Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Luke Taylor and Matt Vickers

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

CCTV on railway network

“(1) It is a legal requirement for CCTV cameras across the railway network in England and Wales to be capable of enabling immediate access by the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces.

(2) All footage retained by CCTV cameras on the railway network must remain accessible to the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces for the entirety of the retention period.

(3) The retention period specified in subsection (2) is 30 calendar days.

(4) Further to subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report, within three months of the passing of this Act, specifying a compatibility standard that will facilitate CCTV access for the British Transport Police and any Police Force in England and Wales.”—(Luke Taylor.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I rise to speak in support of new clause 9, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). We seek a simple but critical improvement to public safety: the interoperability of CCTV systems across our railway network. Currently, rail operators maintain CCTV systems that are not integrated with British Transport police or the local territorial forces in the areas they serve. This technological gap is not just a logistical inconvenience, but an active barrier to justice and public protection.

This issue came to light in a very practical context. My hon. Friend became aware of a spike in bike thefts at St Albans City station. Despite the presence of cameras at the station, the police faced severe limitations on their access to the footage they needed, which delayed investigations and reduced the chance of recovering the stolen property. At the other end of the Thameslink line, at Sutton station, I have had an expensive e-bike stolen and two other bikes dismantled—the theft of a saddle made my ride home from work one night particularly uncomfortable.

This is not just about my cycling challenges, but about broader criminal activity on our railways, including antisocial behaviour, assaults and, most gravely, threats to the safety of women and vulnerable people using our public transport. When someone is attacked or harassed on a platform or in a train carriage, time is of the essence, and having the ability to quickly retrieve and share CCTV footage can make the difference between justice and impunity. New clause 9 would fix this problem by requiring rail operators to ensure that their CCTV systems are compatible with law enforcement systems, enabling faster, more co-ordinated responses when incidents occur. In an age when we expect smart, connected infrastructure, this is a common-sense step that aligns with public expectations and operational necessity. In the age of Great British Railways, it would be an opportunity to streamline and standardise the systems used by our currently fragmented rail system into a single, interoperable system that improves the experience and safety of riders.

I urge the Committee to support the new clause not because it would improve security on paper, but because it would make a tangible difference to the safety and confidence of passengers across the rail network.

[Matt Vickers]

Requiring CCTV on the rail network to meet police access and retention standards could bring important benefits for public safety and criminal justice. Ensuring footage is readily accessible to the police would help to deter crime, enable faster investigations and support prosecutions with reliable evidence.

Victims and witnesses benefit when their accounts can quickly be corroborated, and cases are more likely to be resolved effectively. Standardising CCTV systems across train operators would also reduce inefficiencies, removing delays that can occur due to incompatible formats or outdated technology. In high-risk areas or busy urban transport hubs, this kind of clarity and consistency could make a real difference to public confidence and police capability.

No doubt some will argue that increased surveillance on public transport raises questions about privacy and civil liberties, particularly if passengers feel that they are being constantly monitored. Also, rail operators may face high financial and logistical burdens if they are required to overhaul existing CCTV infrastructure to meet new standards. For smaller operators in particular, the cost of compliance could be significant, potentially impacting service provision or ticket prices.

I would be grateful if the Liberal Democrats told us whether this requirement would apply to all train operating companies, including heritage railways and smaller, regional operators. What specific technical or operational standards would CCTV systems be expected to meet, and how would those be determined or updated over time? Have they reviewed how many operators already meet or fall short of the proposed standards, and what level of upgrade would typically be required? Have they assessed the financial implications for train operators, and would they expect any Government funding or support to assist implementation?

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

New clause 9 would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway be made immediately accessible to the British Transport police and the relevant local Home Office police force. I am sympathetic to the cases that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, shared with the Committee. I particularly sympathise with his plight and predicament when his saddle was stolen; having to cycle home without a saddle must have been incredibly painful, so I fully welcome the aims of this new clause. We know that lack of immediate access to railway CCTV camera images has been a significant issue for the British Transport police, as it may reduce their ability to investigate crime as quickly as possible. However, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address the issue. Let me explain why.

My colleagues at the Department for Transport are looking to implement a system that will provide remote, immediate access for the BTP, Home Office forces and the railway industry where relevant. As I said, that does not need legislation. What is needed is a technological solution and the resources to provide for that. I am sure that the hon. Member will continue to press the case with the Department for Transport, and for updates on the progress of the work, but for now, I invite him to withdraw his new clause.

