National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I realise that it is unusual to speak this early in the debate, but I just hope the House will bear with me for a second. I believe it is important to give a view on the two sets of amendments that have been moved, so that colleagues will understand where the Government are coming from in any contributions they wish to make.

I recognise the concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about inadvertently criminalising the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and the resulting chilling effect this could have on important work. We have listened to the concerns and we have had extensive discussion outside the Committee. The Government will accept a new defence into Sections 17B and 17C, which is manifested by Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A, where conduct is carried out for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities, which are defined as only those activities carried out in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.

I am also grateful again for Amendment 17A from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which is based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC, to expand the defence of “reasonable excuse” to cover obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This pragmatic proposal will mean that, where a legitimate humanitarian organisation, such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, or a charity involved in conflict resolution, or indeed a journalist, takes information from a designated body, which could be about the location of landmines, for example, that organisation will not fall foul of the new offence at Section 17C. The amendment that the Government are willing to accept in the form of new Section 17C(7A) is intended to reflect that.

Again, I am happy if any other noble Lords wish to contribute to the debate and make any further points, if the House will allow me at the end of the debate to respond to those points. I thought it important to put on record now that there should be no difference between us. Therefore, the debate, I would hope, is about the importance of this subject, rather than the Government being forced into agreeing any particular amendment or not. With that, I will sit down and allow other noble Lords to contribute, but I hope the Government’s position is now clear.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. It makes things much easier and will shorten the debate. The point that I was going to make, in respect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is that designated bodies are different from terrorist organisations, because they may be exercising public functions in certain countries. For that reason, there are a number of British nationals who will have to engage with the designated bodies for perfectly legitimate reasons. Most of the examples that we have dealt with concern precisely that scenario: that is, cases of British nationals providing humanitarian assistance, journalists or those involved in conflict resolution.

But we should not lose sight of the possibility that even businesses could find themselves caught by these offences but for the reasonable excuse defence, which has now been accepted. There may, for example, be British businesses operating in Iran for perfectly legitimate reasons that will have to sell an investment and will have to obtain information from a designated body as part of that process. There may be British-Iranian dual nationals who have to, in the same way, accept or obtain information because they have to renew a passport or such other things. The reasonable defence excuse, which has now been cast in sufficiently wide terms, captures those situations. I am a little bit unclear about Section 17B, but the Section 17B offence concerns me a bit less because it already contains an important provision, UK-related activities, so does not come with as much of a risk of inappropriate application as Section 17C. With that, I welcome the Government’s concession on both of these aspects.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 22 in the group in my name and the name of my noble friend Lady D’Souza. It touches on the issues that my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich raised in his remarks. I am very pleased with the progress that we have made around humanitarian organisations.

During the Second Reading debate last week, I specifically referred to the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross and said that it would passing strange if the united desire of this House to designate organisations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could be used to impede the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I specifically referred to an amendment to the Bill which it asked should be moved. I tabled it in due course and it is on the Order Paper.

During our very helpful meeting yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, responded to another point that I raised with him and that I had also raised in correspondence with my noble friend Lord Anderson over the weekend concerning the position of journalists. I was struck by representations made by the admirable Alex Crawford from Sky News, who had given evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights during our inquiry into the activities of ISIS. The noble Lord will recall that I have raised with him the failure to prosecute any of the 400 ISIS members who committed genocide against Yazidis in northern Iraq and northern Syria and who have returned to this country. Not one of them has been prosecuted for crimes against humanity or the crime of genocide.

Alex Crawford went into the camps inside Syria and Iraq and very bravely interviewed some of the insurgents who were there, and she came to give evidence to our committee. She asked, “Would that mean, under the terms of this legislation, that I could be prosecuted for working to establish information and knowledge by going in directly to deal with a proscribed organisation?” I would like further clarity, just for the record and to put it beyond doubt, for people such as Alex Crawford, Lyse Doucet or many others. Last week, I referred to Kate Adie, who stood in Tiananmen Square at the time of the massacres that occurred there. Would someone like that also be placing themselves at risk under the legislation? Let us put that beyond doubt. I know that it is not the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson. During our discussions yesterday, I felt that we made very significant progress in dealing with that.

I will just briefly refer to the position of the IRGC. This is not just about NGOs. The IRGC, as we all know, has to do some very delicate, sensitive and confidential work, sometimes engaging directly in places where there are organisations that we have proscribed or that we will, in the future, designate. Much of this can be funded by the United Kingdom, pursuant to the Geneva conventions, and this can include the provision of medical care of the wounded and sick. So, the idea that this could proscribe such groups solely to secure humanitarian access to civilian populations and detain persons—

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The then Labour Government recognised that a specific stand-alone offence of dissemination was needed to address the fact that the dissemination of terrorist publications was not covered by the offence of inviting support in the Terrorist Act 2000. I hope the Minister can confirm that this Labour Government will take the same sensible steps that their predecessors took, and I look forward to what he has to say. I beg to move.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. As he has explained, Amendment 20 would create an offence mirroring an existing offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under that section, it is already an offence for a person to wear an item of clothing in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that that person is a supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. So we already have that offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act in respect of proscribed terrorism organisations; but, unless Amendment 20 is adopted, there will be no similar offence for someone wearing a uniform or displaying the insignia of a designated body.

I agree with those who have said a number of times that state threats call for a different response in some respects from that which we adopt in respect of terrorist organisations, but I do not see why, in respect of this particular offence, a different approach is needed. With this Bill we are trying to protect our public spaces—our public sphere, really—from the influence of malign foreign state organisations and from their attempts to subvert our democratic values and our liberal principles.

