key factors relevant to how they carry out their functions.”

That would not represent a change of policy; it would merely clarify how the duty is to operate. It would make explicit what many would assume is already intended, but which is not currently set out in the Bill.

The armed forces covenant itself is well understood by many. It reflects the principle that those who have served our armed forces, and their families, should not be put at a disadvantage compared with other citizens in accessing public services. It also recognises that, in some cases, special consideration may be appropriate. I think those principles are widely supported not just in this place but among the wider public. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that they are also reflected in the decision-making processes of public bodies.

The effectiveness of the duty to have due regard to the covenant depends in large part on how due regard is understood and applied. In the absence of a definition, there is scope for variation. Some public bodies may interpret the duty as requiring active and meaningful consideration of the covenant in their decision-making processes; others may take a more limited approach, treating it as a procedural requirement that can be satisfied with relatively minimal engagement. That variation matters in practice.

Members of the armed forces and their families frequently move between different parts of the country, and they rely on services provided by local authorities, healthcare systems and other public bodies. A lack of consistency in how the covenant is applied can result in uneven access to support in those circumstances. Let us take the example of a service family who move from one area to another. They may encounter different approaches to school admissions, healthcare provision and housing allocation. If due regard is interpreted differently in every area, the level of support available may itself vary significantly.

Amendment 8 would support a more consistent and coherent approach. By defining due regard clearly, it would establish a common standard that can be applied across different public bodies. The proposed definition is deliberately balanced: it would require public bodies to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight, but it would not require a particular outcome in any given case, and it would not override other relevant considerations. It would simply ensure that decision makers exercise judgment and balance competing factors. At the same time, it would ensure that the covenant is not overlooked or treated as an afterthought. It requires active consideration—that is the way it must be interpreted.

The reference to appropriate weight would make it clear that the covenant must be taken seriously, even if it is not determinative. That reflects the approach taken in other areas of public law where due regard is applied, in which contexts the courts have been very clear that the duty involves more than simple awareness; it requires informed and timely consideration of the relevant principles as part of the decision-making process. Amendment 8 would adopt that well-established understanding and apply it in the context of the armed forces covenant, providing a much clearer framework within which public bodies can operate.

It is worth reminding ourselves that clarity is important not only for public bodies, but for those affected by their decisions. Members of the armed forces community need to know what they can reasonably expect when engaging with public services. A clearly defined duty would help provide that assurance to them and their families. It would also support accountability. Where a duty is clearly defined, it is easier to assess whether it has been properly discharged. With the proposed definition in place, Parliament and others would be better placed to scrutinise how public bodies are applying the covenant in practice. Without a definition, that scrutiny becomes much more difficult; it is less clear what standard is being applied, and therefore harder to identify when that standard has not been met. Amendment 8 would strengthen both the operation of the duty and the ability to hold public bodies to account for its delivery.

[Mr Francois]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the words that we have used in the amendment are taken verbatim from the Minister’s letter of 9 March 2026? We asked him to provide a definition of due regard; he duly wrote to the Committee very promptly, and we have quoted the first sentence verbatim. These are not random words; this is the Minister’s definition. All we are seeking to do is place it in the Bill.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful, as always, to my right hon. Friend for his intervention, because he has hit the nail on the head. This is not something novel; it is merely codifying—formalising in the Bill—what has already been written in evidence to us, which seems eminently sensible.

It is important to consider the practical impact of the amendment on public bodies. The definition would not impose a new or onerous requirement. Public bodies are already accustomed to taking into account statutory duties and policy considerations in their decision-making processes. A requirement to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight would fit squarely within that existing framework. It would not require extensive additional processes or resources. It would not mandate detailed reporting or specific outcomes. Instead, it would provide a clear instruction about how the covenant should be treated alongside other relevant factors. In practice, that may involve ensuring that decision makers are aware of the covenant and understand its implications. It may involve considering how policies affect members of the armed forces community and whether adjustments are needed to avoid disadvantage. Those seem eminently sensible and wise factors to put in this piece of legislation.

In education, that could mean taking into account the particular challenges faced by a service child who moves schools frequently. In healthcare, it could involve considering continuity of care for families who relocate. In housing, it could involve recognising the impact of service-related mobility on access to accommodation. In each of those cases, the duty does not require a specific result; it requires consideration of the relevant factors, including the covenant, and a balanced decision based on those factors. Amendment 8 would therefore support decision making without constraining flexibility.

We often hear concerns that defining duties in legislation may increase the risk of legal challenge. In my view, in this case, the greater clarity that the amendment would introduce is more likely to reduce that risk and be a protective factor. Where duties are clearly defined, public bodies are better able to understand and comply with them, which reduces the likelihood of disputes arising from uncertainty about what is required. Conversely, where duties are unclear, there is a greater risk of inconsistent application and challenge.

By setting out what due regard means in this context, the amendment would provide a clearer basis for compliance. Importantly, it would reduce ambiguity. It is also relevant that the definition is framed in general terms; it does not describe details or steps that must be followed in every case. That would allow public bodies to apply the duty in a way that is proportionate to the circumstances that they face. That flexibility is important given the range of functions and decisions to which the duty will apply.

