Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateMonday 22nd June 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeFinancial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 5-I(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (22 Jun 2026)
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment, along with another in the name of Baroness Neville-Rolfe, seeks to allow for a debate on the Government’s intentions around a new regime to be laid down in the regulatory rule book in place of that established by the Consumer Credit Act and associated legislation.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open our deliberations on the Financial Services and Markets Bill. I thank the Minister for his constructive engagement so far and I thank noble Lords across the House who have shared their initial views with us. These conversations have been very helpful and have underscored a shared objective: to improve financial services regulation in a way that promotes growth, attracts investment and supports innovation. Although there are differences between us, we all agree on the importance of the financial services industry across the United Kingdom: the contribution it makes to GDP, the 2.5 million jobs it supports and the £110 billion in tax it pays.
However, I think this first group of amendments will challenge the Minister on a very important issue that we will want to address at several points throughout Committee: oversight and parliamentary scrutiny. We have approached this with slightly different amendments, but I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, shares the concern, which also applies to her amendments in group 2.
Clause 1 is short, but it is the gateway provision that introduces Schedule 1. It provides for the repeal and recasting of significant parts of the remaining Consumer Credit Act framework into FCA rules. The reasoning behind this desire for reform, as we said at Second Reading, is broadly understandable. The Treasury’s policy statement on CCA reform says that the current framework is increasingly out of date because it was designed for a paper-based credit market and now sits awkwardly alongside modern regulation. The Government say that the aim is to create a more “agile and proportionate” regime, and we do not disagree with that assessment. Certainly, that is the feedback we have been getting in our discussions with stakeholders.
However, identifying the right problem does not necessarily mean that the Government have chosen the right solution. Their approach has two serious consequences. First, Parliament will lose control and oversight of the core consumer protections currently contained in the CCA. Secondly, we are being asked to approve the repeal of these protections without being able to scrutinise the regime that will replace them. This sets a deeply concerning precedent. The purpose of your Lordships’ House is to scrutinise legislation, challenge the Government, ask questions and ensure that the law is workable, proportionate and effective. Yet there is nothing for us to scrutinise. The Government are dismantling the existing regime without showing Parliament what will take its place.
Both Houses contain a wealth of expertise—much of it is here today—including Members with extensive industry experience, who can identify unintended consequences and suggest more effective solutions. As we have frequently made clear, we want to work constructively with the Government on this Bill, but asking Parliament to surrender its powers to a regulator before it can examine the replacement regime is not meaningful scrutiny and it is not an approach that we can support.
Consumer credit in particular matters because it is woven into the everyday financial lives of millions of people. It allows households to spread the cost of major purchases, manage short-term cash-flow pressures and access funds when they are needed, all of which supports wider economic participation but needs to be done carefully and responsibly. This is a very important area and, as with the other parts of the Bill that delegate power, the Minister must take this opportunity to answer some key questions.
First, which core consumer rights and remedies do the Government intend to keep in primary legislation? By what principle have they decided which protections may safely be moved into the FCA rules? Secondly, when will Parliament be able to see the FCA’s replacement rules in draft? Will these rules be finalised before any repeal of the existing statutory protections is commenced? What transitional arrangements have the Government found? Thirdly, how do the Government intend Parliament to scrutinise future changes once the substance of consumer credit protection sits in the FCA rule book, rather than in statute? Finally, what assessment have the Government made of the effect of these reforms on smaller lenders, brokers and intermediaries, as well as on the availability of credit and related services more broadly? What effect is uncertainty on this point around the future regulatory regime having on economic activity and how much is that costing?
My amendment seeks to re-establish a basic constitutional principle that is being threatened by the Government’s approach in this part of the Bill. Parliament should not be asked to repeal important statutory protections before it knows what will replace them, how the new regime will operate and how it will be held to account. Modernisation and agility are worthwhile objectives, but they cannot justify Parliament legislating in the dark. Before Parliament agrees to transfer such significant powers, the Minister must show us not only that the destination is right but that the safeguards, accountability and route for getting there are right as well. I look forward to the Minister’s response and I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, as this is my first contribution in Committee, I declare my interests as recorded in the register, in particular that I hold listed shares in financial services companies and technology companies that may be affected by the Bill or amendments tabled to it.
I am going to use the opportunity of this first group of amendments to raise the issue of the accountability of the financial services regulators, which, as we have heard, are being given significant regulatory powers. This theme certainly applies to Clause 1 and Schedule 1, because of the vast new powers in relation to consumer credit being given to the FCA, but the theme is pervasive and we will debate it several times in Committee.
I should start by saying that I agree that consumer credit legislation needs a massive overhaul. The current legislation focuses on paperwork and processes. It was written in a pre-digital age and does not have a sophisticated approach to consumers—for example, it does not have the concept of a vulnerable customer. It is crying out for change. Indeed, when we scrutinised the Financial Services and Markets Bill in 2023, I tabled an amendment to give the Treasury significant powers to rewrite the legislation, including the ability to delegate to the FCA. My noble friend Lady Penn, who was the Treasury Minister at the time, convinced me that this was a step too far because of the many significant consultations that were needed. In withdrawing my amendment, I suggested that the extensive consultations sounded to me like an excuse for not making any progress. I am, therefore, supportive of the Government using this Bill as a vehicle to make some progress, although I regret that they still have not completed the task.
That support is qualified by issues that have become apparent since the 2023 Act was passed. At that time, I was a supporter of the FSMA model, which allowed Parliament to determine the overall principles of financial services regulation and left the detail to the regulators. Instead of challenging the huge burden being put on the FSMA model by the 2023 Act, which made provision for the repeal and replacement of retained EU law, a number of us focused on the accountability of the regulators. This was an error. I now believe that we failed to understand fully what that meant for democratic oversight of what the regulators do with the powers that they acquire. We also failed to appreciate the scale of the task of holding the regulators to account.
The FSMA model was set up by FSMA 2000 in an era when the most significant financial services regulation was set by the EU and either applied directly or incorporated by our own legislation. In either event, there was significant oversight through the processes of the European Parliament, particularly ECON, which was chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. In addition, both Houses of Parliament had committees dedicated to oversight of the regulatory outpourings of the EU, and, in the case of your Lordships’ House, we had a Sub-Committee of the EU Select Committee dedicated to financial services.
The FSMA model was not designed to do the heavy lifting that it is now being asked to do, first via the 2023 Act and now via this Bill for consumer credit legislation. I do not advocate scrapping that model but I believe the time is right for re-examining Parliament’s oversight and the accountability of the regulators. The 2023 Bill initially provided for some additional oversight by the Treasury Select Committee in the other place but was amended during its passage to add what is now the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House. I am a member of that committee, along with several other noble Lords present today, and I currently chair it.
These arrangements were designed to increase the accountability of the regulator, but I have to tell the Committee there remains a significant accountability deficit. Of more importance, committees of Parliament cannot and should not replace democratic oversight of the judgments made by the regulators. That is particularly important when we come to consumer credit law. The arrangement envisaged in the Bill passes to the FSA almost total responsibility for judging the complex balance between consumer protection and the need for innovation and competition in the market. Quite simply, that is not the right answer and Parliament needs more involvement.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has some amendments to Schedule 1 that we will be debating in the next group, and I believe they are designed to alter the balance between Parliament and the regulators. I look forward to that debate, but that measure alone would not be enough because any reasonable approach to modernising consumer credit legislation will still involve significant delegations to the regulators. That is why we need to use the Bill to revisit the mechanisms for the accountability of the regulators.
At a later stage in our Committee, we will be reaching some important amendments designed to tackle that: the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has a provision requiring a periodic independent review of the regulators, and my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley has some amendments dealing with an office of financial regulatory accountability.
These issues of democratic oversight and regulatory accountability are unfinished business, and we must use the opportunity of the Bill to strengthen both and not sleepwalk into a situation where the regulators govern us rather than the other way around. We will be debating the accountability of the regulators again when we get to Clauses 16 and 17, when we reach the accountability amendments that I have just referenced.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I will speak just briefly. I find myself in the unusual situation of agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on the role and functioning of the Financial Services Regulation Committee, of which I am a member. The committee was created to undertake a particular task, and what is in the Bill makes that task virtually impossible. We very much hope that the Minister will listen to what the committee has said on this subject.
The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on this important set of issues and for the constructive nature of the debate so far. Before we start, my interests are set out in the ministerial register. I invest in a number of funds that are regulated by the FCA.
I start by addressing why Clause 1 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. The case for reform is straightforward. The Consumer Credit Act—the CCA—is more than 50 years old and was enacted long before the creation of the FCA. It no longer delivers as it should for today’s consumers, who engage with modern products in an increasingly digital world. It too often results in people being sent lengthy, complex documents that they do not read, do not understand and cannot use with confidence. It is important to say that one in seven adults has literacy skills at or below those expected of a 9 to 11 year-old and 34% of adults have poor or low levels of numeracy involving financial concepts, yet the CCA regime means that some of the information provided on credit cards requires a far higher reading age.