The Bill criminalises supporting a designated body but, as the Minister has explained before, it does so on a basis that is more demanding than for the corresponding offence under the Terrorism Act, so it would be challenging to rely on the offence of “supporting” to target the particular conduct Amendment 20 is aimed at. The “supporting” offence requires a prohibited purpose, which is defined as follows:

“that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know”,

that the purpose

“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Faced with a person wearing the uniform of a designated organisation or carrying the insignia of that organisation in our streets, it would be difficult for the police to apply that test and quickly determine whether the prohibited purpose, which is not a low bar, was satisfied in the specific circumstances. But, if we have an offence such as Amendment 20 would introduce, which mirrors an existing offence under terrorism legislation, that determination could be made more simply and there would be no reason for the police to hesitate.

I hesitate to make comparisons with the 1930s, but I imagine that if we had had this power then, we would have designated the SS and then surely would have expected our police to arrest those wearing SS uniform in public spaces. I do not understand the hesitation the Government have in adopting this amendment, which, as we have heard, has already been recommended by a number of experts. I do not believe that immunity is a good reason. It is already the case that if an Iranian diplomat chooses to wear a Hamas uniform, he cannot be arrested because he enjoys immunity. Even though he would be committing an offence under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act, that diplomat would be able to invoke immunity. If the same person chooses to wear in London an IRGC uniform—if the Government end up designating that organisation—that person would be entitled to immunity. I do not think that immunity is a good reason for not extending this offence to designated organisations. For that reason, I hope that the Government will be able to support the amendment or, at the very least, indicate a willingness to adopt an offence on very similar terms. If the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, is going to divide the Committee on his amendment, he will have my support.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, I too have added my name in support of Amendment 20 and endorse everything my noble friend Lord Verdirame has just said. I will briefly add, for emphasis, that the Government have promised an equivalent power for state-related organisations and without this, one of the key planks would not have an equivalent power.

Finally, if I understood correctly the concern expressed about the keffiyeh at the beginning of speech of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that not an article of clothing now commonly associated with a fully proscribed terrorist organisation, Hamas? As has been said, if such legal jeopardy arose, the relevant law does exist—Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. It is not widely used, and the argument would probably be that this headdress was originally about the assertion of Palestinian national identity. It has indeed been co-opted by supporters of Hamas, but it is a separate question which I do not think impinges on whether this amendment ought to be supported.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I too support the Bill and commend the Government for bringing forward this long-awaited legislation. I join others in paying tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, who has done much of the work that has paved the way for this legislation, both as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation. As he repeatedly pointed out, we cannot deal with state threats, including state terrorism, by simply using the same approach that we have used for terrorism legislation. There are political, diplomatic and legal differences.

One of the key legal reasons why state threats need a different approach is that state officials enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction in our courts in respect of their official conduct. I suspect that immunity is one of the main reasons why the Government decided that we cannot have a straightforward membership offence which mirrors the offence under general terrorism legislation.

My questions are about the scope of some of the offences, and in particular new Section 17B of the National Security Act 2023, the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, which would be introduced by Clause 2. To understand the reach of the offences, it may be helpful to test them against some examples, and I have two.

The first is that of an IRGC plotter based in Tehran who has co-ordinated attacks by proxies in the United Kingdom. If that IRGC plotter happened to fly to the United Kingdom, or to another country from which he could be extradited to the United Kingdom, what, if any, conduct would we say has taken place in the United Kingdom for the purposes of the new Section 17B offence? Section 17B will criminalise the provision of assistance to a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities. Subsection (5) provides that the offence

“will apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom but applies to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdon only if the person engaging in the conduct is a UK person”,

or acts on behalf of the Crown or holds office for the Crown.

In my example, the person is not a UK national and does not act on behalf of the Crown, and that person will presumably say that, in those circumstances, his conduct, such as it was, took place wholly outside the UK, so the offence does not apply. They would be able to rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in El Khouri which dealt, in the context of extradition, with the definition of the word “conduct”. The Supreme Court held that

“the word ‘conduct’ would normally and naturally be understood as a synonym for acts done by the requested person in the specified location and not as including effects (whether intended or not) felt in that location of acts done somewhere else. A compelling reason is needed to interpret ‘conduct’ as bearing such an abnormally wide meaning”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is here. The Supreme Court dealt with one of his speeches in another case, that of Cando Armas, in which the noble and learned Lord had taken a different approach. If that had prevailed, we would not have the problem we will have under Section 17B in my example.

It is true that in my example, the person may be relying on, or invoking, immunity, but immunity is quite specific to the facts. That person may not have been a state official, or a former state official, so in the facts of the case they may not be able to invoke immunity successfully but, in any event, immunity is a separate issue and it is not a reason for limiting the definition of the offence. Thus, on the question of the scope of Section 17B, assuming that all the work had taken place in Iran—outside the UK—what would we say is the conduct that has taken place in the UK, so that we can potentially prosecute that person under Section 17B?