The amendment aligns with the overall purpose of the Bill. The intention is to embed the principles of the armed forces covenant in the work of public bodies. A clearly defined duty would support that objective by ensuring that the covenant is considered in a consistent and meaningful way. If the duty is left undefined, there is a risk that its impact will vary significantly between organisations, which would undermine the aim of the Bill. The amendment would strengthen the Bill by supporting a more effective and consistent implementation. It would also reflect the practical realities of service life.

Members of the armed forces and their families frequently experience moves and disruption as part of their service. They rely on public services in different parts of the country and need those services to respond in a consistent and informed way. A clear definition of due regard would help to support that consistency, providing a common framework for decision making that recognises the particular circumstances of the armed forces community. It is not about giving preferential treatment in all cases; it is about ensuring fairness in line with the principles of the covenant. That includes avoiding disadvantage and, where appropriate, providing additional support. The amendment would ensure that those principles are properly taken into account.

Amendment 8 would make a targeted and practical improvement to the Bill. It would support a more consistent application of the armed forces covenant by public bodies, provide greater clarity for decision makers and those affected by their decisions, strengthen accountability, and reduce the risk of inconsistent interpretation. Most importantly, it would help to ensure that the covenant is applied in a way that has a real effect on day-to-day decision making. For those reasons, I view the amendment as a useful and proportionate clarification that would strengthen the operation of the duty as set out in the Bill.

[Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford.

I want to add further weight to the points that colleagues have already made. Service personnel themselves have said that the armed forces covenant, while incredibly well meaning, needs to be enacted and enforced properly. It also needs to be explained to the forces themselves what it means and what is on offer to them. With the duty’s extension going as far as it does, we must be absolutely clear what it means in practice, in order to ensure its enforcement. I speak as a lawyer, too, and the enforcement issue is always the biggest problem with any legislation that comes out of this place.

From the evidence sessions we know that the statutory guidance will be doing a lot of the heavy lifting, but we do not know what it will look like or what form it will take—that is not in front of us—so it is important that we discuss and consider the definition of due regard. Including a definition would bring more clarity to the Bill, as my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford said. During the evidence sessions, many Members questioned what due regard means, so it is really important that we ensure that our local bodies know, via a definition on the face of the Bill, what we are hoping and aiming for them to achieve.

[Al Carns]

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Members for Exmouth and Exeter East, for Solihull West and Shirley, and for South Northamptonshire, for amendment 8, which seeks to define “due regard” in the Bill. I recognise their intent, their positivity and their commitment to the covenant, but I cannot accept the amendment.

The amendment is unnecessary because due regard is a long-established legal concept that public bodies already understand and routinely apply in practice. The existing covenant duty of due regard is already driving positive change in its current areas of housing, healthcare and education.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Does the Minister not accept that there is inconsistent application of the covenant across public bodies, and that to try to fix that, which all of us on the Committee are seeking to do, there is strength in codifying it in the Bill?

[Al Carns]

I absolutely agree, and I am one of the biggest champions for shouting about the postcode lottery in the delivery of the covenant. Putting that in the Bill would not change it. It requires education, communication and, in a lot of ways, internal support within local authorities to deliver it. The hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East mentioned the lack of skills at local council level—that is the problem. It is not necessary to amend the Bill; the statutory guidance will be absolutely clear and concise on what the covenant means.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the Minister for indulging me. I do not disagree that, to a greater or lesser extent, this is a matter of education, but there is the issue of guidance being guidance and not being mandatory. If a definition were included in the Bill, it would provide a much stricter framework—alongside the education piece for local authorities—to ensure that we are getting this right. Does he agree?

[Al Carns]

I agree with the premise of the hon. Member’s point. Where I disagree is in how local authorities may view that and how it may restrict their ability to deliver services across other requirements, in line with local priorities. In my letter to the Committee, I wrote:

“When developing the Armed Forces Covenant Legal Duty, due regard was deliberately chosen to bring about lasting positive change…whilst at the same time retaining some flexibility for public bodies to make decisions that are right for their local context and circumstances.”

That is really important, because some of our constituencies will have different levels of need compared with others. Some may have large veteran populations; others may not. Some may have a large number of cancer patients, for example. Prioritising veterans in a very narrow, bounded line above those individuals may skew a whole list of requirements and needs across other public services, hence my point about communication and education, and then the yearly accountability in line with the covenant, which is critical to ensure a level of accountability.

Government Departments are also demonstrating how covenant considerations are driving change in practice. For example, this Government have gone further than before by removing local connection requirements for access to social housing for all veterans. I would be really interested if the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford has examples of where that local connection requirement has not been removed; if he does, I ask him, please, to highlight them to my office so that we can take them on and deal with them, because we removed the requirement last year.

Our experience of the public sector equality duty also shows that a duty of due regard, when properly supported, is sufficient to drive lasting cultural and organisational change, but I do accept that this is the first step to moving in that direction. In addition, the covenant’s statutory guidance, which we can scrutinise in due course, will include a dedicated section explaining what due regard means in practice, including the key issues faced by the armed forces community that bodies must consider. I would welcome the whole House’s view on how that can be improved—if, indeed, it thinks it should be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

I completely agree. The reality is that the implementation of the covenant has been really narrow, across three different Departments. The Bill will broaden the number of policy areas it covers to 12 plus two, which will put an onus on councils and allow people to hold them to account on delivering in line with the armed forces covenant. That is a positive step in the right direction. When we combine that with Valour over time, starting small and broadening out, we will end up with a data-based solution that ensures that councils can support their armed forces community in a more effective and balanced manner.

