Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 362, tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, which requires the registered medical practitioner to explain and discuss the nature and the risk of the lethal drugs. There is a bit of a theme to the amendments I have tabled so far: they have almost all been about giving the patient more information. The promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, is quite right in focusing on the importance of the patient’s autonomy. I absolutely believe in and value that autonomy—I am sure everybody across the Committee does so too—but true autonomy is linked to having access to good quality and accurate information. It can severely impact someone’s autonomy if they do not. This Bill states that the person must have an informed wish to end their own life. I believe that this must explicitly include an understanding of the nature of, and the risks of, the lethal drugs involved in assisted dying.

This Bill’s passage through this place has led to lots of conversations and a greater awareness of the issue of death across the country. Morbid as that is, it is a really good, healthy thing that people are talking about end of life—something which we will all encounter—and that is welcome. The debate on assisted dying has made many people concerned about the nature of death and the choice that they might face at the end of their life. Inevitably, for some, the impression has been given that an assisted death uniformly provides a pain-free alternative. I accept that that is absolutely what the promoter of the Bill, and those in support of it, are aiming for—that is not in question—but we have heard from the hon. Member for East Wiltshire about issues with that, and that there have been exceptions in places where such laws have been put in place. I also point to the evidence of James Haslam, a consultant in anaesthesia and intensive care medicine, who put in his written evidence to the Committee that assisted dying

“does not guarantee a painless, peaceful and dignified death.”

The key word there is “guarantee” because, unfortunately, some people who ingest the prescribed lethal drugs do experience distress and complications. In the Netherlands, a high dose of barbiturates is used for all administrations of lethal drugs, and in two thirds of cases—the majority—the person dies within 90 minutes, but a third of cases do take longer and can take up to 30 hours. Complications include difficulty swallowing the whole prescribed dose, vomiting, and in some cases re-emergence from coma. I do not accept that this is an incidental concern. Vomiting affects up to 10% of assisted deaths by oral administration in the Netherlands. There is no easy way to research the efficacy of these drugs on humans given their lethal effects, and as a result there is no regulatory authority in the world that has approved these drugs to be used for this purpose. The data that we have shows that these complications take place in all jurisdictions that have assisted dying. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has already mentioned with respect to Oregon, between 2012 and 2022, 11% of the time there were complications.

These complications raise important ethical and medical questions for the doctor and for the terminally ill person. Of course, by the time complications occur, it is too late to discuss or reconsider the person’s options. That is why it is essential that the registered medical practitioner has already explained and discussed with the person the risk and nature of the lethal drugs. Choice is about not simply having options available, but understanding them. That goes to the point I made at the beginning: autonomy is absolutely linked to the quality of the information that someone has been given in order to make that autonomous choice. That requires the registered medical practitioner to explain the full risk and the nature of the possible complications from the lethal drugs.

The General Medical Council sets out five points of guidance for doctors on how they should hold a dialogue with their patients about reaching a decision. Three of the five GMC points are already covered by the Bill, but two are excluded: uncertainties about the diagnosis or prognosis, including options for further investigation; and the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about and likelihood of success of each option, including the option to take no action.

I can see no good reason why we would not want doctors to be entirely honest with patients who are considering assisted dying, even to the point of saying that the vast majority of people will not have any complications, but there is a chance. Personally, I see no issue with that, or why there should be. Doctors should give their patients that information; not only is that good practice—as we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley—but, as the GMC guidance makes it clear, they should do so because we should not give people with serious illnesses a false picture of what assisted death means. I link back to the emphasis on the word “guarantee”, as per the written evidence I quoted.

Amendment 362 would affirm the commitment of the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, to upholding medical standards. It would clarify the full responsibilities of the registered medical practitioner under the General Medical Council guidelines. Perhaps more importantly, it would put the terminally ill person in a better position to understand fully the options available and the associated risks.

In Committee, we have heard frequently that the Bill is about expanding choice and autonomy at the end of life. To act autonomously, terminally ill people need— I emphasise this again—to understand what they are facing as best they can, with the best and most accurate information available to them as early as possible. That is why I support amendment 362, and I urge the Committee to do so, too.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I rise to speak in support of amendments 305 and 306, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.

Under amendment 305, a doctor would have to explain what effects the medicines would have as well as death. I appreciate the points made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, and what other Members have said about effects and side effects. I would first say: we do not know the side effects. There is no research into any of the drugs being used for the purpose that we are looking at—for assisted suicide, euthanasia or whatever whichever jurisdiction calls it. We therefore cannot give a clear view of what the side effects are; they are largely unknown, as I understand it.

In addition, there are different drugs. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud mentioned one drug, pentobarbital, which has caused huge concern. I did not know about the issue in Australia, but I know the evidence from death row in America, after Texas started using pento-barbital; there have been huge concerns and lawsuits there. I am happy to be referred to other evidence. In some cases, the effect of the drug has been described as akin to suffocating or even as being waterboarded or drowning.

Concerns have been expressed about the use of such drugs in other jurisdictions. I agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that we should be looking at all such jurisdictions, because this is something new for us. If we are to learn from other jurisdictions where assisted dying has happened and it has been okay for people, whether that is Australia or others, it is equally right that we hear from those jurisdictions where things have not gone right or to plan. That is important.

Clause 9(2)(b) states:

“The assessing doctor must…explain to and discuss with the person being assessed”,

among other things,

“the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death)”.

Amendment 305 would instead require that the assessing doctor explain to and discuss with the person being assessed the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their life, including how it will bring about death and any other effects it would have in addition to death. That is really important.

There are several relevant things that patients should know if they are to be able to make an informed choice. First, they should have as clear an idea as possible what the experience of taking the lethal drug is like. In some countries where people undergo assisted dying, they swallow a cocktail of drugs. Patients whose assisted dying process did not succeed have said that the drugs are bitter tasting. If this is to be the method used in assisted death in this country, applicants should be aware of that, because some people do not take tablets—they just will not do it. If other methods are to be used, doctors should inform patients of what the experience will be like to the best of their knowledge.

The second thing assisted death applicants should know is that they may suffer complications. We know from countries and states that have assisted dying that some patients undergo complications during the process. It has been said before, but I will repeat the point, because it is really important: there can be complications. People may vomit or undergo seizures. One assisted dying recipient took 137 hours to die. That is five days and 17 hours.

