All 7 Mark Prisk contributions to the Trade Bill 2017-19

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Tue 23rd Jan 2018
Trade Bill (First sitting)
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Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tue 23rd Jan 2018
Trade Bill (Second sitting)
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Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Thu 25th Jan 2018
Trade Bill (Fourth sitting)
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Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 30th Jan 2018
Trade Bill (Fifth sitting)
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Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 30th Jan 2018
Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)
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Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thu 1st Feb 2018
Trade Bill (Eighth sitting)
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Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 17th Jul 2018
Trade Bill
Commons Chamber

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons

Trade Bill (First sitting) Debate

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Trade Bill (First sitting)

Mark Prisk Excerpts
Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd January 2018

(6 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
None Portrait The Chair
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Before we start our formal session, I invite members of the Committee to declare any relevant interests.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
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I am trade envoy to the Nordic and Baltic nations, and to Brazil.

None Portrait The Chair
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Q Thank you. We will now hear oral evidence from the witnesses. Before calling the first Member, I remind the Committee that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill, and we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that have been agreed. For this session, we have until 10.25 am at the latest.

Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Nick Dearden: I am Nick Dearden, director of Global Justice Now.

Nick Ashton-Hart: I am Nick Ashton-Hart from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Christopher Howarth: I am Christopher Howarth, former senior political analyst at Open Europe, and now senior researcher in the House of Commons.

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Bill Esterson Portrait Bill Esterson
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Q What other countries do you think we should be looking to for the way they do these things?

Nick Dearden: We know that post-Brexit we want to be doing a trade deal with the European Union and the United States, so they are good places to start. Both political entities have set out in detail a number of ways in which they negotiate and give Congress or Parliament power over trade deals. In the United States, a 700-strong citizen advisory board is allowed to see all the texts. They have to have very specific public consultations. At the very least, Congress gets an up-or-down vote at the end, and if it does not fast-track trade deals, it gets substantially more power than that.

In the European Union, the Parliament gets to feed into a mandate—the Council gets to set a mandate. Various parliamentary Committees get to look at, scrutinise and give recommendations to the Executive for how a trade deal would affect jobs, the economy, the environment, human rights, or whatever else we may be concerned about. At the end, the Parliament is given a proper debate and an up-or-down vote.

On top of that, as I have already said, many trade deals are required to go back to member Parliaments for them to have a say, too. If you look at how Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands or Finland operate, they already exercise far more scrutiny over external EU trade deals than the UK does.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q Mr Dearden, you say that Parliament should approve Government entering into negotiations. Given that the Government are talking to at least 100 countries at all times about trade, how would that work in practice?

Nick Dearden: There are various ways in which you could do it. One of the ways is to have a Committee set up particularly to scrutinise the Government on this. When the time comes to enter negotiations on a deal, it will discuss with the Government what their priorities are and they will say, “We think this is acceptable and this is not acceptable.” It will be brought in from the very beginning.

I think that is important, because the Secretary of State has said a number of times, “I really want to avoid a TTIP-style situation, where we end up with a deal in discussion that has lost public support and lost a lot of parliamentary support.” To do that, we must have that buy-in from the very beginning, and that must require some degree of parliamentary discussion about what the objectives for this country should be in a trade deal with country X.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q That sounds nice, but how does that work in practice? At what point are Ministers, or indeed our ambassadors, allowed to talk to another country?

Nick Dearden: That would probably depend on exactly when proper trade negotiation starts and we are properly discussing a trade deal.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q How do you define that?

Nick Dearden: You can look at how it happens in Denmark, for example, because they do exactly that. They have a parliamentary Committee that sets a mandate at the initiation of trade talks. I understand that obviously the Government are talking to loads of different countries at any one time about possible trade, but within each of the countries they are talking to, they must have objectives. It is for Parliament to scrutinise, set and agree to those objectives.

At the moment, I do not feel that we have that ability. We are talking to a lot of countries; we have 16 trade working groups currently set up between the Secretary of State and other countries. We know, because we have read it in the media, that various negotiations are ongoing with some of those countries, but Parliament, and we as civil society, have no right to know what is being discussed, when it is being discussed and with whom. That is a profound democratic deficit. At the very least, if these are formal working groups involved in trade discussions, we should know what they are talking about, to whom and when.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q Would that apply to memorandums of understanding or bilateral agreements? You are talking in generalities, and I am trying to find out the facts.

Nick Dearden: I would say at the very least, at this point in time, for each of the trade working groups that has been set up, there should be a mandate set by parliamentary Committees.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q What kind of trade agreement do you think is a good one? Some people think they are just a playground for the super-rich.

Nick Dearden: There is something to be said for that if you look at previous trade agreements such as TTIP—how they have worked and how people have felt about them. There is a big populist backlash going on around the world at the moment, part of which is a result of people feeling there is a democratic deficit in the trade agreements being signed.

We have lots of ideas for how we could construct a trade agreement and how we would want to do it, and I should say now that we are absolutely not against trade; even with TTIP, we were not against the tariff aspects of that trade agreement. When it comes to public policy, it is different. Again, I am not against international co-operation, in trade agreements or other agreements, but there has to be a democratic basis for how those things are decided.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q So free trade agreements are a good thing?

Nick Dearden: They might be or they might not. It depends how they are done, who they are done with and what the terms are. If you have two very different types of country, in terms of wealth and power, obviously there can be a big problem because some people have a much bigger negotiating hand than others. That is what we have seen with economic partnership agreements, which is why we would prefer, for example, to give tariff-free access to goods coming from those countries rather than do a reciprocal agreement, which also puts what we believe to be unsustainable and unhelpful conditions on the African country concerned.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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My concern is not with the follow-on scrutiny of events that happened, but more the idea that somehow Parliament should require our existing teams in negotiations to seek approval before they start those conversations. That is my concern, but I will not delay the Committee any longer.

Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
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Q You were talking about the way in which other countries do the preparation of mandate and scrutiny of the process of creating a trade agreement. I wonder whether perhaps Nick Ashton-Hart could talk about the system in Australia and how the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties does it—or perhaps the system in Germany. Could one of you talk about that?

Nick Ashton-Hart: I would also say on the point about when terms of reference are set and whether our ambassadors need permission before they go and talk, I worked with most of our trading partners in Geneva and dozens of other countries. There are a lot of commonalities in how legislatures interact with Trade Ministries. Generally, the Trade Ministry will say, “We want to achieve these objectives over the course of this Parliament or this year,” and that is done in consultation with the relevant parliamentary Committees.

Ambassadors explore ideas with countries all the time; they do not need a mandate to do that. When it becomes clear that there is interest in formalising something, a process goes on in the capital to say, “Okay, what is our net benefit to be achieved?” To do a deal of any configuration with country X, the economics teams in the Ministry would go away and say, “Where is the net trade-generative agreement here? What sectors would we have to include? What likely trade-offs would we have to do with the other side?”

But that process would generally be informed by a consultation with the stakeholders in the industrial sectors that have most to gain or lose, the unions in those sectors and the like, so that before you even get into a negotiation, you know where your benefits lie, you have your stakeholders signed up to what you are trying to achieve and the other side knows that you have those things.

As I pointed out in my comments, the reason why you see so many leaks in trade negotiations is that it is in the interest of one party or another to put pressure on the other in their capital. Leaks do not happen by accident; they are deliberate.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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I think we are familiar with that!

Nick Ashton-Hart: You are familiar with how that dynamic works. It is no different in trade negotiations.

What I have described is pretty much a common process everywhere in the world, and it is not accidental; it is because the political economy demands that you have the backing, as a negotiator, at home when you are sitting across the table from your counterparties and that they know that you have that. They can watch your processes of consent and agreement and evaluate where your weaknesses are—where there are buttons they can push, but also where you are likely to need support. People know that you have to get to a sustainable deal also, and sometimes you have to do a concession at the right time to solve a problem in a domestic constituency for your counterparty, provided that it is in your interest to do so.

Tom Pursglove Portrait Tom Pursglove (Corby) (Con)
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Q As Mr Dearden will know, this Bill is not concerned with the making of future trade deals. However, of the 40 trade deals that we are seeking to transition, could you set out for the Committee which you supported at the time and which you opposed?

