Criminal Finances Bill

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Wednesday 26th April 2017 Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords amendments

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I must draw the House’s attention to the fact that financial privilege is engaged by Lords amendments 11 and 33. If the House agrees to them, I will cause an appropriate entry to be made in the Journal.

Clause 1

Unexplained wealth orders: England and Wales and Northern Ireland

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to consider Lords amendments 2 to 147.

[Mr Wallace]

I just heard what you had to read through, Madam Deputy Speaker. I have 147 amendments, so I hope the Chair has changed by the time we have got through them. However, I do not think we will be taking them individually.

When we sent the Bill to the Lords some months ago, there was considerable cross-party consensus on its aims and measures. After exercising robust scrutiny, we made a number of amendments in this House, including the significant addition of the Magnitsky clause on gross human rights abuses and violations, which I believe significantly improves the legislation. I am pleased to say that the same consensus continued in the House of Lords and that the group before us consists only of Government amendments.

With Prorogation imminent, it is crucial that we get the many valuable powers in the Bill on to the statute book, including unexplained wealth orders, the seizure and forfeiture powers, and the offences of corporate failure to prevent tax evasion. I welcome the support of colleagues across the House to ensure that we can achieve that goal. Although there are 147 amendments in the group, I reassure hon. Members that they are to a great extent minor or technical changes that aim to enhance the operation of the Bill’s existing measures. I will briefly highlight some of the most significant measures.

Undoubtedly, the issue that received the most substantial scrutiny in the House of Lords was that of company ownership transparency in the British overseas territories with financial centres and the Crown dependencies. This topic is of great interest to right hon. and hon. Members in this House. As part of our international efforts to increase corporate transparency, the Government continue to work closely with our overseas territories and Crown dependencies to combat corruption and ensure that they implement the commitments they have made on law enforcement access to beneficial ownership data by the deadline of June this year.

I met the Chief Ministers of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man earlier this week to discuss their progress, and pressed again our ambition for transparent registers. Yesterday, I co-chaired a meeting of peers and the London representatives of the overseas territories, so that they could update us on their efforts so far.

Once the commitments have been implemented, they will put the UK and our overseas territories and Crown dependencies well ahead of most jurisdictions in terms of transparency, including many of our G20 partners and other major corporate and financial centres, including some states in the United States. As I have said previously, we should be proud of that fact and of the progress we have made since the anti-corruption summit last year. These arrangements will prevent criminals from hiding behind anonymous shell companies and bring significant benefits in terms of the capacity and information that UK law enforcement authorities will have at their disposal to tackle criminal activity and investigate bribery and corruption, money laundering and tax evasion.

It is right, however, that we review the effectiveness of the implementation to assess whether the arrangements are delivering the outcomes that we and our law enforcement agencies are after. That is why we amended the Bill in the House of Lords to require a statutory review of the progress made by the territories against their existing commitments. That report will be laid in Parliament, so that the House can revisit this issue as appropriate in due course.

Some peers and right hon. and hon. Members would have liked us to go further. However, as I have made clear, we are making considerable progress by working consensually with the territories and respect our constitutional settlements with them. The Government maintain that it would not be appropriate to force legislation on jurisdictions that are, to a great extent, self-governing. With Prorogation growing ever nearer, I welcome the fact that that amendment was strongly supported by peers of all parties. I trust that hon. Members will agree that it is a sensible way forward at this stage.

Turning to the provisions that were already in the Bill, we have made a number of amendments to the proposed operation of unexplained wealth orders. The hon. Members for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless) and for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin) raised concerns that the £100,000 threshold for the imposition of unexplained wealth orders could disadvantage law enforcement agencies in certain parts of the country, particularly where property values may be lower or the proceeds of crime more evenly shared out. The Northern Ireland Executive raised similar concerns. In the light of that, Lords amendments 2 and 15 will lower the threshold from £100,000 to £50,000, as was requested by the SNP. The threshold remains an important safeguard that will be considered by the court, along with other factors, before unexplained wealth orders can be made.

Following concerns raised in the Lords and by the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) in evidence to the Public Bill Committee, further amendments were made in the Lords to ensure that unexplained wealth orders could be applied in relation to property held in trusts or other complex ownership arrangements, including through a foreign company. Those amendments will help to ensure that the orders have the greatest possible impact once law enforcement agencies can use them.

Lastly in relation to unexplained wealth orders, Lords amendments 11 and 33 provide for a compensation scheme in relation to the interim freezing orders that can accompany an order. Such a freezing order would be used to ensure that someone does not scarper while we go to court to put in place an order. We therefore need a compensation scheme, should the court decide an order is not appropriate. That is an important safeguard to circumscribe the use of such powers.

Hon. Members will recall that we extended the seizure and forfeiture powers in chapter 3 of part 1 on Report in the Commons to cover gaming vouchers and casino chips, following another concern raised by Opposition Members. Following a representation from the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway, Lords amendments 47 to 49 and 91 to 93 will also allow law enforcement agencies to seize a betting slip where they suspect that the funds used to place the bet are the proceeds of crime. Those provisions will be subject to the same safeguards as those on cash seizure, and we will work with bookmakers and their trade associations to ensure that the measures are used effectively. I trust that hon. Members will welcome that further expansion of the powers.

On a related issue, Lords amendments 69 to 71 will allow for legal expenses to be deducted from any property recovered under the seizure and forfeiture powers, helping to ensure that they function effectively in practice.

