Armed Forces Readiness and Defence Equipment

Jeremy Quin Excerpts

Thursday 21st March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Quin (Horsham) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the First Report of the Defence Committee, Ready for War?, HC 26, the Eighth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, Improving Defence Inventory Management, HC 66, and the Nineteenth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, MoD Equipment Plan 2023-33, HC 451.

It is a pleasure to open this debate. There is only one way to start it, and it is how we should start every single debate on defence: with a clear-eyed appreciation of the threat to our country, our allies and our interests. Russia, which the integrated review identified and its refresh reaffirmed as our greatest adversary, has mobilised a war economy, spending nearly 40% of its budget on defence and security. Such is Russia’s rush to rearm that, notwithstanding all international sanctions, the International Monetary Fund has upgraded its economic forecast for the country from 1.1% to 2.6%, which makes it the fastest-growing economy in Europe.

Not only has Russia, through its renewed and devastating attack on Ukraine, shown its willingness to disregard every aspect of decency and international law, but its war machine is feeding an imbalance in munitions in Ukraine which we in the west are shamefully not doing enough to counter. The reality of war is that, ultimately, production lines tell. Notwithstanding the £2.5 billion that the UK is spending on military support this year, we need collectively to be doing more, not just in supporting Ukraine but in transforming our own supply lines. We need to enhance our own readiness to help deter Russia from a wider conflagration.

While the threat from Russia is grave, it is not the only threat we face. In east Asia, from which the Defence Committee has just returned, China has doubled its official spending on defence to $232 billion a year, although the real figure is much, much higher. North Korea is nuclear-armed, dangerous, unpredictable, and in closer alignment than for many years with Moscow. Iran and its proxies are destabilising the middle east, and, via the Houthis, pose a constant threat to shipping through the Red sea. In that regard, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are actively engaged as we speak.

Following our withdrawal from Afghanistan, the willingness of the west to face up to these challenges is being studied by the global south—countries that are vulnerable to destabilisation and worse on the part of our adversaries. Any sense of the west’s being distracted, or unwilling or unable to rise to the challenge, risks encouraging the increasing number of autocratic states to act in contravention of international law. The sabre-rattling in Venezuela over resource-rich provinces of Guyana, a Commonwealth country, is just one recent example.

Has the risk picture changed for the worse in the last few years? Clearly it has. Have we fully risen to that challenge? We have not. Those of us who are old enough to recall the joy of the Berlin wall coming down will also recall that we had, in that decade, been investing more than 5% of GDP in defence—well over twice our current commitment. In 1989, there was a justifiable rationale for reductions in defence spending, but what goes down to match a decreasing threat must assuredly go back up to meet an increasing threat, and that is where we stand today.

In the Defence Committee report, we are robust not only about the professionalism of the armed forces, but about their ability to rise to any challenge. However, they are being run hot continuously, and that has a direct impact on their ability to train for, recruit and retain for, and be equipped to face the toughest challenge imaginable: a full-scale prolonged conflict, alongside our allies, with a peer adversary. That is just one of many challenges that our armed forces are designed to meet, but it is the most significant—the challenge above all others that we seek to deter.

I welcome the extensive engagement of our armed forces in this year’s NATO exercise, Steadfast Defender, but the days when that could be a routine exercise conducted by forces dedicated solely to the preparedness to face the Russian threat are long gone. Our forces’ sheer range of commitments, from global engagements to domestic MACAs—military aid to civil authorities—maintain constant pressure. The impacts are simple: recruitment and retention that is not up to the task; a hollowing out of munition stockpiles and our means to replenish them; and an inability to prepare and train for the worst-case scenario at the intensity required to bolster our allies, and with the confidence to deter adversaries. Our report highlights the urgent need for change.

To enable us to be fully prepared for peer-on- peer warfighting, something must give, be it the scale of operations and engagements or the size of national investment in defence. There is no doubt in my mind about the course that needs to be taken. The global operations conducted by our armed forces have a critical supporting role in our efforts to deter and prevent expansionism by our adversaries. What the UK needs is not a diminution of our ambition, but an increase in our investment.

