Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill and the growth in competitive objectives that inform it. I thank the many organisations that have provided us with briefings, especially the APPG on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services. Its 70-page analysis deals with each part of the Bill in depth and reaches an important overall conclusion, which is that the case for protecting consumers within any reform of financial services is not merely a moral case, although the moral case is strong, it is an economic case, grounded in a clear-eyed analysis of how trust works, how it is destroyed and what happens to markets when it is lost. The report also notes that the Bill should not simply make complaint handling faster or more predictable for institutions; it should ensure that ordinary people can get the real issue investigated, decided, escalated where necessary and put right. It is not at all clear that the Bill does this or does this sufficiently.

A look at Part 2 illustrates the problem. It contains a number of significant reforms: Clause 5, for example, which concerns the appointment of the chair of the FOS scheme operator. Under this clause, the chair is appointed directly by the Treasury. This is a major structural shift that was not included in the original consultation. The clause also states that the terms of appointment must secure the chair’s independence from both HMT and the FCA. The ombudsman scheme occupies a unique position within our regulatory architecture. It must command the confidence of consumers while maintaining credibility with the industry. Independence is therefore essential: it is not merely a matter of statutory wording; it is also a matter of perception. Where appointments are made directly by the Government, questions inevitably arise about whether sufficient distance exists between Ministers and those exercising important quasi-judicial functions.

Clause 6 also contains significant reform proposals. It addresses time limits for complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. It introduces a long-stop period of 10 years from the relevant act or omission, while preserving the possibility of alternative limits set through rules and allowing exceptions in specified circumstances. This is a process which, though critical, allows no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. It is of course true that there is a strong case for providing greater certainty. Financial firms should not face indefinite exposure to complaints relating to events that occurred decades earlier. It is also true that financial misconduct can sometimes take years to emerge. Consumers may not discover that they have suffered detriment until long after the original transaction occurred. The challenge is one of balance. Parliamentary involvement will be helpful.

Still in Part 2, Clause 7 introduces one of the most consequential innovations in the Bill: the referral of matters from the FOS to the FCA. The ombudsman may also seek the FCA’s opinion of FCA rules where ambiguity exists. This proposed reform reflects the concern that individual complaints can sometimes raise wider questions affecting thousands of consumers and firms. The proposed reform also reflects long-standing industry criticism that the ombudsman has occasionally interpreted regulatory requirements differently from the regulator. In reality, however, it is hard to see this as a well-founded or convincing criticism of the current set-up.

The FOS resolves over 200,000 cases each year, upholding about 30%. We are told that the FOS is acting inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator. If that were true—if this were really a systemic problem—the Government should be able to produce a substantial body of evidence. If it were true, there should be hundreds or even thousands of FOS decisions demonstrating this pattern. If such a list exists, HMT and the FCA have not published it—it is certainly not in the impact assessment. If such a list does not exist, the case for much of the reforms to the FOS rests on assertion rather than evidence. I invite the Minister to point us towards the specific FOS cases that justify the proposed sweeping reforms.

As things stand, the Government appear to be jumping to conclusions that will reduce access to the FOS, reducing access to free and impartial redress; introduce extra bureaucracy and costs; and, ultimately, damage confidence and trust in the financial services industry. We must guard against any risk that the ombudsman becomes subordinate to the regulator or loses the independence that has been central to its legitimacy. There is a strong case for removing Clause 7.

Clause 8 reforms the test used when determining complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. This may well be the most controversial provision in Part 2. Historically, the ombudsman has determined complaints according to what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Critics have argued that this has sometimes allowed decisions to diverge from the regulatory rule book, creating uncertainty for firms that believed that they had complied with the FCA requirements.

We should ask ourselves whether strict alignment with regulatory rules could weaken consumer protection in cases where the rules themselves are incomplete, outdated or silent on emerging risks. The strength of the ombudsman system has been its ability to look beyond technical compliance and to consider fairness in a broader sense. If that flexibility is narrowed too far, some consumers may find that conduct that was plainly unfair nevertheless escapes effective remedy.

There are already voices, such as the Centre for Responsible Credit, calling for the removal of Clause 8. StepChange has said:

“The ‘fair and reasonable’ test was carefully designed by Parliament”,


requiring FOS to consider

“all the circumstances of the case”.

In contrast,

“FCA rules are often high level and permissive”.


StepChange believes that:

“The scope and flexibility of the test is essential for FOS to decide cases in a manner that is … fair”.


Shifting this to be based on compliance with FCA rules risks creating a tick-box exercise and weakening consumer protection. Martin Lewis has warned that:

“Restricting … access to free and fair redress is not a recipe for economic growth. Once consumers are warned about the erosion of their rights, it’s possible it will lead to disengagement from … financial services … and diminishing trust”.