Following discussions with banks and other regulated bodies, Lords amendment 36 will extend the period in which companies can share information with each other to tackle money laundering. At present, information sharing can take place for 28 days from the initial notification; we are extending that to 84 days. That takes account of more complex cases where, for example, numerous banks may have relevant information. It is a further sign of this Government’s commitment to working in partnership with the private sector to tackle money laundering. It will help to ensure that the information sharing provisions underpin the incredibly important work of the joint money laundering intelligence taskforce.

As I said at the outset, there are a number of other Lords amendments in the group that provide for minor or technical changes to the existing provisions. I do not expect that any of them will provoke significant concern among hon. Members, but I would, as ever, be happy to address specific queries during my closing remarks.

I hope that the House agrees that the amendments that have been made in the Lords improve the Bill, which, as I have said, has been the subject of significant cross-party support throughout its passage. The Bill, as amended, will ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing and to work as effectively as possible with the private sector on those crucial national security priorities.

We must, of course, remember that the Bill is only one element of the Government’s wider approach to tackling corruption and other serious and organised crime. I referred in earlier debates to Labour’s Bribery Act 2010, which is another plank in the assault on corruption. That goes to the heart of how the Bill is part of a wider package and continual process of tackling corruption.

I was pleased that there was a call for evidence on the review of limited partnerships, which closed on 17 March 2017, as this allowed people to make their concerns known about the abuse of Scottish limited partnerships that we have all seen and that has been evidenced by The Herald newspaper throughout this process. I thank the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath, who has been an effective champion on this issue. I hope that, once the review is completed and we see the results, he and I will be in agreement about the next steps. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy officials are analysing the responses and expect to submit advice on options to Ministers shortly after the election.

The Ministry of Justice has conducted an initial call for evidence to examine the case for changes to the law on corporate criminality liability for wider forms of economic crime. It is considering the responses at present. We are also strengthening the supervisory regimes for the regulated sector, including proposals for a new office of professional body anti-money laundering supervision—OPBAS, I am told it is called—in the Financial Conduct Authority, to help ensure that the non-statutory supervisors comply with their obligations in the money laundering regulations.

The UK’s public register of beneficial ownership information—the first of its type in the G20—has been up and running since June 2016. Recently, we published proposals for a further public beneficial ownership register for foreign legal entities to increase the transparency of overseas investment in UK property and central Government procurement contracts. We are continuing to reform the suspicious activity report regime, including through investment in systems and processes to complement the legislative reforms. Following a commitment at last year’s anti-corruption summit, we have worked closely with civil society, businesses and practitioners to develop the first UK anti-corruption strategy.

I am pleased that we have reached this stage of the Bill’s consideration in such a constructive fashion. I invite the House to agree to the Lords amendments before us, so that this crucial legislation can be enacted without further delay.

Criminal Finances Bill

Natascha Engel Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 5—Unexplained Wealth Orders: award of costs—

“In Chapter 2 of Part 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, after section 362H insert—

‘362HB Unexplained Wealth Orders: award of costs

(1) Pursuant to Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules (The Court’s Case Management Powers) the High Court must make a costs capping order, in respect of—

(a) unexplained wealth orders under section 362A of this Act;

(b) interim freezing orders under section 262I of this Act.

(2) The High Court shall not have power to make an award for costs on the indemnity basis against enforcement authorities who bring an unsuccessful application for—

(a) unexplained wealth orders under section 362A of this Act;

(b) interim freezing orders under section 262I of this Act.

(3) For the purposes of this section “enforcement agencies” has the same meaning as in subsection 362A(7).’”

This new clause would prevent the courts from awarding uncapped costs on the indemnity basis against enforcement agencies where they have brought unsuccessful applications for unexplained wealth orders or interim freezing orders. It seeks to define such civil actions as within “exceptional circumstances” required for the purposes of Practice Direction 3F to Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules under which the court has the power to make a cost capping order.

Amendment 1, page 3, clause 1, leave out line 29.

This amendment would allow unexplained wealth orders to be issued to politically exposed persons in the United Kingdom and EEA States.

Government amendments 2 to 19.

Motion to transfer clause 12(3).

Government amendments 20 to 57 and 60 to 72.

[Mr Wallace]

We now come to a group of amendments relating to law enforcement investigative and recovery powers. It is primarily composed of Government amendments that I hope the House will agree are, for the most part, technical and uncontroversial. I therefore do not intend to linger on each of them, but I will quickly summarise the key amendments for the benefit of hon. Members.

New clause 8 and other consequential amendments remove the restriction on HMRC’s criminal powers being used for former revenue functions. This ring fence arose following the merger of Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue in 2005. In the intervening period, legislative changes have brought most major taxes within the scope of HMRC’s criminal justice powers, but there remain some anomalies. For example, investigators cannot use certain powers to fight stamp duty tax fraud. Fraud is a crime, regardless of which function of HMRC it is committed against, and the amendments will ensure that the necessary powers are available in all such cases. They do not provide HMRC with any new criminal justice powers.

Amendments 2 to 15, 70 and 71 relate to the power in clause 9 to allow an extension of the moratorium period in which law enforcement agencies can investigate a suspicious activity report before a transaction is allowed to proceed. These amendments will deliver a number of minor and technical improvements to this provision: they will allow an automatic extension to the moratorium period while a court hearing is awaited to make a decision on an application; they will help to ensure that a company does not provide any information to the customer whose transaction is subject to a suspicious activity report, other than the fact that an SAR has been made; they will allow immigration officers to apply for an extension; and they will allow for an explicit right of appeal in Northern Ireland.