My second question on scope concerns the definition of “UK-related activities”. The offence of assisting a designated body is committed if the person intends that conduct materially to assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities, which are defined in subsection (5) as

“activities taking place in the United Kingdom”

and

“activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Let us take another example: that of a person who is based in the United Kingdom and engages in the conduct of assisting the designated body in the UK, but the activities the designated body is pursuing are activities against an ally of the UK, be it Ukraine, the UAE or Israel. The Government will argue—the Minister referred to this in his opening remarks—that the UK-related activity would include activity against our friends and allies. However, if I understood him correctly, he also said that it would still be necessary for there to be some “recognisable effect” in the UK. I think he mentioned that international law requires—I am still a bit confused about this—certain jurisdictional links between the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the state. However, in this case, there is an obvious link: the conduct would have taken place in the United Kingdom. The person in question would have done the planning and provided the support to the designated body in the UK, and then the designated body’s activities would have targeted one of our allies. As I understand the position under international law, there is already a sufficient nexus with the UK territory for us to take action against such an individual, so why would a further nexus be necessary? It is an important question, because it will define the extent to which we will be able to use this legislation against individuals who will use the United Kingdom as a base for planning activities against allies abroad.

In closing, I raise the question of the time allocated to this Bill. There is broad support for it, and we all agree it has to be put on the statute book quite quickly, but some points have emerged that require further discussion. In addition to those I have raised, I want to explore the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. We have only two days to table amendments and then just one day to debate them. I very much hope, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, that we are going to have a long session next week to debate the amendments.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I want to strongly support these amendments, and I shall be relatively brief. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, was kind enough to inform the Committee that in her presence I described the present situation as illogical. In fact, I think I spoke a good deal more strongly than that, and she has been kind enough not to repeat the totality of my remarks.

This is a reform which has been proposed and urged upon successive Governments for years. I found the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, utterly persuasive and completely unanswerable. I take issue with him on only one point, which is when he expressed a little bit of surprise that the CPS would be supporting him. When I was the head of the CPS, I strongly supported this reform. Indeed, shortly after I stepped down from that position, I wrote a column in the Times asking this question: what is it about prosecuting war criminals in this context that the Government do not like? I never received a reply to that question which I understood, and the question is still live.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I also offer my support but express some concerns that I believe could be addressed. I do not think I need to say very much as to the reasons I support the amendments, because the speakers before me have all done such a stellar job.

The one point that I would perhaps clarify is that a number of these offences under international law impose on the UK an obligation to prosecute or extradite. The problem that we have is that, in many cases, we cannot extradite. We cannot extradite in some cases because there is no jurisdiction that can, in practice, begin a criminal prosecution. But sometimes we cannot extradite because the jurisdictions to which we would extradite are jurisdictions where the suspect would face the death penalty or torture. In those cases, the individuals would, in effect, find a safe haven here because of our generous human rights protection, to which I think we should all remain committed. So we may end up with individuals who cannot be deported or extradited and whom we cannot prosecute unless we have some reform of universal jurisdiction. That is the need for this change, which would also bring us into line with international obligations.

My concerns are the following. First, we need to remember that universal jurisdiction is the last resort. In a lot of these cases, it is true that the country where the offence was committed, or of which the alleged offender is a national, will not be able to prosecute. However, ideally, the prosecutions should take place in a jurisdiction that has a closer connection with either the offence or the offender. Where that is not possible, we need to look at other options. Another option is prosecution before an international court and tribunal. As we know, under the ICC statute, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is always complementary to national jurisdictions. Only in the third instance, and as a last resort, should we look at prosecution under universal jurisdiction. It is only when everything else fails, which unfortunately might happen quite often, that prosecution under universal jurisdiction should be contemplated.

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[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I ask the noble Lord to continue the discussions with those of us proposing this amendment today, but our amendment is not as ambitious as he suggests. I wish it were, but actually it is much more limited. On some of the points he raised about the kinds of people who could be brought for prosecution to the United Kingdom under universal jurisdiction more widely, yes, that could happen in a country like Germany, but it would not happen under this amendment. This is about people coming here and being able to do so with impunity rather than immunity, simply because we do not have any powers to arrest them or take them to court.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

I appreciate that it is about only those who are within the jurisdiction, but a lot of officials come within the jurisdiction at different points in time and for different reasons. There was another case a few years ago in which I was also instructed, concerning the visit of the Egyptian head of intelligence to the United Kingdom. On that occasion, there was an attempt to arrest him, which failed, and his immunity was upheld. That is the sort of scenario where we need clarity.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am very glad that my noble friend has raised that point, because it is very relevant. If, for instance, the Foreign Office were to say to the Attorney-General, “We are bringing someone here to have discussions about how to secure peace in Sudan”, but they might have been involved with the RSF or the Sudanese Army in some of the atrocities there, there would be no requirement to prosecute them, because in those circumstances the Attorney-General simply would not allow the prosecution to proceed.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

It is not quite like that, because the Foreign Office would have to issue special permission for the person who came within the jurisdiction, and now that we have clarified the law, that would give that individual immunity. As for the Attorney-General’s decision not to consent, there is a risk that that could be subject to judicial review, and there have already been attempts in that space. But I agree that that is a very important procedural requirement, and it is already in the Act.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 472 and 473. On the arguments and all the difficulties and intricacies, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, cannot be doubted, given his involvement and the things he has done. In the end, however, I am a simple person. I know that there are complications and it is difficult, but if these amendments are accepted, it would allow the possibility of exploring all those intricacies and complications.

The really annoying thing for most of us is when people whom we know have committed terrible atrocities—when the evidence is incontrovertible—can leave the places they have devastated and come here to do their shopping and have holidays. This country, and particularly this present Government, say that everything is going to be best under the rule of law. Lord Bingham, in his book The Rule of Law, said some wonderful things—that the rule of law is the nearest thing we have to a universal origin. In other words, there are no areas the rule of law does not cover. I say that because there is a possibility of enshrining what Lord Bingham was talking about.