We do not know the full number of patients who have died very lengthy deaths in Oregon, because the lethal drugs are self-administered, usually with no doctor present, but just because there is no report saying that things have gone wrong, it does not mean that everything has gone right. Oregon also found that at least nine patients failed to die from lethal drugs. We do not know whether that is the total number—again, because the assisted dying applicants in Oregon self-administer drugs. We can say with certainty that complications exist, although, unfortunately, gaps in the data mean that we do not know how common they are.

Amendment 306 would change the duties of a doctor present during the assisted dying process. Currently, clause 9(2)(c) states that the co-ordinating doctor must discuss with the person

“their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance”.

If the amendment were accepted, the clause would state that the co-ordinating doctor must discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance

“including the escalation of medication intervention”.

This is a point of great importance, both for the person seeking assisted dying and the doctor, who would have to be present for the process. It would mean that the applicant and the doctor would have to think through what they wanted to happen if the applicant did develop complications. Should the doctor at a certain point act to revive an applicant—for example, if the person seemed to be suffering extreme pain as a result of a lethal drug? Alternatively, should the doctor remain as an observer and, if it were clinically possible, someone to administer further pain-relieving drugs? Not doing anything is clearly not an option. Both courses of action might seem harrowing to the person seeking assisted dying, but it is something that they should clearly discuss with the doctor, because these situations could really happen.

There are clearly no easy answers to these questions, but if applicants are to take an informed choice over assisted dying and if we want to provide autonomy, they must know that these questions exist and they must discuss them with their doctors. We have talked a lot about autonomy for people with serious illness. Those people will not have autonomy unless they are informed in accurate detail about the possible outcomes of assisted dying, and these amendments would ensure that.

Ultimately, if someone takes a drug to end their life, they will either die or not die and be left in a compromised state. Are they then escalated to A&E, because leaving them in that state is not an option for any doctor—or does the doctor proceed to administer more drugs? What does the doctor do?

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend raises a really important point. As clause 9 says, the doctor has an obligation to discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications, so that conversation would have happened with the patient. To be clear, the doctor cannot intervene to expediate the patient’s death. That is very clear in the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. Actually, clause 9(2)(c) covers the complications but does not state clearly what would happen in the event of those complications. Would the patient still want to carry on down that path?

[Kim Leadbeater]

To be clear, it does say

“discuss with the person their wishes”.

That includes whether they would want the doctor to call an ambulance if things got complicated, or whether they would want to be left—so the doctor would discuss with the patient their wishes in that situation. Fortunately, it does not happen very often.

[Naz Shah]

Yes, fortunately not. I am not convinced that the clause covers it. I will go back to that, but I have just read it because the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley raised it and I support his amendment, and somebody else raised it earlier.

I am not convinced that the complications are covered, because the clause does not set it out. In the usual sense, complications are side effects from medications. We have research and literature given to us and we understand the potential side effects. In this instance, we do not have a yardstick. I do not know whether the Minister can speak about the Government’s intentions—it would be helpful to have an impact assessment—and whether any research has been done in this area.

I am not convinced that clause 9(2)(c) actually covers this point, and I think the amendment would make the Bill much stronger. Ultimately, these drugs have not been tested—and for a very good reason, because they lead to death. We are in unchartered territory. When we are doing things that we have not done before, we cannot just pick and choose what we apply an analogy to. We need to be careful. We really need to consider the options to make this clause in particular much stronger.

[Jack Abbott]

I completely understand what my hon. Friend is saying about what may need to happen in respect of medical intervention, but I gently point out that the amendment would not cover that. It does not spell out in any way, shape or form what a medical intervention would look like. It says that there needs to be a random discussion, but it does not lay out any sense of the medical intervention. I do not see how the amendment will do what my hon. Friend is looking for.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. As drafted, the Bill does not include effects. All it says is “complications”. It does not include the potential effects of the drugs that will be used. That is how the amendment would strengthen the Bill.

[Danny Kruger]

We might appear to be dancing on a pinhead, but this goes to the heart of the question about what on earth we do in the event of complications. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley says, the Bill as drafted says that discussions should be had about wishes in the event of complications. That might simply be, “Do you want us to call somebody? Do you want us to try to make you more comfortable?” The amendment would require a discussion of escalation—what further medical interventions might be appropriate in the event of complications arising. There is a huge question for us, which we have not yet had answered, about what on earth should be the range of options for a doctor. The importance of the amendment is to specify that there may be further medical interventions in the event of complications. Does the hon. Lady agree that that is the value of it?

[Naz Shah]

I completely agree with the hon. Member. He said it much better than I did in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, so I thank him for that.

[Dr Opher]

I will be brief, because I think we have discussed this enough. I totally agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury. Patients need to be informed about the procedure—there is no argument about that—and I approve of the first three amendments in this group.

Let me say a bit about data. I met the pharmacist from Australia who is in charge of assisted dying and he had data on 2,500 assisted dying patients. The data is clear: all the patients died—no one survived. Almost everyone immediately goes to sleep, which can be a problem, because if they do not take all the medicine, it causes a slight difficulty that I will explain in a minute. Fifty per cent died within 30 minutes, 70% within an hour and 95% within two hours. One patient survived for 21 hours because she had not taken the full dose because she fell asleep; that is a potential problem. All these things should be described, and are routinely described to patients in Australia.

The first thing, then, is that we have plenty of data. The second thing I want to say is that we are dealing with the end of life. I have sat with patients as they have died; I have sometimes seen people being a little bit sick. We know how to cope with that. We do not need to specify how we cope with someone who is dying, because we have done it many, many times. I do not think amendment 306 will add anything to the Bill because it is part of what doctors do normally.

[Naz Shah]

I am genuinely trying to understand and would like my hon. Friend to clarify. He says that doctors generally do this anyway, but the difference is that, in this instance, somebody has chosen to die. Generally, when doctors do anything they are trying to save patients, are they not? The general rule of thumb is that a doctor saves lives. In this instance, they are not doing that because the patient wants death.

[Dr Opher]

We are not doing that in situations of terminal care—we are allowing someone to die. We are very experienced in allowing people to die. I have done it for 25 years. It is not a new skill just because we have the assisted dying element. We deal with the situation as it arises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Amendment 93 relates to the discussion during the assessment that the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor are required to have with the person. The amendment would require that each of those doctors, during their assessment, must discuss the nature of the substance that “is to be provided” to the patient to end their life, rather than the substance that “might be provided”.

