Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

What if it is just one organisation per order? Just in case a speaking note over there with my noble friend says “Oh, but what if we need to proscribe many on the same day?” It is still possible. Just make multiple orders. But it will be one organisation per order so that no Member of Parliament or Member of your Lordships’ House can ever be told “If you vote against this order, you’ve just voted against the proscription of something like al-Qaeda”—even though it was the Women’s Institute that was included in the order. I mean no disrespect to the Women’s Institute. I think Members of the Committee take my point: one organisation per order and real scrutiny of each proscription. I really do suggest that there is no reasonable opposition to that if what we take seriously in this Committee is parliamentary scrutiny of exceptional executive action, however necessary it may sometimes be.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to both amendments in this group for the reasons that have been so eloquently set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The first point is that proscription is a very significant power for the Executive. The consequences are severe. Conduct that was hitherto perfectly lawful becomes not only unlawful but criminal. For that reason, we need to have proper checks and balances. The second reason, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that these amendments are actually quite modest. They do not try to limit or amend the scope of the criminal offences, which was the case with some of the amendments perhaps in the previous group; all they try to do is increase parliamentary scrutiny. To me, the case for doing so seems unanswerable.

The third point is that, as we know, there has been an intense debate on the proscription of Palestine Action, and views on that may differ. But my opinion is that, whichever view one takes, one should be able to support both these amendments—particularly in light of the very interesting exchange in the previous group between the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, where the idea that seemed to emerge was that there might be some way forward on tightening “glorification” by reference to proscribed organisations.

But if the reference point is proscribed organisations, we must be absolutely certain that we are getting proscription right, and we must be able to interrogate fully any proscription that the Government decide. For that reason, I think there is simply no answer to Amendment 454. We need to have one order per organisation that the Government intend to proscribe. It is no answer to say that this would place an undue burden. Civil servants will obviously have to spend considerable time putting together the evidence for proscription and, as part of that, requiring them to prepare two different orders is not asking for too much. Nor is it an answer to say that this would be an increased burden for Parliament.

When we vote on or scrutinise a proscription, we take a decision of great importance, for the reasons I have mentioned before. We should not be put again in a position, as was the case a few months ago, where we have to decide on the proscription of very different organisations—where, on the one hand, you have organisations for which the case for proscription is probably uncontroversial, and on the other hand you have examples of organisations for which there is objectively an argument to be had as to whether proscription is a good idea or not. For these reasons, I give my full support to both these amendments.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I too support both amendments. I support Amendment 449 because proscription is a huge power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “awesome”, and it is indeed an awesome power: it can turn ordinary behaviour into crime. Parliament should not be asked to rubber-stamp those decisions without proper scrutiny. Proscription can criminalise membership, association and even everyday activity, yet at present these decisions are made almost entirely within the Executive, with very limited parliamentary oversight, and that concentration of power carries risks. It leaves decisions open to mistakes or overreach and of course it can also undermine public confidence in counterterrorism law.

Parliament and the public need assurance that proscription is based on sound reasoning, reviewed independently and grounded in evidence. One thing we did not really have when we were asked to proscribe Palestine Action was evidence. Since then, we have had hints of various kinds, telling us that we will see when the evidence comes out and we will understand why that proscription was justified. But so far, I would argue, it has not been justified. Independent scrutiny is particularly important when the intelligence underpinning a proscription is classified and supposedly cannot be shared widely. Where decisions are urgent or complex, having a committee report afterwards helps Parliament and the public understand the reasoning and reinforces the legitimacy of the action taken.

I would have also supported this going further to address the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson KC—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—that proscriptions should be time-limited and expire after a set period, such as two years, unless Parliament is asked to proscribe yet again. As we know, once proscription has happened, in effect it lasts forever. Decisions this serious should not be made in private and left to drift. Parliament deserves a proper look at the evidence, so I hope that the Minister is going to bring us the evidence, as he keeps hinting in various speeches.

Amendment 454 is an excellent amendment, I have to say, because, when we proscribed Palestine Action, it was bracketed with two groups. I cannot even remember their names. They were right-wing, fascist organisations, and we had absolutely no choice about that. Had we dealt with each of those individually, we could have made a much better decision, I would argue. It seems that we just have to trust the Government—and who trusts the Government any more? Certainly not me, and many of the general public agree with me. Asking us to trust the Government is not the way it should be. It really should have better oversight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I give way also to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

Maybe the Minister can take all the questions in one go. The threshold may be the same, but there are three separate decisions and each decision is based on different evidence. We are dealing analytically with three distinct decisions, and that is the reason why there should be three different orders.

