Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMaria Eagle
Main Page: Maria Eagle (Labour - Liverpool Garston)Department Debates - View all Maria Eagle's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThank you, Sir Roger. Committee members have been fiercely disagreeing on something that relates directly to the matters that we are considering today on frankness and candour. I think that demonstrates just how challenging these things will be. We are the politicians who are putting forward this legislation.
Does the hon. Member accept that matters of party political difference in a political system are not the same as telling the truth about what happened in a disaster or an event? There is a distinction.
Absolutely. The Bill is focused on those examples that are clear and egregious, where it is easy to say that there has been a failure of candour or a deliberate attempt to cover up. The legislation will cover many other situations, however, including Members of Parliament. As Members of Parliament, we are expected to operate with a degree of frankness and candour, and yet just this week we have been fiercely debating whether one of our own has or has not done that. It is important for Members to reflect on the wideness of the ramifications outside the purely obvious examples of what might constitute candour, or a lack of it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger. I just want to say a few words on this clause about why the duty of candour and assistance is so important, and why it means so much to Hillsborough families, some of whom are my constituents. We heard from a small number of them in the evidence sessions, but there are many more who could have told equally difficult stories about their own experience.
What happened at Hillsborough was a disaster. Nobody who worked for South Yorkshire police left their homes that morning intending to cause it, but the reality is that their gross negligence and inadequate organisation did cause it. Within four and a half months, the public inquiry had identified a loss of police control as the main cause of the disaster. Had our state been operating fully and correctly, we would have recognised that as a country and that would have been the end of the matter. There would have been accountability for those failings, lessons would have been learned, and the families could have grieved for their lost loved ones and moved on with their lives.
Instead, what happened was that the South Yorkshire police, aided and abetted by the West Midlands police, set about telling a story, intent only on deflecting blame for their own failings—even though those failings were then identified within four and a half months. One can understand, perhaps, why a police force faced with that disaster would have wanted to give their side of the story and understanding of what had happened. However, once the public inquiry—within four and a half months—had made findings that excoriated the police response to the disaster, accused a senior officer of telling a disgraceful lie and said in terms that the police would have been better advised to have accepted responsibility rather than sought to put forward a different story that was not credible, one would have expected that there would have been accountability, that the truth would have been accepted by the South Yorkshire police and that there would have been no more attempts to put forward a different narrative.
That did not happen. Instead, the then inquest proceedings—the longest in British legal history at that time, taking over a year—were used in terms by the South Yorkshire police to tell a different story: to put it in the public mind that they had not been at fault, as the public inquiry had clearly found, but that it had been the fans who had attended the match who had been at fault. It had been those who died who had contributed in some way to their own deaths. It had been the survivors of that terrible disaster who had somehow caused the problem. It had been hooliganism and drunkenness—it had been ticketless fans who had forced their way into the grounds.
That is the story that the police told, aided and abetted by the media of the day, some of which behaved disgracefully and suffer for it still on Merseyside, I might say. That story was told repeatedly. It was in every newspaper and all the mini-inquests for over a year of those inquest proceedings. At the end of it, the public perception about what had happened at Hillsborough was completely different from what the public inquiry had found. It was as if the public inquiry had never happened; yet it was right in almost every aspect, and within four and a half months of the disaster.
It is now 36 years since the disaster. In our evidence sessions, we heard from some of the families about the ongoing impact of the lies that were told and the story that has been repeatedly told by South Yorkshire police and those responsible for the disaster, who have been completely unable to accept their culpability. Even as late as the second inquest, they tried again to tell that same discredited story, so the importance of this clause cannot be overemphasised. It gets to the heart of why one might wish to call this a Hillsborough law, even though that is not the Bill’s short title. It might be known colloquially as that, because the fact is that, had those public authorities had the duties provided for in clause 2, there is no way they could have undertaken that campaign of lies, disinformation and propaganda against the wholly innocent families and wholly innocent survivors of that disaster.
