Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Liberal Democrat new clause 27 seeks to repeal provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 passed by the previous Conservative Government. By attempting to repeal section 29 of the Act, the Liberal Democrats are seeking to prevent the Government from removing people, including criminals, to a safe third country.

Rewind back to 2022 when 45,000 people crammed into small boats, flimsy rafts teetering on the channel’s unforgiving waves—a swarm, spurred by the hope of slipping through our borders, hammering coastal towns and stretching security to its limits.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Did the hon. Gentleman really mean “swarm” in that context? That is quite emotive language.

[Matt Vickers]

Well, hot air is required in this room this afternoon, and I intend to provide it.

We fought back with the Nationality and Borders Act third-country removals, which helped the Government to deter crossings by 36% in 2023 from 45,000 to under 29,000—not by chance, but by design, sending a message to traffickers and migrants alike that Britain is no soft touch or guaranteed prize. Now, the Liberal Democrats barge in with new clause 27, desperate to repeal section 29 to shred that deterrent and plunge us back into chaos, flinging the channel wide open not just to the weary but to every chancer or criminal. That is not tweaking policy; it is torching a firewall, inviting all those to Dover’s cliffs and Deal’s shores and erasing every inch of progress that we have clawed from the crisis. The Lib Dems owe us hard answers. How many boats—50,000 or 60,000?

The Albania deal delivered a masterstroke of border control. That pragmatic triumph has turned a torrent of illegal crossings into a trickle through sheer diplomatic grit. Back in 2022, Albanians dominated the small boats surge. A 12,000-strong, relentless wave of young men were lured by traffickers with promises of easy UK entry for £3,000, clogging Dover’s processing centres and fuelling tabloid headlines of chaos. Then came our 2023 pact with Tirana—a no-nonsense agreement that flipped the script with fast-track returns, joint police operations and a clear signal: Albania is safe and you are going back.

By 2024, the results were staggering. Weekly flights were whisking deportees home, with each jet a nail in the coffin of the smuggling networks that once thrived on our porous borders. That was not luck or loud threats but cold, hard execution, bolstered by UK-funded cameras on the Albania-Kosovo frontier and Albanian officers embedded in Dover.

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[Matt Vickers]

His writing seems to be going quite well at the moment. I do not know that I have the cash for him.

What I have described is not asylum. We cannot pretend that the EU’s 27 nations and its vast tapestry of safe, stable and prosperous lands—we can take our pick of France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and so on, each a bastion of peace and plenty—somehow warrant the same desperate lifeline that we reserve for those fleeing real and genuine chaos. This is the same organisation that the Liberal Democrats supposedly want to build closer ties with. They also want the UK to grant asylum to people who come to this country having already been in a country where they have claimed and been granted asylum. Why are the Liberal Democrats encouraging people to cross the channel when they already have asylum or can claim asylum in a safe third country?

Just like the Labour Government, the Liberal Democrats want to remove sections of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 that allow local and public authorities to conduct an age assessment on an age-disputed person. As we discussed before when the SNP did not wish those who claim to be a child to be treated as an adult, every European country apart from ours uses scientific age assessment techniques such as an X-ray of the wrist. As we have said, there are also other methods. More than 50% of those claiming to be children were found to be adults after an age assessment in the quarter before the election. Without a scientific age assessment method, it is very hard to determine age. Given the horror stories in this area, why do Liberal Democrats want to put the people of this country at risk, and blindly allow unverified people into the UK?

Let us now talk about a nightmare unfolding right under our noses: one that the Liberal Democrats seem hellbent on making worse. In the first quarter of 2021 alone, 560 adults—grown men with stubble, receding hairlines and years behind them—had the gall to pose as kids, slipping through the cracks until scientific age checks, such as wrist X-rays and dental scans that every sensible European nation uses, caught them red handed and stopped them cold.

The Lib Dems’ new clause 27 would axe those checks and rip out the one tool keeping us from dumping people who are 25 years old or even older into classrooms alongside children. That is not some abstract risk. It has happened and it is real; it means men in their 20s sitting at desks meant for teens, all because we have let sentiment trump science. That would not protect children, but endanger them—a reckless gamble that would turn schools into hunting grounds and parents into nervous wrecks, all so the Lib Dems can pat themselves on the back for being compassionate. If they get their way, every classroom will have a question mark. How many 25-year-olds will slip through before the damage is done?

What do the Liberal Democrats believe should happen if the authorities believe a migrant who is claiming to be under 18 is actually an adult? Do they believe that such people should be placed in schools with schoolchildren? Again, it seems as though the Liberal Democrats want to strip the Government of any power to control who comes to the country. That would see net migration drastically increase.

The issue cuts deeper than policy, however; it is about what people expect, and the Liberal Democrats’ new clause pulls hard against that grain. Voters have signalled what they want loud and clear, with 68%—nearly seven in 10—backing tougher border controls in surveys: a call echoing from Dover to Folkestone, where residents live with the reality of arrivals day by day. That is not a passing opinion; it is a steady demand—rooted in years of debate, from the 2016 Brexit vote to the 2019 landslide—for a system that prioritises their say.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not know what the hon. Gentleman had for lunch, but perhaps we should find out and get some of it ourselves. We can then all compete with the poet laureate and the virtuoso performance that we have just heard.

I am going to talk about the new clause, however, which is in respect of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire is proposing that numerous sections of the 2022 Act be repealed under the Bill.

I should start by making it clear that we are determined to restore order to the asylum system, so that it operates swiftly, firmly and fairly, and ensures that the rules are properly enforced. That is a financial necessity to deal with the backlogs that we have inherited—the permit backlog in particular, but also others, especially in the appeals space—so that the costs do not continue to mount up at the expense of the taxpayer. Getting the system moving again is an important part of what we have been doing.

Following the election, the Home Secretary acted rapidly to change the law to remove the retrospective application of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which allowed decision makers to decide asylum claims from individuals who arrived in the UK from 7 March 2023. Previously, there was a ban on that, because of the duty to remove, which was never going to be sensibly put into effect.

I am not going to speak to every section of the Nationality and Borders Act, but the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire wants us to repeal very large chunks of the Act under the new clause. I will mention only a few, and I hope that she will forgive me for not talking about every section.

The introduction of the national age assessment board, for example, in March 2023, relies on a piece of the Nationality and Borders Act that the hon. Lady wishes to repeal. In the interim, since that Act has come into being, we have introduced the national age assessment board and made it available across the country. It continues to offer significant improvement to our processes for assessing age, including creating greater consistency in age assessment practices, which can be very inconsistent in the practical delivery of Merton-compliant assessments in different local authorities—some are more experienced and some better at it than others. The national age assessment board creates a standard and a bar below which it is hard to go. It sets important standards in age assessment, improves quality and ensures that ages are recorded correctly for immigration purposes.

The Nationality and Borders Act also placed protections and support under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings on a legislative footing for the first time in the UK. That includes the right to a recovery period in the national referral mechanism, during which potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking are eligible for support and are protected from removal from the UK. The Act provides the means to disqualify individuals—I suspect that this may be the bit that the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire objects to—from protections or support on the grounds of public order or bad faith. However, that is in line with article 13 of the convention; that part of the Nationality and Borders Act put the convention into UK law. I am surprised she is suggesting that we should remove it.

The Act also sets out the circumstances in which confirmed victims of slavery and trafficking may be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. The Government will be launching a public consultation, before summer recess, on how we can improve the process of identifying victims of modern slavery. We will provide details on that consultation in due course.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am not sure how much of the debate we could have heard, Dr Murrison, had you made that observation at the beginning of it.

I do not think this Government wish to join Belarus and Russia among those who are not signed up to the European Court of Human Rights. The Government are fully committed to the protection of human rights. When we talk about human rights, that means all people who are human: everybody, applied universally.

As the Prime Minister has made clear, the United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to the European convention on human rights. The Human Rights Act is an important part of our constitutional arrangements and fundamental to human rights protections in the UK. To start taking those away on a bit-by-bit basis, particularly beginning with people who are very unpopular and have done difficult or bad things, could be the start of a very slippery slope if we are not careful. That is why I am proud that our Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill has printed on its front cover that it is compatible with convention rights. This Government will always do things that are compatible with convention rights.

The paradox of some of what has been said in the debate we have just had is that it politicises decisions. That is a very different approach to judicial issues from the one we have seen for very many years, where, in effect, a lot of the powers on particular issues that used to sit with the Home Secretary have been taken by judges who are publicly accountable for their decisions. I do not think that this Government would want to see that reversed. The paradox of new clause 33 is that all those who potentially had a human rights claim, whatever their circumstances, could go straight to the Strasbourg court, which would clog up that court. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, that is not taking back control, it is abrogating it, and would flood the Strasbourg court with decisions that could have sensibly been taken here.

That is not to say that any one of us would not be frustrated by particular individual decisions, but I caution against using decisions that have been only partially covered or talked about on the front pages of The Daily Telegraph, which often takes decisions in cases out of context. We have talked a lot about chicken nuggets, and I would just put on the record that that case is being appealed, and judicial activities on that case have not yet finished.

With that commitment to human rights and European convention rights, I hope that Opposition Members will think about some of the potential consequences of what they are suggesting in chopping up human rights and wanting to put us in the same company as Belarus and Russia; about the way convention rights were developed; and about the benefits that adhering to human rights frameworks has given us as a democracy over the years.