Nick Dearden: I do not have a complete list of all of them, but I do know that we have very serious concerns about the economic partnership agreements with African countries, for example, because of some of the conditions that are placed on those countries. We have particular concerns, because we worked on it, with the CETA agreement with Canada, again related to the so-called non-tariff barriers in that agreement.

One problem is that no matter what we thought about the agreements when they were originally negotiated, they are going to look different when it comes to being translated into or replaced by a UK-Canada or UK-African country agreement; they are just going to be different deals. Given that, I think it only right that there be some degree of scrutiny. It says in the Bill, “Well, we aim for these deals to be as similar as possible.” I understand that, but it may well be that some of the deals will be more similar than others.

For the deals that are more similar, I think it would be right and proper for Parliament to say, “Okay, fine. We will wave that one through. We understand that that is continuity.” But for other deals—what a substantial amendment or change in the deal would look like is not defined—we believe that Parliament should have proper scrutiny and proper ratification powers. That is particularly important for deals that have not even been through the proper ratification process in the European Union—examples involve Singapore, Japan and Vietnam. Those deals may all be replaced by UK deals, but they have not been through the proper process as yet in the European Union, and we do not want to see a situation in which they are taken on just because we are so rushed that we do not have time to really think about the consequences of the deals.

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Matt Western Portrait Matt Western
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Q Mr McTague, do you have a view?

Martin McTague: It is difficult to draw parallels with any other country withdrawing from a 40-year relationship. The view that we have taken in the past is that consultation has worked well, inasmuch as the small business community, which we think is a vital part of the economy, has been listened to, and we would hope that that would happen in future. However, there is a temptation, because the bigger corporates sometimes have more access to Government, that small business does not really get listened to. This component, we think, is absolutely vital in the development of the policy.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q Can I ask the witnesses about the Trade Remedies Authority? In your opinion, how effective do you think it could be, given that the Bill provides a framework? I appreciate there are lots of details to fill in later. How independent do you think that authority can be, given the way in which the Bill is currently drafted? I will start with FSB and work my way along.

Martin McTague: At the moment our view is that the early stages of development of TRA look encouraging, but we know they are a consultation. We know that they are looking at a variety of different options, and we are willing to wait for the consultation process before we get into a committed decision.

Chris Southworth: The principles are there in terms of setting up a trade role and it is as much to do with the speed around that. I would echo the same thoughts: there needs to be a lot more consultation around them and there needs to be clearer evidence of learning best practice from others. We are not the only country proposing a Trade Remedies Authority. I would start with the idea that having a trade remedies authority and the core concepts that exist in this Bill feel broadly right.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q Do you feel that there is sufficient distance between the Secretary of State and the TRA?

Chris Southworth: Yes, I would have thought so. I do not think there should be any opposition to the idea that one may need to evolve in time. The UK has to re-learn how it does trade as an independent country, so we will not get it 100% right in the beginning. It should be able to evolve over time, and if there is a better way of doing it, then do it.

James Ashton-Bell: I take a slightly different view. As to what is in the Bill at present, our internal analysis of the Trade Remedies Authority is that there is a fundamental question, and we are looking for an answer to it: that question is about who makes the ultimate decisions about when to take action and when not to take action.

Having an independent organisation to advise on the data that exists—or does not exist, in many cases—is useful. The EU has found time and again that it does not have access to the kind of data information it needs to draw the kinds of concrete conclusions that it would like to draw. Given that scenario, it is useful to have an independent organisation to make those choices and to be clear about what information is and is not there.

When you have things like the economic interest test that is currently being floated as part of this authority, which in essence allows for the identification of particularly problematic trade behaviour from a third country and for it not to be actioned by the Government or authority, it means that there will be a decision at some point not to take action. If there is not enough information, then that in itself becomes a subjective decision about which parts of the economy are worth protecting using these particular tools, and it is argued that, if a subjective decision is going to be made, then it needs to most certainly be made by a Minister who is accountable for making those choices.

Tony Burke: Right from the get-go, the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance, which consists of three trade unions and a number of trade associations including UK Steel, chemicals industries and ceramics among others, pressed strongly to get a trade remedies clause or a structure in there. We were able to put forward our proposals in advance of the discussions taking place at this level. One of the things that we would say from the trade union point of view is that it is absolutely essential that the TRA has a trade union voice—a worker’s voice—on it, particularly at non-executive level. We should also obviously be subject to International Labour Organisation conventions that protect workers in that remedies arrangement. We are supported by the employers on this. From our point of view, the situation in Unite is that we have many members in manufacturing who have suffered at the hands of dumping: steel, tyres, ceramic, chemicals and pharma. It is a big concern for us. We would see that we need a remedies authority that is transparent, and that has trade union and employer representation. At the end of the day, Parliament has to have consent over any decisions made.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q You are happy that the authority is sufficiently independent at this point?

Tony Burke: As it stands, but we do not see the transparency that we would like to see, and we also have a view about what appears to be an ability for the Minister to appoint people. We believe that working people and companies should have an opportunity to have a say, and also for trade unions to bring a case. This is important. We have learned from America. We have worked closely with the steelworkers’ union in the United States. They as a trade union in America do bring cases to protect their members in steel, rubber, paper making and industries like that.

Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
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Q Mr Ashton-Bell, can I pick up on something you said because I noticed that you were nodding when Mr Burke was saying that. You said you struggled to understand how we could get the best deal without engaging every part of society in the debate. You also posed the question of who makes the fundamental decision. Do you therefore agree with Mr Burke that it would be helpful to have, in the nine places available on the TRA, statutory representatives perhaps of small business, the trade unions and producers? At the moment, the Bill has it as a blank sheet for those nine spaces, and nobody is really quite clear who might be appointed. Perhaps you could all comment on that, starting with Mr Ashton-Bell.

James Ashton-Bell: My organisation does not have a defined position on that blank sheet of paper you have just described, but to follow your rationale, and consistent with what I have said so far, bigger organisations do not have a monopoly on understanding how trade impacts the economy. In anything where you are making choices about trade and how it will impact the wider economy, you should have a wide and balanced group of people advising Government, or an independent authority, about how to make those choices. That means, indeed, that small business are very much equal to big business, and workers also, because workers are just as impacted as the businesses themselves.

Chris Southworth: I just want to clarify my point. It is exactly the same: the representation is a critical point. An independent body, yes, but there must be representation within that independent body to represent all the important voices, which includes all those here, but I would also include NGOs and civil society, who have equal interest in the implications of trade. They must be at the table and that has to be in everyone’s interest, including business—big, small and medium.

Martin McTague: Barry, it will not come as a massive surprise to you that, yes, I do agree that small business should be a serious voice on this. It is nice to know that James supports me. That is a welcome change. [Interruption.] It is something that we have clearly got unanimity on.

Trade Bill (Second sitting) Debate

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Trade Bill (Second sitting)

Mark Prisk Excerpts
Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd January 2018

(6 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
None Portrait The Chair
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Thank you; that was very useful. It is not necessary for all four members of the panel to answer all the questions. You may want to target them, because we have half an hour left and we want to make the best use of our time.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
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Q May I ask Dr Bartels about the remedies section, in part 2 of the Bill? In your view, how does the legal framework for remedies, particularly if a remedies authority is established, compare with others abroad? What are the strengths and weaknesses?

Dr Bartels: One of the features of the package that you have been presented with is a split between fiscal and non-fiscal measures that can be adopted. I am not entirely convinced that that is a very sensible division of tasks. For instance, because of that division, what seems to be missing is the ability to impose quotas—not tariff-rate quotas but quantity quotas—as safeguard measures, which is permissible under WTO law and is done. Because of the split, nothing on those measures is set out in this agreement, and the other agreement only deals with duties, so you are limited to tariff-rate quotas. That is one overall observation. I could say other things about the treatment of developing countries in the other Bill, which I find under-complex, to use a German term that my colleague is fond of.

