Yemen Peace Process

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Thursday 23rd May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell). He raised important points about the Houthis, which I will come to in a moment. I am also grateful to the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) for securing this debate. Even though we in this country are obsessed with Brexit, and with who might be Prime Minister in three days’ time, other important issues deserve our attention. The ongoing failed state that is Yemen is a major threat not just to its neighbouring countries but to the whole world, and it could be the powder keg that sparks a wider conflagration.

I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, because a year ago I went to Saudi Arabia and visited Najran. I saw buildings, a school, and a power plant that had suffered extensive damage from missiles fired into Saudi Arabia from Yemen by the Houthis. For those in Saudi Arabia, this conflict is seen as a threat to their state.

Let me add a little history to this debate. First, this conflict is not just between the internationally recognised and living in exile President Hadi and the Houthis, because Yemen has other conflicts within it. Since 2009, there has been an insurgency by the Southern Movement—its Arabic name is al-Hirak—and an area in the south of Yemen is controlled by tribal groups and militias, and has a transitional council that is supported, ironically, by the United Arab Emirates. Everybody talks about Saudi Arabia, but the UAE is also a key player within the internationally supported and recognised coalition that is led by Saudi Arabia. The UAE also has strong views about resisting all forms of influence in the Arab world from Iran and what it perceives to be its proxies.

Secondly, elements in the south of Yemen are linked to al-Qaeda, and there are real dangers to that happening in any failed state. We have seen in Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya that if there is no state with power, the vacuum is filled by non-state actors, including extremists who are prepared to act totally ruthlessly, and who have no principles or regard for international law or what their international partners think. That is what we could have in Yemen—indeed, we already have it, but it could be much worse.

The right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) spoke about having a new approach to whether we should continue to recognise President Hadi, given that he does not have any real locus within Yemen. That is a big issue and a fundamental question, because if there are to be talks, and if any real progress following the Stockholm agreement is to be made, the voices from the south of Yemen must also be heard. Such talks would not involve just the backers of President Hadi and of the Houthis, but other voices from within Yemen.

Yemen is a complicated country with a complicated history. There were once two Yemens, and with the end of the cold war they became one. Now we seem to have more than two, as there are several disparate groupings. Since last year there has been some hope—the efforts of Martin Griffiths have been referred to so I will not repeat them. There was an agreement to remove forces from Hodeidah and to have a neutral policing operation in the city, but we have not had that. The unilateral claim of withdrawal by the Houthis has been disputed by some people. We have also seen that even if the problem of the port of Hodeidah is somehow solved, that does not necessarily mean that the starving people in Yemen will be any better off.

The World Food Programme, which supplies food aid to 12 million people in Yemen, stated on Monday that it is thinking of suspending its operations in certain areas that are controlled by the Houthis. Of those 12 million people, 9 million are in Houthi-controlled areas, and the World Food Programme referred to a series of problems, including intimidation, corruption, extortion, insecurity and fighting, that are presenting great difficulties in getting that aid through. The Houthis are effectively taxing and extorting. Food and other aid is not getting through to the poor people, because these organisations are using their power to prevent it. That absolute scandal deserves wider publicity.

[Keith Vaz]

The hon. Gentleman is very experienced. He is a distinguished former Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and his presence for this debate is extremely important. I remain puzzled, however, so perhaps he can help me with his vast knowledge of international affairs. The coalition admits that it cannot win the bombing war and the Houthis cannot win the war. People are starving. From looking at this problem from the outside, with a lot of knowledge about the tribal nature of Yemen, what does he think is stopping everyone saying that this has to end?

[Mike Gapes]

In short, it is because the conflict has become a proxy. The Houthis are perceived by a large number of countries in the Arab world to be either proxies or puppets of the Iranian regime. I do not think that that is absolutely an accurate description, but it is clear that the Iranians are arming the Houthis. I have seen the remains of missiles with Iranian markings on, which were on display in Najran, and the Saudis have a lot of such material. Nevertheless, the reality is that this is an internal conflict that outside countries are exploiting.

