Banking Reform

Matt Hancock Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mel Stride (Central Devon) (Con)]

I rise to speak against the motion, not least because of the argument made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) that implicit in the motion is the suggestion that the Government have done nothing to avert a future banking crisis. I also believe that the motion is too prescriptive at a time when these matters are being considered in detail, not least through the Sir John Vickers commission. This Government set up the commission and released its issues paper as recently as last September.

Huge complexity, tensions, conflicts and dangers are inherent in the development and implementation of policies that are designed to stabilise the banks. Many hon. Members have spoken about banks being too big to fail. It is true that if we have banks that are too big to fail, there is moral hazard in the actions of those who run them, because they always know that the taxpayer is there to back them up if necessary. In such situations, there is an element of unfair competition in that larger banks, backed by the taxpayer, can afford to take larger risks. However, we are also told by many in the industry that size is a function of competitive advantage and that being big is important in global markets.

Many hon. Members have rightly mentioned capital asset ratios. It is important that banks strengthen their balance sheets and that Basel III is implemented, yet there are inherent dangers even in that. PricewaterhouseCoopers has estimated that the implementation of Basel III in the UK will result in £600 billion put into increased capitalisation, which could in turn reduce growth by between 1 and 2%. I therefore welcome the fact that Basel III will not come into full effect until about nine years’ time.

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend think that it is inconsistent to argue both that the banks should lend more to small businesses and that the improvement in capital ratios should be speeded up, as we have heard from some hon. Members?

[Mel Stride]

That is precisely my point. If we speed up the rate at which the banks have to recapitalise, there is a real danger that we will choke off the supply of lending. There is an argument that lending is not just about supply, but about demand. Companies are not taking up many existing bank overdraft facilities, so it is conceivable that there is an issue with demand, as well as with supply.

We have heard a great deal about the importance of united global action. In an internationally competitive world, there is such a thing as regulatory arbitrage. If one jurisdiction adopts a particularly light approach to regulation, vast sums of money can flow in that direction. However, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has pointed out, our country needs to retain flexibility to reflect the particular conditions in our banking markets.

I agree with many of the comments on the importance of transparency in corporate pay, and in particular bonuses. I accept that because banks can ultimately turn to the state and the taxpayer for support, we have a right to take an interest in that matter and to see that fair dealing prevails. However, I concur with Sir David Walker’s recommendation that we should act in a united way globally so that we do not disadvantage countries that might move on their own.

We have heard very little about taxation on banks. I congratulate the Government on being the first to introduce a permanent tax on banks. However, the arguments about taking out capital that banks might otherwise lend also pertain to that measure. We want the banks to lend more, but the picture is not clear as to why they are not lending, as I alluded to in response to my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Matthew Hancock). It may not be just a lack of supply owing to recapitalisation and a greater aversion to risk among the banks, but to do with a lack of demand among companies, many of which are focusing on paying down debt, rather than taking on more.

My hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Joseph Johnson) and the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) mentioned competition. This country has a highly concentrated banking sector and it became more concentrated after the financial crisis, when some foreign lenders withdrew and some banks amalgamated. Lloyds and RBS make up 50% of lending to the retail, mortgage and small and medium-sized enterprises sectors. That is a huge degree of concentration. There are high barriers to entry to banking, not least the very regulation that we are discussing. Over the past century, the only new high street bank, disregarding demutualisations, has been Metro Bank, which was created last year. On the other hand, Australia and Canada have highly concentrated banking sectors and seem to have been spared the worst of the financial crisis.

I welcome the Government’s approach to Basel III and their setting up of the Financial Policy Committee, along with its oversight role in relation to the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority. I particularly welcome the setting up of the Independent Commission on Banking under Sir John Vickers, which has been welcomed broadly by business, including in a recent speech by Richard Lambert, the director general of the CBI. I welcome some of the approaches that the Government are taking to encourage equity finance to increase above the current level of 1 or 2%.

I fear that stalking the perimeters of the debate on the Government side and perhaps at the heart of the debate on the Opposition side is the idea of bashing bankers and of revenge. The hon. Member for Streatham (Mr Umunna), who I think is no longer in the Chamber, denied that that was what he said. However, when he was speaking, I jotted down his reference to bankers being “to blame”. That is the kind of populism that we must get away from; emotionalism must not triumph over the rational when we consider such issues.