On this issue, as on others in the Bill, Parliament must ensure that in pursuing regulatory certainty, we do not sacrifice fairness; that in pursuing efficiency, we do not diminish accountability; and that in strengthening regulatory co-ordination, we do not weaken the independence of the ombudsman. The UK’s financial services sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. To be trusted, consumers must have confidence that when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress.

The Bill may not expressly repeal consumer protections or statutory rights; the concern is more subtle. Rights created by Parliament may be diminished in practice if access to redress depends on FCA rule compliance, FCA intent, FCA interpretation or Treasury-made conditions rather than independent interpretation of the underlying legal issue.

I close by quoting Which?:

“The proposed reforms to the FOS and the FCA appear to come at the expense of consumer protections. Any benefits arising from weaker consumer safeguards are likely to be temporary while longer term costs could be significant, particularly for vulnerable who rely most on access to redress and effective regulatory protections”.


I agree with that.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we move on to the Back Benches, I remind noble Lords that the advisory time limit is eight minutes. If we all stick within that, we can get everybody in, it is fair to everybody else and we will be able to finish at a reasonable time.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

I have to advise noble Lords that if Amendment 31 is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 32 or 33 because of pre-emption.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 33, 35, 37, 42 and 43 in this group. All these amendments, and my Clause 7 not-stand-part question, relate to the FOS and its regime. I will try very hard not to repeat too much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was saying a moment ago. The proposed reforms of the FOS regime are extensive and fundamental, but there is nowhere a clear and convincing explanation of why such fundamental changes are necessary. In fact, I see no real evidence at all of the need for reform on the scale being proposed here.

What we see, looking at the far-reaching proposals in the Bill, is an assault on the four key pillars designed into the FOS by Parliament: independence, speed and simplicity, time limits on bringing complaints, and the “fair and reasonable” test for determining those complaints. Taken together, Part 2 replaces each of those pillars with subordination to the FCA, a rather undefined change to time limits, and a heavy qualification of the “fair and reasonable” test amounting to its entire abandonment. This raises the question of why such a radical reform can be seen as necessary and/or beneficial. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister what evidence there was of systemic failure in the current operation of the FOS, and for evidence, for example, that the FOS was acting as a quasi-regulator. I have had no reply.

The obvious question in all this is: who benefits? The answer is: not the ordinary consumer. My amendments are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the weakening of consumer protection. To that end, my Amendments 33 and 35, to Clause 6, address the time limits for complaints to the FOS, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has dealt with extensively; I agree with most of what he said. What my amendments offer as an alternative to his is that they are perhaps not quite as strong—that might be their virtue. It is often very difficult to get things written into a Bill; it is sometimes easier to deal with them via secondary legislation, as I do rather obliquely.

In Part 2, the Bill proposes other very substantive changes to the way in which the FOS operates. One of these changes, in Clause 7, sets out the circumstances under which the FOS must notify the FCA of a matter relating to a complaint, under which the FOS must request an opinion from the FCA as to the interpretation of FCA rules. It then sets out in detail how consultation should take place on the matter. There really is detail: five whole pages of the Bill set out in great detail the various stages required in the referral process. It adds complexity for no obvious gain and subordinates the FOS’s judgments to the FCA’s. I have no doubt that the byzantine array of subclauses or qualifications will, overall, introduce greater complexity for no foreseeable benefits and will greatly increase the workload of the FCA. The FCA is already under pressure and is planning to absorb the PSR. The last thing we need is the creation of new systems, rules and powers that show no clear promise of benefit, or at least no benefit to the retail complainant.

On necessity, we have to take into consideration whether the current FOS methods are faulty or unproductive. I have seen no compelling evidence that this is the case, only a rather unconvincing summary of the consultation responses. The FOS received 214,000 new complaints in 2025-26. It is projecting a resolution of 207,000 complaints in the coming year, of which 206,000 concern banking and consumer credit companies. It has a target of 70% of cases being resolved within three months and 90% within six. It does not seem as though it is having difficulty operating, and I am not aware of any significant problems for the average consumer. I hear from the industry that the FOS acts inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator, but I have seen no evidence of that, and I am unconvinced by the simple assertion. Taken as a whole, Clause 7 in effect subordinates the FOS to the FCA, removing yet another foundational pillar: independence. We should remove Clause 7.

I turn now to the proposed amendments to Clause 8. I will speak to Amendments 37, 42 and 43, which deal with how a complaint to the FOS is to be determined. This is a controversial matter; the Bill proposes very significant changes. This has already provoked calls to have the whole clause removed from the Bill, and I recognise the strength of feeling behind that.