The majority of the remaining amendments in this group—amendments 22 to 24, 26, 27, 29 to 38, 46, 47, 49 to 57, 60 to 69 and 72—clarify the operation of the seizure and forfeiture powers that the Bill adds to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Many of these changes are extremely technical in nature, but I will highlight a few of the more significant ones. They will allow the director general of the National Crime Agency to designate the level of senior officer that can authorise the use of certain powers—unlike in the police, no such designation currently exists in law. They will ensure that any interest accrued on forfeited funds while in the agency’s account is returned to the owner of the funds if that person successfully appeals against the forfeiture. They provide that, where the NCA has used the powers, and a court determines compensation should be paid, the NCA will be responsible for paying that compensation. They will introduce a duty on the police and others to consult the Treasury to ensure that the full range of terrorist asset-freezing powers are considered before exercising the related power provided by the Bill. They will require consultation with the devolved Administrations before the provisions in clause 12 relating to the seizure of gaming vouchers and betting slips are commenced. This will ensure that the provisions are implemented effectively in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

On the devolved Administrations, we hope the Scottish Parliament will approve their legislative consent motion on the Bill shortly. Although the Government assert that none of the provisions are devolved with respect to Wales, I note that the Assembly has already provided such a motion. The Government have had extensive discussions with the Northern Ireland Executive about the Bill, and plans were in place for a legislative consent motion to be considered by the Assembly—law enforcement authorities in Northern Ireland are keen to ensure they have access to the powers in the Bill—but the suspension of the Assembly prior to elections has prevented the motion from being pursued at this time. These are clearly extremely unusual circumstances, but the Government remain committed to the central principles of the Sewel convention. We will therefore commit not to commence provisions on matters devolved to Northern Ireland without the appropriate consents having been obtained. It is our intention to pick this up with the Executive, following those elections. It may not be possible to resolve this before the Bill receives Royal Assent. We are most likely to make further amendments to the Bill in the House of Lords to put beyond doubt that all the relevant provisions can be commenced at separate times for different areas of the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 2)—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).

(2) For the purposes of this clause—

“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—

(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;

(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;

(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of documents);

(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading);

(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false statements to auditors, misleading statements, and misleading the FCA);

(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property, facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal property).

“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” has the same meaning as in section 39.

(3) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(4) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.

(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

(7) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”

This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to certain offences listed in subsection (2).

New clause 4—Failure to prevent criminal financial offences in the UK—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a criminal financial offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with B.

(2) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the criminal financial offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(3) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing criminal financial offences.

(4) For the purposes of this clause—

“criminal financial offence” means an offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 [that could not be prosecuted under the offences created by sections 7 and 38 of this Act],

or, one of the offences listed below—

(a) an offence under section 1, 6 or 7 of the Fraud Act 2006;

(b) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968;

(c) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006;

(d) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;

(e) the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;

“relevant body” has the same meaning as in section 36.

(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”

This New Clause would create an offence of failing to prevent any financial offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

New clause 6—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in the Overseas Territories—

“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—

“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Overseas Territories

(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—

(a) this Act; and

(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017

to take the steps set out in this section.

(2) The first step is, no later than 31 December 2018, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of the UK’s Overseas Territories to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.

(3) The second step is, no later than 31 December 2019, to prepare an Order in Council and take all reasonable steps to ensure its implementation, in respect of any Overseas Territory that has not yet introduced a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies within their jurisdiction. This Order would require the Overseas Territory to adopt such a register.

(4) In this section “a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.””

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take steps to provide that Overseas Territories establish publicly accessible registers of the beneficial ownership of companies, for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Part 3 of the Bill (corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion).

New clause 10—Duty to prevent use of new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity—

“(1) The Treasury may not lay regulations before Parliament on new Limited Partnerships before the Secretary of State has completed and published a review of the proposed regulations.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to review draft regulations which would allow the creations of new Limited Partnerships, in order to prevent the use of new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity.

(3) In performing that duty the Secretary of State must, in particular, have regard to the contribution transparency may make in tackling tax evasion, money laundering, national and cross border criminality, and terrorist financing.

(4) Following any review under subsection (2) the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament on what steps the Government will take to prevent new Limited Partnerships being used for criminal purposes.

(5) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Scottish Government,

(b) the National Crime Agency,

(c) the Serious Fraud Office,

(d) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(e) HMRC,

(f) interested third sector organisations, and

(g) any other persons the Secretary of State deems relevant.”

This new clause sets a duty on the Secretary of State to review Treasury proposals for new Limited Partnerships to prevent their use for financial criminal activity, including tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing. In carrying out the review the Secretary of State will be required to consult those groups listed in subsection (5) and lay a report before Parliament.

New clause 11—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences: consultation on other jurisdictions—

“(1) Within 12 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must conduct a public consultation on the issues listed in subsection (2).

(2) The issues are—

(a) the desirability of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories introducing equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act; and

(b) the steps that would need to be taken for the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to introduce equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act.

(3) As part of this consultation the Secretary of State must seek views from—

(a) the governments of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories,

(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or the governments specified in subsection (3)(a) consider appropriate,

(c) any other person or body who the Secretary of State deems relevant, with particular regard to non-governmental bodies and private sector entities.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report setting out the outcome of this consultation within 24 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

New clause 12—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences: publication of convictions—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report listing all bodies and organisations that have been found guilty of a failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign tax evasion offence within the previous five years.”

New clause 13—Failure to prevent tax evasion offences: sentencing guideline—

“(1) The Secretary of State must produce sentencing guidelines for the level of fine to be imposed on bodies found guilty of failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign tax evasion offence.

(2) Such guidance must stipulate that the maximum level of the fine cannot be greater than the total value of the tax whose evasion was facilitated.”

