Jobs and Growth

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Today, we were once again treated to a typically knockabout speech from the Chancellor. It was founded on the entirely specious notion that the cost of implementing the five points put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls) would be £27 billion, of which £15 billion is supposed to represent speculative market response. In fact, however, if any Government were to come forward with a plausible growth policy, it would almost certainly be greeted with a positive market reaction.

The key problem for the British economy today is not indebtedness; rather, it is lack of demand. The UK debt-to-GDP ratio is, in fact, quite modest, but Government cuts are clearly worsening the problem of lack of demand while hardly reducing the deficit at all because of falling tax revenues and rising unemployment. At present, for every 2.7 jobs lost in the public sector, only one is being created in the private sector.

The alternative policy is a public sector-driven jobs and growth strategy. That is the only way to get out of slump when the private sector contracts, which it is doing at present. We must get people off the dole, thus reducing the enormous cost of benefits, and get them into work where they can contribute to tax revenues as well as regain their independence. Keeping 1 million people on the dole costs £7 billion a year. For the same amount of money, 400,000 jobs could be created.

The Chancellor always says at this point, “Yes, but how’s it going to be paid for?” Well, I will tell him. It need not be paid for by borrowing at all. First, the growth dividend even from a miserable 1.5% growth a year still yields an extra £40 billion in Government revenues over four years. A financial activities tax in the City at even the modest rate of 0.05% would raise about £20 billion a year. The Chancellor changed the controlled foreign company rules and those for capital gains tax, capital allowances and inheritance tax. The only beneficiaries of those changes are corporations and the very rich, and they will deprive the Exchequer of a further £2 billion a year over the next few years. That money could have been used to create jobs. The reason the Government are not going to do any of those things is, of course, that they have an ideological hang-up about the public sector. The whole point about the massive cuts programme is that it provides the opportunity that the Conservative party has been awaiting for so long to squeeze the welfare system, shrink the state and make, once and for all, the transition from the public sector to a fully privatised economy.

The Chancellor has two answers to the important question about from where we get future growth. He says that it is by returning as quickly as possible to the pre-financial crash neo-liberalism City dominance. That is not tenable and it is not sustainable after what has happened. Secondly, he says that it is through private borrowing. Extraordinarily, the Chancellor, who rightly said before the election that private borrowing was out of control, is now proposing—this is the last resort of a pretty desperate man—to rack it up from its current level of £1.5 trillion to more than £2 trillion by 2015, which is an increase of 35%, according to the Office for Budget Responsibility. Of course that probably will not happen, but if it did it would certainly lay the foundations for an even bigger financial crash next time around.

My final point is that the elephant in the room, the state of manufacturing industry, is simply being ignored and neglected by the Government. Last year, the UK deficit on trade in goods was £100 billion—6.8% of GDP. That is simply not sustainable. We need a smaller City, and a bigger and more robust manufacturing sector. That means putting far more resources into improving manufacturing productivity; skills training; protecting strategic sectors of our economy from foreign takeovers; restoring supply chains in key sectors, which have been broken up by over-ready selling up; incentivising an increase in market share over short-term profiteering; and helping small and medium-sized enterprises to upgrade to be higher tech, so that they are less exposed to Asian competition. The Opposition do have a plan for growth. Until the Government come forward with a plan for growth, they do not have an economic policy worth the name.

Independent Banking Commission Report

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Monday 12th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee makes a sensible suggestion. It is likely—I do not want to say certain—that we will need a separate piece of legislation on some of these specific changes to banking. However, I hope that we can also use the Financial Services Bill to implement other key parts of the reform. That is the case because we want to get this right. The draft Bill is currently being discussed by the Joint Committee chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), and we simply will not be able to produce all that detail in the next couple of months before the Bill is introduced. We have to get this right. As John Vickers said, short-termism got us into this mess, and we need a bit of long-termism to get it right. However, I hope that the commitment to legislate in this Parliament reassures people that it is going to happen in this Parliament. This bunch of Ministers, this Government, will be held accountable if we do not legislate in this Parliament. We have given a clear commitment, and I am sure that the work of the Treasury Committee, which my hon. Friend chairs, in looking at how this report can be put into practice will be very valuable.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Why effect a firewall between retail and investment banking—which is highly complex and which the banks will use every device to get round—rather than effecting a clean break, which provided 60 years of stable banking after the great depression? Why wait eight years to implement some of the changes, when that will continue to expose taxpayers to another financial crash and when the banks are still too big to fail?

[Mr Osborne]

One of the original purposes of creating the Banking Commission was to try to resolve the argument, which is held in this Chamber and elsewhere, about whether to split banks, ring-fence them or leave things as they are. In this report John Vickers goes through all the arguments for a complete separation of the banks and comes down on the side of saying that it would not be sensible. He thinks that the cost to the economy would be particularly high, and without any real stability benefits. He also thinks that there are circumstances where one would want a retail bank to be supported by the rest of the bank—the investment bank—and have money transferred into it, which would enhance stability. The third point, which will not be universally popular in this Chamber, is that such a separation would be almost unenforceable under European law, because other European banks—or, indeed, one of our banks that had moved to another European jurisdiction—could passport money in. For those three reasons, John Vickers does not think it sensible to split the banks up.

Global Economy

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 11th August 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

We of course continue to monitor the situation at RBS and all the British banks very closely. There is a concern in the financial markets about the capitalisation and liquidity provisions of banks in many countries. I have to say that those concerns have not been expressed at the moment about the UK. We passed the stress tests well and we have a strong liquidity provision in place for the banks, including RBS, and the markets can therefore have confidence in British banks.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Is it not clear that the Chancellor’s whole strategy is failing, as it is now almost entirely dependent on achieving growth? As the economy has been flatlining for nine months, export markets are stymied, quantitative easing has already been tried with little or no effect and interest rates are already flat on the ground. Where exactly does he expect the growth to come from to get us out of prolonged stagnation?