[Matt Vickers]

I am sure that the Minister must disagree with some of the examples that we have seen, and agree that they undermine public trust in the judiciary, legal institutions and the frameworks we have. What is the solution? Must we grin and bear the appalling outcomes of those cases or is there a solution? How does she propose to stop such things happening?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I would respectfully say that the hon. Gentleman’s party had many, many years to think of a solution, and most of the cases that Opposition Members have raised today had their genesis in the years that they were in power. Close to the very end, as they became more and more frustrated, they started coming up with more and more outlandish approaches.

Obviously, one wants the entire judicial process to be used, as speedily as possible, and if the Home Office wishes to appeal a particular case, it will do so. We keep a constant eye on the issues and we think about reforms that we could make. Obviously the hon. Gentleman will be the first to hear if we decide to make changes, but we do not wish to abrogate from the Human Rights Act, the ECHR and the human rights framework. That is where we and other Opposition parties differ from him and his party. That is why I do not accept new clause 33 and I hope that the Committee will vote against it if it is pressed to a vote.

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[Matt Vickers]

Currently a prison sentence of one year is required before a foreign national who is a convicted criminal can be deported. Even then, removal can be frustrated by asylum and human rights claims. New clause 34 would prevent a foreign national who is convicted of any offence from remaining in the UK, as well as anyone who has been charged with or convicted of an immigration offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, and would disapply the Human Rights Act from those cases. We believe that the protection of British citizens is paramount and should be the overriding priority for Government. If a foreign national has been convicted of any offence, they should lose their right to remain in the UK.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

On that point we agree, so why was his Government so tardy at actually deporting foreign national offenders when they were in office?

[Matt Vickers]

We have just had a lengthy discussion about the Human Rights Act and the impact it has on deportations. However, if she agrees so wholeheartedly on the principle, I am sure she might consider backing our amendment.

There are a number of countries where the UK has a significant number of foreign national offenders currently serving in British prisons. However, we deport only a small number of those foreign national offenders each quarter. Our new clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to use a visa penalty provision if a country is not co-operating in the removal of any of its nationals or citizens from the UK, or in relation to the verification of their identity or status. We have done this by amending the Nationality and Borders Act, so that the ability to impose visa sanctions is not discretionary but mandatory. We know that there are countries that are hard to secure returns to. We believe strongly that that should not be without consequences for those countries.

New clause 34 shifts the lens to where it belongs—on the victims left in the wake of foreign offenders, not the perpetrators gaming the system. In 2024, theft offences alone averaged just 8.1 months—a shopkeeper’s livelihood dented, a pensioner’s purse snatched, or a family’s peace of mind and sense of security destroyed. Public order crimes averaged just 9.6 months, with more huge consequences for the wellbeing of victims who are left with a fear of entering public spaces or unable to go about their ordinary lives. Yet the one year deportation bar enables those culprits to linger, post-sentence, free to reoffend while victims wait for justice that never comes.

This clause says, “Enough.” Any conviction, for shoplifting or worse, triggers removal—no Human Rights Act excuses—because every day a foreign offender is allowed to stay is another day a British victim’s trust in the system erodes. Why are the Government okay with that shadow hanging over our streets? New clause 42 would force nations to play ball uphill. We see too many countries dither and delay in refusing to take back offenders. Mandatory visa sanctions flip that script. No co-operation, no UK visas for their elite. Watch fast how passports materialise when there are real consequences. Why is Labour soft-pedalling when we could wield this stick, clear the backlog and reduce pressure on prison places?

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[Matt Vickers]

I think the public will be stunned to hear that immigration enforcement officers have challenges in accessing asylum accommodation centres, as outlined by Tony Smith, the former director general of UK Border Force. We will therefore seek to press the new clause to a vote.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The new clause talks about accommodation centres, which do not exist. What does the hon. Gentleman mean by accommodation centres?

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady will have noticed that I have not dismissed the idea completely, but I do not think the idea is anywhere near a position where one could talk about how it might be practicable, and certainly it is not at a stage where one could consider putting it into primary legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

State support is not a right and, if a person is able later to contribute by paying some of it back, we believe it is right for them to do so. We wish to press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 41 would require the revocation of protection status or leave, or discontinuation of asylum claims, where an applicant returns to their country of origin. The Government are in absolute agreement on the principle behind the new clause. Although we are committed to providing protection to those who genuinely need it for as long as it is needed, in accordance with our obligations under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights, such protection status must be granted only when it is required. As such, I want to reassure Opposition Members that, under our existing policy, where an individual returns to their country of origin, we consider whether they have re-availed themselves of the protection of that country. Where that is the case, we seek to revoke their protection status under the appropriate provision set out in the immigration rules.

We are also clear that asylum claims may be discontinued and withdrawn where the applicant fails to comply with the asylum process, which includes leaving the UK before a decision is made on their claim. I hope Opposition Members are therefore assured that the immigration rules enable protection status to be revoked already and applications to be discontinued where an applicant has returned to their country of origin. As such, new clause 41 is not required.

[Matt Vickers]

We wish to press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The Conservative party has tabled the new clause to ensure that proceedings of the lower-tier immigration tribunal will be heard in public. We have seen absurd outcomes in some of the cases heard in the upper tribunal in recent months, and we feel it is important to make sure that the system is transparent and that the public have full access to the tribunal records at both levels.

Examples of recent cases reported by the Telegraph include that of an Albanian criminal who avoided deportation after claiming that his son had an aversion to foreign chicken nuggets, and that of a Pakistani paedophile who was jailed for child sex offences but escaped removal from the UK as it would be unduly harsh on his own children. More recently, it was reported that a Pakistani man was convicted of sexually assaulting a woman but was allowed to stay in Britain after he claimed he was gay. An Albanian criminal also avoided deportation after a judge ruled that long-distance Zoom calls would be too harsh on his stepson.

The absurdity is further emphasised by the case heard recently in which a Ghanaian woman won the right to remain in Britain as the wife of an EU national, even though neither she nor her husband was present at the wedding held in Ghana. The lower-tier tribunal stated that the marriage was not legal, but that was overturned in the upper tribunal, which ruled that the proxy marriage was recognised in law and that registration at the same time as the marriage ceremony was not mandatory.

The continued abuse of our legal system, and the use of human rights as a defence, has gone on for too long. In another case, a tribunal ruled that a convicted Ghanaian pastor who was deported from Britain for using fake documents should be free to return to the country. Despite being jailed for using illegal documentation, the individual in question appealed under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, leading a judge to revoke the deportation order, claiming that it was an “unjustifiable interference” in his human rights.

The number of decisions may be used as an argument against the new clause, but these decisions are important. The first-tier tribunal’s asylum appeal backlog increased from 34,234 outstanding cases at the end of September 2024 to 41,987 by the end of December. That contrasts with 58,000 in the first quarter of this year. That is significantly more than the upper tribunal, but it underlines the importance of us knowing what has happened in these cases. Public trust is pivotal, as it—

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison—I suspect that you will be bookending our proceedings, if we make reasonable progress today. Does the shadow Minister acknowledge that increases in appeal backlogs are a result of the legacy process that his Government undertook, because people whose claims were not granted in that process have appealed and added to the backlog?

[Matt Vickers]

We know that significantly more people are arriving in the country. In fact, since the election, the number arriving illegally is up 29%, as is the number of people staying in hotels. The Government are actually removing fewer people than arrive by small boat now. The more people arrive, the more the backlogs will become an issue. Transparency in these tribunals is essential.

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[Matt Vickers]

We were doing lots of things. I am sure we will come on to some of the progress that was being made, including the Albania agreement, which has taken thousands and thousands of people back to Albania and reduced the number of people coming. That deterrent stopped people setting off in the first place. It was real progress.

The Bill—this is the reason why we are sitting here today—is the opportunity to shape what comes next, what impact that will have on the number of people coming across the channel and what impact that will have on public confidence in our courts system. That is what we are here for. It is why we have bothered sitting here for so many hours—to ensure that the legislation that goes forward tomorrow is fit for purpose.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Not that many!

[Matt Vickers]

Well, we will see how much longer we get to sit. Time will tell, but I will move on.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I have to compliment the hon. Member for Stockton West on his tie, since he raised it, and the hon. Member for Weald of Kent seems to have good taste in the colour of her jackets. I promise that that is the last fashion statement that I will make in our proceedings today.

On new clause 24, we agree that accountability and transparency are absolutely vital for building trust and credibility in the immigration system. Under rule 27 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014—note the date—the presumption already is that hearings at the first-tier tribunal must be public unless the first-tier tribunal gives a direction that it or part of it is to be held in private. Indeed, the majority of hearings at the first-tier tribunal are public. However, there are sometimes appropriate reasons for a hearing not to be public. For example, hearings may be held in private to preserve confidentiality in respect of sensitive medical details or to protect the privacy of a victim of a serious crime—for example, of a sexual nature. It may also be done to protect a party or witness from duress.

That is precisely why the Tribunal Procedure Committee has broad discretion to determine what practice and procedure in the first-tier tribunal will best support the overall interests of justice, and why the judiciary has a range of case management powers under the tribunal procedure rules to decide how individual cases should proceed. Those tribunal powers were published and written when the party of the hon. Member for Stockton West was in government, in 2014. It is expected that judges will have a wide discretion in dealing with these sensitive issues.

On making rulings of the first-tier tribunal available to the public, currently judgments of the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier tribunal are not routinely published. The decision about whether to publish a judgment is a judicial one. However, members of the public and the media can apply to the tribunal for a copy of the judgment in a specific case. I know that the Lord Chancellor will continue discussions with the judiciary about how we can bolster accountability and transparency to build public confidence, but I cannot help feeling that perhaps certain people who might work for a certain newspaper are getting to the end of their search engines for absurd cases that they can publish, and want a whole new database to search. If they want to bring these issues out into the open at the first-tier tribunal, perhaps they should send some reporters to listen to the case or apply on an individual basis for the judgment to be published. Perhaps that might assuage their ongoing interest in these issues.

