Armed Forces Readiness and Defence Equipment Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMark Francois
Main Page: Mark Francois (Conservative - Rayleigh and Wickford)Department Debates - View all Mark Francois's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the First Report of the Defence Committee, Ready for War?, HC 26, the Eighth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, Improving Defence Inventory Management, HC 66, and the Nineteenth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, MoD Equipment Plan 2023-33, HC 451.
It is a pleasure to open this debate. There is only one way to start it, and it is how we should start every single debate on defence: with a clear-eyed appreciation of the threat to our country, our allies and our interests. Russia, which the integrated review identified and its refresh reaffirmed as our greatest adversary, has mobilised a war economy, spending nearly 40% of its budget on defence and security. Such is Russia’s rush to rearm that, notwithstanding all international sanctions, the International Monetary Fund has upgraded its economic forecast for the country from 1.1% to 2.6%, which makes it the fastest-growing economy in Europe.
Not only has Russia, through its renewed and devastating attack on Ukraine, shown its willingness to disregard every aspect of decency and international law, but its war machine is feeding an imbalance in munitions in Ukraine which we in the west are shamefully not doing enough to counter. The reality of war is that, ultimately, production lines tell. Notwithstanding the £2.5 billion that the UK is spending on military support this year, we need collectively to be doing more, not just in supporting Ukraine but in transforming our own supply lines. We need to enhance our own readiness to help deter Russia from a wider conflagration.
While the threat from Russia is grave, it is not the only threat we face. In east Asia, from which the Defence Committee has just returned, China has doubled its official spending on defence to $232 billion a year, although the real figure is much, much higher. North Korea is nuclear-armed, dangerous, unpredictable, and in closer alignment than for many years with Moscow. Iran and its proxies are destabilising the middle east, and, via the Houthis, pose a constant threat to shipping through the Red sea. In that regard, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are actively engaged as we speak.
Following our withdrawal from Afghanistan, the willingness of the west to face up to these challenges is being studied by the global south—countries that are vulnerable to destabilisation and worse on the part of our adversaries. Any sense of the west’s being distracted, or unwilling or unable to rise to the challenge, risks encouraging the increasing number of autocratic states to act in contravention of international law. The sabre-rattling in Venezuela over resource-rich provinces of Guyana, a Commonwealth country, is just one recent example.
Has the risk picture changed for the worse in the last few years? Clearly it has. Have we fully risen to that challenge? We have not. Those of us who are old enough to recall the joy of the Berlin wall coming down will also recall that we had, in that decade, been investing more than 5% of GDP in defence—well over twice our current commitment. In 1989, there was a justifiable rationale for reductions in defence spending, but what goes down to match a decreasing threat must assuredly go back up to meet an increasing threat, and that is where we stand today.
In the Defence Committee report, we are robust not only about the professionalism of the armed forces, but about their ability to rise to any challenge. However, they are being run hot continuously, and that has a direct impact on their ability to train for, recruit and retain for, and be equipped to face the toughest challenge imaginable: a full-scale prolonged conflict, alongside our allies, with a peer adversary. That is just one of many challenges that our armed forces are designed to meet, but it is the most significant—the challenge above all others that we seek to deter.
I welcome the extensive engagement of our armed forces in this year’s NATO exercise, Steadfast Defender, but the days when that could be a routine exercise conducted by forces dedicated solely to the preparedness to face the Russian threat are long gone. Our forces’ sheer range of commitments, from global engagements to domestic MACAs—military aid to civil authorities—maintain constant pressure. The impacts are simple: recruitment and retention that is not up to the task; a hollowing out of munition stockpiles and our means to replenish them; and an inability to prepare and train for the worst-case scenario at the intensity required to bolster our allies, and with the confidence to deter adversaries. Our report highlights the urgent need for change.
To enable us to be fully prepared for peer-on- peer warfighting, something must give, be it the scale of operations and engagements or the size of national investment in defence. There is no doubt in my mind about the course that needs to be taken. The global operations conducted by our armed forces have a critical supporting role in our efforts to deter and prevent expansionism by our adversaries. What the UK needs is not a diminution of our ambition, but an increase in our investment.
In saying that, I am acutely aware of the regular charge that additional UK investment in defence is wasteful if the Ministry of Defence does not get its house in order on procurement. The Public Accounts Committee has set out in its report the difficulties faced by the MOD in meeting its equipment plan objectives. Reports over the years, not least from the Defence Sub-Committee under my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), have highlighted where the MOD needs to do better on procurement. I have no doubt that we will hear from my right hon. Friend and others about some of the core weaknesses that these reports have revealed.