New clause 14—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 3)—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).

(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—

“economic criminal offence” means any of the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.

(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a person associated with B commits an economic criminal offence intending—

(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or

(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.

(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.

(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”

This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

New clause 15—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 4)—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).

(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—

“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—

(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;

(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;

(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of documents);

(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading);

(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false statements to auditors, misleading statements, and misleading the FCA);

(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property, facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal property).

“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.

(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a person associated with B commits an economic criminal offence intending—

(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or

(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.

(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.

(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”

This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

New clause 16—Conversion of platforms to centralised registers: review—

“(1) Within one year of this Act receiving Royal Assent the Secretary of State must establish a review of the operational efficacy of closed beneficial ownership platforms created by Crown Dependencies or British Overseas Territories that are subject to the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information with Her Majesty’s Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial activity.

(2) The aim of the review will be to gather information to equip Her Majesty’s Government to take all steps necessary to provide financial, administrative or any other support to assist Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in converting all such beneficial ownership platforms into closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.

(3) In the course of the review the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the governments of any Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories which have created closed beneficial ownership platforms and which are subject to the automatic exchange of information with Her Majesty’s Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial activity; and

(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or governments under subsection (3)(a) deem appropriate.

(4) The review shall be completed and laid before Parliament within one year of its establishment.

(5) No later than one year after the review has been laid before Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government must have taken all steps necessary to assist relevant Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in the establishment of closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.

(6) Her Majesty’s Government shall supply quarterly reports to Parliament of the progress of steps taken under subsection (5), and such reports shall set out—

(a) concerns expressed by relevant Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories about conversion of beneficial ownership platforms to centralised registers, and

(b) an assessment by Her Majesty’s Government of the extent to which objections to the creation of centralised registers can be justified on a constitutional, economic, administrative or any other operational basis.”

New clause 17—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies—

“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—

“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies

(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—

(a) this Act; and

(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017

to take the actions set out in this section.

(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.

(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019, to publish legislative proposals to require the Government of any Crown dependency that has not already established a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to do so.

(4) In this section—

“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.

“legislative proposals” means either—

(a) a draft Order in Council; or

(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.”

New clause 18—Whistleblowing in relation to failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector in relation to the disclosure of suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering.

(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to—

(a) arrangements to protect the anonymity of persons disclosing suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering;

(b) the efficacy of current penalties for institutions that treat whistleblowers unfairly, and proposals for future criminal penalties.

(3) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) whistleblowers in the banking and financial services sector,

(b) devolved administrations,

(c) interested charities,

(d) the relevant regulators, and

(e) any other persons the Secretary of State deems relevant.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay the report to Parliament within six months of the passing of this Act.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector, in consultation with those groups listed in subsection (3), and then lay a report before Parliament on steps the Government will take to bring forward penalties for institutions that fail to protect whistleblowers.

New clause 19—The culture of the banking industry and failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion—

“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a review into the extent to which banking culture contributed to the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the banking sector.

(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to, the following issues—

(a) the impact of culture change on decision making senior executive and board level;

(b) the pressure on staff to meet performance targets;

(c) how allegations of tax evasion are reported and acted on.

(3) The review must set out what steps the UK Government intends to take to ensure that banking culture is not facilitating tax evasion.

(4) In carrying out this review, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) devolved administrations;

(b) HMRC;

(c) the Serious Fraud Office;

(d) the Financial Conduct Authority;

(e) interested charities, and

(f) anyone else the Secretary of State deems appropriate.

(5) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of the review before the House of Commons within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

New clause 20—Report on the impact of the criminal offences relating to offshore income, assets and activities—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year of the coming into force of the provisions in Tax Management Act 1970 relating to criminal offences relating to offshore income, assets and activities introduced by section 165 of the Finance Act 2016 publish a report on the impact of the introduction of these offences.

(2) The report must include, but need not be limited to, information about—

(a) the number of persons who have been charged with offences under each of sections 106B, 106C and 106D of the Tax Management Act 1970;

(b) the number of persons who have been convicted of any such offence;

(c) the average fine imposed; and

(d) the number of people upon whom a custodial sentence has been imposed for any such offence.”

New clause 21—Report on income lost to tax evasion—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year of the passing of this Act, prepare and publish a report, in consultation with stakeholders, on the value of income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.

(2) The report must include the following—

(a) the value of the income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences in the financial years—

(i) 2015-16;

(ii) 2014-15;

(iii) 2013-14;

(iv) 2012-13; and

(v) 2011-12;

(b) a detailed summary of the model used by HMRC for estimating income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.

(c) an assessment of the efficacy of HMRC’s performance in relation to dealing with tax evasion, including—

(i) a breakdown of specific HMRC departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement of tax evasion matters;

(ii) details of the numbers of staff in each of the years listed in paragraph (a) who are located within departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in relation to tax evasion;

(iii) details of the budgets allocated to departments or units dealing with investigation above; and

(iv) details of the numbers of prosecutions or the amount of tax recovered in each financial year listed in paragraph (a) as a result of the work of HMRC departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in relation to tax evasion in those financial years.”

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I shall be relatively brief in introducing this group of new clauses. In moving new clause 2, which stands in my name and those of a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House and which mirrors new clauses 3, 4, 14 and 15, I want to introduce a debate about the future of corporate criminal liability in this jurisdiction. I must declare an interest, as over the past few years I have been instructed by the Serious Fraud Office in a number of cases involving the prosecution of large international companies. One of the problems that prosecutors and, no doubt, investigators have found in this jurisdiction when dealing with the modern corporate landscape—to use that hideous jargon—involves trying to fix liability on a company suspected of criminal activity, as a matter of criminal law. It is not difficult to fix criminal liability on an individual if the evidence is there: the person either did or did not do it, and they either did or did not have the necessary criminal intent.