On amendment 305, clinicians in all areas are expected to work with patients to make decisions about their care and treatment as part of a shared decision-making process, including by discussing the risks, benefits and possible consequences of different options. The Committee may wish to note that the GMC’s “Good medical practice” states that when discussing a patient’s condition doctors must discuss with patients

“the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about, and likelihood of success for each option.”

[Naz Shah]

That is the very point I am struggling with. Generally speaking, the GMC guidelines are absolutely right, and doctors are saving lives and making the person better. In this instance, somebody might have complications and they might vomit, for example—that happens a lot because people are unconscious. What does the clinician then do? Do they proceed with an assisted death, or do they get the person into A&E? I am trying to understand the answer to that question, and I hope the Minister can respond.

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend will know that the Bill states that the assessing doctor must discuss with the individual

“their wishes in the event of complications”,

which could include medical interventions. What is also absolutely clear is that the Bill precludes the doctor from making any intervention, vis-à-vis the patient, that may lead to the patient’s death. The Bill is based on self-administration, not on administration by the doctor. By definition, the actions that can be taken by the doctor are things like calling an ambulance; they would not be things like escalating the substance that has been used in order to bring about the death of the patient. I hope that is clear to my hon. Friend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

Those might be appropriate reasons; I hope that can be specified. The crucial thing is that if there is an unwillingness—not an incapacity but an unwillingness—to proceed, that is of some concern. It is not that they are no longer able to do it—possibly for the reasons that the hon. Lady suggested—but if there is an actual unwillingness to proceed, what is the reason?

On amendment 309, if the first doctor is replaced for whatever reason, surely it is imperative that the new doctor conduct their own assessment, rather than taking the previous doctor’s word for it. A doctor is legally responsible, obliged under all medical regulation and law for their actions, and they cannot rely on a previous assessment. If the first doctor gave up the case because of some kind of incapacity—an illness, or, indeed, their demise—it might be that their own judgment was impaired at the time. I would have thought it was obvious that the new doctor should take responsibility for conducting an assessment and proceeding with full responsibility for the case.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendment 309 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. The amendment proposes that if a doctor changes, there should be a reassessment of the patient. My understanding is that that is in line with current practice: if a doctor is changed, the new doctor has to assess a patient to their own satisfaction because they cannot rely on just looking at notes. It is a sensitive issue where a doctor is required to make objective and subjective assessments, as has been agreed by the Committee to date, in clinical decision making. A clinician does not inherit the risk of another clinician without being satisfied themselves that the conclusion of another clinician aligns with their own.

For instance, the clinician has a responsibility to fulfil their own professional standards and their own duty of care. In the light of the significant impact of the decision, it is important that the doctor can be satisfied as they will need to consent to a patient having capacity and not being coerced. They cannot just take the word of another clinician who has managed the case before them. They themselves need to be satisfied. If a doctor does not do that and something goes wrong, and it comes to light that the patient did not have capacity, the clinician who is the new co-ordinating doctor would carry liability. It does not stand up if they say, “But someone else assessed that the patient had capacity” or, “Someone else said that the patient had not been coerced” if it comes to light later that they have.

This measure would therefore protect the clinician and ensure that the patient understood that a further assessment would need to take place. Having this measure in law would hopefully dissuade doctors from transferring their patients unless absolutely necessary for the continuity of care. It would also dissuade the clinician from taking on a new case if they were aware that continuity of care would be disrupted, due to, for example, a move.

[Stephen Kinnock]

This set of amendments relates to the Secretary of State’s ability to make provision, by regulations, for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor if they are unable to continue to carry out the functions of the co-ordinating doctor.

I will turn first to amendment 461. Clause 11, as currently drafted, provides the Secretary of State with a discretionary power to make regulations that provide for cases

“where, after a first declaration has been witnessed by the coordinating doctor, that doctor dies or through illness or otherwise is unable or unwilling to continue”.

Amendment 461 removes the “or otherwise”. The effect could be to limit scenarios in which the Secretary of State could make provision via regulations for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor. The Secretary of State could not provide for replacing the co-ordinating doctor in circumstances other than a doctor’s death or illness, which could include family issues or retirement. That would mean that the person seeking an assisted death may need to begin the process again.

Amendment 310 expands the list of matters that regulations made under subsection (1) may cover. That includes notifying the High Court of substitutions of the co-ordinating doctor, where the co-ordinating doctor is unable to continue to carry out their functions. It should be noted that clause 11 confers only a power, not a duty, on the Secretary of State to make regulations about replacing the co-ordinating doctor. It is not certain that the matter of a substitution of the doctor would be covered in those regulations.

The explanatory statement for amendment 309 suggests that the amendment aims to ensure that a replacement co-ordinating doctor is required to carry out a new assessment of the patient—in other words, to repeat the first assessment made under clause 7. The amendment requires that the regulations that may be made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) make provision for such cases. Although the Secretary of State has a power to make regulations to provide that the co-ordinating doctor be replaced by another doctor, that is not a requirement. The amendment assumes that there will be a replacement co-ordinating doctor, which is not a specific requirement of the legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to new clause 21, new clause 14, new clause 16, new schedule 2 and amendment (b) to new schedule 2. I will start with new clause 21—and have a break in between.

I oppose new clause 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I also wish to oppose new clauses 14, 15, 16 and 17, which between them set out the panel procedure to replace the use of a High Court judge, but I will focus my remarks on new clause 21. That is because, first, it is the most recently tabled of my hon. Friend’s new clauses on the panel. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it seems to be an attempt to solve some of the problems of the earlier new clauses.

I welcome what I think my hon. Friend’s intentions are with the new clauses. The Bill as drafted did not provide anything like adequate safeguards. The new clause states that the panel must hear from, and may then question, the doctors who made the certification, the applicant for assisted death, and any other person who may have relevant information. These moves are very welcome steps towards a tighter set of safeguards, but they are inadequate because of what they leave out.