The problem we have is that in the past few days the United States has decided to send a carrier group into the region. The US has always had aircraft carriers in the region. In 2000, flying with the Defence Committee, I landed on the deck of the USS John C Stennis, named after the Chairman of the US Senate Defence select committee. Bruce George, the then Chairman of our Defence Committee, was hoping that the Ministry of Defence would do the same, but that never transpired. We landed, with the wire, on the deck. This aircraft carrier was in the Gulf of Hormuz. We could see all the aircraft movements in Iran up to the horizon from the bridge of the vessel. The US is reinforcing its military capability with carriers in the region because of its tensions with Iran. I do not want to be diverted on to issues relating to the joint comprehensive plan of action, the Iranian nuclear programme and so on, but there is the potential for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to get America into a regional conflict with Iran.

There are good reasons to be critical of Iran: internally, it has the highest number of executions of any country in the whole world apart from China—much more than Saudi Arabia, actually—its bad behaviour in Syria; its support for Hezbollah; its consistent attempts over decades to undermine any prospect of a middle east peace process; and what it is doing in Yemen. At the same time, the Arab League has just sent an invitation from the Saudi Government to an emergency Arab summit on 30 May in Mecca. The terms of the invitation refer to “recent aggression”, which refers to the attacks on the two Saudi oil tankers off the UAE coast. No one has claimed responsibility. Blame has not yet been attributed, but the assumption is that that was done by either Houthis, people from Iraq or, potentially, those from Iran as part of the proxy regional conflict.

A year ago, as our plane was flying back from Najran and was about to land in Riyadh, there was an alert. We could see, from a distance of probably just a few miles away, an incoming missile fired into Riyadh airport. When attacks start on oil tankers and pipelines, and missiles are fired into airports as planes are landing, that gets into the mindset of the Saudis. If we are to get peace and to get the Saudis out of this conflict that the then Defence Minister, now the Crown Prince, got them into in 2015—I am sure they never thought that four years later they would be sucked into it in such a manner, and I am sure they would like a way out—the problem, as has been said, is that the Houthis also have to want a way out. However, they are doing very well out of taxing the aid that comes in, controlling the ports and all the rest of it. They are not a big group. As a percentage of Yemen’s total population they are a very small group, but they have maximum power and leverage at this time.

I do not have a message of easy solutions. I know it is fashionable for some people to say, “Well, if we stop supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, there would be no conflict in Yemen.” No one who has spoken in this debate has said that, but I have seen leaflets going out from groups such as the Stop the War Coalition that seem to imply that that is the reality. The reality is that we must use our position in the United Nations, as we have been. We must back up Martin Griffiths and his efforts. We must try, even though it is difficult, to talk to the Iranians and say, “This pattern of bad behaviour is not helpful to you if you want us to stop the pressure for more sanctions.” We also need to find ways to get support internally in Yemen for a dialogue between all groups. I flag up the fact that it is not just about the Houthis and Hadi’s Government. There are other factors in Yemen and they all have to be brought together.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I hope the hon. Lady will understand that it is most definitely being taken seriously. Hezbollah is a clear and present danger: it destabilises the region and also offers instability in this country, which is why we have proscribed it in its entirety. That proscription has now taken effect—it happened in March—and I very much hope not only that it will assist in ensuring that activity in this country is curtailed but, more particularly, that when we are dealing with the region we make it absolutely clear that Hezbollah has no place in the middle east’s future.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

I too welcome the Minister. Will he confirm that Hezbollah is in Syria working as a proxy for the Iranian regime and the Assad Government, and has played a malign role, killing many, many innocent people in the Syrian conflict?

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. Hezbollah is a force for evil in our world today, which is why we have taken the strong action we have against it.