It is for that reason that I think it is important that the duty of candour and assistance is an essential part of the Bill. If we enact it and implement it properly without any concerns or problems, that duty is one of the things that will enable us to say that this is a Hillsborough law because, had it been in place at the time, the South Yorkshire or West Midlands police could not have engaged in the disgraceful way that they did, simply to deflect the blame on to anybody else but them—even if that hurt those who had died, the families of those who had died, or the thousands and thousands of survivors. We forget that it was not only my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby who was at the match; thousands of people saw what happened. It was filmed and shown live on TV, so the idea that it could be distorted in the way that it has been—at great public expense and over decades—is a terrible disgrace to the way that our systems work.
If the Bill can put that right, it will have done our whole nation a service, and it will be right to call it a Hillsborough law. It will mean that those families can stop their campaigning and start to grieve and live what is left of their lives. Some 36 years on from what happened, surely they have a right to expect that.
I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East for tabling amendments 18 to 20, which would require public officials and authorities to notify and provide information to any inquiry or investigation within 30 days. The Government agree entirely that public authorities and officials should provide assistance to inquiries and investigations as quickly as possible, and the Bill requires that. Clause 2(6) requires authorities and officials to act “expeditiously” when complying with the obligations placed on them. In some cases, it will be possible for officials and authorities to provide the assistance required within 30 days, but there may be times when it is not.
There will be situations where an inquiry or investigation requires an authority to provide a very large amount of information or data, requiring it to set staff and resources aside to search through potentially thousands of documents and assess their relevance, with all the necessary checks and verification that follow. We think it is important that authorities are given sufficient time to conduct thorough searches and provide accurate information, and that the inquiry or investigation will be best placed to set a reasonable timescale for that.
The duty would also apply to former officials who may have a different job or be retired—or have resigned, as we heard earlier—and there may be situations where it is impossible for them to provide the assistance required within a 30-day time limit. Although I totally agree with the sentiment, a degree of flexibility is therefore important so that we get all the information that inquiries and investigations need. I therefore urge the hon. Member not to press his amendments, but I agree to work with him on a way forward.
I now turn to clause 2. We heard powerfully from my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston exactly why the duty of candour in clause 2 is integral to the Bill. As has been rightly said, this is a Bill for the Hillsborough families, and it will be known colloquially as the Hillsborough law, but it is also a Bill for Ida, for the Grenfell families, for the Manchester Arena families and for anyone who has been wronged by the state.
I rise to support amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden (Yasmin Qureshi), and supported by several other hon. Members, both on the Committee and outside it.
The amendment would ensure that the Bill’s duty of candour and duty to assist apply automatically to independent panels and reviews established by a Minister of the Crown. It makes a simple and technical addition to schedule 1 and, as it has been accepted, is within the scope of the Bill and does not therefore extend it. Hon. Members know that I have a particular interest in independent panels, but the amendment simply seeks to apply the duty of candour and assistance to independent panels that Ministers can set up at any time if they so wish. It would be an anomaly for it not to be included, particularly given that independent panels are becoming a more common way of trying to get to the truth about somewhat complex events.
Hon. Members may be aware that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden is chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Primodos. I, too, have constituents who have been affected by Primodos. I think there was a particular penchant in the north-west for prescribing it as an oral pregnancy test. It was not a drug or a treatment as such; it was a diagnostic test to see whether someone was pregnant. There seems to have been a lot of it prescribed in the north-west of England.
Since the 1960s and 1970s, there have been campaigns to try to find out whether—and, latterly, to try to get it accepted that—Primodos, an oral hormone pregnancy test, caused life-changing and devastating congenital abnormalities, stillbirths and miscarriages. I have constituents who have been affected, both those whose children are still alive and those whose children are not. The all-party group has been campaigning for many years, under my hon. Friend’s chairmanship, to get some resolution for those families.
The all-party group has conducted investigations. There have been failed legal actions against the manufacturers of Primodos. In 2017, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency expert working group gave rise to great hope that there might be a way forward for those affected, but that was a disappointment. In fact, I think that if my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden were moving this amendment, she would say that it was quite clear that key evidence was minimised or discarded, that families were excluded from those considerations and that the conclusions appeared to go further than the remit that the working group was given.
I want to put on record our thanks to Marie Lyon for all the work that she has done. She outlined exactly what my right hon. Friend has said about that report, and the families’ disappointment about the lack of a duty of candour. I therefore fully support the proposal.