This is a highly important sector in which we have a world-leading position and we must retain that. Protectionism, trade imbalances and exchange rates are threats, but I argue that we must not lose momentum on banking reform, particularly in countries that have not been as swept up in the crisis as we have, for what has bitten us may yet come round to bite them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

I want to speak briefly at the end of what has been a very interesting and informative debate, which I commend the Backbench Business Committee on securing.

I welcome some of the measures that the Government have already taken, so in the light of this debate, I hope that the motion, which states that the Government have taken no action, will not be pressed to a vote. Many Members have accepted that the measures on tax, including a permanent tax on banks, the Vickers review into banking structures, the international push for transparency and the action taken to bring banks together to work on bonuses show that a strong work programme is in place already.

[Mr Meacher]

I do not want to take up time, because I have a couple of minutes at the end of the debate, but the hon. Gentleman picks up on a point I was going to raise. I did not say that no action has been taken. My motion states that

“no action has so far been taken which would prevent a recurrence of the financial crash”.

That is a very different proposition.

[Matthew Hancock]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because it brings me precisely to the final thing that the Government have already proposed, and which I think is central to preventing a recurrence of the financial crash: the decision to move the powers for prudential regulation to the Bank of England and to strengthen those powers.

Having quickly welcomed the action already taken, I want to concentrate on prudential regulation. The removal of powers of prudential regulation in 1997 was central to many of the things that Members on both sides of the House have talked about. The hon. Member for Islwyn (Chris Evans), who is not in his place, spoke passionately about how his managers were telling him to lend more no matter what the customer needed. That was part of the rapid expansion of banks’ balance sheets, because there was no prudential regulation at the top of the size of those balance sheets. We also heard, from Government Members, about the rapid, uncontrolled run-up in balance sheets.

The idea of prudential regulation and having an institution exercising judgment, instead of just lots more rules-based regulation, has come of age. After all, the system before 1997, although imperfect, had prevented a run on any bank in the UK for 140 years, so it deserves some credit, and it deserves studying. So why would more discretion and judgment based in strong institutions work better than more rules? There are three key reasons. The first, as we have heard in many contributions, is that although rules can be set down in statute, statute can take a long time to change, whereas bankers can change and adapt very quickly. We have heard a lot this evening about regulatory arbitrage—another example of how financial institutions will change quickly to make the most out of whatever rules have been put in place on the ground. But the system cannot then adapt quickly.

Secondly and crucially, the system cannot adapt to innovations. We have seen massive financial innovation, especially with the development of computers over the past 30 years. However, to blame that innovation itself for the mess we are in ignores the fact that it was the lack of regulations—as my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) pointed out so eloquently, regulation is crucial to a functioning market economy—around these new developments and the attempt to regulate through explicit and specific rules, rather than the exercise of judgment, that was the problem.

[Stephen Barclay]

Is not one issue that mitigates the need for specific rules the regulator’s 11 principles, which act a bit like the 10 commandments? For example: “Principle 1: you must act with integrity. Principle 11: you must be open with the regulator. Principle 3: you must have adequate risk management.” It is inconceivable, given that those rules have legal force, that some of those catch-all principles could not be used in enforcement.

[Matthew Hancock]

They were not used, and that is the problem. A massive, heavy and expanding rulebook distracted the attention of regulators away from the big picture.

My third point about why discretion rather than rules is the best way for the future concerns the importance of the macro-economy, because we cannot separate monetary policy from banking policy. The size of banks’ balance sheets is crucial to regulating the supply of money in the economy. Having counter-cyclical rules rather than pro-cyclical capital rules, as we had under Basel II, is crucial. The exercise of judgment over a bank’s balance sheet is best done in the same place as the exercise of judgment over the macro-economy. Bringing those two things back together in one institution—the Bank of England—is a better long-term way of trying to wrestle with such difficult judgments than having them in separate organisations, which, as we heard in an earlier, eloquent speech, ended with the tripartite system, in which nobody was in charge.

[David Rutley (Macclesfield) (Con)]

I do not know whether my hon. Friend is aware of this, but last week the deputy Governor of the Bank of England appeared before the Treasury Committee and said that he felt that the new twin peaks approach would be a much better model. He felt that the advantage was that it would remove the problems of underlap that were so obvious in the previous system. Whereas there might be some overlap under the current proposal, that has to be much preferable to the previous arrangements.

[Matthew Hancock]

That is a valid and important point. Central to that point is the judgment of people who look forward and have a broad view, looking after the health not only of the banking system, but of the macro-economy, while also having the ability to change the way they regulate according to changes in the economy, so as to take into account new developments, which is critical. Far from being the simple renaming of the institutions, bringing together macro-prudential regulation with regulation of the economy and monetary policy more broadly is central to restoring the ability to prevent the build-up of credit, as happened over the past 15 years.

