Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this is a grim subject, like, I am afraid, many of those that we are going to discuss in our proceedings today. An overwhelming case has been made by those who have spoken, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I very much hope that the Front Benches—Government and Opposition—are listening to the views that have been expressed.

I shall offer one argument additional to those that the noble Baroness has set out. In addition to regulatory sanctions against the providers of these online services, and in addition to any possible criminal remedies that may arise, there is also the possibility of civil sanctions: claims for damages brought by groups of parents who have the misfortune to have had their children dealt with in this appalling way. Any such claim for damages would be immeasurably assisted were the providers of the online services to have a legal duty to risk-assess the likelihood of their services being used in this way.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I was also at the meeting, which has been referred to, that was held this lunchtime and dealt with the troubling question of what seems to be an epidemic of growth in the exploitation of children on the internet. I must say that it revealed figures that I was not aware of, and I regard myself as relatively well briefed on this matter.

Further information came out today—particularly from the work, which has already been alluded to, by Members who were present at that meeting—that much of the of the material that is seen online also moves across into the real world. The use of these elements on the internet to groom children, to set up meetings with them and then to participate with them in illegal acts has been growing to a point where it is quite clearly an epidemic that must be dealt with. We are at the start of something extraordinarily unpleasant that needs to be looked at in the round, in a way that we have not yet done or been able to do.

Having been heavily involved in the Online Safety Act, I am conscious of the fact that we are dealing with legislation which has been overtaken by technology. The developments that have happened since we the Bill became an Act have meant that the tools we thought were being given to Ofcom and being used by the Government are very often no longer appropriate. They are probably not as far-reaching and certainly do not deal with the speed with which this technology is moving forward.

I have not been able to attend any meetings which Ministers may have had with my own side on this, but I gather that there is a Whip on against this amendment. I wonder whether the Minister could think hard about how he wants to play this issue out. It seems that one of the problems we have in dealing with legislation in this area is that we are never dealing with the right legislation. We want to amend the Online Safety Act but obviously, by moving an amendment to this Bill, which is from another department, we are not maximising the chances of having an output which will work. In addition, the way Ofcom is interpreting the Act seems to make it very difficult for it to reach out on new technologies, such as those described by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in her excellent speech introducing the amendment.

In a moment of transition, when we are so keen to try to grasp things so that they do not get out of our control, there may be a case for further work to be done. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned that she was happy to try to look again at the wording of her amendment if it is not appropriate for the Government. I am conscious that the Government are also trying to move in other areas and that other departments are also issuing measures which may or may not bear directly on the issue. It seems that there is a very strong case—although I do not know how my noble friend will respond—for asking for this issue to be kept alive and brought back, perhaps at Third Reading, where a joint amendment might be brought between the noble Baroness and her supporters and the Government to try to make sure that we do what we can, even if it is not the complete picture, to take this another step down the road.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

I will make a very small intervention because people have spoken so eloquently before me. I support the amendment 100% and I am surprised that the Front Benches are not taking a different view. For crying out loud, I am not easily shocked but the briefing that we have all spoken about that we went to this afternoon shocked me. We are so behind the curve on this and we have to get ahead of it, so I support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful, as I am sure the whole House is, to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for tabling this amendment. We are all familiar with regular updates on our smartphones that eat more and more of the memory and use up more and more of the battery. They happen systematically, usually for security reasons, very regularly and seamlessly. However, I was not aware, until the noble Lord tabled his amendment and we had some discussions and meetings around it, that the technology that we are talking about to intercede and stop our devices being able to access or use this sort of material already exists to some degree on our telephones. Who among us who has an iPhone, like me, knew that the software to prevent and screen child sexual abuse material already exists but can be activated only if you go into the parental controls and turn it on—at which point it then starts working? I had no idea that that was embedded in my phone.

The technology exists. The large manufacturers of these gadgets already have access to that technology. In some instances, they have already developed it to a very sophisticated level but, for all sorts of reasons, have chosen not to roll it out. One of the major arguments used against this sort of thing being rolled out is from the free speech brigade—one of whose protagonists I am glad to see is not in the Chamber today. They will always say that free speech trumps everything else. It is an unfortunate choice of verb, but that is the argument put forward.