A definition of due regard in the Bill risks being overly narrow and could unintentionally limit how bodies apply it in practice.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I promise the Minister that this will be the last time I intervene.

[Mr Francois]

On this point.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Yes, on this particular point.

[David Reed]

Promises, promises.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

That was a lawyer’s promise; the Minister can read it as he wills.

Does the Minister not think that having a definition of due regard in the Bill would assist the courts in interpreting its application in cases where a public body’s decision is challenged by a member of the armed forces community?

[Al Carns]

When it comes to the legal process, we must ensure that there is the flexibility in local councils to adhere to the covenant in line with the broader issues and capacity that they may have to deal with. Some council areas have a huge number of veterans, and others have very few. Many councils, including mine in Birmingham, have a huge housing problem. Should we prioritise a single mum with a child, or a veteran? If we made that too explicit, we would skew how local councils view veterans and the armed forces as a whole. That is quite dangerous.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“343AZC Continuity of NHS secondary care services

(1) Within six months of the passage of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the continuity of secondary care treatment for a person who—

(a) is a dependent of a member of the regular or reserve forces who is receiving secondary care services from a health body in one part of the United Kingdom, and

(b) becomes ordinarily resident in another part of the United Kingdom when the member of the armed forces to whom that person is dependent is posted.

(2) The regulations must specify that the relevant health body must take reasonable steps to ensure that any course of secondary care treatment being provided to the dependent is appropriately transferred to an appropriate health body in the area to which the dependent relocates.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “appropriately transferred” means—

(a) the dependent’s treatment or place on a treatment waiting list is maintained upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies, and

(b) the dependent will not require a new referral form from a general practitioner or other primary care professional as a condition for continuation of treatment upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies.

(4) Regulations under this section must include a requirement for a national authority to issue guidance on—

(a) ‎the transfer of patient records,

(b) the continuation of treatment pathways upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies, and

(c) the preservation of waiting list placement upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make provision for NHS secondary care services to be appropriately transferred where a person who is dependent on a member of the armed forces must become ordinarily resident in an area for which a different NHS body is responsible for care as a consequence of the member of the armed forces on whom they are dependent’s military posting.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 11, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“343AZC Continuity of plans for Special Educational Needs

(1) Within six months of the passage of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must make regulations to make provision for a plan for Special Educational Needs awarded to a person who—

(a) is a parent serving in the Armed Forces, and

(b) becomes ordinarily resident in another part of the United Kingdom when posted.

(2) The regulations shall specify that the plan for Special Educational Needs awarded to a person in subsection (1), in respect of their child or children, must be portable when responsibility for delivering that plan is transferred from one education body or local authority to another.

(3) The regulations made under subsection (1) shall provide that, if a service family are required to move from one base to another, for operational or other reasons, any plan for Special Educational Needs awarded to them or their child via their current education body or local authority shall remain equally valid, post-transfer, with the education body or local authority which covers the area of their new posting.

(4) Serving families covered by subsection (2) shall have reasonable time to negotiate a named school for their plan in their new area with the relevant education body and local authority.

(5) In this section, “a plan for Special Educational Needs” means—

(a) in England, an Education and Health Care Plan,

(b) in Wales, an Individual Development Plan,

(c) in Scotland, a Co-ordinated Support Plan,

(d) in Northern Ireland, a Statement of Special Educational Needs.”

This amendment would allow serving families, with a child for whom they have been awarded an Education and Health Care Plan or equivalent Special Educational Needs support, to transfer that support without penalty if they are required to move bases, for operational or other reasons, from one area to another.

Amendment 12, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“343AZC Continuity of adoption and fostering arrangements

(1) Within six months of the passage of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the continuity of adoption and fostering arrangements for a person who—

(a) is a serving member of the Armed Forces,

(b) has entered into negotiations about potentially adopting or fostering children, and

(c) is required to move base as part of their military service.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must ensure that if a service family is required to move from one base to another, for operational or other reasons, any adoption or fostering arrangements they have made with their existing local authority should be appropriately transferred to the appropriate new local authority.

(3) For the purposes of this section, “appropriately transferred” means any adoption or fostering arrangements shall not be disrupted as a result of the transfer from one local authority to another.

(4) Regulations under subsection (1) must make provision for minimum residency requirements for adoption or fostering in a local authority to be waived for any service family which is required to move from one local authority jurisdiction to another, for operational or other reasons.

(5) Service families in this position shall have an opportunity to re-negotiate potential adoption or fostering arrangements with the new local authority, including prior to transfer to their new posting.”

This amendment would allow serving families who are considering adopting or fostering a child to continue that process with no disadvantage if they are required to move bases, for operational or other reasons, from one local authority area to another.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I will confine my remarks to amendment 10, concerning the continuity of NHS secondary care services for the dependants of members of the armed forces. The amendment addresses an issue that has very real consequences for the health and wellbeing of service families, and therefore for the broader integrity of the commitment we make to those who have served and do serve.

At the heart of this amendment lies a simple maxim: those who serve their country, and the families who support them, should not be placed at a disadvantage when accessing essential public services as a result of the demands placed upon them by service life. That principle is, of course, recognised in the armed forces covenant; the question is whether we are giving full and consistent effect to it in practice.