[Andrew Bridgen]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is better to have a regulator who is fleet of foot than a clunking fist?

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Hancock]

In my experience it is always better to be anything than a clunking fist.

I will end by saying this. We do not know what the future holds. We know that regulation is not perfect. It is therefore far better to have one person and an institution in charge of the regulatory structure who can exercise judgment to the best of their ability than it is to try to write a rulebook for a perfect system that we know we will never create. That is why I think that the Government have already put forward such a critical change to our financial architecture—a change that I hope will be accepted by the Opposition and which will form the basis of the good economic governance of our country for years to come.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

I call Mr Morris. Are you going to be very brief?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

It is difficult for the hon. Gentleman to criticise the previous Government, when they put the statute in place ready to be triggered by the present Government. It is baffling to my constituents and to his that we cannot allow them to see the simple figure of how many multi-millionaire bankers there are. I am not suggesting that we reveal their names, just the number involved.

[Matthew Hancock]

rose—

[Chris Leslie]

I am hoping that the hon. Gentleman is going to concede that that needs to happen.

[Matthew Hancock]

The hon. Gentleman is making an argument for rejecting the Walker review. I was not in the House during the last Parliament. Could he just tell us who commissioned the Walker review?

[Chris Leslie]

I am not making an argument for rejecting the Walker review. It recommended the disclosure of the numbers, but it is true that Walker has since changed his tune. The reliance on what he calls “regulatory arbitrage”, and the suggestion that if we were to make that change here in the UK alone, we would suddenly see an exodus of the banking community, are absolutely fallacious arguments. We have a responsibility to show a lead, and surely the Government should be able to do that. It would be invidious if that were not the case.

In the short time available to me, I also want to walk through some of the other proposed changes that hon. Members mentioned. They raised issues about proprietary trading, and there are even more Government Members who are in favour of the Glass-Steagall split between investment and retail banking. There has been an interesting consensus on that. That might not necessarily be the right thing to do, but it is certainly worth consideration by the Vickers commission.

The structure of the sector has also been mentioned, as has the question of whether we need to revisit the issue of competition. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) asked how we could remove some of the constraints on mutuals and credit unions, and on others entering the sector, given that the barriers to new entrants are too high. Indeed, I note the very thoughtful speech from the hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom), who mentioned a number of interesting ideas about how reforms might take place. I was quite taken by her suggestion about consumers’ current account numbers being portable. Other interesting suggestions were also made.

Basel III and the question of cushions and reserves are clearly important for guarding against failure and reducing taxpayer liability, but do we need to pay similar attention to liquidity, as the hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern) suggested? Should certain institutions have greater cushions and reserves than others? Perhaps that is the subject for a more sophisticated debate at another time.

Other components have to be addressed as well, including the financial capability of consumers and consumer responsibility. Yes, consumers have a right to know more about the products and companies involved, but perhaps it is also important to have a debate about the responsibilities of consumers. That needs to be acknowledged. We need to revisit the question of fairness for the taxpayer, and for public service users, indirectly, as well. Unfortunately, we have heard too much back-pedalling on the banking levy and on the role that the banks need to play in repairing the public balance sheet—[Interruption.] The Minister suggests that he is not back-pedalling, but from what we read—albeit in the newspapers—it sounds as though the Government might reduce the percentages that they want to implement, as announced in the Budget, if they are going to stay within the proposed 0.04% in year one and 0.07% thereafter. I would be more than happy to give way to the Minister on that specific point if he wants to clarify that position once and for all. But perhaps he will keep that for another day. He has also been back-pedalling on net lending targets of the business, although that was in the coalition agreement.

It is important that we have these debates. They show that there is a thirst for democratic accountability on financial services policy. Perhaps one of the lessons that we learn is that simply delegating many of these issues to European institutions or to the regulators is inadequate. There is a democratic deficit, and Parliament has a role to play. Hon. Members who try to find out information on Financial Services Authority reforms and regulations sometimes struggle to get the necessary documentation from the Vote Office, which is not good enough. We need to recognise our role as legislators, because our constituents are watching how we behave. They are watching how we set policy, and they expect us to do that. We should not be blown around entirely by the regulators, by Europe and by the markets. Politicians need to lead, and Ministers need to show greater leadership, and I hope that the Government will do that.