Under current English law, however, fixing criminal liability on a corporation involves resorting to what is called the identification principle. This involves finding someone of sufficient seniority within a corporation who can act as or be described as the directing mind of the company. Through that identified person, we can then move on to fix criminal liability on the corporation. That was fine in the Victorian era, when most companies had one or two directors. An example would be a small business in a market town in the 1860s or 1870s, which would have been owned and directed by two or three men—it was always men in those days. If a fraud was committed on behalf of the company, it would have been perfectly easy to find the directing mind of that company among the small group of directors.

As the industrial revolution and corporate legal development proceeded during the late 19th century and early 20th century, however, it became clear that companies were getting bigger. An increase in international trade meant that companies based in this country had offices, and directing minds, in other parts of the world. In 1912, the United States dealt with this by doing away with the identification principle involving the directing mind and, through case law, by developing a principle in criminal law that a company could be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its employees on the basis that they were conducting criminal activities for the benefit and on behalf of the company.

We in this country reached the stage long ago at which we needed to reform the way in which we look at corporate criminal liability. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless), with his Scottish legal experience, will no doubt inform us whether the situation is the same in Scotland as it is in England, but I believe that it is uncontroversial to say that the Victorian identification principle is no longer apt to deal with international corporations. I am not picking on the company that I am about to mention because I think it has committed a criminal offence; quite the contrary—I just want to use it as an example of a large international company. British Telecommunications is a huge company that employs hundreds of thousands of people all around the globe doing various things in the telecoms world, all of them entirely legitimate and beneficial to the company, its shareholders and our national economy. Surely, however, it is a matter of common sense to say that it would be extremely difficult nowadays to fix upon an individual or small group of individuals as representing the directing mind of that company if it was suspected that an offence had been committed many miles away from the main board and the headquarters of the company in London. I repeat that I have used British Telecommunications simply as an example of a large international company with operations right around the world.

Of course it would be perfectly possible to fix upon an individual, a human being, who had committed an offence. It might well be that that individual had committed an offence for the benefit of the international corporation, but unless that person was of sufficient seniority within the hierarchy of that great big international company, it would be very difficult to fix criminal liability for that person’s offence on the corporation as well. As I have said, the United States has been getting round that problem for more than 100 years by using the principle of vicarious liability, which we are used to dealing with in this country in civil law but not in criminal law.

I believe that there are two ways in which we can approach this question, and this is the whole point of the new clauses that I and others have tabled. First, we could use the American system of vicarious liability, and there are plenty of good arguments for doing so. Secondly, we could approach the problem—as we have done in the new clauses—by using the failure to prevent regime, in which, when a company fails to prevent someone or another body associated with it from committing a specified offence, it thereby becomes liable for the criminal offence itself. We already have that provision on the statute book in section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, and it is about to be added to the statute book through the existing provisions in this Bill relating to tax offences. That follows David Cameron’s speech to the corruption summit at Lancaster House last summer.

In pushing forward these new clauses, I want to invite Parliament, in this House and the other place, and the Government—by which I mean not only the political Government but the non-political Government: the officials who run the Government day by day and advise on matters of policy—to consider whether extending the failure to prevent regime would be an easier and better way to deal with this than turning the whole thing on its head by adopting the vicarious liability principle wholesale.

There are plenty of arguments for and against the extension of the section 7 failure to prevent bribery model. I have attended a number of meetings with criminal lawyers who are far more experienced than I am. Indeed, I see one sitting just two Benches in front of me, behind the Minister. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) will know, as I have come to learn over the past few years since I have taken an interest in corporate crime, that a number of difficulties are created by the failure to prevent model. I will not rehearse them all now, but some of those difficulties were set out on Friday 13 January 2017 in the Ministry of Justice’s “Call for evidence” paper, which sets out five options for a failure to prevent regime.

I favour the failure to prevent model over the vicarious liability model because it is already set within our system. The new clauses would not extend the principle but merely extend the ambit of the criminal offences that could come within a failure to prevent system. The provisions will not be brought into this Bill because it is highly unlikely that the Government would accept any of them—albeit they may nod politely at them—when the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence process is still open. However, I hope that the Government will look carefully at the shape and design of the new clauses with a view to considering vigorously whether what we have proposed as a matter of principle is worthy of greater thought.

The intention of new clause 2 is to create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, as defined by reference to the offences listed in part 2 of schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Again, I will do my best to be brief. That schedule brought in the deferred prosecution agreement system for dealing with errant companies. I declare an interest, with both capital and small letters, in that not only have I been instructed by the SFO in two of the three deferred prosecution agreements that have so far taken place, but I brought the system into law when I was Solicitor General—at least I began it before I got the sack. There is a cloud in every silver lining, is there not?

Leaving the EU: Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Lyn Brown]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. We are simply not getting any guarantees from our Government that that is what they will be able to provide, or that they will even negotiate for it.

There is a more general problem about accessing the data we need to combat crime and keep us safe. Even if we, outside the EU, have access to European databases, we might not be able to use them. European data protection law is clear that no information can be handed to a third country—we will be such a country—that does not adhere to EU laws on privacy. Although our Government have said that they will apply EU data protection law at least until the point of Brexit, we do not yet know if they intend to do so afterwards. However, we certainly know what happens if our data laws do not adhere to European privacy rules: the European Court of Justice will simply invalidate any data sharing agreement, as it did on the so-called safe harbour agreement between the EU and the US. What guarantees will the Government give that the information that our police and security agencies need from European Union databases will not also be turned off when we leave?