The difficulty arises from a defining feature of military service: members of the armed forces are required to move. They are often asked to move frequently, often at short notice, sometimes across significant distances within the United Kingdom, and sometimes further afield. Those moves are not discretionary; they are intrinsic to the operational readiness and effective functioning of our armed forces. And when service personnel move, invariably their families move with them.

That reality carries with it a number of challenges, but one of the most pressing, and one that is too often overlooked, is the disruption to ongoing medical treatment for their dependants. While primary care is generally able to accommodate patient movement with relative ease, the same cannot be said for secondary care. Hospital treatment, specialist pathways and waiting lists are typically organised on a regional or trust basis. When a family crosses those organisational boundaries, continuity is not guaranteed.

The consequence, in too many cases, is that dependants find themselves required to re-enter the system. A child undergoing specialist treatment, a spouse awaiting elective surgery or a family member under the care of a consultant may be told that because they have moved into a new area, they must obtain a new referral, join a new waiting list and effectively begin the process again from the start.

It is important to be clear about what that represents—not a clinical judgment or a decision taken in the interests of patient care, but an administrative consequence of the way services are structured and commissioned across different parts of the NHS. It is in effect a failure of co-ordination. For the individuals concerned, however, it has a much more significant impact. It can mean delayed diagnoses, prolonged pain, deterioration in conditions that require timely intervention, and significant anxiety for families already managing the pressures of service life. It can also undermine confidence in the system and create a perception, justified or otherwise, that service families are being treated less favourably.

The amendment seeks to address that problem in a proportionate manner. It does not attempt to redesign the structure of the NHS—that would be a fool’s errand—nor does it impose a rigid requirement on how services should be delivered.

[Rachel Taylor]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful argument; we can all relate to the specific problems that anyone faces when they move house, and that is far more likely for service personnel. However, requiring patients to retain waiting list positions regardless of clinical urgency surely risks distorting NHS prioritisation principles, which are based on clinical need in order to ensure fairness and safety. Could he address that point?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Member makes a valid point. Of course there will need to be a degree of clinical judgment, but the premise that somebody has to start at the bottom of the system by virtue of the fact that they are a dependant of service personnel is inherently unfair, and one that needs to be addressed in the Bill.

[Mike Martin]

Nobody wants a serviceperson or veteran to return to the back of the list. That would be completely contrary to what we are trying to do. Equally, if they were sixth on the list in the old area, we do not want them to be sixth in the new area. Is the hon. Member saying that their degree of clinical severity or urgency, or their triage category, would transfer such that they would slot into the new list at the same level?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for his intervention. This is about placing a clear, time-bound duty on the Secretary of State to secure continuity of secondary care for dependants within six months. We want their clinical need to transfer horizontally across, as opposed to vertically downwards. That is the nuisance that amendment 10 is intended to address.

Amendment 10 sets out the substance of the regulations that I have suggested that the Secretary of State introduce. They are deliberately straightforward. First, where a patient is already receiving treatment, their status should be preserved when the responsibility for their care is transferred to a different health authority—that is, a horizontal move across. In practical terms, it would mean that a patient should not lose their place in the system because they crossed administrative boundaries. Instead, they should have a seamless transfer of care.

Secondly, the amendment would ensure that patients are not required to obtain a new referral solely by virtue of having moved, which would be ridiculous. The need for a referral is, and should remain, a clinical matter. It should not be triggered by geography and movement. Requiring a new referral in those circumstances adds delay, creates duplication and serves no meaningful clinical purpose.

Thirdly, the amendment calls for clear guidance on the practical steps necessary to support continuity, including the timely and efficient transfer of patient records, the recognition and continuation of existing treatment pathways, and the preservation of procedures that have been booked or recommended. Those are not novel concepts; in many ways, they are already part of good administrative practice. What is lacking is the consistency of application across the country.

It is perhaps worth emphasising what amendment 10 would not do, as much as what it would. It would not confer preferential treatment on service families. It would not seek to move them ahead of others in the queue, nor to secure access to services beyond what is clinically necessary. Its purpose is much more modest: to ensure that service families are not disadvantaged as a result of circumstances beyond their control. That is entirely in keeping with the armed forces covenant, which commits to removing disadvantage, not to creating advantage. In that context, the disadvantage is clear; it arises not from clinical need, but from the intersection of mobility and administrative fragmentation. Addressing it is therefore both entirely justified and absolutely necessary.

There is also a broader point about fairness and the implicit contract between the nation and those who serve. Service personnel accept a range of constraints and obligations that do not apply to the general population. They relinquish a degree of control over where they live, where they move and how they organise their family life. In return, it is entirely reasonable for them to expect that the state will take reasonable steps to ensure that those constraints do not translate into avoidable hardship for their families.

Continuity of healthcare is a particularly important aspect of that understanding. Health is not a peripheral concern; it is central to the wellbeing and stability of service families. Disruption to care can have a cascading effect on education, employment and the overall resilience of the family unit. In that sense, addressing the issue is a matter not only of fairness, but of operational effectiveness. A serviceperson who is worried about the health of their family cannot fully focus on their duties. At a time of critical need, their ability to do so is absolutely essential.

