Technology Rules: The Advent of New Technologies in the Justice System (Justice and Home Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, that was an extremely powerful contribution from my noble friend Lady Ludford, with which I wholeheartedly agree. I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, her eminent committee members and their officials for this impressive report, the importance of which cannot be overestimated. There have been equally impressive contributions from members of the committee, although not exclusively from them.

I am no Luddite. I am impressed by new technology and could be described in my own way as an early adopter of it, even if it is the new iPhone or the latest laptop—boys’ toys, as my noble friend just commented. Perhaps I get too excited by technology in the way that she mentioned. However, there are inherent dangers in the way that technology is being used in the criminal justice space that are a real cause for concern, as the report clearly points out and as noble Lords have described.

I do not know whether I am correct in thinking that, like direct and indirect racism, there are perhaps first and second-degree dangers in the use of advanced technology. As in the hackneyed phrase, when it comes to computers, of “Rubbish in, rubbish out”, there is a clear potential danger that artificial intelligence built on the results of biased policing and biased decision-making by the courts will be hard-wired into AI systems, as the noble Baroness, Lady Primarolo, said. Whether it is about the likelihood that a convicted person will reoffend or when used in connection with vetting inquiries, where racial bias in human decision-making is copied and pasted into AI systems, artificial intelligence also has the danger, for example, of being racially biased.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, the report points out what I might call second-degree prejudice and discrimination, such as where AI is used to predict where volume crime might occur but not used to focus police resources on what used to be called white-collar crime, such as high-value fraud. This application bias has the danger of focusing police resources on poor neighbourhoods, where black and other minority ethnic people live, while majority white crime is seen to be even less solvable as the opportunities provided by AI to solve crime are focused elsewhere. The first-degree racism dangers in Durham’s predictor of how likely someone is to commit a crime in the future, or the Home Office sham marriage detector, should not overshadow the second-degree racism that might result from focusing advances in technology on the poor and disadvantaged.

It is not just having the mantra of “If you’ve done nothing wrong, you have nothing to fear” to downplay the harm caused by disproportionality in stop and search that we must be alert to, but that facial recognition technology is likely to give false positive results with women and black people. Operators that are not effectively regulated could load databases of political activists—or even images from Facebook groups that the system could be asked to trigger alerts for—allowing the police to track the individual movements of innocent citizens. That the city council of Santa Cruz in the United States placed a moratorium on the same live facial recognition software used by Kent Police between 2013 and 2018, because that council believed it endangered civil rights and civil liberties, and exacerbated racial injustice, perhaps indicates the dangers and how the UK is lagging behind other jurisdictions in addressing these dangers, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones said this evening.

I found the Information Commissioner’s remarks, quoted in the report, that every technology can create benefits or risks, depending on the context, governance and oversight measures, a little like the Chinese phrase “We live in interesting times”. It was fairly obvious but not particularly helpful, unlike the report, which not only shows how and where the governance and oversight measures are inadequate but, helpfully, recommends how and where they can be improved, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee described.

The report also points out that the courts are filling gaps in the legislation, something judges are reluctant to do. They want clear laws to interpret, not an absence of law that they then have to invent. I am reminded of going, as part of my Master of Business Administration degree, into the bank where my twin brother was a senior executive so we could act as quasi-management consultants and carry out a project on the system that the bank used to regulate salaries. The view of the operational arm of the bank was that the human resources department was holding back the business from moving forward, and that senior executives should be able to reward high performers outside the salary and grading structure.

Similarly, I appreciate how difficult it is for legislation to keep up with technological advances. However, given the erosion of civil liberties and, for example, the overpolicing of certain communities, that should not mean sacrifices just because, to quote Bill Heslop from the film “Muriel’s Wedding”, “You can’t stop progress!” That was his campaign slogan when he was running for political office and he did not win—not that I am suggesting that there are similarities between that character and my twin brother, or Kit Malthouse, the former Minister quoted in the report.

The report’s conclusions, that there is no clear line of accountability for the misuse or failure of technological solutions used in the application of the law and, as a result, no satisfactory recourse mechanisms, are worrying, together with the fact that there is a lack of transparency in the use of advanced technological solutions. Mandatory impact assessments are a safeguard, provided they are objective and independent.

Committee reports such as this one are a fundamental aspect of the work of the House, and we overlook them at our peril—this report perhaps more than many. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, the credibility of the criminal justice system could be at stake. As my noble friend Lady Ludford pointed out, the Government’s response could be described as complacent. I look forward to the Minister’s response saving the day by reassuring this Committee that he has taken on board the recommendations of this important report.

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) Order 2022

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

This statutory instrument forms part of a package of reforms to the DAML regime within the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill currently in the other place. I therefore commend this motion to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, again I thank the Minister for explaining this order. Raising the threshold from £250 to £1,000, the £250 limit being unchanged since 2005, seems quite a reasonable increase. I understand from the Explanatory Note that some organisations wanted the threshold to be raised to £3,000. I think The Home Office is right to limit the increase to £1,000. Law enforcement must focus its limited resources on transactions that are likely to be the result of money laundering. This order has the additional benefit of reducing the burden on commercial organisations, which can, in any event, report suspicious activity to law enforcement despite the changes in the limits in this order. Therefore, we support it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this order as well. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick said, it seems a reasonable increase and some organisations would have gone to £3,000. However, there were other respondents to the consultation who were against the increase to £1,000; they wanted to keep it at the lower limit. Can the Minister say what their concerns were? Although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that £1,000 seems reasonable, other people thought it should have stayed at its original level: does the Minister know why they thought that? He indicates that he does not know why—okay.

I have some of the same figures that the Minister quoted. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the volume of DAMLs is rising steeply and gave those figures. The question is: what percentage of those 105,000 referrals were over the new £1,000 threshold—what difference will increasing the threshold to £1,000 make?

On the further figures that the Minister quoted, he said that only 2% of all DAMLs were refused consent in 2019-20, of which only 1,062 progressed towards asset denial. The question is, of that 2%, how many of those DAMLs were for amounts over £1,000 and so would still be caught? Both those questions are about how much the amount of work will be reduced by increasing this limit, although we of course approve of the objective.

One of the main benefits suggested by the Government, with which we agree, is that this measure should free up law enforcement to pursue other activities. We welcome that in itself. We heard from the current Home Secretary’s predecessor that the National Crime Agency has been asked to make staffing cuts of up to 20%. Can the Minister say anything about whether that previous expectation is still in place or has now been ruled out?

The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“A full Impact Assessment has been published alongside the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which considers the impact of the changes in this instrument.”


One of our key concerns about that Bill is its failure to tackle fraud and economic crime, with falling rates of enforcement and prosecution. I understand that this change is intended to reduce the number of ineffective DAMLs, but what action is being taken alongside that to try to increase the prosecution rate? It is a huge problem and it is very time-intensive to secure successful prosecutions—I understand that—so although we support this SI I would be grateful if the Minister could set out in a slightly broader context how he will try to increase the possibility of getting successful convictions.

Hotel Asylum Accommodation: Local Authority Consultation

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Obviously it is not for me to comment on the entirety of the commercial operations of Clearsprings; nor do I know the extent to which the contracts for asylum accommodation are responsible for its profit margin, so it would not be appropriate for me to answer that question.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, will the Minister comment on the Home Secretary’s evidence yesterday in the other place, where she seemed to suggest that the only way that many asylum seekers could claim asylum in the UK is on arrival in the UK? In other words, the only way for genuine refugees and asylum seekers to claim asylum is to pay people smugglers to cross the channel and then claim asylum in the UK. Is the Government’s policy not feeding the business model of people smugglers rather than trying to dismantle it?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

No, it is absolutely to the contrary. Safe and legal routes, such as the ones we operate in Afghanistan, and in Iraq and Jordan in the past, were designed to provide an opportunity for genuine refugees to make asylum claims to come to the UK. The idea that people can promote their own claims over those of others and cross themselves into the country in order to claim asylum is simply not a sensible way of running an asylum system. It is clearly contrary to the public interest that those able to afford to pay people smugglers are able to come here and claim asylum. That is why the safe and legal routes are the only proper way of delivering asylum sanctuary.

Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for coming in when the Minister was already on his feet. I declare an interest as a council member of Justice, the all-party law reform group that took a significant interest in the CHIS Bill when it was going through the House. It was a very strange time: it was during lockdown when we had Zoom Parliament and so on, as the Minister will recall.

All noble Lords will appreciate that the legislation was—and remains—controversial. Whatever the arguments for and against its necessity, it is controversial to grant advance immunity from prosecution not only to police officers or direct officials and agents of the state but to those whom they run in the community, including in criminal fraternities. We have had the arguments in relation to the legislation itself. None the less, we all need to recognise the dangers that exist with that kind of advance immunity from criminal prosecution, including for quite serious crimes.

During the passage of the legislation the Government said that the Human Rights Act would be a safeguard, and the Minister has repeated that. But we are constantly told that the Human Rights Act is in jeopardy and, with the return of Mr Raab to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and as Justice Secretary, that remains in the balance. That needs to be on our minds when we consider these powers and the codes of practice made thereunder.

I will make one further point, about the consultation around the CHIS codes of practice. Justice informs me and other noble Lords that the consultation took place between 13 December 2021 and 6 February 2022—an eight-week period that included Christmas and serious restrictions because of the rise of the omicron variant. That was of concern not only to Justice but to other charities and NGOs that had concerns about the legislation and about victims’ rights in particular. One of their substantive concerns is that there is not enough in the current codes of practice to encourage victims to seek compensation in the event that they are harmed as a result of advance criminal immunity being given to CHIS.

Christmas is a problem for people who work in the sector in any event, because staff are on holiday and so on, but lockdown made it harder still. What Justice says about that is if the Home Office had compensated for the short festive period by going out proactively to consult potential interested parties, that consultation deficit could have been met. But that, I am told, did not happen. As a result, both Justice and the Centre for Women’s Justice, which of course had been very involved in supporting the female victims of the spy cops scandal, made their views known to the Home Office. That has not been a satisfactory engagement.

I know there is a limit to what can be done about this at this point but I intervene today to put this to the Minister. He perhaps was not the Minister responsible at the time of the consultation but might, none the less, keep this under review and possibly open up a line of ongoing communication with Justice and the Centre for Women’s Justice. Although these regulations are of course going to pass, these codes of practice need to be kept under review, as does the operation of this legislation with the codes of practice. I know from my dealings with him that the Minister is a reasonable person. After the regulations pass, I hope that he will perhaps meet these people to keep that conversation going and ensure that the operation of these provisions and vital codes of practice is monitored, and that the monitoring from the Home Office actively encourages involvement from those who work on victims’ rights and in the sector.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for introducing these draft statutory instruments. As he said, the Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources and Interception: Codes of Practice) Regulations 2022 cover highly controversial changes made to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 which enable the police, security services and other public bodies to task informants or agents to commit crime, where it is necessary and proportionate, for which they will be immune from prosecution and civil damages. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has just said, that is not just the officers who task the individuals or authorise that tasking, but the individuals involved in the criminal acts themselves.

Taking up the point made by the noble Baroness, my understanding is that victims who have suffered as a result of the participation of CHIS in crime cannot make claims because the agents and CHIS are immune from being sued in the civil courts, as well as from criminal prosecution. In relation to the spy cops issues, can the Minister clarify whether that immunity from civil claims is not retrospective and that where undercover officers were inappropriately engaging in relationships with protesters and activists, they may therefore still be liable for civil damages?

The Act’s measures were fiercely debated in this House and, despite the safeguards that were brought in through amendments passed by it, they remain controversial—not least given the potential tasking of children and vulnerable adults to commit crime, and the danger and safeguarding issues surrounding the use of children and vulnerable adults in this way. Since the safeguards introduced in the CHIS Act came into force in 2021, can the Minister explain why it has taken until now to publish these codes of practice, which instruct the police and the security services on how they must comply with the 2021 Act?