More directly to your question—again, this links to what I am saying about the split—the major issue when it comes to the Trade Remedies Authority here is that we do not have it in a context that enables appeals. I know that in the other Bill there is a reference to the possibility of an appeals mechanism. The United States is very big on appeals—it is very elaborate. Of course, one can disagree with the way in which the United States conducts itself—we have all paid some attention to the Bombardier dispute and the United States’ interpretation of its WTO obligations—but at least formally speaking there is a sequence of decision making that includes a court, appeals and so on established there, and we do not have that here. It is very, let us say, basic at this point.

On the rest of it, reading this together with the other Bill, I would say in general terms it looks fairly standard. There are some choices you can make when setting up a Trade Remedies Authority, such as the duties that can be imposed and whether you go for a lesser duty rule or not—we seem to be doing that here. One can make a political choice on that, but in general terms, other than the point on appeals of decisions, and connected with that the relationship between the authority and the Secretary of State, which here is extremely close and in other systems might be a little more arm’s length, I think the detail of what the authority can do is fairly standard.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Does anyone want to add to that?

Jude Kirton-Darling: I would add one thing. I heard the evidence this morning in which there was quite a lot of discussion of the EU trade defence instruments and the EU system, and some of it was a little bit out of date. During the steel crisis, quite a number of reforms came in to modernise and speed up trade defence inside the EU, mainly led by the European Parliament. That is one of the key elements missing from the Bills: the role of Parliament in terms of oversight and scrutiny.

If I think about the role of MEPs when it comes to trade defence instrument questions, we have the right to veto proposed duties and to scrutinise all of the Commission’s proposals, we have access to all of the documents in relation to investigations, and we can demand closed-door meetings with Commission officials to really get into the detail of those investigations. It seems to me that lots of that scrutiny is missing from the proposals on the table. That scrutiny gives a quality to the process of ensuring balanced trade defence instruments that are effective.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q So you do not think that having Question Time and a Select Committee on trade is adequate.

Jude Kirton-Darling: There is a clear role for stronger scrutiny. Inside the legislation, there is no obligation on the Secretary of State or the new Trade Remedies Authority to engage directly with Parliament through, for example, a specific Committee of Parliament. In future, that could be the International Trade Committee—an amendment could be tabled to ensure that link and that scrutiny—but at the moment that is not in the proposals. It is a missing link, if you think about what we already benefit from in the current system, of which we are a member.

I would hate to give the impression that what we have is perfect; that is not what I am trying to say. Today, in the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, MEPs have voted on a modernisation package to try to rectify some of the weaknesses in the EU’s regime. If you are thinking about what to improve on, our system is not perfect, but, at the same time, MEPs—your counterparts—have a clear role in the process, which is entirely missing from the proposals tabled.

Anna McMorrin Portrait Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)
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Q May I address this question to Dr Bartels? The Government suggest, to justify the absence of any process for parliamentary oversight, transparency and scrutiny, that trade negotiations need to be done confidentially and under some secrecy. What is your feeling about that?

Dr Bartels: One can look at what is covered in modern trade agreements according to two poles, and then there is a sort of meeting in the middle. On one side, you have the pure market access issues, where you are reducing duties—you are liberalising trade—in certain economic sectors. Those sectors are going to be affected negatively and are not going to be happy about it, because there is competition that they were not used to. To do that, you need to be able to trade sectors off against one another. There is a reason for confidentiality with that traditional sort of trade negotiation. Not everybody would agree—you might say that someone whose job is at risk should get a right to know what is being negotiated—but there is at least a traditional and strong argument there for confidentiality.

On the other side, you have purely regulatory issues, such as the question of what you think in your system of the precautionary principle for health and safety. That sort of principle would normally be dealt with through the normal democratic process, and I cannot see any reason why that should be changed and negotiators should be given the ability to haggle that away, particularly if they are doing that in secret. In the middle, you have rules that are regulatory but arguably are also protectionist, so the trade negotiators would say, “We should be able to negotiate those away in secrecy.” It is hard to know where to draw the line, but it is certainly useful to conceive of what is in a trade agreement according to those two poles.

None of that means that this should be limited purely to the Executive, even when there is confidentiality on market access. Many other countries have systems where parliamentarians have some rights to see what is being negotiated and to be kept apprised of negotiations as they go. The European Union, for instance, is extremely advanced when it comes to that; there are strict limitations in terms of going into and coming out of the room, no phones are allowed, and so on. The US Congress has similar arrangements. There is a palette of options to enable parliamentary involvement, even within the framework of confidentiality. I am not sure that the Bill is the right place to address that sort of issue, but there is certainly nothing like that in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---
Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
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Q Given that there is this renegotiation going on, do you feel that those countries might seek to use the occasion as a means of bettering the current agreement in some way? Or would they feel—if they are being told, “You will not get a trade agreement unless you do this quickly”—that they are being bullied into doing it against their will?

Professor Winters: By and large, countries find it very difficult to resist the offer of tariff-free access to a market. If they were put in a position where they were told it was the equivalent of the EPA or nothing indefinitely, my guess is that most would shrug and accept the EPA, but given one quarter of a chance, they would want to talk to us about a more reasonable and satisfactory—and in the end more efficient—process of market access.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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Q Professor Winters, we have before us in part 2 a broad legal framework for a future remedies authority. In your view, is it robust enough? If not, what should we be thinking about amending?

Professor Winters: The Trade Remedies Authority is something we clearly need. Without seeing a lot more details about exactly how it operated, I would not want to say whether it is robust, but I would like to emphasise three things about it. One is, I understand, Government policy; I think the others are not.

The so-called lesser duty rule is important for safeguards and anti-dumping. That is essentially the rule that says the duty you put on goods that are allegedly dumped is the lower of the amount of dumping—the dumping or injury margin—required to make good the British industry. That is a good rule to have.

The two things I am less clear are there at the moment are, first, a very strong degree of transparency. Its operations need to be, with the exception of commercial confidence, pretty much out in the open. The second is that experience through decades in nearly every country suggests that these trade remedies are captured by producer interests. They are complex, they are triggered by the producers complaining that they cannot manage or that they are being cheated, and the whole process essentially favours them.

The really important thing is that, exactly like the House of Commons, you need an opposition. I would urge that we try to supplement the Trade Remedies Authority with an officially sanctioned and resourced group to represent the consumer interest, to do the analysis and actually have the right of audience at the TRA to make the case.

George Peretz: If I may add to that, of course the trade remedies provisions are spread across this Bill and the customs Bill. If one looks at the customs Bill to find out where the appeal mechanism is—as a barrister, my first thoughts go to what the appropriate appeal mechanism is—all you find is a power of the Secretary of State to make appropriate regulations.

It is my personal view that that is somewhat unsatisfactory. There are a number of important questions that arise about appeals, one of which is very important, and that is what the appropriate standard of review is. Is it a merits review, which enables a specialist appeal court to correct the decision maker on questions of fact as well as questions of law, or is it simply a judicial review mechanism, where all the court is doing is saying, “Is this a reasonable decision, whether it is right or wrong?”? It is a very important decision to make and it seems to me that that is one that ought to be made by Parliament in primary legislation and not by the Secretary of State or the Executive in a statutory instrument. That is a decision for you.

The appeals mechanism is important. I said slightly flippantly that it was because I am a barrister, but it is the experience of all regulatory processes that what actually happens at the regulatory stage is often very conditioned and influenced by the form of an appeal. Any sensible regulator will, during the process, have their eye on what the appeal route is, who can appeal and what the level of scrutiny of their decision is going to be.

If you have a very robust form of appeal mechanism, which is open to both parties— the complaining industry but also a range of interest groups whose interests might be affected by the imposition of duty—and if they are allowed routes to appeal that will encourage the regulator, in this case the TRA, to take robust decisions. That is robust in the sense of fully reasoned decisions that will sustain detailed scrutiny, to ensure that all parties are properly heard so that they are fully aware of where the objections to what they are proposing to do are and can properly evaluate them. You get better decision making out of all of that.

I sent the secretary to this Committee a copy of a briefing paper I did for the UK Trade Forum website, which is there if any of you want to read it. It expands a bit on that point but I would emphasise the appeal mechanism. There are other issues about the trade remedies. I have probably spoken for long enough but if people have other questions they could ask about them.