Some may raise questions about the practicalities of implementing such a system, particularly in the context of devolved health systems across the United Kingdom. It is therefore important to be clear about the scope and intent of amendment 10. It would not seek to override devolved competencies or impose a uniform model of service delivery. Rather, it would require that whatever the organisational arrangements are, mechanisms be in place to ensure continuity when patients move between them.

In many respects, the steps required are administrative rather than structural. They involve ensuring that information flows effectively, that existing clinical decisions are recognised, and that waiting positions are honoured, based on clinical need. These are matters of co-ordination, communication and guidance; they do not require wholesale reform of the system.

There are already examples of good practice in this area. In some parts of the country, arrangements have already been put in place to facilitate the transfer of patients between trusts with minimal disruption to their care. The amendment seeks to ensure that such practice becomes the norm rather than the exception.

It is also worth noting that the increasing digitalisation of healthcare records and the development of more integrated healthcare systems provide a foundation upon which this kind of continuity can be built. In many cases, the infrastructure already exists; what is needed is a clearer expectation, backed by regulation, that it should be used to support service families consistently and reliably.

[Mr Francois]

My hon. Friend is making an extremely good speech. As he and the Committee know, there is a major reform of NHS England going on. At the ground level, it means that there will be far fewer integrated care boards. In Essex, we are going from three to one, and that approach is mirrored across the country. Is not my hon. Friend’s amendment therefore very timely, because—this should appeal to the Minister—we are trying to slim down NHS bureaucracy and give ICBs more power within the system? Would my hon. Friend’s proposal not tie in extremely well with the reorganisation of integrated care boards, which hold much of the budget within the NHS?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: this is about not only streamlining the process, but giving more heft to those who wield the power to ensure that we get improved patient outcomes at the end of it. That is what we should all be seeking.

Ultimately, the question before us is very straightforward: are we content to allow a situation to persist in which service families can lose their place in the healthcare system simply because they are required to move in the course of service, or do we consider it reasonable to take targeted steps to prevent that outcome? In my view, the answer is clear. Where treatment has begun, it should continue. Where a place on a waiting list has been earned, it should be respected. Administrative boundaries should not dictate clinical outcomes. They certainly should not impose additional burdens on those who have little choice but to cross them.

The amendment provides a measured and practical mechanism to achieve that objective. It respects the structure of the NHS, acknowledges the reality of devolution and focuses squarely on the removal of a specific and identifiable disadvantage. In doing so, it gives tangible effect to the principles of the covenant. It recognises that our obligations to service families are not merely symbolic; they require a practical expression in the design and operation of public services.

[Rachel Taylor]

Although the amendments are well-intentioned, they are somewhat problematic because they target health, education, adoption and fostering, which are all devolved to the respective Governments. They risk recklessly breaching our devolution conventions, including the Sewel convention. The purpose of the Bill is not to strain relationships with the devolved Governments; instead, it seeks to empower them to design the right solutions for each nation.

The covenant duty is intentionally flexible and is supported by guidance and existing frameworks. It allows each Government to design their response. I believe that this Government should seek to work collaboratively with the devolved Governments on supporting our armed forces, rather than prescribing duties to them in legislation.

Furthermore, our NHS already works effectively with the covenant duty to support continuity. The amendments would risk governance and clinical risks. Instead, the Government are focusing on initiatives that aim to promote awareness of the armed forces community.

The Ministry of Defence already provides comprehensive guidance for service families through the adoption and fostering defence instruction notice, which embeds the MOD’s role firmly within existing civilian-led systems. These long-standing frameworks already ensure continuity for families when they move. In combination with the strengthened covenant duty, they will provide a far more practical and effective approach than is proposed in the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

We continue to discuss with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales how best to enhance the cross-pollination of EHCPs and individual support plans. We will continue to do so and, in particular, will try to speed up the transition and make it smoother for highly mobile children.

To legislate in the way the shadow Minister suggests, when a White Paper is already out and changes in legislation are coming, could result in the incorrect solution for armed forces families. What I would recommend is a discussion with the Minister for Veterans and People to update the right hon. Member in full and ensure that any ideas or insights that he has are pulled into that work, so that we come up with the best collaborative solution. The Government’s preferred approach is collaboration within existing frameworks, underpinned by the covenant duty, which will deliver the practical benefits without the unintended consequences.

Amendment 12, which seeks to continue adoption and fostering arrangements automatically across local authority boundaries, would raise significant practical difficulties. Each local authority operates with its own procedures, safeguarding requirements and legal frameworks. A single, one-size-fits-all statutory requirement risks creating confusion, administrative burden and potential delays, which is precisely the kind of disruption that the amendment seeks to avoid.

The Ministry of Defence already provides comprehensive guidance for service families through the adoption and fostering defence instruction notice, which embeds the MOD’s role firmly within existing civilian-led systems. These long-standing civilian frameworks already ensure continuity for families when they move. In combination with the strengthened covenant duty, they provide a far more practical and effective approach than the amendment process.

The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford raised a specific case. I am more than happy to take it offline. If we can help directly where the system has not worked, or help with the process, I will pass it on to the Minister for Veterans and People, and we will get after that problem set.

The covenant’s statutory guidance provides a flexible and practical framework that respects local authority responsibilities while directly addressing the challenges faced by service families. It ensures that individual circumstances can be properly considered without imposing rigid requirements that may not fit every complex case.

