Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 4th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman may wish to familiarise himself with the positions that we have been taking, in common with not only western Governments, but the majority of Governments in the world. Our position was the position of the 133 nations in the UN General Assembly that voted for the resolution of 3 August, with only 12 votes against. That position is to have a transitional Government in Syria, including members of the current Government and the current opposition, based on mutual consent. That is the compromise solution. If he wants us to make a further compromise with forces who have killed indiscriminately and oppressed the people of their country with appalling human rights violations, I can tell him that that we are unable to do.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Although one can welcome his recent announcement of certain modest increases of contacts with the Syrian opposition, does not my right hon. Friend acknowledge that the arms embargo, which Britain supports, creates a hopelessly unbalanced situation, because the Syrian Government have a monopoly of air power, artillery and other forces, and because the embargo is not binding on Russia or Iran, which are not members of the European Union? Does he not acknowledge that this is simply going to mean that this conflict will last for many more months than would have been necessary, with many more thousands of Syrians being killed in the process?

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. and learned Friend always makes an eloquent case on this subject. I respect his views and always pay great heed to them, but although I do not exclude any option for the future, I do not agree that it would be right now to lift the EU arms embargo. It has not been our policy in any of the conflicts in the middle east to send arms into a region of conflict. He will know that there are disadvantages as well as advantages to the course that he advocates, because it would be very hard to know what some of those arms would be used for. In the long term, there would be at least as great a risk that they would make the conflict greater as reduce it. We support the opposition in the terms that I set out yesterday in the House. It is clear that Syrian opposition groups are obtaining arms from other sources, but it has not been our policy at any stage to join in with that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that any serious concessions by the Iranians should be welcomed, but that for the discussions and negotiations to succeed the Iranians will have to demonstrate, with full verification and transparency, that they no longer seek either nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability?

[Mr Hague]

That would be required for the issue to be settled and for the negotiations to succeed. It is important for Iran to announce concrete steps and to put forward concrete proposals. It has put forward some proposals in the talks in Moscow over the past 48 hours. As I have said, the talks remain very tough and frank, and have not met with success so far. In the absence of success, including as my right hon. and learned Friend defines it, the international pressure will only be intensified.

Syria

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

That is a good point. I do not know what Russia’s private assessment is of that damage, but there is such damage, of course, and not only in the view of leaders in the Arab world, but among the huge populations who now watch the footage of these crimes on satellite TV. Of course, the same people across the whole middle east are familiar with, or were rapidly informed of, the fact that when we had a vote in the UN Human Rights Council 10 days ago, only three countries voted against that resolution: Russia, China and Cuba. That does not help any of those countries’ international standing in the region or, in the wider world, among people who have a passionate concern for human rights. That is one of the factors in their thinking. It may be one of the factors in the increased readiness to look for new solutions in order to bring about the implementation of the Annan plan. As I say, we will continue to work with Russia and try to persuade the Russian leaders on that basis.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Over the weekend the Foreign Secretary made the important comparison between Syria today and Bosnia in the 1990s. Will he accept that we are repeating one of the major mistakes of that period by imposing an arms embargo equally on the Syrian regime and the Syrian insurgents, despite the fact that the regime has an overwhelming preponderance of military equipment already? Taking into account the fact that the embargo is not a Security Council embargo—it is one imposed purely by the European Union, and could therefore be changed and modified, regardless of the views of Russia or China—will my right hon. Friend have urgent talks with his fellow Foreign Ministers in other European Union countries on modifying the arms embargo to the degree required to enable appropriate military assistance to be given to Syrian insurgents, so that they can prevent, or at least seek to prevent, the continuing slaughter of the Syrian people?

[Mr Hague]

While not fundamentally disagreeing in all circumstances that might arise with my right hon. and learned Friend, I am not at the same point in the argument. As he well knows, there are serious disadvantages to sending arms to opposition groups, as well as the case that he might make. It is difficult to know in the current situation what those arms would be used for, and whether they could also be used to commit atrocities that we would find appalling. They could contribute to the cycle of violence that is building up and create a further reaction on the other side. We can see some of that now, as there clearly is an increased availability of arms, from whatever source, to opposition groups, and the cycle of violence is increasing. I think it is far preferable to any of the other options—options which may be on the table for the future, but it is far preferable now to put all our effort and to put our diplomatic effort entirely, even at this stage, into trying to secure the Annan plan, because that or something very similar to it is the only hope of a peaceful transition. Until all such efforts have been entirely exhausted, I think it is best to continue to aim for that peaceful solution and not to contribute in any way to the violence in Syria.