In conclusion, we have deep concerns that it will be harder for us to protect our citizens when we leave the European Union. We need the Government to reassure us that they intend to reduce or eliminate this risk through their Brexit negotiations. It is one thing to have our prosperity under threat from the complexities of maintaining access to the single market—frankly, that is bad enough—but it is quite another if our security and the very lives of our citizens are under threat because the complexities of maintaining cross-border co-operation with our police and security services were not properly considered before leaving. To quote the Centre for European Reform again, justice and home affairs

“is not like trade, which creates winners and losers: the only losers from increased co-operation in law enforcement are the criminals themselves.”

My question to the Minister is simple: what guarantees will he give that Britain’s security will not be compromised by our leaving the European Union?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I now have to announce the result of the Division deferred from a previous day. On the motion relating to local government, the Ayes were 299 and the Noes were 6. Of those Members representing constituencies in England, the Ayes were 280 and the Noes were 6, so the Ayes have it.

[The Division list is published at the end of today’s debates.]

Policing and Crime Bill

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)]

I support Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 134. Having heard the hard-hitting accounts of my hon. Friends the Members for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and for Gloucester (Richard Graham) in their report on stalking, no one can be left in any doubt that the Government amendment should be carried.

Turning to Lords amendment 137, having represented the police and the prosecutorial authorities as a barrister, and having represented victims both as a barrister and as a Member of Parliament, I hope I can see the situation from both angles. I am entirely supportive of the victims code. Victims have generally been empowered since the code came into force as a result of steps taken by the previous Labour Government, and the beefing up carried out by the coalition Government and the Government of today.

My concern about Lords amendment 137 is that it would make the police and prosecutorial authorities responsible, and in some cases financially liable, for breaches of the victims code, even if they are not directly responsible. Under new subsection (3)(a), for instance, the police or the CPS could become responsible to a victim for delays caused not by them but by a third party, such as the defendant. Under new subsection (3)(b), the CPS could be held responsible if a defendant, or indeed another party over whom it has no control, treats a victim with a lack of “dignity and respect”. That often happens in the courtroom when a defendant gives evidence, or even through how a defendant instructs their lawyer to present their case, but that is a matter for the judge, not the prosecutor, to control.

New subsection (10) is even more concerning because it would require the Home Secretary to

“take steps to ensure that victims of crime…have access to financial compensation from public funds for any detriment arising from the criminal case concerned”.

That is not necessarily a detriment caused by the prosecuting authority, and there is no requirement of bad faith, recklessness or negligence on behalf of that authority. That is a big step both in principle and in practice. It is a big step in principle because it appears to impose a liability on one body for the actions of a third party over whom it may have no control, and it is a big step in practice because it exposes the police and prosecuting authorities to a significant financial burden at a time when we regularly have debates in this House on the need for greater funding for the police and the CPS. Paragraph 128 of the explanatory notes on the amendments explains that “potentially significant” financial burdens are attached.

Although I am an enthusiastic supporter of the victims code and the need to give victims the very best support, imposing a broadly defined liability—indeed, a financial liability—on the police and the CPS is not the right way to proceed without more thought about furthering the aims of the code. More thought is needed, and I am pleased that the Government will be introducing their own proposals to give effect to our manifesto commitment for a victims’ bill of rights. I am sure that that work will take account of the excellent work of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and his commission. I pay tribute to his work and to all the people involved, including a number of my constituents.

Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 24.

The House proceeded to a Division.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I must remind the House that the motion relates exclusively to England and Wales. A double majority is therefore required.

--- Later in debate ---

The House proceeded to a Division.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I must remind the House that the motion relates exclusively to England and Wales. A double majority is therefore required.

--- Later in debate ---

The House proceeded to a Division.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I must remind the House that the motion relates exclusively to England and Wales. A double majority is therefore required.

--- Later in debate ---

[Brandon Lewis]

I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments 2 to 23, 25 to 95, 97 to 133, 135, 143 to 158, 160 to 301, 303, 304 and 306.

[Brandon Lewis]

I am conscious that this group covers approaching 300 Lords amendments, even if many are of a technical nature, and I appreciate that hon. Members would no doubt like me to go through all 300, but time is short, so, tempting as it might be, I will confine my remarks to the most significant amendments, so that other hon. Members may have an opportunity to speak.

On Report, way back in April and June of last year, a number of my hon. Friends tabled amendments worthy of further consideration. The Lords amendments follow up on that work. My hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Amanda Milling) argued that when a police and crime commissioner took over the governance of a fire and rescue authority, the title of their office should be amended to reflect their new and expanded responsibilities. Lords amendment 215 provides that in such circumstances the legal title of the PCC will become police, fire and crime commissioner. My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) proposed a number of sensible further improvements to our firearms licensing regime, and I am pleased to say that Lords amendments 111 to 113 give effect to three of his helpful suggestions.

My hon. Friend the Member for Selby and Ainsty (Nigel Adams) highlighted the dangers to music festival goers as a result of the irresponsible discharging of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs in the often confined space of a festival venue. Lords amendment 114 would tackle such reckless behaviour by making it an offence to possess a pyrotechnic article at a qualifying musical event. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport indicated in April, we will ensure that this new offence is in force for this year’s festival season. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) sought to strengthen police powers to require the removal of disguises where there was a threat to public order. Lords amendment 94 will enable the required authorisation by a senior officer for the exercise of such powers to be given orally where it is impractical to confer the authorisation in writing.

