Extradition Arrangements: European Union Member States

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the additional cost of trials of those wanted in the UK having to take place in the accused’s home country, and to what extent will that be a consideration in deciding whether to pursue a prosecution?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

As I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, it is probably quite early to say what those additional costs would be, but the decision on whether to pursue a trial would be based not on costs but on the likelihood of that trial being successful, either for the accused or indeed for the victim.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for the leading role he has played in achieving consensus around Amendment 24. I start by reminding the House of the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, in his summary of a similar group of amendments in Committee. He used the analogy of torture, where the ends do not justify the means, in the same way that using children as informants or agents is difficult to justify under any circumstances. Regrettably, banning the use of children as covert human intelligence sources is outside the scope of the Bill. He went on to recall the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who suggested as an alternative to using children using people over 18 who look younger, as the acting profession often does, particularly when dealing with adult themes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out that there is a very fine line between grooming and persuading children to act as covert human intelligence sources. My noble friend Lady Doocey quite rightly pointed out that these children are already vulnerable and exploited, particularly in the case of county lines, without the need for them to be further exploited by the police. We do not send children into war, so why do we send them into potentially more dangerous situations as CHIS, as a number of noble Lords have asked this afternoon? A very experienced police handler of informants told me that, in his experience, even adult CHIS are open to manipulation, let alone children. If you are a child, a non-documented migrant or a victim of human trafficking caught by the police committing crime, you are likely to look for any available way out. You do not need to be blackmailed in such a situation; you are likely to grab at any opportunity, including being tasked to commit crime as a participating informant, a point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Young of Hornsey, in Committee. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, we are talking about the power imbalance between the police and these vulnerable people, including children.

The Minister’s response in Committee was to cite a High Court judge, Mr Justice Supperstone, who was convinced by the police that it was okay to use children in this way. They appear to have been less successful in convincing the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham. When I was seeking promotion to the most senior ranks in the police service, on a six-month course at the national Police Staff College, we were told that we were moving from superintending ranks, where we had to operate within the existing paradigm, to ACPO ranks, where our responsibility was to change the paradigm. Despite the High Court’s decision, we need to change the paradigm. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, says, the court did not consider the active involvement of children as CHIS in crime.

The Government, in response to our deliberations in Committee, have come up with their own alternative. I am as unimpressed as the noble Lord, Lord Young, with this attempt. First, in relation to authorising the use of children, it amends secondary not primary legislation—much easier for the Government to subsequently change and impossible for us to amend. The only change to primary legislation is on post-event reporting. The government amendments, particularly Amendment 26, prohibit the use of children under 16 to commit crimes against their parent or guardian, but not 17 and 18 year-olds: this is already the case, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said. It creates the position of a “relevant person” who is responsible for the risk assessment and for ensuring that an “appropriate adult” is present if the child is under 16. This risk assessment and the presence of an appropriate adult are already required in legislation. In the case of 17 and 18 year-olds, the appropriate person has only to consider,

“whether an appropriate adult should be present”.

Again, that consideration is already required.

Saying that a child criminal conduct authorisation should be limited to four months instead of 12 is also not a real change. Child CHIS can only be authorised for a maximum of four months and a CCA cannot be granted unless the child has been authorised to be a CHIS, so a review after four months is already inevitable. Overall, I would summarise the proposed alternatives the Government are putting forward as too little, too late.

Amendment 24, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been a long time in the planning. I join with the noble Baroness in thanking Stella Creasy MP and Just for Kids Law. It covers vulnerable adults as well as children—the case for which was made strongly by my noble friend Lady Hamwee this afternoon—which the government amendment goes nowhere near. The presence of an appropriate adult would be mandatory for all children and vulnerable adults under this amendment, instead of being compulsory only for under-16s, as in the Government’s alternative. It sets out the very limited circumstances when a child could be used, where the best interests of the child must be paramount. The child or vulnerable adult is not to be put at risk of physical or psychological harm, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed. The Minister may say that these restrictions are so limiting that it may result in children and vulnerable adults not being used at all. That is a risk we should be willing to take.

In the absence of Amendments 12 and 13, we support Amendment 24 as the best of the available options, though I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, that it does not involve the independent prior authorisation contained in her Amendment 14. However, as I have just said, it does include informing the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as possible. If anyone thinks that 16 might be an appropriate age for drawing the line, I would urge them to watch the film “County Lines”, directed by Henry Blake. It brings out the horror of the impact of county lines drug dealing on teenagers, including older teenagers, and powerfully makes the case for immediately removing children from these circumstances. Important points were made by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, about the lifelong impact of adverse childhood experiences such as involvement in county lines. Regrettably, contrary to the assertion of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, Amendment 12 does not prevent using a child as a CHIS; it only prohibits tasking them to commit crime. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out, some adults are at least as vulnerable as some children.

Amendment 24 is a compromise, but it is comprehensive in that covers both vulnerable adults and children, and we support it strongly for the reasons so clearly expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his kind words about my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I inform the House that he read all the lovely comments from Monday’s debate and was very touched by them.

Also, in response to my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, I apologise for the late arrival of the letter. I hope he has had a chance in the course of this debate to look at it.

This has been a very thoughtful debate on an incredibly important issue. I have listened very carefully to the points made by all noble Lords throughout the preceding debates on the safeguards that should apply to children. At this stage, I must say to my noble friend Lord Cormack, who bemoaned the advent of certain behaviours over the last 20 or 30 years, that I am afraid to tell him that they go back far longer than that. I also thank all noble Lords who have engaged with me on this issue directly, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Rosser, who gave up their Saturday afternoon, together with Stella Creasy, to speak to me and my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I must say that I think we all found that conversation very helpful.