[Mr Osborne]

As I have said, the British economy is growing and it is the assessment of the Bank of England and the Office for Budget Responsibility that it will continue to grow. The growth in the last six months has actually been stronger than in the United States, and half a million jobs have been created in the private sector in the last year—

The Economy

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

We were treated to a typically Panglossian picture by the Chancellor, as though there were nothing currently wrong with the economy. The Chancellor is not a man who does humility. When challenged, he could cite only three developments that he regarded as successes. The first was the rise in exports, but he failed to mention that imports are rising faster. The second was the increase in jobs, which, although certainly welcome, will be soon swamped by the increase of 1 million in unemployment in the public and private sectors that has been forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility. The third was the improvements in the manufacturing sector, which, as has been said many times, have now sadly embarked on a downturn.

[Mrs Mensch]

rose—

[Andrew Griffiths (Burton) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Meacher]

I will give way only once. As the hon. Member for Burton (Andrew Griffiths) has had plenty of opportunities to intervene, I will give way to the hon. Lady.

[Mrs Mensch]

Is the right hon. Gentleman not a little put out by the fact that the IMF, the OECD and every major economic organisation backs my right hon. Friend the Chancellor, and that his party is entirely on its own in its view of the situation?

[Mr Meacher]

I am afraid that the hon. Lady is behind the curve. The fact is that there has been a major change in the IMF’s view of the balance between cuts and the promotion of growth. I shall say more about that later.

The negatives that the Chancellor ignored are far more numerous than the positives. Let me begin with an important one. The latest figures for public sector net borrowing—which show levels 50% higher than last year, just before the election—are the first clear sign that the Chancellor’s massive cuts strategy is not just in serious trouble, but going backwards. That comes as no great surprise to people like us who have constantly argued that lower growth—and growth has been nil over the last six months—and the prospect of a prolonged period of stagnation will lead to a fall in tax receipts that will swamp the effects of expenditure cuts. That is central to this whole debate, but the Chancellor did not mention it.

Real incomes fell last year for the first time since 1981, and are on course to fall again this year. Inflation is higher, and consumer confidence has slumped to levels that we saw during the depths of the recession. High street retailers are sending out profit warnings and, to cap it all, the Government have been forced to revise upwards the forecasts for the budget deficit. We should not forget that driving down the deficit is the Holy Grail of Government policy, but it is going in the wrong direction.

Where is the evidence that Britain is enjoying what the Chancellor ironically calls expansionary austerity, on the spurious ground that the knowledge that the Government are getting a grip on the public finances will produce confidence and will encourage spending by the public to replace the cuts in public spending? That policy relies on a tighter fiscal policy while allowing a looser monetary policy to remain loose, but if the monetary policy was already ultra-loose—as it was when the Government came to power—there is certainly no scope for it to be made any looser. Any tightening of fiscal policy, let alone the massive tightening that we have seen in the Budget and the comprehensive spending review, is bound to lead to a lower level of aggregate demand in the economy. That is exactly what we are now seeing. Despite two years in which the bank rate has been almost on the floor at 0.5%, there is a marked reluctance to borrow. Mortgage demand is running at half the levels it was in the 10 years up to the financial crash and lending to business is not picking up.

The key question for this debate is: where is the growth to come from? Even Martin Wolf, the distinguished right-wing commentator for the Financial Times has acknowledged that the only plausible source of increased final demand is export growth, but export growth is in effect blocked off, because almost all EU markets are depressed as they all try to export their way out of crisis at the same time. To cap it all, the likely eventual Greek default could severely depress further any prospect of early EU recovery and therefore of UK export markets in the EU.

I repeat the question: where is the growth to come from?

[Lorely Burt (Solihull) (LD)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Meacher]

I have not got time, I am afraid.

Incredible as it might seem, the last straw that the Chancellor is clutching at is a huge increase in personal and household borrowing, which is already at more than £1.5 trillion—well above the level of Britain’s entire gross domestic product. Although it was falling at the last election, the OBR is now forecasting that it will reach £2.13 trillion by 2015—half as large again as Britain’s entire GDP. That is an extraordinary admission. The Government’s only way of imposing massive public expenditure cuts is by pumping up a gigantic financial bubble in the private sector, which can only end in another colossal financial crash. I would be the first to admit that that depends on the private sector’s being willing to load up on hugely more debt, but the other side of that coin is that if households save more, as they are very likely to do because they are extremely worried about their prospects, demand is going to plummet and the economy is likely to hit the wall with an almighty crash. I ask again: where is the evidence for this expansionary austerity that we are being told about? It is not in the balance of payments figures, which are getting worse, not better; it is not in the high street, because consumers would need an increase of about 6% in their incomes to compensate for the price rises and tax increases of the past year; and it is not in the business community, where investment has fallen.

The latter point has an important story behind it. In the commercial private sector there is currently a huge net corporate financial surplus that is almost without precedent. Among the banks and the rest of the financial sector, that now amounts to £44 billion, while for the big corporations in the non-finance sector, it is larger still at £67 billion. Together, the corporates are running an unprecedented surplus that is nearly equal to 8% of Britain’s GDP. Still, however, the banks are not lending—they are already well short of their Merlin targets after only a couple of months—and the big companies are not borrowing. Why? It is because they see little prospect of demand for their products and services to justify their investment. That is the problem and it is not resolved by the current strategy. That is exactly the opposite of what they were expected to do by the Chancellor, who predicted that as the public sector was cut back, the private sector would surge forward to fill the gaps.

It is tragic that the historical evidence that expansionary fiscal contraction has never worked has not been learned. It has been tried three times in the past century. It did not work in the huge public expenditure cutbacks of 1921 to 1923—the so-called Geddes axe, which was very similar in size to the current Osborne axe; it did not work in 1931 to 1935 in the great depression; and it appeared to work in the Howe Budget of 1981 only because it was accompanied by a sharp reduction in interest rates and the major US-driven international recovery of the early 1980s, neither of which applies today. What is not just tragic but deeply culpable is that the same approach is being imposed today, not because there is any evidence that it makes economic sense, but because it is really driven by an underlying ideological motive to shrink the state and to maximise the privatisation of the economy. And it is not working and will not work.