The answer to my right hon. Friend’s question is yes. Could he explain to the House that one of the things that the Committee thought about very carefully was how candid we should be about the weaknesses in our armed forces? After much careful deliberation, we did not include anything in our “Ready for War?” report that we had reason to believe our potential adversaries did not already know.
May I begin by saying to the Minister for Defence Procurement, for whom I have great regard and who is trying to reform our broken procurement system, that everything I say in the next few minutes is not personally aimed at him? To quote “The Godfather”:
“It’s not personal…It’s strictly business.”
At his speech at Lancaster House on 15 January, the new Defence Secretary now famously said that we are moving
“from a post-war to a pre-war world”.
His words clearly resonated, both nationally and internationally. For example, when I was on a visit to Washington recently, those words were played back to us by Pentagon officials. Shortly after, in an unclassified letter to all Conservative MPs, the Defence Secretary stressed the need for industrial improvements and to rearm, in terms reminiscent of the 1930s.
However, let us consider what that actually means. The head of the MOD, a senior Cabinet Minister, has said, in effect, that we are now likely to go to war. Although he did not specifically state who with—be it Russia, China, Iran or someone else—that one statement, which I fear may turn out to be true if we do not rapidly improve our conventional deterrence, has incredibly serious implications for our entire defence and security posture. The much-vaunted integrated review has now been completely overtaken by events. In a world with increasing Iranian-inspired violence in the middle east, sulphurous threats over Taiwan emanating from Beijing and now the state-sponsored murder of Alexei Navalny, even the most naive liberals surely have to concede that the Defence Secretary might just be right. The integrated review, and its 2023 refresh, are completely lacking in any great sense of urgency in response.
Similarly, the MOD defence Command Paper, which was meant to dovetail into the integrated review, also lacked a sense of urgency, even to the point of retiring a number of key frontline systems, such as radar planes and tactical transport aircraft, in favour of new equipment, arriving much later in this decade. Many analysts expected that to change post Ukraine, but no major equipment decisions were altered, despite Putin’s barbaric invasion in February 2023—something that some members of the Defence Committee effectively predicted in a debate in this House some six weeks before the invasion began.
The right hon. Gentleman is in the unique position of being a member of both the Public Accounts Committee and the Defence Committee. Does he share my view that it is a bit like groundhog day when hear the words “defence” and “review” in whichever order? I do not know how many such reviews we have had in the last few years, yet we never see the step change necessary to ensure we will deliver the capability our country needs.
The Chair of the PAC is entirely right, although in the MOD context, if it is groundhog day, “groundhog” sounds like a vehicle that has slipped to the right.
More recently, after a detailed inquiry, the Defence Committee, on which I serve, published a damning report on 4 February 2024, entitled simply “Ready for War?”. I have served on the Committee since 2017 and this is one of the punchiest reports we have ever produced. In answer to the question in the title, the all-party Committee, which includes six former MOD Ministers, concluded:
“Despite the United Kingdom spending approximately £50 billion a year on defence (plus more for Ukraine) the UK’s Armed Forces require sustained ongoing investment to be able to fight a sustained, high-intensity war, alongside our allies, against a peer adversary. ”
In plainer English, and as the subsequent detail in the report starkly points out, despite a considerable outlay of taxpayer’s cash, we could not fight a sustained war with Putin’s Russia for more than a couple of months before we ran out of ammunition and fighting equipment, not least as we have very few tanks, ships or combat aircraft in reserve. The full report can be found online.
Given that it takes years to build a modern warship—a totally ridiculous 11 years in the case of the new Type 26 frigate—and four years to build a Typhoon fighter, if we had to fight what the strategists sometimes describe as a “come as you are war”, one with little further warning, we would have to rely on whatever equipment we had to hand or could rapidly remobilise. We simply do not have enough war-winning kit to win as it is. As the Public Accounts Committee’s report on the 10-year equipment plan illustrates starkly, the difference between what the MOD aspires to buy and the funding it is likely to have available is £17 billion. However, it is worse because the three services account for the plan on a different basis. Without going into all the technicalities, an apples and apples comparison across the three services shows that the gap is £29 billion. Even beyond gaps in capability of our kit, our greatest weakness is now the lack of skilled personnel to operate and maintain the equipment that we do have. Without them—and far too many of them are leaving, as the Chair of the Defence Committee said—even multi-billion dollar aircraft systems simply remain in the hangar.