How the FOS decides on complaints is absolutely critical to its operations and to their general acceptability. At the moment and historically, the FOS rules on complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. The Bill changes that. It says:

“A complaint may be determined in favour of the complainant only if, in the opinion of the Financial Ombudsman … at the time the disputed act or omission occurred, either … the act or omission did not comply with an FCA rule applying to the respondent, or … there was no FCA rule applying to the respondent that related to the act or omission, and the disputed act or omission was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.


This adds one of two requirements not present now, in addition to the “fair and reasonable” test. In essence, it removes the FOS’s current and critical independent status and reduces the FOS’s scope to a subset of FCA rules. If you ask who benefits from all this, the answer, it seems to me, is not likely to be the consumer.

The small print of the Bill makes the situation for the complainant even less attractive. The Bill specifies a long list of other requirements to be considered in making a determination, most of them tilting the scales in favour of FCA rule-based compliance. This long list includes

“any other matters specified in regulations made by the Treasury”

and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. Here, we are a very long way from the “fair and reasonable under all circumstances” test.

The net effect for the Bill’s proposals will inevitably be to increase bureaucracy and to increase a remoteness from practical circumstances and a reliance on box-ticking procedures. It will convert the independent FOS into a compliant subsidiary of the FCA. We have not seen spelled out any evidenced justification for such a radical narrowing of the FCA’s reach and independence. I ask the Minister again to provide the evidence that supports these radical changes. By “evidence”, I mean hard data, not simply a headcount of consultees’ opinions, as interpreted by HMT.

As I noted at Second Reading, the UK’s financial sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. For it to be trusted, consumers must have confidence that, when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress. We have one of those already: the FOS. My Amendments 37, 42 and 43 would remove the new bureaucratic and complex restrictions, qualifications and subordinations in the Bill. In their place, the amendments would restore a simple and clear operating framework. They would restore the primacy of the “fair and reasonable” test, and they would update the list of things that the ombudsman must or may take into account.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 34 again concerns symmetry of enforcement and redress periods. The Bill introduces a 10-year hard stop on complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, but the problem is that the 10-year figure is already riddled with exemptions: for long-dated instruments, for latent harms, for products with extended maturities and for situations where the consumer could not reasonably have known they had a claim. The Government have already conceded that the 10-year period cannot sensibly apply in a wide range of cases. I have a concern that, once Parliament writes “10 years” into statute, that becomes the headline. Consumers may assume they have 10 years, even when they are in one of the many categories where the long stop does not apply. That creates a real risk that people will time themselves out because they believe the headline rather than the detail.

Then there is the deeper structural issue that I have referenced before: firms’ enforcement rights do not end at 10 years. They can enforce debts, pursue arrears, securitise portfolios and benefit from long-tail revenue streams well beyond that period. Yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship or to bring a complaint may fall away far earlier. That is the same kind of asymmetry that I raised before. My solution is that at least the starting point should be that the duration of rights, remedies and enforcement powers for firms must be aligned with the duration of rights and remedies for consumers arising from the same act or relationship.

I have addressed only that aspect of asymmetry in my amendment; I have not attacked the 10-year hard stop and the impact that that might have on consumer perception. My amendment would not interfere with the exemptions that the Government have already accepted. It would simply ensure that, where a firm retains enforcement rights beyond 10 years, in various circumstances, the consumer retains the corresponding right to challenge the fairness of that relationship for the same period—in other words, symmetry. I need not say any more, as we have been around this loop, but it is the same argument in a different place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

Would the Minister mind repeating that?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Certainly. We are trying to align the FOS’s “fair and reasonable” test with the FCA rules, but it retains some discretion.

I apologise for taking another moment to consult my officials. For clarity, where the FOS has aligned with the FCA rules, it has to believe that that is the case, and that determination has to be upheld.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

Looking at the legislation itself, it seems clear that if the act or omission is in breach of the FCA’s rules or the consumer duty that absolutely qualifies it as being okay. There is no subordinate reference to “fair and reasonable”.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will take the opportunity to write because this definitely needs clarification. The note that I have says that in cases where the omission being complained about is governed by FCA rules, if the firm has met its obligations under those rules, the FOS will be required to find that it acted fairly and reasonably. All the FCA’s handbook is relevant here, including the principles for businesses and, therefore, the consumer duty. There will be coherence between those determinations but only when the FOS believes that the fair test has not been met can it challenge the FCA. I will write to noble Lords because this is an important point that needs a definitive answer. I apologise for that.