Debt advice charities have criticised the way in which the CCA requirements often result in borrowers being sent arrears notices even when they have agreed a repayment plan, causing confusion and alarm. To address the point raised by the noble Baroness in her amendments, this demonstrates that it is not just the content of the arrears notices that is the problem but the inflexible legislative triggers that mean they must be sent even when there is no clear purpose and they cause more harm than good. There are many more examples of where the CCA results in poor outcomes for consumers and anachronistic procedures for lenders.
That is why this Bill continues the work that began in 2012 of repealing this outdated legislation so that it can be replaced with updated rules that better meet the needs of consumers and are fit for the digital age. The Government strongly believe that those replacement rules should, in the main, reside in the FCA rulebook, not in primary legislation. The FCA has extensive experience in developing firm-facing rules for retail markets, including mortgages, insurance and investments. Its rule-making approach is underpinned by consultation and consumer testing so that protections remain robust, proportionate and relevant. The FCA’s new rules for buy now, pay later, which come into force next month, demonstrate what a modern, FCA rules-based regime can deliver for consumers.
I have heard the concerns of some noble Lords that the Bill does not set out how the repealed provisions of the CCA should be replaced and that this has been left to the FCA to determine at a future time. While I appreciate that concern, this is entirely consistent with the model of regulation established in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. These provisions sit in the CCA only because this model of regulation did not exist in 1974. Parliament has already vested the FCA with significant responsibilities in this space, objectives that include a primary consumer protection objective, powers to allow it to fulfil its role and a comprehensive system of transparency, governance and oversight.
Parliament will have a key role in scrutinising the FCA as it makes these replacement rules. The FCA is required to advance its objectives through its rules, including its consumer protection objective. The FCA is required to consult, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on rule changes and to submit copies of those consultations to the relevant parliamentary committees. They include the Financial Services Regulation Committee, ably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
The FCA has a comprehensive set of enforcement powers that will help it to ensure compliance with its rules and to act decisively where firms are failing to comply. As well as ensuring that an expert body with the right objectives, powers and resources can fulfil this function, this approach ensures that the rules can adapt as needed in the future to stay current and respond to future trends.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked when Parliament will see the replacement rules and how the transition period might work. The FCA will set out the detail of the new rules through its normal rule-making process. Repeal of legislation will be commenced only once the relevant FCA rules are in place. The Bill contains a power for HMT to allow for an orderly transition. In practice, Parliament, consumer groups and stakeholders will see the FCA rules at consultation stage before the new regime takes effect. I am aware that some noble Lords have tabled amendments to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny further. The Government believe that the current arrangements work effectively, but I look forward to debating them in more detail later. CCA reform is an important opportunity to create a clearer, more flexible and more accessible framework that better reflects today’s consumer credit landscape.
The noble Baroness asked what rights and protections will remain in legislation. Where rights and protections require legislation to work, they will remain in legislation. Criminal offences will remain, so canvassing to minors and doorstep selling will remain in legislation, along with other key protections such as Section 75.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also asked about the impact on smaller firms, as the FCA replaces parts of the Consumer Credit Act. I can assure her that the aim of the reform is to create a more proportionate set of regulations for all firms, including smaller lenders. Everyone will benefit from this modernised regime.
I hope I have provided the Committee with some assurances that the CCA reforms are vital. I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and the Minister for his response. I particularly thank my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friends Lord Goodman and Lord Ranger of Northwood, all of whom, I think, echoed the Opposition’s concern about overdelegation. In fact, I appreciated and enjoyed their interesting historical and contemporary perspectives, which brought the matter to light.
The discussion has demonstrated that the concern at the heart of these amendments extends well beyond the technical details of consumer credit regulation. It concerns a fundamental question about how Parliament performs its constitutional role, particularly when substantial powers are transferred from statute to regulators. I will not repeat all the points made by my noble friend Lady Noakes, but we need to look at Parliament’s oversight. There is a democratic deficit. We will no doubt debate her letter when we come to Clause 17. I noted the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, for bottoming out the role of the committee and the points that he made.
We support the objective of modernising the consumer credit framework—I would like to emphasise that—but reform cannot mean that Parliament approves the removal of existing protections without seeing what will replace them. Nor should moving provisions into a regulator’s rulebook place it beyond meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. We will continue to apply these principles throughout our deliberations in this Committee. Wherever the Bill delegates new powers or expands the remit of the Treasury or the regulators, we will be asking the same essential questions. What safeguards will govern the exercise of these powers? Who will be accountable for the decisions taken? How will Parliament examine what is being proposed, assess whether it is working—because follow-up is important too—and intervene where it is not?
There must be a direct relationship between power and accountability, and when the authority, discretion or remit of a regulator is increased, the capacity for effective oversight must increase alongside it. It is constitutionally perverse for an expansion of regulatory power to be accompanied by a weakening of parliamentary scrutiny. The Government repeatedly invoke the need for agility, which I understand, and we recognise the value of a framework that can respond to changing markets and emerging technologies. My noble friend Lord Blackwell warned against the confusing dual responsibility that sometimes exists between the CCA and the courts and regulators, but the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out that it is not as simple as delegating everything to the FCA, which is not a legislator. She was right to warn against automated substitution.
Agility cannot become a proxy for opaqueness and flexibility cannot become an excuse for removing important decisions from democratic oversight. The Government must demonstrate that each transfer of power is not merely convenient but necessary, proportionate and matched by effective accountability. If the Minister is willing to engage with us on this basis, we will do so constructively, but we will continue to challenge any provision that asks Parliament to surrender oversight without first showing how that oversight will be replaced. We will return to this issue on Report, unless we can find a better way of ensuring proper scrutiny, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on this important set of issues. I start by addressing why Clause 1 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. However, I do not want to duplicate what I said on the previous group, where I set out at length the Government’s policy for the CCA. Suffice it to say that the case for reform is straightforward. The Consumer Credit Act is more than 50 years old and was enacted long before the creation of the FCA. It no longer delivers as it should for today’s consumers, who engage with modern products in an increasingly digital world. That is why the Bill continues the work that began in 2012 of repealing this outdated legislation, such that it can be replaced with updated rules that better meet the needs of consumers and are fit for this digital age.
I understand the strength of feeling on the question of delegation, but I note that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, said that this is not a consensus. As I have said, this is entirely consistent with the model of regulation established by Parliament in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Government strongly believe that those replacement rules should, in the main, reside in the FCA rulebook, not in primary legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, expressed concern about how the FCA will replace some key protections, including information requirements. In the last group, I already explained the process that the FCA will follow. As I said, in practice, Parliament, the sector and consumer groups will see the FCA’s detailed proposals at the consultation stage, before the new regime takes place. I am happy to assure the noble Baroness that the FCA’s recent public statement confirmed that it aims to consult on key information requirements, rights and protections, including cancellation and withdrawal, the termination of agreements, including early settlement, and on looking across the consumer credit journey, with this approach being underpinned by the consumer duty. This will be supported by consultation and cost-benefit analysis, consumer research and stakeholder feedback.
Amendments 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 would retain information requirements and related sanctions in legislation or limit the FCA to prescribing only the form and content of notices. That would preserve the rigidity we are seeking to address. I cannot accept these amendments, as the provisions are not fit for the digital age. The Bill repeals these rigid statutory requirements so that the FCA can develop a more effective, rules-based regime. This is not about reducing information but about improving its timing, its quality and its clarity. The aim of the regime is that it provides consumers with better information in a clearer form and at a time that is most useful to them.
The consequence of repealing these information requirements is that certain related sanctions will fall away. These sanctions were designed for a different era. The Office of Fair Trading had limited powers for supervision and enforcement, so the regime was designed to be draconian to act as a robust deterrent. The sanctions apply automatically, regardless of the seriousness of any breach or whether any consumer harm has arisen. For example, a lender that used the incorrect wording in an arrears notice is required to refund any interest and fees charged from the point at which that breach was originally made, even if the error was in no way harmful to the borrower. Much has changed over the years since these sanctions were designed, and this approach is poorly suited to the modern approach to regulation. The FCA has strong supervisory and enforcement powers, and under consumer duties firms must deliver good outcomes. Unlike when the CCA was enacted, any consumer who suffers harm can straightforwardly access redress through the Financial Ombudsman Service, the FOS.
I recognise the concern behind Amendment 2, which seeks to ensure that FCA rules can supplement but not replace or diminish rights and remedies in the CCA. However, the Bill already preserves statutory rights that need to remain in legislation. Because FCA rules are not capable of eroding such rights, the amendment is not necessary.