But the reality is that the technology we are talking about works in such a way that in no way, shape or form does it prevent free speech. It does not in any way, shape or form intervene with those platforms which are encrypted. It operates separately to those platforms but works in such a way that, without revealing what is going on in those encrypted messages, it stops the sort of material that we are talking about actually getting involved in the first place. In my view, that is not exactly an interdiction of free speech.

For all these reasons, I ask the Government to look at this very carefully and closely. We are not dealing with some wonderful space age technology that has yet to be developed; we are talking about technology which already exists. There are individuals who have a huge amount of knowledge and experience in this area. It is probably a brilliant example of His Majesty’s Government pursuing one of their avowed aims, which is to work more closely with foreign jurisdictions together in this sort of area.

For all these reasons, I hope that the Government will give a positive response, and that we will not have, “Oh, it is very difficult”, or, even worse, that we will have a consultation. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, in speaking on issues related to online safety, I seem to spend most of my time apologising for the fact that the Act is not as up-to-date, efficient or effective as it should be, but here is another example of where technology has overtaken the good work that we did all those years ago to try to bring forward that legislation.

I learned about this at the same meeting that has been referred to already. At first sight, it looks as though it is an answer to a lot of problems that we have with the way in which younger people in particular interact with the internet. Those of us who were involved in pursuing what is now the Online Safety Act will be aware that we were largely looking at the user end of the material and cycle, looking at the apps and their interactions, that were being generated by those who were involved in servicing the internet. We did not look at technology in the hardware side at all and had no real thought about anything that we were dealing with in the then Bill affecting it. Yet this seems a very interesting and easy-to-adopt technology that would solve a lot of problems in relation to issues about the spread of material, which we would think should not be available where there are things like age bars or other means of providing gaps in the access to it.

There are always going to be problems with how we manage the changeover between childhood and adulthood, and we are aware that the technology is moving fast on that as well. It may well be that what is current today may be out of date by the time this Bill becomes law. But the Government should look very closely at the way in which this technology operates to prevent, at the equipment level, access to material which should not be seen by children particularly.

There will, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has said, be issues about free speech, and I do not think we should underestimate those. There are obviously ways in which this could be used against societal values; but for the particularity of how children are to be protected, making it impossible for them to access material, which they should by law not see, on the equipment they buy seems a very useful way forward, and I commend it to Ministers.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Let me say from the outset that, in principle, on these Benches we conditionally support Amendment 239A, which has been spoken to so powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Nash.

The noble Lord very clearly set out the urgent issues involved, as did my noble friend Lady Benjamin and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and all of us who were there in the same meeting which we have referred to before. We are at a technological and moral crisis point, as we have debated in a previous group regarding child sexual abuse material online. We face a children’s mental health catastrophe, and the ubiquity of child sexual abuse material is a central driver of that catastrophe.

The noble Lord, Lord Nash, has explained that his amendment would mandate that manufacturers and importers of smartphones and tablets ensure their devices satisfy a CSAM requirement to prevent the creation, viewing, and sharing of such material.

The question, however, clearly arises as to whether this would undermine encryption or privacy. We recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Nash, in his revised Amendment 239A, does indeed include a duty of privacy in his regulations. In my view, the thing to avoid is the chance that a technological fix of this kind could involve some degree of surveillance. I do agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell, that, at first sight, the technology looks extremely promising, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, mentioned, but, before taking this further, we need to be absolutely sure about the robustness of this technology and its impact on privacy.

By requiring software to be preloaded at the system level, we would move away from the model of parental controls and platform responsibility, and we would place the duty on the manufacturers who profit from these devices. Quite apart from that, we do, of course, also need to ensure that the platforms take action.

The Minister may promise further consultation, but we do not need much more consultation to know that the status quo is failing; we need to find a solution now rather than playing an endless game of digital catch-up. As other others have urged, I hope that the Government will take a look at this proposal urgently, closely and seriously.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak from the Labour Benches and first congratulate the Minister on listening to the debates we had in Committee. I thank him very much for bringing forward an amendment which is as close as I have seen this Government move to try and patch up some of the problems we are facing but, as I am going to say later, I am afraid I do not think it goes far enough.