On Amendments 37, 42 and 43, as I have set out, the reforms to the FOS’s fair and reasonable test are designed to preserve the FOS’s existing discretion in areas not covered by FCA rules. The Bill specifies the matters that the FOS must take into account when making determinations, taking this out of FCA rules and making it subject to parliamentary oversight. The matters listed include the law, relevant guidance, codes of practice and further materials published by the FCA or other regulators. This provides greater clarity around how the FOS makes its decisions. As I explained earlier, the Government’s view is that where there are relevant FCA rules, there are benefits from ensuring that FOS decisions are consistent with them. I will write to clarify further in case I have created confusion in this conversation.

On Amendments 38 and 41, the Government recognise the important role the FOS plays within the wider financial services regulatory environment. The reforms included in the Bill are about making sure that the FOS and the FCA are able to carry out their respective roles effectively, co-operating where necessary but maintaining their separate responsibilities. These amendments would go further and require the FCA to become involved in the determination of individual complaints. This is a role that the FCA is not designed or equipped to undertake. It is, and should continue to be, the role of the FOS as the independent, impartial dispute resolution service.

Turning to Amendments 39 and 40, the Government’s review of the FOS concluded that the “fair and reasonable” test works well in the majority of cases to enable a quick and fair resolution of complaints. Removing the “fair and reasonable test”, as proposed by these amendments would undermine the FOS’s quick and informal role and put in its place a more legalistic approach based on strict adherence to the FCA’s rules. This could introduce additional costs and delays, and reduce the FOS’s effectiveness as an accessible and simple alternative to the courts.

I turn to Clause 7 and the new referral mechanism, which will require the FOS to seek a view from the FCA where it considers that a matter relating to a complaint may indicate ambiguity in the FCA’s rules or have wider implications for consumers and firms. As well as enabling the FOS to make decisions that are consistent with FCA rules, the referral process will ensure that systemic questions and issues are identified at an early stage and the FCA can consider whether a regulatory or supervisory intervention may be appropriate, rather than continuing to consider each individual complaint separately. Alongside the new reporting requirements provided for in Clause 9, this will improve understanding of the FCA’s rules and the standards expected of firms, in turn improving confidence in financial services and ultimately reducing the number of consumers who experience poor treatment, which all noble Lords will agree is preferable to providing redress after the fact.

Given the important role that the FOS plays, this is a clearly a matter of huge interest, and there is a range of views on exactly what the best system would look like. Notwithstanding that, I will write on the specific things that I might have caused confusion about.

I have listened carefully to the representations. The Government’s view is that the reforms set out in the Bill strike an appropriate balance, improving the clarity and consistency of redress arrangements while allowing the FOS to continue to make fact-specific decisions on individual complaints. They ensure that both the FOS and the FCA are equipped to fulfil their respective roles and responsibilities so that consumers can have confidence in the key financial services on which they rely, and so that firms understand what is expected of them and can act on it. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

That is right.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, remarked earlier in our Committee discussions, we often agree about things, but not, I am afraid, about this amendment. There are three reasons for that: first, the amendment is not necessary; secondly, it probably would not work, although its lack of any real detail makes it quite hard to tell; and, thirdly, it would significantly bypass parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms. For example, proposed new subsection (1)(c) says that the determination of complaints will

“be determined by reference to such statutory requirements as may be specified”,

without actually specifying them. This does not make for proper scrutiny.

How complaints are determined is absolutely critical in how redress is obtained. The amendment tells us nothing about how that would be done, or on what criteria judgments would be made. Proposed new subsection (1)(g) contains what looks suspiciously like a Henry VIII power. None of these provisions is really necessary, and nor is the amendment as a whole. That is because there does not appear to be a convincing evidence base for the radical root-and-branch reform that abolishing the FOS would bring about. The nearest we have to evidence is in the assertion by the Minister that:

“The Government’s review found that, in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator”.—[Official Report, 22/6/26; col. GC 260.]


That is all the government explanation there is for the proposed radical reform and, by extension, for the amendment before us.

I have repeatedly asked the Minister for more detail; I asked at Second Reading, and I asked again on the first day in Committee. I have had no response to what are essentially simple questions. How many cases are small? How was their significance assessed? How is the FOS, in this small number of cases, acting as a quasi-regulator? What we have currently is an assertion, but it certainly is not evidence. When he speaks, can the Minister tell the Committee what “small” means in this context? How many and what kind of cases were involved and how did they come to be characterised as significant? As for HMT’s rather bland consultation report, the frequent use of the phrase “broadly speaking” does not inspire a lot of confidence about the strength of its case.