Iran Nuclear Deal

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Wednesday 8th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Field]

Let me first thank my hon. Friend for all the hugely important work that he does. He is our trade envoy to Libya, which is obviously a difficult role, but in the past he was our Minister for Africa in the Foreign Office, and I know that his contribution there is remembered very fondly.

My hon. Friend has made a good point about the special purpose vehicle, which is important because it will ensure that we see genuine and lasting sanctions relief. The SPV is designed to facilitate legitimate trade under both European and international law. Its immediate focus will understandably be on the facilitation of trade where the immediate needs of the Iranian people are greatest—the humanitarian needs for foodstuffs, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals and trade in consumer goods. That will obviously have an impact on UK companies wishing to trade with Iran, as well as benefiting the Iranian people. The UK, France and Germany are the initial owners and shareholders of the SPV, but we are working with other interested EU member countries that may also wish to play a formal role in these initiatives.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

The millions of young people in Iran who have suffered under the oppressive theocratic regime were hopeful that the JCPOA would lead to an easing of sanctions, which would in turn lead to economic benefits, but because of the incompetence and corruption of the regime, that easing of sanctions has not had the economic impact for which they hoped. Can we send a clear message to the people of Iran that if we have to re-impose sanctions because their regime broke its word, we will not be acting against the Iranian people, and that we look forward to the day when they will be able to choose their Government freely?

[Mark Field]

The hon. Gentleman has, perhaps, used slightly less diplomatic language than I might have used, but I think that the message to the Iranian people from all of us here is loud and clear: “We are very much on your side.” Iran remains a priority country for the UK in relation to its human rights situation, to which he alluded. On 15 November, the UN General Assembly Third Committee approved a resolution, co-sponsored by the UK, which urged Iran to address a long list of human rights violations, including the widespread use of arbitrary detention. We very much want to see a move towards democracy and all the opportunities that that will provide for all Iranians, not only in human rights but in the broader arena of prosperity.

Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

In general terms, the answer is yes, I very much hope so. That is what sanctions are designed to do. However, as the House will appreciate, we are today just looking at the framework within which specific sanctions regimes can fit, rather than at the actual sanctions regimes or indeed their efficacy and effect in the countries we are discussing. We are looking at a legal framework under these SIs; we are not really looking at the full operation of the sanctions that may form part of the framework we are setting up today.

I assure colleagues that the 2018 Act does indeed provide the necessary powers in UK law to allow us to develop our own regime. However, these SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures by laying SIs such as these. We will give consideration to new regimes as circumstances suggest and as parliamentary time allows. Approving these regulations would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions in respect of Zimbabwe, Belarus and Syria, and in respect of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, from the date of our EU exit. In the event of a deal, EU sanctions would continue to apply during the implementation period, and these instruments would not immediately be needed. As a member of the EU, or during the implementation period, EU sanctions will apply in the UK. We will look to use the powers provided by the 2018 Act to the fullest extent possible during this period, but there will be some limitations on the measures we can impose autonomously. I wish quickly to describe the purpose of each regime.

The chemical weapons sanctions regulations aim to deter the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, and encourage the effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention, by imposing immigration and financial sanctions on those involved in their use and proliferation.

The Zimbabwe sanctions regulations aim to encourage the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, and to deter the repression of civil society. The regulations impose an arms embargo and other financial, immigration and trade restrictions, including on the trade in goods and technology that may be used for internal repression.

The Belarus sanctions regulations aim to address human rights abuses and threats to the rule of law, and to encourage the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance of four individuals. The measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression.

The Syria sanctions regulations aim to deter the Syrian regime from actions, policies or activities that repress the civilian population, and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. The regulations include asset freezes and/or travel bans on designated persons, together with financial, sectoral and aircraft sanctions; and wide-ranging trade restrictions, including on goods and technology that may be used for internal repression and the interception and monitoring of telecommunications, but also in respect of other goods and technology, such as crude oil, jet fuel, luxury goods and items that can contribute to chemical and biological weapons.

These four SIs transfer into UK law well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. They encourage respect for human rights, the rule of law and security and stability in very difficult environments—

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

Will the Minister give way?