Foreign Affairs and International Development

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The UK is one of the strongest advocates of the sanctions being applied by the EU, including the ban on EU imports of Iranian oil from 1 July. The House should be clear about that, but discussion is continuing within the EU about protection and indemnity insurance and when a ban on it would be applied—on 1 July or at a later date. We are discussing that separately because of concerns expressed by countries outside the EU about the impact on their trade. We are assessing that, working with France in particular, to try to understand how serious the impact would be. We are clearly applying sharply increased pressure on Iran, but we also have to bear in mind the wider consequences for oil prices and the world economy, and balance those concerns.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that even if the Iranians make constructive proposals in Baghdad next week, which would be very welcome, it would be premature to consider any suspension of sanctions, except in the unlikely event that the Iranians propose to suspend, as of that date, their further enrichment of uranium?

[Mr Hague]

We will have to see what, if any, proposals Iran makes in Baghdad on 23 May, but if my right hon. and learned Friend is saying that we should be cautious about making large-scale concessions, of course I agree—we will be cautious. It would, in any case, require agreement across the E3 plus 3. We will see what the Iranians say. If they propose and start to implement concrete steps, of course there would be ways in which we would want to respond, but very serious and significant steps would have to be taken for us to change, in any way, our approach to, for example, the imposition of the oil sanctions that I just described.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Is it not clear that the Assad regime had no intention of respecting the ceasefire and withdrawing its tanks and heavy artillery from towns and cities? As the international community accepts a responsibility to protect, will the British Government initiate urgent discussions with the Arab League, Turkey, the United States and other European countries, with a view to encouraging Arab states to close their land borders and their airspace to any traffic destined for Syria? If that were combined with a naval blockade of the Syrian coast, would it not, at the very least, prevent any further arms from being delivered to the Syrian regime?

[Mr Hague]

As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, we have very tough sanctions in place, imposed through the European Union, and the Arab League has sanctions of its own. But as he will also know, some Arab League countries do not implement, or do not fully implement, those sanctions, particularly countries that are close to Syria, such as Iraq. For that reason, it is extremely difficult to impose the general blockade that my right hon. and learned Friend talks about, and arms shipments continue to reach Syria from Russia as well. Cutting off all such arms supplies without the co-operation of the countries I have mentioned is not possible. What we now have to do is try to ensure that the terms of the UN Security Council resolution are met, and clearly warn the Assad regime that if they are not met, we will be able to return to the Security Council for further measures.

Sergei Magnitsky

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Wednesday 7th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

May I first reassure the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) that the Russian ambassador knows perfectly well that he will have no influence in the House of Commons? He is anxious that his bosses in Moscow see that he has done everything in his power to make their views known.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) on giving the House the opportunity to consider a matter that has already been debated in many other Parliaments around the world. That is much to his credit. This debate is primarily about the personal tragedy of Sergei Magnitsky and his family. Magnitsky was a man of extraordinary courage and integrity, a symbol of the new Russia, both in his life and, sadly, in his death. He was a representative of the new Russia. The people who murdered him were symbols of the old Russia and, in some ways, the old Soviet Union.

To a significant degree, in some ways I am more disturbed by what happened to Magnitsky than by what used to happen in the old Soviet Union. The Soviet Union made no pretence of being anything other than a totalitarian state. It had no interest in the rule of law as we understand it. Indeed, on this issue, I suspect that it would have reacted quite differently from Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev. The Politburo would not have tolerated the state theft of $230 million from the Treasury by public officials acting in a criminal fashion.

President Medvedev would have us believe that Russia is now a country of the rule of law, but we know very well that in practice that is sadly not the case. Instead of moving towards belief in the rule of law, Russia is moving towards being a society that might very well be tolerating a relationship between the Russian state and organised crime that is deep and serious, and which extends to the highest levels of Russian society. That is a serious accusation to make, but the facts seem to point in that direction.