I have already set out, in the last group, several examples of protections that remain in primary legislation, including Section 75 and provisions connected to criminal offences, which must of course remain in legislation. Amendments 6 and 15 would retain withdrawal, cancellation and early settlement rights in the CCA rather than allowing them to be recast into FCA rules. These rights are an important feature of consumer credit products that ought to be preserved. However, the current framework is complex and outdated and, as a result, not always well understood by consumers. The purpose of reform is to ensure that these protections work better for consumers, which is why the FCA has committed to consider cancellation rights alongside other rights including withdrawal, termination of agreements and early settlement, as part of its future framework. The amendments would prevent the FCA taking forward this vital work.
Lastly, Amendment 17 covers certain important rights, such as time orders, and seeks to retain these provisions within legislation without changes. However, changes to these provisions are necessary to ensure that they work together with the new information requirements recast into FCA rules.
I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking forward these changes for the benefit of consumers, and convince them that the changes the Bill makes are necessary to modernise our protections and ensure that they are serving their intended purpose of protecting consumers. I acknowledge that we will come to the scrutiny of the regulators, especially the FCA, in future groups. I therefore propose that Clause 1 and Schedule 1 stand part of the Bill and respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press her opposition to them.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and all who have spoken in this debate. I am sorry that, to some extent, having it in two separate bits has made it more awkward. We are at a kind of impasse here. The Minister replies as though we are saying that nothing in the Consumer Credit Act can be changed and it will all have to stay there. In fact, all I am saying is that there are some basic core rights in statute, similar to the sorts of core rights that exist in many other Commonwealth countries, that should remain, because you do not have rights with the regulator. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey explained, the consumer duty does not give you any rights. It is about the opinion of the FCA, and it can change how it will apply it.
The main thing that we are objecting to is that the Bill is shoot first, ask questions later: “Give us all the power now and we’ll consult and tell you what we’re actually going to do later”. That is not the way to make legislation right—it is not how you would hire a telly, for heaven’s sake. We are being asked to tick the box on behalf of the public for something that is fundamentally unseen. The Bill does not retain core rights. It says that some things will change and gives an open-ended power to change everything else automatically when the Government want to. The fact that the Government are not taking rights away now does not mean that they cannot take them away later.
That is the impasse that we are at. We need some core rights that stay. The rest can all be simplified, streamlined and handled by the FCA and made more modern. The two should be able to work together, but it is not a simple fix. This has been pushed through without that second consultation, and that is why it is now falling apart as unsatisfactory. I will return to this when we come to Report, but, for now, I will not press my opposition to Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“38A In section 140A (unfair relationships between creditors and debtors), after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) An application under section 140B(2)(a) shall not be made, and no action for an order under section 140B shall be brought, after the expiration of six years from the date on which the relationship between the creditor and the debtor ends.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would retain the six-year limitation period, running from the end of the creditor-debtor relationship, for applications or actions seeking relief under sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 in respect of an unfair relationship.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, before I turn to the detail of these amendments, I should briefly set the scene. Noble Lords will be aware that last week the Conservative Party announced a new policy in relation to the Financial Ombudsman Service. An amendment on our proposal for an alternative approach, a financial adjudication service, is currently being discussed with the Table Office, and I do not intend to pre-empt that discussion. We will have the opportunity to debate that proposal at a later stage of the Bill.
The clauses before us, by contrast, change the landscape of dispute resolution in financial services in the immediate term. Our policy announcement does not prevent us engaging properly with the provisions before us now. Indeed, it makes it more important that we do so. We want whatever system Parliament agrees on now to work as well as it can. The amendments in this group are concerned with certainty, timeliness and fairness. They are intended to ensure that the framework being created by the Bill does not introduce unnecessary uncertainty for firms, does not allow yet further delay to become embedded in the system and does not create open-ended liabilities or an undesirable degree of retrospection.
I turn first to Amendment 17A, which relates to unfair relationships under Sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Its purpose is to retain the six-year limitation period running from the end—I emphasise “end”—of the creditor-debtor relationship for applications or actions seeking relief in respect of an unfair relationship. These can of course go back many years. This reflects a concern that has been raised with us following the Supreme Court ruling in THG plc v Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd, which found that unfair prejudice petitions under Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 are not subject to statutory limitation periods. I appreciate that that judgment arose in a different statutory context, but it has prompted a serious and practical question. Does that reasoning have any implications for applications or actions seeking relief under Sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act?
If there is any doubt about the applicable limitation period, the consequences could be significant. Credit agreements, and the relationships arising from them, may have ended many years earlier. Banks and other lenders do not keep records indefinitely. They cannot reasonably be expected to defend claims on the basis of files, communications, systems and decision-making processes from an indefinite period in the past. That is why limitation periods matter. They reflect a basic principle of fairness: that after a certain period evidence may be lost, as memories fade and documents are no longer available. Without a clear time limit, firms could be exposed to open-ended liability and a significant increase in vexatious or speculative claims, often fired up by claims management companies.
Amendment 17A therefore seeks to preserve the existing position that, where relief is sought under Sections 140A and 140B in respect of an unfair relationship, the relevant limitation period should be six years from the date on which the relationship between the creditor and the debtor ends. I would be grateful if the Minister could give some clear answers here. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor said in the previous group, it is important to have predictability. Does the Government’s understanding remain that the six-year period applies? Has the position been affected in any way by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in THG v Zedra? If the Government consider the position is already clear, will the Minister set that out on the record? If there is any doubt, will he commit to preserving the current six-year period?
I turn next to Amendment 36, which concerns referrals from the Financial Ombudsman to the FCA. The Bill creates a new mechanism by which the Financial Ombudsman may refer matters to the FCA where there is an issue of wider significance or where FCA rules may be ambiguous. In principle, that is sensible and an important mechanism, but one of the recurring criticisms of the current system is that firms can find themselves judged against interpretations or expectations that were not clear at the time.
A route for the FCA to provide clarity is therefore welcome. However, that mechanism will work only if it operates at pace. If a complaint is referred to the FCA and then sits there for months, the result will be uncertainty for everyone. The consumer is left waiting, the firm is left with a live and unresolved complaint and the ombudsman cannot proceed. The wider market may be left in doubt about the meaning or application of the rules.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I have only a few comments on this group. As I listened to the comments on Amendment 17A, particularly those of my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, I understood what reminded them of mortgage prisoners. In that case, people who held mortgages with banks that failed, and who were rescued by the Treasury, were then sold on to private holders who were not themselves lenders of mortgages. In effect, they lost the ability to refinance, and so they remained imprisoned in very high-rate mortgages at a time when everyone else was able to remortgage. We can see echoes of that in some of the limitations that would be introduced by these amendments. I am therefore always concerned about those time limitations, particularly in situations where assets can be sold on, as they often and increasingly are today.
Amendment 44, from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, seeks to deal with the issue of consumer redress. If a consumer has been abused in some way and has a moral right to redress—a right in law—should that be lost simply because we have a regulator that fails to act promptly and within a reasonable time? I understand that it is tough for the industry, because it leaves it with uncertainty, but some of these products are life-changing for individual consumers and have life consequences. That is what made me think of mortgage prisoners; their lives were completely ruined by that process.
Where there are such consequences for the individual, it is very concerning to take away the right to redress because there was a delay in the functioning of the regulator. I understand that it means that the industry has to live with uncertainty, but my advice to it is to behave well to your customers. That really is the very best way not to get into these issues.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by considering Amendments 17A and 44. The Government’s reforms to the FOS are aimed at ensuring that the legislative framework in which it operates supports it to perform effectively the role that it was established to do, providing quick, informal and impartial dispute resolution between financial services firms and their customers.
Given the nature of the FOS and the way it operates, it can be effective at resolving the majority of disputes between customers and financial services firms, but it cannot do everything, and some things are more suited to other routes. The alternative routes include the courts and a consumer redress scheme established by the FCA. These routes are more appropriate when addressing systemic issues, such as widespread mis-selling. The reforms that the Bill makes to Section 404 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 are designed to enable the FCA to act quickly to prevent disruption and uncertainty when it finds that a mass redress event has occurred.
Turning to Amendment 17A, I thank the noble Baroness for raising this important issue. I recognise that there have been questions about the time limits that apply to claims brought under Sections 140A to 140C of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 in the light of the Zedra ruling. The Government understand that there is an interest in and desire for clarity in this area. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked me about the Government’s position following the Zedra ruling and its implications for the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The Government’s position remains that the limitation period runs from the end of the credit agreement. That approach provides legal certainty and reflects the nature of these claims. That understanding is consistent with existing case law, including the Supreme Court’s judgment in Smith v RBS.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this brief debate and to the Minister for his response and clarification of THG v Zedra, which I will certainly consider.