The Explanatory Memorandum says:

“It is not considered that relevant public authorities or the IPC need to be provided with additional time to adopt different patterns of behaviour with a delayed commencement date”


as the changes contained in the revised codes of practice have been in force since 2021. If, as the Explanatory Memorandum says,

“the new provisions in the CHIS Act”

provide guidance

“covering the way that Criminal Conduct Authorisations … must be authorised and reflects the changes made to the use of children and vulnerable adults as CHIS”,

what is the point of the revised codes of practice? If they are important, even essential, to ensure the relevant authorities comply with the law, why have those authorities been allowed to operate without them since 2021, bearing in mind that there was no statutory basis for authorising CHIS to participate in crime before the 2021 Act?

Solihull Murders

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think it is of rather more importance than investigating burglaries; we should all think that. I do not necessarily agree that it is not a priority for the police forces. The police forces are certainly saying the right things but, as I have already said from this Dispatch Box, I, the Minister in the other place, the Home Secretary and the Government think they have more to do.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, is not the problem here—the difference between burglary and domestic violence—the attitude of police officers towards women? What are the Government doing about that?

Counterterrorism: Martyn’s Law

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very sound point. He is, in effect, asking me about the scope of the proposed legislation and that work is ongoing. It would not be appropriate for me to comment at this point.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and to Martyn’s family for their work on these issues. What else can the Government do to encourage small venues to improve security, while we await this long-overdue legislation? What about a public information campaign or a security rating scheme for venues? Lives may be unnecessarily at risk because of government inaction.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes an interesting point. ProtectUK was launched in March 2022 as a digital tool. Its work includes offering guidance, advice and engagement with counterterrorism experts via an online platform. As it develops, it will establish itself as a central digital location for counterterrorism support. There are a number of other aspects to that, which I could go on about at some length, but considerable work is being done in that space.

Public Order Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

Does the noble Lord understand that prosecutors, in authorising and not authorising charges, have discretion in whether to prosecute a case? No prosecutor I have met would ever prosecute a case on the facts the noble Lord has just set out.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Is the noble Lord also aware that one of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, addresses exactly this issue, making somebody voluntarily accompanying a person to a clinic exempt from this clause?

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

The noble Lord, Lord Beith, did say that it went some way in this regard, but that it did not deal with all the issues that he and I expressed concern about.

It has been bandied about in this debate for quite some time that the other place voted by a large majority for this legislation. According to certain interpretations, that could be correct. Like the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who spoke recently, I was in the other place, for 25 years. There are 650 Members of the Commons. Of those, 297 voted for this legislation—46%—while 110 voted against and 243 abstained, meaning that 54% of the other place did not vote for this clause. So often in this debate it has been said that there was a vast majority in the other place and that we must submit to its will, yet 54% did not vote for this clause. It is good to be factual on percentages and numbers in the other place.

It is a fundamental and widely accepted principle of sentencing that the punishment must fit the crime—that is, if you feel that freedom of expression and peaceful protest are a crime, which I do not. However, the fines envisaged in Clause 9(4) are grossly disproportionate to the types of protest activities that often occur outside abortion clinics. A six-month prison sentence for a first offence, which could be the result of a volunteer offering support to a pregnant woman, surely strikes most people as neither reasonable nor proportionate, and nor does a two-year sentence for someone who offends multiple times.

The Government reviewed this in 2018. People have dismissed the review as if it does not matter today, but mind you, if it had said something different, they would be happy to mention it. It found that the vast majority of these activities are passive in nature; that they involve everyday lawful activities such as silent prayer and handing out leaflets offering help and support to women who may not want an abortion, but who may feel they have no other choice; and that they occur outside a small number of abortion clinics. Inside this buffer zone, to stand in silent prayer could get you six months’ imprisonment. What country are we living in? This is not China, and it is not Iran. It is the United Kingdom. I have heard the Prime Minister and previous Prime Ministers, and Ministers in this House, say at the Dispatch Box that the most persecuted people in the world today are Christians. But to express your Christian opinion, even in silent prayer to God, can be regarded as an offence inside a buffer zone and you could find yourself in prison.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

The answer is that the situation has moved on, so what was an answer before the existence of PSPOs is no longer relevant.

I have said enough. I think we all know where we are on this and the positions we came from. I would like to work with those Members who want to, and with the Minister, to make sure that we get to where the vast majority of us, and of the public, want to be: women being able access a service legally and safely, and 150 metres down the road you can be as extreme in your opposition as you like.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

We on these Benches accept that many people have strong views both on abortion and on this clause, on both sides of the argument, as reflected in our debate. I want to say two things at the outset. First, my understanding is that organisations that provide abortion services, such as the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, talk through the options available in the case of an unwanted pregnancy, including continuing with the pregnancy and arranging adoption or fostering, becoming a parent and ending the pregnancy with an abortion. The second is that it must be one of the most difficult, life-changing decisions anyone has to make.

To be subjected to one-sided opinions by well-meaning, passionate but in some cases fixated individuals at such a vulnerable moment cannot be right, whether outside or inside an abortion clinic. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said, this is about targeting an individual seeking medical services. Many noble Lords have talked about free speech. There is a difference between offering advice and support, and forcing advice and support on those who do not want it. By all means, campaign, demonstrate and provide advice, help and support on the internet, for example, but not when someone is on their way to an abortion clinic.

What is said inside an abortion clinic is regulated and controlled; what is said outside by campaigners against abortion is not. There is a series of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Fox of Buckley, supported the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. Amendment 80 brings us back to the debate we had last week about “reasonable excuse”. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for that debate and for his contribution today.

This brings us back to the potential argument that the more important the issue, the greater the excuse to break the law. Last week, we debated whether anything could be more important than saving the planet from catastrophic climate change and therefore, there could be a “reasonable excuse” to do anything, however unlawful, if saving the planet was the intention. I am sure there are some who feel that nothing is more important, as they see it, than “saving the life of an unborn child”, so any means justify the ends. Such an amendment would render buffer zones ineffective.

Amendments 81 and 86 lead potentially to the whack-a-mole scenario—or, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee more eloquently put it, the displacement of protests from one clinic to another—whereby those wanting to get those wanting an abortion to change their minds at the last minute would travel around the country until every local authority had a buffer zone around every clinic. Either there is a right to abortion without last-minute interference, or there is not. I am not clear from the wording of Amendment 86 whether it would amount to a maximum of a two-year buffer zone, or simply the expensive and bureaucratic process of having to renew the buffer zone every year.

Amendment 82 introduces the concept of “intentionally or recklessly” interfering, which no doubt would result in endless arguments about whether the offering of advice, or whatever form the interaction takes, amounted to interference or not. Amendment 89, also supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, would allow “silent witness” by those who persistently, continuously or repeatedly picket abortion clinics. That sounds to me like quite intimidating behaviour, even if it is silent prayer. We cannot support these amendments. Either the Committee supports this clause or it does not; creating uncertainty about whether the interaction is reasonable, which clinics have a buffer zone or what amounts to interference is unhelpful.

On Amendment 94, I can understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has drawn a parallel with Part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and public space protection orders, but the latter refers to things like banning the drinking of alcohol in a local park—otherwise innocuous activities that are causing a particular problem in a specific area. This measure is about interfering with a person’s right to choose to access abortion services. They are very similar in terms of protecting public space, but very different in terms of the kind of activity they are trying to prevent.

We support Amendments 80A, 82A, and 82B in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Watkins of Tavistock, and my noble friend Lady Barker, which would bring the phrase “buffer zones” into line with similar legislation in other jurisdictions. We support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and my noble friend Lady Barker.

On Amendment 84, if we are going to have buffer zones, they need to be around every place where abortion services are provided. Amendments 87 and 91 helpfully clarify that the proposed offences apply only in relation to abortion services. Amendments 95, 96 and 97 also usefully exempt anyone invited to go along to the clinic with the person seeking abortion services, and anything said or done when all parties are in someone’s home or a place of worship.

We also support the clarification provided by Amendment 93A in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, supported by my noble friend Lady Barker and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg: that an “abortion clinic” should include places where advice and counselling related to abortions is provided.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Is the noble Lord saying that we should have buffer zones outside every location at which somebody can get, for example, the medical intervention for abortion, such as Boots the chemist, or every facility offering counselling?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My noble friend’s amendment is a probing amendment for the House to consider what sort of premises might be included in buffer zones to ensure that places where women go to get advice are included. The noble Baroness makes an important point, but this is a probing amendment so that the House can consider between Committee and Report whether an amendment in line with the wording that my noble friend has provided is right.

I understand the intention behind Amendment 85 in the name of my noble friend Lord Beith and supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, but I think it is now covered by Amendment 96. If someone decides to go into a place of worship on their way to an abortion clinic, that is their decision.

Similarly, I understand the intention behind my noble friend’s Amendments 88 and 90, supported by the right reverend Prelate and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Hoey: they want to protect free speech. But freedom of speech is a qualified right, and this restriction of it applies only in this very specific and limited scenario in relation to abortion services and clinics. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that the European Convention on Human Rights contains qualified rights, as the noble Viscount said. If a country believes that restrictions need to be placed on a qualified right because there is a justification for it, it is open for it to do so—that is exactly what we are considering here. Whether something is clearly contrary to European Convention on Human Rights, as my noble friend suggested, will be for the courts to decide. I understand—not least following discussions with the Minister and officials—that there is an expectation that, if Clause 9 were passed in its original form, it may be subject to legal challenge. But that is the proper place for a decision to be made on whether the qualified right should be restricted by this clause.

There are other places and other times when those opposed to abortion can make their views known and can seek to influence others. If freedom of speech is to be protected at all times and in all places, why are only noble Lords allowed to speak in this debate? Advise and persuade someone not to have an abortion all you like—for example, by talking to the providers of abortion services to ensure that they include “pro-life” choices in clinics—but do not do so when someone has decided to go to an abortion clinic and is about to enter.

Similar arguments apply to Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. Amendments 98 and 99, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, helpfully point out the Home Office review conducted in 2018, which many noble Lords have quoted. It concluded that buffer zones would be disproportionate, which is at least helpful in understanding the Government’s reluctance to support this clause, as it might be portrayed as yet another U-turn. The then Home Secretary explained his decision in a Statement about the 2018 review, which a number of noble Lords have selectively quoted from. He actually said:

“The review gathered upsetting examples of harassment and the damaging impact this behaviour has had on individuals. This behaviour can leave patients distressed and has caused some to rebook their appointments and not follow medical advice in order to avoid the protestors. In some of these cases, protest activities can involve handing out model foetuses, displaying graphic images, following people, blocking their paths and even assaulting them. However, what is clear from the evidence we gathered is that these activities are not the norm, and predominantly, anti-abortion activities are more passive in nature. The main activities reported to us that take place during protests include praying, displaying banners and handing out leaflets. There were relatively few reports of the more aggressive activities described above. Nevertheless, I recognise that all anti-abortion activities can have an adverse effect, and I would like to extend my sympathies to those going through this extremely difficult and personal process … Through the review, we also found that anti-abortion demonstrations take place outside a small number of abortion facilities. In 2017, there were 363 hospitals and clinics in England and Wales that carried out abortions. Through the review, we found that 36 hospitals and clinics have experienced anti-abortion demonstrations … Having considered the evidence of the review, I have therefore reached the conclusion that introducing national buffer zones would not be a proportionate response, considering the experiences of the majority of hospitals and clinics, and considering that the majority of activities are more passive in nature.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/18; col. 37WS.]


Even if “passive activities” is not a contradiction in terms, passive activity can leave patients distressed and cause some to rebook their appointments and not to follow medical advice in order to avoid protesters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging debate that has re-run a lot of the points from Second Reading. I added my name to all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, who ably introduced that group, which I of course agree with. She opened her speech by talking about the large majority in the other place, which we have heard about, but she made the additional point that each political party had a majority in favour of passing the amendment. She then went on to talk about the argument regarding a “reasonable excuse”, and she did not think that there could be an argument for harassing women seeking a legal service.