Other Lords amendments respond to points raised by Opposition Members. The hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) expressed concerns about PCCs taking on the governance of fire and rescue authorities. In response to similar concerns raised in the Lords, amendments 193 to 199, among others, strengthen the process by which a PCC brings forward a proposal for the creation of a PCC-style FRA to ensure that it is as robust and transparent as possible. She separately argued for a strengthening of the Licensing Act 2003 by putting cumulative impact assessments on a statutory footing. We agree, and Lords amendment 117 does just that.

Lords amendments 30 to 33 deliver on the commitment given by my predecessor on Report to amend the Bill to allow disciplinary action to be taken against former police officers outside the normal 12-month period following retirement or resignation in the most serious and exceptional cases. Lords amendments 36 to 42, among others, respond to representations from the Independent Police Complaints Commission and, indeed, from Opposition parties that the reformed organisation should retain the word “Independent” in its title. As a result of these amendments, the reformed IPCC will henceforth be known as the Independent Office for Police Conduct. This will help to reinforce public confidence that the reformed organisation will be fully independent of those it regulates.

On Report, the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) argued that the current law requiring a coroner’s inquest in every case where a person dies under a deprivation of liberty safeguard, even where the death was from natural causes, caused unnecessary upset to bereaved families.

EU Nationals in the UK

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. I give notice that there will a six-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches, although that does not apply to the Scottish National party’s Front-Bench spokesperson, Stuart McDonald.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. The speech limit is being reduced to four minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. I am going to have to reduce the time limit to three minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I seek your reassurance. Resignations can come at a bewildering pace these days in Westminster, so can you tell the House whether we still have a Government Whips Office? For the bulk of the debate there has been only one Government Back Bencher in the Chamber. That used to be the job of the Government Whips Office. Have they given up?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

That is not a point of order and we are running very short of time.

EU Referendum: Race Hate Crime

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Tuesday 5th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Colleen Fletcher (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making important points about the responsibilities of different agencies. The Minister may have heard about the incident in Coventry, where my constituent, the Coventry and Warwickshire radio presenter Trish Adudu, was racially abused in the street last week. Trish said that an individual shouted at her and another Coventry resident, and said vile things, including the N word, which I have never used and cannot bring myself to use even when describing this incident tonight. She was told: “Get out of here. Go back home. Haven’t you heard the result of the vote?” Trish was visibly distressed when she reiterated that on the radio and on TV. Does my hon. Friend—and hopefully the Minister—agree that there is no place for such sickening and deplorable behaviour? We must work together to put a stop to it, bringing in all those agencies and working cross-party. Robust action must be taken—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. I have been very generous with the intervention, but that was very long. There is plenty of time and if the hon. Lady wanted to make a speech, she could have done so, but I think that was it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend.

We have processes in place to report hate crime, and swift action can be taken, as was demonstrated by Greater Manchester Police following the incident of hate on a tram towards an American lecturer. Importantly, many who voted to leave the EU did so as a protest vote to voice concerns against the Government and austerity measures, and the vast majority do not endorse any racist rhetoric. Many who voted to leave felt that they were doing the right thing for the economy, and they fell for the lies being peddled as promises, such as £350 million a week for funding the NHS. However, Brexit has legitimised and normalised racism. We must ensure that all incidents are reported and prosecuted, and we must hold the media and leaders—including political leaders—to account when hatred is propagated. We must act against social inequality, and provide and protect jobs, wages, workers’ rights, good schools and hospitals. In essence, social and economic equality often leads people to view the “other” through the prism of dislike, hatred or suspicion. Only together can we work to tackle that problem, and ensure that future generations can hope for a safe future in this country and regard it as their home.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. We have 14 minutes, and about six Members wish to speak. I hope that that will be borne in mind.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Murrison]

Certainly not. This Bill has been characterised by consensus, and I have been heartened by the constructive attitude that the Labour Front Benchers have taken to this measure, moving from a position of abstention on Second Reading to one of support now. It does them a great deal of credit and has made this Bill very much better. The double lock was a turning point in this measure as far as I am concerned, but may I also say that the privacy clause, new clause 5, is essential for many of us? The Home Secretary pointed that out. We have not had an opportunity to debate it very much today, but new clause 14, on health matters, has also been particularly important for a number of us who had concerns.

Clause 222 has not been debated at great length, but again it is vital because it allows us in five years’ time to come back to this measure to see what more needs to be done and what might be removed. That is particularly relevant in the context of ICRs. We have heard that one outstanding issue relates to the definition and use of ICRs, and I know that the other place will debate that at some length. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Security has referred to it and he is right to do so. I firmly believe that we will want to come back to it in any event in five years’ time, as technology will have changed so much in that period.

In summary, I very much welcome this measure—it is absolutely right. I am convinced that that overwhelming majority of our constituents will be pleased with the assiduity we have applied to this measure and, in particular, with the consensual nature of our debate. It is a great measure. It will give our constituents the protection that they undoubtedly need, while safeguarding their historic liberties.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

For the remaining one and half minutes, I call Suella Fernandes.

[Suella Fernandes]

I will be short and to the point, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I rise to speak in support of this Bill, as it is a hard-won fight for all of us, and something of which this whole House can be proud. The nature and scale of the threat that we face today differs from the one that we faced even 12 months ago, as it is rapidly evolving and complex. I am proud to have contributed to this Bill as a member both of the Joint Committee and the Bill Committee. We made more than 100 recommendations, many of which have been adopted by the Government.