One perfect example of how dysfunctional the MOD has now become in relation to people is the saga of Capita—or, forgive me, “Crapita”, as it is now affectionally known to the Defence Committee. It has totally messed up the recruitment system for the British Army. A few years ago, its share price topped £4; today, it is barely 13 pence. Everyone in Defence knows that the outsourced contract has been a disaster, yet absolutely no one in the upper echelons of the Department has the moral courage to sack the company. The Defence Secretary recently described the situation in The Times as “ludicrous”. He is absolutely right. Indeed, no doubt he has made a note of his own comments on his own famous spreadsheet, but still nothing actually happens. Capita limps on as the Army bleeds out—with, in some parts of the Army, three soldiers now leaving for every one that Capita somehow, painfully, manages to recruit. If we think we are going to deter the likes of Vladimir Putin in this manner, we are living on a different planet, in a parallel universe, in a fantasy dimension.
Given that we now spend the thick end of £50 billion a year on defence, the British taxpaying public are quite entitled to ask why so little of our defence capability works properly. Why are some of the Army’s fighting vehicles 60 years old? Why do we have hardly any battle tanks that actually work? Why do we have hardly any submarines that are now regularly put to sea? Why do we have aircraft carriers that perennially break down whenever they try to leave port? Bluntly, it is because we now have a Ministry of Defence that has become in recent years a gigantic, sclerotic bureaucracy; constantly hidebound by needless, self-generated red tape; obsessed with process rather than outcomes; in which some senior civil servants are now more interested in wokery than weaponry, endlessly ripped off by some of their own major contractors, such as Boeing, to name but one; and in which key elements of our fighting equipment are so old—and the procurement system for replacing them so broken—that we now cannot fight a major war with Russia for more than a few weeks, as it well knows.
Moreover, as the Red Book clearly shows in tables 2.1 and 2.2, we are cutting the core UK defence budget next year by £2.5 billion and playing “smoke and mirrors” with the donations to Ukraine and with addressing an overspend on the nuclear enterprise from the Treasury reserve in order to pretend otherwise. This act of what the Russians call “maskirovka”, or strategic deception, is wholly unworthy of a Conservative Government. If Members happen to believe, as I do, that the role of our armed forces is determinedly to save lives by convincing any potential aggressor that, were they to attack us, we would defeat them, then we are palpably failing.
This is not an intellectual parlour game. Ultimately, this is about whether our grandchildren are going to grow up in someone else’s re-education camp, but we might not know that if we walked into the current MOD. We can try to blame the military, for instance, for so frequently over-specifying new military equipment, such as Ajax, that it enters service many years late, but in the end the responsibility lies with the politicians who, theoretically at least, are supposed to be in charge.
The Romans had a famous saying about military matters: “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—he who desires peace save-line3should prepare for war. Given that the Secretary of State, the man who runs the Department, has told us that we are in a pre-war world, surely we had better start preparing for it, if we are to have any chance whatsoever of preventing it, and we should now do that in earnest, before it is too late.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. I know that he is coming towards the end of his speech. Would he care to remark on a couple of slightly more optimistic features of deterrence, because deterrence of conventional forces depends on far more than an equal balance of equipment, even though, as he says, we are nowhere near achieving that? It also depends on our allies and others who will fight in the same cause. Does he not accept that it is not just enough to take our defence spending up to 3% or more, such as the 5% we regularly spent through the cold war, but essential to ensure that our American allies remain totally involved in the deterrence process and that the Ukrainians succeed in fending off Russia, because if they succeed we can contain Russia in the future, as we successfully did in the past?
I agree with every word my right hon. Friend, the former eminent Chairman of the Defence Committee, just said. My one caveat is that the MOD’s excuse for these capability gaps is that we can rely on allies to fight with us. But they will be relying on us, and if we are unable to support them or they are on wartime tasks elsewhere, things might go horribly wrong.
I say all of this not just as someone who served proudly as a Territorial Army infantry officer in my local Royal Anglian Regiment during the cold war; not just as someone who is still very proud to carry the late Queen’s commission; not just as a former veterans and then Armed Forces Minister in the Ministry of Defence, albeit almost a decade ago; but most of all, as I said at Prime Minister’s questions last week, as the devoted son of a D-day veteran. Stoker 1st Class Reginal Francois died when I was 40 years of age. He told me one night of the carnage—his word—that he witnessed that day, albeit from offshore, on a minesweeper named HMS Bressay. In the afternoon, they were opposite Omaha beach.