The amendment before us is essentially skeletal and removes the complaints procedure to a wholly different legal arena. Given the grossly overstressed nature of our justice system, it is very hard to see any improvements being located there. The FOS is meant to be, and is, a quick, simple alternative to costly court processes for consumers. There is no hard evidence to support the proposals made in this amendment and, indeed, no clear sense of what kind of redress system and what criteria for determination are envisaged.

Last July, the FCA and the FOS signed a memorandum of understanding. Article 21(b) of the memorandum says that the two parties will

“seek to achieve a complementary and consistent approach, so far as that is consistent with their independent roles by consulting each other at an early stage (including on the interpretation of regulatory requirements where they are relevant to the resolution of disputes)”.

Article 24(c) says:

“For the Financial Ombudsman Service: seek a view from the FCA on the interpretation of its rules and how redress could potentially be assessed, as early as possible in advance of issuing a final determination, and provide the FCA with any relevant information and draft determinations it can share, to assist the FCA in formulating a view.”


The following article says that the FCA should try to respond to the FOS’ submission within 30 days.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for tabling this amendment and giving the Committee a further opportunity to discuss the FOS.

An effective ombudsman service ensures that consumers have quick and easy redress when things go wrong, improving customer confidence in, and engagement with, our financial services system. The FOS largely fulfils that vital role, and the reforms in the Bill will improve that further, ensuring that it provides a quick and informal route for resolving disputes in financial services.

The amendment would undermine this vital role entirely. We believe that replacing the FOS with a financial adjudication service alongside the new tribunal appeal structure would create a more formal, legalistic and adversarial system. That approach would move away from Parliament’s intention of providing consumers and firms with an accessible alternative to resolving disputes through the tribunal and courts system. The Government’s view is that this would not be the right outcome for consumers and firms. The Government’s reforms have been developed in response to issues identified through the review and consultation last year to stop the FOS acting like a quasi-regulator, to stop it taking the lead on mass redress events and to deliver a clearer, more consistent and predictable framework.

I thank the noble Lord for raising that issue and I apologise for not writing in answer to his question. I promise that I will get back to him as soon as we have that information to hand again.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

Perhaps the Minister could answer it now.

[Lord Stockwood]

I do not have it to hand. My apologies, I will bring it to the noble Lord. We are confident that the changes will improve trust and confidence that the FOS acts fairly and impartially, while ensuring that decisions are closely aligned with the high standards of conduct and consumer protection set by the FCA where relevant.

The right approach is this careful, targeted reform that preserves the core strengths and benefits of the FOS model—quick, informal and accessible dispute resolution—while delivering the necessary changes to improve the overall operation of the framework. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my non-diminution Amendments 2 and 3, and to Amendments 4 and 5, which stem from them. In Committee, the Government made it clear that they wish to remove tail risk for firms—a theme running through the changes to the CCA and FOS. I agree that issues such as font sizes and business practices need updating—I would certainly prefer not to have to agree instantly to a garbled recitation of terms and conditions over the phone just to access basic service contracts—but the Consumer Credit Act is fundamentally about protecting consumers from bad corporate behaviour. Aside from the much-cited font issue, tail risk usually arises from bad behaviour that simply takes a long time to surface. There is no justifiable reason for remedy to disappear.

Although I see the attractions of using the FCA framework, I do not accept that there should be a time limit after which bad behaviour is insulated from rectification, or that protections requiring judicial remedy might fall away—over which there is no current certainty. That is the purpose of my non-diminution amendments: to allow modernisation, but not at the cost of significant consumer rights.

A long-standing defect in the CCA illustrates the point: the Act was drafted in 1974, before securitisation existed. As a result, consumer credit has been sold on in ways that mean that the statutory definition, and thus obligations, of the lender no longer apply. This was a happenstance of financial evolution, not intentional design, yet it seriously degrades a regulated product and directly created the modern mortgage prisoner problem that my noble friend Lord Sharkey has brought to this House more than once. One can foresee the same happening with student loans once they are sold off.

The solution is straightforward. Whenever any right stemming from lending or credit is exercised, including the setting, levying or collecting of interest, the corresponding obligations must travel with that right. That must hold even where responsibilities are split across multiple entities under securitisation structures that currently allow each actor to claim it is not the statutory lender. This is entirely consistent with the CCA’s original assignment provisions, and we have precedent, because the MCOB rules already require obligations to follow the exercise of rights in mortgage services.

This principle works. We explained it to the previous Minister and officials before the summer, providing copies of my first amendment and documentary explanation. I recognise there have been changes on the Government’s side, but it is regrettable that there has been no engagement since, especially as collaborative working on good ideas was a stated commitment of the new Prime Minister.