Sir James Munby, the former president of the family division of the High Court of England and Wales, has written several times about the problems with the Bill. It is a matter of great regret to me that we did not hear from Sir James; I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley set out that he was invited to give evidence to the Committee. Sir James has expressed profound concern about the series of new clauses— new clauses 14, 15, 16 and 17—that my hon. Friend has tabled. He wrote that the new clauses did address some of the problems of the original Bill, but he went on:

“These changes are to be welcomed, so far as they go. It is important to recognise, however, that they do not, in my opinion, go anything like far enough.”

As I have said, some elements of new clause 21 do indeed address some of the problems that Sir James identified but, again, the new clause unfortunately still leaves many of the biggest problems untouched.

The Bill does not set out that evidence must be heard under oath. That is an extraordinary omission. Sir James Munby asks, in his most recent essay:

“is the panel to hear evidence on oath? Indeed, will the panel have power to administer an oath?”

We rightly expect our courts to hear evidence under oath if they deal with cases concerning property or contract. The matters the panels will be dealing with are far more important than that. It is baffling to me why we should hear evidence on these matters without making witnesses swear oaths to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Anyone speaking to one of these panels should do so with the same commitment to telling the truth as they would in a court of law.

[Danny Kruger]

rose—

[Danny Kruger]

Danny Kruger; we are easily confused. [Laughter.]

The hon. Lady talks about the question of oaths, and it is extraordinary. Does she agree that it speaks to the confusion about whether the panels are a judicial construct at all? They have a judicial function—they exercise a judicial responsibility—but they are composed of non-lawyers. Maybe that explains why there is no oath, but I agree with the hon. Lady that there should be one. Does it not speak to the confusion in the new clause?

[Naz Shah]

As I make progress, I will speak to that point, but I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern. I will return to my speech and expand on the point when I arrive at that juncture.

Sir James goes on to say that there are even graver problems with the panel procedure. I appreciate that his paper was published before new clause 21 was tabled, but it does not address all the concerns he raised. He referred particularly to new clause 16, but it is relevant to note that the problem he identified is left untouched by new clause 21. Sir James says of new clause 16:

“It says very little about the procedures to be adopted for testing and, if need be, challenging the evidence”.

He goes on to say that

“it says nothing about who should exercise that function; nor about the nature of any independent evidential investigation and nothing about who is to undertake this and who is to pay for it.”

Finally on this point, he says that new clause 16

“says nothing about what, if any, public funding arrangements there will be for the applicant, the two doctors, and any other parties or expert or lay witnesses.”

The first point raised by Sir James is an extraordinary one. The panels will bring together three people: a lawyer, a consultant psychiatrist and a social worker. They will sit on what is a quasi-judicial body. The latter two will not necessarily have any experience of questioning witnesses and assessing evidence as part of a quasi-judicial process. The first person—the lawyer—will have such experience. What is going to happen? Are we just hoping that they will successfully make it up as they go along? Is there not a danger that in some cases the non-legal members of the panel end up deferring to the wishes of the lawyer, who has more experience in these matters?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I appreciate the point my hon. Friend is making, and it is a shame that we did not hear from James Munby in evidence. I understand why he says that: he is looking at it through a judicial lens, because he is a judge. But this is not a judicial entity. It is a panel—it is not a court—and the range of expertise on it is actually a strength, not a weakness.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

As I make progress I will address some my hon. Friend’s points—I have a fairly long speech—but I will say now that when the Bill passed on Second Reading, one of the safeguards was that it included judicial oversight. That is very different to what we are talking about now.

[Danny Kruger]

This is a very important point, and I am grateful for the hon. Member for Spen Valley’s admission that this is not a judicial process. We have constantly been told that the Bill has been gold-plated with the judicial stage of the application process, but we have now heard that there is not a judicial stage. We have also heard that this is “judge-plus” and somehow an improvement—it is a judge and others—but we should be clear that there is not necessarily a judge in the process, and it is very unlikely that there would be. We have just heard conclusively that the judicial stage of the process in the Bill has been dropped.

[Naz Shah]

I agree: there is not a judicial process, so to speak. There most definitely is not. As I make progress, I will outline my concerns about that very clearly.

Let us take the second point raised by Sir James. He asked who will go about

“testing and, if need be, challenging the evidence”?

New clause 21 finally gives the panel the power to call people to give evidence who are neither the applicant nor the doctor. New clause 21(4) says that the panel

“may hear from and may question any other person”

and

“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

I welcome that as a start, because it acknowledges that there will be cases in which people other than the applicant and the doctors have vital information. But that really should not be where we finish—not if we want a genuinely robust assisted dying Bill with strong safeguards for vulnerable people.

The ability of the panel to hear evidence from other parties would indeed be one step towards detecting whether people are, for example, being coerced towards an assisted death. That would be one step towards being able to detect whether people were choosing assisted death because of a lack of palliative care or social care. But how will the panels know which witnesses are most likely to have or be aware of the significant evidence they seek?

The panel members will have the statements by the applicant and the doctors, and they will have the answers to any questions they have of the applicant and the doctors. I ask Members to think through how certain it is that those sources alone will be enough to find all the people who might have significant knowledge of a person’s circumstances. I would argue that it will not be certain. Yes, in some cases there will be no hidden circumstances that a panel would hear of from a witness only if they were called, but in other cases there will be, and those circumstances are much more likely to occur in the cases of people who are coerced or who feel like a burden to their families. They will be more likely to occur for those who have poor mental health, who are isolated, or who lack the social care they need. The panels are not likely to find witnesses with relevant information if what they have to go on is the statement of witness evidence of a person who has, for example, been successfully and skilfully coerced.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

New clause 21(4)(e) says that the panel

“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

Does my hon. Friend not agree that the expertise of the three panel members, as set out in the new clause, will mean they will very much have the ability to identify, on the basis of that subsection, the kind of individuals and the knowledge required?

[Naz Shah]

As I have stated before—I will make reference to that very point later—I would argue the safeguards are just not robust enough.

There should be a mechanism for trained and experienced people to find witnesses who might have relevant information. This could relate to another criticism that Members have made of the panel system: there is no provision for the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of the applicant. Sir James Munby argues that we should strongly consider this, saying that

“there must be a rigorous procedure in every case for testing and if need be challenging the evidence, including an independent evidential investigation, perhaps by the Official Solicitor, of the kind discussed in Conway. There are two reasons why this is essential in every case…Without this, it will not be proper for a judge to be involved in the process as a member of the panel.”