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[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

It is a real pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale). He referred to the fact that the explanatory memorandum on the sanctions on Belarus does include the names of individuals, whereas, in contrast, the explanatory memorandums on Zimbabwe and on Syria specifically say that they do not. Clearly, there may be reasons for that in terms of individuals being able to know that they were on lists, but perhaps the Minister—if he is listening—will be able to respond to my point to clarify exactly why Belarus is being treated differently from Syria and Zimbabwe.

We are once again debating in this House matters that are probably a complete waste of our time, because everybody knows that there is not going to be a no-deal Brexit and that it may even be, hopefully, that we will not have Brexit at all. It is a bit like Alice in Wonderland: we keep coming back to having the same old discussions about things that probably will not happen. Nevertheless, we have to do it, so I will briefly refer to some of the issues that have been touched on.

The chemical weapons sanctions are extremely important, but we have to be honest about this. The chemical weapons convention is about 20 years old. I was involved in the debates in the House at that time. In fact, I had an Adjournment debate urging the Government to ratify the convention. I can recall how important those discussions were. However, we know that countries lie and cheat. The Assad regime in Syria was a signatory to the convention. It apparently had no chemical weapons whatsoever. Then suddenly, after the use of chemical weapons and the threat of military action by the Obama Administration in 2013, the Russians were able to make an arrangement to remove massive stockpiles of the chemical weapons that the Syrian regime apparently did not have. Subsequently, it has become clear that the apparent removal of all of Syria’s chemical weapons has not been the case, because, as the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) mentioned, there has been documented use of chemical weapons—I think she said 86 times—within Syria. The overwhelming majority of those occasions have been related to use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, so we know that the convention—and therefore the sanctions that relate to it and compliance with it—has not been totally effective.

We need to revisit these issues internationally and to have more robust measures. Some of the robust measures that we can take are against designated individuals. There is a connection between the chemical weapons use in Syria and the chemical weapons convention. Mention was previously made of individuals living in this country who are acting as conduits, or bankers, for the Assad regime, either through family connections or through corrupt connections of another kind. We all know from the series “McMafia” that people in accountancy and law firms in our capital city are facilitating the way in which people get round sanctions. Last year, the Foreign Affairs Committee produced a very good report called “Moscow’s Gold” that detailed how Russia had a malign role within the City of London and elsewhere.

Clearly, Russia-friendly regimes such as those in Syria, Belarus and other places can use various mechanisms to get round financial sanctions. Whether it is done through London, from offshore British overseas territories or via other jurisdictions, we need to be more vigilant on these issues. Although the European Union plays a very important role, we also have to recognise that this is a global issue. It is not sufficient for us to act in a European context; we also need the United States, and other countries, to come together to make sure that there is vigorous enforcement of the sanctions regime.

[Luke Graham (Ochil and South Perthshire) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a very important point about the need for global co-operation on this. Does he believe that the UK should be taking a leading role in the UN, as it does, to make sure that there is true global co-operation to apply sanctions in multinational blocs but also to make sure that they are enforced, and that we co-operate to encourage as much good behaviour as possible?

[Mike Gapes]

Yes. I have been in discussions with people within the UN system who deal with the issue of terrorist financing, for example. UK officials, former or current, have always played an important role in that system. I pay tribute to the role of our people within the UN system. We need to work globally, but we also need to continue to strengthen the European Union’s sanctions regime for however long we remain members.

The sanctions regime in Zimbabwe was brought in against the Mugabe regime. There were a number of occasions when high-profile individuals were still able to attend international meetings. These were designated meetings in Brussels or in other European capitals that even Mugabe himself was able to attend. Our hope, with the democratic change in Zimbabwe, was that there would be a normalisation of politics in Zimbabwe and that sanctions would then be lifted to help the economic and social development of that country, which has suffered so much under the brutal dictatorship that it has had. Sadly, Zimbabwe is not making the progress that was hoped for. However, I am not sure whether the current sanctions regime is actually the best way forward to deal with the problems in Zimbabwe. We need to look at the possibility of trying to encourage a transition that there is clearly public demand for. Zimbabwe is also, because of its geographical position, suffering from the impact of the cyclones that have hit Mozambique—they have also gone across into parts of Zimbabwe. I hope that the Minister can address that issue as well.

