(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for his wise intervention. We have come a very long way. Over a decade ago, the natural environment White Paper created local nature partnerships. Some of those have been incredibly successful but some have not. What we are trying to create here on a statutory basis is something that will see around 50 of these right across the country, with consistency and a determination to draw the threads of the desire to restore nature through the planning system and get good decision-making as a result. I am happy to work with my colleagues and anyone in this House to see whether that can be tweaked but, at this stage, I think we are going a long way towards creating the kind of regulatory and statutory basis that we need to see the proper restoration of nature.
I am straying on to the next set of amendments, but the Minister made it very clear that, regarding building up local plans, there needs to be flexibility and that something statutory in the Bill would stop that. However, under Clause 86, if there is a difference between the local plan and national guidance, statutorily, in the Bill, it says that national guidance must be followed—so there is no flexibility. Can he explain that contradiction?
As the noble Lord says, he is perhaps straying on to the next group. What we are concerned with here is making sure that we are creating a plan that is agreed locally under very clear guidelines, and that has a proper weight in planning decisions across the country. We will then see an understanding of where the nature-rich areas are, where nature can be improved and what the particular features are in those areas that need restoration, all unpinned with an understanding of what species exist and where they can be increased in abundance. That is what we are trying to achieve here. We all want the same thing. I think we have gone a long way to achieving that and I have listened carefully to what noble Lords have said.
It was not a matter of the plans. The Minister has said that, as a matter of principle, the reason to reject the amendment was that flexibility is needed and that statutory provision for the automatic assumption to accept another plan should not be in the Bill. But Clause 86 says exactly that. I am trying to tease out why it is okay for one national plan but it is not okay for these local environment plans. What is the difference, as a matter of principle, if flexibility is required for local plans in every area, as the Minister said?
There are over 200 clauses in the Bill, and what good legislation seeks to do is to achieve the right balance between the needs of society—new houses, energy and the rest of it—and the understanding that we have a serious problem. We think we have that degree of flexibility about right here. There may be other parts of the Bill that are more rigid in what they seek to achieve, but I have tried to explain that if flexibility did not exist here, rather timid plans might be created, and we want ambitious plans to be created for these local nature recovery strategies. That is why we think this degree of flexibility is the right way forward.
The national development management policies are dealing with the top-level issues. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that we are out to review those issues of consultation. These issues have come back. We have not got the list yet, but your local plan will accept those as being there and will then deal with issues that are local. As my noble friend said, there will be issues such as the green belt, but they will take into account the national policies on green belt and deal only with very localised policies on it, so there should be no conflict. I do not see where that conflict can be. But we are going to have a meeting on this to further discuss and probably have, not arguments, but strong debates—those are the words—on these issues.
My Lords, I am more confused than I was when the debate started. If there is no conflict, what is the point in having the clause?
The point is to make clear that there is no conflict.
Amendment 193, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, would require the Secretary of State to
“lay a Statement before both Houses of Parliament”
if there is
“a conflict between the national development management policy and a development plan”.
As I have noted, actual instances of conflict between national development plan policies and those being included in the plans should be relatively unusual, as the Bill makes clear that planning policies should avoid such conflicts—something that will, in cases of doubt, be assessed transparently through public examination of those emerging plans as they are made. Should any conflicts arise when considering individual planning applications or appeals—for example, where the local plan has become very out of date—this will need to be made very clear through the report on the application, or the evidence before the planning inspector. These procedures will ensure transparency for communities. At the same time, it would be impossible for the Government to track every instance of such a conflict arising and to report to Parliament on it. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, will understand that this is not an amendment we can support.
Amendment 195, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, would require the Secretary of State to consult county combined authorities if it is deemed that there is a conflict between the national development management policy and a development plan. As I have already explained, where any inconsistencies arise between an emerging plan and the national development management policies, these will be evident during the plan preparation and examination. We expect that any county combined authority will be engaged in this process at the local level. There is no need for an additional statutory requirement to be placed on the Secretary of State in the way the amendment would do.
I have also pointed out the impracticality of applying a requirement of this nature in relation to any inconsistencies which might arise in the handling of individual planning applications, the great majority of which will not be cases that the Government are party to. Consequently, I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that we are unable to support this amendment. I hope that I have said enough to enable the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, to withdraw her Amendment 185 and for other amendments in this group not to be moved as they are reached.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, asked what intervention powers the Government will have to get involved. We think that local authorities know their area best and, unequivocally, are best placed to produce their own local plans. However, if local plans are not produced or are failing, or if something is absolutely wrong with that plan, the Secretary of State will retain the power to intervene if necessary.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I speak to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, could I make an appeal to the usual channels that, given that there is a major problem this evening in terms of transport, we are mindful of that in terms of how long we sit? Only in this House—certainly not in the House of Commons—could we be here with the difficulties that are experienced outside and, while I realise we have got to try and make progress on Committee, I appeal for the exercise of a degree of common sense.