We also heard some figures, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has repeated, about there being only five PSPOs currently operating in the country but about 50 targeted clinics where there are regular protests. This creates a patchwork of provision, which a number of noble Lords have spoken about. So tactics have evolved, and there has been an increase in protests.

I want to mention one particular Conservative Minister, Victoria Atkins, who I always think is very perceptive and who has been an active defendant on domestic abuse issues in her previous roles in the Ministry of Justice. She supports this legislation. That has particular significance for me.

I also refer to my noble friend Lady Thornton, who made a central point: the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, try to address in a reasonable way the points raised at Second Reading—that was the spirit in which she put forward that suite of amendments. The vast majority of noble Lords who have spoken against them have not addressed any of the points that she made when she introduced them. I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, is an exception to that, but the vast majority of other speakers did not acknowledge her points.

I turn briefly to the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, in which she made the particularly telling point that many of the women going to seek an abortion may have been subject to coercive sex. For that reason, they may be particularly vulnerable to intimidation as they are going to get advice on whether and how to progress with an abortion. This was a perceptive comment, especially as it came from a nurse; it is something I recognise from the courts in London in which I sit as a magistrate. I also acknowledge her point that she wants a good resolution of these issues rather than a fast resolution.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, gave an absolutely excellent speech; I agreed with every word he said, which is quite unusual from these Benches. Nevertheless, he made a very good point about demonstrators, whom he comes across in other contexts where he would not dream of trying to limit their ability to protest. However, here we are of course talking about an individual, often in a vulnerable state, trying to access a legal service, and that changes the argument about whether demonstrators should be allowed to influence them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, Clause 9 does not prevent anybody protesting against abortion; it only prevents them protesting against abortion within

“150 metres … of an abortion clinic”.

I will now pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on the argument regarding reasonable excuse. As he said, we have had a debate about reasonable excuse in other contexts—for example, in relation to the protests by Extinction Rebellion and the other protest groups which would use that argument for the types of protest they undertake. My understanding of his argument is that basically it is for Parliament itself to take a decision on this sort of thing, rather than pushing these decisions down to courts, judges and magistrates. That was a powerful argument against Amendment 80.

The other speech which resonated with me was that of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which I am sure came from absolute front-line experience. He said that we are not talking about a discussion on abortion occurring as people—women, of course—try to receive these services; rather, it is a monologue and bullying which is meant to be intimidatory. He was absolutely right in pointing that out.

In conclusion, I will say something that is so obvious that nobody seems to have said it in this debate: the Government agree with, and accepted, Clause 9. I accept that there are debates about the wording, the compliance with the ECHR and all the rest, but clearly the Government believe that the situation has moved on since the 2018 review. They clearly believe that there is an advance in the tactics and the money deployed to intimidate women as they are trying to access these legal services. If the Government believe that, we should pay attention. It is not often from this Dispatch Box that I say that we need to listen to the Government because they have clearly taken a decision, but the response by the Minister will perhaps be the most important speech that we will hear in today’s debate.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

No pressure.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his closing words; as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, “No pressure”. I thank all noble Lords for their impassioned contributions to what has obviously been a very substantive debate.

Clause 9 seeks to establish buffer zones outside abortion clinics in England and Wales to ensure that persons accessing or providing abortion services are free from harassment or intimidation. As the Committee will be aware, this clause was inserted into the Bill on the basis of a free vote in the other place. I will not get involved in second-guessing the motivations of those who voted, but the result was 297 votes in favour to 110 votes against. As I have said before, and I am very happy to say again, the Government respect the will of the House of Commons.

It is obviously clear—today’s debate makes it even clearer—that there are very strong views on both sides of the argument. Many noble Lords want the clause to become law, and many want to alter or to delay it. Amendments 80 to 97—tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey, Lady Fox, Lady Watkins, Lady Barker and Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lady Sugg, the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beith, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans—all seek to make an array of changes to Clause 9, be that by raising the threshold for the new offence or by seeking to clarify the clause in some way.

Amendments 98 and 99 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, seek to introduce buffer zones pending the outcome of

“a consultation … to determine if there has been significant change in”

protests “outside abortion clinics since” the Government’s last review. Amendments 87 to 93 look to ensure that only activities relating to abortion services within a buffer zone constitute an offence, while Amendments 88, 96 and 97 seek to ensure that activities within private dwellings and places of worship are exempt. Amendments 80 to 82 seek to provide a person within a buffer zone with the opportunity to defend their actions and

“to strengthen the burden of proof required to establish an offence.”

As I said before, I thank all noble Lords for their interest and ideas to amend the existing clause in its current form, particularly their well-intentioned attempts to tighten what was described in the other place by the Minister as a “blunt instrument”. It remains the Government’s view, based on legal advice, that this amendment does not meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and would require a Section 19(1)(b) statement to be provided. That said, after having been brief, I am now even more keen to meet noble Lords in the coming days, and I encourage them to meet me so that we may discuss the next steps for the clause. For now, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 10 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I intend to oppose the question that Clauses 10 and 11 stand part of the Bill, and I shall speak to the other amendments in this group. It is not particularly helpful to have a clause stand part notice beginning a group rather than an amendment, but there we are.

This group of amendments relates to the new police powers of stop and search in relation to protest. Noble Lords will know the intrusive nature of being stopped and searched by the police, but I respectfully suggest that the full impact on a totally innocent member of the public being detained and searched by a police officer on the street, in full view of passers-by, can only be imagined by those of us who have never been subject to such an experience.

Imagine, then, being black. During a round-table discussion held by the Home Affairs Committee, a black child said that

“we know the police treat Black people differently… it means that we do not feel safe ever.”

Black people are seven times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people, if the stop and search is allegedly based on suspicion. However, according to the latest Home Office data, black people are 14 times more likely to be stopped and searched under powers that require no suspicion.

In relation to tackling knife crime, prohibited objects are limited and obvious, and the consequences of carrying such weapons can be fatal. In relation to these new powers and related offences, the prohibited objects can be almost anything, and the consequences of carrying them can be completely innocuous. What exactly is an item

“made or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with”

highway obstruction, or

“intended by the person having it with them for such use by them or by some other person,”

or an item

“for use in the course of or in connection with”

causing a public nuisance, or

“being present in a tunnel”?

I do not need nor intend to come up with ever more ludicrous suggestions as to what completely innocent objects might be caught up in such an offence. Even if there were noble Lords without much of an imagination, they would still be able to do that for themselves. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has a few suggestions in her Amendment 101. I do not know about Amendment 101—this is Room 101.

The Government say that these powers are needed in order to prevent these types of offences, but in recent weeks the police have made arrests prior to offences being committed under existing legislation, based on intelligence and targeted at specific individuals. These powers are disproportionate to the outcomes they seek to achieve. Even if stop and search to combat knife crime were effective in reducing crime, which Home Office research shows, at least above a certain level, it is not, the argument that saving young people’s lives justifies the damage to trust and confidence in the police in some communities caused by badly targeted stop and search does not hold water in relation to peaceful protest. The number of instances where an arrest follows a without-suspicion stop and search is four in every 100, by the way.

Secondly, the right to freedom of expression, assembly and association—the right to protest—is likely to be impacted by such powers, disproportionately affecting those who feel disfranchised and for whom peaceful protest is an important safety valve: not just black and minority ethnic people but, per the letter noble Lords will have received from the Body Shop, young people, who disproportionately take part in protests because they feel that the democratic process does not represent their views.

If you fear the police, not least because of your lived experience, supported by the data which demonstrates that you are likely to be targeted by the police for stop and search—seven or 14 times more likely depending on whether suspicion is required—if you are black, you are likely to be dissuaded from exercising your human right to protest. It is not just me or the usual suspect NGOs saying this; His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services set out in its report on public order policing

“the potential ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of assembly and expression in terms of discouraging people from attending protests where they may be stopped and searched … Such powers could have a disproportionate impact on people from black, Asian or other minority groups.”

I am not claiming that some offences of highway obstruction, locking on, public nuisance, tunnelling, being present in a tunnel or any of the other offences in this Bill might not be prevented by these stop and search powers. I am arguing that, whether with suspicion, which is bad enough, or without suspicion, which is outrageous, to give the police these powers is disproportionate in terms of the harm that is likely to be caused compared with the benefit that is likely to result.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

This is so important. I do not think the Minister or the Government appreciate how vulnerable women can feel walking, particularly in the dark or on their own, and it gets dark very early in the winter. This is really serious. I also do not think they realise how much young women, particularly if they are attractive, can get hassled. If you have been hassled a lot, you can snap because you are sick and tired of it. I really do not think this has been thought through.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister responds, he may also wish to think very carefully about what he said about these powers not being exercisable by officers in plain clothes. I am prepared to apologise to the Committee for misleading it when I say that these powers alter Section 1 of PACE, which has nothing in it about an officer having to be in uniform to exercise powers of stop and search. So what the Minister said about these powers not being exercisable unless the officer is uniformed is not true.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If I am incorrect I will most certainly correct my statement. That was the information that I was given. If it is incorrect in any way, I will of course come back and apologise. It was inadvertent if that is the case.

I think we are getting slightly off topic, but I say to the noble Baroness that the Minister certainly appreciates that women and girls can feel very vulnerable, particularly at night, and I understand the level of hassle. However, a road where one is likely to be alone is not likely to be subject to the Section 60 power, so we are in the realms of the hypothetical to some extent. I accept and understand the concerns that have been raised, but I reiterate that it is everyone’s right to ask a police officer for identification, and I believe that under the suspicionless basis the officer has to be wearing uniform, but I will confirm that later with the Committee, certainly if I am incorrect. I do not have an answer for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, so I will have to write to her.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, questioned the area in which suspicionless stop and search could be operated. Marches that occur in central London traditionally start at Marble Arch, go down Park Lane and sometimes through Oxford Street and Regent Street. The number of people who could be subject to suspicionless stop and search as the result of that sort of demonstration is mind boggling.

In his real-world experience as adviser to the police on these issues, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester talked about these powers being invariably used disproportionately. The Minister has said nothing to reassure the Committee that the powers will not be used disproportionately, with the damage that will be caused to the reputation, trust and confidence in the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made the valid point that the powers can be used against children. Public nuisance is such a wide offence. I also raised the offence of being present in a tunnel. How can someone go equipped to be present in a tunnel? There was no answer about that.

Before this, there were two elements to suspicionless stop and search. The Minister talked about Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which is to do with serious violence. The other was Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, which the Conservative Government repealed because it was being used disproportionately. The Government withdrew suspicionless stop and search in relation to terrorism because they considered that its impact on trust and confidence in the police was disproportionately negative. It does not exist any more in relation to terrorism, but this Government want to introduce it in relation to people exercising their lawful right to protest.

The Minister made no reference to what HMIC said was likely to be a chilling effect on people exercising their human rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11. There was not a word about this, even though HMICFRS raised it. There was nothing about the disproportionate impact on minority communities. Minority communities and young people are more likely to be engaged in protest because they do not feel that the parliamentary process represents their views. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we will return to these issues on Report. I am sure we will vote on them.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I should like to clarify my remarks about uniforms. Section 60—which is what I was talking about—applies only to officers in uniform. Section 1 powers can apply to all officers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister clarify whether these powers—not Section 60 powers—to stop and search people in relation to protests can be exercised by officers in plain clothes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I think I explained, we are basing these powers on Section 60.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. I said that very clearly earlier. I have already explained its geographical extent.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister point to the part of the Bill that says that suspicionless stop and search powers are restricted to officers in uniform?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the Government are stretching credulity if they say this creates no new powers; it creates new powers for the British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police. It is mostly on the British Transport Police that I want to concentrate.