I suspect that the historical examples to which the Minister referred—I am not certain; perhaps he can explain—were cases in which all the various organisations were in the same context, whether it was organisations related to Afghanistan, ISIS or al-Qaeda. What we had in the case of Palestine Action was the lumping together of very different organisations: a British extreme movement and two white supremacist Russian movements. They have nothing to do with each other, and the evidence is different. Does the Minister accept that, in those circumstances in particular, where we are dealing with very different decisions based on different evidence, there should be an order per organisation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, have made fair and reasonable points. We group them for speed and efficiency, and historically they have been grouped because we want to clear a number of proscription orders at the same time. However, I put this point on the table for the Committee: if, in the light of the advice of the security services of officials, ministerial interrogation of that and, now, the added locus of the Intelligence and Security Committee having sight of and being able to be briefed on those orders, we brought three orders into one order, the threshold remains the same, and that threshold will have been crossed by those organisations. It might be that its members have a sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than the Russian nationalist cause, but the threshold decided by ministerial jurisdiction, on advice from officials and the security services, is the same: they have crossed the threshold of the 2000 Act for a terrorist organisation. Making them separate orders would still mean that Members of both Houses would have to vote and say, “We do not accept that they have crossed the threshold”. That is a different decision.

I am conscious of time. Those points have been made. I hope I have put the Government’s case with the response I made to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and with my “take it or leave it” explanation of the points on disambiguation of the orders. Members can reflect on it. In the meantime, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

I find it striking that in this statement there was not a single mention of the unborn child. It is as if such a person does not exist morally or physically. We often use the phrase “the elephant in the room”—everyone knows about it, but it is never mentioned. This is the baby in the room. When we talk about the most vulnerable, surely we must mean that human being. For all these reasons, this clause must not stand.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 456 has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Wolf and Lady Falkner, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, who unfortunately cannot be here due to a prior commitment overseas.

This is a simple amendment: it would reinstate the offences that Clause 191 would otherwise decriminalise for women acting in relation to their pregnancies. The amendment also provides that criminal proceedings against any woman acting in relation to her pregnancy could not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General. Under the current law, a woman may avoid criminal liability if defences such as duress apply. The effect of Clause 191 would be that, regardless of circumstances, it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to do any act with the intention of procuring her own miscarriage at any stage of the pregnancy. It would, however, remain an offence for any other person to administer drugs or use instruments to cause an abortion. If Clause 191 is adopted, we would end up with a law that simultaneously denies criminal responsibility to the principal—again, regardless of individual intent or circumstances—while maintaining it for others.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for the very useful meeting that she arranged before Christmas for some of us and the proponents of Clause 191, in particular Ms Antoniazzi MP. As the proponents explained to us, what has prompted Clause 191 is a rise in completely unmeritorious investigations against women. Some of these cases are genuinely appalling. For example, we know of the case of a woman who went into spontaneous premature labour, called for help and instead of being met by medical support was met by the police. While she was still trying to resuscitate her prematurely born baby, even before the paramedics arrived, the police were in the house searching the bins. She was separated from her critically ill baby and investigated for a year for abortion offences, despite medical tests confirming she had not taken any medication.

There are other cases where women have been forced to take abortion pills by an abusive or violent partner, and they were put under criminal investigation while the partner was not. These investigations seldom result in prosecutions and the very few prosecutions hardly ever result in a conviction.

Under our amendment, the consent of the Attorney-General would be required to institute criminal proceedings, not to open an investigation, but there are reasons to believe that this procedural requirement would have a restraining impact on the investigation phase too. The Attorney-General cannot give consent retrospectively. The CPS’s guidance for offences that require AG consent makes it very clear that prosecutors should seek consent before charge.

The current policy for these offences also requires the involvement of senior officials. Before a case is submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for consent, a deputy chief crown prosecutor or deputy head of a central casework division must check that the case has been prepared to an appropriate standard. Following on from that, a lawyer at the Attorney General’s Office will review the application before placing it before the Attorney-General. That lawyer may seek further information or clarification from the relevant prosecutor and their line manager. It is also necessary to ensure that the Attorney-General is allowed sufficient time to consider the case, so that he can make his own assessment.