[Matt Vickers]

I thank the Minister for her opinion, but we stand by this new clause. We want greater transparency, and we think this is an opportunity to do just that and allow the public to see what is and is not going on, so we will press it to a Division.

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[Matt Vickers]

That is a safe assessment of my scientific qualifications.

We are not saying that this is the only thing that agencies and experts on the frontline, who deal with these cases day in and day out, will be able to use; it is something that they can use. If we have ended up with adults in classrooms alongside children, that is wrong. We need to give the agencies every tool in the armoury to make the situation work. This is one thing that they can use—with their knowledge and with every other assessment they would make—and it is the right thing to do.

We have talked about kicking this down the road. I think we have a commitment that the Government will do something on this issue some day, or some time. But here is an opportunity to keep the power in the legislation for agencies to use here and now, rather than in six months or a year. I am sure that the Minister will give me a timeframe on whether the Government will come back with such a power.

The SNP’s new clause 43 is almost the polar opposite of our new clause. It states:

“A person who claims to be a child must not be treated as an adult by the Home Office for the purpose of immigration control.”

We know that there are adults coming to this country who claim to be children. Believing them without question would make it harder to control our borders and create significant safeguarding concerns. Why does the SNP think it should be made harder for the Government to determine the true age of those entering this country illegally? How does this best serve the interests of the British people? Given the SNP’s blind adoration for the European Union, we must question why they are happy for the United Kingdom, of which Scotland is a key part, to be the only European nation that does not use medical tests to determine the age of those coming to the country.

Why does this matter? The issue has not decreased in significance. The number of asylum age disputes remains high, particularly in the latest available figures. Of those about whom a dispute was raised and resolved, more than half were found to be over the age of 18. The fact that a record number of asylum seekers pretend to be children should be the wake-up call that we need to ensure that we have the checks in place to verify age and stop those who seek to deceive from entering the UK. As the available figures show, this tactic is becoming commonplace, and action must be taken to stop this abhorrent abuse.

If the figures were not evidence of the need to support new clause 26, perhaps the facts of the cases will be. A 22-year-old Afghan who had murdered two people in Serbia claimed asylum in the UK by pretending to be a 14-year-old orphan, when in fact he was 18. There is the utterly horrific case of the Parsons Green terrorist, Ahmed Hassan, who posed as a 16-year-old before setting off a bomb on a tube train in west London, injuring 23 people. Although the Iraqi’s real age remains unknown, the judge who jailed him for 34 years in 2018 said he was satisfied that the bomber was between 18 and 21. The clock is ticking. The crisis is not slowing; it is surging.

In quarter 2 of 2024 alone, 2,088 age disputes landed on the desk of the Home Office. That is 2,088 claims where someone said, “Trust me, I’m a child.” By the end, 757 were unmasked as adults, and the deception rate was a staggering 52%. That is not a blip, but a blazing red flag. That is more than 750 grown men, and potentially dozens more uncaught, slipping through a system that Labour has crippled by repealing the scientific age checks in the Illegal Migration Act, leaving us guessing in the dark while the numbers climb.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will deal with some of the broader points in my response, but we do age assessments. We do not simply accept—just as his Government did not—asylum seekers’ claims about their age as if they were the truth. I would not like the shadow Minister to give the Committee the impression that that is happening—that we are accepting claimed ages without any kind of check. I will go into much more detail in my response to the debate about precisely what we do, but he must not give the impression that we are not checking; we are.

[Matt Vickers]

I hope the Minister agrees that we should be doing more, rather than less. We need to give agencies all the opportunities and powers to do so, with or without the consent of people who aim to deceive. That is the right thing to do.

If we rewind to 2022, 490 disputes in quarter 1 ballooned to 1,782 by quarter 4. Now we are at 2,088 and counting. This is not a fading headache; it is an escalating emergency. It is a conveyor belt of fraud clogging our borders and spilling into our schools. Failure to conduct these vital checks would mean that we are not just blind, but complicit in handing traffickers a playbook that says, “Send adults, call them kids and watch us flounder.” The public sees it and parents feel it, and every day we delay, the risk festers. We need science, not sentiment, and we need it now.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I start by endorsing what my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said about Dolores, Thomas Roberts’s mum, whom I met last night. She has gone through a searingly awful life experience. It is difficult even to think about that, let alone to offer any comfort. Unfortunately, I do not think that her experience would have changed much had scientific age assessment been in place, although the person in question had been assessed by his local authority as a child and was therefore in a separate environment from that which he would have been in had he not been assessed.

I am determined to see whether we can connect up our information about people coming from Europe, following Brexit and the disintegration of our access to Eurodac and various other pieces of information collected in Europe on asylum seekers and those arriving illegally—not all of them are asylum seekers. Reconnecting, if possible, to those databases would give us more comfort than we have at the moment. However, I emphasise that when people come to this country, we do check them against all our biometric records and the terrorism lists and watch lists that we have. It may be possible for us to do more in future.

We have had a debate about new clause 26 from the Opposition and new clause 43 from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on behalf of the Scottish National party. That has again demonstrated the wide range of opinion that there is at both ends of the argument whenever we consider such issues. I will deal with both arguments in my response, and I hope to find a middle way.

First, repealing section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Bill seeks to do, does not stop our capacity to do age assessments. Listening to some of the contributions from members of the official Opposition, one would have thought that repealing section 58 will take off the table—completely and utterly—all age assessment. That is simply not true. The age assessments in section 58 were about the duty to remove somebody to Rwanda; they were not connected to anything else. As I understand it, the issue with that legislation was that the then Government’s intention was not to remove children to Rwanda, so it became more important to have a way of assessing whether somebody was a child. The Safety of Rwanda Act and the IMA—the previous Government’s approach to this issue—would have created even bigger incentives for people to claim that that they were children, because they would have avoided being sent to Rwanda, not that anyone ever actually ended up there. The previous Government’s approach of deportation permanently to Rwanda actually created even more incentives for people to lie about their age.

The fact is that there are people who are genuine asylum seekers who are children, people who are not genuine asylum seekers who are adults who claim to be children, and children who sometimes claim that they are adults. When that happens, one has to look at modern slavery issues and coercive control. There are safeguarding issues on both sides of the age assessment argument. Children pretend to be adults for reasons that we can imagine, but we will not go into those, because they are not very pleasant. There are also incentives created by the way in which the Children Act 1989 deals with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As a Kent MP, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent knows exactly what happens with the Kent intake unit and the pressure that her own local authority has been put under. However, she also knows about the Government support that her local authority has been given to disperse unaccompanied asylum-seeking children around the rest of the country so that some of the burden can be shared.

We are dealing with people who arrive without papers. Some of them wish to lie about their age, and some have been told to lie because the people-smuggling gangs perceive it as a way for people to access more resources than they could if they were seen as adults. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, the system can get it wrong on both sides. People who are children have been judged to be adults and put in inappropriate places, and people who are adults have been judged to be children and put in appropriate places. There is no guaranteed scientific way of making a judgment. We can make judgments about people who are much older, but we are dealing with that uncertain four to five-year range on either side, which is the difference between 18 and 24 or 17 and 23; you will know about that, Dr Murrison, from your work as a medical doctor.

On new clause 26, I want to reassure Opposition Members that there is already provision in law for the use of age assessment, and our repealing of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act does not remove that provision. That is because the Immigration (Age Assessments) Regulations 2024, which followed scientific advice from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee in the Home Office, specify for the purposes of section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 the scientific methods currently recommended for age assessment. We have retained those bits of legislation; neither the 2024 regulations nor section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act have been repealed by the Bill, so the capacity to use scientific age assessments remains on the statute book.

The hon. Member for Stockton West did not seem to know which age assessment methods we were talking about. The 2024 regulations specify the power to use X-rays and MRIs, and that it is possible to take a negative view of the credibility of a person who refuses to consent, where there are no reasonable grounds for refusing that consent.

With those measures on the statute book, the Government continue to explore methods to improve the robustness of age assessment processes by increasing the reliability of the scientific methods being used. At the moment, we do not have enough certainty about the gap that exists in the current assessments, which are still being assessed. The hon. Member for Stockton West and the Conservative party put these things on to the statute book but then did not operationalise them. At the moment, we are doing as much work as we can to see how reliable they are, with a view to operationalising them. But as I wrote in a response to shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South, when he wrote to me about this issue, we are in the middle of that process. I hope that we will soon be in a situation to make announcements one way or the other, and those announcements will be made in the usual way.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 26 does not specify the method to be used; it commits the Government to coming back within six months with a statutory instrument. How long does the Minister think it will be before the Government are in a position to do that? Is it six months’ worth of people coming here without our having the ability to assess them without their consent using these methods? Is it a year? Is it 18 months? How long does she think it will be before we are in a position to make these decisions?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are making a scientific assessment of how accurate and effective the methods are that could be used to make age assessments, and I hope to have some results from that work soon. What I do not want is to have a clause in primary legislation telling me that I have to do that by a set time.

I am trying to reassure the hon. Gentleman that despite the repeal of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which this Bill brings about, the capacity to do age assessments and apply them scientifically is still on the statute book. We are looking closely into how we can operationalise these methods if we feel they will give us a more trustworthy result, but we will not do that if we do not. We are in the middle of getting to the stage where we can make that judgment.