Michael Clancy: I read your blog; it is very good. The other thing that I would say is that the tenure should be made more independent by having term limits. That is quite important in reinforcing independence and impartiality. We have had experience in Scotland of the whole system of judicial appointments being reworked for temporary sheriffs because they did not have a stated term and were subject to the whim of the appointing Ministers. That would be my addition to this discussion.

George Peretz: The provisions for the appointment of members of the Trade Remedies Authority are very similar to the provisions for appointments to the Competition and Markets Authority, which as anyone who has watched the press this morning knows takes very important decisions about the economy. There is a difference with the Trade Remedies Authority, and the argument why you might need a more constraining set of rules governing whom the Secretary of State might appoint. At the moment the Secretary of State appoints the majority and the rest are staff members. There may be an argument for a more constraining set of rules, particularly if the Trade Remedies Authority is—as the customs Bill contemplates—itself given the remit of applying a wide range of economic interest tests as the trade remedies body. That means that even if the TRA accepts that there is a legal basis for opposing a trade remedy, then as a matter of economic interest to the UK it is able to say, “We are not going to do so here because, for example, the consumer interest outweighs the interest of the particular producers affected.”

That seems to me to be a political position: it is balancing the interests of jobs in a particular area of the country against the interests of consumers across the country, to put it crudely. If the TRA is, as the customs Bill contemplates, itself going to be taking that kind of decision, then there is a case for saying that its composition ought to be balanced by statute and that it ought to reflect a variety of different perspectives. In that sense its role is much more political than that of the Competition and Markets Authority.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We have half an hour left. Incidentally, Mr Peretz’s evidence is available in written format in the Committee Room.

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Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

rose—

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

No, the Opposition failed, so we will give the Government a try. I call Mark Prisk.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you, Mr Gray. I have asked other witnesses about the remedies regime, and I am interested in your views. In a way, you all represent industries that are familiar with this challenge. “Remedies” sounds arcane, but it is really about all the challenges a locality may face with dumping in particular business sectors. What would you want to see in an effective remedies authority, and what would need to change in the Bill to deliver that?

Gareth Stace: Let me start with what would need to change in the Bill. We would like to see more detail in the Bill. The Bill sets out powers to create an independent arm’s length authority—the Trade Remedies Authority—to advise the Secretary of State, but there is no detail. There is little detail of the powers that it might have or of the scope of its remit. I am sure that will come in secondary legislation or after that, but as you quite rightly said, industries that are or have been subject to dumping and unfair trade practices are quite nervous about what is going to happen in the UK, and the more detail we have, the better. That is why at this stage we are quite nervous about what might or might not come out down the line.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Q We know that there is not a lot of detail—it is a framework—but is there something specific, such as an appeals process, that you want to be teased out in our deliberations?

Gareth Stace: Yes, an appeals process—there is no detail in the Bill—is not even set out as: “The appeals process will be this, this and this.” We do not even know what the basis of appeals might be, because we do not know how the TRA will define subsidy, injury and dumping. We do not even have something to base that on.

Tom Reynolds: It is clear that we need a TRA, and it is certainly welcome that the Bill establishes one. I want to rebut a point made by an earlier witness, who said that trade remedies are invariably captured by producer interests. That certainly has not been the experience in the European system. I am sure that Gareth agrees that that was apparent in the steel crisis—the trade remedy system was slow to react to the producer interest.

We have to read the Bill alongside the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill. My feeling is that the rules for the TRA, which are set out in that other Bill, tip the balance the other way, against the producer interest. There are areas where that Bill and the way that it works with this Bill can be improved, which I would be happy to explore with the Committee.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Q Is that specifically the national interest?

Tom Reynolds: There are really four points. The public interest test and the economic interest test is of concern because, as Gareth has already pointed out, the lack of detail means it could operate in any number of ways. Our fear is that it might include an over-simplistic cost-benefit analysis that appears very seductive in its indication that the benefit for producers may be outweighed by the damage to the consumers, when it does not show the full story and perhaps the long-term impact to the consumer that removal of a competitive environment for domestic producers creates if the trade remedies are insufficient to keep production here in the UK.

A big concern for ceramics—the country of concern that is dumping into the European Union at the moment is China—is how you calculate the dumping margin in instances where the domestic price cannot be used because it is subject to such state distortion. That detail is crucial to the effectiveness of the trade remedies system.

There are other issues, such as the lesser duty rule—it was touched on earlier. For the proper operation of the lesser duty rule, we would need to see the detail and how you calculate injury. That is crucial. Pushing all of this into the long grass just adds a lot of uncertainty and concern for producers.

Cliff Stevenson: Because the Bill is simply setting up a framework for the TRA and not really having anything more substantive than that, there are only small points that you might look at, but there are some important points. For example, the composition of the members of the TRA is critical because trade remedies is a highly political area of policy where there are very different views. Some see trade remedies as purely protectionist and would abolish them completely, and some see trade remedies as an essential competition policy-type tool to correct multilateral distortions.

I am in the second group. I believe that, in the absence of multilateral competition rules, trade remedies are the only thing we have that allows state distortions and other unfair practices to be addressed. Within the EU, we do not need anti-dumping or anti-subsidies law because we have really good competition and state aid law.

What we want from this legislation—you have to see the two Bills together—is a coherent, robust system that could redress those problems. In terms of this Bill, the composition of the members is very important to look at because, if all the members thought trade remedies were protectionist, we would never get any trade remedies through—or all members might believe that trade remedies were essential. You would want to ensure that there is some balance in there.

There are some other smaller issues that could be significant. For example, regarding the provision that the TRA should report to Parliament annually, I think there could be a little bit more detail on what it might report on, so that, if the TRA was being biased one way or the other, by being obliged to provide certain statistics, such as number of cases opened, measures adopted and so on, it could be assessed.

Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Picking up on your last point, Mr Stevenson, in the EU, the Commission is obliged to report to the European Parliament on trade events, so there would be an annual production of just such statistics. There is a lacuna in the Bill in that there is no provision to make such a report to Parliament and to aid parliamentary scrutiny on trade remedies in that way. Is that something that you and the trade remedies alliance would seek to redress? Would you like to see introduced in this Bill some way in which a report ought to be made—an annual report perhaps—to Parliament?

Cliff Stevenson: Yes, what would definitely be of importance is to have a substantial report submitted to Parliament on an annual basis. In the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, there is a provision on reporting. There is already a proposal for there to be an annual report. The EU anti-dumping regulation is quite specific about what the European Commission must report to the European Parliament in terms of the statistics it must provide. A little more detail ensuring that certain things were provided in this report would be useful.

Tom Reynolds: The question about Parliament’s ongoing role with the Trade Remedies Authority is an interesting one, but so is Parliament’s role in setting up the rules for the system. The point made by Jude Kirton-Darling earlier on about the level of involvement of MEPs in scrutinising and offering amendments on, for instance, the new anti-dumping methodology and the TDI modernisation, which was mentioned, has been integral in improving that legislation from the Commission’s original proposals. I would be more comfortable if there was a more rigorous approach for parliamentarians to get involved in the setting of the rules for the system as well.

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Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I want to pursue what Mr Jones said. We have got away from the initial question of the sift Committee. You stressed the urgency of this and the need to try to get things through as quickly as possible, and you adopted an approach to delegated powers and Henry VIII powers of, “Well, maybe they’re necessary in the circumstances”. However, it was your organisation that recommended that there should be a sift Committee in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. Would that not be an appropriate way of trying to say, “What we’re talking about here is a minor change to an existing agreement, but this is actually a major change”?

We are talking about 100 separate agreements between the EU and Switzerland alone, some of which include free movement of people. There are going to be some major changes, such as those we talked about with Turkey and the customs union, and with Norway, free movement of people and the four freedoms. Do you not think, given that you have already recommended a sift Committee in one form, that a similar sort of mechanism for trying to distinguish between what is and what is not vital, and what should have parliamentary scrutiny, is a sensible way to proceed?