He goes on to make it plain that by “judge” he means the legal member of the panel.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I appreciate that this is slightly difficult to get our heads around, but we have legal expertise—we potentially have a judge, a sitting judge, a retired judge or an eminent KC—but they are not there in their capacity as a judge. I understand that that is tricky for people to understand, but they are there because of their skillset. That is the important distinction.

[Naz Shah]

That is the very distinction I am trying to highlight further, because the panel takes away the judicial oversight. Yes, they have expertise—there is no question about people’s expertise—but Sir James Munby says clearly that these people will not be sitting in their capacity as judges, as my hon. Friend just outlined, but just as experts. That does not provide judicial oversight. That is not what the panel does.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that is the whole point: Sir James Munby said he did not think that was the job for the judge.

[Naz Shah]

I will go into this in even greater detail in later speeches, but I will say now that although the process was not fit for purpose, Sir James Munby also says that this one is not fit for purpose. Neither process gives us the legal aspect—if anything, the Bill has been watered down. As I make progress, I will outline how I think Sir James Munby’s evidence is clear that the safeguard has been watered down. I appreciate the mood in the room while I insist on talking about this, but it is very, very important, because when we voted in the House to send the Bill to Committee, one of the biggest reasons why we did so was judicial oversight. Many Members have said that they let the Bill get to this stage because of that.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Naz Shah]

I will make some progress. As it is, we have removed the judicial oversight. I appreciate what my hon. Friend says about the panels having expertise, but that is not judicial oversight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson]

I think my hon. Friend just said that the amendments would allow the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of the applicant. Why would that strengthen the process?

[Naz Shah]

I think that by making some progress I will answer that question.

Turning to Sir James Munby’s question about what, if any, public funding arrangements there will be for the applicant, the two doctors and any other parties, experts or lay witnesses, each time a panel meets we will be asking three senior professionals to give up many hours of their time to scrutinise applications, listen to and perhaps question witnesses, and then decide whether to call further witnesses. I could ask many questions about funding, but I will ask just one at the moment. Both Ministers will be well aware that courts and tribunals in England and Wales face lengthy delays—in some cases, delays of years. Will the Government commit to adequately funding the panel so that applicants do not face lengthy delays?

Another question about the resourcing of the panels is just as important: can we make good on the commitment in the Bill to provide a consultant psychiatrist for every panel? I think the answer may well be no. We spoke to the Royal College of Psychiatrists during our evidence sessions, but at that stage my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley had not tabled the amendments that would create a panel including a consultant psychiatrist, so we did not ask the professional body whether it would be able to do so.

I have had private conversations with my team of senior psychiatrists. We asked whether England and Wales had enough consultant psychiatrists to serve on each panel. They said it was extremely unlikely. I would like to understand whether my hon. Friend consulted the Royal College of Psychiatrists before she tabled those amendments. If she did not, that seems an extraordinary omission.

Ministers keep saying that the Government will release an impact assessment only when the Committee has finished amending the Bill. I say again: that seems to me a most unsatisfactory approach to a Bill that would lead to such a huge change. Surely the Minister could ask civil servants to prepare a preliminary estimate of how many applicants there might be in England and Wales. It should probably be phrased as a likely minimum and likely maximum number. That would be extremely helpful. Surely the Government could do the preliminary work on whether the psychiatric profession in England and Wales is capable of meeting that demand. I say this in the light of my understanding that the present state of the country’s judiciary contributed to the removal of the judge in the first instance.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Just to be clear, that was not the reason for the change. We need to be very clear about that. The reason for the change was that it strengthens the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

That was not my understanding; I will come back to that point, because I am sure I have references to where that has been talked about. There is also the question of whether panels should be heard in public. Under new clause 16, the legal member of a panel would decide whether it should sit in public.

Finally, I return to Sir James Munby’s paper on this question. As I have gone through in some detail, he raised significant concerns about panel procedures set out in new clauses 14 to 17. Unfortunately, it seems to me that most of those concerns have not been addressed by new clause 21. Sir James was a very senior judge, who headed the family division of the High Court, and is someone we should listen to with the utmost attention on these matters. He said:

“I appreciate that some may point to the multidisciplinary membership of the panel and to an assumption that the function and process of the panel may (it is said) be inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Plainly, it might be thought, it is an advantage that the panel has a multidisciplinary membership, and it is often said that three heads are better than one. Yet it would be a mistake to think that either of these features of what is now proposed are sufficient to overcome the very real problems I have identified. They are not. What remains crucial is the substance, not mere appearances. If the panel is to perform its function effectively and do more than just ‘check the paperwork’—if it is to be the real safeguard intended by its proponents—then its processes must be much more thorough than is currently proposed.”

[Lewis Atkinson]

Has my hon. Friend had the opportunity to consider the functioning of mental health tribunals, which operate as panels in a very similar way to this proposal: chaired by a legal member with a specialist member and a medical member? They perform a similar quasi-judicial function, receive evidence and make important decisions on people’s healthcare choices. Does she not agree that that model provides a good example of how this system could work?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend’s intervention takes us back to the concerns I already have. I understand that mental health tribunals relate to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which would inform people on that panel in making their judgments. I have spoken extensively against the use of the Mental Capacity Act in this particular field.

[Lewis Atkinson]

I thank my hon. Friend for engaging on this issue, but this is not about the Mental Capacity Act; it is about the Mental Health Act 1983 and whether someone would be sectioned and denied liberty—a significant decision against the person’s own wishes. That determination is made by mental health tribunals sitting in that judicial function, day in, day out, with exactly the sort of panel membership outlined here.

[Naz Shah]

I either misheard my hon. Friend or did not understand his earlier point, so let me speak to the point he makes now. My understanding is that sectioning someone under the Mental Health Act is a very extreme measure. Someone is sectioned in circumstances in which lots and lots of evidence has been taken from people who know the person, and there is a history. That was certainly the case when I chaired a mental health charity. Whether it is carers or other people who contribute to that, there is a long-standing relationship; from my understanding, it is very rare for something to happen otherwise. That is my understanding and experience of it, but I am happy to have a chat with my hon. Friend to talk more about it and understand it more.