Bank Bonuses

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The last Chancellor of the Exchequer has directly addressed the question of whether the bonus tax in the form in which he introduced it last year could be repeated this year. He thinks that it could not, because behaviour has changed. Indeed, we have seen base pay rise in response to the bonus tax. However, as I made clear in my statement, we are seeking a new settlement with the banks, and nothing is off the table if they cannot agree to that.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Why is the right hon. Gentleman not extending the existing tax on bankers’ bonuses, which has yielded £3.5 billion in the past year? Does that not prove that this is a Government of the rich, by the rich and for the rich, and does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that this rancid stink about bankers’ bonuses simply will not go away?

[Mr Osborne]

The right hon. Gentleman may not know it, or perhaps he did not really believe it, but he fought the last election on a manifesto—written, incidentally, by the Leader of the Opposition—that committed the then Government to opposing a unilateral levy. We have introduced such a levy, and it will raise almost £10 billion in the current Parliament. We are extracting from the banks revenue that the last Government did not extract. Indeed, they opposed the method that we have introduced.

Banking Reform

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House, concerned that no action has so far been taken which would prevent a recurrence of the financial crash, calls upon the Government to establish a clearing house for approval of all financial derivatives and to set in place alternative mechanisms to remove the implicit taxpayer guarantee, other than to purely deposit-taking banks, in the event of any future banking collapse.

The motion is on the Order Paper through the good offices of the Backbench Business Committee, and I take this opportunity to congratulate the Committee and its Chair on the way in which, in my view, they have already opened up Parliament to valuable new procedures and paved the way for important debates that might otherwise not have happened. I hope and believe that this might be one of them.

I begin with the words of the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Dominic Strauss-Kahn, who a few weeks ago told Stern magazine that he thinks a second financial crisis is almost inevitable given the paucity of reform and the vulnerability of the financial system, and that next time round it may well be impossible to persuade taxpayers to fund bail-outs. I do not believe that is an exaggeration, and the latest travails of the eurozone serve only to underline those fears.

It is worth noting that we in the UK have more bank lending as a proportion of our gross domestic product than even the Irish—some £7 trillion, which is five times our GDP. If we are to prevent a repetition of the financial crash, it is clear that its causes must be identified and dealt with by appropriate means. I argue that those causes, in the main, include: an over-lax monetary policy that encouraged an excessive leveraging culture; extreme light-touch regulation that left too much to the markets; the development of a vast global market in credit derivatives, which were not well understood, and which Warren Buffet, the world’s second richest man, notably described as

“financial weapons of mass destruction”;

the role of enormous bonuses, which drove recklessness; a banking structure so over-concentrated in the lead banks that when disaster struck, they were judged to be too big to fail, with catastrophic consequences, as all hon. Members well know, for national debt and the budget deficit; and a banking model that linked speculative investment with retail deposit taking, both of which were protected by an implicit taxpayer guarantee. I hope that that description is accepted on both sides of the House.

All those causes need to be dealt with, and yet none has been. Given the limited time, of which I am very conscious, I want to concentrate on the most important. First, financial derivatives are a perennial candidate for causing the next crisis, because they add opacity and leveraging to the financial system. Credit default swaps, a £65 trillion market, and collateralised debt obligations, which are one of the most common derivatives, urgently need regulation.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Meacher]

I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman, but having heard what Mr Speaker said, I am reluctant to take more interventions, precisely because this is a very short debate—only three hours—and many wish to speak. We already have a six-minute limit, and I have too often been at the back of the queue, unsuccessfully waiting to be called at the end.

[Mr Redwood]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, and I shall refrain from intervening at great length for the very reason he gave. Will he explain to the House why over the past decade the UK banking regulator allowed the huge expansion of balance-sheet risks of all kinds, and why it did not demand more cash and capital?

[Mr Meacher]

I mentioned light-touch regulation in the City of London, which we have had since the Thatcher era and through the Blair era. I believe that that needs to end. We want not excessive but adequate and proper regulation, and for the past three decades, in the so-called neo-liberal era, we have not had it.

Derivatives should be approved by the regulatory authority before they can be issued. At that stage, they can be either prohibited or accepted, perhaps with certain conditions attached. The key point is that transparency is essential. It is worth noting that the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act seeks to achieve that by requiring that all derivatives are traded on public exchanges.

Linked to that is the role—or perhaps the scandal—of the credit rating agencies in allocating a spurious status to some highly dubious securities. Light-touch regulation in this country has evaporated into virtual deregulation. Credit rating agencies were paid by the very institutions whose credit worthiness they were supposed to be assessing. By granting the highest rating, as they so often did, they made it easier for the banks that were securitising and further repackaging debt to create the greatest possible number of securities with the lowest possible regulatory cost. That practice should never have happened, and I believe that it should always be prohibited where there is a serious conflict of interest, as there was in that case.

[Sajid Javid (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Meacher]

I know of the hon. Gentleman’s expertise in this matter, and I will give way to him, but I will not give way subsequently because I want to speak for only about a quarter of an hour.

[Sajid Javid]

Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the price of credit derivatives over the past three or four years has been far more accurate as a predictor of default risk than the credit ratings given by rating agencies?

[Mr Meacher]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point of which we need to take account, but I still think that the credit rating agencies potentially have an important role. They are listened to in the market, are the basis on which financial transactions take place, and should be trusted, but in the present circumstances they are certainly not. However, I am grateful for his question.

On bonuses, there is outrage among not just Opposition Members but, for example, right-wing Governments in Germany, France and Sweden, that a banking system that owes its continued existence to massive Government intervention should pay itself mega salaries and bonuses entirely out of line with the top of business, let alone ordinary taxpayers. There is outrage especially because those gigantic bonuses often drove the recklessness in the first place. The overweening power of the banks attracts almost universal hostility, especially given that 90% of investment bank profits, in an era of austerity, are directed not at strengthening balance sheets, at shareholders through dividends, at customers through lower fees or at taxpayers, but at bonuses.

France, among several others, has demanded a mandatory cap and that there should be no guaranteeing of bonuses, but Whitehall, as usual of course, argues that it would not be practical. However, if the G20 Governments insisted on limits and made continued liquidity provisions dependent on compliance, no bank could refuse. I believe that Her Majesty’s Government should now be taking the lead in the G20 not in succumbing to lobbying from the City of London and the British Bankers Association, but in reining back bonuses on a much greater scale than we have so far seen, and to much lower levels, and in ensuring that they be paid only in exceptional circumstances.