First, as I indicated, this has been no minor act of theft from private individuals, companies or some local department. The theft involved, by public officials, was from the Russian Treasury of $230 million. Of course, scandals happen in other countries. The test is the reaction of the Government to such situations. Not only has no serious effort been made to identify, try and punish those responsible for the theft, but the opposite has happened: the person who exposed the fraud was himself persecuted, and at the end of the day was murdered. That is a very sad situation. Medvedev and Putin have gone through the motions of punishing some minor officials, but instead of praising Magnitsky for what he did, he has been persecuted.

I do not necessarily suggest that Mr Putin or President Medvedev were personally involved, but there are only two possible explanations for their failure to respond. The first is that they are impotent to do so. That may be true of Medvedev, but I frankly cannot believe that Mr Putin is anything other than able to have responded, if he had so wished, in the most fundamental way, to identify not only the perpetrators of the crimes against Mr Magnitsky, but the theft from the Russian state. The only other explanation has to be that, for reasons of their own, those at the highest levels of the Russian Government are prepared to tolerate criminality of the most serious kind, because there is a sufficient common interest between those who have political power and those who wield power through organised crime to make doing what they did preferable to taking action of the kind that should have been taken.

I do not underestimate the seriousness of what I am saying, but if we could see Magnitsky’s fate as an isolated incident, one might be more charitable about the policy of the current Russian Government. However, as has been said, from the Opposition Front Bench and by others, there are so many cases of flagrant disregard for the rule of law. It is the blatant political interference in the judicial system—which goes way beyond the tragedies of the Magnitsky case—that is important. For some time now, Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev have been alleging that the fate of Khodorkovsky was nothing to do with politics, but entirely to do with his breach of the criminal law. The timing of the decision to review his case could not have been more political, and illustrates that those who were responsible for putting him in prison may now be realising that the reaction that that created throughout the world means it is time to allow him to be released.

The final thing that I would like to say in this short debate is simply this. By approving the motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, we are not only showing solidarity with all those fighting for the rule of law in Russia, which is just as an important as the creation of a pluralist democracy, but saying to Mr Magnitsky’s family—we cannot say it directly to Mr Magnitsky himself—that we honour his memory and his achievements, and we are doing what we can to help what he tried to achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Leigh]

I immediately acknowledge that, and I do not condone the exclusion of any candidate from standing or the lack of prime-time airtime for Opposition candidates. I do not pretend it is a perfect democracy, but the House of Commons has to appreciate that this is still an infinitely freer election than has happened in the past in Russia. At least some progress has been made; let us not knock that.

There has been talk about the case of Mikhail Khordokovsky. I do not defend the tumbling and the show trial of that oligarch, but we have to remember what happened under Mr Yeltsin’s rule. He sold off the family silver to his friends, cronies and supporters, and there was no limit to the power of the oligarchs under him. I do not defend the trial, but Mr Putin was clearly sending a political message to the Russian people that no oligarch is above the rule of law.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My hon. Friend might make that argument regarding the first conviction, but what message was Mr Putin sending by bringing Mr Khordokovsky to trial a second time, after he had served his sentence, and having him sentenced to many more years in prison?

[Mr Leigh]

Straight away, I make no defence of that, but we have to appreciate the internal politics going on in Russia. That is all I am trying to do. I do not think we should indulge ourselves, pleasant as it may be, in Putin phobia, which is sometimes nourished in our own commentariat. There are double standards and the democracy is not perfect, but unfortunately many of the Russians to whom I and others have spoken conclude that the west would rather see a Russia that is poor, weak and unstable as long as it subscribes to our notions of liberal democracy—and it is not for us to lecture them—instead of a Russia that is rich, influential and stable. That is primarily what they want. They might not share all our views about liberal democracy, but ordinary Russians whom one can talk to in the street are primarily interested in their pensions and their quality of life, which has improved immeasurably in the past 10 years. I therefore support the moderate tone that the Minister has taken today. We have to have an environment of respect for the Russian Government and we have to encourage dialogue with them rather than continually giving them lectures that, I am afraid, have absolutely no resonance with the Russian people. It is true that Russia is changing too slowly, but at least President Medvedev has attempted to reform the police service and get rid of the Soviet “people’s militia” system, so some progress is being made.

The death of Sergei Magnitsky leaves one cold and those guilty of it are thoroughly contemptible. Of course we condemn what is going on, but I think our Government are taking a measured and sensible approach in seeking to prevent any of those people from coming to this country and in not seeking to predetermine the outcome of trials that are taking place in Russia. My hon. Friend the Minister’s attitude in seeking to preserve good relations with an essential trading partner is a balanced and right approach, which I support.