[Danny Kruger]

Does the hon. Lady agree that the intervention of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central is very helpful because it highlights the difference between a genuine judicial tribunal, as he suggests, and what is being proposed here? This is not a tribunal. It would not sit in a judicial capacity. Its members would not take oaths in the way that members of a tribunal do. They are not appointed through the independent appointments process that tribunals have. This is a multidisciplinary team masquerading as some sort of final judicial stage, without the proper accountability of a judicial stage. On that basis, we cannot regard it as any sort of improvement to the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for reminding me of that; I talked about that earlier. I agree with him that this is about the legalities. Ultimately, it comes back to judicial oversight, which is what was promised originally. That is why judges were part of the original proposals for the Bill. The words we must listen to are Sir James Munby’s. If we want an assisted dying Bill with real safeguards for the vulnerable, then we should reject new clauses 14 to 17 and new clause 21. They are not thorough enough to do the job.

[The Chair]

I should let the hon. Member know that I am happy for her to make five speeches, as she has indicated, but each one needs to be specific to the clause and not replicating the previous speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Given my hon. Friend’s expertise, does he anticipate JR being allowed in the panel setting? If so, would it be before the death or after? Can the decision by the panel be judicially reviewed?

[Jake Richards]

In my mind, any decision to give a certificate of eligibility could be subject to judicial review.

Third parties can put evidence before the panel to be considered, but it is not right that third parties might challenge the application. As I have set out before, this is not a dispute but a rigorous safeguarding process. If they have information about the person’s capacity, their diagnosis or any other relevant factors, they can and must ensure that the panel—if not the doctors or indeed the police—be seized of the information. Third parties can appeal the decision by way of judicial review. That would provide for a decision that was

“wrong, or…unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings”,

per amendment (a) to new clause 17. An injunction would be applied and the matter would have to be dealt with expeditiously. It is worth saying that all the evidence suggests that that would happen incredibly rarely. In Spain—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Naz Shah for part 2.

[Naz Shah]

Part 2 of five, I might add, Mrs Harris.

I rise to oppose new clause 14 from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. The clause would create the post of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. It is quite an extraordinary clause, and I am not sure we have seen anything like it in recent legislation. What I am sure of is that we have not seen a law as far-reaching as this introduced without any of the detailed work that should have been done on it by the civil service.

The voluntary assisted dying commissioner—I will call them the VAD commissioner—created by the new clause would have unusual powers. The commissioner would select the members of the panel, who would in turn decide on people’s assisted dying applications. The commissioner would be the authority to whom people could appeal if their application was refused. The commissioner would also decide if particular panel members had made any mistakes or shown any misconduct in their work.

In this country, we do not give one person the job of selecting judges, overseeing their work and then functioning as a court of appeal, even if that one person is extremely well qualified. That is for good reason. But the new clause suggests giving all those powers to one person. Hon. Members might object and say that the comparison is not exact, and that there will be fewer assisted dying cases heard by the proposed new panels than there are cases heard before the courts, but that misses the point. We do not put all the powers over the judiciary into the hands of one man or woman because it would be a lot of work for them. No, we do not do that, because we do not wish to put too much power into the hands of any one person. However, under the new clause, we would do exactly that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

This conversation is very helpful, and the point the hon. Lady makes is absolutely right. If we are going to rely on JR as a sort of appeal process, we need to make it clear how that would work. Would there be legal aid? How quickly could these things be done? I think that that needs to be built in. Does she agree?

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree that we have not thought this through enough, because that process has not been laid out. We really need to think about these potential eventualities.

When such cases happen, the public, including family members of the person who has died, will rightly demand answers, and so will the media. They will want to know who the panel members were and why they made the judgment they did. In such cases, who would investigate whether panel members had got it wrong? The commissioner who had appointed them? The commissioner, or any person, no matter how honest and how learned, would come back to that question with a very strong bias. The commissioner will mark their own homework. That is not a system that anyone can argue will provide proper safeguards.

Hon. Members might object that the voluntary assisted dying commissioner will be a very senior judge. According to the new clause, the commissioner

“must hold or have held office as a judge of—

the Supreme Court

the Court of Appeal, or

the High Court.”

I agree that only people of high intelligence and good standing become judges in those courts, but that does not mean that the very highest judges in the land do not sometimes make mistakes—sometimes very bad ones.

[Jack Abbott]

If we follow that argument, does that mean that we would support the new clauses? If we are moving from that single point of reference—a High Court judge and judicial review—it is surely much safer to move to what is proposed.

[Naz Shah]

The truth is—I said this in my previous speech, which I will not repeat, as instructed by you, Mrs Harris—that neither of the safeguards is strong enough. As it was, the Bill was not strong enough—that has been recognised and changes have been proposed—but neither is the idea of a commissioner.

There is another great problem raised by this set of changes to the Bill: they seem likely to increase the prospect of group-think when it comes to members of the panel. I would argue that that danger has been greatly increased by the move away from the High Court judge model that was originally in the Bill.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley introduced the Bill on Second Reading, she reassured the House that all assisted dying applications would have to be examined by a High Court judge. There were problems with that proposal, which is why she abandoned it. But there was one strength in making a High Court judge the arbiter: the Crown does not appoint High Court judges on the basis of whether they agree with assisted dying. We could all reasonably expect High Court judges to have a range of views on assisted dying; there is no reason I can think of that would mean that High Court judges, as a body, were biased in favour of assisted dying.

Something different will happen if a commissioner selects people to serve on these panels. Anyone serving on a panel will know that they will have to approve some applications for assisted death. We do not know how many applications for assisted death the Government expect to have. We also do not know how many social workers, psychiatrists and lawyers would be unwilling to approve any assisted death applications at all—I do not want to repeat myself, but I will be referring back to psychiatrists in another amendment. However, the number of psychiatrists who are strongly opposed to assisted death is very high, according the Royal College of Psychiatrists. We have also heard strong reservations expressed by the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers. Therefore, many professionals will choose not to sit on these panels, because they will not want to approve any cases. That means that some panel members are likely to end up dealing with dozens of cases per year. That poses the danger that some of the people who sit most on these panels will be advocates of assisted dying and will approve applications that other members may not have.

[Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for discussing her view of the approach of the proposed panel members. Does she recognise that all three of those professions have professional requirements to act with integrity and in accordance with the law? It is highly unlikely that they will push forward, as she seems to suggest, and risk their professional accreditation.