Globalisation has given we citizens of the world the possibility of living in a global village. It is no longer about living on this little island—we all belong to this huge global village, and whoever touches any citizen in our global village touches us. It is not just the people who live in Ukraine or somewhere else: they touch them, and they are touching us.

We are therefore partly involved in all this. The United Kingdom must not become a haven, as the noble Lord said, for those who committed such atrocities and are escaping justice and the places where they were done. We must not be a place that gives the impression that the door is open and they can come here. They do their shopping, and some even bring their children to send them to university or other places of learning; I have known this. They think that they are getting away with it. To me, that is what must not happen.

Margaret and I came to this country in 1974, and it was another nearly six years before Idi Amin’s Government fell. We were terrified to have any contact with the Ugandan embassy, because the people he had sent before his Government fell had committed terrible atrocities. Margaret and I knew these characters and they got away with it. In his regime, nearly 900,000 people were murdered, including the chief justice, the chancellor of the university, the head of the civil service—I could go on and on. These dictators and people like that seem to have a very long arm that prevents anybody getting near them.

For me, these amendments are opening a door for further conversation. The proposers of the two amendments were wise in saying that this, if it is to happen, should be laid at the door of the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General, who has a lot of advisers and very able people, will look at it and make a decision on whether prosecution happens. They are not simply opening it out to every court, to everybody, to think they can have a go. It is so limited. If we do not do this, as a country that really upholds the rule of law, and if we do not have this universal jurisdiction as an armoury in place, we will simply have people coming here when they have committed terrible atrocities, and they will look as though they are untouchable.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, my old home city, for the way in which he has approached these amendments. I thank him for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which he chairs, and through him I pass on my thanks to my old colleague Sarah Champion, the MP for Rotherham, for the work she has done on this issue. As he knows, we had an opportunity to debate the committee’s report in Grand Committee. I was fortunate that my noble friend Lord Katz took the debate on that occasion and was able to set out the Government’s response, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will realise has not really changed in the intervening months since that debate. However, I am grateful to him, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their supportive comments, and I will come on to comments from other noble Lords in due course. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is not in her place at the moment, and missed the start of the debate so was therefore not able to speak in this debate—although she tried—but if she reads Hansard tomorrow, she can make any points she was going to raise in a letter to me and we will consider those prior to Report, which I hope is a fair compromise.

Before I go on to the main bulk of the arguments, I refer to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and his comments on the death of Mr Ryan Evans, of Wrexham, which is close to both him and me. It is obviously a deeply sad incident and his death in Ukraine in 2024 followed a Russian strike, as the noble Lord outlined. The UK Government continue to support efforts to ensure accountability for the crimes that are committed in Ukraine. This includes supporting the independent investigation of the International Criminal Court into the situation in Ukraine, as well as providing assistance to Ukrainian domestic investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. Although I cannot give him much succour today in relation to that particular issue, I hope he will pass on the Government’s condolences to Ryan’s parents. We are obviously happy to have further representations on that matter should he wish to make them in due course.

The points made by my noble friend Lord Katz in the previous debate—and those with which I shall respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—relate to the fact that the UK applies its universal jurisdiction only to a very few specific international crimes. Our approach to universal jurisdiction is designed to ensure that those suspected of, or accused of, crimes are investigated, charged and tried fairly and impartially at every stage, with access to all available evidence. This is in accordance with local constitutional and legal frameworks. It remains the case—and I know this will disappoint those noble Lords who have spoken in support today—that we do not believe that it is necessary at this time to extend the scope of the UK’s policy on universal jurisdiction to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the long-standing view of successive Governments in general that where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime—and this goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted where they are perpetrated. That also goes to some of the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, because the advantages of securing evidence and the witnesses required for a fair investigation and a successful prosecution are part of a credible judicial process.

It should be noted that the UK already has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity where they are alleged to have been committed by UK nationals or residents. In some cases where the UK does not have jurisdiction, such as in Ukraine—I have just mentioned the situation in relation to Mr Ryan Evans, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—we are trying to ensure that we build domestic capabilities, and we support the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General to ensure that allegations of war crimes are fully investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.

To go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, the most serious international crimes not covered by the UK’s universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which, again, I would argue today, is better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities. The UK is a strong supporter of the ICC and its mission to end impunity. I know that we will do what we can to ensure that the crimes that have been mentioned today are dealt with by that international court, but I have to say that the debate that we had in the Moses Room, led by my noble friend Lord Katz, and the response I have given to the amendments today are the Government’s position. I accept and respect the points that have been put to the Committee today, but given the considerations that I have mentioned, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to withdraw his amendment. In saying that, I suspect we will return to these matters on Report. The Government will always reflect on what has been said in Committee, but I hope in due course the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

I apologise for interrupting, but I just wanted to make sure that I am not misunderstood. The ICC is there where it has jurisdiction, but the problem that we have is that, in some of these countries, there is no ICC jurisdiction yet. Syria is not a party to the ICC; Ukraine has become a party to the ICC but only as of 1 January 2025. Any offence in Ukraine predating that would be an issue in terms of ICC jurisdiction. That is where the gap in universal jurisdiction policy is quite relevant. I just wanted to clarify my position, which was not to say that we do not need it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I accept that, and I thought I understood the noble Lord’s position clearly, but I am grateful for his clarification. It still adds to the general point that I have made today, and I go back to the original, overarching point that the UK applies universal jurisdiction to only a very few specific international crimes. Our approach—through long-standing support of successive Governments—is that, where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime, we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted close to where they are perpetrated. That may not be a position that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, or his supporters today, but it is one which I hope I have clarified. I note also—which I did not mention earlier—the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the general approach of the noble Lord, Lord Alton. With that, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