Iran

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “House” to the end of the Question and add,

‘supports the Government’s efforts to reach a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through a combination of pressure in the form of robust sanctions, and engagement led by the E3+3 comprising the UK, US, France, Germany, China and Russia; and recognises the value of making clear to Iran that all options for addressing the issue remain on the table.’.

I have a genuine respect for my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). It is courageous sometimes to put forward a view that may have very little support, but as I listened to his speech, I could not but irresistibly be reminded of the remark that was made about a Minister in the 1930s, who had the reputation of being very logical. It was said of him that starting from a false premise he had moved inexorably to the wrong conclusion. I say to my hon. Friend in all honesty that I feel that he is in that situation.

Of course, we all want to see a peaceful resolution of this dispute by negotiation. I agree with my hon. Friend that there is a powerful case to see if we can have a normalisation of relations between the United States and Iran, but it takes the two to have such a negotiation, and, as he himself conceded, when President Obama put forward such a proposal, it was rejected in Tehran. There is no evidence that Tehran has changed its position. If it has changed it, it would be very easy for it to say so.

I want to go straight to the question raised in the motion rather than to the wider issues involved, and that is whether there is a powerful or persuasive argument at this moment in time for renouncing the use of force. I presume my hon. Friend means not by the United Kingdom, but by the west—the international community in general. I believe he is profoundly wrong for three reasons. First, if the United States—the key country in this regard—the west and the international community renounced the use of force at this stage, I believe that Israel would be more likely to decide to act unilaterally. The Israelis know perfectly well that their military capability is far less than that of the United States and that the Americans, with their cruise missiles, bunker-busting bombs and other capabilities, stand a much better chance of destroying or severely degrading Iran’s nuclear capability. As long as the United States has not ruled out that option, the Israelis are under much greater pressure to allow the negotiations the best possible opportunity to produce the desired result. If that option is removed from the table, particularly by the United States, the Israelis will say, “We are sorry, but sanctions are not working and the negotiations are going nowhere. Every week that passes creates a more dangerous Iran. If no one else will act, we will.” I say to my hon. Friend that, for anyone who understands the Israeli position, this is not scaremongering, but the most likely consequence.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

If the Israelis do act unilaterally, what sanctions should be applied to them?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The Israelis acted unilaterally against Iraq when they removed the Osirak reactor, and both the western world and the Arab world breathed a huge sign of relief. It would ultimately depend on how successful the Israelis could be, and that is a separate question.

Secondly, this is inevitably an extraordinarily complex period of diplomacy and, as other hon. Members have noted, diplomacy requires maximum pressure. It requires carrots and sticks. To reduce unnecessarily the pressure we can apply would be to act fundamentally against our own interests. There are circumstances—very limited circumstances—when it is right to rule out the use of force in advance. Let me give an example, because it is a question of disproportionate responses. When Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands, some rather foolish people said, “The United Kingdom has a nuclear weapon, so why does it not just threaten Argentina that it will use it if it does not withdraw from the Falkland Islands?” The Government at the time rightly said that under no circumstances was that an option, because it would have been an incredibly disproportionate response, and that was of course the right position to take.

However, we are not in such a situation. When a country is contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons, as the rest of the world believes Iran is, even if my hon. Friend does not, and when we know that that would dramatically alter the geopolitical balance of power in the Gulf—the capability of producing a nuclear weapon in a few weeks is as serious as actually having one—that is a huge threat. We can debate whether it is a legitimate threat, but the possibility of using conventional force to destroy that capability in order to prevent the emergence of such a nuclear weapon state is not inherently unreasonable, extreme or irrational.

[Dr Sarah Wollaston (Totnes) (Con)]

Is it not in Israel’s gift to de-escalate the situation and move away from a nuclear arms race by declaring its own nuclear capability?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

That might be an option, but the political reality is that Israel has had nuclear weapons for 30 years and that has not led to Arab countries threatening seriously to develop their own nuclear capability. The reason the Saudis and others have reacted in such a hostile way to Iran is that they know that Iran is intent on geopolitical dominance in the Gulf region by being the only country of the Muslim world, other than Pakistan, to have nuclear weapons capability or the reality of it. I believe that we cannot rule out a military response because the potential for such a response must be part of the equation.