This police force is not locally accountable. It is the police force of the operators of the railway system. It has its own structures and is essentially a nationally organised force with certain centres of activity. There are many cases where police support is needed, and we certainly see this in Berwick. The local police have to come on the scene some time before British Transport Police can come from 70 miles away to take part in whatever problem there may be. We have to be a bit careful about so readily extending powers to a very different kind of police force, which does not have the chain of local accountability that our civil police forces have.

If anyone thinks that the arrangements are all very smooth and there is not a problem in relations between local police and British Transport Police, they should read the proceedings of the Manchester Arena inquiry. They will discover some pretty uncomfortable things about how co-ordination between British Transport Police and other agencies is meant to work but does not always work in practice. I was slightly surprised that Scottish Ministers decided they wanted to extend the powers included here, but it is with the approval—if the case is in Scotland, it is not to the Secretary of State—of Scottish Ministers.

I will take the Minister back to an incident in the 1960s which he is too young to remember. It shows that these are not new problems requiring drastic new powers. A railway line called the Waverley route between Edinburgh and Carlisle was closed. Before it managed to get itself closed—it has since been partially reopened—people in the village of Newcastleton between Hawick and Carlisle protested vigorously. One night, when the night sleeper was heading towards Carlisle, the minister of the local kirk and some of his congregation and others gathered on the crossing and stopped the train. On the train at the time was Lord Steel of Aikwood, then the young MP for the Borders area. This incident was handled by the police quite smoothly and locally, without any involvement of the British Transport Police—I doubt very much that they ever got there.

Local police are used to dealing with these situations. I fear from the provisions we have now that, given the nature and scope of this Bill, someone proposing to have either a group of people in a station protesting against imminent cuts to the service, or a single protestor in the station building by the ticket office saying “Your service is going to be halved from next week—join me in a protest”, will find themselves subject to the powers of the Public Order Act. There will be an unnecessary level of police involvement by the British Transport Police. Without the powers here, they would be able to deal with it in the normal way, as the local police would. We are in some danger if we get the British Transport Police into the state of mind that they are policing protest. It is really not what they are good at and not what they are supposed to be good at.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I support the comments of my noble friend. The only observation I was going to make about the powers being given to the British Transport Police is that it is primarily funded by the rail industry and whoever pays the piper calls the tune. Can the Minister confirm that the BTP is accountable to the British Transport Police Authority, the members of which are appointed by the Secretary of State for Transport? What does the Minister believe to be the consequences, for example, for protests at railway stations, of such funding and accountability mechanisms?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 16 covers the British Transport Police in England and Wales. It is reasonable that, as the Minister explained, the government amendments also cover the BTP in Scotland, since that has been requested by the Scottish Government. We disagree with the premise of the Bill, as was visible in many of the groups, not least the last one, but we understand recognising the specific roles that the MoD and British Transport Police play as part of the wider policing family. Can the Minister confirm—this is part of what the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, said—that the use of their powers is strictly limited to the areas under their jurisdiction?

Prior to today’s debate, I asked the Minister why the Civil Nuclear Constabulary was not referenced in the clause. Helpfully, he responded. I received a letter that said:

“we have not seen assemblies outside civil nuclear establishments and … the public do not have access to this land, so any assembly outside them … falls under the jurisdiction”

of the usual territorial force. I take that to mean that it is not included because no need has been identified for it to have these powers, which is welcome. It would be handy if the Government had applied that logic elsewhere in the Bill.

Does the Bill allow the Government to extend these powers to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, should they wish to do so? In other words, we have just seen the Government announce and give the go-ahead to the building of Sizewell C, and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary would presumably be involved in and around that sort of site. Would the Government have to come back to Parliament to get primary legislation through in order to give the Civil Nuclear Constabulary similar powers to those in the Bill? Is some secondary legislation tucked away that would allow them to do that, without us being able to properly scrutinise that to determine whether we believe the Civil Nuclear Constabulary should have these protest-related powers?

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

110: Clause 17, page 19, line 26, leave out “reasonably believes” and insert “has reasonable grounds for suspecting”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to raise the threshold for the Secretary of State to bring civil proceedings.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 110 in my name, I will speak also to my Amendments 111 to 113 and 116 and the other amendments in this group. These amendments are about a power to be given to the Secretary of State to bring civil proceedings to curtail or prevent protest, including potentially with a power of arrest attached, if the Home Secretary “reasonably believes” that activities are causing or likely to cause disruption to the use or operation of any key national infrastructure or have a seriously adverse effect on public safety in England and Wales.

Amendments 110 to 112 in my name would increase the evidential test to

“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”

to ensure that the Secretary of State has to set out before the court the exact evidential grounds for her application. In meetings with the Minister and officials on the Bill, it was explained that protests could affect a number of different operators or local authorities and that it would be in the public interest to have an overarching injunction in such cases.

The HS2 nationwide injunction seems to prove that such an overarching injunction is available to those concerned without the intervention of the Secretary of State but, in any event, Amendment 113 is designed to ensure that the power is used if, and only if, it is not reasonable or practical for a party directly impacted by the activity to bring civil proceedings, and to ensure that the Secretary of State does not use the power where any party directly impacted does not consider such proceedings to be necessary. My Amendment 116 is designed to ensure that a power of arrest cannot be attached to an injunction simply on the basis that the conduct is merely

“capable of causing nuisance or annoyance”.

This is in Clause 18(2)(a), which the amendment removes from the Bill.

We wholeheartedly support the additional checks and balances proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in her Amendments 114 and 115. I beg to move Amendment 110.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, during Second Reading a number of noble Lords, including those who do not share my views of the Bill more generally, expressed significant scepticism about the new Clause 17 provision for the Home Secretary to bring civil proceedings against protesters, instead of being brought by directly affected oil, gas or transport companies, and so on. I share these concerns at the politicisation of both policing and civil disputes, and therefore oppose Clause 17 standing part of this Public Order Bill.

Not only is it constitutionally dubious for a politician to be standing in the shoes of the police in relation to the criminal law, or of affected companies in relation to the civil law; it also raises questions about this use of considerable sums of taxpayers’ money in expensive litigation that could and should be brought by those who profit from fossil fuel or other carbon-intensive development, and no doubt factor legal fees into their budgeting. The lack of transparency required by the new Clause 17 also brings a risk of corruption, in the event that the relevant firms should choose to donate to or otherwise “promote” a Home Secretary amenable to seeking civil legal proceedings on their behalf.

It should be noted that under Clause 17(5), the Secretary of State must only

“consult such persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate, having regard to any persons who may also bring civil proceedings in relation to those activities.”

No transparency in the Secretary of State’s discussions, or non-discussions, with these “persons”—namely, large companies—or consideration of why they should not finance their own legal proceedings, is required. Never has the word “must”, in a provision supposedly creating a duty upon a Secretary of State to consult, constituted such a toothless tiger or illusory protection from the potential abuse of public money and political power.

In addition to supporting the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I propose Amendments 114 and 115, which would create safeguards against corruption and abuse. They require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons for any decision not to consult; the results of any consultation; any representations made to the Secretary of State as to a proposed exercise of the new power; an assessment of why other parties should not finance their own proceedings; and assessments of why any proceedings have been brought by the Secretary of State at public expense, rather than by private companies themselves. Such publication will occur both each time an exercise of the power is considered, and annually on an aggregate basis.

Clause 17 is both unnecessary and undesirable. If it really must stand part, so must the vital safeguards previously referred to, but also those in Amendments 114 and 115, which I commend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank both noble Baronesses for their interventions. Turning to the question about transparency, we will certainly engage on that, and I appreciate it. It is always important that government actions are transparent. It is clearly an important public principle, and on that we agree.

As to corruption, in this context, it is really not a terribly likely hypothetical scenario. I say that because, if one were an ignoble baron seeking to pursue an injunction to preclude some sort of serious disruption, it is unlikely that the cost of pursuing an injunction would be sufficiently high to warrant seeking the assistance of the Secretary of State in bringing that injunction. It would be more likely that such costs would be borne by the company or person themselves, given the urgency and the much larger costs incurred by the disruption occurring. While I accept that there is a hypothetical concern, therefore, I find it unlikely in reality that such an envisioned scenario would eventuate.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling Amendment 116. Let me start by saying that I, again, recognise the sentiment in this amendment. It is important that the Government intervene only in matters that are serious and proportionate to the public interest. However, I wish to remind noble Lords that causing nuisance or annoyance to the public can have a far-reaching impact when it occurs on a widespread scale. The recent protests targeting the M25 have shown just that. Furthermore, while a Secretary of State may apply for the power of arrest to be attached to an injunction, it is for the courts to decide whether or not this is an appropriate measure.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 145, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Again, I understand and have considered the need for scrutiny and transparency, as I touched on earlier, and therefore I entirely understand the logic of the tabling of that amendment. None the less, it is the Government’s view that while a review is not needed to ensure that activity relating to these provisions is necessary, it is important that transparency is carefully considered, and I will ensure that that is done.

There are already several clear provisions in the Bill that serve to ensure that the use of these powers by a Secretary of State will be subject to scrutiny and safeguards. As has already been noted, of course, in Clause 17(5) there is a requirement for consultation as may be appropriate ahead of initiating civil proceedings. Moreover, as we have already touched on, civil proceedings can be issued in the interest of the public only when it is considered expedient to do so in the judgment of the judiciary hearing the claim. As I have already committed to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I will nevertheless consider what further clarity could be provided on the circumstances in which a Secretary of State might seek to initiate such proceedings. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. If I can try and get the sense of the House, we on this side feel that this is constitutionally dubious, potentially providing opportunities for corruption, and that it is a very serious step to allow the Secretary of State to apply for an injunction to prevent a protest. On the government side, the Minister thinks it is reasonable if lots of people are affected—different organisations, private and public—and that it would be expedient for the Secretary of State to represent all parties and apply for an injunction on their behalf. Therefore, there is a clear difference of opinion as to whether we are satisfied that there are sufficient safeguards, as opposed to the Minister being satisfied that is the case. As the Minister reflects on what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we too will reflect on what the Minister has said, and we will no doubt return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 110.

Amendment 110 withdrawn.

Public Order Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I now get the opportunity to congratulate and welcome the Minister —the noble Lord, Lord Murray—to this Committee. I have had the opportunity to welcome him in other ways before, but it is important to be engaged in detailed scrutiny of the Bill for the first time.

This group is about sentencing. Notwithstanding everything that I have said so far—and no doubt will say again, and make the Minister’s ears bleed with my position on the Bill as a whole and specific offences—it is also important to engage with the specific issues of appropriate and proportionate sentencing, how the sentencing framework and different offences in that framework fit together, and whether we in this country should be incarcerating more and more people, including for what may well be peaceful dissent. It is very difficult to separate the issue of sentencing from the other formulation of the offence. When I was young, I was a lawyer in the Minister’s department, and one of the things that we were responsible for at that time in the Home Office was looking at the overall sentencing framework. That may now belong in the Ministry of Justice, but none the less the point was that whenever a new offence was proposed by any government department, it needed to pass some gatekeepers in a little unit in the Home Office who wanted to be clear about the formulation of the offence—mens rea, actus reus, et cetera—but also about the sentence, because in government people look for levers for change and everyone has a new big idea about a new offence.