In speaking to the amendments to which I have put my name, I want to make a broader point. When I was leader of the city of Sheffield, with its population of 560,000, I was not always mindful of the needs and the importance of the parish and town councils that lay to the north of the city and which had previously been in what was then the old West Riding—that is, Bradfield, Ecclesfield and the town council in Stocksbridge. It struck me much later, as a declared communitarian, that this was a big mistake. The more that we devolve and ensure that we make decisions and delegate decisions as close to people as possible, the more we will ensure that we protect and reinforce our democracy. Town and parish councils are the building blocks on which the broader decisions are taken by county and metropolitan authorities and, here in London, by the boroughs, the GLA and the mayor.
As we move to greater devolution, which was debated in the previous business this evening, we must take into account that, while elected mayors and mayoral combined authorities are the way forward in terms of infrastructure, investment and devolvement of powers from central government, this will not succeed unless people feel an affinity and are engaged with their community and neighbourhood in the cities and, in rural areas—of which I have had experience in the last 20 years—with their parish and town council.
These amendments are not just technical amendments relating to the powers that should exist with parish and town councils. They are about the reinforcement of democratic representation by local people and the investment in community facilities, including religious facilities and institutions where it is possible to define sensibly what that investment is for. I imagine that the Government will want to reflect on this. It could be in heritage. It could be, as has been described by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, the community facility that in so many parishes and small towns across the country exists only within the local church. I did apologise to the annual conference of parish and town clerks for having been a bit centralist in the past, so I might as well put that on record tonight. A sinner who comes to understand is worth three of those who have not understood the mistakes that they have made—so there we are.
There is a very real issue here that the Government could deal with very simply and easily and, as has been described, where there are contradictory pieces of legislation—Section 137 was mentioned—we could set the record straight. We have moved on a lot since the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission’s proposals and the 1972 and 2003 Acts. Life has moved on. There is a greater consensus now about devolution and about subsidiarity—I never could say that word without losing my teeth. We have an opportunity on the levelling-up Bill, very simply and easily and without a great deal of fuss, to put this right on Report.
My Lords, I will probably upset my noble friends Lady Scott and Lady Harris when I speak to Amendment 163. There may be confusion, but if any of the Acts should be withdrawn, it should be the 1972 Act, not the 1894 Act, for one reason of practicality and one of principle.
The matter of practicality is that the Church Commissioners, in their latest report, said that the reserves of the Church of England after its liabilities in pensions is £7.5 billion. Therefore, there are issues concerning investment in church funds or church buildings where the first port of call should be the reserves which the Church of England holds. The report goes on to say that in dioceses, the reserves are £1.6 billion, with a cash reserve of £1.84 million, and cathedrals’ general reserves are £524 million, with £50 million in cash.
The second reason is one of principle. I find it absolutely incredible and unacceptable that the Church of England—an organisation that does not see me as an equal citizen in this country, that has used discrimination and prejudice to try to deny my marriage and many other people’s marriages in this country and continues to do so, and that uses a fudge to try to hold its own organisation together rather than see equality for all in love—should be the first port of call as a matter of principle in which parish or any other councils should be able to claim off the state.
For those reasons—one of practicality, the funds that the Church holds, and one a matter of principle, which I see as a position of prejudice and discrimination held particularly by the Church of England—I feel that if any legislation should be repealed, it should be the clause in the 1972 Act and not the 1894 Act.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Secretary of State would have an independent review of the decision and would make a decision taking all that into account.
We are also keen, as I say, to make sure that those combined authorities and combined county authorities operate in the same way to ensure this consistent approach to devolving these functions to mayors, whether they are leading a combined authority or a combined county authority. This clause achieves that for the exercise of fire and rescue functions by replicating the existing provisions in the 2009 Act.
I turn to issues raised by the noble Baroness regarding Clause 33. The single-employer model is just one option available to combined county authority mayors with both police and crime and fire and rescue authority functions, allowing the area’s chief constable to run both operational services. A mayor of a CCA could seek to utilise the model if they felt that doing so would deliver a more effective service. To go back to the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, if we are talking about fire and rescue and police and crime, an effective service is one that keeps people safe; that is their job and I suggest that, if it is effective, that is exactly what they are doing.
As far as York and North Yorkshire are concerned, the fire and rescue service and the police and crime functions are, as the noble Baroness said, already adjoined, but without the use of a single employer. That has not been taken into account in York and North Yorkshire, and there is no reason to think that the mayor will do that. At the moment, the combined authority still has to go through parliamentary approval, so that will be something for local people in the future.