Stephen Jones: Yes, sorry; forgive me for the lack of clarity. My reference was really to the existing provisions between the UK and the EU in relation to financial services. In my assessment, for the purposes of transition and of business services in financial services, the chances of change, and therefore of the need for sift, are zero. There just is not the time. In the context of other areas, where there is an assessment that change is possible, the sift Committee strikes me as a very sensible mechanism to prioritise and assess those changes and the degree of scrutiny that is required.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Q Mr Bain was very clear about the importance of continuity to business. Can I ask the chambers of commerce in particular, but also other witnesses, about that issue? Clearly, the Bill is about the continuity of existing arrangements. How important is that principle of continuity to your members?

Anastassia Beliakova: It is absolutely critical. Our members are operating on the assumption that during a transition period there will be continuity in our trading arrangements not just with the EU but with all the other markets with which we have a trade agreement of some sort. The working assumption is that they should not be making any changes currently or planning for significant changes in trading conditions in March 2019. Of course we are still waiting for greater clarity from the EU on this over the coming months, but I cannot stress enough that in the immediate future the continuity in our trading relationship with the EU during transition is critical. Our continuity, looking further ahead, with the other markets, is also something that our members want to count on.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Q Mr Jones, what about financial services?

Stephen Jones: Continuity is very important, particularly through the transition period and on an ongoing basis. We believe that there is an opportunity for a free trade agreement in services between the UK and the EU that prolongs many of the existing arrangements, which are beneficial on a cross-border basis, particularly in markets for wholesale financial services and markets affecting professional counterparties and market-based counterparties, where cross-border provision, passporting and mutual recognition are important to the efficient working of trade not just in financial services but in goods—not just in the UK but in the EU as well.

The economic case for maintaining much of the existing arrangement is significant, but we are, as you know, working with a negotiation envelope as far as the EU is concerned that appears to require change—to require the UK to have less access than previously, in a visible sense. So we need to be seen, I guess, within the context of that envelope, to prioritise what is important for both sides in financial services. In our assessment it is more of the capital, derivative, centralised clearing and—outside my remit but clearly very important—insurance and reinsurance markets, which are professional-to-professional markets operating on a seamless and cross-border basis across Europe, the disruption of which would be quite significant. In those circumstances maintaining as much as we can of the existing establishment regulatory supervisory arrangements around those business activities will be important for the UK economy, but equally for the continental European economy as well.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Mr Bowles, is that your take as well?

Edward Bowles: There are two things I want to say. One is that the lead time involved for change for a regulated industry—and it is not just financial services but, my guess is, pharmaceuticals and manufacturing, among others—is so long that, to give you an idea, to create a subsidiary where you do not have one, even in a market where you may have a branch, is a minimum 18-month project plan timeframe from beginning to end, and in some cases longer depending on the breadth of products you are dealing with and the number of regulatory approvals involved. Therefore, a degree of clarity around the future timeframe and the continuity in that timeframe is critical. Otherwise you end up creating a high degree of uncertainty, not just for the regulated entities but for all their clients—thousands of clients who would be forced, with scrambling and redocumentation, to look to a different legal entity and to price and measure risk in a different way from the way they are used to doing it with the current entity.

Continuity is key, but the working assumption, as Stephen said, is that there will be change. The question is when that change will come, and whether it will be in one step or more than one step. Will we have sufficient clarity that when we deliver the end state it will be the final end state? That is why the transitional period is critical to get us to the point where the framework gives us a high degree of visibility over what the end state might be.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Q On the financial services side, can we look at the issue of remedies? Clearly, in the current set of arrangements that is frankly irrelevant in a strict legal sense to you as a sector but, looking forward, the TRA is clearly not going to disappear in two years’ time or after however long the transition period lasts. Therefore, looking at the longer term, what is the relevance to financial services and what are the critical issues that you will be looking for in an effective remedies regime at that stage? Perhaps you can just give us one or two highlights to give us a sense. We have heard about goods so far, which is very important, but obviously services matter as well.

Stephen Jones: I defer to Mr Bowles on this—given his experience with TTIP and equivalent regimes.

Edward Bowles: Obviously a high degree of dialogue is done regulator to regulator, so we are a supervised entity not merely in the home state where we may have our domicile and headquarters but in all markets where we have operation. In fact, your first point of call would be the nature of the relationship in terms of supervisory co-operation between those two entities, and what it is that you are permitted to do, and where any disputes may arise about what you are doing in those markets. In fact, the TRA is probably much less relevant to a highly regulated and supervised industry like financial services than to some others, in which there are fewer regulator-to-regulator forums that would determine the methods and modes of operation.

Stephen Jones: I would just add that the concept of dumping in financial services is, therefore, not strictly relevant.

Nick Smith Portrait Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Mr Bowles, I will ask just a bit more about Standard Chartered and the developing markets in the states and countries where you work. As previously mentioned, your Razia Khan predicts some difficulty in lining up quick deals in Kenya and other places in Africa. What is your view about other countries where your company has long-standing experience, like Vietnam and South Korea? How quickly can those countries respond to these sorts of deals?

Edward Bowles: Thank you for the question. Standard Chartered has been UK-headquartered for the last 155 years, but 85% of our revenues are from Asia, Africa and the middle east. In respect of most of those countries, there are no FTAs, either with the UK or, indeed, with almost any other markets. I was quite involved in my 10 years at Standard Chartered with the negotiations between the EU and Korea, the EU and Singapore and the EU and Vietnam and, most latterly, with those on TTIP, and on India in between times—that has been a slightly less successful product in negotiating terms. The fact is that we have FTAs with some of those markets and some of them are incredibly advanced. Korea and Singapore are incredibly advanced markets. You are dealing with very sophisticated regulators, politicians and others. They completely understand what the UK would be seeking to achieve in any renegotiation post the roll-over of the current FTAs.

There is certainly scope, I think, in some of those FTAs for tweaking, shall we say, and data offshoring would be one of the issues that I am sure the UK would want to look at. The negotiations take a long time. Korea was seven years. Singapore is not yet in force but we have just had a European Court of Justice ruling in relation to one aspect of it that will enable it to come into force soon, but it has been eight years overall. We can cut and paste them, but then the question is, “What are the incentives on each side—which will probably be asymmetric in terms of interests—for tweaking, and what will be the appetite and the timeframe over which you could do it?” My guess is that you would want to do it expeditiously, but the degree of consultation and engagement with other interested industries, politicians, civic sectors and so on, would inevitably build in a longer time.

For other markets that are rather less developed perhaps than Singapore and Korea, it would take longer, because if there is no existing FTA you are looking at a degree of transparency around their regulatory framework and around the concessions they inevitably will be asked to make, and the question is: “What is the quid pro quo for them?” India is a classic example. You have visas, and immigration is one of their core demands. It has always been one of the core issues that has bedevilled the EU-India FTA negotiations and that will be no less the case, I am sure, with the UK than it is with India.

Trade Bill (Fourth sitting)

Mark Prisk Excerpts
Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 25th January 2018

(6 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 January 2018 - (25 Jan 2018)
Hannah Bardell Portrait Hannah Bardell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to kick off what I think we all agree is a hugely important debate. We are pleased that the amendments were selected.

It is important to say at the outset that our amendments to clauses 1 and 2 would ensure that the principles of devolution are safeguarded in the Bill as the UK leaves the EU. Just over 20 years have passed since devolution, and it is important to pause for thought. There has been a lot of discussion—on Second Reading and in the public discourse—about how the cross-party agreement that brought us devolution and the Parliaments and Assemblies of the devolved nations of the UK all those years ago is threatened. Much in the Bill drives a coach and horses through the cross-party agreements that brought huge changes to the devolved nations of the UK. I say to fervent defenders of the United Kingdom that by threatening devolution and devolved powers—the Scottish National party has set out 111 areas in which they are under threat—the Bill threatens to undermine the Union.

We agree with the provision in clause 1 that aims to ensure continued access to Government procurement markets after the UK leaves the EU, but we believe that UK Ministers should have to seek consent, not just to consult. During our debates on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, the Prime Minister promised that the devolved nations of the UK would be consulted. As we know, it has not been possible to seek proper consultation in Northern Ireland because of the situation there; we look forward to seeing what happens in Northern Ireland and what threat that poses. However, I think it is fair to say that the devolved nations do not really feel that consultation has happened. For us, consultation and consent are absolutely the bottom line.