Some may ask: who loses? The answer is that no one suffers unjustified loss. When a regulated consumer product is transferred, the protections attached to it must remain intact rather than be severed, whether by design or accident. For consumer credit, this simply maintains existing rights or, in the case of mortgage prisoners, restores them prospectively. But they had those rights when they took the mortgages out.

Taking the same principle to student loans, once sold into the private financial system, they must carry with them the standards of respectable financial products. Borrowers must be protected from predatory interest rates and, under international accounting rules, when projected non-repayment exceeds 50%, the entire corpus of loans, not just the unpaid part, is pulled on to national debt metrics. Allowing predatory interest rates simply deepens that problem.

This is the logic behind this family of amendments. I urge the Minister to engage constructively as the Bill progresses. As he will know, when I have a principled solution in my sights, it does not go away, because it rests on my conscience, as it should on his.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5 in this group. Structurally, the amendment follows the approach used by my noble friend Lady Bowles in her previous amendment, and I am very grateful to her for the help and support in drafting. My amendment has a simple purpose, which is to bring relief to mortgage prisoners. As many of your Lordships will know, mortgage prisoners are people who are stuck with their existing mortgage holders—who are not active lenders—on very high interest rates and who cannot access a better deal, such as the normal market fixed-rate deals. As a result, mortgage prisoners continue to pay interest at around four percentage points over the normal market fixed-term rates. This costs them hundreds, and even thousands, of pounds extra per year.

According to the UK Mortgage Prisoners action group, there were originally around 195,000 mortgage prisoners. This number is declining slowly due to death, reaching the end of term and repossessions. The largest group of mortgage prisoners are former Northern Rock customers. After nationalisation in 2007, these mortgages were placed in a Government-owned company run by UK Asset Resolution—UKAR. When returning these mortgages to the private sector, the Conservative Government could have sold them to active lenders, which would have offered the prisoners a fair market deal. The Government did not do that. Instead, they sold the mortgages to non-active lenders and vulture funds; the consequences we continue to see.

It is not as though the Government were not warned about the problem this would cause. The risk to customers was clearly identified. In January 2016, the noble Lord, Lord McFall, wrote to the Treasury and UKAR, warning them that:

“Many of … those affected by these sales, will be mortgage prisoners and will be unable to switch lenders”.


He told the Government that the customers affected by the sales should be protected, offered a fair deal and given access to fixed rates. He warned that:

“Given the prospect of rising interest rates it is important that all mortgage customers are given the opportunity to achieve certainty over their payments by accessing a fixed rate”.


He told the Government that he was,

“concerned that some customers affected by these mortgages sales … will not be offered reasonable fixed mortgage rates”.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

5: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Protection of consumers where regulated credit agreements or regulated mortgage contracts are transferred to inactive lenders (1) This section applies where rights under any regulated credit agreement or regulated mortgage contract are assigned, sold, securitised or otherwise transferred to a person who is an inactive lender or closed book owner.(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the consumer shall retain against the transferee all statutory and contractual rights, protections and avenues of redress that were available against the original creditor or lender.(3) Any variable interest rate, fee structure or other pricing term applied by an inactive lender or closed book owner must not exceed a reasonable market proxy determined by the Financial Conduct Authority.(4) Any person exercising rights of enforcement arising from an agreement or contract to which this section applies is treated as a creditor or lender for the purposes of this section.(5) For the purposes of this section, the exercise of rights of enforcement includes the setting, varying, applying or collecting of interest, fees or other pricing terms, whether undertaken directly or through an agent.(6) The duties in this section apply from the date on which this section comes into force—(a) to any regulated credit agreement or regulated mortgage contract in force on, or entered into after, that date, and(b) to any person who holds, or subsequently acquires, rights under any such agreement or contract, regardless of whether the assignment, sale, securitisation or transfer of rights occurred before, on or after that date.(7) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this section requires the reopening, invalidation or unwinding of any assignment, sale, securitisation or transfer effected before the date on which this section comes into force, but any exercise of rights, variation of interest rates or enforcement occurring on or after that date in respect of such a transfer is subject to the provisions of this section.(8) For the purposes of this section—“inactive lender” or“closed book owner” means a person who holds rights under a regulated credit agreement or regulated mortgage contract but does not actively offer new regulated credit agreements or regulated mortgage contracts to consumers in the United Kingdom;“regulated mortgage contract” has the meaning given by article 61 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/544).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause seeks to ensure that when regulated credit agreements or regulated mortgage contracts are transferred to inactive lenders or closed book owners, consumers retain their full statutory and contractual rights. It would allow the Financial Conduct Authority to cap variable interest rates and pricing terms at a reasonable market proxy.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I had hoped that the life-crippling injustice visited on mortgage prisoners by government would produce a more sympathetic approach. In fact, it is hard to tell what approach, if any, the Government are proposing. What are they proposing to do about this long-standing and obvious injustice? Let me point out one thing. There has been a lot of research in this area, much of it funded by Martin Lewis and Money Saving Expert. That report, three years old now, put forward six areas for discussion to arrive at a solution.