It is vital for our constituents that we pass this Bill today, and it will get my vote. I wish to put on record my thanks to the Front-Bench team, which was led by the Home Secretary and ably assisted by her turbo-charged team of the Solicitor General and the Minister for Security who brought style, eloquence, professionalism and panache, and to our Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Simon Kirby). I am proud to support this Bill, and it has my vote tonight.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving advance notice of his point of order during the Division. I think that everybody shares his feeling that under no circumstances should that ever happen. I am delighted that he did make it to the Division, and that there are no further Divisions this evening in which Members could be prevented from voting. We will certainly ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate and get back to us in order to make sure that that never happens again. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order.

Child Refugee Resettlement

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

Some of the 75 experts whom we have offered to the European Asylum Support Office to contribute to its endeavours in connection with the EU-Turkey deal will help with processing. Others will be translators. We have also offered medical support, as well as officers who will be able to identify vulnerability issues. I had conversations with EASO about this when I was in Athens on Friday. We have identified the people concerned, and we want them to be deployed quickly—within, I hope, a matter of weeks.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

We now come to the statement on key stage 2 tests. Before I call the Minister for Schools, I should inform the House that the Speaker had granted an urgent question to the hon. Member for Scunthorpe (Nic Dakin), but the hon. Gentleman has withdrawn it in the light of the Government’s offer to make a statement on the matter.

Immigration Bill

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Monday 9th May 2016 Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords message

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

I inform the House that Lords amendment 87B involves financial privilege.

After Clause 30

Detention etc. by immigration officers in Scotland

[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

I beg to move, That this House insists on its disagreement with Lords amendment 84.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Lords amendment 84, and Government amendment (a) in lieu.

Government motion not to insist on amendment 85B in lieu of Lords amendment 85 and to agree to Lords amendment 85C as amended by Government amendments (a) to (f).

Government motion to agree to Lords amendment 87B in lieu of Lords amendment 87 and Government amendments (a) and (b).

Commons amendments 84A and 85B, Government motion not to insist, and amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 84.

[James Brokenshire]

The Government remain strongly of the view that specifying a maximum time limit for immigration detention would be arbitrary, would not take account of individual circumstances and would encourage individuals to seek to frustrate the removals process until the time limit was reached, so having a negative impact on our ability to enforce immigration controls and maintain public safety. In response to the concerns expressed by a number of Members here and in the other place, we accepted that there should be greater judicial oversight over detention, and we tabled a motion, the effect of which would be that individuals would automatically be referred to the tribunal for a bail hearing six months after their detention began or, if the tribunal had already considered whether to release the person within the first six months, six months after that consideration.

This House approved that motion but, although some peers accepted that the issue of judicial oversight had now been satisfactorily addressed, others remained concerned that six months was too long without that oversight. After careful consideration, we propose again a duty to arrange consideration of bail, but we are now reducing the timing of an automatic bail referral from six to four months. This earlier point of referral reflects the fact that the vast majority of persons are detained for fewer than four months.

Moving on to amendments (a) to (f), the Government have listened carefully to the concerns expressed in this House and the other place on the issue of detaining pregnant women. The motion agreed in the other place would maintain the 72-hour time limit agreed in this House, extendable up to a week with ministerial approval. We have listened carefully to the points raised by the peers who have tabled these amendments. In order further to strengthen the safeguards, we have tabled amendments that will make it clear that pregnant women will be detained for the purpose of removal only if they are shortly to be removed from the UK or if there are exceptional circumstances that justify the detention. The guidance will also make it clear that they should be used in very exceptional circumstances, underlining our expectations in regard to the use of this power.

We have also proposed an amendment that would place an additional duty on officers making detention decisions in respect of pregnant women to have due regard for their welfare. These additional measures, alongside the 72-hour time limit, would act as statutory safeguards to complement the Government’s wider package of reform, which includes the new adults at risk policy, a new gatekeeper function and new safeguarding teams. We also intend to ask Stephen Shaw to carry out a short review to assess progress against the key actions in his previous report.

I turn now to Lords amendment 87. The Government have always been clear about our commitment to identifying and protecting vulnerable refugee children, wherever they are. We wholeheartedly share their lordships’ underlying intentions in this regard. We have a moral duty to help. Our efforts to date, both within and outside Europe, have been designed to do just that. Our commitment to help those in need stands comparison with any other country. The UK has been playing its part in supporting European neighbours to provide support to those who have arrived, by already providing nearly £46 million of funding to the Europe-wide response to help the most vulnerable, including infants and children. This assistance will support vulnerable people including children on the move or stranded in Europe and the Balkans. In addition, the £10 million Department for International Development fund announced on 28 January will support the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Save the Children and the International Rescue Committee to work with host authorities to care for and assist unaccompanied or separated children.

As the Prime Minister made clear last week, we will accept the amendment. However, we have always made it clear that, in implementing it, we must do nothing that would inadvertently create a situation in which more children put their lives at risk by attempting perilous journeys to Europe. That is why only those from Greece, Italy and France who were registered in the EU before 20 March will be eligible for resettlement, when it is in their best interest to come to the UK.

Immigration Bill

Natascha Engel Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. Before I call the next speaker, I remind Members that we have to conclude the debate at 9.26 pm, and there is a very high level of interest.

[Kelly Tolhurst (Rochester and Strood) (Con)]

I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire), and welcome her back to the House.

I have followed this Bill throughout its progress, in Committee and on Report. Today, I will talk about two points. This evening we have heard a lot of talk about the migration crisis that we are seeing across Europe. As a Kent MP, I have seen those troubles more acutely, because of our proximity to the Calais camps. Obviously we have all seen the troubles that have happened across Europe, and find them devastating.