On the broader question of averting future financial crises, attention has so far largely focused on enhancing capital control, but that does not actually have a good record in this regard. At the outset of this latest crisis, virtually all financial institutions across the globe had capital adequacy of between one and two times the minimum Basel regulatory requirements—at least at that level, and in some cases twice as much. Basel III, which has just reached its provisional conclusions, is scarcely any improvement. The core top-tier capital requirement is only 4.5%, and the contingency capital requirement is only 2.5%. Of the EU’s top-50 banks, 45 already meet that standard, and Basel III is actually proposing that the requirement not be introduced until 2019. This is simply nowhere near good enough. A much better possibility might be counter-cyclical capital controls, enforcing different levels of bank capital at different stages in the economic cycle. I can see the point of that, but I suspect that it would leave open the problem of the degree of ratchet and the timing of it. I suspect that that would be far too problematic.

An alternative approach—many have talked about this—is the introduction in Britain of something like the Volcker rule, restricting banks from undertaking certain kinds of speculative trading, notably proprietary trading. Of course that would certainly stop banks doing what they are doing at the moment, which is trading on their own books with the money of depositors. The key point, however, is that it would not overcome the too big to fail problem when applied to investment banks. For example, I do not think it would prevent a repetition of the collapse of Lehman Brothers; neither would it address the interconnectedness—the Chancellor was speaking about this a few moments ago—of today’s banks, with counter-party relationships and exposure between commercial and investment banks, and insurance companies. That is the problem. I say this with regret, but any rule-based reform is almost certain to face the risk of regulatory arbitrage, because financial institutions invent ever more sophisticated products that are simply aimed at getting around regulatory controls. I therefore do not think that what I have described is an adequate answer. For all those reasons, the force of argument and the balance of advantage point strongly towards separating retail from investment banks, in establishing distinct, narrow banks that are conservative, transparent institutions with no financial instruments or incomprehensible balance sheets.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Meacher]

I am being intervened on by someone whom I cannot resist. I am only too glad to give way to the Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee.

[Mr Tyrie]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. On that point, does he agree that the Government have done the right thing by creating the Vickers review? The review will examine, in depth and carefully, without rushing a reform, whether structural reform of the banks is required, and will give us guidance on how to protect ourselves from the too big to fail problem.

[Mr Meacher]

I entirely agree with that, and I was just about to make the same point myself. I hope I can also take the hon. Gentleman with me when I say that Parliament should have the opportunity to express its views to the Vickers commission before it reports, rather than simply making comments when its work is virtually a fait accompli. Indeed, that is one of the purposes of this debate.

The key advantage claimed for the model that I am describing is that it would remove the implicit taxpayer guarantee—that is, the capacity of the financial conglomerates to use retail deposits, which are implicitly guaranteed by Government, as collateral for proprietary trading; or, as the Treasury Committee put it, I think rather nicely, banks playing

“at a high-stakes casino table with…taxpayers’ chips.”

I have a lot of respect for this model, but the crux of it is that the withdrawal of the taxpayer guarantee would be a sufficient deterrent to prevent investment banks from engaging in highly risky investments that might collapse, with serious and far-reaching consequences for the national economy. The real question—which I do not think enough people have asked—is whether that is likely to be true. The fact is that if a financial institution outside the protected narrow banking boundary threatened systemic contagion, it is difficult to believe that the Government would not attempt some form of bail-out. I therefore have to say, regrettably, that I doubt whether the narrow banking model could, by itself alone, be relied on to overcome the problem of moral hazard and too big to fail.

Does that mean that there is no solution to the too big to fail problem? Not necessarily. There is an alternative to narrow banking as a means of preventing a bank from gambling away other people’s money, which is the recent Kotlikoff proposal in the US. It is a proposal that deserves serious consideration—consideration that I hope the Vickers commission will give it. In the US context, it is proposed that all financial companies become pass-through mutual funds. They would have a 100% equity ratio, to ensure bank solvency, and the payments function of banks would be performed by cash funds that would be 100% reserve—for example, through Treasury bonds. Such banks could, of course, still initiate new mortgages and new loans, but these would not be funded through deposit accounts until they had been sold to a mutual fund. The key point is that the bank would never hold them; in other words, the bank would never have an open position. Banks would not own assets—apart, of course, from their offices and so on—and they would not then be in a position to fail or trigger a bank run. That is a significant proposal.

For those—and there are plenty of them—who want to take greater risks beyond a cash-based mutual fund, there are already hundreds of investment avenues that would continue to be available, such as foreign exchange, derivatives, real estate, hedge funds and all the rest. The key difference with this limited-purpose banking would be that any failure in such investments would be incurred by the investor, not by the bank. That is the crucial point. There would be no problem with the banks being too big to fail or trying to insure the uninsurable risk of financial contagion. Critically, there would be no future claims on the taxpayer.

This reform would overcome a critical market failure without the need for any vast new complex regulation. I say that for the benefit of those on the Government Benches. It is, in effect, a market solution. It is true that it would not necessarily prevent asset bubbles—I do not think that anything can do that, certainly not in this area—but under limited-purpose banking, such bubbles would not threaten the entire financial system. Anyway, there would be nothing to preclude some form of macro-prudential authority from having oversight in this area. I think that that would be a very good idea.

I am not suggesting that this reform would be a panacea, because I do not believe that a panacea exists in this area. It should, however, be thoroughly investigated by the Vickers commission and, I hope, by the Government. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that at present Britain has the most profoundly dysfunctional banking system of any G7 country. It came nearer to collapse than any other in the autumn of 2008. I believe that we need to break up the mega-banks, with their addiction to mortgage lending. We need smaller banks and, in particular, specialist business banks such as infrastructure banks, housing banks, green banks, creative industries banks and knowledge economy banks. Only that kind of fundamental reform of the banking system, involving all the elements that I have described, can provide the foundation for the economic and social transformation of this country that we all want. I commend the motion to the house.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

I want to speak briefly at the end of what has been a very interesting and informative debate, which I commend the Backbench Business Committee on securing.