Clause 33 sets out the process required for the mayor of a combined county authority to request fire and rescue functions. The clause is an important part of the procedure to be followed when fire and rescue functions have been conferred on a combined county authority mayor as part of the single-employer model. It ensures that there is sufficient scrutiny from both constituent councils of the CCA and the public because it requires the mayor to provide a report setting out an assessment of the benefits of the conferral and a summary of the public consultation carried out, along with a specific summary of representations from the constituent members of the CCA and the mayoral response to them.
This clause also contains further scrutiny to make sure that any proposal will deliver more effective services for an area. The Secretary of State has to obtain and publish an independent assessment of a proposal from a combined county authority mayor if two-thirds or more of the constituent members of the CCA oppose the transfer. The Secretary of State will then agree to transfer the functions only if they consider that doing so is in the interests of public safety for that area.
Removing the clause would remove key conditions for fire and rescue functions to be transferred to the mayor of a combined county authority and could therefore potentially lead to proposals going forward that have not been subject to either sufficient consultation or robust assessment. This in turn could lead to an ineffective implementation of the model and inconsistent application of it between areas.
I move on to issues the noble Baroness raised regarding Clause 34. This clause enables the Secretary of State to make provisions relating to the administrative operation of fire and rescue services, should a combined county authority mayor request these functions and transfer them to their chief constable to carry out on their behalf under the single-employer model. The clause is necessary because it enables there to be a scheme to transfer property, rights and liabilities as part of implementing the single-employer model. It also allows the chief constable to appoint staff as part of delegating their fire and rescue functions, subject to the necessary and important restrictions on who can carry out these responsibilities so that operational independence between policing and fire is maintained.
Removing this clause would make it very difficult for the chief constable to carry out their functions under the single-employer model, because they would not have access to key assets or be able to effectively resource their delivery. This would therefore lead to an ineffective implementation of the model and would hinder its day-to-day operation in a way that could ultimately impact on the successful delivery of these public safety functions for the area concerned.
On the issues raised by the noble Baroness on Clause 35, this clause sets out safeguards governing the exercise of fire and rescue functions where the single-employer model is being operated. These include a requirement on the chief constable to make sure that they secure good value for money, and an obligation on the CCA mayor to hold those exercising functions under the model to account. This clause is another important part of the process and procedure to be followed when these functions have been conferred on the mayor as part of the single-employer model. Where possible, the processes for handling the functions available to be conferred on combined county authority mayors are the same as those for combined authority mayors and subject to the same requirements.
Removing the clause would mean that the single-employer model would work less well in practice because important safeguards on the exercise of fire and rescue functions under the model would be lost. This in turn would lead to ineffective implementation of the model and inconsistent application of it between areas.
I turn to issues raised by the noble Baroness in relation to Clause 36. This clause enables the Secretary of State by regulation to make provisions corresponding to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 dealing with complaints and conduct matters. This clause is an optional power to be used when these functions have been conferred on a combined county authority mayor as part of implementing the single-employer model. It specifically relates to complaint and conduct matters for members of a police force and their civilian staff or members of staff transferred to a chief constable or appointed by them where they are exercising functions under the single-employer model.
Removing the clause would mean that the methods for dealing with complaints and conduct matters could not be specified for those carrying out functions under the single-employer model where a combined county authority mayor has decided to use it to exercise their police and crime and fire and rescue functions. Without this clause, it would be much more difficult for any complaints and conduct matters to be handled consistently and efficiently, thereby hindering the effective implementation and day-to-day operation of the single-employer model.
Clause 37 allows the Secretary of State to transfer the application of fire and rescue provisions under Section 32 to specified persons where regulations have transferred these functions to the chief constable of the area. Removing this clause would mean that the Secretary of State would not be able to make further provisions applying a fire and rescue enactment or new corresponding provisions in relation to chief constables to whom fire and rescue functions have been delegated as part of the use of the single-employer model. As such, removing this clause would hinder the effective implementation of the single-employer model.
Amendment 122A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, relates to powers under Clause 38.
I have listened very carefully both to the speeches that were made regarding the power of fire and rescue and police being together and the noble Baroness’s answers. I assume the purpose of this is not just an administrative difference but actually to improve the services of fire and police to people where this merger happens. Has the Minister looked at the four areas where this has happened, and His Majesty’s inspector of fire and police? Do those areas actually have a better service, an average service or a worse service than the national average?
I cannot answer the noble Lord in detail, but I will look into it and make sure he has those comparisons and knows what they are.
I can help the noble Baroness: having looked at the comparisons, I can say that they are actually below the national average. So, what is the purpose of going through this huge administrative issue if it does not improve the services to people on the ground?
Because this is localism. If local areas want to take on those responsibilities, the Government have been listening to local authorities and combined authorities and listening to the fact that they want to take these on. The fact that there are only a few of these combined police and crime responsibilities and fire and rescue responsibilities—at the moment, there are not very many—means that it is quite difficult to tell, but we need to keep an eye on it, obviously, and I will come back to that in a minute under Amendment 122A.