I will also address new clause 43, which says that we should not use age assessments at all, other than in exceptional circumstances. Given what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said when he moved it, I think it accepts that we should continue with Merton assessments, which are the other way of dealing with age assessments currently. Those usually involve two social workers and various other experts interviewing the person concerned to try to get a handle on their real age.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I welcome the fact that the Government will come back with scientific age assessments that also do not require consent. But if six months is too long, at what point would the Minister expect to be concerned? If we have not been applying these assessments and we have ended up with the wrong people in the wrong classrooms for years, at what point should we be concerned? If six months is too soon, is it 18 months?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Gentleman is being a bit mischievous. We are in the middle of an assessment of whether scientific age assessments work and at what level of capacity and detail we can trust them. I expect reports fairly soon, and once I have them I can make a decision on how we go ahead with them. I will let Parliament know in the usual way when that has happened, but it is not useful or effective to have the hon. Gentleman’s new clause setting a deadline for that in the Bill. I hope he will accept that in the helpful way in which I intend it. We are not in disagreement on principles, but if we are going to use scientific age assessment, we need to ensure that it is as effective and useful as possible, so that it can be taken seriously and play an effective part in the battle that all of us want to be involved in: ensuring that children do not end up in adult settings and adults do not end up in children’s settings.

[Matt Vickers]

People who arrive here deceptively claiming to be children cannot be allowed to succeed. We should make use of the best scientific age assessment methods available to us, with or without consent. Those will not be used in isolation, but alongside all the other possible assessment methods available to us. We can debate the science all day. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to define those methods within six months through a statutory instrument, using expert advice to do so. One deceptive adult migrant in a classroom or care setting alongside children or vulnerable youngsters is one too many. Giving our agencies the ability to use the best scientific methods available to them to assess age without consent can further their ability to protect children. I would therefore like to press new clause 26 to a Division.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Thursday 13th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause encompasses the conditions that can be attached to permission to enter or stay and immigration bail. Where a person is liable to be detained, for example because they are in the UK without the required permission or are subject to deportation proceedings, they may be placed on immigration bail. Where appropriate and in accordance with our European convention on human rights obligations, those on immigration bail can be subject to measures such as electronic monitoring and curfews.

Where a person does not qualify for asylum or protection under the refugee convention but cannot be removed from the UK because of our obligations under domestic and international law, they are granted permission to stay. Irrespective of the threat posed by the person, our legislation prevents us from imposing the same conditions that they may have been subjected to while on immigration bail.

The new clause will end that disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the particular migrant who poses a threat. It also makes crystal clear the conditions that may be imposed when a person is subject to immigration bail.

[Matt Vickers]

The new clause makes provision about the conditions that can be imposed on a grant of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom or a grant of immigration bail. The new conditions focus primarily on electronic monitoring, and we are supportive of those. However, given that the Government are repealing the provision passed by the last Conservative Government to mandate scientific age assessment, I am interested to know how they intend to ensure that the requirement that an electronic monitoring condition

“may not be imposed on a person unless the person is at least 18 years old”

can be delivered. As the Minister may have noticed, I am deeply concerned about the repealing of mandatory scientific age assessment provisions, and this is another reason why. Can she give us any timetable for when the Government might return to the issue?

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I would be interested in the Minister’s assessment of the operational utility of the new clause. What impact do the Government expect it to have on lowering the rate of abscondence from immigration bail?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had a small but perfectly formed debate on the new clause. I seek to reassure the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and explain to those who have made contributions the effect of the provisions.

I say gently to the hon. Member that the Bill is in compliance with international human rights laws. The powers in the new clause are necessary to protect the public from a very small cohort of migrants who pose a threat to them, but who cannot be removed because of our obligations under domestic and international law. In other words, they exist only because we are observing our obligations under international law. If we were simply to ignore international law and seek to deport people against the standards of international law to which we have signed up, we would not need to have these extra powers. We are debating new clause 30 only because we are adhering to international law. The hon. Member says that we are being cavalier about our commitment to adhering to international law. I gently say that he has got it pretty wrong.

In these cases, we will continue to frequently assess each person’s circumstances to ensure that they are removed at the earliest opportunity from measures such as a requirement to report, a curfew or electronic tagging, if it is safe to do so from the point of view of protecting the public. The powers will be used only in cases involving conduct such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, extremism or serious crime, or where the person poses a threat to national security or public safety. That is a pretty high bar.

The idea is that if somebody is on immigration bail and we are trying to detain them to deport them, but it transpires that we cannot deport them because of the threat to their safety and they have to be looked after here, it is wholly proportionate, if they present a real threat to the public, that the powers to electronically tag them or subject them to exclusion or inclusion zones can be attached to them. We are talking about people who come off immigration bail because we cannot deport them and, without the new clause, would suddenly find themselves much freer to cause the damage that we fear they may cause if they are left unwatched. That is the very narrow purpose of the new clause in the circumstances that I have talked about. To impose these tough restrictions there has to be a proportionality test, and of course all that is testable in law.

We are seeking to make certain that we can satisfy ourselves, more than we can at present, that that small category of people who, on a case-by-case basis, will be assessed to present this kind of risk can be properly managed and watched. In those circumstances, I hope that the Committee will agree to add the new clause to the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 30 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

EU Settlement Scheme: rights of entry and residence etc

“(1) For the purposes of this section ‘relevant citizens’ rights’ means the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures which—

(a) are recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of

section 7A or 7B of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and

(b) are derived from—

(i) Title 2 of Part 2 of the withdrawal agreement or Title 1 or 4 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Title 2 of that Part,

(ii) Title 2 of Part 2 of the EEA EFTA separation agreement or Title 1 or 4 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Title 2 of that Part, or

(iii) Article 4(2), 7 or 8 or Chapter 1 of Title 2 of Part 2 of the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement or Title 1 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Chapter 1 of Title 2 of that Part.

(2) Subsection (5) applies to a person (‘P’) where—

(a) P has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom granted by virtue of residence scheme immigration rules,

(b) the leave was granted to P on the basis of requirements which included that P is a relevant national or is (or was) a family member of a person who is (or was) a relevant national,

(c) each of the requirements on the basis of which P’s leave was granted was in fact met,

(d) either—

(i) in a case where P’s leave was not granted on the basis that P is (or was) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, P was resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period, or

(ii) in a case where P’s leave was granted on the basis that P is (or was) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, the relevant sponsor was resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period, and

(e) the residency mentioned in paragraph (d) was not relevant residency.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)—

(a) a person is to be treated as a family member of another person if they are treated as the family member of that person by residence scheme immigration rules;

(b) ‘joining family member’ and ‘relevant sponsor’ have the same meaning as in residence scheme immigration rules;

(c) a person is to be treated as resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period even if they were temporarily absent from the United Kingdom or the Islands at that time if their absence was permitted for the purposes of establishing or maintaining eligibility for leave under residence scheme immigration rules;

(d) ‘relevant national’ means a national of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland.

(4) In this section ‘relevant residency’ means—

(a) residency in accordance with Union law (within the meaning of the withdrawal agreement),

(b) residency in accordance with the EEA Agreement (within the meaning of the EEA EFTA separation agreement), or

(c) residency in accordance with the FMOPA (within the meaning of the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement).

(5) Relevant citizens’ rights—

(a) are capable of accruing and applying to a person to whom this subsection applies notwithstanding that the residency mentioned in subsection (2)(d) was not relevant residency, and

(b) are to be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.

(6) Every enactment (including an enactment contained in this Act) is to be read and has effect subject to subsection (5).

(7) In this section—

‘EEA EFTA separation agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) of that Act);

‘enactment’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 20(1) of that Act);

‘the implementation period’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 1A(6) of that Act);

‘the Islands’ means the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey or the Isle of Man;

‘residence scheme immigration rules’ has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 17 of that Act);

‘Swiss citizens’ rights agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) of that Act);

‘withdrawal agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) and (6) of that Act).”—(Seema Malhotra.)

This new clause ensures that an EEA or Swiss national or their family member who has immigration leave granted under the EU Settlement Scheme can enforce residency and other rights directly under the withdrawal (or other separation) agreement even if the person, or their family member, was not resident in the UK or the Islands in accordance with Union (or other equivalent) law at the end of the implementation period.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

Duty to publish a strategy on safe and managed routes

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy on the Government’s efforts to establish additional safe and legal routes for persons to seek asylum in the United Kingdom.

(2) A report under subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament.”—(Pete Wishart.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament a strategy on the development of safe and managed routes for people to seek asylum in the UK.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure once more to be in this delightful room doing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.

The clause repeals in full the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The Act, which requires that decision makers treat Rwanda as a safe third country for the purposes of removing individuals there, and disapplies sections of the Human Rights Act 1998, was passed by the previous Government in an attempt to facilitate removals to Rwanda under the migration and economic development partnership. Despite that, the Act has served no practical purpose since it became law: no decisions were made that were affected by its provisions, and, as we have stated repeatedly, only four individuals were ever relocated voluntarily. No enforced removals to Rwanda ever took place under the partnership.

The Government have been clear from the outset that we will not proceed with the partnership. There is no evidence that it was successful in deterring small boat arrivals, nor has it delivered value for money for the British taxpayer. On the contrary, nearly 84,000 people arrived on small boats between 14 April 2022, which was the date the partnership was announced by the former Government, and 5 July 2024, which was the day after this Government were elected.

The Government have been clear that we will not make further payments to Rwanda, saving £100 million in upcoming annual economic transformation and integration fund payments, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise have been liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without even considering the additional staffing and operational costs, which would have been substantial. We will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending the partnership. It is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act so that the legislation, which relies on the provisions of the treaty, will no longer be on the statute book. That is what clause 37 achieves.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 37 repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. In doing so, the Government are removing the only deterrent, and indeed the only place where we can send people who have arrived from a safe third country. It is well established that it is extremely difficult to return people to some countries. In addition, the lack of documentation can frustrate the process of removal to someone’s home country. That is why a third country deterrent is needed: if people cannot be removed to their home country, they can and will be removed to a third country.