In saying that, I am acutely aware of the regular charge that additional UK investment in defence is wasteful if the Ministry of Defence does not get its house in order on procurement. The Public Accounts Committee has set out in its report the difficulties faced by the MOD in meeting its equipment plan objectives. Reports over the years, not least from the Defence Sub-Committee under my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), have highlighted where the MOD needs to do better on procurement. I have no doubt that we will hear from my right hon. Friend and others about some of the core weaknesses that these reports have revealed.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

The answer to my right hon. Friend’s question is yes. Could he explain to the House that one of the things that the Committee thought about very carefully was how candid we should be about the weaknesses in our armed forces? After much careful deliberation, we did not include anything in our “Ready for War?” report that we had reason to believe our potential adversaries did not already know.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Quin]

I said we would hear from my right hon. Friend, and indeed we shall. He is absolutely right. We are incredibly careful as a Committee to keep to the right the side of the line. There are a lot of facts in our report that make for very, very unpleasant reading. I do not have time to list them all today, with the clock whirring as it is, but I commend the report. It goes through some of the problems we face in great detail. As my right hon. Friend says, they will be well known to our adversaries. If we do not front up to those problems, we will be fooling no one but ourselves.

Obviously, I have a personal interest in this matter, but I believe that over the past five years we have seen a real determination from the MOD to get better, and there are structural changes that will embed improvement. The defence and security industrial strategy moved the MOD away from competition by default and towards viewing our defence sector as a critical strategic asset. That has proved a timely intervention, placing more emphasis on building sovereign capacity and greater reassurance of our supply chains. DSIS has marked an improvement in the relationship with industry. Companies large and small are more engaged than they have ever been in the early thought processes around capability requirements and specifications. There is better investment in senior responsible owners to exercise control and authority over projects.

When the Department and industry work together—for example, on Poland’s defence expansion or on novel technologies for Ukraine—it is a formidable combination. Baking exports and industrial co-operation into procurement at the earliest stage works for industry and for the UK. Above all, achieving minimum deployable platforms early and allowing for spiral development, if properly invested against, will generate not only routinely upgraded state-of-the-art platforms, but industrial partners that are able to retain and invest in their workforce and their research and development. It means going beyond feast and famine, and towards long-term co-development.

I believe that the Minister’s recently announced reforms are excellent. They institutionalise reforms that really will improve our procurement, but for them to work as they deserve, there needs to be cultural change. Uniformed SROs need to recognise the profoundly different skillset that applies to procurement. They need to be encouraged to seek commercial and legal advice early in order to escalate problems. Above all, they need to be willing to recognise that when a project will not work, they should take the learning and call it a day. If we are focused, as we must be, on cutting-edge solutions, we must recognise that some will not work. For any commercial entity, that is not a sign of failure; it is a recognition that, in a portfolio, some risks will be taken that do not succeed.

In Defence Equipment & Support there are many good people doing a difficult and demanding job, but I believe it is absolutely possible, as part of the current reforms, to instil and reward greater entrepreneurialism and productivity. DE&S has the pay freedoms to do so. With cultural change and proper investment, the reforms will move us from peacetime lethargy, influenced by staccato funding, closer to the urgency and realism that the threats demand.

It is clear that no one on either side of the House should think that we can get to where we need to be against the current threat simply by being a bit better at procurement. As our report makes clear, significant improvements are required in everything from stockpiles to housing simply to retain and maintain the size of our current force structure, let alone increase it, as we should.

[Sir Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I am glad that my right hon. Friend has mentioned accommodation, on which I focused after succeeding him as Minister for Defence Procurement. Does he agree that accommodation is as much a part of operational capability as hardware in the battlefield?

[Sir Jeremy Quin]

I support my right hon. Friend’s point. We had “fix on failure” for too long, although it has changed in recent years. More investment is being put into our housing, but it is needed because we have a crisis in retention and recruitment. As the report sets out in vivid and very scary detail, we are losing far more experienced personnel than we are able to recruit. Housing is part of the offer to our brilliant defence personnel that we need to get right.