My central point is that a redress and complaints system must be fair in operation. It must be capable of delivering justice for consumers, but it must also give firms a reasonable degree of certainty about the liabilities they face, the standards against which they are judged and the timeframes within which matters will be resolved. If we create a system in which liabilities are open-ended, where regulatory redress powers can go beyond ordinary limitation principles, and where referrals can remain unresolved for an indefinite period, I do not think it will produce a better system for consumers.
I agree that we must look after consumers—this is obviously a very important part of consumer law—but I worry that we will produce a slower, more uncertain and more contested system for everyone if we do not get these judgments right. I do not accept a bias towards business, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested. Actually, we are seeing a shift the other way in some of these areas, which is why I have had the representations I have had on these points and why I think is it is very important to find clarity.
I note what my noble friend Lady Altmann said about pensions. The Minister has answered and explained that he sees pensions in a slightly different way. I am not sure what the limitation rules are there.
I hope that the Minister will reflect further on the thrust of these amendments. In particular, I hope that he will consider whether the Government can provide a clearer statutory safeguard on limitation—clarity is certainly important—as well as a firmer timetable for FCA opinions. I worry that just delegating it to the FCA will mean it being in charge of its own timetable. If there were an enormous problem in the financial services industry that required the diversion of staff elsewhere, for example, things could slip, and redress for the consumer could then slip as well.
All of these amendments go in the same direction: towards fair, timely and certain decision-making, with predictability for both consumers and the businesses involved. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, there seem to have been two themes in today’s discussion; I will address both because I agree with them both.
The first is on whether we value banking hubs. There have been so many voices that say that we value them, but they are calling for a much-improved framework, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. I suspect that there is a universal consensus that we need to think through this issue, which is exactly why the Richard Lloyd review is now anticipated. I think that most people who see the value of banking hubs in their community—most MPs have been asking for banking hubs in their constituencies—very much appreciate the direction of the Lloyd review. On the background and evidence for the need for banking hubs, I will address some of those issues much more when I discuss community development financial institutions in a later group, so I will not repeat all that.
That does not take away from the fact that we have a constitutional issue here. According to its report, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is very concerned that the problem has not been clearly identified and that a power as extensive as the one provided for here in the Bill severely compromises effective parliamentary scrutiny. The Select Committee asks for the power to be removed from the Bill. I say to the Government that it is important that there will be some real clarity before this hits the Commons—otherwise, this clause will be very much in trouble.
I support banking hubs. I suspect that I will be very pleased when I read the Lloyd review. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. I cannot just say to Parliament that, if it is something that I like, we do not need oversight, scrutiny and a proper process and that we do not need to consider the role of the regulator versus the democratic decision-making that should be happening in Parliament. This is a very good instance where I suspect that I would be very much in favour of the Lloyd review, but I would be very sad if that is not brought before Parliament for discussion, scrutiny and proper oversight. It is unfortunate that the Bill follows a procedure and process that seems to be completely unnecessary and that does not allow for that oversight. Oversight is valid, whether or not you think you will like what the regulator will do.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 21, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Noakes, would ensure that any government intervention in the provision of in-person banking services is evidence-based, proportionate and properly balanced. It would require Ministers to consider not only the needs of consumers but the legitimate commercial reasons why firms may reduce their physical banking provision.
More widely, Clause 3 raises two distinct but closely related concerns. Our amendment speaks to the first: banks do not close branches simply on a whim. Consumer behaviour has changed profoundly, more banking is conducted digitally, and maintaining a physical network carries substantial costs. The Government may decide that wider social considerations justify intervention, but they cannot responsibly make that decision while ignoring the commercial realities facing the firms they intend to regulate.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, I will begin by setting out why Clause 3 should stand part of the Bill. The way that UK citizens bank has changed significantly in recent years, with many customers choosing to use digital channels such as mobile banking. As such, we have seen many firms reviewing how best to meet these changing needs, and banks are closing branches in response.
However, for some people who require access to in-person banking services, these changes may have resulted in detriment. The Government are committed to ensuring that people who need in-person banking, including vulnerable customers and those with specific needs, can continue to access essential services. Last month, as mentioned, the Government launched an independent review into access to banking services led by Richard Lloyd, former executive director at Which? and a former board member of the FCA. I encourage noble Lords to engage with him. As they have noted, he conducts this critical work. I am glad to hear much agreement from many noble Lords today as this is a critical issue and the Government are right to be exploring it.
Clause 3 ensures that we can act swiftly and proportionately if the evidence from the Access to Banking Services review supports intervention. Once the Access to Banking Services review has concluded and made its recommendations, the Government will assess whether any further legislative change may be required. I appreciate that the power is broad and that many of the amendments in this group are aimed at scrutinising or reducing the breadth of that power. I also recognise that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has drawn Clause 3 to the attention of the House and recommended that the power be removed from the Bill. The Government have considered that report and will be responding in writing in the normal way before Report.
We accept that this is a broad power, but we consider that it is needed now so that, once the independent review reports, the Government can respond promptly and proportionately in light of the evidence and recommendations that it provides. As the review is still ongoing, it is not yet known what detriment exists, which customer segments are most affected, whether further intervention is needed or what form it should take. The Government are committed to keeping all aspects of this power under review as the independent review completes its work.
I pass on my personal welcome back to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. His comments about Ministers changing is indeed pertinent on a day such as today. I am not casting too far in the future; indeed, I keep checking my phone just to see whether I make it through Committee stage.
The noble Lord whether this power could be narrowed. I can confirm that the Government expect to narrow the power once the review has concluded in October and we have had the opportunity to consider the recommendations. This will provide further clarity on any appropriate interventions that will allow the power to be refined.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
If the review is going to be completed in October, presumably there will then be a period of time when the Government will consider it. In my experience, that usually takes several months, by which time the Bill will be law. I struggle to understand how the power can be narrowed, given that we are probably at the end of the year before proposals have come forward.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I was coming on to that point. The noble Lord asked what the power can do and how that scrutiny can take place. It allows the Government to introduce targeted secondary legislation or to confer functions on the FCA, including the power to make rules in the future. When using this power, the Treasury must have regard to the recommendation made by the Lloyd review.
I think the noble Lord made a point about what legislation could be amended. I can only answer this in part at this time: the Treasury expects to use the power if needed to amend relevant legislation, for example, financial services legislation.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
I would just like to clarify this. Is the Minister saying in effect these powers are going to be one time only? Is that the implication?
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the Minister said that they may need the power to change financial services legislation. Since financial services legislation is in the hands of the Treasury, I think we are entitled to a slightly more specific explanation of how the power might be used to change primary legislation. Can he be more specific about which bits of financial services legislation the Treasury will likely use the power for?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
With all these examples, I will have to come back in some detail at a later stage. The idea of narrowing the powers means that we can take into consideration the conversation and debate, while acknowledging that there will be some work to do in the intervening period. We believe we have the time to do that before the Lloyd review comes into play, allowing us to make the amendments necessary.
On Amendment 18, from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I reassure noble Lords that the Treasury engages very regularly with the retail banking sector as part of its policy-making process. In addition to the Treasury’s ongoing regular engagement, the Access to Banking Services review will engage closely with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, including the industry, consumers, local authorities, small and medium-sized businesses, and trade bodies. Furthermore, if regulations are made under this power to confer functions on the FCA, the Government would expect the regulator to follow its usual processes and to fulfil its statutory duty to consult before it imposes any new requirements.
Amendment 21, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, contains a similar requirement for the Treasury to consult before making any regulations. It would require the Treasury to have regard to other sources of evidence, including the burdens that any regulations would place on banks, and for the Treasury to publish a statement alongside any draft regulation summarising its consideration of the evidence. The review will consider these sources of evidence, and, in considering the review’s recommendations, the Treasury will naturally take into account the impacts on banks and other relevant businesses. If the Treasury brings forward regulations under this clause, it will publish an impact assessment that will consider the impact on firms, as well as the proportionality of regulation.
Similarly, Amendment 23—in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka and spoken to by my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton—would require the Treasury to have regard to the need for local banking services when making regulations under Clause 3. I reassure my noble friends that the review will consider the need for in-person banking services and the impact on any specific cohorts or demographics. Funding will be considered once the review has identified the scale and nature of the consumer detriment and once the Government have considered how to respond.
Likewise, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, seeks to require the Treasury to have regard to several matters relating to the existing provision of banking services, including through banking hubs and the Post Office. The review will consider these sources of evidence when forming its recommendations. On her specific point on the time between bank branch closures and the opening of a banking hub, I reassure her that, if a banking hub is recommended, FCA rules already require banks not to close existing cash-access services, such as branches, until the recommended solution is in place.