I have said in this House before, and I will say it again, that we have been outpaced by technology in this area—“chatbot” was not even a word, I think, at the time that we finally passed the Online Safety Act. The harm which has been described so graphically today in the speeches we have heard so far was unthinkable in those days. We have really opened up a torrent of problems which we did not know we were trying to solve at the time that Bill went through, even though we were proud of the Bill when it happened.

Today, we at least have the benefit of two good choices about how to take this forward. The Minister has brought forward an amendment that deals with the issue but, unfortunately, to my mind, it does not go in the right direction, and I want to explain a bit about why that is the case. The problem we are facing constantly with the Online Safety Act is that what is in the wording of the primary legislation is at variance with the way in which it is interpreted and implemented by the regulator. There are good reasons for that, which we do not need to go into today, but a gap has emerged between that which we in this House wanted to be happening now—out there with our children, with our families, with those who are using the internet for the benefit it all brings—and how the regulator is able to operate. It is too slow, lacking in ambition about where it is trying to go and I do not think it has all the powers it needs in the way that the Bill sets them out. Even if it did, I do not think the way it is structured allows it to move forward.

I say to my noble friend the Minister that it cannot be right to further complicate the situation by bringing forward powers to be held in the hand of the Secretary of State to try and remedy a structural fault elsewhere. That is why I think he should think very carefully indeed about the noble Baroness’s amendments, which set out—sometimes in painful detail, but certainly for real benefit—exactly what we will not tolerate in this online space. We should have done it in the Online Safety Bill. We did not, but it is not too late to catch up now. Simply taking powers, some of which are dangerously beyond what this House would normally agree, is not the way forward. I hope if the votes tonight go against him, he does not take it too badly but works with everybody here who cares so much about this to try and come forward with something that will begin to address the problems we face.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. When it comes to assessing risk to children, a plastic bath duck has better risk assessment than AI chatbots. I fully support my noble friend’s amendments.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the government amendments and to the amendments in my name and in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. In doing so, I declare an interest as receiving pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on image-based sexual abuse.

I am grateful to the Government for working with me to bring forward their amendment in response to my amendment in Committee on 48-hour take-down. I am pleased they are working with me on the amendments that your Lordships’ House passed on Report on the creation of a centralised hash registry and hash sharing. I must add that it is disappointing that after months of speaking to the Government about the importance of hashing and 48-hour amendments working together that they cannot be scrutinised together.

While I am very pleased that government Amendment 1 addresses the concerns I brought forward on de-indexing and duplicates, I do not believe it is sufficient to achieve the mechanism I set out to create in my original 48-hour take-down amendment in Committee. My intention was to create a system where no victim is left behind. This requires the mechanism to be agile and for internet services to feel the consequence of not acting on each individual instance reported. The government amendment has done the bare minimum and simply updated the Online Safety Act where it already instructed internet services to swiftly take down such content, to now add,

“as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours”.

In reality, this represents very little change as the good actors will still move at pace and the bad actors will continue to ignore. One survivor, Jodie, who many noble Lords have met, responded to the government amendment by saying that

“it is hugely frustrating to see headline grabbing commitments without the substance needed to actually protect victims. A 48-hour deadline sounds strong, especially when delivered by the Prime Minister to millions on breakfast television, but without real enforcement it risks creating false hope”.

Another victim, Daria, said:

“As a survivor, I feel this is quite simply gaslighting”.


We must remember that Ofcom rules are about systems and processes, and not outcomes. If a service has followed the rules but individual violations still occur, an internet service will not be held responsible. Sophie Mortimer at the Revenge Porn Helpline confirmed this, stating:

“While the platforms that already act in good faith will meet these standards, the persistent bad actors who continue to drive the sharing of this content will ignore and the Government amendment does not give Ofcom enough weapons to respond”.