The Secretary of State has power under this clause, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, to apply legislation relating to police and crime commissioners in relation to combined county authority mayors where the single-employer model—that is, the ability to make the chief constable the single operational head of both the police force and the fire and rescue service—has been engaged. Clause 38(4) provides a power to amend, revoke or repeal legislation consequential on that power. This is important because of exactly what the noble Lord opposite said: this is the power that could be used if any area has implemented the single-employer model but the chief constable is failing to manage the F&RS effectively. The Secretary of State may wish to revoke the implementation of the single-employer model and use this provision to do so. I think this is the power we have put in to ensure that exactly what the noble Lord opposite says need not happen.
My Lords, I shall speak to the only amendment in this group, Amendment 128 in my name and signed by my noble friend Lord Shipley. This is a probing amendment to tease out the Government’s thinking on this issue. It was a deliberate decision to have this amendment in a group on its own because this really is the elephant in the room: fiscal devolution. We can talk about structures and systems but, without the proper levers of finance and autonomy at a local level, the structures and the systems will achieve very little and will not deliver the equalling up of areas and regions across the country.
I think we need to be clear about what this amendment is not about. This is not about handing down moneys raised by national taxation to areas so they have a little extra leeway on how that money can be spent. As welcome as this is, it is a small step that is not going to solve the regional inequalities that exist in the country. This is what the Conservative Mayor of the West Midlands authority calls the “begging bowl approach”. It is nothing more than spending decentralisation. It was quite amusing, listening to the Chancellor earlier today talk about a pothole fund. The very notion that a Chancellor of the Exchequer stands up in the national Parliament to deal with potholes is ludicrous. A predetermined pot of money handed down, usually with strings from Whitehall, to have local areas determine key projects in areas to spend that money is not fiscal devolution.
It was also telling that the Chancellor today, in announcing that the West Midlands and Greater Manchester combined authorities will have departmental-type arrangements, sees these arrangements as nothing more than decentralisation of central government departmental spending. It is even more telling, as has been reported in the Financial Times, I think it was, that even when the areas get this extra leeway on how the money is spent, there may be a committee set up here in Westminster to oversee how that money is prioritised and then spent. Other parts of the world that understand and implement devolution will be laughing in disbelief at this ridiculous notion of local autonomy.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has shown that this is not a party-political issue, but an issue for those of us who believe that you cannot deal with levelling up unless you give real fiscal powers to local areas that require them, to be able to make autonomous decisions in the locality on where to invest and where to make the biggest changes. It is also about stopping this particular view in England that local areas have to look to Westminster to be able to make decisions that many local areas across the vast majority of the western world, whether they are federal or not, can take.
I reiterate what my noble friend Lord Shipley said: we are not a unitary state. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, fiscal devolution exists. We are talking predominantly about 56 million people in England, where fiscal devolution is totally off the table at the moment. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, was quite right to point out that, in itself, the Bill does not bring about fiscal devolution; it brings about departmental decentralisation, with predetermined spending limits being able to be made a little differently at the local level. Everything that the Minister said reinforces that view. Nothing in the Bill significantly gives further fiscal devolution to local areas if they so wish. In fact, she made the same mistake again: she talked about the trail-blazers in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester that have been announced today. As welcome as they are, they are not fiscal devolution. They are the decentralisation of departmental spending decisions; that is the fundamental issue.
This debate, on all sides of the Chamber, has stipulated that the Government are not going far enough and the Bill does not go far enough. We may have to return to this on Report, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I start by congratulating the clerks who made up this group—it is an astonishing achievement to have managed to get so many completely separate issues all in one group. I am afraid that I am going to make life more difficult for the Front-Benchers, particularly for the noble Baroness the Minister, by moving from one subject to another—but here we are; I will do my best.
I ought to remind the Committee that I am a former police and crime commissioner for Leicestershire and Rutland. I have a clause stand part notice in my name for Clause 59, which we will not reach for many sessions, probably. I thank noble Lords who have added their names to that notice. My noble friend Lord Hunt, at the end of his speech, talked about Clause 59; I very much hope that the Government will listen. Even if my words are fairly harsh, they are not addressed at Ministers here; obviously it is not their responsibility, as such, but the Government’s responsibility that we are landed with Clause 59, which really is not a worthy clause in a Bill of this kind. It should never have been in this Bill; it is a mean, short clause in a large, important Bill and it has absolutely nothing to do with levelling up or grand plans for the future of our country.