For those reasons, the Government consider the amendment unnecessary and duplicative. We remain fully committed to supporting healthcare needs for armed forces families, improving SEN provision and ensuring robust support for those involved in adoption and fostering. We will continue to work collaboratively with delivery partners and improve guidance where needed, rather than impose inflexible statutory mandates that risk unintended consequences. I hope that that provides reassurance. I ask hon. Members not to press amendments 10, 11 or 12.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out his broad support for the intent of my amendment, if not for its practical workings. I am grateful for the invitation to meet him and his ministerial colleague to see how we can reach a settlement to ensure equality for armed forces personnel on this issue. On the basis of his reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

Does the shadow Minister wish to press amendment 11?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Reed]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“343AZC Armed Forces Covenant Action Plans

(1) Within six months of the passage of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must make regulations requiring a local authority to which the Armed Forces Covenant duty applies to prepare and publish an Armed Forces Action Plan.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify that an Armed Forces Action Plan set out—

(a) the steps the authority intends to take to fulfil its duties under the Armed Forces Covenant,

(b) how the authority will assess local need within the Armed Forces community, and

(c) how resources will be allocated to support delivery of those duties.

(3) A relevant local authority must, at least once in each reporting period, publish a report on progress made against its action plan.

(4) In preparing an action plan and report under this section, a relevant local authority must have regard to any guidance or outcomes issued by the Secretary of State.

(5) The Secretary of State may issue guidance, including indicative outcomes or measures, for the purposes of supporting consistent implementation and assessment of the Armed Forces Covenant duty.”

This amendment would require local authorities subject to the Covenant duty to prepare and publish an Action Plan setting out how they will deliver the duty.

The amendment, which stands in my name and in the name of my right hon. and hon. Friends, would place a clear and consistent obligation on local authorities to produce an armed forces covenant action plan. At present, there is no standardised mechanism for assessing how local authorities are delivering their covenant duties, nor is there a consistent framework for evaluating the effectiveness of delivery in practice. The absence of such a structure makes it difficult to form a clear picture of how the covenant is being implemented across the country. Without a defined framework, delivery is likely to vary among authorities, a point that has been raised today in relation to other amendments.

Some local authorities, particularly those with an established focus on armed forces issues, may continue to provide strong and proactive support. They may already have effective partnerships in place with local services charities, good engagement with their armed forces communities, and a clear understanding of local need. In some areas, local authorities are already producing plans or strategies, often working closely with the local armed forces network and charities. The amendment would build on that existing good practice, rather than starting from scratch.

Other authorities, facing a wide range of competing pressures, may find it more difficult to give their covenant commitments the same level of attention. That is not necessarily due to a lack of willingness; rather, it reflects the reality of limited capacity and competing priorities.

The result can be a variation in provision across different areas, whereby the consistency of available support may depend in part on where an individual lives. That sits uneasily with the intention behind the armed forces covenant, which is to provide a consistent commitment to those who serve or have served and to their families. The amendment is intended to support the duty by helping to ensure that the covenant is delivered in a more consistent and transparent way at a local level.

In practical terms, the absence of a structured approach presents some challenges. First, it can limit the ability of local authorities to assess the scale and nature of their armed forces community. Without a clear expectation that information will be gathered and analysed, there is a risk that need will not be fully identified. That may relate to housing, access to healthcare, employment support or the specific needs of service families who move frequently. It may also include the needs of veterans who are less visible and are therefore less likely to come into contact with services unless there is a proactive effort to reach them. If need is not clearly understood, it becomes more difficult to design services that respond effectively.

Secondly, without a clear planning framework, resource allocations can become less strategic. Decisions may be taken on a reactive basis, responding to immediate issues as they arise rather than being guided by a longer-term assessment of the need. Given the financial pressures facing local authorities, that is understandable. However, it increases the risk that covenant-related activity will not be prioritised consistently, particularly when it is not clearly set out alongside other statutory responsibilities. A more structured approach would allow better co-ordination of support between services, including housing, healthcare and employment support, where needs often overlap and require a joined-up response.

Thirdly, the absence of a requirement to set priorities or to publish reports on progress makes it harder to assess how covenant duties are being delivered in practice. It becomes more difficult for central Government to understand what is happening at a local level; it is also more difficult for local stakeholders, including service charities and armed forces families, to see what support is available and how it is being developed. Those issues were reflected in earlier evidence sessions, in which concerns were raised about the lack of consistent metrics and the difficulty of comparing delivery between authorities.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend is making a very powerful speech. Does he not consider one advantage of these action plans to be shared learning across local authorities, as those with more experience can aid those with less experience in improving the standard and delivery of support for veterans and the armed forces community?

[David Reed]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Looking across the Committee, I see Members who have served in local government, some of whom may have had military experience before doing so. They would have been able to apply their experience, and that of their families, to their work as elected councillors. However, that is not standard across the country, which takes us back to my central point: given the financial pressures and other statutory pressures, we can see why, without a requirement for a clear plan, implementation becomes difficult for a local authority that does not have experience.

The lack of comparability limits our ability to identify where approaches are working well and where improvements may be needed. It also makes it harder to share learning among areas. Amendment 13 seeks to address those points in a proportionate and practical way. It would not impose a detailed or overly prescriptive model, as it is not bureaucratic in nature, and it would not remove flexibility from local authorities; authorities that want to do a lot more could do so, which would perhaps be fed back into central Government. Instead, it would establish a clear expectation that each authority take a structured approach to delivering its covenant responsibilities.