What if it is just one organisation per order? Just in case a speaking note over there with my noble friend says “Oh, but what if we need to proscribe many on the same day?” It is still possible. Just make multiple orders. But it will be one organisation per order so that no Member of Parliament or Member of your Lordships’ House can ever be told “If you vote against this order, you’ve just voted against the proscription of something like al-Qaeda”—even though it was the Women’s Institute that was included in the order. I mean no disrespect to the Women’s Institute. I think Members of the Committee take my point: one organisation per order and real scrutiny of each proscription. I really do suggest that there is no reasonable opposition to that if what we take seriously in this Committee is parliamentary scrutiny of exceptional executive action, however necessary it may sometimes be.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to both amendments in this group for the reasons that have been so eloquently set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The first point is that proscription is a very significant power for the Executive. The consequences are severe. Conduct that was hitherto perfectly lawful becomes not only unlawful but criminal. For that reason, we need to have proper checks and balances. The second reason, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that these amendments are actually quite modest. They do not try to limit or amend the scope of the criminal offences, which was the case with some of the amendments perhaps in the previous group; all they try to do is increase parliamentary scrutiny. To me, the case for doing so seems unanswerable.

The third point is that, as we know, there has been an intense debate on the proscription of Palestine Action, and views on that may differ. But my opinion is that, whichever view one takes, one should be able to support both these amendments—particularly in light of the very interesting exchange in the previous group between the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, where the idea that seemed to emerge was that there might be some way forward on tightening “glorification” by reference to proscribed organisations.

But if the reference point is proscribed organisations, we must be absolutely certain that we are getting proscription right, and we must be able to interrogate fully any proscription that the Government decide. For that reason, I think there is simply no answer to Amendment 454. We need to have one order per organisation that the Government intend to proscribe. It is no answer to say that this would place an undue burden. Civil servants will obviously have to spend considerable time putting together the evidence for proscription and, as part of that, requiring them to prepare two different orders is not asking for too much. Nor is it an answer to say that this would be an increased burden for Parliament.

When we vote on or scrutinise a proscription, we take a decision of great importance, for the reasons I have mentioned before. We should not be put again in a position, as was the case a few months ago, where we have to decide on the proscription of very different organisations—where, on the one hand, you have organisations for which the case for proscription is probably uncontroversial, and on the other hand you have examples of organisations for which there is objectively an argument to be had as to whether proscription is a good idea or not. For these reasons, I give my full support to both these amendments.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I too support both amendments. I support Amendment 449 because proscription is a huge power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “awesome”, and it is indeed an awesome power: it can turn ordinary behaviour into crime. Parliament should not be asked to rubber-stamp those decisions without proper scrutiny. Proscription can criminalise membership, association and even everyday activity, yet at present these decisions are made almost entirely within the Executive, with very limited parliamentary oversight, and that concentration of power carries risks. It leaves decisions open to mistakes or overreach and of course it can also undermine public confidence in counterterrorism law.

Parliament and the public need assurance that proscription is based on sound reasoning, reviewed independently and grounded in evidence. One thing we did not really have when we were asked to proscribe Palestine Action was evidence. Since then, we have had hints of various kinds, telling us that we will see when the evidence comes out and we will understand why that proscription was justified. But so far, I would argue, it has not been justified. Independent scrutiny is particularly important when the intelligence underpinning a proscription is classified and supposedly cannot be shared widely. Where decisions are urgent or complex, having a committee report afterwards helps Parliament and the public understand the reasoning and reinforces the legitimacy of the action taken.

I would have also supported this going further to address the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson KC—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—that proscriptions should be time-limited and expire after a set period, such as two years, unless Parliament is asked to proscribe yet again. As we know, once proscription has happened, in effect it lasts forever. Decisions this serious should not be made in private and left to drift. Parliament deserves a proper look at the evidence, so I hope that the Minister is going to bring us the evidence, as he keeps hinting in various speeches.

Amendment 454 is an excellent amendment, I have to say, because, when we proscribed Palestine Action, it was bracketed with two groups. I cannot even remember their names. They were right-wing, fascist organisations, and we had absolutely no choice about that. Had we dealt with each of those individually, we could have made a much better decision, I would argue. It seems that we just have to trust the Government—and who trusts the Government any more? Certainly not me, and many of the general public agree with me. Asking us to trust the Government is not the way it should be. It really should have better oversight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I give way also to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

Maybe the Minister can take all the questions in one go. The threshold may be the same, but there are three separate decisions and each decision is based on different evidence. We are dealing analytically with three distinct decisions, and that is the reason why there should be three different orders.

I suspect that the historical examples to which the Minister referred—I am not certain; perhaps he can explain—were cases in which all the various organisations were in the same context, whether it was organisations related to Afghanistan, ISIS or al-Qaeda. What we had in the case of Palestine Action was the lumping together of very different organisations: a British extreme movement and two white supremacist Russian movements. They have nothing to do with each other, and the evidence is different. Does the Minister accept that, in those circumstances in particular, where we are dealing with very different decisions based on different evidence, there should be an order per organisation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, have made fair and reasonable points. We group them for speed and efficiency, and historically they have been grouped because we want to clear a number of proscription orders at the same time. However, I put this point on the table for the Committee: if, in the light of the advice of the security services of officials, ministerial interrogation of that and, now, the added locus of the Intelligence and Security Committee having sight of and being able to be briefed on those orders, we brought three orders into one order, the threshold remains the same, and that threshold will have been crossed by those organisations. It might be that its members have a sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than the Russian nationalist cause, but the threshold decided by ministerial jurisdiction, on advice from officials and the security services, is the same: they have crossed the threshold of the 2000 Act for a terrorist organisation. Making them separate orders would still mean that Members of both Houses would have to vote and say, “We do not accept that they have crossed the threshold”. That is a different decision.