I am deeply concerned that the Government have not specified how Ofcom will even know if a service fails to act within 48 hours. Ofcom has confirmed that there is no automatic mechanism for it to know whether services are not meeting the 48-hour take-down requirement in any given case. Further, the only recourse the Government provide should a service be found to generally not comply are the long and bureaucratic business disruption measures. This means that women will still suffer ongoing trauma when platforms refuse to comply.

My amendments seek to address the gaps in the government amendments, and I will outline them briefly. Amendments 2 and 8 mandate services to publicly report—and report to Ofcom—their average take-down times.

Amendments 3 and 9 strengthen the government wording on finding duplicate images to ensure that services have to take all reasonable steps, instead of simply relying on what a service may identify.

Amendments 4 and 10 incentivise services to act by creating a more agile mechanism whereby they can be fined per violation, and this can increase for every 24-hour period in which they fail to act, thus ensuring there is a consequence for not acting on individual instances of abuse. I believe these amendments create a more agile mechanism and do not rely solely on business disruption measures. This amendment is based on the TAKE IT DOWN Act, which operates under the rules of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA. The sum I have chosen is based on the figure levied under FTC rules for continued instances of violation after companies have been notified.

Amendments 5 and 11 mandate the Secretary of State to create a mechanism whereby individuals can report to Ofcom in cases where the service provider has failed to remove the content within 48 hours. At present, it is not clear what a victim would do if they reported the content to a service which then failed to act after the initial 48 hours.

Amendments 6 and 12 ensure that services have “clear and conspicuous” notices of where victims can report NCII content. This uses the wording from the TAKE IT DOWN Act and gives more clarity to internet services. The government amendment and the Online Safety Act refer simply to being able

“to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider”.

Amendments 7 and 13 add provisions that seek to curb malicious reporting by requiring a statement that the report has been made “in good faith”. Additionally, this provides internet services with further assurances they need to act more quickly upon receiving reports.

I am grateful to the Government for coming to the table on this issue. However, victims deserve so much more than press releases that promise action but in reality represent little practical change in the most traumatic moment of their lives. I implore noble Lords to vote with me so that no victim is left behind. I beg to move.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, at Third Reading it is extraordinarily rare to find issues still in contest, and to be presented, as we have been today, with a choice on which we will have to vote. Normally, by this stage, the issues have been clearly discussed and the parties concerned—the Government on the one side and those proposing amendments on the other—have had enough meetings to be able to get to a point where they can agree on what is going forward.

Having said that, I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward what he has brought forward. These are substantial changes to the Online Safety Act and they are extraordinarily welcome. They cover the ground very well, but, as has been pointed out, they perhaps do not go quite as far as they could do. We are at Third Reading, so it is therefore very difficult to find the time and space to be able to resolve what I think are relatively quite small differences between the two sides.

I point out simply to my noble friend the Minister that this places those of us who support the noble Baroness in her amendments in a difficult position about his amendments, which we want to support; but the only way to get them to resolution is probably to vote with the noble Baroness. I hope he will appreciate that, and I suggest to him that, when he comes to respond, he makes it very clear that the Government are still willing to talk about these issues and still willing to meet those who have concerns and views about what the Government have done. I hope he might be able to promise that action could be taken in the Commons to resolve this.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. As ever, she has spoken fantastically convincingly to her amendments, which sit in a broader set of aims that we have heard in Committee and on Report—at many stages. While recognising that the Government have moved considerably, I believe that we are debating this again in the context of a flood of women coming forward as survivors of non-consensual image abuse. As the harms are ever increasing, I am putting my faith in the noble Baroness’s interpretation of what is still necessary. Her amendments do something really important. I have spoken about this before and will do so on a later Bill this afternoon, but we need to tackle the issue of enforcement.

We cannot keep on adding duties to the Online Safety Act and expecting something to be different at the other end. In fact, we are adding a burden for people without giving them the tools by which that burden could be alleviated. The noble Baroness’s amendments have sought to create a more streamlined and agile system by allowing for fines every 24 hours in which an image is not removed. We have to find an incentive for tech to come to terms with the regulator, and the noble Baroness is doing just that. Unless we put a ticking clock on online services for failing to respond to harms to children and women, we cannot hope that women and children will be safe.