In particular, in this group, with my first and some other amendments, including those of other noble Lords, I am really probing whether the new proposed offence of locking on—the Minister’s colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, who is about to arrive in his place, was discussing that earlier—could even include people who, in a disruptive way, link arms. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, made the argument that sometimes linking arms in big enough groups would be just as disruptive as gluing your hands to the road. Are we really suggesting incarceration for up to 51 weeks for an offence that could be perpetrated by people singing “Kumbaya” and linking arms? It is a probe, but it is important that there should be some probes about the sentences for these offences, and not just their intention and formulation. I think that it is very important that we consider how many people we are incarcerating in this country, the trajectory that we are on with imprisonment in this country, and whether we have a criminal statute book—including a sentencing statute book—that is proportionate and coherent to meet the needs of a very troubled and polarised society at the moment. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I look around in vain for anyone else who wants to speak. I agree with the principles that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has just spoken about. Amendment 13, in my name, is based on a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its report on the Bill, the committee points out that the offence of locking on under Clause 1 is punishable with—as she just said—

“up to 51 weeks in prison.”

The committee states that:

“This sanction is significantly harsher than the maximum penalties that, until recently, applied to existing ‘protest-related’ non-violent offences such as obstructing the highway (level 3 fine) or aggravated trespass (3 months imprisonment).”


The committee notes that there is likely to be a low hurdle for prosecution—again, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, just said. The amendment therefore questions whether the length of potential imprisonment —51 weeks—is proportionate to the offence that is committed. Amendment 13 suggests that this should be reduced to a three-month maximum sentence.

The remaining amendments in my name in this group relate to the level of fine that can be issued to a person who commits an offence under Clauses 1 to 7. They are similar to amendments that I tabled to the corresponding clauses of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill—now an Act—when it was previously debated in this House. However, given the nature of the debate at that stage—in particular, in Committee, we started discussing those clauses at 11.45 pm—I believe that there is merit in discussing this issue again in this Committee.

Under Clauses 1 to 7, a person convicted of an offence may be liable to “a fine”. However, the Bill does not specify what the maximum level of such a fine should be. For each of these new offences, our amendments ask the simple question: is an unlimited fine proportionate for such an offence? In particular, is it proportionate that a person convicted of the offence of being equipped for locking on, for example, should be subjected to an unlimited fine? The Minister may argue that the level of fine suggested in our amendments is too low. At this point, they are simply probing amendments designed to make the principled point that an unlimited fine may be disproportionate for a number of the offences contained in the Bill. Finally, it would also be of benefit to the Committee if the Minister could set out how they intend fines to be applied consistently for these offences, if there is no upper limit as to the fine that can be imposed.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be extremely brief. I want to reiterate the final two points that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made. I speak as a sitting magistrate in London. I occasionally have to deal with unlimited fines, but it is far more straightforward as a magistrate, when you have a level set and an example of what the maximum fine might be for whatever offence one is dealing with at the time. For most offences that we deal with, levels are indeed set; we are given the parameters, if you like, of what would be appropriate. I was going to make the same point as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick: if one wants some form of consistency across the country for these types of offences, it would be useful to have some level of guidance, perhaps setting a level of fine that may be appropriate.

The other point I want to make, which is slightly outside the scope of these amendments, is about the power of the court to set compensation. I have been in a case dealing with relatively minor offences, but the level of potential compensation was absolutely astronomical when we were talking about disrupting train services and things such as that. The level of compensation is a judicial decision but, certainly in my experience, the level of compensation can potentially eclipse the maximum level of any fine the court may give. I do not know whether the Minister is able to say something more about appropriate levels of fines—and appropriate levels of compensation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for that short debate, and I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her warm welcome to this Committee. It has been a fascinating exercise to conduct my first Committee stage.

The general intention of this group of amendments is to reduce the maximum fines and the maximum sentences listed in Clauses 1 to 8. The maximum fines and sentences attached to these offences reflect, in the view of the Government, the serious harm and disruption that can be caused by these actions. It may be helpful if I set out just one example of that harm for the Committee. During the targeted and reckless activity by Just Stop Oil in August 2022, protesters dug two tunnels in an attempt to disrupt access to an oil terminal in Essex. This particularly dangerous protest tactic not only disrupted the operation of the terminal but had a knock-on impact on many others. First, it led to full and partial road closures impacting the public, local and private businesses and the council. Secondly, it resulted in ambulances and fire and rescue services being on standby due to the risk of collapse in the tunnel, thereby impacting on availability of those emergency services. Thirdly, it consumed a huge amount of police resources in responding to the operation, impacting on the police as well as the public, as officers had to be diverted from other duties.

Given this example and countless others, the maximum sentences and fines set out in the Bill are not only proportionate to the harm and disruption caused but necessary. It is worth saying that these are maximum sentences and it is plainly not the case that every person convicted under these offences will be given these sentences and penalties. Indeed, it is right to say that the maximum penalties are used only in the most egregious cases. The courts will consider the appropriate penalty in each case and, in response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, they will be considered on a case-by-case basis. For these fundamental reasons, I therefore respectfully disagree with these amendments and ask that Amendment 12 be withdrawn.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Will the Minister address the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and I raised about how consistency in the levels of fines being imposed, particularly by lay magistrates’ Benches, will be achieved when there is absolutely no guidance in the legislation on the level of fine that should be imposed?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is, of course, frequently the case in legislation that there is no guidance on the face of the Bill as to the likely sentences that are imposed. It is very common for there to be sentencing guidelines formulated in the usual way by the judiciary. No doubt that is what will happen in relation to these offences. As I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will agree, these are the guidelines to which prosecutors routinely refer the court before the court passes sentence.

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At the moment, if there were a vote tonight, I would vote that Clause 1 should not stand part of the Bill. I am sure there will not be such a vote, but we need that level of persuasion.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and completely agree with him that the Government have not made the case for any of the provisions in the Bill.

I agree with many of the points that other noble Lords have already made in this debate on all sides of the House. The Government should take note of the strength of feeling, particularly among the influential Members of the Cross Benches, who are opposing the provisions in the Bill and are likely to persuade their colleagues to vote with them against it on Report if we do not have sufficient clarity and answers to the proper questions that many Members of the House have put to the Ministers but to which they have not received answers today.

I will not repeat what I have already said, particularly in relation to the first group. I am grateful to Liberty for its briefing on the Bill. Based on that briefing, I say that case law confirms that we have a right to choose how we protest, and the diversity of protest tactics throughout history demonstrates the deeply interconnected nature of free expression, creativity and dissent. The offence of locking on under Clause 1 not only defies those principles but criminalises an innumerable list of activities—not only what we would typically understand as lock-on protest, where people lock themselves to one another via a lock-on device or chain themselves to Parliament, but any activities involving people attaching themselves to other people or to an object or land, or attaching objects to other objects and land.

The Government claim that the wording of this offence is sufficiently precise to be foreseeable and that the provisions are in accordance with the law. As noble Lords will have noted from discussions on previous groups, I disagree. I am concerned that the offence under Clause 1 risks disproportionately interfering with individuals’ rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said on a previous group, the broad and vague nature of “attach”, which is not defined in the Bill, means that this offence could catch people engaged in activities such as linking arms with one another, or locking their wheelchairs to traffic lights. The recurring themes throughout our debates today have been the risk of disproportionality and the risk of uncertainty.

As I have stated before, this proposal is not supported by the police. When consulted on a similar proposal by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, police respondents said:

“most interviewees [junior police officers] did not wish to criminalise protest actions through the creation of a specific offence concerning locking-on.”

Even the police are against it.

Turning to the new offence of being equipped for locking on, I reiterate my concerns that the vague and potentially unlimited list of activities covered by this offence are exacerbated by the ambiguity of the drafting of Clause 2. I note that the object in the offence of locking on does not have to be related to protest at all. It must simply be established that a person intended it to be used in a certain way. Nor does the object have to be used by the person who had it in their possession. The offence refers to

“the commission by any person of an offence”.

The phrase

“in the course of or in connection with”

casts an extremely wide net as to what activities might be criminalised under the offence. So wide is the net cast by this clause that effectively any person walking around with a bike lock, a packet of glue, a roll of tape or any number of other everyday objects could be at risk of being found to have committed this offence. As we have heard, the possibilities are endless. It is also significant that, unlike the substantive offence of locking on, there is no reasonable excuse defence in the wording of this offence, which means that individuals will find it even more difficult to challenge.

The Just Stop Oil movement has called off its protests because too many of its members are behind bars under existing legislation—particularly the favourite of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, Section 79 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. If current legislation has effectively put a stop to the disruptive Just Stop Oil protests, why on earth do we need this Bill?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, as we now have both Ministers on the Front Bench, I will repeat the point I made earlier about explanations being made in the Chamber. I will add a sentence to what I said before about explanations being given in writing, by letters to individual Members of the House, generally copied to other interested Members: they kind of float though and one loses a grip on how much has been answered. Explanations that are part of the justification for a piece of legislation are not easily available to those who need to know them. We have a parliamentary website with a webpage for each piece of legislation. That is where people will go to see what the debate has been on particular amendments and how amendments have changed as a Bill has progressed. That is where they should be able to see the answers that Ministers were not able to give at the time when a matter was raised. Either through Hansard or some other mechanism, these answers should be lodged on the public record, and they have to be given in the Chamber in order to progress. This is immensely important, and I am making the point here because it is on the point of principle that other noble Lords have spoken about on this group.

Public Order Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

With my amendments in this group—Amendment 1, as well as other amendments applying to other offences—I have taken this defence of “without reasonable excuse” and put it into the main body of the offence. This would allow, initially, a police officer when seeking to arrest and, subsequently, a prosecutor both to be clear in their own minds that there was no “reasonable excuse”. If there were a potential “reasonable excuse”, it should be considered as part of the central element of this offence—for example, if I needed to lock my bicycle, or if I were just walking down the road with someone intimate or my friend and, because we are big chaps, we got in the way of a police officer, but we really had a “reasonable excuse” to be linking arms. This is a very modest but essential amendment, not just to this outrageous offence of “locking on”, which should not even be here, but to other offences in this awful Bill. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the other amendments in this group. If noble Lords will indulge me, as is usual with the first group of amendments, I will remind them why we have arrived at this point. The Government had already included draconian anti-protest measures in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill—including giving the police power to place restrictions on meetings and marches if they might be too noisy, including one-person protests—when, just before the Conservative Party conference in 2020, Insulate Britain began a series of protests, including dangerously and recklessly blocking motorways. Allowing a sentence of imprisonment for highway obstruction was proposed and agreed by this House, and now many Stop Oil protestors have been either sent to prison or remanded in custody pending trial.

However, the then Home Secretary felt that she had to say something to appease Tory supporters at the Conservative Party conference: that she would introduce even more draconian anti-protest measures. Despite the PCSC Bill having already passed through the Commons, the Government introduced these even more draconian anti-protest measures, those we have before us today, as amendments in Committee of the PCSC Bill in this House. Apart from custodial sentences for highway obstruction, this House rejected all these measures on Report of the PCSC Bill.

Apart from the new stop and search powers, which some police officers and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services suggested the Government might introduce, but which the Home Office left out of the original PCSC Bill, none of the measures that we are being asked to agree to today in this Bill was requested by the police, none of the measures was supported by HMICFRS, and some that were considered, such as serious disruption prevention orders, were rejected as contrary to human rights, unworkable and likely to be ineffective.

I have Amendments 8, 29, 40, 55 and 60 in this group, which all relate to reasonable excuse. We saw, with the arrest and detention by the police of a journalist who was reporting on recent protests, the potential danger of only allowing a reasonable excuse defence to be deployed once charged, as the Government propose in this Bill. In other legislation, a person does not commit an offence if they have a reasonable excuse, and therefore cannot be lawfully arrested and detained. I might not go as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in saying that it should be for the prosecution to prove that the protestor did not have a reasonable excuse. I am reminded of the wording of Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, where

“Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence”.


If the Government are looking for compromise, as they should in the face of the opposition already expressed to these measures in this House in its consideration of the PCSC Bill and in the views expressed on this Bill at Second Reading, maybe this should be an option that they consider.