It is for one reason only, as has been stated: merely to ensure that one mayor of the West Midlands Combined Authority—Conservative, as it happens—can become the police and crime commissioner for the West Midlands police force area whenever he really wants to. All he has to do is ask the Government, who are his own party, of course. He does not have to consult with anybody, unlike under Clause 58—for which there is also a stand part notice—where consultation is at least mandatory. In effect, he just has to wake up one morning and say to himself, “Oh, I fancy being police and crime commissioner today; I’ll have a word with a Minister”. Then, without much ado, he will be. In fact, he has, to use modern parlance, fancied it for a long time. Unfortunately, for him, there is a combination of the present law, which demands democratic consent from the combined authority members and from the constituent authorities—the councils that make up the combined authority—and, annoyingly for the mayor, the electorate who have voted on four separate occasions for a Labour police and crime commissioner. “How dare they”, says the mayor, and the Government follow suit by putting in this clause.
First, the present law sought to be amended by Clause 59—namely, the need for majority support from the combined authority and support from all the councils that make up the combined authority, the constituent authorities—was put into the 2009 Act by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. For the Government of the day, and for all of us, it represented a sensible, democratic and consensual approach. Of course a mayor can become police and crime commissioner, if he or she has general support—as has happened in Manchester and West Yorkshire. However, it did stop a mayor from grabbing that position without local support. In the West Midlands, that support is not forthcoming. Now, seven years on—only seven years—the same Government wish to change all that and give the mayor a free ride, effectively.
Secondly, the electorate in the West Midlands has voted every time, as it happens, for a Labour police and crime commissioner, most recently in May 2021, on the very same day that they voted for a Conservative mayor. There is no suggestion that the two position holders, the mayor and the police and crime commissioner, have not worked well together. Both were elected, so I ask the Minister, what is the argument for change? What is the argument to nullify the result of an election, effectively, if it does not happen to suit one party?
This clause is there only, I submit, for the West Midlands mayor. Ironically, if he becomes police and crime commissioner, he will no doubt appoint a deputy who will do most of the work but will not have been elected by anybody. Police and crime commissioners, whether we like them or loathe them, were actually set up by the Government of the day to do a particular job for their public. One of the selling points by the Government when this controversial Bill was put before Parliament was that it would be the public who would elect police and crime commissioners, and that gave them some mandate. This clause represents a real lessening of democracy. It is usually only authoritarian regimes that make laws to abolish the results of democratic elections that they do not happen to like or do not suit them. Surely, we are better than that.
At Second Reading, the Minister did not have time to deal with the points I am making now. In no way is that a criticism: she had much too much to do, given the number of speakers and different points that were made at Second Reading. Now we are in Committee, I would be grateful if she would be kind enough to listen to the following questions and give me answers. First, what is the purpose of this clause if it is not to nullify the results of an election held 22 months ago? Secondly, what is wrong with the principle of having broad consent for change, which was the Government’s policy right up to now? Thirdly, why is there no consultation for the mayor before he makes his application? He does not need to consult under the new provision. Lastly, should the Government not think again about how undemocratic, chilling and unnecessary this clause looks? Its departure from the Bill would, I believe, be well received by all people of good will who believe in local democracy and think it rather shocking that an election result can be overturned merely because the party that lost it does not like it.
My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the probing Amendments 89 and 90, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the role of local government and the NHS. I speak as somebody who has been an NHS manager—I think I said previously that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was in the higher echelons of NHS management when I was a mere trainee. I have also been a local government council leader and recently I have been an NHS non-executive director.
There were clear issues as we went through the Health and Care Act. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, it seems like we are having the same discussion. It is not that we want to say, “We told you so”, but the structures that have been set up and the cultures and behaviours of the two organisations mean that they are incompatible with what we all want to achieve, which is a localised and systematic approach to dealing with people who go through the NHS and care system to improve health and reduce health inequalities between areas.
The NHS, by structure, looks up. It looks up to NHS England and the department. The way that the funding goes means that the levers that the Secretary of State or the senior directors of NHS England can pull will mean that NHS staff, in terms of managers and leaders, will look up and will respond to a top-down approach. The culture within the NHS is top-down, top-down, top-down. Local authorities, and particularly local councillors, look out. They look out to their area: that is who they serve, that is who, predominantly, gives them their marching orders—not somebody above them from a national organisation and a central ministerial area of government.
That is not the logic. It is an opportunity for the directly elected mayor to be able to join up all these issues within their geographic area and deliver more joined-up services by working with others.
Do the Government therefore suggest that, at a local level, a council leader could appoint their own cabinet rather than taking from elected councillors? That is the logic of what the Minister is saying.
That is not the logic. It takes the whole issue too far. Cabinet members will come from the elected members. That is required in the legislation.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as this is my first time speaking in Committee, I lay out my interests as in the register as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Shipley and have listened carefully to this debate. Technically, it does not matter how small and granular the information is; it is how it is evaluated and reported against the aims of the mission that is important. That is why I want to speak in particular to Amendment 48 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock.