Amendment 33 would ensure that the consent of the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers is required for any regulations made under clause 1 that deal with matters within the competence of devolved authorities in Scotland or Wales. The Library briefing for the Bill states:

“If responsibilities for much of procurement law move from the EU to the UK with Brexit, there are questions about who takes on these responsibilities. At present, responsibilities for procurement are generally either devolved or set at the EU level.”

The devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales implement EU directives directly.

Let me draw on a specific example. Procurement is probably quite a dry and technical subject to many people, but it is very important. Back in 2008, we had a big challenge with superbugs and sickness in hospitals in Scotland, as did much of the UK. Through Government procurement measures, we were able to take contracts with private firms back under Government control. That was absolutely vital. If our amendments are not agreed to and we are unable to guarantee our procurement rights, there is a risk that they will be lost in the 111 areas I mentioned.

My Labour colleagues should think very carefully, given that it was their party that was instrumental in devolution. Labour should be congratulated on that. Labour Members must reflect on the impact of the Bill and the opportunity presented by the amendments, which have been laid with a degree of cross-party consensus and support. If we choose to push the amendment to a vote—obviously we will listen to the full debate—it would be excellent to have their support, and perhaps that of some Government Members. They might deem the promises made to Scotland in the past to lead not leave the UK, to be an equal partner—all those words and rhetoric—to be not rhetoric, but something that Members actually stand by.

On amendment 34, we agree with the provision in clause 2 that aims to provide continuity to existing trade deals that the UK is part of by virtue of its EU membership. There are about 40 trade deals, with more than 60 countries. We have heard a huge amount of evidence from a number of different organisations, including today from Devro, a company that makes sausage skins—we might argue that there will be no breakfast after Brexit if Devro is not able to produce the skins for sausages. We also heard from Hologic, a company I visited some time ago that operates in my Livingston constituency. Its representative spoke about the importance of consultation and consent and the involvement of the devolved nations.

We believe that UK Ministers ought to seek the consent of devolved Ministers when amending the law in devolved areas. The amendment would assure that the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers is required for any regulations made under the provisions of clause 2 that deal with matters within the competence of devolved authorities in Scotland and Wales.

I ask colleagues on both sides of the Committee to think about when trade deals are being negotiated. I know the Bill is about transferring current deals across, but it is also about what happens beyond that; it is about the framework that is put in place and ensuring that that framework is good and robust for everybody in the UK, wherever their business is and wherever they live. It is incredible to think that we would not get support, particularly from our Labour colleagues, on ensuring that the devolved Administration in Wales, whoever that may be, would have a say and would be able to give consent on the decisions that are made for those businesses.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
- Hansard - -

Let us say a major treaty was going forward that was in the interests of Scottish whisky, for example. Is it the hon. Lady’s position that Welsh Ministers should be able to veto that?

Hannah Bardell Portrait Hannah Bardell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Those are things that can be discussed. I am not going to draw on particular areas—if it were Welsh lamb, for example, should we have a veto?—and say that we should be interfering. I would like to think that if it came to that situation, the Welsh Government—whoever was in power in Wales—would take a sensible approach and realise it was the right thing that the Government in Scotland, whichever colour they may be, should be able to consent and be consulted on the products of their nation. We should have an even hand across the UK.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

I note that the hon. Lady said no to that. In other words, as it stands, what she is saying about consent means that the treaty in question could not go forward. I put the question to her again: what if there was a major interest in Scotland that, under her amendment, was vetoed by Welsh Ministers? Is that what she intends?

Hannah Bardell Portrait Hannah Bardell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, that absolutely is not the intention. We all live in a world at the moment where we can put scenarios forward and say this or that might happen.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

That is the point of this Committee.

Hannah Bardell Portrait Hannah Bardell
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

And the point of the amendments is that in relation to goods coming from whichever part of the UK, we do not create a democratic deficit. That is what the Bill creates. The amendment rectifies that.

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Anna McMorrin Portrait Anna McMorrin
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is absolutely about consent, agreement and consultation. Essentially it is about not rolling back on the devolution settlement. Amending the Bill to explicitly ask for the consent of devolved Administrations for secondary legislation under the Bill would therefore not interfere with that, nor would it amount to a veto power.

As I already said, what was already drafted in the UK Government’s White Paper should be in the Bill. Consent and consultation are at the very heart of devolution. If there is secondary legislation being made within an area that is currently within devolved competence, the devolved Administrations and Welsh Ministers must give consent and ensure the democratically elected Welsh Assembly or Scottish Parliament is able to debate it. That is why I agree with the principle underlying the amendments, as agreed by both the Welsh and Scottish Governments.

Professor Jones, a Welsh political expert, told the Select Committee on Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs:

“We see the UK Government in effect reintroducing a kind of conferred powers model where it will decide which bits of the powers returning from Brussels will be conferred on the Welsh Government… That—in the context of this constant churn and change—looks one-sided and objectionable.”

The most disappointing aspect of this Bill’s disregard for devolution is that the UK Government know it is completely unacceptable.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

It is excellent to have a Member from Wales speaking. Naturally we have heard from the hon. Member for Livingston, the Scottish Member who is moving this amendment. Do I take it from what the hon. Member for Cardiff North is saying that she supports the principle and therefore will be supporting the hon. Lady’s amendment?

Anna McMorrin Portrait Anna McMorrin
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I said, I absolutely support this principle, which has been agreed jointly with the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government.

Ministers, Conservative MPs and civil servants privately acknowledge how extremely ill-advised it is to remove the power of devolved Governments over devolved areas. Clearly the issue is one of trust: trust to exercise devolved powers responsibly; trust to carry out measures that represent the people of Wales and Scotland; and trust to provide meaningful scrutiny of legislation. As it stands, under this Bill, and after Brexit, the devolved Governments will be at the mercy of Whitehall, which will have complete control of all areas, including those which are currently devolved. That is called rolling back devolution. As set out in the Government’s White Paper, devolved Governments must have the right to give consent to secondary legislation in areas of devolved competence.

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Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Mr Davies, I have long admired this Minister’s chutzpah. The chutzpah of somebody to say, “Although I, as the Government, have completely abrogated my responsibility to get this Bill right, and you the Opposition have decided to fulfil my role for me, to try to put it right and get the stuff in place, if we passed your amendments we would not have consulted on them”! What complete, spurious nonsense. Let us have a grown-up debate, because that is not one; it really is not. It trivialises the work of this Committee and the important work that Government must do in scrutinising our future framework for trade negotiations. Mr Davies, I will calm down and try to get back to the essence of what we are doing here.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to lower my blood pressure after the Minister’s intervention.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

I will do my best, but he may not take that view when he calms down and the blood pressure starts to ebb. My understanding on Second Reading and in earlier debates was that the crux of Labour Members’ worries—on this Committee and in the House generally—was that the Bill’s problem is that it reaches far too wide. Why, then, propose amendments that extend its remit even further? Do the Opposition want a narrow or a wide Bill, and if it is too wide, why extend it?

Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

A plausible case. Elements of the Bill go far too wide, including the Henry VIII powers, which we will come on to later. We believe that the way in which the Government have sought to use Henry VIII powers in this legislation is too wide and unacceptable. The hon. Gentleman is right: that was one of the subjects of debate in our Second Reading deliberations. One other key criticism made by many Labour Members in that debate was that the Bill not only did the few things that it did badly, but failed entirely to do the one thing that it should have done properly. That is, to quote the Queen’s Speech policy paper, to

“put in place the essential and necessary legislative framework to allow the UK to operate its own independent trade policy upon exit from the European Union.”

There are many deficiencies in the Bill. Some relate to the widening of powers that it gives to Government, whereas others relate to the narrowness of the Bill.

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Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am pointing out to the Minister, in response to his earlier remarks, the reason I voted for CRAGA then. I think I am right in saying that while his party voted against CRAGA, which it is now relying upon so heavily—there is an irony there—he did not turn up for the vote. I turned up for the vote and I voted for it, but because it was subject to all the scrutiny procedures that were already in place from the EU. The situation has changed.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

I have listened very carefully to the six stages of assessment. I do not have a problem with the principle that there should be a thorough process, but the amendments and new clauses ignore one tiny detail: next March, we leave the European Union. All business representatives, particularly of businesses in my constituency, have said that they need to know what happens on 1 April. How will it be possible for any of these existing trade agreements, which is what the Bill is about, to be transferred across under his proposal? How many years will businesses have to wait?