[Paul Flynn]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I do not want to accept too many interventions, for the reasons you have mentioned, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Thirdly, the use of force will never be a desirable response, but it might be the least bad one if all else fails. In considering that, let me put to the House what I think is a very important point. Many commentators have drawn attention to all the downsides of a military response. They suggest that an attack by the United States—let us concentrate on the United States at the moment—would lead to a hike in the oil price, which is correct. They suggest that it might lead to increased terrorist support by Iran for Hezbollah or Hamas and to attempts to block the strait of Hormuz and all that that would entail, and they are right. There are various other downsides, too. But, when we think about it, we find that almost all the examples—the correct examples that have been given—of the adverse consequences of a military strike by the United States are relatively temporary. They are short to medium-term: they might last a few days, weeks or possibly even months, but they would gradually cease to have any impact.

The alternative, however, of an Iran with nuclear weapons capability is not temporary; it is permanent. Therefore, we have to come to—we cannot avoid coming to—a judgment. If diplomacy fails, if negotiations go nowhere and if sanctions do not deliver, we will at some stage still have to come to an honest judgment: whether the downside, which I do not deny exists, nevertheless has to be borne if the long-term objective is either to destroy or seriously to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability.

That brings us to a crucial question: would such action in fact do so? Do the Americans have the capability? That is ultimately a military question, and we are not privy to the military advice that the President may be receiving. If the advice is, “No, it wouldn’t,” it is not worth considering the option, but, if the advice is that we could either destroy or seriously degrade Iranian nuclear capability so that it is pushed back five or 10 years, that is a different argument.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, but does he not accept that even the US Defence Secretary admits that a successful military strike would only delay the programme for about a year—those are his words, not mine—and that what my right hon. and learned Friend ignores is the possibility that a strike could actually do much worse and inflame a regional war?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Panetta was probably referring to the consequences of an Israeli attempt to damage Iranian nuclear capability which, because the Israelis do not have cruise missiles or bunker-busting bombs, would clearly have a much more limiting effect, even if it had some limited success.

In the interests of time, I shall share my final point with the House. Sometimes the inference of those who argue against even the option of a military response is that the world would be a much more peaceful, happy and gentle place if only we renounced the use of force, even as an option, in resolving this dispute. I say to my hon. Friend, however, that we have to contemplate— for a very brief moment, Mr Deputy Speaker—the consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon state. There is not just the one response, to which my hon. Friend referred—whereby the Saudis themselves, pretty certainly, feel obliged to become a nuclear weapon state, Egypt and Turkey perhaps follow them and, therefore, the middle east, which is already the most dangerous part of the world, becomes incredibly volatile for all the perfectly obvious reasons that I do not have to go into. The only alternative, which my hon. Friend touched on, is that in order to discourage any Saudi, Egyptian or Turkish response of going nuclear the United States would have to give a nuclear umbrella guarantee to the Arab and Gulf states of the region, just as it has to NATO members, to Japan and to South Korea. In each case, when the United States gives such a guarantee, however, the guarantee is not credible unless the United States has bases in the area, as it has had in western Europe and has in the far east.

My hon. Friend’s view leads to the point that, if Iran became a nuclear weapon state, to have any prospect of discouraging the Saudis and others from becoming nuclear powers themselves, we would have to envisage not just for a few weeks, a few months or the odd year or so, but for the indefinite future, the middle east as a region where the United States, far from disengaging, became more committed and involved than it ever has—committed by guarantee not just to go to war, but if necessary to use its nuclear weapons in the defence of what would then be its allies, in the sense that NATO is an alliance, alongside the need for bases in the region, with all the inflammatory consequences of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf on a permanent basis.

The stakes are very high, and my hon. Friend cannot just sleep quietly, saying, “I don’t think we should have the military option, and everything would be peaceful if only people accepted the judgment that I have come to.” It has to be an option. We must hope that it never comes to that, but it cannot be ruled out at this stage. It is no one’s interests that it should, and therefore I commend the amendment to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I call Mr Jack Straw. The same unofficial time guidelines still apply.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

The environment in the middle east—the sectarian divides, the history of tension and its multifaceted nature—surpasses even that of India and Pakistan in its potential threat not just to regional security but to global security. It would be a very brave or very naive individual who, in the absence of the sorts of communication that were the foundation of our capacity to maintain peace over the 50 years of the cold war, presumed that we could feel confident that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, there would not be a heightened risk of nuclear conflict in the region. That is why it is right that the House try today to speak with one voice in urging on the Iranians a different course from the one implicit in the scenario that the hon. Gentleman depicted, which is the development of nuclear weapons.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) has twice mentioned nuclear deterrence, but would the right hon. Gentleman agree that nuclear deterrence requires a threat from a nuclear armed state to deter another country with a nuclear weapon? Other than the Saudis and other Arab states themselves becoming nuclear weapon states, that would require an American nuclear umbrella guarantee, with all its implications, including American bases in the region, for the indefinite future.