If you look at the Bill, you see that the only person who will evaluate the homework of whether the geographical disparities are actually narrowing against the missions in the Bill is the Minister. The Minister will not only set the way in which the task is set but will then be the person who marks his or her homework on that. That is why it is particularly important that Amendment 48, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, is accepted by the Government, as it proposes an independent review of whether the geographical disparities are narrowing.
I ask the Minister a very simple question: why would you object to an independent body assessing whether the Government are meeting the requirements in the Bill which they say they are so eager to meet? That is why, as Amendment 48 proposes, regardless of how data is collected, at what level and what criteria are used, it has to be independently measured to ensure that the Government’s desired requirements and policies are working to achieve the levelling-up issue in a geographical area.
My Lords, three issues have been raised by this small group: defining geographies—we talked a lot about geographies and spatial disparities— and granularity; independent scrutiny, which is really important; and then funding allocation and how that happens. I am beginning to think that the Government and the Minister may regret the publication of the levelling-up White Paper because it is a fountain of really good information.
On geographies, we need to understand what we mean by “geographies”. The noble Baroness, Lady Young, talked about very small pockets of multiple deprivation, and largely we have been speaking in the previous debates, yesterday and today, about big, regional or county-wide differences across the country. We need to understand at what level—or is it at all levels?—levelling up will take place. The levelling-up White Paper is quite handy in that regard—the Minister is nodding, so that is a good start. It has not taken IMD—the index of multiple deprivation—but it has a great map; I love maps which are mapped out according to datasets of this sort. It is figure 1.13 in the book, if noble Lords want to know. It has mapped, across local authority areas, gross value added, weekly pay, healthy life expectancy and level 3+ equivalent skills in the adult population. It is very revealing.
The map shows where there are all four of those indices in the lowest quartile of the measures. Where are they? According to this map, it is not always where you suspect. One of the areas is north Norfolk— I would never have thought that. Another area is where we would expect: the north-east, shown as a great, dark blob where that is a problem. Then there is the area down the Yorkshire coast and then obviously on the Lancashire coast, where you would expect—and then central Devon. So this is a very important sort of dataset to use. That is on a big scale. However, when my noble friend Lord Shipley introduced this, he talked about being able to go below that level of dataset to understand where the highest levels of multiple indices are occurring on a regular basis and how that can be tackled.
So that is the first point: it is not defined in the Bill, and we need a definition of what we are tackling in terms of geographies. So I totally agree with my noble friend Lord Foster about the granularity and importance of the data, and I agree with my noble friend Lord Scriven on supporting the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hullock—I am so sorry, I always do that; I meant the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock—on the importance of independent scrutiny.
Finally, on the allocation of levelling-up funding to date, if this is a symptom of how it is going to occur in the future, we may as well abandon levelling up. The House of Commons Library has a report on the funding to date and where it has gone. The Government have put local authority areas into priorities 1, 2 and 3, with 1 being the most needy. I would expect that, unless there were exceptional circumstances, the money would go to priority 1. But no: 59%, only just above half the money, has gone so far, in the first two rounds of funding, to priority 1 areas. Some has even gone to priority 3 areas, which, by the Government’s own definition, are doing okay. So what is this about levelling up?
In response to the question about the cost of bids, I know, because I spoke to the chief executive of Leeds City Council, that it spent a third of a million pounds on drawing up bids for level 2 and got not a penny piece in return. When local government across the country, or certainly where I am, is cutting its budgets—£43 million has to be found in my own budget in Kirklees because of rising energy prices, inflation and all the rest of it—local government cannot afford to spend a third of a million pounds on making bids that then get turned down because the Government decide to hand the money to local authorities in priority 3 areas. It is not right, it is not levelling up and it needs to change.
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses the assessment of levelling up. Amendment 10 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Foster, with whom I am more than happy to have a teach-in on data for anybody who would like to come and learn more about the technicalities—please just let me know. The amendment would define criteria that could be used to evaluate levelling-up policies that aim to address geographical disparities.
As I set out in detail to noble Lords in our first day of Committee, the missions contained in the levelling-up White Paper are a product of extensive analysis and engagement. The missions are supported by a range of clear metrics, used to measure them at the appropriate level of geography, and these metrics take account of a wider range of inputs, outputs and outcomes needed to drive progress in the overall mission. These metrics cover a wide range of policy issues but all are clearly linked to the drivers of spatial disparities. This has been set out in the White Paper.