[Naz Shah]

I am not questioning people’s integrity; I am putting it to the Committee that people have biases. We all have subconscious biases. We have things that we like; we know that that exists, whether it is a subconscious bias or a conscious bias. As human beings, we all have that. In this instance, I am suggesting that if we have members of a panel who choose to be there because they have a fundamental belief, which is different from that of those who oppose assisted dying, there is a risk of subconscious bias and group-think.

[Rachel Hopkins]

rose—

[Jake Richards]

rose—

[Naz Shah]

I am happy to take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire, and then I will come to my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley.

[The Chair]

Order. I call Rachel Hopkins for an intervention, but we need to keep to the point and not labour one particular thing.

[Rachel Hopkins]

The point I was making was that no professional would want to risk their professional accreditation and career by allowing a complete bias to take over any decision making. In fact, I would suggest that some may want to prove their integrity by being involved in these decisions and making them in line with their professional practice.

[Naz Shah]

I disagree with my hon. Friend. Subconscious bias operates in society; this is not about being held to account. People are not doing these things deliberately, but because they have a subconscious bias.

[Jake Richards]

My hon. Friend is making a fine speech. She said that High Court judges make mistakes, which is undoubtedly true. She also said that the panel may be guilty of unconscious bias. Is there any layer of scrutiny that would satisfy her? What does she think about jury trials?

[The Chair]

Could the hon. Lady make progress now, please?

[Naz Shah]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, but I reject the facetiousness of his point.

Let me speak to the issue of unconscious bias in relation to the proposal before us. In 1992, there was a jury trial, which found my mother guilty of murdering an abusive partner. In 1998, I went to the High Court and put it to three white middle-class judges that my mother could not tell the truth because of the abuse, the dishonour and the concept of izzat, which defined her existence as a woman. They were not capable of believing that, because they did not have that cultural understanding —so, yes, unconscious bias does exist, even in criminal cases in courts of law.

Returning to my argument, I remind hon. Members of the testimony of Dr Ryan Spielvogel from California, who said:

“when I am going through the options with patients who are newly diagnosed with a serious life-threatening illness, I say, ‘Okay, here’s what disease-directed treatment would look like. We can continue with your chemo. Here are some side effects and complications that you might have, and here are the benefits of that. Here’s what palliative care or hospice care would look like.’ Then I say, ‘I don’t know if you know this, but in our state we have this other option for people nearing the end of their lives when they have intolerable suffering. You can ask me to fill a lethal prescription for you to help end your suffering sooner.’…The number of times that people look at me and say, ‘You can do that? That’s an option here?’ is astounding. I would say that nine out of 10 of patients I have conversations with have no idea that that is even legal. If they do not know it is an option, they are never going to ask for it.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 105, Q143.]

I wonder whether I would be comfortable—this is just a personal thing, but I want to put it out there for people to think about—about a doctor such as that, who really supports assisted dying, being on the panel. I am not casting aspersions on him, but I genuinely am unsure.

Of course, the panel will be chaired by lawyers. I would like to remind hon. Members of the evidence of Professor Meredith Blake, who is a senior legal adviser to the Western Australian government on their assisted dying law. Professor Blake’s evidence was quite extraordinary. My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury asked her:

“Does it concern you that a large proportion of people who opted for assisted dying cited being a burden as their reason?”

She replied:

“That is not the evidence that we have got.”

My hon. Friend responded:

“Let me just clarify. The state’s own report in 2023-24 had 35%.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 220, Q284.]

I do not recall having a satisfactory answer from Professor Blake to that question, but please feel free to check Hansard.

If we see a series of questionable decisions by one or more panel member, the only official scrutiny will come from the person who appointed them to do their jobs, and that is not a robust safeguard. Furthermore, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said earlier that decisions would be unanimous, but that is not entirely correct, and I am happy to point to the relevant bit in the Bill. If two people decide they agree, and the other decides to stay quiet, that would be seen as a unanimous decision, and the panel would proceed. I am happy to point that bit of the Bill out to my hon. Friend, as I would love to see an amendment if one were needed.

[Danny Kruger]

I think the point the hon. Lady is making is that each member of the panel has a veto over the decision so, in a sense, there has to be unanimity about the approval. However, she is absolutely right that if two members disagree with one another about any other aspect of their proceedings, including who to invite to give evidence, they could be overruled, so there is not unanimity there.

[Naz Shah]

I completely agree. That is the case in the Bill, which raises concerns.

Finally, Parliament needs to get back into the habit of holding powerful commissioners accountable. There is no mechanism in the Bill for removing a commissioner even if they somehow failed significantly in their duties. We might say to ourselves, “If that happened, they would do the right thing and resign,” or, “They would resign if the Prime Minister said something in public.” I am sorry, but we cannot leave that to chance.

There has been a very telling example recently of just how badly quasi-judicial institutions can fail, and just how hard it is to get their senior leadership to accept responsibility. The Criminal Cases Review Commission mishandled the Andrew Malkinson case. Mr Malkinson was falsely convicted of raping a woman in 2003. She had been raped by another man.

[The Chair]

Order. Can the hon. Lady keep to the issue?

[Naz Shah]

This relates to my point, Mrs Harris, I promise you. DNA evidence subsequently proved that Andrew Malkinson was indeed innocent, yet he was allowed to remain in jail.

Members of this House expressed serious disquiet about the conduct of the chairwoman of the CCRC, Helen Pitcher, over the Malkinson case. In July last year, my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary called for Ms Pitcher to step down, but she refused to do so and remained in office until January. I note that Ms Pitcher remains chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission—and that is where the link is.

[Jack Abbott]

My hon. Friend is saying that there is no mechanism to remove the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. Actually, paragraph 4(5) of new schedule 1 says:

“The Secretary of State may by notice in writing remove a person from the office of Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if satisfied that the person—

(a) has behaved in a way that is not compatible with their continuing in office”—

I think that addresses a lot of the concerns that she has been expressing—

“or

(b) is unfit, unable or unwilling to properly discharge their functions.”

There is a mechanism in the new schedule that would give the Secretary of State the power to remove the commissioner.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for pointing that out, and I will look at it, but that was not my understanding.