The logical consequence of repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act is that a greater number of migrants will arrive from countries that are harder to return them to. Without some form of agreement to send the migrants to a safe country, they will continue to come and to stay. Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a list of safe countries, but the list is limited to countries that contribute very few illegal migrants, save for Albania. The last Conservative Government cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by over 90%, showing that our returns agreement with Albania worked. As the former director general of Border Force said:

“If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 41, Q43.]

Channel boat crossings are up 28% since the election, with more than 1,300 people crossing in the week commencing 1 March 2025. This Labour Government have smashed farmers, small business owners and pensioners, but it seems that the people-smuggling gangs are the only ones who are safe. The only thing that will stop the gangs is a strong deterrent that means that people do not board small boats because they know that they will be deported if they reach the UK, and they will not be allowed to stay.

The additional offences and powers in this Bill are welcome as far as they go, but, with the scrapping of the Conservatives’ deterrent—that if someone has no right to be in this country, they will not be able to stay—this Bill is just window dressing. It will not, and cannot, stop people crossing the channel in small boats. The Government know that, because their own impact assessment shows that only a handful of people each year would be imprisoned because of the new offences created by this Bill.

Since the announcement that our deterrent would be scrapped, there are almost 8,500 more people in asylum hotels. That is the Government’s failure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

In terms of the political arguments, what people out there want to see is the number of people arriving illegally in this country going down. They are not seeing that; it is up 28%. They want to see the number of hotels in communities across the country going down. It is not, although it was. The number of people arriving was also going down, but it is now up 28%, and there are 8,500 more people in hotels. That is the reality of the situation.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. Of course, that is what Committee debates are meant to be about; it is easier to have a bit more to and fro in Committee than it often is on the Floor of the House, when we have two and a half minutes and we have had to rewrite our speech and discard most of what we were going to say.

Will the hon. Gentleman admit that the way in which the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act meant that nobody could be processed at all; they were just stuck, and there was a build-up in hotels of small boat arrivals and other asylum claimants who could not be processed? That meant that there was a big backlog, and we have had to restart decision making. That inevitably means that there will be a slowdown in sending back people who have arrived by small boat until we can get on top of the backlog that the Conservative Government created.

[Matt Vickers]

The principle at stake is that if someone arrives in this country illegally, they will be removed. We were not processing people who had arrived illegally and were meant to be removed, but we were returning more of them before the election than we are now. However, I will get through my comments, and there will be plenty of time then for debate—we have a full morning ahead of us.

Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal migrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent? At the moment, people know that if they come here on a small boat, they are 96% likely to be allowed to stay. That is a strong pull factor. The only way to remove that pull factor is to reinstate a strong deterrent. People need to know that if they arrive here on a small boat, they will not be able to stay. Can the Minister explain how she will increase the number of removals without a third country to which migrants can be sent? If it is not Rwanda, where will they go? Will it be Redcar? Will it be Romford? Will it be Richmond? Where will these people who cannot be removed to a safe country go?

As Alp Mehmet said,

“repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration… 240,000 people were declared to have entered”

the EU “illegally last year” and will likely end up coming to the UK. The Government have confirmed with this Bill and the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act that there is no deterrence, because once people arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. Mehmet also echoed the comments from the National Crime Agency, saying,

“the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 39-40, Q43.]

As he pointed out, there is not “anything in the Bill” that would suggest that people will be removed quickly. Why has a removals agreement not been included in the Bill? The EU is now looking at offshore processing and deportation centres. There is also a growing consensus in the EU that the 1951 refugee convention is not fit for purpose. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact of these changes on the UK? Why have the Government scrapped the Rwanda plan, leaving the UK as an outlier? We wish to oppose the repeal of the Act by way of a Division.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I have asked this question a few times and never quite got to the bottom of it. We were sending people to Rwanda who could not be returned to their home country because it was not safe. Where will those people go now, if not Rwanda? Does the Minister fear that, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, the Government might end up coming back to this issue in a few years when they realise that things are continuing to go the wrong way?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

First things first: the hon. Gentleman was not going to send to Rwanda only those whom we could not return to their own country; in theory, he was going to deport to Rwanda absolutely everybody who arrived to claim asylum after March 2023—that was what we were told. In reality, those people all ended up in hotels, unable to be processed and growing in number, while the Conservative party indulged in its expensive gimmicks and fantasies of how the world should be.

As many Committee members have pointed out, the day job was not being done while that parallel universe policy was being developed. It took all the attention away from running what is a complex enough system as it is. Many resources were diverted to try to create that new reality, resulting in the neglect of the system, and huge backlogs were built into the system because of how the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act. That made it impossible to run the current system or to move to a new system that was remotely workable, thereby landing this country with a huge, dysfunctional series of backlogs, and a system that we have had to literally start up again from scratch to try to get working coherently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Is there any reason we cannot introduce provisions in this area as part of the Bill, and when can we expect to see them?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Work is going on in the Department to assess the accuracy of the various methods of age assessment, which ministerial predecessors from the hon. Gentleman’s party commenced, but which has not yet been finished. As soon as we have more idea about how reliable scientific age assessment can be, how expensive it is and all those things, I will either come to Parliament or make a statement about how we intend to proceed. The hon. Gentleman must not assume that because these sections have been repealed we are not interested in scientific age assessments and their potential per se. They were simply unworkable because they were attached to the duty to remove, which was such a feature of the Illegal Migration Act.

The six measures that the Government intend to retain, including where provisions are in force, have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. These powers are all ones that the Government see as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve wider priorities alongside the powerful measures set out in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire talked about section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. The public order disqualification under the Nationality and Borders Act is currently in operation. It enables decisions to disqualify certain individuals from support and protections afforded by the national referral mechanisms on grounds of public order and bad faith. Public order grounds include serious criminality and threats to national security. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, considering the individual’s vulnerabilities. That is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act that is being retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Disqualification will continue to be assessed on an individual basis.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Stuart, for what will be a marathon session. Clause 19 provides definitions for the key expressions used in relation to the electronic devices measure. These definitions mean that the measure will focus the powers only on irregular entrants who are in possession of an electronic device that authorised officers have reasonable groups to suspect contains information relating to facilitation offences under the Immigration Act 1971.

Furthermore, clause 19 defines “authorised officer” as:

“an immigration officer, or…a constable of a police force maintained by a local policing body”.

The aim of the powers is to gain access to information held on such devices on the organised crime groups who help facilitate or plan migrants’ dangerous journey and, as a result, to save lives from being lost. The clause is integral in defining the key expressions relating to how the powers can be used.

Clause 20 enables immigration officers within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and police constables in England and Wales only to search an irregular entrant if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are in possession of an electronic device that contains information linked to a facilitation offence. That power enables the search of a person, property, premises, vehicle or container. That is to ensure that, in any circumstances in which it is necessary to obtain a device, the authorised officer can use the powers to conduct a search. The clause contains safeguards to ensure the powers are used appropriately. Clause 20 provides clarity over how searches must be conducted in accordance with these powers.

Finally, clause 26 defines any additional expressions referenced throughout clauses 19 to 23. That will ensure that it is clear to users of the powers what key expressions mean. It is important to be transparent about what is meant and to ensure that the public and authorised officers fully understand these expressions.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

We support clauses 19 to 26, but only in so far as they endorse powers that we think already exist to seize, extract and retain data from mobile devices. Clause 19 provides definitions of key terms in sections 20 and 21 relating to the provisions of those clauses to allow authorised officers to search for, seize and retain relevant articles. The definition of a “relevant article” is

“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971 is, or may be, stored in electronic form.”

Will the Minister provide some concrete examples of what the Government think such information might consist of?

Clause 20 gives relevant officers—either an immigration officer or a police constable—powers to search a relevant person, which is someone who has entered the UK without leave or in breach of a deportation order. Will the Minister explain why subsection (2) does not allow for any more than one search after the person in question has arrived in the UK? The clause gives officers the power to search for “relevant articles”, which are described in clause 19 as

“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission (whether in the past or future) of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971”.

That is quite a narrow definition, as it covers just electronic devices. Will the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary powers to search for non-electronic items exist elsewhere? In practice, we suspect the power will be used to gather information and evidence to identify smugglers for prosecution. We fully support that, but most mobile devices are destroyed during or prior to travelling across the channel. Will the Minister therefore explain whether she expects any of the evidence gathered using the powers in these clauses to be used to support decision making on immigration enforcement?

If the devices are seized, as the former director general of Border Force pointed out in his evidence, they may contain useful information about nationality, identity, age and travel history, and may provide valuable evidence when assessing asylum claims. Will the Minister explain how effective the new powers will be in supporting evidence gathering to remove those with no right to be here? Will information gathered using these powers be available to asylum screening teams? Will that evidence be used in decision making for immigration appeals? These clauses do not have extraterritorial reach, so can the Minister explain to what extent the Government envisage these additional powers will make a meaningful difference to smashing the gangs, when many of the perpetrators are located outside the UK?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 21 provides immigration officers in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and police constables in England and Wales, with the power to seize and retain electronic devices. Clause 21 provides a clear and detailed approach for authorised officers to ensure that the powers are correctly, efficiently and effectively used.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 21 gives authorised officers the power to seize any electronic device that has been found in a search under clause 20, or is not found on a search but appears to the officer to be, or to have been, in the possession of a relevant person. How would officers determine whether an article appears to be or to have been in the possession of a relevant person? What is the evidence threshold for that?