I am conscious of time. Those points have been made. I hope I have put the Government’s case with the response I made to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and with my “take it or leave it” explanation of the points on disambiguation of the orders. Members can reflect on it. In the meantime, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Report stage & Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Verdirame]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 25, at end insert—
“(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the citizenship, during the appeal period, of a child of a person who makes an appeal under inserted section (2B).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the citizenship of the child of a person who has been deprived of citizenship, and who has made a successful appeal against the deprivation order, is not affected by the provisions of the Bill.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have tabled this amendment, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to whom I am extremely grateful. There were other noble Lords who would have wished to support the amendment but missed the rather brief moment that we had to table amendments to the Bill.

The amendment does not go as far as the Malthouse amendment in the other place, which would have given courts the power to decide whether or not a successful appeal would take effect immediately. Under our amendment, following a successful appeal by the deprived person, the deprivation order would continue to have effect in respect of the deprived person but it would not have effect in respect of any children of that person born after the original deprivation order was made. As the Minister said at Second Reading, it is already the case that, where the child has acquired citizenship through the parent before the deprivation order, the child’s citizenship is unaffected.

Even if amended as we propose, the Bill would still fully address the two risks identified by the Government as being the main drivers of this legislation. First, the deprived person could still be barred from returning to the United Kingdom. In his wind-up speech, the Minister concluded by asking:

“are noble Lords willing to take that risk”—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 268.]

to let the person in? Under this amendment, deciding whether to take that risk would be a matter for the Government.

The second risk identified by the Minister was that a deprived person could tactically renounce any other citizenship they might have, so that even if the Government were to succeed in having the deprivation order reinstated through further appeals, the person would have a chance to bring himself or herself within the scope of the stateless provision in Section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This risk would not arise with the amendment. The deprivation order would continue to have effect against the deprived person throughout the entire appeal process. A tactical renunciation of any further citizenship would not place the deprived person in a better position.

We all appreciate that separating the citizenship position of the principal from that of the child is not an ideal solution and may pose practical difficulties, including guardianship arrangements, but families would at least have the option of seeking to put these arrangements in place. We must not forget that what we are discussing is the position of children who, following the successful appeal, according to our courts would ordinarily be entitled to British citizenship.

If the Government are successful in the further appeals, an argument against the amendment might be that a non-British child would have temporarily benefitted from British citizenship and possibly spent a few years living in Britain with British family. If the Government are unsuccessful in their further appeals, however, the argument against the Bill without the amendment is, in my view, even stronger. In this scenario, without the amendment, we would have left a British child stranded in places—including prisons or camps—where his or her rights are systematically violated.

With the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we had a very useful meeting with the Minister, and I am grateful to him and his officials for meeting us. A concern raised at that meeting was that the amendment might necessitate certain consequential amendments of Section 2(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act. In effect, what would be required is inserting a cross-reference in that provision to the new subsection of Section 40A which the amendment would introduce. This would be a limited and manageable consequential amendment, but I suspect this will not persuade the Government, who I understand remain opposed to this amendment for other reasons.

We appreciate that the Bill has a high level of support across Government Benches and Opposition Benches. These measures may affect a small number of individuals, but it is a growing number, and they raise important issues of principle. That is why we consider they are certainly worth us debating again. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I place that in the mix because it is outside the scope the Bill. I affirm, as I hope I have already done, that the Government’s policy position is that this would be unworkable and would lead to potential areas of risk. Having said that, as I said to the noble Lord in response to his introductory comments, we will keep this under review and monitor it. If issues arise, they will no doubt be drawn to the Government’s attention, the borders inspector can examine them and, indeed, the Government can reflect upon them. On policy grounds, I still urge that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken. I know there is considerable concern around the House, beyond the noble Lords and Baronesses who have spoken today, about this issue.

I will make three brief points. The first is to echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I, too, was surprised to hear that the consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) might be out of scope. This is a Bill to make provision about the effect during an appeal of an order under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act. Within that that theme—that umbrella of effect—in my view, it would be entirely possible to have a consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) concerning the acquisition of citizenship during the appeal period by children.

The second point concerns the extended period of uncertainty that the Minister referred to. There is another way of looking at this. If the Government are ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, we will be faced with an unknown number of individuals who are now children but who will, at that point, be young teenagers, coming back to this country. In some cases, they will be returning to this country having spent many formative years in prisons or camps in north-east Syria and elsewhere. So, even from a national security point of view, we may end up in a rather challenging position.

Finally, I thank the Minister for his comment on the impact and on the Government’s commitment to keep implementation of the Bill under review. We will, I hope, have an opportunity to return to the question of implementation, to the position of children affected by the deprivation of citizenship and, more generally, to the Government’s policy on the deprivation of citizenship. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who brings so much expertise and wisdom to this debate.