Martin Lewis has had no response from the Government at all to his report: more talk, but no action that would actually help. The difference between what the Government are saying and what the amendment is saying is that the Government are promising nothing, not even making a commitment to do something, or even think about it, and the amendment delivers something. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

13: Leave out Clause 7
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove provisions relating to how the Financial Ombudsman Service may refer matters on complaints to the FCA.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 13 to 15 and 99. Clauses 7 and 8 propose radical reform of the relationship between the FOS and the FCA, and of the method of determining complaints to the FOS. These proposals will have a critical effect on consumer protection. They will turn the independent FOS into a subset of the FCA and make successful complaints harder to progress or achieve. Parliament designed and brought the FOS regime into being to provide accessible, no cost procedures for quickly determining complaints. At its heart is the “fair and reasonable” test. This test is abolished by the Bill, despite having been explicitly confirmed in July last year in the memorandum of understanding signed by the FOS and the FCA. The Bill will reduce access to free and impartial redress, introduce additional bureaucracy and costs, and ultimately risk damaging confidence in the financial services industry.

The Government have not supplied any meaningful hard evidence that might justify, or at least explain convincingly, the rationale for these reforms. They say only that the Government’s review found that,

“in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator”.

They do not say how small or how significant these cases are, or how significance was defined and engaged, and they have completely ignored repeated requests from these Benches to provide a clear description of the problem being addressed and of the necessity for such radical changes.

Three months ago, at Second Reading, I asked for hard evidence. I got none, not even an acknowledgement of the request. I asked again on the first day in Committee, and again had no result. I asked again on the last day in Committee. This time, the then Minister—who is in his seat—apologised for not writing in answer to my questions and promised to get back to me

“as soon as we have that information to hand again”.—[Official Report, 8/7/26; col. GC 161.]

I have heard nothing since. This lack of response displays an almost contemptuous approach to parliamentary scrutiny, and it also makes obvious that the Government are unclear about the existence of any significant problem in the way that the FOS and the FCA operate under their current MoU.

I am grateful to Sarah Pritchard, FCA deputy CEO, for her attempts to persuade the Government to answer our questions in a meaningful way. In her letter to me and my noble friend Lady Kramer of 6 August, she said:

“We recognise that you have consistently sought further evidence from HM Treasury to support the case for reform, particularly the contention that uncertainty in FOS decision making may be constraining innovation. Following our meeting, we have formally re-iterated this request to HM Treasury and highlighted the importance of ensuring parliament has access to the evidence and analysis underpinning these proposals”.


HMT appears to deal with these things even-handedly; it has ignored her as well.

Her letter went on to say:

“One area where legislative change is being proposed concerns the interaction between our rules and the Ombudsman’s ‘fair and reasonable’ test. The aim is to provide greater consistency and alignment between regulatory requirements and complaint outcomes, while preserving the Ombudsman’s discretion to consider the wider circumstances of the case”.


This sounds like the arrangements currently in place under the MoU, but the Bill goes much further in practice. In effect, it reduces the scope of this discretion and reduces the FOS to a subset of the FCA, with the FCA rulebook being the determinator. It is very hard to see that this preserves the independence of the FOS and, of course, independence is desirable.

In evidence given to the Treasury Select Committee on 15 July, Nikhil Rathi said:

“From the FCA’s perspective, we want an independent Financial Ombudsman Service. That is a really important safeguard for your consumers”.


Both Mr Rathi and Mr Alder, the FCA chair, in the same TSC session, went on to express concern about the interaction between the FCA’s interpretation of rules and the FOS’s decision-making. Mr Rathi said that

“with a system where people can try to instrumentalise it so that everything that they disagree with can get pushed to us to try to deal with in 30 days because it is deemed ambiguous, you will gum up the system”.

His chair emphasised the point of this:

“To Nikhil’s point, if we get this wrong, the system will become gummed up … As a result, the main objectives of those changes in the legislation will not be met. It is very important that we get this right”.


This is the very real danger of a requirement for the FCA to respond to a referral from the FOS within 30 days. In the same session, Sarah Pritchard said:

“We have been clear that we want the Financial Ombudsman Service to deliver quickly for consumers. We do not want to turn into a backdoor appeal mechanism. Where there are important matters around the intention of our rules, absolutely we should be there to clarify. We are already taking referrals from the Financial Ombudsman Service that do that”.