My question for the Minister about clause 21 is similar to my one about clause 20. Will the powers be used to gather evidence that can be used in immigration decision making and appeals? The Opposition support the powers in this clause, in so far as they go.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman supports the powers, but I emphasise to him again that clause 21 is very much in the context of the clauses that we have just agreed. It is a more limited—not a blanket—power. It exists within the parameters that I set out in the previous debate.

I emphasise again that none of the information seized in this context could be used in an asylum case; it is for the purposes of dealing with organised immigration crime. It is not for wider purposes, unless other criminality is found, in which case it becomes available and can be passed on. That will be dealt with in some clauses that are coming up. But these provisions are limited to collecting evidence and intelligence on organised immigration crime from people who have just entered the country illegally.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Duty to pass on items seized under section 21

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 22 will provide immigration officers using the powers with the duty to pass on electronic devices to other agencies, such as the police. The clause will be used if an electronic device seized contains information about a non-immigration offence—this is the case that I was hinting at earlier. Clause 22 provides the process to be used in these types of cases. We cannot seize an electronic device without that process in place, because we may discover information relating to a criminal offence, such as a counter-terrorism offence or an offence related to indecent and/or obscene material of a child—those kinds of offence. If we discover evidence of such activities on a phone, we must act, and to act we have to have the processes in place to enable items to be forwarded to police or any other agency that needs to take possession of the device for its investigation into the other criminality.

The clause provides for a robust step-by-step process to ensure that immigration officers know what actions to take to forward the device or if the agency to which we wish to forward the device refuses to accept it for an investigation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 22 gives authorised officers the duty to pass on seized items that have been found in a search under clause 21 where there is a reasonable belief that the article or information stored on it has been obtained in consequence of, or is evidence in relation to, an offence other than the relevant immigration offence. The immigration officer is under a duty to notify someone who has the functions to investigate the relevant offence. What might be the reasons why a person notified under the clause might not accept the article, and what would be an acceptable reason? If a relevant person refuses to accept the article, what are the next steps? We support the powers in the clause so far as they go.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a bit difficult to talk about specific circumstances in a generalised way. As the hon. Gentleman will perceive, there may be some material on a phone that police or immigration officers are worried breaks the criminal law—I talked about counter-terrorism and child sexual exploitation as potential examples. That information may be passed on and the relevant authorities might decide that it was not at a criminal level—that would be the kind of occasion that the hon. Gentleman was asking me about.

However, one would assume that, with the appropriate training, it would be fairly obvious whether something would be a worry for the purposes of counter-terrorism or child sexual abuse, and police forces could understand whether they have an obligation to try to prevent criminal activity of a category other than that for which the phone was originally seized. Once we begin to seize phones for narrow purposes, we have to make certain that passing on that information is lawful, and that is the purpose of the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Powers to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 23 gives authorised officers the power to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles that have been retained under powers detailed in clause 21, and authorises the use of any information retained under this clause relating to the prevention, detection and investigation, or prosecution of such an offence. We support the powers in the clause. However, it is important to bolster the utility of the powers in clauses 20, 21 and 23. It is for that reason that we have tabled new clause 22, picking up on the suggestion made by the former director general of Border Force in his written evidence to the Committee.

We have tabled the new clause because currently Border Force and immigration enforcement officers are not able to use mobile devices to track illegal migrants on bail. Although powers exist for electronic tagging, there are difficulties with using these powers and so they are not frequently used. At present, mobile devices can be used only for tracking people for serious offences. Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, an illegal entry into the UK does not count as a serious offence for these purposes.

Mobile devices are often used by migrants on bail to report by phone rather than in person, which minimises their risk of arrest and detention on reporting. Without access to location data about illegal migrants, they are able to stay at addresses not listed on their bail forms. If immigration officers were able to make use of location data from mobile devices, they would be better able to secure compliance with bail conditions and thus reduce the risk of absconding.

New clause 22 would allow law enforcement to access the mobile phone location data of people who enter the UK illegally. It would do so by adding illegal immigration to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as a serious offence that allows location data to be used. We would also amend the Immigration Act 2016 to allow a person’s mobile phone location data to be used as part of electronic monitoring for immigration enforcement.

Of course, migrants can change phones, but they are more likely to make use of them than electronic tags. In our view, the new clause would add a useful new power to immigration enforcement teams. I am very keen to hear the Minister’s view.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 22 proposes an amendment to section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. However, I do not think that this proposal is either necessary or appropriate.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides law enforcement and other relevant public authorities with the ability to acquire communications data covertly, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Members of the Committee should particularly focus on the seriousness of the powers conferred in the 2016 Act, including the ability to covertly acquire communications data where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

With new clause 22, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate to add immigration issues to that area of the law, and whether, with an immigration issue, it would be necessary and proportionate to start acquiring covertly communications in an immigration setting. It is important to consider whether that would unbalance the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and cause some issues that would probably weaken it.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is intentionally neutral on the specific types of crime for which the powers within it can be deployed. Instead, it sets a threshold for serious crime, to enable access to more intrusive powers. The threshold for the acquisition of communications data—the who, when, how and where of communication, but not the content—is set out in section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act. Events data, which includes details of where and when a specific communication took place, is available only for crimes that meet the serious crime threshold. The threshold at section 86(2A)(a) of that Act is a crime for which a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment can be handed down.

The proposed new clause does not define illegal immigration, but many of the immigration offences in section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, as recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act, will already meet the serious crime threshold. There is no real reason to put immigration crime in there; it is already implicitly included. If we start to add particular instances, that will unbalance the way that the Investigatory Powers Act works. That is a technical point, but it is about keeping our statute book coherent, rather than adding things in for effect. Essentially, since offences under section 24 of the 1971 Act are indictable, the serious crime threshold would already be met, so events data can already be acquired as part of the investigation. We do not need to go through the rigmarole in the new clause to emphasise what is already possible.

Where offences do not meet the serious crime threshold, it would not be proportionate to extend the use of events data to those crimes. The right to private and family life is set out in article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and it is important to uphold our obligations to the European convention on human rights. I know that is not always the most popular thing among Opposition Members, but as someone who voted for it in 1998, I am still quite proud of it. Defending our human rights and ensuring that such things are proper, proportionate and lawful is an important part of trying to pursue and deal with difficult cases with certain standards of behaviour.

Although article 8 is a qualified right, we must ensure that interference remains necessary and proportionate to the level of criminality. By introducing specific crime types that do not meet the sentencing threshold, we risk eroding the safeguards in the regime. By taking away the rights of people who may seem marginalised at the moment, I submit that we are putting at risk our own rights, and human rights in general. That is not something that I would want the Government to do.

New clause 22 would also unnecessarily amend schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016. Where a person is subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of their immigration bail, the Home Office can access their location details via the GPS tag or non-fitted device. There is no need to access mobile phone location data, because there are already powers to monitor the whereabouts of individuals at risk of absconding. I hope that, having had that debate, the hon. Member for Stockton West will realise that those things are already covered in the way that we currently do things. I hope that he will not press the new clause to a vote, but obviously we will not know until we get on to voting on it—some time in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Amendment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 24 and 25 deal with amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, extending those powers to other authorised officers and to key definitions in the clauses. Clause 24 includes amendments to the 2001 Act to extend powers of seizure where a device may contain legally privileged material, excluded material and special material. The 2001 Act also contains essential safeguards for the handling of such material. Extending its powers will ensure that the seizure of any device will not be prevented by claiming that it holds legally privileged, excluded or special material, which is often an excuse that is raised when such matters come up.

Furthermore, clause 24 will ensure that this data is protected, but that operationally, the information needed can still be taken for the purpose of these powers, and that seized electronic devices are returned as soon as reasonably possible.

Clause 25 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to extend the powers to other authorised officers, via secondary legislation, if they are required to support the disruption of organised immigration crime. The Government will ensure that any decisions on extending the powers to other authorised officers will be fully considered before action is taken.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 24 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 so that provisions relating to the protection of legally privileged material and excluded and special material apply when mobile devices are seized under clauses 20 to 23. Can the Minister explain how often the Government envisage that those provisions would need to be invoked?

Clause 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to extend the powers given to authorised officers in clauses 20 to 23, to be available to other people, including people designated by the Secretary of State. Why might these powers need to be extended to different categories of people? Who does the Minister have in mind? Why are those not included on the face of the Bill? Why was it judged appropriate that these powers are subject to the negative procedure?

Clause 26 defines key terms used in the preceding clauses, and we have no problem with those definitions.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

In general, it is not expected that parents will be criminalised, but there is not a total ban on that. It will depend on what has happened and what the circumstances were. That will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is difficult to be more explicit about that, given that the nature of the offence represents a stricter law that is meant to deter people from making small boat crossings. It is a signal to smugglers and passengers that fatalities and injuries at sea are taken extremely seriously, so there may well be consequences for particular unacceptable behaviour of the sort that I have talked about. I would not want there to be an absolute exclusion, but I would not expect a large cohort of people to fall within the purview of the new offences.

[Matt Vickers]

I thank Members for their considered contributions. Effective international partnerships can be useful, but I would not want to deny anyone the right to scrutinise a partner on Twitter, particularly one to whom we pay so much money. The previous Government were right to toughen up on sentences for the worst offences. They were right to restrict prisoner release during the pandemic. That put pressure on the prison system, and that that is why the previous Government were also right to undertake the biggest prison building programme since the Victorian era. I realise that the Labour party did not agree, but it was right that the previous Government used the Nationality and Borders Act to increase the penalty for people smugglers to a life sentence.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament.