While addressing all the issues I have mentioned, we must also increase our fundamental defence production capability. We underwrote commercial military expansion in the 1930s, and we should be prepared to do the same. It is absolutely clear that, although better buying will of course help, it should be alongside, not instead of, sustained, effective and increased investment.

Investment horizons on priority projects must stretch well beyond annual commitments to allow proper planning. We will make savings if the services do not gamble all their chips on the delivery of a perfect platform when it is “their turn,” and they will not do that if they know funding will be there for upgrades. Industry will invest alongside that, will work with small and medium-sized enterprises and will train the workforce we need if it knows that we are marching together for the long term rather than being marched over the edge of a cliff at the end of every order.

The need for increased defence investment would be true in any circumstances when faced by the threats we face. It is all the more vital when the United States’ commitment to Europe is being questioned. Since 2015, this Government have shown themselves to be ready to make difficult decisions, have shown leadership in the early days on Ukraine and have increased investment. In my personal opinion, the Government must now set out their timetable for reaching and sustaining 2.5%.

Although decisions should be taken “capability up” rather than “numbers down”, it is also my view that we are unlikely to be able to meet and deter expanding threats in the longer term for less than 3%, which remains a low level of annual insurance compared with the relatively recent past. However, the sooner the Government commit and invest, the lower the ultimate price likely to fall on this country. By doing so, we might be able to help save all of Europe by our example. Failure to invest could result in a very high price indeed.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Cartlidge]

As my right hon. Friend has already intervened, I hope he will allow me to make some progress and refer to comments from colleagues.

Obviously, there has been particular debate about spending. The shadow Secretary of State was unable to answer whether Labour would match the figure of 2.5%, but a number of my colleagues wanted us to go further and faster. This point was put well by the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord). The Chair of the Defence Committee and others have suggested that we should look back to the sort of GDP figures in the cold war, although they did not necessarily say that we should go to exactly those amounts. However, as was said by the hon. Gentleman, who I believe was in military intelligence, in those days almost all of eastern Europe was an armed camp full of Soviet divisions, whereas now those countries are in NATO, so the situation has changed profoundly.

As was rightly said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Sir Alec Shelbrooke)—one of my predecessors as Minister for Defence Procurement—if we increase defence by a significant amount, the money has to come from somewhere. An increase from the current level of about 2.3% to 3% equates to £20 billion, which is not a small amount of taxpayers’ money. Even an increase to 2.5% equates to an extra £6 billion. So it is Government policy to support that but to do so when we believe the economy can support it on a sustained basis.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) made a passionate speech about how there had, in effect, been a cut to defence spending in the Budget, and several other Members said the same. I do not agree, although I accept that there is a debate about it. It is about the difference between the main estimate and the supplementary estimate, and some people have said it is about the inclusion of nuclear. To me, the nuclear deterrent is fundamental to defence, so of course it should be in the defence budget. We are not going to take out GCAP or frigates, and we are certainly not going to take out the nuclear deterrent, which is at the heart of the UK’s defence.

[Sir Jeremy Quin]

I like a lot of what the Minister is saying. It is right to say that we have, in Poland, Finland and Sweden, allies in NATO that produce great capability in terms of dealing with the threat from Russia, but since 1989 China, now one of the two biggest economies in the world, has gone on to be spending £232 billion alone on defence—and that is just the official number. We also now have a nuclear armed North Korea, with Iran making its way in the same direction. The world picture is darkening. That may not necessarily “directly impact” us, to use the words of other hon. Members, although I think it does, but it has indirect impact on some of our allies and on where they need to place their resources. It is a real concern and we should not forget that.

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that. It shows why I have repeatedly said that we need to reform defence procurement because of the need to stay competitive with our adversaries.