I turn to Amendment 48, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock. This amendment would require an assessment by the independent evaluating body to be included in any review of statements of levelling-up missions. We have accepted in this Chamber that scrutiny and seeking expert advice will be important in ensuring that we deliver on our missions and level up the country. That is why we have established the Levelling Up Advisory Council to provide government with expert advice to inform the design and delivery of the missions. The council includes voices from different parts of the UK.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, might not have been here for the debate on a previous group but I should say that the advisory council is chaired by Andy Haldane and its membership was published in the White Paper. The council members are not tied to government views and the council is made up of renowned independent experts in their field, such as Sir Tim Besley, professor of economics and political science at the London School of Economics; Cathy Gormley-Heenan, a former deputy vice-chancellor of research and impact at Ulster University; Sacha Romanovitch, the CEO of Fair4All Finance; and Sir Nigel Wilson, chief executive at L&G. All are independent experts in their field. We welcome the challenge and expert advice that the council provides and have been clear that we want it to provide us with candid views and challenging recommendations for how the Government are delivering levelling-up policy.
The noble Baroness read out a list of eminent people and said that their voice is important. If that is the case, why cannot their assessment and report be in the Bill, as the amendment seeks, and part of the Government’s independent assessment of geographical disparity? Under the present Bill, there is only the Minister’s assessment of whether the missions are narrowing geographical disparity. If these people are so eminent and important, why cannot that be part of the report to both Houses of Parliament?
No one has said that those views cannot be taken when the missions are scrutinised by both Houses of Parliament. However, we will not put it in the Bill, as in our opinion that would not be appropriate.
Amendment 58, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, would change the definition of disparities in the Bill. The amendment is right to note that geographical disparities may include differences between regions, counties, councils and council wards. However, in the course of our work on the levelling-up White Paper, it has become clear that the appropriate unit of comparison will vary depending on the mission or policy area.
To help us tailor analysis and policy to the UK’s complex economic geography, timely and robust spatial data have been made a foundational pillar of the new policy regime for levelling up. More granular spatial data is crucial to ensure that policy fully recognises the different characteristics, opportunities and challenges of different places—including, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Foster, on two occasions now, rural and urban areas.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I remind the House of my position as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. Like many, I was looking forward to this Bill. You could say that I was even excited at the prospect of a set of provisions that would unleash the economic, social and environmental opportunities of all the towns and cities across the land—maybe I need to get out more—but, having read the Bill, my excitement turned into a feeling of utter disbelief and confusion.
Is this Bill’s focus devolution and economic growth? Is it planning guidance, housing, or the control of local government structures and finance? I have no idea what its driving purpose is; it seems to be a pick-and-mix of whatever was in the Secretary of State’s in-tray, which he has decided to cram into one Bill. At the same time, he has given himself so many powers that all he will be doing is sitting in a Whitehall office making provisions for rules on street votes in Saltburn, making new design orders for development in Southampton, or deciding the financial constraints of the council in Sheffield. Indeed, this Bill could be diagnosed as having a split personality.
Part 1 of the Bill sets the whole tone of the Government’s thinking. Devolution is derived from the Secretary of State’s pen—deciding what is important, what is to be measured and when, and marking his own progress. That is why this Bill is flawed before it starts. It is still the Whitehall-centric view of the country from SW1: deciding if all is going well from that vantage point. It is indeed a “Henry VIII powers on steroids” Bill.
The elephant in the room is that there is no reform of the Victorian monolithic structure of Whitehall itself. You cannot have an empowered set of regions until you start looking at the reforms of Whitehall needed to facilitate that. If the Government really are radical about what matters to local areas, let them decide what is important in closing the economic, social and environmental gaps. Let them have a say and put them at the centre of whether progress is being made in closing the economic, social and environmental gaps. Why cannot that be turned around? Why cannot local areas be the judges of what is important and how progress is being made, along with government?
It is also what is not in this Bill that shows why it is doomed to fail on levelling up. When we look at other countries, we see that they cannot control sustainable economic growth in any region without having full fiscal devolution. Here in England, only two property-based taxes are the levers that local politicians can pull to raise income to invest in their area. In France, local areas have nine taxes; in Germany, the figure is more than 12; and in New York City it is 22. The OECD has shown that, to be effective, local areas need to have a split of taxes based on 60% property and 40% non-property. Other than the iron glove of the Treasury, what stops local areas in this country having fiscal powers to make the right investment decisions and create the right incentives for their areas? We have to stop the Oliver Twist approach of holding out the begging bowl and asking the Secretary of State, “Please sir, can I have some more?” in a bidding war for time-limited funds that is flawed and will continue under this Bill. This is an area that these Benches will return to in Committee.
This Bill has many great intentions but unfortunately, the powers in it are not really being devolved to local areas. Devolution means that local areas, local politicians, local businesses and local communities can make real decisions about investment, fiscal issues and significant issues that affect their area. This Bill stems most of that power still from the Secretary of State’s pen in Whitehall.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not see the levelling-up agenda as being anything other than helping us to be more economically competitive at a global level. I am sure that there will be opportunities to refine the outcomes frameworks and the metrics used to ensure that we are successful in our desire to raise all boats.