This is even more important than the offensive weapon example, in that these are basic human rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights—the rights of expression and assembly. To allow people who are exercising their human rights, who have a reasonable excuse for what they are doing, to be deprived of those rights by being arrested and detained, as the Government propose, but where the reasonable excuse for exercising their rights can only be considered once they have been charged, cannot be right.

In Clause 3(2), for example, the proposed legislation says, in relation to tunnelling,

“It is a defence … to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for creating, or participating in the creation of, the tunnel.”


Clause 3(3) says,

“a person is to be treated as having a reasonable excuse … if the creation of the tunnel was authorised by a person with an interest in land which entitled them to authorise its creation.”

I am sure that the Minister will correct me if I have this wrong but, say a landowner instructs workers to build a tunnel on her land, which she owns, before it is subject to a compulsory purchase order to facilitate a development, in order to disrupt the development, which she objects to, she and her workers can be arrested, detained and charged, and only then can they deploy the reasonable excuse defence that the Government provide for in the Bill. How can that be right?

In relation to the obstruction of major transport works, the Bill provides specifically, in Clause 6(2)(b), that if the action

“was done wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”,

the person has a reasonable excuse, but Clause 6(2) says that

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence”.


Again, the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but does that mean that lawful pickets, on a picket line, can be arrested by the police, detained, and charged and can deploy the reasonable excuse defence only once charged? The Minister may say that the police would not arrest those engaged in lawful picketing—even though the proposed legislation would allow it—but, presumably, the Minister also believes that a mainstream journalist, with an accredited press pass, reporting on a protest, would not be arrested and detained for five hours by the police, and would also deny that. Similar arguments apply in relation to Amendment 60 to Clause 7.

We have seen from the arrest of the journalist that the police cannot always be trusted in every circumstance to use their judgment and not use the powers given to them in legislation. If someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions—we will come to a discussion of what amounts to a reasonable excuse in the next group—such as an accredited press card holder reporting on a protest, they should not have a defence once arrested, detained and charged, but the police should not be allowed to arrest and detain them in the first place. That is the desired effect of the amendments in this group and we strongly support them.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 1 and 7 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I support to similar effect Amendment 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which coincides with that proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. They relate, of course, to the locking-on offence in Clause 1, which, as the noble Baroness said, is an offence for which the actus reus is extraordinarily broad. You do not have to attach yourself to railings to commit it; it is enough to “attach an object”—any object—

“to another object or to land.”

Nor is there any requirement that serious disruption be caused; it is enough that the act

“is capable of causing, serious disruption”,

a term undefined, at least so far, and that you are “reckless” as to whether it does so.

When I raised this point at Second Reading, the Minister was good enough to say that he would write to me on it, and I thank him for doing so. He makes the point in his letter that the defendant has personal knowledge of the facts, making it reasonable for him to have to establish them. I agree with that: no one, I understand, objects to the evidential burden resting on the defendant, and I apprehend that that is what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was just saying, but it is clear from the letter that the Government’s intention is to go further and to place the legal burden on the defendant of proving lawful excuse.

The letter explains that there are times when the evidential and legal burden of proof may legitimately fall on the defendant, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence. One of those times, as the Minister said, is when you are carrying a bladed article in a public place. You may then be expected to prove that you had good reason to avoid conviction under Section 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. But as the court said in the relevant case, L v DPP:

“There is a strong interest in bladed articles not being carried in public without good reason”.


The public interest in objects not being attached to other objects is less strong, to put it mildly, particularly against the background of the fundamental right to protest.

As Lord Bingham went on to say in Sheldrake, now the leading case on reverse burdens, security concerns do not absolve the state from its duty to observe basic standards of fairness. There are cases not referred to in the Minister’s letter, such as DPP v Wright, a Hunting Act prosecution, in which it was held to be oppressive, disproportionate, unfair and unnecessary to impose a legal burden on the defendant. Then there is the point well made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights: if the reasonable excuse is an afterthought, rather than an ingredient of the offence, protesters will be liable to be arrested whether they had a reasonable excuse or not. It is undesirable in principle for the possible defence to arise for consideration only after arrest or charge.

The curious thing about this debate, it seems to me, is that it is unlikely to affect the ease of conviction one way or the other. Once it is accepted that a protester may legitimately be asked to bear the evidential burden, then the legal burden, whatever the legal significance of the point, will rarely matter much in practice. The court will take its own view on whether the excuse is reasonable or not and not usually spend much time on the technical issue of burden of proof. Indeed, that was another point made by Lord Justice Pill in the L v DPP case, on which the Government relied in the Minister’s letter to me. In other cases where the Government have overstepped the mark by putting a legal burden on the defendant when they should not have done so, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act has come to their rescue, by enabling the reverse burden to be interpreted as a merely evidential burden that does not get in the way of the presumption of innocence. That emergency cord will not be available to the Government if the courts rule against them on reverse burden after the Bill of Rights has removed Section 3, as appears to be their intention.

I approach this issue in a spirit not so much of crusading zeal as of some bafflement that the Government would take such a legally risky course for so little practical advantage. I suggest that the orthodox approach to these offences is also the fairer approach for members of the public, and the safer approach for police, prosecutors and the Government. The prosecution should simply have to prove its case in the normal way.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

If I am to be corrected, I am, but may I just offer a view? It is an offence to wilfully obstruct the highway. Of course, if you obstruct it because a person in your car is having a heart attack and needs attention, there will probably be a reasonable excuse for the obstruction and that is a defence. However, it is a summary offence to obstruct the highway, punishable by imprisonment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the noble Lord continues, I ask him to point to the provisions in this Bill that make up for the problem relating to highway obstruction that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, identified. Having read this in detail, my understanding is that nothing in the Bill addresses the noble Lord’s concern. Therefore, the question remains: why are we discussing this?

[Lord Horam (Con)]

The Bill addresses this point, but we could spend for ever on that. None the less, I understand that the Bill is designed to bring clarity to the issue of whether a police officer is within his rights to deal with an obstruction, for whatever cause that obstruction may occur. To answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; clearly, in the situation he outlined, the police officer would exercise his common sense and would not arrest the person in question. Therefore, it seems to me that, if we seek clarity, the more we add bits and pieces to the legislation that put down reasons why people may have a right to protest—for some reason which they bring forward—we simply fudge the whole issue and deduct from the clarity that we need. At the end of the day, people really do want this clarified: they want to know what the rights and duties of the police officer are, and that they are accordingly following those thoroughly.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is reasonable to say at this point that we are about to have two days of quite detailed explanation on that, so I am afraid that that is as far as I can go on this.

Returning to the more general points that have been made so far in this debate, particularly as to why the police need these powers, what existing powers they have, and so on and so forth, we will be returning to this in a much later group, and I intend to speak in much more detail on it. From a general point of view, recent protests were clear that they had as their aim the intent of causing as much disruption as possible through the use of what can only be described as guerrilla tactics. These measures give the police the proactive powers necessary to respond to these dangerous and disruptive tactics quickly. We are going to work closely with our partners in the police to ensure that they have the support and resources in place that they need to use these powers.

Again, as my noble friend Lord Horam remarked, too often we have seen protesters acquitted on grounds of technicalities or get penalties that do not reflect the harm that they have caused to others. We want simple, stand-alone offences that ensure that those who cause this level of disruption and misery can be convicted and receive a penalty proportionate to the harm that they have caused. I will return more specifically to the legislation in a later group; I hope that will be acceptable.

To give one example of this type of behaviour, just two Just Stop Oil activists climbed the suspension cables of the Queen Elizabeth II bridge in the early hours of 17 October this year. They caused its closure for more than 36 hours. Once discovered, the Essex Police attended and closed the carriageway so that officers could safely leave their vehicles in an attempt to engage with the activists. It was later advised by National Highways to keep the road closed for the safety of the protesters, road users and responding partners. The closure of the carriageway meant that the entirety of the clockwise traffic from Essex to Kent that usually utilises the QE2 bridge had to be diverted through the east bore of the Dartford Tunnel, halving the usual counter-clockwise Kent-Essex traffic capacity that would normally use all the tunnels at the Dartford crossing. This had a number of knock-on impacts in terms of the emergency services and local communities and businesses. I am sure that we are all familiar with what those were.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised a hypothetical example of a landowner in respect of a tunnel.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister continues, can he point to which part of this Bill would be deployed against the two Just Stop Oil activists who climbed on the QE2 bridge?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, we are about to go into a good deal of discussion about things such as serious disruption, key national infrastructure and so on, which form essential parts of this Bill. I am not a policeman, but I imagine that the police are perfectly capable of utilising those aspects of the Bill.

I come to the hypothetical example of the landowner that the noble Lord raised earlier. It is worth pointing out, in relation to the entire Bill, that the threshold is “serious disruption”. In the case that the noble Lord outlined, that is clearly not the case, so there would be no case.

I move on to the measures in Clauses 1 to 8. As well as the measures we will discuss next week, the police will have the proactive powers necessary to respond quickly to these dangerous and disruptive tactics.

I turn to the specific amendments in the group. Amendments 1, 7, 8, 24, 28, 29, 35, 39, 40, 55 and 59, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Skidelsky and Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, seek to move the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse from the defendant to the prosecution, making it a key element of the offence. We will debate the subjects that the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, raised with regard to trade disputes in the fourth group today, so I will defer specific answers to those questions until the debate on that group.

Whether or not someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions is very specific to each particular incident, so we see it as entirely appropriate that the defendant, who has committed the offence in the first place and has personal knowledge of these facts, is required to prove them. It is also the case that the burden of proof resting on the individual is not a novel concept. There are multiple offences where this is the case, including—as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out—the defence of good reason for possessing a bladed article in a public place under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, raised the example of linking arms. Of course linking arms itself is not an offence; it is an offence and applicable only if the act

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to … two or more individuals, or … an organisation”.

Groups of protesters linking arms and obstructing roads or buildings can cause just as much disruption as those who use other equipment to lock on. For example, it is not right that groups of people who glue themselves to roads may fall under this offence but those who link arms and cause just as much disruption do not.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on why the burden of proof being on the defendant is in the public interest, we have seen people cause so much serious disruption and then continue to burden the prosecution with more and more requirements to prove things. Surely it is right that, where people have caused this kind of disruption, they should demonstrate that they had a reasonable excuse.

With these offences, the prosecution will still need to prove all the elements of the offence to the criminal standard of proof, including that the act

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption”,

as I just explained, and that the defendant intended or was reckless as to serious harm disruption. For those reasons, I respectfully disagree with the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I commit to doing that in the debate on a later group.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister address the issue of people being arrested and detained, and being allowed to deploy a reasonable excuse defence only once charged, as opposed to someone not committing an offence if they have a reasonable excuse, which is the normal process with most legislation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have gone into reasonable detail on the reasonable excuse situation, so I will rest my comments there for now.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry to disagree with the Minister, but he addressed the issue of whether the burden of proof was on the prosecution or on the defence. He did not address, in any shape or form, police being allowed to arrest and detain people and their being allowed to deploy the reasonable excuse defence only once charged.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

If the Minister is going to come back to my noble friend, could he do so in this Chamber? That question is absolutely fundamental to the discussion on the Bill. To have the answer in writing, available in the Library if one goes to look for it, is in our view not adequate.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

This is Committee, so we are allowed this sort of debate. I want to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act. It says:

“A person commits an offence if … the person … does an act, or … omits to do an act that they are required to do by any enactment or rule of law … the person’s act or omission … obstructs the public or a section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large, and … the person intends that their act or omission will have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b)”.