I welcome some of the measures that the Government have already taken, so in the light of this debate, I hope that the motion, which states that the Government have taken no action, will not be pressed to a vote. Many Members have accepted that the measures on tax, including a permanent tax on banks, the Vickers review into banking structures, the international push for transparency and the action taken to bring banks together to work on bonuses show that a strong work programme is in place already.

[Mr Meacher]

I do not want to take up time, because I have a couple of minutes at the end of the debate, but the hon. Gentleman picks up on a point I was going to raise. I did not say that no action has been taken. My motion states that

“no action has so far been taken which would prevent a recurrence of the financial crash”.

That is a very different proposition.

[Matthew Hancock]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because it brings me precisely to the final thing that the Government have already proposed, and which I think is central to preventing a recurrence of the financial crash: the decision to move the powers for prudential regulation to the Bank of England and to strengthen those powers.

Having quickly welcomed the action already taken, I want to concentrate on prudential regulation. The removal of powers of prudential regulation in 1997 was central to many of the things that Members on both sides of the House have talked about. The hon. Member for Islwyn (Chris Evans), who is not in his place, spoke passionately about how his managers were telling him to lend more no matter what the customer needed. That was part of the rapid expansion of banks’ balance sheets, because there was no prudential regulation at the top of the size of those balance sheets. We also heard, from Government Members, about the rapid, uncontrolled run-up in balance sheets.

The idea of prudential regulation and having an institution exercising judgment, instead of just lots more rules-based regulation, has come of age. After all, the system before 1997, although imperfect, had prevented a run on any bank in the UK for 140 years, so it deserves some credit, and it deserves studying. So why would more discretion and judgment based in strong institutions work better than more rules? There are three key reasons. The first, as we have heard in many contributions, is that although rules can be set down in statute, statute can take a long time to change, whereas bankers can change and adapt very quickly. We have heard a lot this evening about regulatory arbitrage—another example of how financial institutions will change quickly to make the most out of whatever rules have been put in place on the ground. But the system cannot then adapt quickly.

Secondly and crucially, the system cannot adapt to innovations. We have seen massive financial innovation, especially with the development of computers over the past 30 years. However, to blame that innovation itself for the mess we are in ignores the fact that it was the lack of regulations—as my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) pointed out so eloquently, regulation is crucial to a functioning market economy—around these new developments and the attempt to regulate through explicit and specific rules, rather than the exercise of judgment, that was the problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Meacher]

I was astonished to hear the Financial Secretary say he thinks that the regulation of financial derivatives in the last financial crisis was adequate, since it seems to me to be clear that that was not so.

This has been one of the most thoughtful, high- quality and rewarding debates I have taken part in, or heard, in the House for a very long time, and we must thank the Backbench Business Committee for bringing a new tenor of openness and genuine discussion into debates, rather than adversarial confrontation.

For Members who may be considering how to vote, let me state once again that I did not say that no action has so far been taken by the Government; I think they have taken action. I said that no action has so far been taken that would prevent a recurrence of the financial crash, and simply shifting regulation from the Financial Services Authority to the Bank of England is certainly not going to achieve that.

I took a brief note of the most important points made by each Member who contributed to the debate, and I was astonished at the high measure of agreement—I will not say consensus—on the issues and, to some extent, on what ought to be done. These included the following: the problem of the creation of runaway credit; the importance of Basel counter-cyclical capital controls; the separation of retail and investment banking; the need for a rebalancing of the economy, with the banks giving more emphasis to industrial investment; improved accountability and competition; the need for universal banking and the re-mutualisation of some banks, perhaps including Northern Rock; the need for higher ethical standards; the overriding need for greater transparency; the need for equity financing; and the need for greater diversification in banking structure. These are all issues—and I have missed out some—on which I think there is broad agreement across the Chamber.

Having had an extremely valuable debate, I hope Members will carefully consider the terms of the motion, as it is quite modest. It was designed to get broad cross-party agreement, and I hope it will achieve that.

Question put.

Comprehensive Spending Review

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Wednesday 20th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. A very large number of right hon. and hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye, and I would like to accommodate as many of them as possible. I therefore issue my usual exhortation to brevity with particular force. Single supplementary questions, please, and economical replies from the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

In cutting the deficit, why did the Chancellor ignore the economic growth dividend, which could yield at least £60 billion in extra Government tax revenues over the next five years? Why did he not tax at all the 1% super-rich, whose wealth has quadrupled over the past decade? And why did he not introduce a major public sector, as well as private sector, jobs and growth programme, which could most effectively cut benefit payments and increase tax revenues?

[Mr Osborne]

The first thing I would say to the right hon. Gentleman is that we believe strongly, as do the major employers in this country and the people internationally who look at this economy, that dealing with the deficit is essential for sustainable growth. That is what this is all about: putting the British economy and our public finances on a sustainable footing so that we can create jobs in the future and so that the economy can grow.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about taxes on the top 1%. We introduced an increase in capital gains tax, and the truth is that not everyone in my party was particularly happy about it, but Labour had 13 years and all those Budgets in which to do that. The shadow Chancellor now rather lamely says that Labour supports the capital gains tax increase, but I would love to know, when the Cabinet minutes are published in 20 or 30 years’ time, whether he ever raised this matter in Cabinet. We took a decision to increase capital gains tax to the higher rate, and last week I published proposals for increasing tax on the very highest pension contributions. That is a £4 billion tax; it was not an easy thing to do, but we have done it. We have also accepted and lived with the previous Government’s decision to increase tax to 50%—of course, they introduced that in the last month they were in office. Again, that was not an easy decision. I am not instinctively in favour of higher marginal tax rates, but it is necessary at a time like this. I am determined that all parts of the income distribution should make a contribution, but that the people at the top of the income distribution should make the most.

Finally, on the disposal of the banks, at the moment we are not in a position to do that, but of course we monitor the situation the whole time and, as and when we can dispose of them, we will. I am very keen to create a more competitive banking sector at the end of this process, which is one of the reasons why we set up the independent commission.