This is a short Bill, yes, on a narrow point, but it raises some important constitutional questions. It concerns the power of the Home Secretary under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act to deprive a person of British citizenship. As we know, under this provision the Home Secretary may deprive a person of citizenship in two cases: first, if she is satisfied that the deprivation will be conducive to the public good; and, secondly, if she is satisfied that citizenship was obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. I do not have any problem with the second scenario; it is the first one which is intensely problematic.

There is a limit to the exercise of this power. A deprivation order may not be made if that person would be rendered stateless, and thus would result in a breach of our obligations under the statelessness convention. But this limit, however important, is insufficient. In practice, as has been mentioned before, people with two nationalities, such as me, are British citizens only for as long as the Home Secretary of the day is satisfied that depriving us of our citizenship would not be conducive to the public good. Under the law as it is, it is easier for me to be stripped of my British citizenship than of my barony. This rule is based on an idea of citizenship that is simply unfit for a modern liberal democracy. Yes, the power is used sparingly, as the Minister said, but we are, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, a country that, in Europe, uses this power to an exceptional degree. We strip citizenship at rates that are higher than those of almost any other country in the world, as was noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Accountability for Daesh Crimes.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation observed that there is a sharp contrast between the high number of deprivation orders in these cases, which are usually national security cases, and the low number of prosecutions or temporary exclusion orders. To put these things in perspective, from 1972 to 2006 only 10 people were deprived of citizenship, whereas from 2010 to 2023 there were 1,080 deprivations of citizenship, and of those 222 were on the basis of the “conducive” test—104 of those deprivations were in one year alone, 2017.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, we need to think of how this power would be used by a Home Secretary who comes to office with a rather different conception of the public good from that of his or her predecessors. We have to be very alive to those risks. There is little in the language of Section 40 to which we could point to invite restraint if faced with a Home Secretary determined to make even more extensive use of the power of deprivation than has been the case so far.

The problem with this Bill is that it makes a power that is already excessive even worse by reversing the decision of the Supreme Court in the N3(ZA) case. The Supreme Court ruled that a person deprived of British citizenship automatically and retrospectively regains their citizenship following a successful appeal. It is still possible, even after the Supreme Court ruling, for the deprivation order to be made and enforcement action pursuant to that order to be taken, despite the affected person bringing the appeal.

As a matter of principle, it seems to me that, given that the power of the Secretary of State is already so extensive, and in the light of the severe consequences that the exercise of that power has, it is wrong to allow deprivations which our courts have found to be unlawful to continue to have effect pending an appeal. It seems to me even more important for a power such as this that we should stick with the ordinary approach, which is that the decision of the court should take effect pending the appeal and, where circumstances justify, the Government could seek a stay—or, as the noble Lord, Lord German, explained, there could be some work around identifying the grounds on which such a stay should be granted.

Another problem with the Bill is that it creates an incentive for the Government to pursue every possible point in order to preserve the continuing effect of an order. On matters of such importance, if anything, the incentive should be the opposite.

Last but certainly not least, British children born during unlawful deprivation periods find themselves in an even worse limbo. Under the Supreme Court ruling in N3, children would acquire British citizenship if their parents’ appeal is successful, and they would do so immediately. Under the Bill, children would not acquire citizenship, even though the most authoritative determination of the law at that point would support their acquisition of citizenship. I appreciate that the consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach is that a child would be treated as a British citizen during the appeal period and that, if the Government are ultimately successful, that child would have to be regarded as never having acquired British citizenship. But, as a matter of principle, I would rather we erred by treating a non-citizen child as a citizen temporarily than by depriving a child who was a British citizen all along of the benefits of British citizenship.

I have two questions on this point which echo points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. First, the national security reason, which is stated as the main justification for this Bill, does not apply to children. Being the child of an individual who may pose a threat to national security is not a national security concern. So what is the reason for extending the consequences of the measure to children? Secondly, would the Government be open to considering ways of mitigating the effects of the Bill on children, in the light of the fact that the consequences for them cannot be justified under the underlying justification for the Bill—namely, national security?

I do not have any objection in principle to Parliament taking the view that a law, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, must be changed. It does not mean that the Supreme Court was wrong about the law. As lawmakers, we have a different perspective from that of judges. Our role is to make the law and sometimes change it, and that may at times require reversing a decision of the Supreme Court. In this case, however, I see no legislative reason and no reason of principle that justifies a fundamentally different conclusion from that reached by the Supreme Court. As for the position of the children of the persons who have been deprived of British citizenship, there is a strong reason for considering forms of mitigation.

It seems to me that by extending the powers in Section 40, as the Bill requires us to do, we are going in exactly the opposite direction of that which we should be taking, which is to restrict a power that has been on the statute books for a long time but that is way too illiberal and exorbitant.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

According to the Times, Home Office research last year concluded that there was “no evidence” that hostile policies changed the behaviour of migrants. Can the Minister confirm or deny that they are accurate quotes from Home Office research?

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I hesitated to come in before and I apologise for not participating at Second Reading, but I followed the debate closely. I must declare an interest: I have been instructed before by the Government as a member of the Bar on matters relating to the subject matter of the Bill. But I can speak freely on Amendment 13 because it is not anything on which I advise. I wish to speak in support of it.

The negotiation of removal or readmission agreements is, of course, a matter for the Government and not for Parliament. But there are many examples in treaty negotiations of Governments invoking pressure from their parliaments—or even from their courts—as a reason for not being able to make a concession or for insisting on concessions from the other side. It seems to me that it might end up strengthening the hand of the Government in these negotiations if they are able to say that Parliament is insisting on them.