Amendments 20 and 25 would require the Treasury to commission further independent reviews if it wishes to make subsequent regulations after first exercising the power in this clause. There is an existing requirement in Clause 3 for the Treasury to have regard to the recommendations of the current review when making regulations. The review was commissioned to bring together proactively the evidence from across the UK and to look at the trajectory for access to in-person banking services, not just the position as it currently stands. If the Government consider it necessary to make further provision in future, they would envisage this to follow the usual process of consultation and impact assessment, beginning from the baseline of evidence provided by the ongoing review. Further wide-ranging independent reviews are likely to be disproportionate.
Amendment 24, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, is similar: it would limit the power to be used only to implement matters arising directly from the independent Access to Banking Services review. As I have made clear, the Government’s intention is for the power to be used to implement the recommendations of the review. However, it is important that the power is not limited solely for this purpose, in case further relevant evidence outside the scope of the review comes to light as Ministers consider the review’s recommendations. The Government should be able to consider all relevant evidence, not just the review itself, before making any regulations.
Amendment 19 would require the power to be used to make regulations only if the relevant banking services would not be provided on a voluntary basis. The Treasury welcomes action taken by industry to support customers and welcomes the voluntary commitments, such as services provided in banking hubs, that the industry has taken forward. The Treasury will consider relevant information in determining any regulations to take forward following this Bill, including any relevant voluntary arrangements already in place.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles, for bringing these amendments—and to the right reverend Prelate for his reference to scripture. They raise important questions and will facilitate a useful debate about access to finance, the responsibilities of financial institutions and the right way to support small businesses and underserved communities.
I will begin with Amendments 28 and 29 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and in the case of Amendment 28 also in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. These amendments seek to require the FCA to establish and maintain a framework for assessing and rating banks’ and building societies’ performance in providing access to affordable credit, including for underserved groups. Amendment 29 would go further and require firms falling below a minimum performance threshold to take proportionate remedial action.
Access to financial services and appropriate credit is of course extremely important. That is particularly true for small and medium-sized businesses, micro-businesses and those parts of the country where access to finance can be more difficult. If we can improve the flow of capital to productive businesses, we can simulate growth, increase employment, allow firms to develop and generally improve the health of our economy. Many of the most successful businesses in this country began as small enterprises. They require confidence, access to working capital and a banking system willing to support their growth. When credit is unavailable or available only on unreasonable terms, good businesses can be held back, investment delayed and opportunities for employment and innovation lost.
However, my concern is with the mechanism proposed. I am not convinced that this can or should be done from a centrally mandated position. Banks and building societies have to make lending decisions on the basis of risk, affordability, regulatory capital, commercial judgment and the circumstances of the borrower. They are complex assessments, not straightforward public policy levers that can simply be pulled from the centre. If banks are going to make these decisions on the basis of their commercial interests, in many cases they will already have done so. Where lending is not happening to the extent that the noble Baroness would like, there is a reason for that. It may relate to risk appetite, capital requirements, information gaps, the lack of security, regulatory burdens, compliance costs or wider economic uncertainty, but the answer, it seems to me, is to work out why that is the case and then address those underlying barriers.
The answer should not be to move towards a system in which the Government through statute begin to direct the lending priorities of banks from the centre. Once we go down that road, we risk blurring the line between commercial banking and public policy allocation of credit. That is not a small step. It could have unintended consequences for financial stability, risk management, and ultimately for consumers and taxpayers. This would also send a worrying signal that the UK is a jurisdiction in which private interests are essentially subordinate to political objectives.
I support efforts to promote investment into SMEs, micro-businesses and underserved communities, but I do not think the right mechanism is one enforced by the Government in statute through ratings, thresholds and mandatory remedial action. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain what work the Government are doing with banks and financial service providers to improve access to affordable credit, particularly for SMEs and underserved groups. I hope he can reassure the Committee that this work is being done with those organisations rather than over them.
I turn briefly to Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and follow the words of my noble friend Lady Noakes. This amendment would introduce a fiduciary duty requiring firms to act in the best interests of retail customers, including small businesses. It would include duties around avoiding exploitative practices, ensuring suitability and fairness and taking reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm.
I understand the concern that sits behind this amendment. We all want financial services to treat customers fairly, we all want to prevent exploitative practices and we all want suitable products, clear terms and proper regard to foreseeable harm. Those are important principles. However, I am against imposing a broad fiduciary duty of this kind across regulated financial services. The concept of fiduciary duty carries with it a particular legal character and a potentially very wide set of implications. If applied broadly to all retail customer relationships, including small business relationships, it could create significant uncertainty about the legal obligations of firms, the interaction with existing FCA rules and the extent to which ordinary commercial relationships are being recast as fiduciary ones.
We are also concerned that this step could lead to a serious increase in the regulatory and compliance burden, which would fall on firms that are already struggling. Indeed, there is already a substantial framework governing conduct, consumer protection, fairness, suitability and foreseeable harm. The question for the Government and the FCA should be whether that existing framework is operating properly and proportionately, not necessarily whether a new overarching fiduciary duty should be imposed on top of it.
My concern is that such a duty could invite litigation, uncertainty and defensive behaviour. It might also make firms more reluctant to serve marginal or higher-risk customers if they fear that any adverse outcome could later be characterised as a breach of fiduciary duty. That would be the opposite of what many of us want to achieve in this group, which is broader and better access to financial services. Indeed, it would make providers and regulators more risk-averse.
These amendments raise an important debate about access to credit, the treatment of customers and the role of financial institutions in supporting growth. I support the objective of improving access to finance for SMEs, micro-businesses and underserved communities and hope to hear support for this from the Minister, but we should not seek to achieve that by central direction of lending decisions or imposing broad new legal duties whose consequences would be uncertain and work against the Government’s broad objective of simplifying regulation and reducing burdens.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 28, 29 and 30 are aimed at increasing access to finance and ensuring that the customers of financial services firms are protected. I recognise the intention behind these amendments. However, I do not believe that either solution is workable.
On Amendments 28 and 29, I agree that data on access to finance and holding the sector to account are important. However, these proposals would introduce a new, prescriptive and burdensome framework on the FCA and firms that I am not persuaded would deliver the desired output.
Amendment 28 would require the FCA to establish a framework to monitor, assess and publicly report on certain banks’ and building societies’ performance in providing access to affordable credit. Amendment 29 would require the FCA to take action against firms that do not meet a minimum standard. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, this approach resembles the United States’ Community Reinvestment Act 1977, but we should not assume that it would have the same effect here. Our starting point is different: we are working nearly 50 years later, in a digital age, with a far more diversified credit market. In any case, lenders already publish significant data. Chapter 7 of the FCA’s Conduct of Business Sourcebook requires extensive disclosure on personal and business current accounts. We also have the FCA’s Financial Lives Survey, the SME Finance Monitor and the British Business Bank’s annual SME finance publications, among others.
Amendment 29 would require the FCA to act against firms that do not meet a minimum lending standard. Striking the right balance on access to credit has long been a challenge. We want consumers to be able to access credit where it supports financial resilience and businesses to secure the finance needed to grow, but inappropriate credit can lead to overindebtedness, with serious consequences. The amendment could, in effect, compel lending to more vulnerable groups or SMEs. Even a well-designed regime could be a blunt instrument, with a risk of unintended outcomes. It would also represent a significant intrusion into firms’ commercial decisions.
More fundamentally, it is difficult to see how firms could increase lending and take on greater risk without raising prices to reflect that greater risk. If firms do not price risk appropriately, it opens us up to financial stability risks. The FCA would be placed in the invidious position of having to mandate affordable credit, while the mechanism required to expand provision could increase costs and potentially increase risk for the borrower and the firm. That runs directly counter to the intended objective for vulnerable customers and SMEs.
Although I cannot accept these amendments, I stress to noble Lords that the Government are not complacent about financial inclusion or the availability of SME finance. The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, asked me to set out what the Government are doing, and I am happy that noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned several of these interventions already. The Government published their Financial Inclusion Strategy last autumn, and we are supporting practical interventions for consumers, including a small sum credit pilot enabling mainstream lenders to test lending to customers outside their usual risk appetite. Monzo was announced as the first participant in the scheme earlier this month.
We have launched a transformation fund for credit unions, alongside common bond reforms in this Bill, to strengthen their lending capacity. We are also advancing targeted SME finance measures to improve competition and supply, including enhancing the consumer credit data sharing scheme through Clauses 41 and 43 of this Bill. We are supporting up to £150 million of lending through the Community ENABLE funding programme over the next two years. We are establishing a CDFI taskforce and working with industry to improve bank referrals. Indeed, tomorrow I am meeting several large asset managers as chair of the place-based impact investment scheme. We will set out next steps on open finance later this summer. This has significant potential to support SME lending across a wide range of providers, alongside broader work with the Bank of England on capital and ring-fencing.