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

The Board

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 6 states:

“The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”

It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented?

Subsection (6) states:

“The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.”

Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him.

There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.

The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity. The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security.

The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander. However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally.

I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Delegation by the Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that

“The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.”

This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything.

There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.

Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Supplying articles for use in immigration crime

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The subject of this Bill is incredibly important to this country and its future. I hope that, during the next two weeks, the Committee will give us a constructive opportunity for the consideration and strengthening of the Bill.

Let me briefly outline our first amendment. Clause 1 creates the Border Security Commander as a statutory office holder, and requires that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander. As Tony Smith, former director general of the UK Border Force, said in evidence to the Committee:

“I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]

That is why we tabled amendment 10, which would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

The status of the Border Security Commander—as well as the commander’s functions and priorities, which I will come to in discussions on later amendments—is crucial if the role is to be in any way meaningful. As the Minister is aware, there are organisations that do not require civil servants to run them. Such a structure ensures their independence and reduces the internal day-to-day political struggles that can easily be imposed on them. Allowing recruitment from outside the civil service may also provide a wider talent pool and prevent the role from being relegated to that of yet another senior civil servant in the Department. We heard evidence about the wide array of roles in the Home Office already. The amendment would highlight the clear distinction between existing positions and the importance of securing our borders.

I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the following questions. Why have the Government decided that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant? What is the operational benefit of that decision? Why would the Border Security Commander not benefit from greater independence? What level of seniority will the Border Security Commander have? In evidence to the Committee, Tony Smith assumed that the post would likely be a director general. Is he correct? If so, why have the Government made that decision? Fundamentally, if Mr Smith is correct and the Border Security Commander cannot actually command anything—we will discuss that in detail when we come to later amendments—what is the point of the position?

Clause 2 sets out that the Border Security Commander must

“hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Commander’s designation,”

and that the

“terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

That is all the information we get. Will the Minister explain what the terms and conditions of a designation as commander will be? Let us compare the situation of the Border Security Commander, who is allegedly responsible for the security of our border, with that of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out that the commissioner has to be suitably qualified; will the Minister explain why no such requirement appears to exist in the legislation for the Border Security Commander? What would count as suitable qualifications for someone to take up the post of commander?

If the Secretary of State determines that a person’s designation as commander should be terminated, the Secretary of State must give the commander a written explanation of the reasons, give them an opportunity to make written representations and consider those before making a final decision. That seems sensible and in line with other positions, such as the Met Commissioner, that ought to be vaguely comparable in terms of responsibility.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you chairing our proceedings, Dr Murrison, and I look forward to many hours of that—as I am sure you do.

I will set out what clauses 1 and 2 do and hopefully persuade the Committee that amendment 10 is not required. The clauses set out the role of the Border Security Commander and detail the terms and conditions under which they hold the office. The purpose of the Opposition’s amendment 10 is to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander be a civil servant. The hon. Member for Stockton West—I will learn all Members’ constituencies by the time we get to the end—seemed to say that he thought there was operational benefit in complete independence. I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but there is also benefit in co-ordination and in being attached to a central strategic point. The Government believe that that attachment, rather than total independence for the sake of it, is more likely to be effective.

Amendment 10 implies that the Border Security Commander should not be a civil servant. The role of the commander is a civil service role and the Border Security Command is a directorate within the Home Office. In a future recruitment exercise, existing civil servants could be appointed or the role could be advertised externally. Under the arrangements in clause 1 there is no limit one way or the other on where the Border Security Commander might come from—they could be internal or external. I hope that is some reassurance.

The mechanism of appointment is a civil service recruitment campaign to ensure that the best candidate is selected on merit. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and leads the functions of a directorate in the Department, it is logical that the role would be a civil service role. The idea is to cohere, not to fragment the work that is done. I see it very much as ensuring that all the cogs across Government connect with one another, so that when we turn the wheel we get something out at the end, rather than having a load of cogs that do not connect, which would not lead to a more effective outcome.

Clause 1 sets out that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the commander and will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that resources are available to support them in exercising their functions. The Bill will place the Border Security Commander on a statutory footing, which will future-proof and solidify the role and ensure a clear direction and leadership for the UK’s border security system. Placing the Border Security Commander under this new legal framework is a clear signal of our determination to tackle organised immigration crime by going after the criminals who put lives at risk and undermine our border security.

Clause 2 details the commander’s terms and conditions and how they will hold, maintain and vacate the office. This clarity is necessary to ensure continuity in the role, and it underlines the Government’s commitment to making the Border Security Commander an enduring office.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We will discuss when we come to the next group of amendments the aims and objectives of this role, and the fact that if we are going to have a Border Security Commander, they should have a very meaningful role that can make a real difference. I would like to press on clause 2 of the Bill, which talks about

“The terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee what those terms and conditions of designation might be? As I mentioned, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out how the Met commissioner must be suitably qualified. What sort of qualifications could we expect to see in a commander and what will those terms and conditions be?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.

It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.

The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Functions of the Commander

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I have not come across Chief Commissioner Miekelson before, but I will endeavour to catch up on Netflix or iPlayer.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are all going to be doing that.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 3 sets out the functions of the Border Security Commander. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), correctly pointed out on Second Reading that the new Border Security Commander

“cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report…the Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 69.]

According to the legislation, the functions of the commander

“must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security, for the purpose of minimising such threats, and…maximising the coordination of those activities for that purpose.”

That sounds suspiciously like a co-ordinator, rather than a commander. That is exactly what the legislation states: the commander does not appear to be empowered by the Bill to command anyone.

Subsection (5) defines a partner authority as a

“public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”,

but—in subsection (6)—

“not…the Security Service…the Secret Intelligence Service”

or “GCHQ”.

Will the Minister confirm what is meant by partner authorities? Does she have a list of likely organisations that the Border Security Commander should be able to direct co-operation with? How far does she think that the Border Security Commander will be able to have an impact on public authorities abroad? For example, what role might French law enforcement be expected to play in having regard to the commander’s strategic priority document?

The Opposition have tabled amendment 13, which would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities, specifically Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, police and crime commissioners and the National Crime Agency. Ideally, we would like the Border Security Commander to have a meaningful role and the ability to direct other agencies. As the Government seem unwilling to do that, however, we thought it might be possible for the Home Secretary to give the Border Security Commander a little support.

If the Minister does not want to accept amendment 13, I would like to understand why not. Why do the Government seem willing to allow the commander only to co-ordinate, rather than to command? Why could the Home Secretary not add some additional impetus?

The clause requires the Border Security Commander to issue a strategic priority document that sets out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the threats to the border identified by the commander. We have tabled amendment 12 to ensure that the strategic priority document supports the Home Office’s UK border strategy. We are attempting to ensure that the Border Security Commander is aligned with the rest of the Home Office’s work to secure the border. I am interested to understand why the Minister is not willing to accept that amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I can certainly assure the hon. Lady that I recognise the import of what she is trying to do with the new clause. Often, such proposals are hooks to hang a debate on, so that there can be a little more information about the Government’s intent. I can assure her that having close operational and diplomatic liaison across all the different structures we have to work with to deal with cross-border immigration crime is absolutely at the centre of what the Border Security Commander will want to do. When we come to it, I hope she will not press her new clause to a vote.

[Matt Vickers]

The contrast is interesting. The Opposition want to see a Border Security Commander independently empowered to make meaningful changes to secure the border, rather than another civil servant muted by political oversight. There is a big contrast in perspective in terms of whether a Home Secretary should be signing off on anything anyone in this huge role—which will make a difference to our borders—will be able to say. Secondly, I would like to understand why the Government do not think it worth the Border Security Commander having the objective of reducing or even ending small boat crossings.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.

Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.

The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats, which requires a whole of Government response and will be enabled by the clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partners across the system are working in lockstep to enhance border security, while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners beyond border security matters.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 5 provides that a partner authority has duties, so far as is “appropriate and reasonably practicable,” to co-operate with the commander in carrying out the commander’s functions. It would be helpful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by

“so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable”

and under what circumstances it might be justified for a partner authority not to co-operate. Does it mean, as per subsection (2), that the partner authority would co-operate only so far as the co-operation was compatible with the exercise of its other functions, or are there other circumstances where partner authorities might not have to co-operate?

Again, the clause exposes how powerless the Border Security Commander is. The commander cannot actually command any of these partner authorities to do anything at all. Subsection (3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have—

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Q What concerns, if any, do you have about the Bill as drafted?

Jim Pearce: From a policing point of view, there would be insurance around safeguarding. For the electronic devices, for example, I understand the benefits that would come from the counter-terrorism-style powers to be able to seize electronic devices. I am confident that that is managed through the measures in place around reasonable suspicion and having to get the advice from a senior officer. It is about operationalising that, putting it into practice, and making sure that our staff understand through education and training. Any change in legislation requires training, finance and input. Those are the types of things that I would be thinking about.

Rob Jones: I agree. It is about the professional development and the guidance for officers who are using new tactics and new tools against this threat, and making sure that we are ready to go with very clear guidance on how officers should look to engage the new offences in the Bill.

Sarah Dineley: Clause 17 and one of the subsections of clause 18 create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offences, and it would be remiss of me not to highlight some of the challenges that that will bring. We have a system of judicial co-operation, something called mutual legal assistance, whereby we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level. We work very hard on building those relationships to collaborate.