Finance Bill

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 6th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

I am grateful for the intervention, in both senses.

Returning to the Bill, I should say that our plan stands first and foremost for responsibility, because a failure to deal with the deficit is the greatest threat to our economy and to the well-being of our nation. A failure to act now would mean higher interest rates hitting businesses, hitting families and hitting the cost of repaying the Government’s debt. That would mean more business failures and sharper rises in unemployment, and it would risk a catastrophic loss of confidence in the economy. The Budget’s forward-looking fiscal mandate will eliminate the deficit in five years and put us on track to have the debt falling by 2015.

The Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that the measures in our Budget will lead us to meet that challenge one year early and the bulk of the reduction will come from lower spending, rather than from higher taxes. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor announced that the spending review will conclude with an announcement on 20 October and address precisely how we will bring down spending.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

If the Budget is to meet the objectives that the right hon. Gentleman has in mind, where exactly does he expect growth to come from over the next five years?

[Danny Alexander]

I draw the right hon. Gentleman’s attention to the Budget measures forecast, which the OBR published. It demonstrated significant growth in the private sector, based at least in part on measures, which I shall come on to describe, in the Budget and in the Finance Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Redwood]

Once again, the hon. Gentleman is not listening. I was explaining that the coalition Government have made no change to the capital expenditure line that they inherited from the outgoing Government. What they will do is get more bang for the buck—to get more spending on construction, relative to the total investment line in the Budget. On the radio this morning, I was able to satisfy the other people in the discussion; the independent forecaster’s overall forecasts for the economy say that investment is going to rise. There will be an overall increase in investment because more homes will be built over the next five years than the pathetically low figure that was reached under Labour. There will be more investment in housing improvement, and more investment by the private sector. That more than offsets the decline in the investment programme in the public sector inherited from Labour.

[Mr Meacher]

The right hon. Gentleman’s fantasy that there will be a continuation of or an increase in capital investment is completely belied by the OBR forecast on page 90 of the Treasury Red Book, which shows that net investment will fall from £49 billion in the current year to £21 billion in 2014-15. That is a colossal drop.

[Mr Redwood]

Those are Labour’s figures for the public sector. I have just told the House that I am talking about total investment across the economy. Overall, the right hon. Gentleman will find in the Red Book that it is anticipated that the rises in investment elsewhere will more than offset Labour’s cuts in the capital programme, which we have decided to live with. I should also tell him that he is quoting the net line when he should be quoting the gross line. In other words, he is knocking off the depreciation, whereas we are interested in the total spend—the gross line, which is much higher than the figures that he has inadvertently, I think, given the House in error.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Meacher]

How can the right hon. Gentleman believe that private investment will remotely compensate for this enormous fall in public sector net investment, given that household consumption is falling, particularly with the increase in VAT, the banks are not lending, and export markets are fading because of the situation in the eurozone? Why should the private sector invest in those circumstances?

[Mr Redwood]

That is what I have been explaining to the right hon. Gentleman. We are in this position because everything has been so awful. The private sector has just been through a couple of years when it has invested practically nothing because companies could not get any money and were not making much profit. Now, profit margins are growing, there is a bit more money around and they are getting more confident for the future.

It would be much better if Labour Members got behind their voters and constituents, who want the jobs that we wish to see created, got behind the recovery that everybody else is forecasting, and started to live in the real world. They presided over the collapse. Throughout their years in office, manufacturing fell, whereas in the Tory years before that, manufacturing rose. We want to get manufacturing rising again. From that point of view, the one good thing that they did was to preside over a collapse in the value of the pound. They probably allowed it to collapse a bit too much, and it is beginning to rise again under the new Government. That gives those in manufacturing a huge opportunity to make better profit margins, to invest more money, and to produce more. That is exactly what they are beginning to do, and there will be a beneficial effect.

[Mr Redwood]

A shift in the relative position predicted by someone else does not necessarily mean that manufacturing is going to decline. The figures in the official forecast, and I think in most sensible forecasts outside, show that manufacturing will recover from the very low base that it reached in 2009-10. That is what is needed, and we need to have policies that do just that.

[Mr Meacher]

rose—

[Mr Love]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

I pay tribute to the three maiden speakers whom we have just listened to: the hon. Members for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) and for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) and my hon. Friend the Member for Scunthorpe (Nic Dakin). I am always struck by how confident, forthright, quite often amusing and, on occasion, even inspiring maiden speakers are. I am sure that we shall hear a great deal more from them all. I also noticed that they all touched on issues of policy. When I first came to the House, it was a custom that maiden speakers talked about their constituencies and their predecessors, but skirted round any question of policy. I am pleased that that rule is obviously now more honoured in the breach, and I hope that we shall hear much more about policy from all the maiden speakers whom we have heard this evening.

On the Finance Bill, let me start by agreeing with what I can—this part of my speech will be very short. I agree that the deficit is too large and that it needs to be reduced. On every other issue—the size of the cuts, their composition, their impact on growth, the balance between tax increases and spending cuts, and the whole question of fairness—I think that the Budget judgment, as expressed in the Finance Bill, is fundamentally and manifestly wrong.

First of all, as some of my hon. Friends have also said, the Chancellor made great play of the idea that his Budget to eliminate the structural deficit within five years was unavoidable. That is absurd. Balanced budgets are the primitive 1920s economics of Montagu Norman in this country and Herbert Hoover in the United States, and in both countries they led directly to the great depression. Capitalism is driven by cyclical forces that need constant regulation, not balanced budgets irrespective of the economic cycle. The truth is that the Chancellor has gone overboard on austerity. The cuts are as tough as those that the IMF is imposing on Greece, which is on the verge of bankruptcy, which we certainly are not. They are also twice as tough as the Canadian measures that the Chancellor has repeatedly prayed in aid to justify what he is doing, three times as tough as Sweden’s measures in the mid-1990s and much tougher even than the IMF measures in 1976.