I highlight community development finance institutions, which I know are a priority for the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. In addition to the CDFI taskforce and the Community ENABLE funding programme that this Government have funded, the sector benefits from Fair4All Finance’s affordable credit scale-up programme, which has committed more than £40 million in social investment in England to date. The financial inclusion strategy further includes measures to strengthen community finance, including promoting partnerships with mainstream lenders. Taken together, these measures support access to finance in the UK in an appropriate and responsible way.
Amendment 30 would introduce a new fiduciary duty on firms when carrying out FCA-regulated activities. It would place specific legally binding requirements on firms. I agree with the noble Baroness that it is vital for firms to act in a way that delivers good outcomes for consumers. However, I believe that FCA regulation is able to achieve this, and I am concerned that this new duty would risk creating overlapping requirements, causing confusion and reducing consumers’ access to finance.
The FCA’s consumer duty is designed to set a high standard of protection for retail customers by requiring firms to act to deliver good outcomes in line with the outcome sought by this amendment. It requires firms to put consumers’ needs at the heart of their business, including by acting in good faith, avoiding foreseeable harm and supporting consumers to pursue their financial objectives. In practice, this means that firms must design products and services that meet consumers’ needs, provide fair value, communicate clearly and offer effective support.
I am concerned that the requirements set out in this amendment would risk making more vulnerable customers more expensive and risky to serve, which would reduce their access to products such as credit and insurance. Introducing a novel statutory fiduciary duty, the precise scope of which would fall to be settled through litigation over a number of years, would create significant legal uncertainty. That uncertainty would carry a cost, which firms would be likely to manage by withdrawing from, or repricing, services for higher-risk customers. I recognise that there is some precedent for a fiduciary duty in trust-based pension schemes. However, the dynamics of the market are very different from wider consumer financial services. Typically, employer pension schemes do not choose which individual customers to serve, and the fiduciary duty applies at the membership level.
I genuinely understand the importance of lending for all parts of the economy, and I understand the need for borrowers to be protected, but I am convinced that the Government are taking the right set of actions, and I am afraid that Amendments 28, 29 and 30 would bring significant unintended consequences. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for signing Amendment 28 and for speaking so eloquently in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Massey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, are both involved in the world of finance and meet international financiers. I will give them a challenge. When they meet American financiers and bankers, whether here or in the United States, will they please raise CDFIs? The noble Lord, Lord Massey, will find that basically everything he said flies completely in the face of the US experience, and I say the same thing to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords across the Committee. I have noted the variety of concerns expressed on this part of the Bill. As noble Lords have heard, my party has announced proposals to remove the Financial Ombudsman Service and replace it with a new financial adjudication service. That proposal is not before the Committee in this group, but we have an agreed amendment; we will have the opportunity to debate it properly at a future stage.
I start by speaking to Amendment 32 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. The amendment would retain the existing six-year longstop rather than extending it to 10 years, as Clause 6 would do. As I have already said, I am concerned about this move, albeit for different reasons to some other Peers who have spoken. I accept that there is a balance to be struck here: consumers must have access to proper, effective and fair redress mechanisms. Where a consumer has suffered detriment because of misconduct, poor practice or a failure by a firm, there should be a clear route through which a complaint can be considered and, where appropriate, redress can be provided. However, this does not mean that time limits are unimportant. On the contrary, time limits are an essential part of a fair system. Claims can be heard fairly only when sufficient information is available to both sides to allow them to mount a proper case. That means records, correspondence, product documents, internal decision-making, staff recollections and the wider factual context in which the relevant decision was made.
The further back in time a complaint goes, the more difficult this becomes. Evidence may be incomplete and documents may no longer exist. The people involved may have left the organisation, systems may have changed, products may no longer be offered and the regulatory context may have moved on. A complaint may still be sincerely brought, but the ability of the firm to respond fairly and fully may be materially impaired. That is why limitation periods exist: they reflect the basic principle of justice that, after a certain period, it becomes harder to determine matters fairly and reliably. That principle applies in the courts, and I believe that it should continue to be properly reflected in the ombudsman’s framework. I am concerned that extending the longstop from six years to 10 years risks pushing the system beyond that fair balance.
I have noted the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, in particular his references to pensions and endowment mortgages. I will be interested in the Minister’s response on how those products are dealt with and whether the exemptions are intended to cover that area.
On this occasion, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey—although we often agree on other matters—because there is a genuine concern in the industry about vexatious or speculative claims. We should not be naive about this. There is a whole claims management industry dedicated to identifying and pursuing potential claims. Some of those claims may be legitimate, and consumers should not be denied redress where redress is due, but others may be weak, opportunistic or based on limited evidence. If the period is extended significantly, the volume of such claims may increase, so firms will have to devote more resource to investigating and defending matters from many years ago.
All this has a cost and makes all concerned more risk-averse, so it becomes more difficult for providers to accept customers at the margin. This matters for not only firms but the wider economy. We cannot stimulate growth, support lending, encourage investment and improve productivity if banks and financial services firms are pouring ever more resources into fighting historic claims, rather than serving customers, lending to businesses, supporting economic activity and innovating. There is a real opportunity cost here.
My noble friend Lord Roborough is unable to be here today, but I understand that his Amendments 38 to 41 are intended to probe whether the reforms in the Bill provide sufficient certainty for regulated firms that, where they have complied with the relevant rules and requirements, the Financial Ombudsman Service will not be able to go substantially beyond that framework in finding fault or imposing redress. This is not to question the proper role of the ombudsman in cases such as car finance commissions, where the courts have confirmed the relevance of undisclosed conflicts of interest; rather, it is to test whether the current “fair and reasonable” jurisdiction risks giving the FOS a quasi-regulatory role, including through inconsistent interpretation, the retrospective application of standards or decisions that go beyond the rules in force at the time. This is the core issue that has been raised time and again: the FOS needs to be reined in, but does the Bill do it?
At the same time, I recognise the number of views on this question. It is for the Minister to show that the proposed changes do not weaken the ability of consumers, including vulnerable consumers—particularly those in serious circumstances, such as terminal illness—to obtain fair redress. I have been told, for example, that there is a variance between companies over acceptance rates in such cases. The Minister might want to look into that.
Serious concerns have been raised. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this group. My own concern remains that, as drafted, the Bill shifts the balance too far. It extends exposure to firms in a way that may appear consumer-friendly at first sight but risks generating delay, uncertainty and large volumes of contested claims. The six-year longstop strikes the right balance, so why 10 years? What evidence has led the Government to conclude that six years is insufficient? Can the Minister break that down by product or financial services type? What assessment has been made of the impact on firms, on complaint volumes, on the claims management sector and on the resources of the ombudsman itself? How will the Government ensure that extending the longstop does not simply create a larger backlog of older and more difficult cases?
I would be grateful if the Minister could also address the practical point about record-keeping. Do the Government now expect banks and other firms to retain detailed customer records for 10 years in anticipation of potential FOS complaints? If so, what assessment has been made of the cost and operational burden of doing so? I speak as a former company secretary in a large company; I know about the problems in keeping data. Indeed, what about doing it retrospectively?
I hope that the Minister will reflect carefully on the points I have made on the possibility of retaining the six-year longstop. I very much look forward to his response.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, as we have heard today, the Financial Ombudsman Service—the FOS—plays a vital role in providing quick, informal and impartial dispute resolution between customers and their financial services providers. It offers an accessible route for dealing with complaints that is designed to act as an alternative to resolving cases through the courts, which can be costly, lengthy and a process that often does not work for firms and consumers. The Government are clear that an effective ombudsman provides consumers with confidence in our financial services sector and is a key element of an effective system.
The Government’s review of the FOS found that, although the FOS fulfils its role in the majority of cases, in a small but impactful minority of cases, it has acted as a quasi-regulator. That conclusion was supported by the Financial Services Regulation Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in its report, Growing Pains: Clarity and Culture Change Required, which was published in June 2025. It recognised that the FOS’s
“actions have regulatory impacts by creating precedents that the FCA requires firms to follow”,
and that this
“generates an unacceptable level of uncertainty for firms, stakeholders, and investors”.
I want to be clear that the review was not suggesting that the FOS was acting improperly; rather, it concluded that the way in which the legislative framework operates made such issues unavoidable by creating a disconnect between the FCA’s rules and the FOS’s decisions, giving rise to unpredictability and a lack of certainty across the regulatory environment. That unpredictability is damaging for everyone and harms consumers’ confidence in the financial services products and services they rely on, as well as firms’ confidence to invest and innovate in the UK.