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[Matt Vickers]

Neighbourhood policing is the foundation of public trust in our police forces. When officers are visible, engaged and embedded in the communities they serve, crime is deterred, information flows more freely and residents feel safer and more connected. New clause 15 recognises the role of neighbourhood policing in preventing crime and promoting community confidence. Having officers who know the patch and who are known by local residents is invaluable in early intervention, tackling antisocial behaviour and protecting the vulnerable.

I should be grateful for further comments and clarity on how new clauses 15 and 16 will ensure that forces and directly elected police commissioners will have the flexibility to deploy resources based on local need, rather than being constrained by rigid top-down targets. What criteria or metrics will be used to define whether neighbourhood policing levels are sufficient to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention, and who decides what is effective? Further to that, what role will local communities have under this proposal in shaping what neighbourhood policing will look like in their area?

[Luke Taylor]

This year, the Met police will cut more than 1,700 officers, PCSOs and staff. I invite the Minister to intervene and correct me on that if necessary, as it would seem to suggest that there was an error in the figure given earlier. A correction cometh not.

That figure will include the loss of the parks police team and of officers placed in schools, who have been so critical in maintaining early intervention in those settings and diverting young people away from a life of crime. They have also improved relationships between young people and the police, ensuring that young people can trust the police when they have information that might lead to crimes being prevented or solved. Those officers are dearly needed today.

The £260 million shortfall below the required budget in London will also create a 10% cut to the forensics teams, which includes the investigation of offences such as tool theft, sexual offences and many other crimes. There will be an 11% cut to historic crime teams and a 25% cut to mounted police, who police festivals, sporting events and the protests we see happening so much more regularly in central London. There will also be a 7% cut to the dog teams that provide support to officers going into dangerous and challenging situations, leaving them unsupported and potentially at risk. There will also be reduced front counter operating hours, and there are even hints about taking firearms off the flying squad.

One might ask, “Why are these cuts relevant to this new clause?” The cuts throughout the Met police will inevitably lead to more abstractions from outer London police forces. In particular, the cuts to mounted police and dog teams will pull officers from outer London, including from Sutton and Cheam, which will leave our high streets less safe, our residents more fearful of being victims of crime and more crimes going unsolved.

That demonstrates the absolute necessity of community policing, as well as the need for guarantees to be put in place so that those cuts do not happen, which will affect my residents and residents across London. New clause 16 would also require an annual report that would give clear and transparent information on officer numbers, PCSO numbers, costs and the real-world impact on crime and public confidence. I urge Members to support this new clause.

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[Luke Taylor]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

There can be no denying that we are entering a new world with the advent of new technologies that fundamentally reshape the relationship between citizens and the state. There is probably no more vivid an example of that than live facial recognition technology, which is rightly causing great concern among people across London and throughout the UK.

I am, for instance, concerned about the installation of permanent cameras in Croydon, just next door to my community in Sutton and Cheam. In Sutton itself, the use of roaming facial recognition cameras has already caused anxiety among local people, not least the thousands of Hongkongers who call Sutton home, many of whom escaped exactly this kind of potentially abusable surveillance from the Chinese Government, only to find it trying to take root in Britain. That anxiety has often been met with the unfair and often disproven riposte that if someone has done something wrong, they have nothing to worry about.

It is undeniable that without proper safeguards, this technology can be a negative force, through either human malpractice or, perhaps just as worryingly, technological shortcomings. Research from the US has shown that the technology can be racially biased, struggling to distinguish between non-white people, because it was trained on white faces. Research from the Alan Turing Institute has shown that a version of the technology developed by Microsoft has a 0% error rate in identifying white men, but a 21% error rate in identifying dark-skinned women. Those would be worrying facts in their own right, but we are talking about liberty and justice—the two cornerstones of our democracy. We must be very careful about adopting technology that undermines that, and any sensible legislator would want safeguards in place.

Anything that further erodes minority communities’ trust in the police must be resisted and avoided. Our neighbours in the EU have done just that, limiting the use of this technology unless it is absolutely necessary for security or rescue, and requiring judicial oversight or an independent administrative authority to facilitate its safe use even in that case. New clause 19 would see us follow our European neighbours in making sure that the technology is deployed only in limited circumstances and with the maximum oversight.

Our proposed measures—including a new oversight body and new powers for the Information Commissioner’s Office to monitor the use of this tech—present a path forward that we urge the Government to take. If we do not, we will continue to languish without a proper legal framework while permanent cameras are installed. For the technology to be embedded before safeguards have been properly considered would be a democratic and civil liberties tragedy and would put us on a path to a creeping digital authoritarianism. To put it another way, it would be unfair even on those who have to use the technology.