Saudi Arabia: Mass Executions

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that there is a moral dilemma here. Moral dilemmas are never a choice between black and white; they are a choice between different shades of grey, and there is deep murkiness here that we do not like. I hear exactly what the hon. Gentleman says, and we will continue to make the points and keep up the pressure I have been describing today.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

Amnesty International has said that there was a welcome reduction last year in the number of executions worldwide, but clearly what Saudi Arabia is doing is going in the opposite direction. The worst offenders are China with more than 1,000, Iran with several hundred, and then Saudi, Vietnam and Iraq. What steps can we take internationally, in the UN and elsewhere, to get back to the good trend of a reduction in the number of executions?

Sri Lanka

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hunt]

I am absolutely happy to give that assurance. The high commission has been supporting the Nicholson family and will continue to support other families. I think the whole House has been touched, moved, shocked and saddened by what happened to that family, but also uplifted by the generosity of Mr Nicholson’s response to an unspeakable personal tragedy.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)]

May I begin by thanking the Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary for what they said? Unfortunately, this will not be the worst day we will have to talk about, because this Daesh death cult and its local affiliates will continue to carry out these kinds of atrocities globally. We must always say that this will not change our behaviour, it will not change our values and it will not change our solidarity with the people of Sri Lanka or elsewhere. We will stand resolutely with them in trying to get to the people who have done this and to stop other attacks.

[Mr Hunt]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his strong and powerful words as a former Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I can only agree with everything he said. I think other countries around the world look to this country because of our, sadly, extensive experience in fighting terrorism here. They look to us for expertise, and they look to us to say and do the right thing in these terrible situations.

Hong Kong: Pro-Democracy Activists

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Wednesday 10th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Field]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. I am not sure what I was doing 42 years ago, but I know that he was already a Member of this House at that time. He makes a valid and fair point. He is absolutely correct that it is vital that we maintain that for the interests of all Hong Kong citizens today and in the future. We will continue to make the robust case, which is absolutely essential.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

You will recall, Mr Speaker, that in 2014, at the height of the Umbrella movement protests, the Chinese embassy prevented a delegation from this country’s Select Committee on Foreign Affairs from going to Hong Kong. It is clear that the Chinese Communist authorities are extremely sensitive about any scrutiny and any questions asked by this House and its Committees. When the Minister meets his Chinese Government counterparts, will he emphasise to them that this country has a pluralistic parliamentary democracy, which is what the people of Hong Kong also wish to have?

[Mr Speaker]

I rather remember that the Chinese Government’s obstruction at that time was regarded across the House as thoroughly reprehensible. I also recall that the Chinese embassy had the greatest possible difficulty in grasping the concept of an independent Parliament. I think some re-education was required.

Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I perhaps feel a little prime ministerial when I say that I refer the right hon. Lady to the answer I gave some moments ago, but the answer is the same: our intention is to transfer the EU sanctions, but because we have our own autonomous regime, the evidential threshold must be met. Therefore, everything is being studied closely to confirm that it fits within the evidential requirements of the sanctions Act.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

indicated dissent.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman is shaking his head. He is welcome to intervene and say why, but I can assure him that that is exactly the position as I understand it at the moment.