I agree with the Chair of the PAC, the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), and my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger), that we cannot just look at what we want to spend and at the future aspiration; we have to look at how we spend the money that we have better. That is why on 28 February I announced our new integrated procurement model, to completely overhaul our approach to acquisition. I said in my speech—and I stand by this—that the current delegated procurement model, under the Levene reforms, has created an inadvertent tendency towards over-programming: as soon as there is financial pressure on the equipment plan, such as we have had through inflation, the single services compete to get their capability on contract. By contrast, the very definition of our integrated approach is pan-defence prioritisation, as we are seeing in practice in our pending munitions plan, which will address many of the concerns of right hon. and hon. Members about getting our industry up to spec in terms of missiles and other key munitions. Let me be clear that such prioritisation would be challenging even if we went to 2.5%, such is the nature of defence.

A particular priority of our new acquisition model, as was referred to by the Chair of the Defence Committee, is spiral development: accepting 60% or 80% of requirements rather than 100% exquisite. The key to that is ramping up our engagement with industry, so we have held far more engagement events with industry at a secret level. Just this week, for example, we have held engagement between the strategic command and industry about cyber and electronic warfare—at a secret level, because we want to empower industrial innovation.

I have also said that exports are a key part of getting our industrial base as resilient as possible. So I am delighted to confirm the overnight news that BAE Systems will partner in Australia to build its nuclear-powered submarines. This is a major moment for AUKUS, and the collective submarine-building will support 7,000 additional British jobs across the programme’s lifespan.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman) and the hon. Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck), who this week chaired the Sub-Committee on AI, both rightly stressed the importance of technology. To see that, one need only look at the situation in Ukraine and at the extraordinary propensity of electronic warfare, which underlines how the battle space has changed. So a key part of our system will be about learning the lessons from the frontline as rapidly as possible, as we spiral our own developments in response. We are learning those lessons. For example, as part of its drive to incorporate autonomous platforms flying alongside crewed fighters, the RAF is now progressing to procure drones to overwhelm an adversary’s electronic warfare defences. That underlines an important point: that advantage in future warfare and uncrewed combat, will not necessarily be gained by individual platforms and technologies; it will be their smart integration, across crewed and uncrewed systems, that will enable us to develop a force fit for the future. That is why I believe we need an integrated approach to procurement.

To conclude, the brief snapshot of military exercises that I have outlined today does not do justice to the breadth and reach of our armed forces. They are more than ready. They are out there, deployed all over the world, keeping us safe and defending our interests. Meanwhile, the reforms we have made to procurement will help us adapt to emerging threats and evolving technological possibilities. That is a key lesson from Ukraine and from our Defence Command Paper.

This Government will continue to back our armed forces with record levels of defence spending, an ambitious 10-year equipment plan and by forging a new partnership with industry to co-develop cutting-edge capabilities. It is a plan that will ensure that our defence industrial base is more resilient and our armed forces are better equipped. It is a comprehensive strategy for our national security, and I commend it to the House.

[Sir Jeremy Quin]

Madam Deputy Speaker, as the shadow Secretary of State said, your predecessor in the Chair at the start of the debate complimented the hon. Members standing, saying that he anticipated the debate would be rich in facts and high in quality. Almost universally, he was absolutely right. It was an excellent debate.

There is an almost universal view, on both sides of the House, that our brilliant armed forces are simply running too hard against all that is demanded of them to meet essential commitments. A war is taking place on our continent. As the Defence Secretary has said, we are in a pre-war phase. Our Select Committees have an essential role to play in highlighting difficult issues, as we have been doing this afternoon. I endorse what the Chairman of the PAC said in relation to finding more ways in which Select Committees can scrutinise the most sensitive of defence programmes. That is important for Parliament and helpful for the Government.

We have to rise to the significant challenges set out in the two reports, on the readiness of the armed forces by the Defence Committee and the equipment plan by the PAC. I welcome what the Minister said about AUKUS. I did not expect him to answer all the questions that were raised in the reports, but he must work on it because I know the Department will work on it. We have our job to do. It is our duty to raise these difficult concerns, and I know both Committees will continue to do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the First Report of the Defence Committee, Ready for War?, HC 26, the Eighth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, Improving Defence Inventory Management, HC 66, and the Nineteenth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, MoD Equipment Plan 2023-33, HC 451.