Let me quote Shakespeare’s famous phrase:
“This story shall the good man teach his son.”
My father was a good man. The story that he told me was of a country that eventually, reluctantly, had to go to war against the evil of Nazi tyranny because for years its politicians had been so parsimonious—he actually said “tight”—and so naive that when Nazism emerged, we completely failed to deter it. That is the lesson of the 1930s, but it was also his lesson to me.
My father made me take a solemn vow that, as his son, I would never take living in a free country for granted, because, as he said, too many good men had died to achieve it. Two years after we had that conversation, he was dead. That is why I am here this afternoon. That is why I came into politics in the first place. As a wartime serviceman, my father was a great admirer of Winston Churchill, our greatest ever Prime Minister, who led this country through a war of national survival and then lost a general election for his trouble. When I walked into the Chamber earlier this afternoon, I could still see the damage caused when the Chamber was bombed in 1941. Churchill insisted that it not be repaired, lest we forget, and he was right.
In summary, I may not be my father’s contemporary, that famously courageous MP, Leo Amery, so I cannot claim to “speak for England” on this matter, but I was elected to speak for the people of Rayleigh and Wickford, and so, on their behalf, I issue this stark warning today. The skies are darkening. Brutal dictators with powerful weapons at their disposal are on the rise. The democracies are on the backfoot rather than the front. History tells us time and again, and indeed ad nauseam, that the appeasement of dictators—be they called Adolf Hitler or Vladimir Putin—does not work. We should be increasing the defence budget to at least 3% of GDP—what my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) used to call “at least three to keep us free”—not cutting it, as we now are, and pretending that we are not. The first duty of Government, above all others, is the defence of the realm, and we forget that at our peril. Si vis pacem, para bellum.
The debate encompasses a wide range of issues. My colleague on the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), outlined some of them. I will focus on one aspect: industrial capacity, by which I mean not only the big, well-known manufacturing plants, or the well-known prime companies that we often rightly hear from in the national media, but their extended supply chains and material suppliers, and equally their often under-remarked-on workforce—not just the engineers and craftsmen but the crucial production workers, who are vital for ramping up production and our ability to surge in a crisis. We have experienced difficulties with that in response to the war in Ukraine.
Many in that supply chain also sell to the civilian market, including the public sector. Many of the specialist engineering companies in the midlands supply Formula 1, civil aviation and premium vehicles, as well as defence. They need orders from defence and from public sector bodies to maintain their workload and employment, and to train the workforce of the future. That is why—this will be a theme throughout my contribution—a whole-of-Government approach is necessary. Underlying that is the question of whether we are in a new environment or just an oscillation. Basically, is there a war going on? The people of Ukraine certainly know that. The Baltic nations, Poland, Finland and Sweden know that. It does not mean that war is inevitable, but it certainly means that it is now possible, and failure to respond will actually make it more likely.
One has to question whether the commentariat and the British establishment understand that. The Government need to make clear their view on the state of international relations. Do they regard the invasion of Ukraine by Russia as an interlude—a very bloody one—after which the situation will return to something approximating normal, albeit not the status quo ante, or has there in fact been a tectonic shift, and are we at best back in the cold war, although with a hot war going on in Ukraine and the danger of extension elsewhere along the new iron curtain that is descending over Europe? That is clearly understood not just by the politicians and the defence establishment, but by the publics in Sweden and Finland, with a dramatic shift in opinion, after centuries of neutrality, and their historic decision to join NATO and become very active participants.
Even so, across NATO, there is not that sense of urgency, or a clear realisation of the crisis. Only this week, the boss of the Scandinavian ammunition company Nammo was in the press pointing out that societies were still in peacetime mode. He gave the example of its factory in Norway, which needs additional electricity supply capacity in order to expand. A new site for TikTok has been created nearby, but the factory cannot get enough electricity. He rightly pointed out that the defence of western Europe is slightly more important than cat videos on TikTok. He contrasted that with the Defence Production Act in the United States, which was the Truman-era response to the Korean war, based on the Franklin D. Roosevelt War Powers Act. It gives extensive powers to the US Government, and they are using them. That is why they are responding to the weaknesses in procurement and ramping up production capacity, including through several Government-owned and Government-constructed, company-operated plants. Will the Minister indicate whether our Government are looking at that as a possible mechanism?