It is important to be clear about what the amendment would not do. It would not impose a complex or resource-intensive new burden. Many local authorities are already undertaking elements of this work; the amendment would simply bring that activity into a clearer and more consistent framework. It would require local authorities to produce an armed forces covenant action plan, which I am sure would be developed in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence, bringing together experience from where it is being done well in local government. That plan would set out in clear terms the steps that the authority intends to take to meet its obligations. It would provide a more coherent framework for delivery, bringing together activity that might otherwise be spread across different services.

Importantly, amendment 13 would also require authorities to assess the level and nature of the need within their local armed forces community. This key element would ensure that planning is informed by evidence, rather than assumptions. It would also encourage engagement with those directly affected, including service personnel, veterans and their families, as well as the organisations that support them. In addition, the amendment would require authorities to set out how resources would be allocated to meet that identified need, helping to create a clearer link between assessment and delivery. It would support more transparent decision making and would help to ensure that commitments are reflected in practice.

The requirement to report on progress is another important part of the amendment. It would introduce greater transparency, allowing central Government, local partners and the armed forces community to understand how the covenant is being delivered in particular areas. That transparency would support activity and accountability; allow local authorities to demonstrate the work that they are undertaking, including where progress has been made and where further development is needed; and provide a basis for identifying effective approaches and sharing good practice.

I will wrap up, because I am conscious of time. Amendment 13 is an important amendment. It would give local authorities a framework to work with central Government to carry out their new statutory duties, while managing their workload across competing priorities.

Oral Answers to Questions

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Gentleman did not want to hear about the £5 million for the Arrol Gibb centre in Rosyth, the £5 million for the Clyde engineering campus, and the extra funding for a defence technical excellence college that will create defence skills. I hope that, on reflection, he will ask his Government in Scotland to back what Scottish Labour has backed: the funding for two Scottish DTECs.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

3. When he plans to publish the defence investment plan.

[Ian Roome (North Devon) (LD)]

6. What progress his Department has made towards the publication of the defence investment plan.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (John Healey)]

Before I answer, I want to thank our British personnel who are working 24/7 in the middle east, at home and around the world to protect British lives. For our part, we are working flat out to settle the defence investment plan, which is a plan for the 10-year transformation of Britain’s defence, as laid out in the strategic defence review. We are fixing a military programme that, when we came into government, was over-committed, underfunded and unsuited to the threats and conflicts we now face.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I draw the House’s attention to my former role as the co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group for defence technology. When I was at Sandhurst, when we would talk about punctuality, the colour sergeant would often say to us, “Three minutes early is two minutes late.” When it comes to the defence investment plan, it feels more like “on the bus, off the bus.” Can the Secretary of State confirm whether it will be published before the House rises on 26 March?

[John Healey]

We will settle this defence investment plan. Unlike the plans we have seen recently from previous Governments, it will be affordable and deliverable. The hon. Gentleman knows from his time in service—he gave an anecdote from Sandhurst—that over 14 years, Tory Governments hollowed out the armed forces; we are turning that around. We are putting £270 billion into defence in this Parliament, which is the biggest increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war. We are delivering for defence, and delivering for Britain.

Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

The reality is that the last Government’s legacy Act made promises that could not be kept, and explaining why to our veterans community is exceptionally difficult, and I will not lie on that. On the same hand, we have been clear that inquests that were started by the last Government, but stopped—such as Loughgall in 2014—must continue and come to their rightful conclusion. We must ensure that throughout that process, all our veterans are protected as we progress.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

The Minister has more experience than most with the global threats facing this country. In those circumstances, we need to be recruiting the brightest and best to our armed forces and retaining them. He has set out current retention levels with certain detail, but that is before the Bill passes through Parliament and, as the Government hope, becomes enacted as law. Does he not recognise that the inequality of arms under the legal system for our veterans is likely to have a significant impact upon retention?

[Al Carns]

This Government have an exceptional record on supporting our veterans. We put more money into veterans than any other Government in the past 10 years. We put £50 million into Valour. We have enhanced the Op Restore programme. Op Courage on mental health has now got £21 million and has rolled out. Our career transition partnership is second-to-none. On housing, we have got Op Fortitude. We have had 4,100 referrals and more than 1,000 veterans supported. We are doing a fantastic job for veterans. We must ensure that they are protected as we go forward.

Oral Answers to Questions

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Monday 8th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

There is real expertise in, and opportunities for, our shipyards nationwide—both those that support Royal Navy military vessels, and those that spend much of their time working on Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, which are the backbone of the Royal Navy fleet. There is a real opportunity in not just shipbuilding but ship repair. I would be happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss those opportunities. Given that the Labour conference will soon take place in Liverpool, perhaps I can pop over and see her.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

For many veterans, hearing loss is one of the hidden scars of service, and in a number of cases, it has been linked to defective 3M hearing equipment. Will the Minister use their arts of persuasion on the Prime Minister to ensure an independent inquiry, so that we can find out the extent of this, and see whether any other equipment is involved and how we can prevent it from happening again?

[Al Carns]

Anyone with hearing loss from equipment can absolutely apply for compensation through the war pension scheme or the armed forces compensation scheme. Broader work is happening on those specific bits of capability outside this place.