Then there is the question of how the deficit should be reduced—as I have said, no one disagrees that it needs to be. There are three ways of reducing the deficit: not only through tax increases or spending cuts, but through economic growth as well. Before the Budget, the OBR estimated that UK growth this year and over the succeeding four years would be slightly less than 2.5% on average. As each 1% of growth adds an annual £15 billion to UK income, the OBR forward projections of economic growth imply an increase in UK income over the next five-year period—the perspective of the Bill—of between £150 billion and £180 billion.

Because all Governments take roughly 40% of any increase in UK income, those figures imply an increase of revenues to the Government of around £70 billion to £75 billion over this five-year period. That would be enough virtually to halve the current budget deficit over that period, which hugely reduces the need for spending cuts. I do not say that I am against spending cuts totally. Indeed, when it comes to Trident, ID cards and some of the extraordinarily wasteful Government IT databases, there is plenty of room for cuts. However, the figures that I have quoted raise starkly the question of whether the Chancellor’s enormous spending cuts will squash out the growth-generating potential of the economy—something that, frankly, would make the cuts simply counter-productive.

Indeed, those figures also raise the central issue, which had something of an airing between those on the Front Benches in the earlier debate, of where the Chancellor expects the growth to come from over the next few years. Household consumption, which accounts for two thirds of national output, is now almost certain to fall, particularly with the increase in VAT. Any growth in wages after inflation is already weak and is likely to weaken further as unemployment rises, which it will. According to all surveys, consumer confidence is fading, while some 60% of UK exports go to the eurozone, which as we all know is in considerable disarray. So where exactly is the growth going to come from?

I give the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) credit for being the one Government Back Bencher who tries to make a case for the Budget, but he seems to have forgotten the prime rule of computer projections, which is: garbage in, garbage out. If we feed in dodgy premises, we get out dodgy conclusions. Government Members keep quoting the OBR as though it is independent—I do not think that Sir Alan Budd is actually independent, and the OBR is next to the Treasury, so it is not exactly independent—but that is not the point. The key point is that the OBR projections are based on certain premises that are––I say this without exaggeration—fantasy.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Given the strength of the right hon. Gentleman’s views on the neo-Keynesian economics that effectively advocate keeping on spending because that is the only way to grow the economy, what does he think of the performance of the Irish economy? In 2009, Ireland managed to reduce state spending by 7% as a result of stringent measures involving public spending and public sector salaries, yet, in the first three months of this year, its economy grew by almost 3%. Does that not demonstrate to him and to other Labour Members that it is a false assumption to say that reducing public sector pay will shrink the economy, and that cutting back can in fact provide an opportunity for the private sector to grow again?

[Mr Meacher]

The opposite conclusion should be drawn from the Irish economy. The Irish Government made huge, swingeing cuts of 12% to 15%, which absolutely decimated that economy. Sooner or later, of course there will be a revival in all economies, but at a fearful cost. We shall very much be going down the route of the Irish economy if this Budget goes through. If the hon. Gentleman were to go to the Republic of Ireland and ask people’s view of the finance budget of three or four years ago, I think that he would get a very different impression.

[Helen Goodman]

I support my right hon. Friend’s interpretation of what has been going on in Ireland. The construction industry has been completely destroyed, and there are empty shells of houses all around the countryside. Unemployment is sky high and, for the first time in many decades, people are emigrating from the Republic.

[Mr Meacher]

My hon. Friend helpfully assists my argument.

I want to be fair and point out the Government’s proposals on corporation tax and the small companies tax to get firms investing, as well as the national insurance cuts for firms outside the south-east to aid new hiring. That is all very welcome, but those measures will be more than cancelled out by the additional Tory spending cuts of £32 billion a year by 2014-15, and the additional £8 billion in tax increases. Let us take a highly topical example. It has been pointed out that the construction industry gets 40% of its work from public sector contracts. The 700 cutbacks in the schools building programme announced yesterday, and the nadir in house building, which is now at its lowest ebb since 1923, will almost certainly cost tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of building workers their jobs over the five-year period.

I shall give the House another example. According to the Treasury Red Book, the OBR forecast for public sector net investment is that it will be flattened from its current level of about £49 billion to just £21 billion in 2014-15. That is a staggering drop. It is not just a marginal change or a change in direction but a staggering reduction. So I repeat, where is the growth going to come from, especially as the banks are not lending? The Bank of England reported a fortnight ago that the flow of net lending to UK businesses was still negative. In other words, people are repaying money to the banks, rather than the banks handing out money to businesses. That compares with the situation in the first half of 2007, when there was annual growth of 20% in the relevant M4 figures for banks lending to businesses.

The great fallacy of the Bill—the fantasy black hole at the centre of the Budget—is that as the devastating public spending cuts take effect, the private sector will expand its hiring and investing to compensate. That is the Government’s argument, but the premise is completely indefensible. Why should the private sector do that? The only reason that private businesses invest is because they see the possibility of profitability and expansion, but where will that come from when consumption is falling, when the banks are not lending and when export markets are fading? Where is the growth to come from? All the coming misery is allegedly unavoidable because there is a crisis in the bond market, which there is not, and because the UK is supposedly like Greece, which it certainly is not.

Many of my colleagues have pointed out the real risk involved in this deficit-cutting fixation to shrink the state. Let us make no mistake, this cannot be justified economically; it has ideological motive. That is the fundamental bottom line in assessing this Budget. It will impale Britain on a very low growth path for years ahead, with rising joblessness and stagnant gross domestic product, even if the country does avoid a double-dip recession, although the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice admitted the other day with typical frankness that that remains an open possibility.

Even in the Chancellor’s own framework for the Budget, there remains the question of striking a balance between tax increases and spending cuts. The Chancellor chose an 80:20 ratio, but that is far more heavily weighted against public spending than in previous economic episodes of this kind, including under previous Tory Governments, such as that of the early 1990s. Poorer households will unquestionably be the main victims of the spending cuts, and even the tax increases—notably VAT—will of course impact most harshly on the poorer half of the population. This is anything but a fair Budget.

Even the two new taxes that impact directly on the rich will have little effect on them. The £2.5 billion bank levy will mainly be offset. There has been no mention of this, but it is fixed at the very low rate of 0.07% of eligible liabilities. One could hardly find a tax rate lower than that. One can be sure that it will be largely avoided through balance sheet adjustments away from short-term wholesale funding, together with other devices such as group restructuring and de-leveraging.