Do the Government recognise the fragility of the supply situation? Recent crises such as covid, and the situation in the Red sea and Ukraine, have already shown how vulnerable our supply chains are, and many firms and customers are finding that the so-called cheapest option can end up being very expensive. To be fair, that applies not just to the United Kingdom; all around the world, companies are finding that extended supply lines and single points of failure at home or abroad can have very damaging consequences. The discussion has shifted, and now there is much talk about reshoring, near-shoring and friend-shoring. I am not sure how much of that has penetrated the calcified mindset of our Treasury and the senior civil service, but I hope that the Minister will be able to shed some light on that.
This is not a Eurocentric issue; we must also be aware of the increasing tension in the Gulf, particularly arising from the destabilising impact of Iran and its proxies across the middle east and north Africa, as well as the increasingly aggressive attitude of China, which is why deepening relations through AUKUS and with Japan is so necessary and welcome. I hope that the Minister can report on the success this week at the AUKMIN—Australia-UK ministerial consultations—and AUKUS conferences taking place in Australia. We fully understand why the Secretary of State is there today, rather than responding to this debate.
We have to be clear that these problems did not come out of a clear blue sky. They were shown to us some years ago. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford identified the evidence that we had from an American general. When the Americans conducted an exercise with the British Army about an outbreak of conflict in Europe, we basically ran out of munitions in about 10 days, but nothing was done about it. Even once the conflict started in Ukraine in February 2022, and it soon became clear that artillery would play a major role in it, the Ministry of Defence did not place an order for new shells until July 2023. The Minister cannot complain that I have not given him notice of this issue; I have raised it several times in previous debates, and have never had a satisfactory answer about that delay. We cannot afford that degree of indecision going forward. It is not as though we have not had shell crises before; we had one in 1915, which brought down the Government. I am afraid that there does not seem to be much collective institutional memory in the civil service today.
We are giving £2.5 billion in the next financial year to Ukraine, and it is money well spent, but we cannot spend the same pound twice, so does the right hon. Gentleman agree that if we rightly give that money to Ukraine, we cannot then spend it on Army salaries, British shells or submarine maintenance? In other words, it is for the Ukrainians; it is not part of the UK defence budget, is it?
Well, it is unfortunately scored as being in the UK defence budget, and in the claim that we are keeping up defence expenditure; that masks an actual cut in British domestic defence spending. It is absolutely right that we supply the Ukrainians—I think we should be supplying more—as they are on the frontline and are carrying the fight. We—not just us, but the rest of Europe, the United States and the free world—should be backing them up with matériel. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that trying to slip that into the defence budget, rather than it being part of our national commitment, is the wrong way of handling it.
Even with new production, I am still not clear—perhaps the Minister will clarify this—on what is happening with the increasing capacity for propellants and explosives. Across the western world, very few points—just two or three factories—are capable of making them, and they are stretched to capacity. I understand that difficulty, but I want to know what is being done to create new capacity. I know that the United States is doing it, but what are we doing here and in Europe? In that context, I commend the article from Iain Martin in The Daily Telegraph, in which he says that, whatever our differences with other European countries over the EU and Brexit, we should certainly be working much more closely on maintaining and creating new defence capacity—not just military but industrial as well.
Although I accept that the Government and this House must take the lead, others must follow. If we are, as I have been arguing, in a new defence environment, the City of London and the finance houses must accept their responsibilities. They must make it clear that not only is investment in defence a good investment as it leads part of British manufacturing, but it is their patriotic duty and part of the defence of the free world. However, getting that message across and changing the mindset needs a whole-of-Government approach, not just the involvement of the Ministry of Defence and those of us in the House who are interested in the subject.
As I said to union representatives in the evidence session, the unions have tens of thousands of members in the defence and aerospace sector. They should not stand idly by while mobs try to shut down their workplaces. Only this week, we had demonstrations outside GE Aerospace in Cheltenham, which was, for over a century, the Smiths factory. There have also been protests outside the Leonardo site in Edinburgh, which I presume is the old Ferranti site. I hope that unions are backing not just their members’ employment but the national interest, and will look at whether any funding is going to bodies that are organising to shut those places.
I fully acknowledge the issues facing our uniformed forces, as well as their expertise and commitment. I am pleased that others will highlight their contribution. I regret that the Government have taken their commitment for granted. In any conflict, supply and resupply are crucial. Conflicts are won not just on the battlefield, but—sometimes even more so—in our factories and those of our allies. That is why we need a rethink, a reset and a recovery of lost ground. Will the Government take up that challenge?