There is a large number of amendments before us. I will start with Amendment 31. This proposal would substantially extend the timeframe for bringing complaints to the FOS and would require the FOS to spend even more of its time and resources investigating, considering and attempting to resolve historic cases than it does today. We know from current experience that this would substantially increase costs while delivering comparatively limited increases in redress awarded. Further extending the timeframe beyond 10 years in an open-ended way to accommodate a complainant’s reasonable awareness of an issue would increase uncertainty for firms around historic liabilities, reducing appetite to invest in the UK’s financial services businesses.
The Treasury’s analysis of data from the FOS on historic cases is clear: they are more likely to be withdrawn or abandoned and have lower success rates than the average, often due to limited evidence and information being available. The Government’s analysis concluded that complaints to the FOS that are over 10 years old cost firms, on average, more than £18 million per year in case fees but deliver only £600,000 per year in redress for consumers. This is not a proportionate or balanced approach, nor is it consistent with the FOS’s quick and simple purpose. Extending the timeframes would slow down the FOS’s resolution of cases that are more recent and have a higher chance of being upheld, delaying consumers access to the redress they are owed.
Turning to Amendment 32, the Government considered carefully the options for different time limits to be set in legislation, including a six-year limit, and published their analysis in the impact assessment. Although this is a matter of judgment, the Government concluded that a 10-year time limit would strike the appropriate balance between consumer protection and providing certainty to firms, with a six-year limit resulting in too many people losing access to redress. However, I assure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord that the new limit introduced by the Bill is designed to act as a backstop to the existing limits set in rules made by the FCA. In most cases, the time limit will remain at the existing six years, with the 10-year backstop kicking in for cases where the customer could only reasonably have become aware of the problem at a later date.
On Amendments 33 and 35, the Government agree that, where the cause for complaint may take longer to come to light, such as with pensions, it is important that complaints can continue to be brought to the FOS. This is why the Bill gives the FCA discretion to make exceptions to the time limit in specified circumstances, where it is appropriate to do so. The Government carefully considered their approach to defining these exceptions and determined that the FCA is best equipped to develop proportionate and fair exceptions and to define these in its rules, given the FCA’s supervisory role and oversight of the sector and the level of technical detail that is required for the definitions.
The noble Lord is right to recognise the careful balance needed between ensuring that we do not undermine the certainty that this reform is intended to deliver while maintaining consumers’ trust and confidence that they will have access to redress when things go wrong. The Government are working closely with the FCA as it develops these exceptions and the FCA will set out its proposals in due course.
Amendment 34 relates to cases where there is an ongoing relationship between the consumer and a firm. Some complaints may be about acts or omissions that continue to occur or have effect in the context of an ongoing relationship between a consumer and a firm. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 does not place a restrictive definition on “acts” or “omissions”, so there is no reason why such an ongoing act or omission could not be the basis for a complaint within the time limit. The Government’s reforms in the Bill will not change the FOS’s discretion to identify the act or omission to which a complaint relates for the purposes of applying relevant time limits. It will continue to be for the FOS to make those judgments, based on the circumstances of the case and in line with the rules set by the FCA.
I will now explain the Government’s purpose behind Clause 8 and why it should stand part of the Bill. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Sharkey, asked about the evidence base behind the Government’s policy. The Government’s review found that, in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator. This means that, in some cases, the FOS has held firms to a standard that is different from those set by the FCA. The majority of responses to the Government’s consultation on the proposals to reform the legislative framework in which the FOS operates were broadly supportive of aligning the FOS’s fair and reasonable test with the FCA rules.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
Can the Minister clarify something? Is he saying that, provided you comply with an FCA rule, you are then always fair and reasonable? That is what I am taking away from this. I can list so many examples, such as Libor and mini-bonds—all kinds of things—where the perpetrators ticked every single compliance box. I am curious to know.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I apologise for taking a moment to ask my officials a question; I want to make sure that I give the right answer. Where the FOS has complied with the FCA rules, it still has the discretion to make judgments, as long as it believes them to be fair and reasonable.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
Certainly. We are trying to align the FOS’s “fair and reasonable” test with the FCA rules, but it retains some discretion.
I apologise for taking another moment to consult my officials. For clarity, where the FOS has aligned with the FCA rules, it has to believe that that is the case, and that determination has to be upheld.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
For absolute clarification, “fair and reasonable” must be interpreted by the FOS as a standard that is met if there is compliance with FCA rules. I just want to understand because we can then go back historically and see where FCA rules might not have been perceived as fair and reasonable. It is interesting.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
Looking at the legislation itself, it seems clear that if the act or omission is in breach of the FCA’s rules or the consumer duty that absolutely qualifies it as being okay. There is no subordinate reference to “fair and reasonable”.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I will take the opportunity to write because this definitely needs clarification. The note that I have says that in cases where the omission being complained about is governed by FCA rules, if the firm has met its obligations under those rules, the FOS will be required to find that it acted fairly and reasonably. All the FCA’s handbook is relevant here, including the principles for businesses and, therefore, the consumer duty. There will be coherence between those determinations but only when the FOS believes that the fair test has not been met can it challenge the FCA. I will write to noble Lords because this is an important point that needs a definitive answer. I apologise for that.
On Amendments 37, 42 and 43, as I have set out, the reforms to the FOS’s fair and reasonable test are designed to preserve the FOS’s existing discretion in areas not covered by FCA rules. The Bill specifies the matters that the FOS must take into account when making determinations, taking this out of FCA rules and making it subject to parliamentary oversight. The matters listed include the law, relevant guidance, codes of practice and further materials published by the FCA or other regulators. This provides greater clarity around how the FOS makes its decisions. As I explained earlier, the Government’s view is that where there are relevant FCA rules, there are benefits from ensuring that FOS decisions are consistent with them. I will write to clarify further in case I have created confusion in this conversation.
On Amendments 38 and 41, the Government recognise the important role the FOS plays within the wider financial services regulatory environment. The reforms included in the Bill are about making sure that the FOS and the FCA are able to carry out their respective roles effectively, co-operating where necessary but maintaining their separate responsibilities. These amendments would go further and require the FCA to become involved in the determination of individual complaints. This is a role that the FCA is not designed or equipped to undertake. It is, and should continue to be, the role of the FOS as the independent, impartial dispute resolution service.
Turning to Amendments 39 and 40, the Government’s review of the FOS concluded that the “fair and reasonable” test works well in the majority of cases to enable a quick and fair resolution of complaints. Removing the “fair and reasonable test”, as proposed by these amendments would undermine the FOS’s quick and informal role and put in its place a more legalistic approach based on strict adherence to the FCA’s rules. This could introduce additional costs and delays, and reduce the FOS’s effectiveness as an accessible and simple alternative to the courts.
I turn to Clause 7 and the new referral mechanism, which will require the FOS to seek a view from the FCA where it considers that a matter relating to a complaint may indicate ambiguity in the FCA’s rules or have wider implications for consumers and firms. As well as enabling the FOS to make decisions that are consistent with FCA rules, the referral process will ensure that systemic questions and issues are identified at an early stage and the FCA can consider whether a regulatory or supervisory intervention may be appropriate, rather than continuing to consider each individual complaint separately. Alongside the new reporting requirements provided for in Clause 9, this will improve understanding of the FCA’s rules and the standards expected of firms, in turn improving confidence in financial services and ultimately reducing the number of consumers who experience poor treatment, which all noble Lords will agree is preferable to providing redress after the fact.
Given the important role that the FOS plays, this is a clearly a matter of huge interest, and there is a range of views on exactly what the best system would look like. Notwithstanding that, I will write on the specific things that I might have caused confusion about.
I have listened carefully to the representations. The Government’s view is that the reforms set out in the Bill strike an appropriate balance, improving the clarity and consistency of redress arrangements while allowing the FOS to continue to make fact-specific decisions on individual complaints. They ensure that both the FOS and the FCA are equipped to fulfil their respective roles and responsibilities so that consumers can have confidence in the key financial services on which they rely, and so that firms understand what is expected of them and can act on it. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
As one always says in this situation, I will read what the Minister said with care. I have to admit that I was a little disappointed on the “fair and reasonable” test, but on close analysis it may prove to be better. In particular, I hope I will have a copy of the letter. It is clear that the rules include the principles, such as:
“A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct”.
Is it the ombudsman who would decide what was the proper standard of market conduct, or is that one of the issues that will have to be referred to the FCA? I am not expecting an answer now, particularly as—
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group on the subject of fraud and scams. I have also added my support to the lead amendment, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and to which she has just spoken. Most of my amendments arise, at least in part, from the abolition of the PSR and the absorption of its activities into the FCA; I will quickly run through each of them.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained the need for her Amendment 46, which would require the FCA to make rules to ensure that the tech or communications company on whose platform or service the fraud arises is responsible for a proportion of the cost of reimbursing the victims. Whether or not the mechanism in her amendment is the right one, the principle here is obvious. At the moment, it is the banks that must compulsorily fully refund victims of fraud. There is some sense in the banks having to reimburse victims, because almost every fraud goes through some sort of bank account to allow the fraudsters to cash out. It is clear that the mandatory reimbursement requirement has incentivised banks to do more to protect customers. However, we also know that fraud does not originate from banks’ services. According to UK Finance’s latest report, some 66% of scams arise on online services and a further 17% originate via telecoms. Let us be clear: the highest proportion of that arises on Meta platforms.