That covers, completely and perfectly, the people on the gantry of the QEII Bridge. The maximum sentence for that activity is up to 10 years in prison. None of the provisions in this Bill goes anywhere near 10 years in prison. Why do the Government not rely on existing legislation rather than creating all these other offences?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have already gone into that. As I say, the Bill creates another set of offences designed to deal with evolving protests, but I will come back on the specific point about the PCSC Act.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out “, or is capable of causing,”
Member's explanatory statement
This would limit the offence to an act that causes serious disruption.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 2 in my name I will speak to the other 12 amendments in this group. Amendment 2, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Skidelsky, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is related to the offence of locking on. I remind noble Lords that the Government’s Explanatory Notes suggest that

“Recent changes in the tactics employed by … protesters have highlighted some gaps in … legislation”,


of which this is one. Suffragettes chained themselves to railings, so to suggest that this is a gap in legislation as a result of recent changes in tactics employed by protesters is nonsense. I expect the Minister will challenge such an assertion, but we can debate that when he responds.

This amendment would narrow the offence of locking on where such actions—attaching themselves or someone else to another person, an object or the road, for example, to cause serious disruption—by removing the wider offence of an act that

“is capable of causing, serious disruption”.

Can the Minister explain what “capable of causing” actually means? If someone locks on in a minor side road or at the entrance to a cul-de-sac, causing little or no disruption, but had similar action been taken on a busy major road it would have been capable of causing serious disruption, would they commit an offence in such circumstances? If they block a busy major road at 3 am when there is no traffic, whereas had it been 10 am they would have caused major disruption, does that amount to it being capable of causing serious disruption in another place and time? Amendment 2 seeks to restrict the offence of locking on to incidents where serious disruption is actually caused to probe what “capable of causing” means and how widely the offence would be applied.

Amendment 25 in my name would again remove “is capable of causing” in relation to the offence of tunnelling, for similar reasons. Can the Minister explain what sort of tunnel might be capable of causing serious disruption but does not actually do so? Why, in that case, does it need to be criminalised? Similarly, Amendment 36 in my name, supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox of Buckley, seeks to remove “is capable of causing” in relation to the offence of being present in a tunnel. Again, can the Minister explain how someone’s presence in a tunnel might be capable of causing serious disruption without actually doing so?

Amendment 3, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which we support and is signed by my noble friend Lady Ludford, similarly seeks to limit the scope of the offence by removing the reference to causing serious disruption to two or more people and replacing it with

“serious disruption to the life of the community”,

as suggested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We support this amendment.

Amendment 4, in my name and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Skidelsky, seeks to restrict the offence to cases where there is an intent to cause serious disruption—not merely, as currently drafted in Clause 1(1)(c), being

“reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence”.

Can the Minister give an example of when someone who does not intend to cause serious disruption should be guilty of the offence—in this case, of locking on —when they are simply exercising their right to protest?

Amendment 26, in my name, similarly seeks to narrow the tunnelling offence to cases where there is an intent to cause serious disruption, rather than where someone is merely “reckless” as to whether their tunnel might cause serious disruption. Can the Minister give an example of reckless tunnelling that might fall within the scope of the offence as drafted?

Similarly, Amendment 37, in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, seeks to narrow the definition of the offence of being present in a tunnel to cases where there is an intention to cause serious disruption. Would a journalist who goes to interview protestors in a tunnel be guilty of an offence of being reckless as to whether her presence in the tunnel might cause serious disruption, for example? Can the Minister provide any reassurance?

Amendment 6, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, quite rightly attempt to place a definition of serious disruption on the face of the Bill, rather than asking us to sign a blank cheque where such a definition is decided by the Secretary of State subsequently by statutory instrument.

Similarly, in relation to the tunnelling offence and the being present in a tunnel offence, Amendments 27 and 38 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seek to provide a definition on the face of the Bill of serious disruption in relation to tunnelling.

Amendment 17, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and supported by my noble friend Lady Ludford and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seeks to define

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in Amendment 3.

Finally in this group, Amendment 54, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lady Ludford, to which we give qualified support—subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, will say in explaining the amendment—seeks to provide a definition of serious disruption to major transport works, as suggested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, we have concerns over the inclusion of “reckless” in this definition, for reasons I have previously explained.

I think noble Lords will see the complexity of this Bill and the problem we have in trying to cram so many amendments into one group. If the Minister is able to respond to each and every remark I have made, I will be astonished. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, my name is to Amendments 6, 27 and 38, which have been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. They answer a question which was posed by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who asked if there is a definition of “serious disruption” in the Bill. There is not, and my amendments seek to provide a definition. I am concerned about the meaning of words, which is always crucial in Bills of this kind.

I am a member of the Constitution Committee and in our scrutiny of the Bill we noted that the clauses which use the phrase “serious disruption” create offences which could result in severe penalties. Most of them may be taken summarily before a magistrate, but then they lead on to other things. They could, in due course, lead to a serious disruption prevention order and all that that involves. The committee took the view that a definition should be provided.

We looked at Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred, but, in our view, if one has to go down the line of designing a new offence, that definition was not tailored to the offences that we are talking about in the Bill. Therefore, the committee’s recommendation was that the meaning of “serious disruption” should be clarified proportionately in relation to each of the offences where the phrase arises.

In regard to locking on, I seek to say that “serious disruption” means

“a prolonged disruption of access to places where the individuals or the organisation live or carry on business or to which for urgent reasons they wish to travel”—

a hospital appointment, for example—

“or a significant delay in the delivery of time sensitive products or essential goods and services.”

So I have tried to design something that is very specific to the locking-on offence described in Clause 1.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will certainly endeavour to—I can make no promises. I am sorry: the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me about recklessness, which I forgot to answer. The definition of reckless is to capture those for whom we cannot prove that they intended to cause disruption but who were clearly happy to cause it. I hope that clarifies the matter to some extent. For now, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, made some very important points. He is a member of the Constitution Committee. He said that convictions for these offences could lead to more serious consequences such as serious disruption prevention orders and that some of the conditions that could be imposed under those orders are quite draconian, such as 12 months of electronic tagging. He made the important point that because the offences are very different in nature, there should perhaps be a tailored definition of serious disruption depending on what offence we are talking about.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, made a very important point about creating ambiguity between the provisions in this Bill and Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The Minister’s attempt to explain why Section 78 could not be relied on does not hold water. He started talking about offences of aggravated trespass and having low sentences, but Section 78 has a far more serious penalty than any of the offences contained in the provisions here, so I do not understand why we need new offences that have serious sentences attached to them when Section 78 can provide much stiffer penalties than any offence in this Bill. That does not seem to make any sense.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham made an important point about places of worship. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, made an important point too. I greatly respect the role that he played in overturning apartheid in South Africa, but I am not sure he can say with confidence that what he did amounted to serious disruption when we do not have a definition of serious disruption in the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, supported by the Minister, talked about suffragettes and how they were very different from the protesters at this time, but that was not the point I was making. My point was that suffragettes locked on and the Government are saying that this new offence of locking on is a response to new tactics employed by protesters. Well, that is what the suffragettes did. That is the only point I was trying to make.

As for nothing being done, the police have been arresting stop oil protesters even before they have caused serious disruption. They have been arresting them for conspiracy to cause public nuisance. Whether it is for causing public nuisance under the famous Section 78 or highway obstruction, for which they can now be sent to prison, protesters are being remanded in custody by courts which are not confident that they would not go on to repeat the offences for which they have been arrested. Some of them have been sentenced to prison for highway obstruction. So I do not think it is the case that the police are not doing anything, or that existing legislation cannot be used effectively by the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, supported the idea of tailored definitions, hence his wavering, if I can put it that way, in terms of his own amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, reinforced the point about clarity and predictability. People need to know whether they are going to break the law if they do something, which is why we need these definitions.

The infamous Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act talks about serious harm, rather than serious disruption, but it is defined in the Act. So, if the Government can define serious harm in that Act, why can they not define serious disruption in this legislation? The noble Baroness, Lady Blower, talked about what the Minister said in the other place about there being a definition of serious disruption under the Public Order Act 1986. I agree with the noble Baroness that it is out of date and dubiously applicable in the circumstances set out in this Bill. Even the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, talked at Second Reading about the importance of clarity, and police witnesses at Committee stage in the other place said that as much precision as possible is desirable, yet the Minister seems completely ambiguous about whether the Government are going to define serious disruption in the Bill in response to the question asked by the noble and learned Lord. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said that the National Police Chiefs’ Council is in favour of the definition of serious disruption to the life of the community put forward by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, so surely there is at least a lead for the Government to follow.

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has raised the absurdity of the locking-on offence and the problems that will arise, which are addressed by some of the amendments in this group.

I want to introduce the Minister to an issue he may not be familiar with—perhaps it does not happen in his part of the country. Quite a lot of young couples go about carrying padlocks. Why do they do that? It might not be immediately apparent to a constable that they are wishing to pledge their lifelong devotion to each other. They go to a place such as the High Level Bridge in Newcastle, and they attach the padlock to the bridge; they then throw the key into the water. Explaining that that is what you are about to do might be pretty difficult when your average police constable says that you are carrying a padlock, obviously intending to lock on to somewhere. But they do not lock on to anything—except perhaps each other, and they might be caught by that, as the noble Baroness just pointed out. That is simply one example.

Another obvious example which has been raised by noble Lords before is that of bicycle padlocks. People have to carry them whenever they are going to use their bicycle. Again, these are pretty obvious cases for the locking-on offence as the Government have conceived it.

These are things that just happen in ordinary life. When you compound the offence created in the Bill with the offence of obstruction of a constable, you can see really difficult situations arising, where citizens with no intention of creating serious disruption are nevertheless caught because they are carrying such things in the vicinity of somewhere where serious disruption might be about to arise, or might be known to be about to arise.

I really think that the Government have got to clean up this Bill if they want to proceed with it, and remove from it things that drag ordinary citizens into conflict with the criminal law when they have no criminal intent at all—and do not need to have for the purpose of some of these offences—and are not involved in serious protest. Serious protest is itself, of course, an often justifiable activity, as the courts have demonstrated in some recent cases. Quite apart from the problems faced by those who want to engage in legitimate protest, we should not be passing legislation that simply confuses ordinary citizens as to what they are allowed to do.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, on Amendment 5, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, we agree that there needs to be far more clarity as far as the offence of locking on is concerned.

On Amendment 18, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, to which I have added my name, we agree that the scope of going equipped for a locking-on offence should be limited to where the person intends to use the object for locking on, rather than including an object that may be used for locking on. There is a real danger of innocent people carrying innocuous objects being drawn into this offence, as my noble friend Lord Beith has just illustrated.

If we look at a similar offence in Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968, “Going equipped for stealing, etc.”, we see that the wording is:

“A person shall be guilty of an offence if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary, theft or cheat.”


There is no mention of any article that may be used in the course of or in connection with the substantive offence. Can the Minister explain why there is a difference in this case from the Theft Act’s “going equipped” and these “going equipped” offences?

Amendment 19 in my name, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Skidelsky, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, probes what “in connection with” means; in this case, “in connection with” locking on. Can the Minister give an example of where an object can be used in connection with locking on but is not used to actually lock on? Similarly, Amendment 48 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, seeks to establish what “in connection with” means in relation to offences of going equipped to tunnel. Can the Minister give an example where an object can be used in connection with tunnelling but is not used to actually construct, or even to be present in, a tunnel?

Amendment 20, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and signed by me, includes the question around the term “in connection with” but extends to whether it should also include items for use by someone else, through the term “by any person”. This is the substance of my Amendment 21, signed by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Skidelsky, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which would replace “any person” with “them.”

As in the Theft Act example, surely it makes no difference if the person carrying a pair of handcuffs with the intention of committing an offence of locking on is the person who is actually going to chain themselves to the railings. If the thief and his mate go looking to break into cars, but the person carrying the crowbar is not the thief who is actually going to use it, the thief’s mate is still guilty of the offence of going equipped to steal. Why then is it necessary to include “by any person” in this offence when it is not present in the offence under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968?

Similarly, Amendment 49 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, seeks to understand why “any person” is included in the offence of going equipped for tunnelling when there appears to be no need for this widening of the offence.