Barry Gardiner Portrait Barry Gardiner
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In fact, they would not have to wait. I have great respect for the hon. Gentleman and I know he speaks with real experience in these matters, having been a trade Minister. I ask him to look at what we have proposed: we have tried to introduce the bifurcation at a high level in the legislation. We have put the proposals in at that point. Of course, they would have an impact on all the new free trade agreements. We are trying to ensure that for new free trade agreements, this is the proper process of scrutiny that will come into place. On the corresponding agreements—where the EU already has an agreement—there will be a streamlined procedure, but one that is still subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, particularly where those agreements have been substantially amended.

Let me conclude this section of my remarks by repeating that we have tabled the amendments and new clauses to establish a procedure for new free trade agreements that do not correspond to any prior EU agreement—that is the point I just made to the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford. I was struck by how forcefully the representatives of business made the case to the Committee in our final oral evidence session on 23 January that there needs to be substantially greater consultation on the new trade agreements that the Government are negotiating, which correspond to prior EU agreements. Wherever those EU agreements are modified to incorporate new obligations, those obligations must be highlighted and presented to Parliament, to business and to the country as a whole, for proper debate, proper scrutiny and proper accountability. We will precisely return to the issue of scrutiny for these new replacement UK agreements as we go through the rest of the Bill.

Trade Bill (Fifth sitting)

Mark Prisk Excerpts
Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 30th January 2018

(6 years, 1 month ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 January 2018 - (30 Jan 2018)
Judith Cummins Portrait Judith Cummins
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is incredibly important to include an ethical dimension to any human rights legislation in the Bill. We also require all future UK trade agreements to be consistent with the sustainable development goals adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015.

The importance of those goals needs no further elaboration but may be a useful point on how the world’s poorest countries have been marginalised from the gains of global trade over the past 40 years. Although emerging economies such as China have clearly been able to use the export opportunities of a globalised economy to develop into leading actors in many fields of trade and investment, the countries that are home to the bottom billion, as the poorest have been called, have been left behind.

That is precisely what the World Bank’s former research director, Paul Collier, warned of in his best-selling book “The Bottom Billion”, where he concluded that reliance on trade is more likely to lock yet more of the bottom billion countries into the natural resource trap than to save them through export diversification.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
- Hansard - -

I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s last argument. Millions of people have been lifted out of abject poverty because of trade. I would like to make clear that this is a friendly amendment, as the hon. Lady described it, for future trading agreements, rather than the agreements that the Minister has referred to.

Judith Cummins Portrait Judith Cummins
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is important that we establish the principles of human rights within our trade agreements.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

I entirely agree with the principle that human rights are important. I just want to be clear whether we are talking about existing agreements being transitioned, as dealt with by the Bill to which the hon. Lady has tabled her amendment, or, as her remarks indicate, about future agreements some way in the distance.

Judith Cummins Portrait Judith Cummins
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am talking about both because human rights are the basis of principle, not a point, so my proposal covers both.

To prove the point, the world’s least developed countries saw their share of global merchandise fall still further, to under 1%, in 2015. Africa has seen its share of global trade cut by a half over the past 30 years. It is our task to ensure that the poorest countries can benefit from trade and investment. To that end, the sustainable development goals included three specific targets on trade, set out for all countries to follow, which include promoting a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable, multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organisation.

--- Later in debate ---
Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

I strongly support the hon. Lady’s point about the value of human rights and the importance of workers’ rights and environmental standards, not only as we trade abroad but in how we deal with our domestic politics. That is very important. I am sorry that, at the tail end of her point, she started to suggest that one side of the House somehow does not agree with that. In fairness, there is a range of views across the spectrum, but the principles about human rights and workers’ rights and so on are there.

I cannot support the hon. Lady’s amendment, not because of the values that she talked about at some length but because, in her own words, the amendment seeks to change any future trading agreement. On a point of principle, I do not think that is something the Committee has the power, or is in the position, to do. On that principle, I will vote against the amendment, and I hope other Members do the same.

Greg Hands Portrait Greg Hands
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for Bradford South for her interesting and wide-ranging speech. I wholly agree with her strong comments on human rights and the UK being a leader in that space and the wide range of fields referred to in the amendment. In fact, I think all Conservative Members wholly endorse that.

However, I assure the hon. Lady that the amendment is unnecessary. The UK has always sought to comply with international law, and we will continue to uphold our strong commitments to human rights and labour and environmental standards around the world, as well as to the sustainable development goals, gender rights, disability rights, endangered species, fighting climate change and so on. The process of exiting the EU will not alter that position, and we will still be bound by our commitments under international law. Both the Secretary of State and I stated in the Chamber on Second Reading that our aim in undertaking the transition programme is to seek continuity in the effects of existing trade agreements. This is not an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of those agreements, which have already been scrutinised by Parliament.

The hon. Lady referenced least developed countries. I remind her that, despite her warm words, she voted against the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill on Second Reading, which is currently being considered in another Committee and which enshrines a system of trade preferences for developing countries as we leave the EU, to make sure that those powers are in place for the UK to offer unilateral trade preferences. Unfortunately, if her vote on that Bill had been the majority view in the House earlier this month, the UK would not have a system of trade preferences for developing-world countries as we exit the EU.

The amendment is unnecessary, particularly in relation to our compliance with international law.

Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)

Mark Prisk Excerpts
Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 30th January 2018

(6 years, 1 month ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 January 2018 - (30 Jan 2018)
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
- Hansard - -

I will not detain the Committee for long, but it is important when we establish a new authority to step back. Some of these issues will be raised in debates on amendments, so I will not get too far into the detail.

I strongly support the creation of the Trade Remedies Authority. As our trade policy is slowly developed in the months and years to come, we will need it to be underpinned by a robust remedies regime. Certain characteristics of the authority are very important, and it would aid the interpretation of the Bill in due course if the Government’s aims and intentions were set out on the record.

For an authority to be effective, it needs certain characteristics. First, it needs to be objective and evidence-based. I think that most Members would agree with that in general, but it becomes far more difficult when there is an acute case that is difficult in our constituencies or is of a totemic nature nationally. We need to be clear when we establish the authority that it should be objective and evidence-based in its deliberations and when advising Ministers.

Secondly, the organisation needs to have a broad base. It needs to be open and accessible. All stakeholders must feel that they are able to engage with the authority, and that they are listened to by its whole structure. We have heard examples of authorities in other countries. I simply say that I want to ensure that the consultation process includes not just the business world, but the workers whose jobs may well be threatened and consumers, whom we heard mentioned in evidence. I hope that the Minister can confirm that it will. Many of these issues require a balance between those two sides, and we need to ensure that we have such a balance. It is also important that the authority listens and is seen to listen. The characteristics I have touched on—objectivity, broadness and inclusivity—are important if the authority is to be recognised both here in the United Kingdom and by our trading partners abroad.

The third characteristic is efficiency—or timeliness, as some lawyers describe it. I always find it entertaining when lawyers describe timeliness. Efficiency is of course in tension with the idea of a broad consultation, but we are all aware that there will be cases where prompt action is required, so it is necessary to have good processes in place. Although those will clearly come later, it is important that we put that on the record at this stage, and we would benefit from hearing from the Minister about that.

The most important characteristic, however, is independence. We have heard on Second Reading and in Committee that we all want the authority to be independent and that, naturally, it should be at arm’s length from the Government—the current Administration and future Administrations—for many years to come. That is right, but if it is to be effective, the authority also needs to be able to withstand the media and political pressures that will arise when individual cases come forward. We must ensure that the structure that the Bill builds is robust enough to withstand those pressures. That is why the authority’s non-executive members must be appointed on the basis not of sectional interest but of merit.