Currently, police services across the country seem to set their own rules on usage, without the proper guidance. To protect them from bad intelligence leading to awful miscarriages of justice, they deserve clarity, just as much as the public do, on the right way to make use of this tech. Nobody seriously doubts that this sort of technology and other major advancements in fighting crime will continue to arrive on our shores. The question is how we wield the new powers that they afford us in a judicious manner. That has always been the task for legislators and enforcers. Forgive the trite idiom, but it remains true that with great power comes great responsibility. How we protect privacy and liberty while keeping ourselves safe in the hyper-digital age is a central question of our times.

[Matt Vickers]

When deployed responsibly and with appropriate safeguards, facial recognition technology is an incredibly valuable tool in modern policing and public protection. It is already being used to identify serious offenders wanted for violent crime, terrorism and child exploitation; to locate vulnerable individuals, including missing children at risk; and to enhance safety in high-risk environments such as transport hubs, major events and public demonstrations. It enables rapid real-time identification without the need for physical contact—something that traditional methods, such as fingerprinting and ID checks, cannot provide in fast-moving situations. It can accelerate investigations, reduce resource demand and ultimately make public spaces safer.

The technology is improving in accuracy, especially when governed by transparent oversight, independent auditing and clear operational boundaries. I would be grateful for further comments on whether the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and the Government feel that this proposed regulation of this crucial technology could limit the ability of law enforcement to respond swiftly to emerging threats or intelligence-led operations.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out the case for introducing new safeguards for the use of live facial recognition. I agree there need to be appropriate safeguards, but the issue requires careful consideration and I do not think that it can be shoehorned into this Bill.

I say strongly to the hon. Member that live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps keep communities safe. If I may say so, I think that some of his information is a little out of date. Despite what he implied, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including, among others, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 2008.

I fully accept, however, that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework governing the use of live facial recognition technology for law enforcement purposes is needed. We need to get this right and balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder while safeguarding individual rights. To that end, I have been listening to stakeholders and have already held a series of meetings about facial recognition, including with policing, regulators, research institutions, civil society groups and industry, to fully understand the concerns and what more can be done to improve the use of the technology.

I will outline our plans for facial recognition in the coming months. In the meantime, I hope that the hon. Member, having had this opportunity to air this important issue, will be content to withdraw his new clause.

[Luke Taylor]

Based on the comments and reassurances, I will be happy to withdraw the new clause. I would be interested in being involved in any discussions and updates as they come forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan

“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires police and crime commissioners and others to “have regard to” the police and crime plan. The new clause would replace that language with a firmer obligation to “follow the strategic priorities of” the plan. The change would apply consistently across subsections (1) to (4) of section 8.

The primary rationale for the amendment is to strengthen democratic accountability. PCCs are directly elected by the public to represent local views and set the strategic direction for policing. Their police and crime plans are developed following consultation and are expected to reflect community priorities. However, under the current “have regard to” standard, there is only a weak legal duty to consider the plan, and no binding requirement to act in accordance with it. The new clause would address that gap by ensuring that PCCs and, by extension, police forces must follow the strategic priorities that they have set and communicated to the public.

Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Luke Taylor and Matt Vickers

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.

The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.

Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.

We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell, as always.

The Liberal Democrats very much welcome the measures in clauses 78 and 79 to give the police and courts more powers to reduce vehicle theft. It is disheartening to see so much car theft in our cities, particularly London. In south-west London, a regular complaint of residents is that the police are not able to do anything about it. The police themselves are struggling. The technology has become an arms race, and these clauses are needed to keep up with thefts that are becoming so much more technologically advanced.

It is depressing that a litany of old-fashioned manual theft prevention measures are now necessary again—people are having to use steering locks and wheel clamps—because the police cannot keep up with the technology that thieves employ. We are very supportive of these measures to give the police the tools they need to crack down on this incredibly distressing form of theft.

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[Matt Vickers]

Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers.

The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime.

When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods.

The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?

[Luke Taylor]

I broadly back the powers in the clause. However, I have been involved in two cases in which an item was tracked but the tracking was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain the address. I was witness to a neighbour banging on the door of another neighbour’s home, demanding that he be let in to retrieve his phone, which he claimed had been tracked to that address. The police had been called, but they were not able to enter. When the resident came home, it was demonstrated that the phone was not at that address; it was actually five doors down. The individual had dropped the phone while walking home, and another resident had picked it up, brought it home and was looking after it until they could take it to a police station.

That individual had been incredibly agitated. Under these measures, if the police were called and the tracking information showed that the phone was at a particular address, the inaccurate data would have allowed the police to enter the property incorrectly. Are there appropriate safeguards in relation to the accuracy of the location information that is used? What measures are in place to compensate people when errors are made?