The July 2025 MoU between the FOS and the FCA is in operation now. It seems clear that this blueprint has taken into account current and anticipated problems, but it differs radically from the FOS proposals in Clauses 7 and 8, including on the absolutely critical criterion of the FOS making a determination. If the MoU is working and if it is working with, as it says, the fair and reasonable test at its heart, why are the Government proposing to abolish that test and the FOS’s effective independence?

My Amendments 13 and 14 address these issues. Amendment 13 would remove Clause 7, with its referral method and four other pages of prescriptive micromanagement, including a kind of Henry VIII power on page 6. Amendment 14 seeks to restore the “fair and reasonable” test agreed in the MoU.

Consumer groups have noticed the proposed changes in the Bill and many are very strongly opposed. For example, Martin Lewis of Money Saving Expert strongly supports the removal of Clause 7 and the replacement of Clause 8 with the current “fair and reasonable” test. In all, 12 leading consumer organisations have written to us asking for support for Amendments 13, 14 and 15. I will not read out the whole list, but they have agreed a statement that says:

“At a time when the cost-of-living crisis is pushing household budgets to breaking point, the Government should not be altering the fairness test and introducing new bureaucratic hurdles in the very system that provides redress for financial loss”.


Finally, my Amendment 15 would create breathing space to enable a proper evidence-based review to take place, with a report to Parliament on its findings and recommendations. Amendment 15 sets out the proposed independent review process and its scope and timelines. It requires the review to take place not before the second anniversary of signing the MoU and then to report within 12 months. Amendment 99 would simply put the commencement of Clauses 7 and 8 on hold until the review’s report has been laid before Parliament. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on making a very powerful case for keeping the existing system under which the FOS operates. The problem here, expressed in the considerable representations that we have received from consumer groups, is a lack of clarity about the problem that this is meant to address, coupled with clear concerns about the loss of the fair and reasonable requirement. That is the central point. We have a system that works, in which there is a degree of consumer confidence. The reason for interfering in that system is not clear to the bodies representing consumers, so my Government have to do more to justify these changes.

Interestingly, I had some discussions with the previous Minister, who is now sharing the same Bench as me, and one of the points that came out is that it is quite difficult for the Government to point to cases in which they expect a different result following this change from what was happening before. It would be unreasonable for the Government to pick on individual cases and say, “Those people really should not have had that finding from the ombudsman”, but that is at the heart of what is being proposed here.

Before my noble friend the Minister’s elevation, I discussed this with him at length. He assured me at the time that the impact on the consumer would not be material—that the way that the legislation is worded, in particular the rules that the FCA would have to interpret for the FOS, would embrace the concept of “fair and reasonable”. It would certainly help a great deal in allaying my concerns if those assurances could be given to the House. The Minister probably cannot express it in these terms, but it would help if he could say that these changes are contingent and will be reviewed and judged on their effect. That would allay my continued concerns about what is being proposed here.

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The Bill makes important reforms to the redress framework to increase clarity and consistency while preserving the strengths and the independence of the FOS. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press Amendments 13, 14, 15 and 99.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and all the others who have spoken for the way in which they have covered the issue. But it is notable that a lack of evidence for the reform proposals still exists. We still have not seen what it is that is wrong with the current system. We have not seen any hard data. We have seen soft data that suggests there is a problem with the operation of the FOS. It is the case as well that the definition of the determinator contained in the memorandum of understanding contains direct references to the FCA rules in its book, and that is the expanded definition that is currently being worked on by the FOS and the FCA. But it is still the case that I cannot see a compelling problem that is addressed by the radical changes that the Government seem bent on making.

If possible, I would like at some stage to continue the conversation about the evidence. I feel that we are somewhat wide apart, perhaps unnecessarily when on the one hand we seem to have a system that works very well, and on the other hand we have a desire for fairly radical reform. I am not sure that that plays out happily together, but I would be happy to discuss that if the Minister is willing. Having said that, particularly my remarks about the evidence, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

14: Leave out Clause 8 and insert the following new Clause—
“Determination of complaints: matters to be taken into accountIn section 228 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (determination of complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction of the ombudsman scheme) in subsection (2), at the end insert “, having taken into account the relevant law and regulations, the relevant regulator’s rules, guidance and standards, the relevant codes of practice and (where appropriate) what the Financial Ombudsman considers to have been good industry practice at the relevant time”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove Clause 8 from the bill and insert a new clause requiring the Financial Ombudsman, when determining whether an outcome is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of a case, to take into account various other points.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 14.