Despite voluntary charters, this is not improving at all. Your Lordships’ Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, of which I was a member, recognised this in its report nearly four years ago; if the Minister has not read it, I recommend it as some bedtime reading. It said:
“Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act”.
We were right. Nothing has changed since then to change that conclusion. If anything, matters continue to worsen as technology such as AI starts being used by criminals. It is time that the platforms were at last forced to step up and take financial responsibility for the losses that arise from their platforms, not just leaving it to the banks to pick up the full liability. I say this to the Minister: in your answer, please do not tell us that the Online Safety Act will solve this. It is too limited; it covers only directly paid-for advertising and is unlikely to make much difference.
The Government’s fraud strategy recognises all this. It says that,
“if industry partnership and market incentives alone remain insufficient to drive improvements, the Government will take legislative action within this Parliament”.
This has been going on for years. The voluntary online fraud charter was signed three years ago. Nothing material has improved. Fraud is still around 45% of all crime, and the percentage arising on tech platforms has not fallen; if anything, it has risen. The Bill is the perfect opportunity finally to take action on this and not leave it until thousands more people have fallen victim. We know that tech companies will not take action unless they have to—they continue to prove that—which is why the Government are at last taking action in respect of child protection. This is no different. It is now time to act without further delay.
My Amendment 47 would introduce a requirement for the mandatory reimbursement rules for APP fraud, which came into force in October 2024, to be reviewed after three years of operation. It is unlikely that we got everything right at the first attempt, so a review of how effective they have been in meeting their objectives of protecting consumers and incentivising the banks to improve protections—as well as, importantly, whether there have been any unintended consequences—must make sense.
I have tried to set out in the amendment—I will not go through all the detail—the key matters that were discussed when the requirement was introduced in 2022-23 as the matters that ought to be reviewed. I would have also included the tech platforms, but I did not want to duplicate the amendment that we have just discussed.
I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who sadly is not with us at the moment, on his Amendment 58, which would add specific fraud prevention duties on payment service providers. I also have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind his Amendment 125, which would introduce a financial fraud prevention secondary objective to the FCA, although I caveat that by saying that I am not sure that adding yet more objectives to the regulators is necessarily the right way to go.
My Amendment 59 is designed to ensure that the FCA continues to collate and to publish the fraud data that the PSR has been collating and publishing for the past few years. This has been extremely valuable. It has identified several PSPs that were clearly not taking their fraud prevention duties seriously and led to action being taken against them. The pressure of shining a light on some of the bigger players has clearly incentivised them to step up and improve their systems. The information identifies very clearly which PSPs are protecting their customers best and which are doing it worst, which is important information for consumers when choosing a bank or payment provider.
To give just one example to show the value of this reporting, the last report by the PSR identified that, for every 1 million transactions received by Guavapay, 109,744 were APP scam payments—that is more than 10%. As a result of that information, the company has been forced to close by the FCA. In the meantime, consumers would have been able to see that this was an unsafe operator if the report had been issued in a timely manner—an issue that I will come to in a second.
This reporting was started as a result of efforts by Members of the House during the passage of FSMA 2023, and it followed undertakings by the then Minister. But there are already signs that, since moving the PSR’s activities into the FCA, this has started to slip. As I said, the last report of this nature was for the period up to 7 October 2024, when the mandatory reimbursement requirement was introduced. That was not published until February 2026, some 16 months later. My amendment would add a time limit of three months for the publication of these reports. No further report has been published since, so I hope that the Minister will recognise the value of this reporting, and that he will confirm that it should continue and that this amendment—which does not create any new burdens at all but just continues the status quo—should be accepted.
Amendment 64 would reverse the deletion of Clause 72 from FSMA 2023—it was the clause that introduced the requirement to introduce a mandatory reimbursement requirement. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government explain that this is being removed because it has already happened. But Clause 72 does not only introduce the requirement; subsection (9) also includes the ability
“to vary or revoke a relevant requirement”
or
“to impose further relevant requirements”.
So I am not sure that deleting it in full works—that is something to look at. Most importantly, can the Minister confirm that the mandatory reimbursement requirement is intended to continue, even if reviewed and amended in the future—particularly in relation to tech companies, which we have talked about—and that this Bill is not intended to change anything in that respect?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, for reasons that will become apparent, I start by referring to my register of interests, including my shareholding in Meta.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend noble Lord Holmes, who is absent, for bringing forward this important group of amendments. I am sorry that this debate is so late and that the Grand Committee is so thin under the new five-hour arrangements—of which I am not a fan—because, collectively, these amendments raise an important and timely point. As online retail platforms and digital marketplaces become more popular and AI makes fraud easier, there has been a concurrent increase in the risk that people face from online fraud, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.
We have seen concerning figures suggesting that Facebook Marketplace is now the single most scammed UK consumer platform. Very large sums are stolen through it every day in the UK, and a very high proportion of UK purchase fraud begins there. We have also seen banks such as Santander taking active steps to block suspected Marketplace transfers to protect customers. Those examples raise very important questions: how easy is it for consumers to obtain redress when they are defrauded in this way? Who holds ultimate responsibility when a fraud is facilitated through an online platform, and how can the regulatory framework ensure that the firms best placed to prevent the fraud have a real incentive to do so? It is also important to consider how changes can be made without introducing new rafts of regulation that put up costs and prices.
Banks and payment service providers have significant responsibilities, and rightly so. They process the payment, have duties to their customers, and have tools available to detect and prevent suspicious transactions. Yet they are often not the place where the fraud originated, and may see only the final payment instruction, by which point much of the harm has already been set in motion. By contrast, technology companies and online marketplaces may be much closer to the source of the problem. They host the listings, provide the communications infrastructure, enable the interaction between buyer and seller, and in many cases have access to data which could help identify suspicious behaviour before money ever leaves a consumer’s account.
Amendment 46 is based on the principle that fraud should be paid for by those best placed to prevent it, not simply those who happen to process the payment at the end of the chain. If platforms know that they may share liability where fraud is facilitated through their systems, they will have a much stronger incentive to identify fraudulent listings, remove scam accounts, improve verification, share data and co-operate with banks and regulators, and indeed help consumers to avoid fraud, as we can do a lot ourselves as consumers. This is not about saying that technology firms should always be liable in every case, nor is it about absolving banks of responsibility. Yet it recognises that the current model may place too much of the burden on one part of the system, while allowing other actors, including very large and profitable tech companies, to avoid the financial consequences of fraud which often begins on their platforms.
The goal should be to stop fraud before it happens, which means better consumer warnings, transaction monitoring, real-time data sharing, and use of technology by all relevant firms. It also means transparency. If particular platforms, channels or types of transaction are consistently associated with fraud, that information should be visible. Sunlight is an important tool of accountability, which is why Amendment 59 is valuable in principle. As the experienced noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has explained, regular publication of data on APP fraud performance, including where fraud originates, would help Parliament, regulators, firms and consumers to understand the real shape of the problem. It would put pressure on firms whose systems are repeatedly linked to fraud to improve their performance.
Before we take a definitive view on these amendments, I would be grateful if the Minister could address several questions. First, what is the Government’s view on the principle of shared liability for APP fraud across the wider ecosystem, including technology companies and online marketplaces? Secondly, is there a place for greater transparency on APP fraud performance? Thirdly, what discussions have the Government had with tech platforms about fraud originating on their services, and what more does the Minister believe those firms should be required to do? Fourthly, does the Minister accept that online platforms should have stronger incentives to prevent fraud where they host the marketplace, the listing or the communication through which the scam takes place? Finally, how do the Government envisage tackling this problem? Do they have plans to introduce legislation on this issue, or do they believe that changes within the existing framework will be sufficient?
APP fraud causes real harm to individuals, families and businesses. It can undermine confidence in digital payments and online commerce, which is increasingly the direction of travel. It also imposes costs on the wider financial system. I recognise that this may go even wider than our Bill, but this is an important group and I look forward to the Minister’s responses, and to seeing how we can improve this important area.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and to noble Lords for tabling these amendments and to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. The scale of fraud and the devastating impact of that crime on victims remains a concern for this Government. The Government take the issue of fraud very seriously and are dedicated to protecting the public and businesses from this appalling crime.