The second example is that, when my bike was stolen, I followed its tracker and went to the house where it seemed to be located. I called the police, who attended. The bike was not in the house; the tracker was actually in a van that was parked on the street outside. Again, if entry to the property had been obtained under these measures, there would have been damage and an incorrect entry to a resident’s home.

These powers seem like a good idea. The hon. Member for Stockton West called them common sense, but what seems to be common sense usually omits serious thought. Without an additional step of scrutiny, I do not think tracking information is sufficiently accurate to ensure these powers are used appropriately. I therefore invite the Minister to provide a bit more reassurance that thought will be given to accuracy and that mitigations will be in place to compensate residents when the measures are used incorrectly. We must not put residents and citizens at risk of property damage for reasons beyond their control.

Crime and Policing Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Luke Taylor and Matt Vickers

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

We are saying that they will not get ahead of others. They will join the back of the queue; they will be put down the list. The people who behave, who are responsible, who are fair, and who play by the rules will carry on in their place while others are moved down the list for misbehaving.

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

The shadow Minister talks about the victims of antisocial behaviour and the offenders. I completely agree with his desire to provide an incentive for those are offending, but offenders often live with their families and children, who are often equally the victims of the antisocial behaviour. Does he agree that to punish offenders’ children and partners in a way that makes their housing situation more precarious and denies them a good home and an aspirational move to a better area, is an inappropriate punishment for an individual and becomes, effectively, a group punishment?

[Matt Vickers]

In my part of the world, the antisocial behaviour is more often wreaked by young people. Parents should be responsible for those young people, and there should be consequences so that people help their families to fall in line and behave. I think this is the right thing to do. Those on a housing list who play by the rules should carry on, while those who misbehave, who do not play by the rules and cause absolute hell for other people, should be pushed to the bottom of the list. I stand by that.

[Luke Taylor]

I am not sure that the shadow Minister understands the severity of the difficulties that families find themselves in. I have a certain sympathy with wanting to sound like there is a serious consequence for families and individuals who are breaching orders, but this amendment is an extreme measure that would lead to misery for whole families. It seems an overreaction and an extreme punishment for a whole family to suffer in that circumstance.

[Matt Vickers]

There are decisions to make about the extremity of the consequences and sanctions, but there is a choice. Is it about the victims who suffer sleepless nights and all this havoc, whose windows have gone through, who are abused and are petrified to live in their own home, or are we on the side of the families who wreak this behaviour and the young people who terrorise others? There is a choice there.

Crime and Policing Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Luke Taylor and Matt Vickers

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

I completely agree. Many farmers in my patch would say exactly the same. When rubbish is dumped in a park or local authority area, it gets cleaned up, at huge cost to the taxpayer, but when it is dumped beyond the farm gate, or in a field owned by a farmer—or anyone else with any scale of land in a rural area—too often they have to pick up the cost, and all the consequences beyond cost.

Currently, fly-tipping offences typically result in a fine and, in some cases, a criminal record. However, repeat offenders are often penalised in a way that does not sufficiently discourage further violations. The fines can sometimes be seen as a mere cost of doing business, especially by individuals or companies who repeatedly dump waste, often for profit. The Opposition’s new clause 24 proposes adding penalty points to the driving licence of any individual convicted of a fly-tipping offence. It is a significant proposal that aims to deter people from illegally dumping waste by linking that to driving penalties, which would impact an individual’s driving record, and potentially their ability to drive. Our new clause shows that we are serious about tackling the issue of fly-tipping. By linking fly-tipping to driving penalties, the new clause would create an additional layer of consequence for those involved in illegal dumping. People with driving licences may be more cautious if they know that their ability to drive could be impacted.

I note amendment 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, but it is unclear what that amendment would achieve. I am concerned that it would not complement clause 9, and would be counterproductive. The requirement for parliamentary approval of guidance within a month could lead to delays in the implementation of important policies or updates, particularly if there are disagreements or procedural delays in Parliament. I would not want anything to impede, by overreach, our ability to tackle and curtail fly-tipping.

[Luke Taylor]

We welcome measures to combat fly-tipping. As my hon. Friend the Member for Frome and East Somerset has already mentioned, the problem is particularly concerning for rural landowners and farmers, who often have to deal with the cost of this environmental crime on their land. Amendment 4 intends to give parliamentary oversight and democratic control over the guidance. That is a good thing, which we should all support. However, I understand the concerns about delays. I think there is a balance between accountability, parliamentary approval and delays. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that.