The second tax change that will affect the rich is the increase in capital gains tax to 28%, but that still takes it only halfway to parity with higher rate income tax, which is where it ought to be, and where Nigel Lawson—Nigel Lawson!—left it in the 1980s. The change will still allow people with very high incomes to dress up their income as capital gains so as to halve the tax that would otherwise be payable. The idea that the rich are making an equivalent sacrifice and—to use the mantra that I think will come back to haunt the Government—that we are all in it together is nothing more than a sick joke.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I have some sympathy with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, because the Liberal Democrats were also inclined to support a higher rate of CGT. But does he still support that proposal, given the evidence that it would raise less income and thereby impose harsher penalties on the public sector than if it were left at 28%?

[Mr Meacher]

I have never believed what some Laffer economists say, which is that increasing taxes on the rich results in a reduction in the net income. I believe that that is based on a false premise.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Justine Greening)]

Can the right hon. Gentleman explain why his Government failed to narrow the gap between rich and poor?

[Mr Meacher]

I regret that the Labour Government did not succeed in narrowing the gap between rich and poor. However, they did something quite remarkable in reducing the number of children in poverty by 600,000. No, it was not enough, and we fell below our target. I can tell the hon. Lady why the gap widened, however. To cite a phrase that was used early on in the Labour Government, new Labour took the attitude that it was fairly unconcerned about people becoming filthy rich. That was a serious mistake, and the increase in the wealth of the tiny top segment of the population has been enormous. That is the reason that the gap increased.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I am interested to hear the right hon. Gentleman raise the issue of child poverty. Can he explain why in the last Parliament it went up by 300,000 on every single measure?

[Mr Meacher]

Indeed. The hon. Gentleman is wrong on the figure; the last figure available for when Labour were still in government suggested an increase of about 100,000. That, of course, was the result of a recession caused by the bankers. The Labour party protected the poor and the unemployed to a significant degree, as those groups are about to find out from the very different treatment meted out to them by this Government.

[Kate Green]

I have no idea what statistics the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) is looking at. Over the period Labour were in power, between 1997 and 2010, child poverty fell by 500,000 on every measure. While it is true that it rose in one or two years, it still finished significantly lower than it had been at the beginning of the first Labour Government’s term.

[Mr Meacher]

I think I must move on—and we must move on—from debating poverty between the parties. Since I have the privilege of speaking, however, I have the last word. The fact is that the Thatcher Government tripled poverty to more than 3 million over the period between the early 1980s and the end of the 1990s; Labour reduced that significantly, but did not, in my view, do as much as it could have done to reduce the enormous gains of the wealthy.

As always, it is the dog that did not bark in the night to which we should give most attention. There is nothing in the Bill about a financial activities tax on financial speculation, which is a domestic version of the Tobin tax. Considering that the banks’ recklessness was a major contributor to the crash, that would have a significant reforming potential as well as being a major revenue earner. There is nothing for a really tough crackdown on tax avoidance, which is still estimated to cost the Exchequer some £25 billion a year, nor is any action being taken on the indefensible non-dom loophole. Nor is there any reference to a wealth tax, which might have seemed reasonable when, according to The Sunday Times rich list—not a trendy-lefty organisation—the top 1,000 richest multimillionaires, a minuscule proportion of the population, have nearly quadrupled their wealth over the last decade and a half by no less than £335 billion. This was all in The Sunday Times rich list two or three months ago. In the last year alone, their wealth increased by £77 billion. The fact that they are not being required to make any significant sacrifice at all, when everyone else is—

[Andrew Bridgen]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Meacher]

No, time is going on and I want to conclude.

The fact that those people make no sacrifice while everyone else is being hit extremely hard makes an utter mockery of any idea of fairness in the Budget. This is not an honest Budget or an honest Bill. It was born of an ideological fixation to shrink the state well below 40%. The facts and arguments have been massaged to fit around this preconceived idea, and the methods used—draconian cuts to produce a balanced Budget—remain a throwback to the reactionary and ultimately disastrous economics of the 1930s. It will fail, but the risk is that it will drag down Britain with it.

Banking Reform

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 17th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes a good point about who takes control in a crisis. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor was very clear yesterday that, given his responsibilities in respect of public finances, he will ultimately be in charge in such situations.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Since the direct causes of the financial crash were colossal bonuses that drove recklessness, the use of fancy structured investment vehicles including sub-prime mortgages, the conflict of interest whereby credit rating agencies and auditing companies are paid by the company that they are supposed to be assessing and, above all, the overly lax culture of light-touch regulation, what precise, specific mechanisms is the Financial Secretary putting in place to deal with each of those underlying problems as opposed to merely shifting around the institutional infrastructure, which is all he appears to be doing?

[Mr Hoban]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. He takes a close interest in these matters. Of course, he will remember that in 2006 the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls) praised the system of “increasingly light-touch” regulation and claimed that he had

“resisted pressures from commentators for a regulatory crackdown.”

The right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) ought to take up some of these historical issues with his own Front Benchers.

As regards a change to the regulatory approach, we need to see a move away from the prescriptive, box-ticking approach that we have seen in a recent years to a system in which the PRA and the CPMA can make more judgmental decisions about what is happening in the markets they supervise and with the prudential decisions that individual institutions are taking. If we put judgment at the heart of the system, we are more likely to avoid some of the issues that we have seen arise in recent years.

Office for Budget Responsibility

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that is also the conclusion of the G20, the European Union and most international observers of the UK situation.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

If the Chancellor accepts Sir Alan Budd’s estimate that around three quarters of the current deficit—about £120 billion—is structural, and if he intends to eradicate that entirely during this Parliament through public spending cuts and tax increases, where does he expect the growth to come from to prevent unemployment from increasing to 3 million and staying there for the next five years?

[Mr Osborne]

The fiscal mandate will be set out in the Budget. I am disappointed that the right hon. Gentleman was not elected as Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, but perhaps from his current position he will begin to propose cuts—as I said, cuts were even pencilled in to the previous Government’s plans—before concerning himself with our proposals.