[Mr Alexander]

I listened with great care to the point that the distinguished former Foreign Secretary made about the American security guarantee and the potential for basing within the Gulf and elsewhere. I would also suggest, though, that given the financing of A. Q. Khan in the past, one would also need at least to countenance the possibility that, rather than rely on an American nuclear umbrella, other states in the region might take matters into their own hands. Although it might take 10 or 15 years for the development of nuclear technology, it could spur the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other means, principally financial, rather than through research. We should work extremely hard to avoid any of those scenarios in these circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Patrick Mercer]

Of course I do. I was trying to make a point. The right hon. Member for Belfast North has made his point. In defence of my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, I know his record and his background. I watched the 3rd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in action in the native city of the right hon. Member for Belfast North and they never appeased anyone. It is a fine battalion and he is a fine officer.

Some fascinating statements have been made tonight. I cannot support my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, despite my admiration. I find the amendment interesting. I found the comment from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) that American action might be acceptable or amenable—forgive me, I am paraphrasing and have not quite got the right phrase—in the short to medium term wholly remarkable in the light of what has happened in Iraq and what is happening in Afghanistan on the Pakistani border. I really do not accept that.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Perhaps I can explain to my hon. Friend what I was saying. I think that it will be clear from the record, if he reads it tomorrow. I was saying that there would of course be serious consequences from a military intervention by the United States, which could last weeks, months or even one or two years—who knows? However, if the alternative is Iran having a nuclear weapon on a permanent basis, which would mean a massively enhanced threat from a nuclear weapon state, one cannot simply dismiss the military option because there would be a significant downside for one or two years.

[Patrick Mercer]

I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. However, the words still sit uneasily with me. I do not believe that we are in the business of tinkering with world peace.

I found Defence questions earlier today very depressing. The right hon. Member for Belfast North said in this debate that this situation is the biggest threat to world peace. We are already involved in a regional war in this area. As my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) made so very clear, the country that we are talking about borders Afghanistan, and the regional war stretches through Afghanistan, into Pakistan and touches nuclear-tipped Russia at one end and the potentially nuclear-tipped Iran at the other. We cannot afford any ill-judged military action.

I do not want to sound like a stuck record and to go through all the points that have been made about Iran’s hideous rhetoric; the fact that she may be working on a weapons programme: the fact that, as we speak, she has troops involved in an exercise in southern Iran, called in support of the military leadership; the fact that she is threatening to close the strait of Hormuz; and so on. However, I will say this. When I visited Tehran, some interesting things came to mind. For instance, until I was taken down the boulevard of Bobby Sands—there is a boulevard of that name in the centre of Tehran—I had not realised that Great Britain, and Iran’s relationship with Great Britain, had such high relevance in Iranian and Persian thinking. I had not realised that Great Britain punched above its weight in Iranian thinking. I had not realised that Iran saw Britain as perfidious Albion—I am generalising hugely, of course.

Much of the west’s foreign policy is seen, obviously wrongly, as being dictated by ourselves as a tiny but important nation. I had not realised that a Tehranian might say, “Heavens above, it’s raining again. It’s typical British weather.” All the ills of the world seem to be laid at this country’s door. That puts us in an extremely important position in negotiating with Iran. Many of the Foreign Secretary’s comments therefore give me heart.

When I was in Iran, the Iranians said to us, “Are you honestly suggesting that we support al-Qaeda? Please demonstrate.” Of course, we said, “Well, we have the evidence.” “Do you?” “No, we only have circumstantial evidence.” Of course, we are used to hearing misinformation and black propaganda—we need look no further than our intervention in Iraq under the last Government, in the second Gulf war. In Iran, we said, for instance, “We have heard that the central shura of al-Qaeda is resident here in Tehran”. The reply was, “Please point it out, because it is not. There is no evidence to suggest that that is the case.”