My Lords, can the Minister explain why the time to travel to work in a car, such as a Bentley or a BMW, is a weighted factor worth nearly 20% of all weighting to steer funding for levelling up economic recovery, growth and regeneration of an area?
My Lords, I do not think that it is entirely fair to categorise an area with poor transport infrastructure by reference to the speed and distance travelled in a Bentley. The focus of this fund is to deal with the challenges that we have around the need for greater connectivity, and it is those projects that will be funded.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeAs somebody born and raised in Huddersfield and whose family still lives there, now calling Sheffield my home, I feel I have a little knowledge about West Yorkshire and the devolution deal in a White Rose county. As a vice-president of the LGA, I welcome the order, but start with a word of caution as I look up the M1. Do not fall for the hype that these devolution deals are a way to solve the decades of underinvestment and lack of opportunities for Yorkshire’s people and the infrastructure required for future well-being and prosperity.
Although welcome, these deals do not deliver the powers and responsibilities that each area needs to shape their destiny. In reality, this is decentralisation, not true devolution. We have seen over the past few months that the real powers on game-changing investment will continue to sit with the iron fist of the Treasury, fixed and rooted in Whitehall. One of the significant schemes for West and South Yorkshire is HS2: both are on the eastern leg of the line. The Government have gone cold, and plans from the National Infrastructure Commission now appear to either kick the eastern leg into the long grass or scrap it altogether.
Support for future opportunities by linking the people and businesses of the great towns and cities of Yorkshire and the north via an integrated transport system is also needed. We have been told to lower our horizons. Whitehall has cut the budget for Transport for the North. London still has the real levers over money and strategic decisions. These devolution deals give us some crumbs at our tables, while the bread machine and loaf-makers stay in Whitehall. No innovative money-raising powers or exciting and significant fiscal incentives for the economic and social improvements at the scale that West Yorkshire requires are in this deal. The pandemic has made the task even harder. As this week’s annual study by the Centre for Cities shows, the number of people seeking work in parts of Yorkshire has increased fivefold in the wake of Covid, with many facing the prospect of years in the job wilderness unless the Government recognise the scale of the unfolding economic crisis that we face.
Although the deal is welcome, the Government must be honest with people in West Yorkshire. The vital levers of power and fiscal control to make the significant changes required are not part of this deal. Small changes can be made by the metro mayor, but the game-changing levers for people, communities and the local economy will still be in the grip of Whitehall. Levelling up will be a soundbite until we get meaningful devolution leading to a more federal England that can truly unleash the full potential of Yorkshire and its people.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have saved my data, which I carefully put together—although I will not be able to read it very well—for my noble friend’s question, of which he kindly gave me notice. I shall tell a tale of two boroughs—the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames, a Liberal Democrat authority, and the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, now, sadly, a Labour borough. It was taken over after I was leader of the council—but that is democracy for you. Things can change back again, I hasten to add, for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Things can swing both ways. For those two boroughs, exactly the same budget base was estimated, through both council tax and grant. Richmond upon Thames had £173 million and Hammersmith and Fulham £174 million—pretty much the same amount. Yet 83% of the money in Richmond upon Thames is raised through council tax, whereas only 31% of the money in Hammersmith and Fulham is raised through council tax. That is patently absurd. Of course we need to think about a more sensible system of local government finance. It is very hard to estimate via complex formulae, and I am sure the devolution White Paper will look into some of the vagaries of local government financing, whereby a river can separate, and thus create such great differences between, two neighbouring authorities.
My Lords, I draw the House’s attention to my interest in the register as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. The public health grant for 2020-21 was 22% lower per head in real terms compared to 2015-16. Restoring spending per head to this level would require an additional £1 billion. At a time of a public health crisis, to deal with the local ongoing and long-term effects of Covid-19, and to restart public health services that have had to be paused during this pandemic, does the Minister think the £1 billion should now be reinstated?
I will have to write to the noble Lord about that. I did not quite catch his question, but I will make sure that we get a full and proper answer to him and put a copy in the Library.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government how many COVID-19 Secure Marshals they plan to have in place by 1 October.
Local authorities are best placed to determine the model of deployment and responsibilities of marshals in their areas. We do not expect to set national targets for the number of marshals but rather to work with local authorities to encourage them to consider using marshals where appropriate. We will be setting out further details in due course.
My Lords, for the first time since the 1300s, mingling is an offence under English law. The Home Secretary confirmed today that, if two families of four saw each other on the street and stopped to say, “Hello. How are you?” they would be mingling and carrying out an offence. Can the Minister tell us what enforcement—not education—powers the new Covid-secure marshals will have to stop such mingling?
The marshals are there to encourage compliance rather than to act as the enforcement arm, which is provided by the police and environmental health officers.