To that end, the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world. Specifically, we have liaison prosecutors based in the major organised immigration crime countries—Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium—and two in France, one of whom is actually a dedicated organised immigration crime liaison prosecutor. We use them to foster and build those relationships so that we have that reciprocal exchange of information where required. That is not to say that is without its challenges. I flag that as something that we will continue to work on, but it has challenges.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Q Starting with Rob Jones, what do the witnesses think the Bill does for them operationally?

Rob Jones: It gives us the opportunity to make the most of the intelligence dividend that we have invested in tackling the threat. We have a good understanding of the people behind small boats crossings in particular, the supply of materials, the facilitation from near-Europe and further afield, but we want momentum and greater agility so that when we are aware that a crossing is being prepared—when materials are moving—we can act pre-emptively and proactively.

As I said earlier, we do not want to be investigating after thousands of people have arrived, and trying to put together very complex investigations that may involve months of covert surveillance and eavesdropping—a whole range of covert tactics—to get us over the line for a charging decision for a section 25 offence. The new offences give us the opportunity to act when we see that jigsaw puzzle coming together, to go to the CPS when we reach a tipping point and to go earlier than we can now. That means that we can pull more people through that system, deliver justice more quickly and be more disruptive in tackling the threat. That is a big step forward. That is lacking in the current toolbox to operationalise the intelligence we have.

Sarah Dineley: The endangerment offence potentially fills a gap between the current section 24 and 25 provisions. Each boat has a pilot—someone steering it across the channel—who, by the very nature and condition of those boats, the overcrowding, the lack of lifesaving equipment, and so on, puts everyone in that boat in danger of losing their life. We welcome that clause and will draft guidance on how it can be interpreted in terms of practical application.

Jim Pearce: Police officers mainly deal with the inland clandestine events as opposed to the small boats. From my point of view, it would be, correctly, common practice to use schedule 2(17) of the Immigration Act 1971 to detain migrants and then pass them into the immigration system. On searches after that, yes, there are powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 after that provision under section 32, but that is mainly to safeguard; it is not to seize evidence.

On Rob’s point about early intervention and intelligence gathering, the only way you gather intelligence is through what people tell you and what electronic devices give up. The Bill gives police officers the ability to gather intelligence through defined and clear powers in legislation, so that they are not misusing a PACE power, an operational procedure or anything else. That would be the biggest change for policing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn at this point?

Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls.

This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Migration Watch’s website says that you are worried about population projections and a

“significant fall in the percentage of the indigenous (white British) population.”

Can you explain what your worry is, and could you define “indigenous white population”?

Alp Mehmet: First, I am a first-generation migrant. I came here as an eight-year-old. I have been here since the mid-’50s. The immigrant ethnic minority element of the population in those days was something like 4%. In the 1951 census, it was 3.9%, and it is now 25%. That has substantially happened over the last 30 years.

What worries me, if that is the right word, is the fact that people are being added to the population, and migration is the only driver of population increase at the moment. I know you have David Coleman coming up next. He will tell you a great deal more about the likely evolution of the population’s demographic mix. That is my concern. Having arrived here as a migrant, and accepted and joined this country and made it my own, I see it now changing very rapidly into something that the majority of people in this country do not want to happen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn?

David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Professor Coleman, are you a member of the Galton Institute?

David Coleman: Yes and no. The Galton Institute does not exist any more; it has changed its name to the Adelphi Genetics Forum.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think the new endangerment offence will make any difference to channel crossings?

Dr Peter Walsh: Evidence from academic research shows that the impacts of deterrence policies are fairly small. The main reason for that is that migrants often do not have accurate or detailed knowledge of policies in destination countries. Their understanding of those policies is often lacking in detail and wrong, and it is often influenced by what they are told by their smugglers or handlers, who have a vested interest, of course, in downplaying risks.

There is also some statistical evidence that looks more broadly at what drives unauthorised migration and asylum applications around the world. That has found that domestic policy is not statistically one of the more important factors. Instead, geopolitical developments, conflict—civil, ethnic or international conflict—ecological disaster and regime change are all statistically much stronger drivers of unauthorised migration and asylum applications in particular countries.

Finally, rounding out the picture, when an asylum seeker decides which destination country to move to, that calculus is influenced not just by policy—policy is one of the things that they take least account of—but by things like the presence of family members, members of the community, friends, language and in some cases, in the context of small boat arrivals, escaping the Dublin system. Individuals may have claimed asylum in other EU countries—maybe those claims are outstanding or have been refused—and they understand that if they move to the UK they cannot be returned to the EU, because we are no longer a part of the EU and of the Dublin system that facilitated that.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Dr Walsh, you have just argued that deterrence does not really work, yet one of the big arguments on Second Reading was that somehow by repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act and most of the Illegal Migration Act we had thrown away the only thing that would work. Would you care to comment on that?

Dr Peter Walsh: Because under the IMA the Government proposed not to process people’s claims, they would not have known whether returning those individuals to countries of origin would be safe or not. That is where Rwanda came in.

There were always questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy. For my part, whatever deterrent effect it would have had would have depended fundamentally on how many people were actually sent to Rwanda. You can imagine that if it was a large share of people arriving by small boat, that might make people think twice, but if it were a small share—only thousands a year when we have tens of thousands of small boat arrivals—that would imply that the chance of being sent to Rwanda was fairly small. You can imagine that the people then making the trip would view that risk as just one risk among many much greater risks—risking their lives, for example—so there were always real questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy and how many people would in fact have been sent there.

The last Government said that the scheme was uncapped, and the Rwandan Government said, “We can take as many people as you can send.” But there were logistical challenges there, not least among them where people would be detained. At that time we had about 1,800 people in immigration detention in the UK, with a capacity of 2,200. You would have to detain people if you were threatening to remove them to Rwanda, so that was a very big initial stumbling block, putting aside whatever the capacity of those Rwandan facilities would have been, and more broadly the capacity of the Rwandan asylum system to process large numbers of claims. Typically it processed only a few hundred a year, not 10,000 or 20,000, so there were real questions there.

The big risk was what to do with people who are neither deterred from arriving nor able to be removed to Rwanda. That would be a sub-population in the UK without legal status who would be here indefinitely, so they would for ever have no legal right to remain in the UK, but we would be required to provide them with asylum accommodation and support at great cost. That was the risk when it came to Rwanda and the IMA.

Asylum Seeker Hotel Accommodation: Reopening

Debate between Matt Vickers and Angela Eagle

Tuesday 21st January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am happy to go on to what we are doing, but the legacy that one inherits is important and has to be taken into account when thinking about how we deliver for the future. We said that the Rwanda scheme was not going to work and that we would restart asylum processing. We also said we were going to set up the Border Security Command, which has been done. Opposition Members will know that there is legislation pending on border security and asylum, which hopefully will come before the House in the not-too-distant future. It has taken shape, but it is going through various processes to get agreement on when we can publish and introduce it.

Given the concern of Members in this Chamber, I hope they will attempt to engage positively with the new Bill when it is published, so that we can get the Border Security Command up and running as quickly as possible with the correct powers, including counter-terrorism powers. That will allow us to take more effective action to start dismantling and disrupting the activities of the smuggler gangs. In the last few years we have seen them be allowed to grow across the channel, becoming increasingly sophisticated and industrialising their processes. I hope all Members will agree that we have a duty to take action. We want to restore order to the asylum system so that it operates compassionately and efficiently. That will enable us to exit hotels and bring down the cost of the asylum system by billions of pounds.

Let me address the motion specifically. The strain on the system has necessitated the continued use of hotels in the medium term to enable the Home Office to deliver its statutory responsibilities to house asylum seekers while their claims are looked at. Of course, the more efficiently and effectively we can look at the claims, the less trouble we will have trying to house people—as the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) said. I disagree with her comments about the right to work. There are legal ways of trying to get into this country with a right to work that are processed through the visa system. We cannot have people getting around that by coming illegally and then having the right to work. That would be a huge pull factor that we simply do not want to countenance. She and I will disagree about it, but that is the Government’s view.

Since the general election, nine hotels have closed. Fifteen hotels were opened temporarily, and I apologise to the hon. Member for Windsor for the speed with which that had to be done. It is not ideal and I would not want to be in that position again. I have asked Home Office officials to be more open and transparent, as far ahead of time as possible, to try to give warning. We do not want any nasty surprises, but the hon. Gentleman had one. I have apologised for that—

[Matt Vickers]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will be happy to, but let me finish apologising. I apologised to the hon. Member for Windsor in my response to the letter he sent me. It was not an ideal situation and it is not one we want to get into again.

[Matt Vickers]

What would the Minister say is a sensible period of notice that she would like the Home Office to give before migrants arrive in a hotel?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We do not want to get into that situation, because we want to go down rather than up, but I would want notice of significant changes to be “as much as possible” because, sometimes, operational things occur. A hotel site can be lost—for example, we lost one in Manchester during the floods. Unexpected things can happen that have certain implications, so I will say it is as much notice as possible.

[Matt Vickers]

And MPs would know in advance?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, as much as possible and, I hope, more in advance than we managed during the openings that I talked about.

Since the general election, nine hotels have closed. There were 15 opened temporarily—which is what this debate is really about—and nine are scheduled for closure by the end of March 2025. I certainly hope that, as we look for more dispersed accommodation and a more effective, faster system, we will get to the stage where we do not have to open any more. I cannot give the hon. Member for Windsor any date when the hotel in his constituency might close but I am working to close all such hotels. As I have said on the record, the use of hotels is undesirable and is not value for money. It is unsustainable in the long term and we want to get away from it.

Given that it is 6.03 pm, I congratulate the hon. Member for Windsor on securing the debate. I am happy to stay in touch with him about what is happening with the hotel in his constituency.