The most difficult negotiation is, as we have heard, with the European Union. The European Union is not opposed to readmission agreements. On the contrary, it concluded a number of them with many countries, from Turkey to Belarus. Incidentally, the readmission agreements with Belarus and Russia have been suspended, quite rightly, because of the situation that has arisen. A number of us, I think, would have regarded those agreements as problematic from a human rights point of view even before that.

The reason why a readmission agreement with the UK is difficult is that the UK is a country from which European Union member states would have to take people back, rather than send them back. The Government published a draft readmission agreement for negotiation with the EU in the summer of 2020. That text is still available on the government website. If the EU had accepted that treaty, it would have allowed the UK to send people back to EU member states—not only permanent residents and nationals, but also third-country nationals who have transited through an EU member state. The provisions in that draft treaty proposed by the UK were identical to a number of provisions found in readmission agreements concluded by the European Union, including the one with Turkey. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong about this, but I think that negotiations with the EU on the Government’s draft proposal never took off.

It is worth noting that both the UK and the EU—and that includes the EU in its own capacity and EU member states—are subject to quite wide-ranging treaty obligations on both migrant smuggling and human trafficking. These treaties impose various obligations of international co-operation, including, in the case of the migrant smuggling protocol, the obligation to

“cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea”.

Generally speaking, these are obligations of conduct rather than by result. They do not oblige the EU to accept the terms of the treaty proposed by the UK. They do, however, require the EU, EU member states and all parties to those treaties to engage in good faith negotiations with the UK on readmission, particularly where very similar treaties have been concluded in other contexts. It would be a very unattractive position for any party to these treaties to take the view that they are open to readmission agreements only when they are in their interest and not when they are not.

It seems to me that Amendment 13 would bring some of these questions to the surface by requiring the Government to update Parliament on the status of these negotiations and on the reasons why these negotiations might not be progressing. That is outlined in subsection (3) of the new clause proposed in Amendment 13. It would not be a case of government and Parliament speaking with separate voices; on the contrary, it would be a case of Parliament adding its voice and adding pressure for the purposes of achieving an objective that both Parliament and government consider important.

My final point concerns the language of “formal legally binding agreements” in subsection (1). It is broadly right that this should be the optimum arrangement—the formal legally binding agreement—but it is also the case in this sort of practice that states will often conclude agreements that are not binding. The European Union has two such agreements with Guinea and the Gambia. For various reasons, those agreements, in some cases, are more appropriate. My understanding—and the Minister will, again, correct me if I am wrong—is that the arrangement with Albania that was announced a few weeks ago is actually part of a non-binding arrangement that was built on an existing treaty. The treaty itself is the one from 2021, but the further agreement that was announced by the Prime Ministers at their recent meeting is an example of such a non-binding agreement that can, in certain circumstances, be a better way of achieving that same objective. I would agree, however, with the notion that the formal and legally binding agreement is the gold standard in this kind of situation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill sets out a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of a person who has arrived in or entered the UK illegally and satisfies the four conditions set out in Clause 2. In the majority of cases, formal returns agreements are not required in order to carry out removals. Most countries co-operate with returns, and these relationships are managed through official-led engagement with immigration counterparts in receiving countries and through consular services based in the UK. Returns agreements can be a useful tool to solidify or improve returns co-operation and are sometimes requested by the receiving country. We carefully consider whether it is beneficial to enter into negotiations to formalise a returns relationship, having regard to the potential requests that the other side would seek to incorporate into an agreement, such as a liberalisation of the UK visa requirements in respect of their nationals.

As of May 2023, the Home Office has 16 returns agreements in place. Recent additions to the list include Albania, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. Just last week, the Prime Minister announced the start of negotiations on a new returns agreement with Moldova. A number of these agreements are sensitive, and receiving countries might withdraw co-operation if they are publicised, so it would be detrimental to formalise and publish all such agreements. There are also some countries where the existing security and country situation might prevent returns taking place, such as Sudan and Afghanistan. We continue to monitor the situation closely in those countries with a view to resuming enforced returns as soon as is practicable and safe.

I should add that, while returns agreements have a valuable role to play, they are not silver bullets. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has, in terms, accused this Government of ripping up the Dublin convention, but may I just remind the noble Lord that the UK was a net recipient of migrants under the Dublin scheme? As my honourable friend Tim Loughton said in the other place:

“In the last year that we were covered by the Dublin convention, before the pandemic struck, we applied to the EU for 8,500 returns under that returns agreement and only 105 were granted—that is 1.2%—so what he says is complete nonsense. It did not work when we were in the EU, and he is now expecting to magic up some agreement that the EU will not give us anyway”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23, col. 792.]


Mr Loughton was, at that time, intervening on the speech of Stephen Kinnock in the other place.

In addition to the returns agreements, we also have our world-leading migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda. I remind the House that there is no limit on the numbers that can be relocated to Rwanda under the partnership agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, cited various figures, including in relation to the current asylum backlog. I remind noble Lords that, under Clause 4, any asylum claims made by persons who meet the conditions in Clause 2 are to be declared inadmissible. It is, of course, important to deal with the current backlog. The Prime Minister announced today that the initial decision legacy backlog is down by over 17,000, but there is no correlation between these legacy cases and the cohort to be removed under the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, asked about the impact assessment for the Bill. We have already published the equality impact assessment, and we will publish an economic impact assessment in due course. Noble Lords will have to wait patiently for the economic impact assessment. In the interim, I do not propose to comment on impact assessments issued by NGOs or leaks in the media.