Finally, for all these offences, the role of the Attorney-General does not end with the consent to prosecution. The Attorney-General will have to maintain an interest in the progress of the case and be kept up to date.

The amendment cannot rule out the risk of an inappropriate or unmeritorious investigation. That risk cannot be ruled out for any offence on our statute book. The amendment seeks to balance competing legal and moral principles, while taking into account the reality of the situation.

The requirement for Attorney-General consent should discourage the police from investigating cases that will not pass muster not only with the CPS at a senior level but with the Attorney-General. The requirement would also offer an opportunity for a tightening of the policy in respect of these offences so that the risk of unmeritorious investigations and prosecutions is further reduced. The amendment does not specify a requirement for the Attorney-General to introduce guidance on the circumstances in which consent would be given, but it is to be expected that such guidance will be published and could make it clear that the bar is, indeed, high.

This is a probing amendment. There are other amendments in this group that I am interested in and inclined to support to mitigate what seems a rather radical approach in Clause 191. It would be of assistance in this debate if the Government could help us understand a bit more about what is really happening with these investigations.

To conclude, I have three brief questions for the Minister. First, what is the latest available data on these investigations, and do the data confirm an increase in criminal investigations against women since 2020? Secondly, how do the Government explain this rise in investigations? Finally, other than Clause 191—which, of course, was not part of the Bill originally—what policy steps have the Government been considering to remedy this problem?

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461J. I thank my noble friend Lady Goudie, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for supporting it.

The amendment seeks to add a new clause after Clause 191 that would pardon women who have had a conviction or caution for an offence abolished by Clause 191. Because of the existing 1861 legislation, abortion is classified as a violent crime. The record means that these women will permanently have to declare it as part of a DBS check, thus continuing the damage caused by this offence. It would ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems.

Like Amendment 459C, Amendment 461J seeks to right a wrong and an injustice. Of course, it is not the first time your Lordships have sought to do this, when something which has been unlawful and unjust is abolished. I am referring to the changes of the law on homosexuality and what followed.

The amendments in this very large group that seek to amend or get rid of this clause—passed as it was by a vote of 137 to 379 on a free vote in the Commons—will form the debate this afternoon. For example, Amendment 455, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, seems to profoundly misunderstand what it means, because if abortion remains criminalised after 24 weeks of gestation then, under the current law, only women who have an abortion after 24 weeks of gestation are targeted by the police, even when, in most cases, they have had a spontaneous miscarriage or a stillbirth. That amendment would make no difference to the current cruel situation, but the noble Baroness actually says she wants to get rid of the whole clause anyway.

Amendments 456 and 456A, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, would, essentially, reverse the change agreed in the Commons and mean that abortion would remain criminalised. But I am aware that some noble Lords who are very concerned about this clause also support reproductive rights for women. We have already had many meetings about this, with the royal colleges and others. I ask that, between now and the next stage, those of us who take the view that reproductive rights are important but have concerns should continue those discussions.

Unlike what the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, said in her speech on the clause standing part, this clause was not plucked out of thin air in the Commons. It is the product of years and years of trying to mitigate the criminalisation of women under cruel and awful circumstances. There have been entreaties to the DPP, discussions with the policing bodies and discussions with our legal systems, and every single one of them—I could bore the Committee by giving dates and facts—has taken the view that Parliament has to take a view on this matter. This is not something that can be mitigated by changing guidelines or rules. Indeed, Parliament took a view on this and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland a few years ago. As I said, this had no detrimental effect.

This clause seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales are no longer subject to year-long investigations and criminal charges—the kind of situation that the noble Lord just explained. Since 2020, around 100 women have faced police investigations. Six have gone to court; one has been sent to prison. The clause will not change the wider abortion law, or the existing time limits of the 1967 Act. It is supported by 50 organisations, including the medical royal colleges, violence against women and girls groups, every group that represents abortion providers in the UK and other women’s organisations. We should discuss our concerns about the clause and whether it does the job we want it to do, but there is support for it. Fifty countries in the world have not criminalised abortion. Why on earth should we in England and Wales?