Nuclear-certified Aircraft Procurement

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Maria Eagle]

I do not think the previous Government were committed to buying Typhoons, so I do not see why the hon. Gentleman should be so outraged by the fact that after less than a year, we have not yet ordered any more Typhoons. We are committed to the Typhoon fleet that we have. The buying of any more will have to be considered in the investment plan that is being worked on now. Other European nations are buying some Typhoons, so there is some work there, although I know they are not assembled at Warton if other nations buy them. We also have export orders that we are trying to pursue. Although I cannot advance what I said to the hon. Gentleman previously, it is something that I am very conscious of, and we will continue to see what can be done about the future of our Typhoon fleet. We are committed to the fleet that we have and to the upgrades that we need.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

In response to an earlier question, I was pleased to hear the Minister commit to seeking to compress the timetable between delivery and the in-service date. I believe I heard the Minister say that the delivery date was the back end of the 2020s. Can she confirm the anticipated in-service date?

[Maria Eagle]

I cannot confirm the anticipated in-service date beyond saying that we are hopeful that we will get the aircraft as soon as possible and that we will be able to use them as soon as possible thereafter, subject to all the usual requirements to get something in service. That is as good as I can do for the hon. Gentleman today, I am afraid.

National Armaments Director

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

Today this House is quite properly considering the scale and seriousness of the threats we face, from those requiring conventional deterrence in Europe to those of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The case for strengthening our armed forces is not just compelling but essential. However, we must be honest about how we fund this renewal, and what we are willing to sacrifice to do so.

Let me be clear: the case for increased defence spending is self-evident. Like many others, I have long argued that we must invest more in our sovereign capability, critical munitions, advanced deterrence and national resilience, including by expanding both the remit and the resourcing of the national armaments director. The strategic significance of that role has grown substantially. In today’s volatile security environment, the national armaments director is not merely a procurement official; they are the principal architect of our defence industrial strategy, responsible for ensuring that our armed forces are equipped not just adequately, but decisively. Their portfolio spans capability planning, acquisition reform, exportability and the stewardship of our defence supply base, from the factory floor to the frontline. In an age of contested logistics, technological disruption and rapid rearmament by authoritarian regimes, the role is fundamental to preserving both operational readiness and sovereign capability.

Delivering a credible deterrent in today’s world means accelerating procurement cycles, building in modularity and adaptability, strengthening domestic supply chains, and driving long-term collaboration between government, industry and academia. It means ensuring that we can surge production in a crisis, replenish stockpiles at speed and invest in the innovation that gives us the strategic edge. That cannot be done in isolation or as an afterthought. That work must be led, co-ordinated and embedded across defence planning, not in spite of fiscal pressures, but because of them.

If we are serious about resilience, readiness and regeneration, we must empower the national armaments director with the authority, capacity and resources to act not simply as a technical overseer, but as a strategic enabler at the heart of defence policy. Only then can we translate increased spending into real-world capability, and ensure that British power is not only credible on paper, but deliverable in practice.

However, this investment must not come at the expense of our international development commitments. Funding defence by slashing foreign aid is a false economy. Worse, it risks undermining the strategic posture that we seek to build. Aid is not an indulgence. It is not a soft option, and it is certainly not a luxury for easier times. It is an instrument of national strategy—a projection of British values, a tool of soft power, and a forward-deployed asset in the defence of the realm. When Britain pulls back from the world, our adversaries do not hesitate to step in. China in particular has understood this dynamic. It does not wait for crises to send in troops; it sends in investment, infrastructure and influence, often to the very regions from which we have retreated. When we reduce aid, we do not save; we cede ground and create vacuums that others are all too willing to fill.

Let us be frank: foreign aid and defence are not in conflict. They are complementary. One builds resilience, prevents crises and supports our allies; the other protects us as those crises unfold. A truly strategic posture requires both, because real security does not start when the first shot is fired. It starts in the classrooms of conflict zones, in the clinics of fragile states, and in the partnerships we forge before troubles take root. If we choose to retreat from the world, we shall find that the world does not retreat from us.

UK Military Base Protection

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank my hon. Friend for the encouragement to head back to the Ministry of Defence; I will be hightailing it back there as soon as this statement is over. The review commissioned by the Defence Secretary will look at what happened at RAF Brize Norton, but also at what lessons can be applied to our military bases, the defence estate across the UK, and our overseas bases. Keeping our people safe and keeping our ability to protect our country, safe and free from interference, is vital for this country. That is why we have undertaken the review.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

When organisations such as Palestine Action break into military bases, damage secure facilities and put our personnel at risk, they are not just protesting but sabotaging. With that in mind, if any other extremists had carried out those tasks they would rightly be described as domestic terrorists. Does the Minister agree that this is not legitimate protest, it is domestic terrorism and that any attack on our armed forces’ infrastructure should be seen thus?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for those comments. I often find the phrase “Flip it to see it” is useful to identify whether there is inbuilt bias in how we approach a topic. As he suggests, if we were to flip Palestine Action to a number of other groups, it would clearly be regarded with the same seriousness with which the Government are approaching it. I am very glad that the strong message, on a cross-party basis, has gone out today that what we saw in Brize Norton is unacceptable and that it is right that we take measures to keep our national security safe.