We will debate in due course whether the non-executive members should include people from Wales or Scotland, or trade unionists. There are merits to ensuring that the authority listens to all such interests, but I worry that if non-executive members are appointed because they represent one sectional interest or another, the authority’s ability to give independent, objective advice to the Government will be limited. We will come on to the details of that when we debate amendments, but that is an important broad principle.

I strongly believe that if we are to have a remedies authority and an effective set of remedies rules, we need to ensure that those principles are clearly set out not just in legislation but by Ministers and those who are appointed to the authority, so that people both here and abroad can see that that is the intention. I think that would also answer some of the concerns about whether the authority will listen to workers through the trade union movement, by ensuring that consultation is broad and that the authority is clearly outward facing.

It comes back down to this last point: if we want others to follow the rules in trade, so that we have a free and fair system, we have to be seen to abide by those rules ourselves. There will come a moment when this authority reports to a Minister, when there will be a totemic business that is right on the cusp because of a particular practice, or there will be job losses that sharply affect a community that has already lost many jobs. At that moment, the test of the authority is whether it is objective. Is it giving its advice to Ministers on the basis of evidence? Is it genuinely independent and therefore able to be trusted by people here and abroad? Those are important principles and I welcome the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---
Bill Esterson Portrait Bill Esterson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am glad that the Minister has confirmed that we voted to support the creation of a Trade Remedies Authority and that he voted against it. I think that was very clear in that lengthy intervention.

As the explanatory statements make clear, amendments 21, 22 and 23 would have the effect of giving Parliament the power of consent over the appointment of a chair to the Trade Remedies Authority set up by the Bill. They would establish a procedure for the appointment of non-executive members to the authority, and ensure that the TRA includes representatives of key stakeholder bodies among its non-executive membership—all things that the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford requested.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
- Hansard - -

I actually said that the non-executive members need not to be beholden to a sectional interest and they need to be able to make a corporate decision. My worry is that amendment 23 does precisely the former. There are some 5.3 million people in the west midlands and some 5.6 million in Scotland. Presumably, according to the logic with which the hon. Gentleman has drafted the amendment, we should also have somebody from the west midlands. I am sure that people from Yorkshire would then like to have someone from Yorkshire. My concern is that ultimately we will end up with one person representing not the broad picture, but a sectional interest. I am very happy to have people who have links and connections to those areas, but to appoint them on the basis of where they come from or to represent one sectional interest would be wrong. Merit should win.

Bill Esterson Portrait Bill Esterson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Perhaps the appointment of the non-executives can cover all those areas.

Trade remedies and the Trade Remedies Authority are a key element of our trade policy. Gareth Stace of UK Steel told us in one evidence session that

“If we get this very wrong, we become the dumping ground—not just in Europe, but for the rest of the world.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 66, Q127.]

It is therefore essential that we get it right, and the Bill is our opportunity to do that. The Government have spent the past few days in Committee trying to convince us that the Bill is a technical little Bill that is not trying to do much other than put in place necessary frameworks. On the Trade Remedies Authority in particular, they have gone to great pains to stress that they are simply setting up the necessary structures to carry out our trade defence once we have left the European Union. This much is true: the Trade Bill does set up the Trade Remedies Authority, which will be a key component of our trade policy once we leave the European Union, when we have to carry out our own trade remedies.

--- Later in debate ---
Going back to my earlier point, ensuring that the decisions are made in the devolved nations would be recognition of the distinct nature of the nations of the UK and the differences in the way they do business with each other, with Europe and with the rest of the world. We all know that the Scotland Act 1998 was very careful to state that everything that is not expressly reserved is devolved. It is really important that we take that on board.
Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Prisk
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On a point of order, Mr Davies. I have been listening to the hon. Member for Sefton Central and the hon. Member for Livingston, and it is clear that these are broad subjects. Will you confirm that it is not your intention to have an additional debate on schedule 4, and that given the scope of what is being discussed—not just the amendments but wider issues—this is in effect a stand part debate on schedule 4?

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

That decision is at my discretion. It may actually end up being at the discretion of one of my fellow Chairs, and I do not want to commit them to anything, but I certainly hear what the hon. Gentleman says.

Trade Bill (Eighth sitting)

Mark Prisk Excerpts
Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 1st February 2018

(6 years, 1 month ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 February 2018 - (1 Feb 2018)
Faisal Rashid Portrait Faisal Rashid
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Absolutely. That is a crucial point, which I hope Government Members will take into account.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
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Is it not actually the case that good law is not made on the rush? The very nature of the new clause that we are debating is on the rush, and that is why we should reject it.

Faisal Rashid Portrait Faisal Rashid
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will give the Minister time to respond on that.

Trade Bill

Mark Prisk Excerpts
3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th July 2018

(5 years, 8 months ago)

Commons Chamber
Read Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 17 July 2018 - (17 Jul 2018)
Caroline Lucas Portrait Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed, I do rise to speak to new clause 3, which is in my name and signed by more than 50 Members of the House from four different parties, and I give notice that I would like to move it when it comes to the votes.

This amendment essentially seeks to remedy the Bill’s failure to provide for a proper role for parliamentarians in the scrutiny and approval of trade agreements. At present, trade agreements can be negotiated, or renegotiated as is likely to be the case with many of the existing EU trade deals covered by this Bill, entirely under royal prerogative powers, essentially giving the Government free rein to decide when and with whom to start negotiations, to set their own priorities and objectives, to conduct the negotiations in great secrecy, and to conclude the deal without any meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. That not only sidelines Members of this House, but it prevents valuable input by civil society organisations and the wider public. This Bill is supposed to help implement an independent trade policy following withdrawal from the EU, but it does nothing to put in place the kind of scrutiny and approval framework that should be required for an accountable trade policy in a modern democratic country. And this is the only legislative opportunity we are likely to have to put such a framework in place.

In his statement yesterday, the Secretary of State for International Trade once again sought to make a distinction between replacements for existing EU trade deals and future trade deals, but the fact is that effective parliamentary scrutiny and approval is needed for both, for it is increasingly clear that, contrary to the hope of Ministers, it is not going to be a simple case of transitioning, or “rolling over,” existing EU trade deals. Some or all of the countries in question are not simply going to be content to continue with the existing arrangements, and Ministers will have little choice but to negotiate a replacement deal. So while yesterday’s statement by the Secretary of State must be welcomed for its clear, if somewhat overdue, recognition of the current democratic deficit in the making of trade deals and the need to correct that if we are to have a modern, transparent and accountable trade policy, it needs to be applied much more fully and more extensively.

Unfortunately, the package of proposals set out yesterday falls well short of what is required, both because it does not apply to the existing EU trade deals covered by this Bill and because it does not go far enough. For example, it is welcome that the Secretary of State proposes a process for Ministers to set out their ambitions before embarking on a new set of negotiations, including scoping assessments, and the commitment to publish impact assessments is also a step forward, but the reality is that recent impact assessments by the Government on trade have focused purely on the impact for exporters, without taking into account at all the wider economic impacts, let alone social, environmental, gender and regional impacts and the effects on workers’ rights. So we need to see a much stronger commitment to transparency.

Most significantly of all, the Secretary of State’s proposals fail to give Parliament meaningful oversight of new trade deals. For that to happen, Members of this House need a guaranteed vote on the deal that emerges from the negotiations. Without that, all the other measures proposed by the Secretary of State yesterday risk being little more than window-dressing.

The Secretary of State contends that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 is all that is needed. However, that process is an utterly inadequate rubber stamp: it gives Parliament a right to say whether a new trade deal should or should not be ratified, but does not enable Parliament to propose modifications. Moreover, as we know to our detriment time and again, Ministers can and do simply overrule Parliament and ratify the trade deal despite Parliament’s objections. In contrast, Members of both the European Parliament and the US Congress get an automatic vote. If this issue is about taking back control, why do we not take back some control in this Chamber and make sure we get the same kind of vote that other legislatures with whom we will be negotiating do?

Trade deals are not simply commercial negotiations; they are public policy negotiations and should be treated as such. Transparency, scrutiny and parliamentary approval should be embraced, not treated as a risk.

Mark Prisk Portrait Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady’s new clause says the impact assessment should include

“both qualitative and quantitative assessments”.

Can she give an example?