I know Marie Lyon; I have met her on a number of occasions because I have constituents who are affected. She runs the Association for Children Damaged by Hormone Pregnancy Tests, and she has been the mainstay of the campaign, which has been going on since 1978, to try and get some resolution for these matters. I am happy to support my hon. Friend’s thanks to her.
One thing that could assist those families in respect of Primodos is an independent panel, which would go much further than the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency expert working group, and which would collect documents and approach the issue from a transparency point of view. Given that the families’ attempted legal actions have not succeeded, that seems to me a likely next way forward. But the reality is that if the Bill comes into force and independent panels are not specifically included, those families may feel as though they are in a disadvantageous position. It is on that basis that I seek to move amendment 1.
The Chair
The right hon. Lady will understand that amendment 1 will not be moved now; it will be taken when the schedule is reached at the end of the Bill. At that point she will need to indicate if she wishes to press it to a Division.
Tessa Munt
I rise to support amendment 3, proposed by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. I am also a co-signatory of amendment 1, and I thank the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston for her reference to it. I echo the comments that have been made about Primodos and many other things. We have investigations, inquiries, inquests, and independent panels—and no doubt something else will come up at some point. Will the Minister clarify that point and agree that we should have some common language to cover all those things? As has been mentioned, independent panels do come up quite often.
I seek clarity on investigations and inquiries that might be taking place already. My understanding is that the Bill will not affect them, so if someone has something that they want to raise, they will probably need to wait until the Bill has become law. That seems slightly perverse, in that there may be people who want something done within the next six months who are going to have to sit and wait. I would like some clarity on that.
A fine on a public body, paid by the taxpayer, does not concentrate minds in the way that personal responsibility does. In a recent joint inquest into three self-inflicted deaths at HMP Lowdham Grange, the hearing was adjourned twice due to the Ministry of Justice’s failure to comply with directions for disclosure.
The coroner’s court ultimately took the unusual step of fining the Ministry of Justice because of that. That example shows that existing powers to fine organisations that fail to comply with directions of disclosure do not effectively address the persistent lack of candour, duty and transparency from public bodies. That is why I feel the amendment is so important, and I really hope the Minister takes it onboard.
I rise briefly to emphasise some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and urge the Minister to consider whether more can be done in that respect. The lesson of Hillsborough is that the organisations at fault set about using every pound they had available to defend themselves—and we will hear more in the IOPC report, to be published later today.
Those senior offices who made decisions to use the public money that they had in that way simply elongated and lengthened the amount of agony and pain. A corporate fine against an organisation may not be enough to deter that kind of behaviour, so I urge the Minister to consider what more might be done in terms of command responsibility.
I thank all hon. Members for tabling these amendments and for today’s debate. As we heard on Thursday, command responsibility is a priority for change and accountability, and I therefore hope I will be able to provide further clarity as to how our Bill ensures clear accountability right at the top. Hillsborough families were clear that there must be individual accountability, with those who have engaged in state cover-ups held responsible. Our Bill clearly delivers that.
Any individual who commits a duty of candour offence can be prosecuted. That includes chief executives or the equivalent. If a public authority breaches its duty of candour or misleads the public, anyone in a management position who consented or connived with that breach can also be prosecuted. As such, amendment 27 would duplicate the provisions in schedule 3(3). Given that clarification, I ask the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw the amendment.
Our Bill is consistent with the approach taken in other legislation, including the Bribery Act 2010 and the Fraud Act 2006, where personal liability for offences committed by a corporate body relies on consent or connivance. Anyone in charge of a public authority has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their authority complies with the duty of candour and assistance. If they fail to do so, they will face prosecution.
Amendments 33, 34, 44 and 45 would hold the chief executive personally responsible for offences committed by the public authority even if they did not have knowledge of the offence being committed, and even if—in the case of amendments 33 and 44—they had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the organisation’s compliance with the duty of candour. We do not believe that that is the intention of the amendments, and we do not think it fair to attach criminal responsibility in that way. We intend the duties to apply widely. For example, we plan to extend the duty of candour and assistance to NHS investigations. It would not be reasonable or realistic to expect the chief executive of an NHS trust to be across every single detail of every response in any investigation into an incident at that trust. Instead, we would expect them to have systems in place to ensure that the authority is complying, which is precisely what the Bill requires them to do.