Amendments 51 and 52 in my name, and supported by noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seek to understand what would be caught within the offence of obstructing major transport works by including Clause 6(1)(a)(iii), which includes obstructing someone

“taking any steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating, or in connection with, the construction or maintenance of any major transport works”.

This seems to be extraordinarily wide, to the extent that it is almost impossible to understand what would or would not come within the remit of the offence. For example, if a construction worker working on a major transport works is prevented from filling her car with petrol the day before she is due at work—a car she uses to get to work—is that caught within the remit of this offence? Where is the line drawn? Can the Minister give a clear understanding of what is included in the offence, and if not, how does he expect protestors to know whether they are going to be committing an offence?

Amendment 53 in my name, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to probe why Clause 6(1)(b) is necessary. It refers to interference with apparatus, for example. Can the Minister explain how interfering, moving or removing apparatus relating to the construction or maintenance of any major transport works would not amount to obstructing the construction or maintenance, an offence under Clause 6(1)(a)? If it did not amount to obstructing the construction or maintenance, why should it be a criminal offence?

Amendment 65, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and signed by me, seeks to narrow the scope of the criminalisation of interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure to cases where the use or operation of the infrastructure is prevented to “a significant” extent, rather than to “any extent”. In other parts of the Bill, reference is made to serious disruption, so why is there no such caveat in this part of the Bill? Would teenagers involved in horseplay, for example, where one throws the other’s mobile phone on to the train tracks, resulting in staff temporarily halting trains so that the phone can be retrieved, be guilty of an offence under this section as drafted?

Amendments 66 and 67 in my name are intended to probe what Clause 7(5) means. It states that

“infrastructure is prevented from being used or operated for any of its intended purposes … where its use or operation for any of those purposes is significantly delayed.”

That makes sense, and that would be the effect of Amendments 66 and 67. Can the Minister explain how adding “The cases in which” at the beginning of that subsection and “include” in the middle of the subsection extend the offence beyond the specific example of significant delay? What else would count as preventing its use or operation?

We support Amendments 69 and 78 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to probe whether “broadcasting and telecommunication services”, as well as “newspaper printing infrastructure”, should be included in the definition of “key national infrastructure”.

We also support Amendment 70 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I have signed, to narrow the definition of “road transport infrastructure” to A roads rather than both A and B roads, as recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Highway obstruction is already an offence for which a custodial sentence can be given, and the enhanced penalties for this offence should be limited to key roads such as motorways and A roads.

We support Amendments 71 and 72 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I have also signed, recommended by the JCHR, to probe the extent of “rail infrastructure” and “air transport infrastructure”. Does “rail infrastructure” include, for example, the Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch railway, a narrow-gauge steam service used solely for tourism purposes? Does “air transport infrastructure” include small, private airfields or airstrips with little or no air traffic? In what way are they part of “key national infrastructure”?

We also support Amendments 73 to 76 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I have signed, to probe what facilities would be considered as being used “in connection with” infrastructure, in relation to

“harbour infrastructure … downstream oil infrastructure … downstream gas infrastructure … onshore oil and gas exploration and production infrastructure … onshore electricity generation infrastructure”.

Finally in this group, my Amendment 79 seeks to probe whether all periodicals and magazines should be included in the definition of “newspaper”. Noble Lords will be able to think of several disreputable or trivial titles that should not be considered part of “key national infrastructure”.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Not at this point, I will have to write to the noble Lord.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Bearing in mind the number of amendments, I worked out that the Minister spent 17 seconds per amendment in his response. I gave the example of a mobile phone that ended up on railway tracks interrupting national infrastructure and whether that was within the scope of the Bill. Does the Minister feel that his response has been comprehensive enough, on the very detailed questions he’s been asked?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I hesitate, as a non- lawyer, or even as someone who has never been a judge or magistrate, to enter this debate. I have amendments 34, 56 and 62 in this group.

Amendment 34 seeks to ensure that only those people present in tunnels created under Clause 3 are criminalised—in other words, illegal tunnels, or tunnels dug by protesters—rather than those present in tunnels such as the London Underground tunnels. The drafting of the offence appears to capture people causing serious disruption in the London Underground tunnels, which I am sure was not the intention. In meetings with Ministers before today’s debate, there was an undertaking to recognise that and address it. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister what conclusions the Government have come to, bearing in mind that they have been given prior notice.

Amendments 56 and 62 reflect the recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights that particular regard must be had to the right to peaceful protest under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights when deciding whether someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions that would otherwise be an offence of obstructing major transport works and interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure.

On the other amendments, I admire the ingenuity of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in her Amendment 9. I shall leave it at that.

With regard to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the reasonable excuse defence is clearly very difficult. One can understand and sympathise with Extinction Rebellion or the Just Stop Oil people who say, “You’re destroying the planet by giving out more licences for oil and gas exploration”. What more reasonable excuse could you think of for causing this sort of disruption? My only concern is that the Government will take the noble and learned Lord’s first option of doing away with the reasonable excuse defence altogether in these offences, rather than adopting the approach that the noble and learned Lord has suggested.

In the case of the journalist who was arrested, the alternative suggestion in the noble and learned Lord’s detailed amendments would clearly be something that she could use in her defence. I hesitate to say what would happen to her if there were no reasonable excuse for these offences. As the noble and learned Lord said—and with no disrespect to the noble Lord who is a serving magistrate—these are very difficult decisions. If the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court disagree, and if you have two judges even on the Supreme Court dissenting, how can a Bench of lay magistrates grapple with these difficult issues around reasonable excuse? So there certainly needs to be clarification and clarity around reasonable excuse, and I hope that the Minister can help us with these issues.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments. I will come to the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but I will deal with my Amendment 42 first, because it deals with an important specific ask of the Government. I will then come on to the more general point about the reasonable excuse defence.

My Amendment 42, for which I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would insert a defence for a person who is present in a tunnel or is undertaking acts

“wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.”

The amendment probes situations where all or part of a person’s workplace is within a tunnel, such as the London Underground.

Currently, other clauses, such as Clause 6 on obstruction of transport works, include a reasonable excuse defence for people causing disruption as part of a trade dispute, and I think we all welcome the Government’s inclusion of that. But have they considered whether that defence needs to be replicated for the new offence of being present in a tunnel? What is covered in the definition of a “tunnel” under the Bill? Does it include the London Underground or the Channel Tunnel, for example? Under the Bill, the definition of a “tunnel” is simply

“an excavation that extends beneath land”.

So some clarification of that would be helpful, and I would be grateful for answers on my Amendment 42.

Aside from that amendment, we have had an interesting, almost philosophical, debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is right to say that you cannot just leave this to others to debate. There is a very real debate here: how far is protest justified by people who say, “My reasonable excuse is that there’s such a climate emergency and, if only people realised it, they would realise that we’re the people who are being sensible and reasonable”? This is a very difficult debate and discussion, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has challenged Parliament to have it. The Government may need to think about this and come back on Report with something that seeks to explore the whole issue.

This example is not the same, for obvious reasons, but the Chartists would have been regarded in their time as unreasonable extremists. Many of the suffragettes were imprisoned and force-fed. You can say that this is different and we are in a different time, but you see the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is getting at: what is a reasonable protest, and how far should someone go? In other words, where is the balance in a protest that will inevitably cause some disruption? I have been on protests and demonstrations that have caused disruption. But where is the balance and where do you draw the line? We never debate or discuss this—

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Certainly, and I thank the noble Baroness for her question. It is important that we have clarity because this is clearly a very important point. In the Bill, the pursuit of lawful and legitimate industrial action constitutes a lawful exercise of that right and is not criminalised. However, that provision in the Bill does not read across, if you like, to all the other offences, and in particular is not found in any tunnelling offence. That is the point where I differ from the speech the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, gave moments ago. The reason for that—

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He just said that, in other parts of the Bill, somebody engaged in a trade dispute is not criminalised by the offences contained in this Bill. However, we had a discussion in the Minister’s absence about the fact that it was a reasonable excuse defence once charged. In other words, somebody engaged in a trade dispute could be arrested, detained and charged by the police, which I would describe as being treated as a criminal, and it is only at the point after a charge and an appearance at a court that this defence is available. I guess that the Minister is technically right, in that somebody is not criminalised until they are convicted by a court, but we are really arguing semantics here. So the way that the Minister expressed himself—saying that, effectively, somebody involved in a trade dispute would not be in danger from the provisions of the Bill—is not actually accurate.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

In Clause 7, “Interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure”, one can see that, in subsection (2), “a defence” is provided

“for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that … (b) the act mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection was done wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.”

I am sure the noble Lord can see how the protection for the right to be involved in a trade dispute is protected by that drafting—and that is certainly the clear intention of the Government.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I hear what the noble and learned Lord says, and I will certainly ask them.

I think that I had reached Amendment 61. It similarly seeks to strengthen the defences available. As I have said already, whether or not someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions is very specific to each particular incident, and we see it as entirely appropriate that the defendant, who committed the offence in the first place and has personal knowledge of those facts, is required to prove them.

I turn lastly to Amendments 56 and 62, which seek to make it an explicit requirement for the police and courts to pay regard to Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR when determining whether someone has a reasonable excuse for the offences of obstructing major transport works and interference with key national infrastructure. Although I understand the sentiment behind the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I do not see it as being necessary. It is of course right that the courts and other public bodies are already obliged to act compatibly with the ECHR by reason of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Therefore, there is already legislative protection for the consideration of such rights, and it is not necessary to repeat that in this Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can I just seek clarification on what the Minister said earlier about tunnels not constructed by protesters and people causing serious disruption in those tunnels? My understanding is that the Minister is saying, “Don’t worry, trust the police.” I know that that is what the legislation says about someone causing serious disruption in a London Underground tunnel, maybe London Underground workers operating a picket line in a tunnel constructed by London Underground: “Don’t worry about it, the police are reasonable people; they wouldn’t use the law in that way and, at the end of the day, the courts wouldn’t convict.” However, as the journalist who was trying to report on a protest found—the case that the Minister started his remarks with—we are still faced with the possibility of being arrested and detained for five hours by the police and of the police being unreasonable; that is by their own admission now. It seems an onerous experience for a completely innocent person to go through that, and to have to rely on the fact that, at the end of the day, the courts will not convict them, when they have been completely innocent from the start.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. The short answer is that these cases are always going to be fact-specific. If there was a serious disruption in a London Underground tunnel, I suspect that there would potentially be many offences being committed other than those under this Bill. As my noble friend Lord Sharpe has already said, this situation will be considered and we will come back to the noble Lord. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Scammers

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right: the Home Office is leading work on a fraud strategy. The Prime Minister referred to it in the other place as recently as 2 November. We intend to publish on that shortly. It will consider all the possible tools required to go after fraudsters and to protect those who are most vulnerable. The strategy’s other aims will be to stop and block frauds being carried out, and to improve law enforcement. Considerable money is being invested in improving data collection, as well as law enforcement capability.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, of the £580 million taken from people through authorised push payment scams last year, less than half was reimbursed to victims. Banks say that people should be more careful, but this is unacceptable given the sophistication of these schemes and how rife they are. Will the Government replace the voluntary industry code on authorised push payments with a statutory code, including an obligation to reimburse victims unless there is clear evidence that they are at fault?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have slightly different figures for the number of victims who were reimbursed. I am told that up to the year ending June 2022, 71% of victims got fully reimbursed. On the code to which the noble Lord referred, in 2021 the Payment Systems Regulator consulted on further measures to combat APP fraud. It proposed that all payment service providers must reimburse victims of APP scams where the victim is found not to have been grossly negligent. It is also worth pointing out some other legislative activity. In November 2021, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury announced that the Government would remove any legislative barriers through the Financial Services and Markets Bill to enable the regulator to act to make reimbursement mandatory. That Bill is currently in Committee, and the PSR is currently consulting further on the mechanism for reimbursement.