[Mike Gapes]

I did not seek to intervene, but I am happy to. I am unclear. Is the Minister saying that, where there are currently sanctioned individuals, all of them without exception will continue to be sanctioned in the event of a no-deal Brexit, or that because the evidential requirements of the UK, acting autonomously, may be different from those that apply while we are in the European Union, some of those individuals will no longer, or could no longer, be sanctioned?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As I said earlier, it is possible that, in exceptional circumstances, a person or an entity might not be transferred, but we do not expect that to be the case often, if at all. The intention is, wherever possible, to transfer the operation of the existing regime into our own autonomous legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

If we are looking at individual cases such as that, we are straying slightly outside the terms of this debate, which is about the framework for the operation of sanctions in these four areas. We work closely with our European allies on the operation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, and we will continue to do so. However, we will of course look at all sanctions under the terms of the Act that we passed last year.

The four statutory instruments under consideration transfer into UK law the EU sanctions regimes on Burma, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau and Iran—the human rights element of Iran, rather than the anti-nuclear side. In each case, the instruments seek to substantially mirror the measures in the corresponding EU regime, which include financial, immigration and trade measures.

These SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. This would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions on the countries in question from the date of exit. If we reach a deal, sanctions would continue to apply under EU law during any implementation period, and these SIs would not immediately be needed.

As I said at the beginning, should we leave the EU without a deal, we will publish the list of those sanctioned under these SIs and all our new sanctions SIs on exit day. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but as I said earlier these decisions will be subject to the legal tests contained in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not then be implemented.

Hon. Members may recall that review and reporting requirements were incorporated into the sanctions Act. Hence, alongside these statutory instruments, we have published reports on the purposes of each regime and the penalties contained in them—these are known respectively as section 2 and section 18 reports. These reports, plus an explanatory memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should Members wish to read them in detail. The Government will also review each sanctions regime on a regular basis.

I would now like briefly to describe the purposes of each regime. The Burma sanctions regulations seek to encourage the Burmese security forces to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The corresponding EU sanctions were established in their present form in April 2018, in response to systematic human rights violations by Burmese security forces since the summer of 2017.

The EU sanctions regime designates members of the Burmese security forces who were involved in human rights violations or abuses, or in the obstruction of humanitarian assistance activity or an independent investigation into the atrocities in Burma.

[Mike Gapes]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. Is there any evidence that, since the imposition of those sanctions in 2018, the behaviour of the Burmese military towards the Rohingya or other minorities in the country has in any way improved?

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[Mark Menzies]

Let us move on with the need for sanctions against Venezuela. That regime has not entered hardship as a result of the oil price collapse; it has entered hardship because, not just under Maduro but under Chávez—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) shakes her head, as though it is all down to the oil price collapse. It is not; it is down to the fact that Maduro and Chávez played fast and loose with the constitution. They both abused their positions in order to suppress opposition, including within the press. To suggest that all this misery has been brought about by the oil price collapse is to be economical with the actualité.

[Mike Gapes]

Is it not a fact that the richest person in Venezuela is the daughter of former President Hugo Chávez, a billionaire with about $4 billion US dollars, which has been systematically stolen from the people by this so-called socialist regime?

[Mark Menzies]

The hon. Gentleman is 100% on the money. That is the inconvenient truth that many Opposition Members fail to recognise, because massive abuses were committed well before the collapse in the oil price, and it is one of the reasons why sanctions are needed.

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[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

This debate is probably unnecessary, because we have not yet left the European Union and we almost certainly will not leave with no deal if we do leave, so many of the things we are debating will be dealt with over a long period in transitional arrangements, or not at all. However, given that the House is spending a great deal of time at the moment debating things that are not about to happen, that is par for the course.

In January, I asked an urgent question about Venezuela and there was extensive discussion. The situation has got worse since then. There are now serious threats to Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly and the person who is recognised by many countries and Governments, including our own, as the legitimate leader of Venezuela.