I begin by joining the Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Horsham (Sir Jeremy Quin), in thanking the men and women of our armed forces—we should never forget their dedication. It is often said that the first duty of government is to keep the nation safe and protect its citizens, but we have a Conservative party that has admitted that it has “hollowed out” defence. We have had a return to war in Europe and growing threats around the world, as has been explained, and we now need a clear-eyed vision of what we need to do in defence. It is about deterrence—there has been a lot of talk about warfighting, but the success of defence is in deterring action from happening.
We need to recognise how we have got to where we are today. I hear all the calls from Conservative Members for increases in defence expenditure. I do not question those individuals’ commitment or dedication, because I know that many of them are very committed individuals who believe in defence, as I do. However, I find it a little ironic that between 2010 and 2016, the defence budget in this country was cut by 18%. Even with the increase, the defence budget is still 7% lower than it was in 2010, and the Budget on 6 March included a cut in the defence budget. I hear all the stirring cries for increasing the defence budget, but we did not get into this situation by accident.
In 2010, we had a Conservative-led coalition Government who tried to scare the public by saying that they inherited a £36 billion black hole in the defence budget. That was absolute nonsense. The figure came from a 2009 NAO report on the equipment budget that said that there was a £6 billion black hole in that budget, and that if we had flat cash for the next 10 years, the figure would be £30 billion. The spin doctors added another £6 billion to that figure, and it became the myth that was reiterated.
That myth masked what the Government were really up to, which was slashing the defence budget over that period, and we are still seeing the consequences of those decisions. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), whom I respect, talked about a 1930s moment. I agree that we are in a 1930s moment—the similarities are there. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Conservative Government cut defence expenditure, including Winston Churchill, who admitted it in later life.
I hope this does not come across as nit-picking—it is important. The 10-year rule, which was a rolling 10 years, was not just a Treasury policy: it was the policy of the entire Government, and it was not rescinded by the incoming Labour Government in the 1920s. It was the policy of the whole Government, and it was only rescinded in the mid-1930s, a few years after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. It is important to get that right.
The right hon. Gentleman has got that on the record. I am not going to get into a history lesson about the 10-year rule—I think the history books tell the story—but we have seen what happened from 2010 onwards.
We have had a cut of 40,000 personnel in our armed forces, and it is not just about numbers; it is about experience. Individuals were made compulsorily redundant. If I had made people compulsorily redundant when I was a Defence Minister, The Sun and the right-wing press in this country would have been shouting from the rooftops, but they did absolutely nothing, and we lost experience. One in five of our ships was removed, as were more than 200 aircraft, and the satisfaction rating among our armed forces personnel is now below 50%. We have had a system over the past few years that has wasted money, as we have chronicled in our report, and we actually now have the £30 billion black hole in our equipment budget that was predicted in 2009, as the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), has referred to.
This is not about whether the defence budget is 2%, 3% or 5%. It is about looking at how we have got into this situation, and how we change it—how we face the challenges that confront us today. Whichever party is in government after the next election will have to face those challenges, but we have to get away from British exceptionalism. We have great ambitions to be a global power, like some kind of imperial power. I am sorry, but we are not. We can continue that myth ad infinitum, but unless we link the resource to the ambition, it is not going to work.
For the past few years, we have had the nonsense slogan of “global Britain”—some pre-imperialist view of what we are doing around the world. I am sorry, but it is absolute nonsense. We have to look at what we can do to protect our own defence. The idea that we are going to be a major player in anything that happens in the south-east of the South China sea—that having two offshore patrol vessels based in Singapore is going to deter the Chinese—is nonsense. If anything happens there, frankly, any commitment that we could give is like a gnat on the backside of an elephant compared with what the Americans would be able to do. We have to be realistic about that.
What do we need to do? We need to look at what we must deliver as part of our NATO commitments. We also need to get away from the myth—and it is a myth, in our Army in particular—that we will deliver a force of divisional strength under any NATO commitment. We cannot do it now, we have not been able to do it for quite a few years, and we just need to be realistic about that. We need to sit down with NATO and look at what we can contribute to European defence. Clearly, the nuclear deterrent is a key part of that. However, do we, for example, need a full spectrum Army? No, we do not. We need to plug into our NATO allies, and ask what we can deliver well as part of the overall defence against the threat coming not only from Russia in Europe, but increasingly from China in the north Atlantic as we get global warming and the opening of sea lanes.