There are multiple reasons to oppose new clause 21. With it, the Bill will reduce the impartiality that would have been provided by having a High Court judge rule on applications. It will increase the risk that a large number of decisions are taken by people who are enthusiastic proponents of assisted dying, which will reduce patient safety. It will also create a powerful new commissioner, who will appoint panel members and will then rule on whether they have made the right decision. That same commissioner will also be able to decide whether to overturn a panel’s decision to reject an assisted death application. That is a huge amount of power to put in one person’s hands and we should not do so. I urge hon. Members to reject the new clause.

[Sean Woodcock]

May I say what a privilege it is to have you in the Chair, Mrs Harris? [Laughter.] Clearly, I know how to win and lose an audience.

I rise to speak to amendment (d) to new clause 21, which has been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North. I will start by saying how glad I am that the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, has recognised some of the concerns regarding the multidisciplinary panel, and I welcome the improvements that she has made in the new clause.

I am pleased that the panel “must” now hear from the person to whom the referral relates, whereas previously it was the case that the panel “may” hear from them. That is a partial concession, but an important one. It will allow the commissioner to have greater scrutiny over the application and better assess the person’s eligibility for assisted dying.

Amendment (d) is a technical amendment. We have discussed a number of such amendments before in this Committee, many of which have fallen for reasons that I understand, even if I do not agree with them, including on the basis that doctors are already having these conversations and we do not want to police them. The panel stage is brand new; given that and given the level of public scrutiny of the Bill, I make no apology for supporting putting something into primary legislation to say what is expected of this process. It is very important that we make sure from the off that we get things right.

I am deeply concerned about some of the potential oversights in the panel model. The purpose of the panel is to provide meaningful scrutiny of a person’s application. The panel draws on a wider range of experts to assess the complex aspects of the application, such as assessing for coercion and capacity. However, the panel’s ability to fulfil this scrutinising role is in many ways quite limited.

Amendment (d), which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, would address the significant oversights in new clause 21. It would introduce a far more comprehensive set of requirements for the panel in its review. Those changes are not barriers to access; rather, the amendment would ensure that the panel has a far wider range of information—a theme to which I referred earlier—on which to review the application for an assisted death. Fundamentally, the amendment would give the panel more tools to conduct meaningful scrutiny.

However, let me list what the panel is not required to do under new clause 21. It does not have to hear from one of the two registered medical practitioners. It will hear from the other registered medical practitioner, perhaps via audio link, but it does not have to question them. Likewise, it will hear from the person, perhaps via audio link, but it does not have to question them. The person may have a proxy to sign their declarations, but the panel does not have to hear from or question the proxy. The panel does not have to hear from or question any other person. Let us be clear who that includes: the panel could assess the person’s application without any information from the person’s relatives, family members, friends, social workers or care workers.

New clause 21 states only that the panel

“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

Subsection (4) makes it clear that, whereas paragraphs (a) to (c) require the panel to hear by live audio from the person seeking assisted dying, the evidence that the panel chooses to take from anybody else could be in written form.

Let me draw out with an example what that might mean in practice. A person is diagnosed with a terminal illness—in this case, heart failure arising from coronary heart disease. Both doctors approve the person’s application for assisted dying, on the balance of probability. The person has a physical disability and asks a proxy—a neighbour, say—to sign off the application. The first doctor speaks to the panel via video link restating the schedule forms and providing no new information. The panel then hears from the person, also via video link. It cannot see the person, but after hearing their statement it decides that it is satisfied that the conditions are met and approves the person’s assisted death.

The panel has not spoken to the second doctor and has not put any questions to the second doctor or to the person applying for an assisted death. Incredibly, the panel has not spoken to the proxy, who may just be someone of good standing in the community. Nor has it spoken to the person’s relatives, to anyone standing to benefit from the person’s death or to anyone in the person’s care. Any one of those people could have concerns that the person is being coerced into an assisted death. They may even have evidence of coercive behaviour. However, at no point is the panel required to consider speaking to any of those people.

Time and again, the Committee has heard from experts that coercion and controlling behaviour can be extremely difficult to detect. Often, the person will not reveal that they are suffering from that form of coercion, yet it is often those who are closest to the sufferer—a close relative, a member of the family or a social worker—who pick up the signals. Any of them could be looking out for the person’s welfare and noticing them becoming more isolated and emotionally manipulated by another. At no point, however, does the panel have to consider hearing from that person. If this Bill is going to do everything to safeguard against the risk of coercion, as everybody on this Committee believes it should, that should change.

The panel must consider listening to the people closest to the person. Amendment (d) to new clause 21, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, would address those flaws by giving the panel a higher standard of scrutiny. The panel would have to hear from and question both doctors. It would have to question the person, not simply hear from them. If the person has a proxy, as under clause 15, the panel would have to hear from and question that proxy. Crucially, the panel would have to consider hearing from and questioning persons properly interested, and any other person who has provided treatment or care for the person being assessed in relation to that person’s terminal illness. It would also be able to hear from and question any other person whom new clause 21 states can be asked to report to the panel.

The changes in the amendment would significantly improve the scrutiny provided by the multidisciplinary panel. It would provider a broader range and greater detail of evidence for the panel to base its review on. Ultimately, it would make the multidisciplinary review far more meaningful. Why is this greater scrutiny necessary? This is about protecting the vulnerable people who are easily forgotten. The amendment seeks to provide the strongest possible protection for them. This robust and comprehensive scrutiny is necessary to have a better chance of preventing the worst abuses.

I foresee one possible criticism from some hon. Members, which is that the amendment would slow down the decision-making process for people who are at no risk of coercion. That may well be true, but if the amendment is accepted, the panel would have to question both doctors, not just hear from one, and it would have to determine whether to hear from and question other people. In straightforward cases, in which the panel discovers no initial evidence that disquiets it, a small amount of time might be added to the hearing; in cases in which the panel finds evidence that means it may need to dig deeper, there could be a greater delay to the decision.

Personally, I do not see how we can avoid that. If we are serious about having safeguards to protect the most vulnerable, we should and must accept it. The process of vetting applications will take more time on average, and a lot more time in some cases, but the alternative is a simpler and faster system in which it will be much harder for the panel to detect coercion and other disqualifying factors. In that case, the chances will be higher that some coercive or abusive people will find it possible to push people towards an assisted death. Such a system is what we see in new clause 21, as drafted. We face an inescapable trade-off. We cannot lift protection for those who are most vulnerable to coercion because it would make the process easier for people who do not face that risk. I urge hon. Members seriously to consider supporting the amendment.