I was pleased that the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), used the phrase, “We welcome this sanctions proposal.” I hope she was referring not just to “we” in general but specifically to the shadow Justice Secretary, the shadow Home Secretary, the shadow International Development Secretary—he sits alongside her—the Leader of the Opposition and all those who have been apologists for or supporters of the Chávez and Maduro regimes. I hope she was referring to members of the Venezuela solidarity campaign, members of the Stop the War Coalition and all those organising rallies and events today to say, “Hands off Venezuela.” I hope she was referring to all those who are acting in this country to undermine the sanctions regime and the action being taken by the Bank of England and others against the corrupt, kleptocratic regime in that country. I praise her for what she said—I have no disagreement with her at all—but I hope she was speaking for everybody on the Labour Benches in that respect.

We need to discuss the wider question of the impact of sanctions. What is the purpose of sanctions? Is it to change the behaviour of a regime or to bring about some kind of punishment for bad people? Punishing bad people is a good idea, but a better idea is to change the behaviour of the regime so the people in the country benefit. We know from history that sanctions regimes are often not successful in changing Governments’ behaviour.

It could be argued that the Iranian regime has changed its behaviour and signed up to the JCPOA in respect of its nuclear programme because of the sanctions imposed on it, and that is at least partially true. However, a bigger reason for that change in behaviour might be that the regime has adopted a long-term view and, thinking 10, 15 or 20 years ahead, wants to take the heat off now while secretly doing what it did in the past with covert facilities at Qom and various other programmes to get around those international sanctions.

[Joan Ryan]

Does my hon. Friend agree that Iran’s desire to wipe out the state of Israel is based on an ideological hatred? Iran and Israel are a thousand miles apart. They have no regional material competition, nor does Israel have any significant effect on the lives of Iranian citizens. In the long term, sanctions against an ideological regime are unlikely to succeed.

[Mike Gapes]

Iran was sanctioned not for its generalised foreign policy, or for its abuse of human rights internally, or for the terrible things it has done to support the murderous Assad regime in Syria, or for what it has done in respect of the situation in Lebanon, or for what it is doing to support the Houthis in Yemen, or for its hostility to and visceral hatred of the idea of self-determination for the Jewish people and the state of Israel, but for its nuclear programme. There may be arguments for extending sanctions on Iran, but we have to recognise that, so far, this is about the current sanctions regime.

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) is right that successive British Governments have played an important role when other Governments wobbled, or when other Governments, such as the Hungarian Orbán Government or the Italian Government—he mentioned Berlusconi, but the current Salvini Government are doing the same thing—have been complicit in being friendly to the aspirations of Putin in weakening sanctions regimes. We have stood firm, and we, France and a few others have led the way on tough sanctions.

Sometimes our EU partners have been divided and we have tipped the scales towards a more robust regime. If we are outside the European Union, that EU regime is likely to be weaker than it would otherwise have been. We would also find ourselves facing all the economic problems that come from being outside the EU, and we would be susceptible to pressure from other countries to go soft on sanctions because we would not have the collective weight of the European Union behind us.

Libya

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Monday 8th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Field]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the French, and as I pointed out, the United States, or aspects of the US Administration, also has a close relationship. We are calling on all international partners to use whatever influence they have to implore General Haftar to back down and to promote the peace process, which is obviously handled at the UN. I know that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has spoken to his French counterpart only today in Brussels and has made that case.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

Would it be correct to say that this recent move is driven by a 75-year-old general in a hurry, who wants to create facts on the ground, supported by a coalition of anti-Muslim Brotherhood countries from the Arab world, including Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and others who wish to exploit the oil if General Haftar takes control of it?

[Mark Field]

The hon. Gentleman knows much about this subject, and has obviously kept an eye on Libyan affairs for quite some time. General Haftar may not be the only old man in a hurry, in certain ways.