There is an idea that we will be sending aircraft carriers around the world. No, we will not. We need to commit them to NATO, and that means some very tough decisions. It also means that we need a mindset change. We have to be honest with the public about this, and say that we will not be able to do everything. There are then some hard decisions to be taken about the armed forces. For example, we should say to the Army, “We’re not going to be doing that, but we are going to do this very well. We will dovetail that into NATO commitments, and actually make a real difference.” There are big decisions that will have to be taken by any Government, whoever gets in after the next election.
Please let us get away from the myth—and it is a myth—that we will be going around the world and intervening in every single conflict. For example, look at the air strikes on the Houthis in the last few weeks. We have contributed four aircraft because we want to be seen to be alongside the Americans, but I would ask: what is the strategy for doing that? There is no strategy. Okay, we have bombed the Houthis, but is that going to resolve the situation? No, it is not. Does it show that Britain is a global power? No, it does not. Frankly, we do not have the resources, unless someone will say that the defence budget is going to be 3%, 4%, 5%, 6% or 7%, but no Government are going to commit to that.
I say to Conservative Members and the commentariat in our right-wing press that they should just be honest with the British people about what we can do. We can and do have a valuable role to play in NATO and we have willing partners that want to work with us. I am certainly very excited about Sweden and Finland joining, although we need to make sure that we actually get those commitments. As I say, some hard decisions have to be taken and there are some home truths for our armed forces. As the Chair of the PAC said, there are capabilities that we will just have to get out of. We will have to say, “We’re not going to do that, but we’re going to do this and we’re going to do it well, and we are going to contribute,” and that will maximise our influence.
On China, people ask: do we just forget about the South China sea? No, we do not. We use our strong diplomacy, and our great and fantastic abilities with technology and other things in those areas, but it is not about deploying people or equipment out there. Frankly, the sooner we get the reality of such a wake-up call, the better. I will always call, and I have always called, for increased defence expenditure, but I will not do so if it is just to try to plug a vision that will never ever be achieved. We need to make sure that we spend that money well.
That leads on to the point about skills raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warley (John Spellar). We need to see any defence expenditure as potential growth in our economy. However, we are not doing that if we are giving contracts to the United States, or to Spain for fleet solid support ships, and not thinking about growing our defence industries here. I accept that there has to be international collaboration, but we must have give and take. The idea that the French would ever give an FSS ship contract to a Spanish shipyard, frankly, is just—
I defer to those on the Front Bench on what transparency is appropriate, but I recognise the point made in the hon. Lady’s Committee’s report and I think in the Defence Committee report about the difficulty of getting the information that the Committees need to do their work. I recognise that nuclear is identified as a separate line in the budget and is protected in theory, but I am concerned about what might be a marginal increase in this enormous budget. It is around a quarter of our total defence spending. If that increases even marginally and the shortfall has to be made up from our conventional defence budget, that entails a significant reduction in that conventional spending, which is so important at the present time.
According to the MOD’s own figures in the latest supplementary estimates, the amount we are spending on what it calls the defence nuclear enterprise is now gusting towards 20%. Everything my hon. Friend says about the risk of that gradually eating everything else is entirely correct.
I thank my right hon. Friend for that. If we managed to get the genuine increase in defence spending that is needed, the question then arises of how to spend that and where the money should go. I say this not just on behalf of the 20,000 or so defence personnel in Wiltshire, but because it is the right thing to do: we need to put people first. I recognise that there has been a significant step change in the doctrine of defence policy in recent years towards the recognition that an army is fundamentally about its people, and I respect that. The fact is, probably because of the many decades of disinvestment, that we have problems of low morale, low pay, often poor housing and a shoestring training budget, all of which contribute to the recruitment crisis we have in the armed forces that my right hon. Friend mentioned.
The PAC report makes clear that we are losing people faster than we can recruit them, and that is entirely unacceptable. We have to improve recruitment. The Public Accounts Committee heard that for every five people recruited to the armed services, eight are leaving. That is a national security crisis. It is not just a problem for recruitment, but a profound security risk.
I recognise the point that the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier) made that we have had too many reviews, so I hesitate to use the word—if I could think of another word, I would use it—but we need a quick total review of the people issue in our armed forces. It could be done quickly and all it probably entails is an amalgamation of all the work done by others, but I would like to see that with a great degree of urgency. It should look at recruitment, terms and conditions, families—crucially—and onward progression in all three services, so that we can with the urgency required turn around the recruitment crisis.