Similarly, we asked British troops in Afghanistan whether they could demonstrate whether any of the weapons being used against them had come from Iran. The answer was yes, but there were also weapons that had come from France, the USA, Germany and Britain herself. There was nothing to indicate a relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran, despite everything that we were hearing from the western press.

Here is the rub: the single most important thing I heard in Iran was that the current generation of leaders there fully understand what it is like to be involved in a war of national survival. Many of the individuals who are now of political maturity were young men of military age during the Iran-Iraq war. One Member—forgive me, I cannot remember which—said earlier that nuclear weapons had only ever been used once. That is true, but let us not forget that in the Iran-Iraq war, when hundreds of thousands of men were killed in action and millions of people died, weapons of mass destruction were used willingly.

Syria

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

They are very serious crimes, and that is a wholly legitimate question. The hon. Gentleman will know, however, that when a country is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court—as Syria is not—the United Nations Security Council must put forward a reference to the prosecutor of the ICC. Given the difficulties of passing the moderate and sensible plan put forward by the Arab League, it will be even more difficult—indeed, currently impossible—to pass a resolution seeking a reference to the court. That is why I explained in my statement that we will make strong representations at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council, where we will press for the appointment of a special rapporteur and the establishment of special investigations into the human rights situation in Syria, as an alternative track.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Will the Foreign Secretary consider speaking to the Russian Foreign Minister before Mr Lavrov goes to Damascus tomorrow, and reminding him of the serious damage that Russia is doing to its own long-term interests in the middle east? If he does speak to him, will he draw to his attention the statement that has been put out by the opposition Syrian National Council today, in which it accuses Russia and China of being

“responsible for the escalating acts of killing”?

It goes on to say that their use of the veto in the Security Council was

“tantamount to a licence to kill with impunity”.

Will not Russia bear a heavy responsibility if Syria now descends into a bloody and protracted civil war?

[Mr Hague]

I think that that is true; I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. This is why I have used strong language of my own, at the weekend and in my statement today. I believe that the vetoes are a betrayal of the Syrian people: they make Russia and China increasingly responsible for the situation in Syria and for some of the slaughter that is taking place there. They must consider—on the basis of their own national interest, apart from anything else—whether it is a sensible policy to carry on in this way. They are turning their backs on the Arab world, which will reduce their influence in the middle east. It is my belief that they are backing a regime that is, as I have said, doomed in any case. As I said to the shadow Foreign Secretary, the Russians were left in no doubt of our well-expressed views after I had spoken to Mr Lavrov. They will also be conscious of the views being expressed in the House this afternoon.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 17th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. We obviously talk a great deal to Russia about the situation in Syria. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, within the past few weeks, has talked to Foreign Minister Lavrov about Syria, including to pass on our great concern about the systematic abuse of human rights in that country.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Although the respect for human rights in Russia may be considerably greater than in it was in the Soviet Union, does not the terrible treatment of Mr Magnitsky, his death in custody and the refusal of the Russian authorities to recognise responsibility for what happened suggest that my right hon. Friend the Minister should follow the advice of my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) and not wait until the United States has reached its conclusion, but do everything in our power to follow a similar course of action?

[Mr Lidington]

As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, we have powers in existing law to ban people from coming to this country on the grounds that their presence would not be conducive to the public good. He also knows that successive Governments have followed a practice of not commenting on individual cases. His concerns about the abuse of human rights in Russia are, however, well made. That is why my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and all Ministers, when they meet Russian counterparts, always make a point of raising human rights matters.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

We are seriously concerned about recent reports that young monks and nuns in Tibetan areas of Szechuan province have immolated themselves. As I said, we have taken that up with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, and with the Chinese embassy in London. We encourage, of course, the resolution of grievances that have led to that situation. We will continue to encourage the Chinese Government to take that constructive approach.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

As the Chinese Government have been able to recognise and respect the autonomy of both Hong Kong and Macau in the People’s Republic, should they not allow autonomy for Tibet, to ensure that, within the People’s Republic, its unique culture and identity are properly respected and recognised, and will the Government try to encourage it to do so?

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very fair point indeed. As he knows, we recognise Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China, but we call for meaningful dialogue between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities in the interests of autonomy in future. Of course, we always call for respect for human rights.