I think that the hon. Gentleman is broadly right, although I fear that the situation is less linear than he suggests. There may be groups who do not like the Muslim Brotherhood, but I think that some Faustian bargains are being made when it comes to the coalitions that are being formed. As the hon. Gentleman says, given that the strength of General Haftar’s work has tended to be in the Benghazi region, oil is clearly very much at the forefront of his mind.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Thursday 4th April 2019 Westminster Hall

Select Committee statement

[Mike Gapes (in the Chair)]

We move on to the 16th report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the topic of China and the rules-based international system. Tom Tugendhat, the Chair of the Committee, will speak for up to 10 minutes, during which time no interventions may be taken. At the conclusion of his statement, I will call Members to put questions on the subject of the statement and call Tom Tugendhat to respond to them in turn. Members can expect to be called only once, and questions should be brief.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Khalid Mahmood (Birmingham, Perry Barr) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend, as I will call him, on this excellent report, which has been put together in such detail. I will ask a couple of questions, particularly on what he thinks the Government will do regarding the Indo-Pacific routes, and how we can push the Government to make some clear lines in relation to them.

My hon. Friend raised the belt and road project, which will have a huge effect on Europe and on what we do. China has to meet international standards, in relation to products, the way they are transported, the areas that they go through, and the people who are affected. It has to trade on the same level footing as we do. He also rightly raised issues surrounding democracy in Hong Kong. I press the Government to support that and to continue to move forward; we have a responsibility to do so.

Finally, soft power was mentioned—where we have a huge advantage. My hon. Friend rightly mentioned universities, which are very important, as is the World Service, but I urge him to look at the British Council, which does a phenomenal amount of work in this area. The British Council’s presence in China, looking at the issues, will lead to more young people and students coming to our universities. That is a great tool of soft power that we do not use as much as we should.

I thank my hon. Friend for the report, and urge him to look at those questions. The Minister is a very good fellow, and I am sure he will be supportive.

[Mike Gapes (in the Chair)]

There were a lot of questions there, but we do not have much time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Mr Gapes, I will be as brief as you are in Committee. [Laughter.]

[Mike Gapes (in the Chair)]

No longer!

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will pick up on the points that have not been covered, particularly those relating to the British Council. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood) is right that we did not explore its work, but it is an extremely important element of Britain’s soft power.

The work of the Department for International Development in China is also interesting, because it has ceased, in many ways, to be a donor agency instead of a partner agency. That is an area in which our partnership with China is reaping rewards, not just for China but for the United Kingdom and many other countries in the region. Our assistance in professionalising Chinese aid and sharing best practice is helping in many areas. That is an expression of soft power that we often overlook. We often look at DFID’s soft power as a donor agency, but being a partner agency is an important element too.

[The Minister for Asia and the Pacific (Mark Field)]

Let us not beat about the bush: the rise of China is the big geopolitical issue of our age. It is fantastic that the Committee has put so much work into its report. I know that it makes a lot of recommendations; there may be some that we do not entirely agree with, but having appeared before the Committee, I hope that we can work closely together on its important work.

My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) quite rightly pointed out the importance of the juxtaposition between the two reports debated in this Chamber today. I think it is wishful thinking to assume that there will be a global protocol for the internet. It may be slightly disingenuous for Facebook and others to suggest that they can work towards one, because there is no doubt that there are fundamental differences in values. Equally, this is a world in which we need to work both in bilateral relationships and internationally.

May I touch on the rather provocative question asked by the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes)? Of course our view is that the judgment of the International Court of Justice was advisory, rather than being a judgment that we are necessarily subject to, but there is a risk that in trying to address these issues we could be accused of being mealy mouthed. Fundamentally, I am not quite sure where we will come out. There is a great risk that if the injustice to the Chagos people continues for any great length of time, we will be accused of riding roughshod in the way that has been suggested. I am being very candid with the hon. Gentleman, but I think that it is right to do so.

[Mike Gapes (in the Chair)]

Order. May I gently suggest that we get back to China?

[Mark Field]

Well, there was an issue relating to China there—the fundamental issue of standing up for the rules-based international order. We will need to work closely on it with partners and recognise that China will not respect that order, although it respects order in its own right, and that it will want us to adapt and evolve those rules for a 21st century in which it will be an even bigger player.

I do not think I have any more questions, but more questions will arise from a full analysis of the Committee’s excellent report, to which we look forward to providing a full written response in due course.