Having made the general point about the importance of investment in people, I come quickly to the major services of the armed forces, and first is the Navy. It is important that we invest in all five domains, including in the grey zone and sub-threshold activity, which are so important. Our principal specialism in the United Kingdom historically and now remains our sea power. It is a good thing we are moving towards a maritime strategy. I recognise that is the Government’s priority, and I say that as a representative of a land-locked county with all these soldiers in it. Nevertheless, we need significant investment in the Navy. We would all like to see these things, but let us actually do it and have more submarines, more escorts and more minesweepers. We need seabed warfare vessels. On that point, I call the House’s attention to a report from Policy Exchange a month or so ago talking about western approaches and the significant threat we face in these islands and across Europe to undersea infrastructure. It is fundamentally our responsibility on behalf of Europe to protect that.
I have mentioned the new model army and the New Bletchley report, and I would like to see a real commitment to a reformed and modernised Army. We have to recognise the point made by the former Chief of the Defence Staff Nick Carter when he said that the Army is the weakest of the three services. That is a sad state of affairs. I suppose one has to be the weakest; I am sorry it is the Army. There are big questions over our ability to field a division in Europe, as promised to NATO. According to a senior US officer, the UK cannot even be called a tier 1 power. I understand that the Committees were told by a former commander of joint forces command that our Army will not be ready to fulfil its NATO commitments until the early 1930s. Indeed, that was the assumption of the integrated review, so in a we are sense back to the 10-year rule, which is not how things should be. [Interruption.] Did I say 1930s?
On that surreal note, let me quote Rudyard Kipling:
“We don’t want to fight, but by jingo if we do,
We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money too!”
There is plenty of jingo, but the ships, the men and the money are more difficult to find. I genuinely hope that some of the fantasy talk in this debate is widely seen by the general public. It was a Gilbert and Sullivan performance as Members first conceded that our weaknesses are such that we had to conceal the extent of them in the report—that is what the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) said in an intervention.
No, I will not. I am mindful of Madam Deputy Speaker’s injunction that she is fast running out of time, and I do not intend to take my whole 13 minutes. The right hon. Member should not worry—I will make sure that people see his performance. He said that we need to conceal the extent of our weakness, then he adumbrated our weakness. If that was not our total weakness—if there are weaknesses that he concealed from that list—I ask myself, why on earth are these people pirouetting in this Parliament about which enemy they are going fight, and in which theatre of war?
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will keep this brief. For the record, the gentleman has traduced me. He has said directly the opposite of what I actually said, as Hansard will show.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that point of order, which he has used to make his point. Let us return to George Galloway.
I am happy to engage with the Committee, as I did during the week on artificial intelligence. There will always be a balance to be struck between what we can share and where we have to recognise the sensitivity of defence.
From the High North to the Mediterranean, we are deploying 20,000 service personnel from our Navy, Army and Air Force on the NATO exercise Steadfast Defender, which is one of the alliance’s largest ever training exercises. It is a valuable opportunity to strengthen interoperability between us and our allies.
I am happy to report that, as the right hon. Members for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) and for Warley (John Spellar) said, overnight we have had confirmation that a new defence and security co-operation agreement has been signed with Australia, which will make it easier for our armed forces to operate together in each other’s country. It will also help facilitate UK submarine crews to visit Australia as part of AUKUS.
A large number of points have been made in this debate, and I will try to take as many as I can. The Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Horsham (Sir Jeremy Quin), and several others, particularly the right hon. Member for Warley, talked about the importance of industrial resilience, and I totally agree.
The right hon. Member for Warley made an important point about finance. We must not forget the private sector’s role in investing in defence. We have seen commentary on environmental, social and governance, on which he wants to see cross-Government work. I am pleased to confirm that, with my Treasury colleagues, we held a meeting at Rothschild’s in the City to see what more we can do, and I am confident that we will be saying more on this important point about how we make the case for investing in defence as a way of investing in peace.
On ESG, there have been many references to the second world way today. Is it worth reminding the House and the country that, if we had not had a defence industry building Spitfires and Hurricanes in 1940, this debate would not be taking place? In fact, this place would no longer exist.
My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point. It shows why I want to see us supporting our sovereign capability, because where the Spitfire was there in the 1930s, we hope that the global combat air programme will be there in the 2030s.