I hope that all noble Lords will recognise the substantial amendments that the Government have put forward to ensure that robust safeguards are in place in legislation for the very rare circumstances in which a juvenile CHIS may be tasked to participate in criminal conduct. Noble Lords have been told that the courts have found these safeguards to be inadequate. That is not the case at all. The High Court considered the safeguards for juvenile CHIS in 2019 and expressly found them to be lawful. In fact, Mr Justice Supperstone explicitly rejected the contention that the scheme is inadequate in its safeguarding of the interests and welfare of juvenile CHIS. He also set out his view that it was clear that the principal focus of the framework for juvenile CHIS is to ensure that appropriate weight is given to a child’s best interests and that the practical effect of the enhanced risk assessment is that juveniles are

“only utilised in extreme circumstances and when other potential sources of information have been exhausted.”

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked whether a child impact assessment has been conducted, and the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, suggested an independent review of authorisations of juveniles. This has happened. The independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner conducted a review of all public authorisations of juveniles and the conclusions of that review were reported in March 2019 to the JCHR. The IPC was satisfied that those who grant such authorisations do so only after very careful consideration of the inherent risks and concerns around the safeguarding of children. The public authority’s duty of care to the child is a key consideration in the authorisation process. The IPC also highlighted that juvenile CHIS are not tasked to participate in criminality that they are not already involved in and that becoming a CHIS can potentially offer a way to extricate themselves from such harm. The decisions to authorise are made only where this is the best option for breaking the cycle of crime and the danger for the individual.

In moving the government amendments today, I will not move Amendments 35, 38 and 49, which relate to devolved activity in Scotland. This is because, as I hope noble Lords have seen in the letter I issued earlier today, the Scottish Government are unable to support the Bill. Respecting the Sewel convention, the Government will not legislate without the consent of the Scottish Government. Therefore, at Third Reading I will bring forward amendments to remove from the Bill the ability to authorise participation in criminal conduct for devolved purposes in Scotland. Authorisations necessary for the purpose of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom relate to reserved matters and the relevant public authorities will still be able to grant authorisations for these purposes for activity in Scotland through the powers contained within this legislation. An authorisation necessary for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime or preventing disorder is not in itself reserved. An authorisation granted for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime or preventing disorder may therefore relate to devolved matters, and it will be these matters to which the Bill will not apply.

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[Viscount Brookeborough (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene—[Inaudible]—discussed in the context of CHIS operating in non-terrorist criminal organisations and rather less of those in terrorist groups. Because the Bill covers both at once, I feel there is a danger—[Inaudible]—extent that it might seriously inhibit the latter, which is the fight against terrorism. I therefore cannot fully support the amendment as a whole, but I would support proposed new subsection (c) on sexual offences on its own if I could do so.

The major difference between non-terrorist crime and terrorism is that the former—[Inaudible]—of death. Terrorism always has death and destruction as its aim. I know little about the former apart from what I have read in the press and heard in the very excellent debates on the Bill. However, I have some knowledge of—[Inaudible]—we remember the serious nature of the criminality that terrorist groups seek to carry out. The intelligence that CHIS gather prevents large numbers of deaths and serious harm to the public.

There have been, I believe, some misconceptions in these debates about the terrorist world. There has been mention of informer—[Inaudible.] All agents are informers, but not all informers are agents. The single-use informer is a person who is short term only and would probably be paid off or given another life after the operation, such as the dismantling of a drug-dealing gang. This is because he will have been exposed by the arrest—[Inaudible]—operator in a large organisation that provides ongoing information that can go on for years or even decades. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested that a CHIS operating under one of these authorisations is called a participating informer. Perhaps that was so in the areas of his experience, but it was not so in mine, when—[Inaudible]—these types of agents, strategic agents in a terrorist group or short-term criminal informers.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, said:

“Let us suppose that in becoming a member of a terrorist organisation, a CHIS is required to fill out a membership form … The handlers may therefore assist”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 151.]


in filling the form out. I hesitate to disagree with such an eminent noble and learned Lord, and while I do not doubt that this might be the case for other groups, I am not aware of any terrorist organisation that produces a membership application—although the IRA had a green book that was given to people once they were inducted.

[Inaudible]—in Northern Ireland for 23 years of the Troubles. More recently, I am well aware of the agent-handling protocols from the Troubles era and that they have been adapted and improved for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. For centuries, perhaps for all time, there have been spies and intelligence gatherers at state level, where it is basically strategic intelligence within a pyramid of government structure. This is, if you like, the Le Carré world. Spies rarely have to commit crimes, such as planning and carrying out a bombing—[Inaudible]—in the last 60 years is worldwide terrorism and the need to have long-term deep plants or active terrorists who have been turned.

[Inaudible]—that states have. Terrorist organisations are very flat in structure and every person from the top to the bottom is—[Inaudible]—for want of a better word. They are active terrorists. It is also important to realise that it is very difficult to—[Inaudible.] In 40 years of the Troubles, there were only, I believe—[Inaudible]—figures of such people. We saw what happened when Robert Nairac thought he could become a member of a family. As a result, most CHIS are turned terrorists or at the very least members of the same communities. They will have committed and will almost certainly continue to commit crime—[Inaudible]—a big part of the induction process in the first place. There are no convenient forms to sign, and any reluctance to take part, from initiation onwards, is suicidal.

Imposing these legal limits, as laid down in the amendment, could put CHIS in the terrorist world at substantial risk. After being inducted into a terrorist organisation, every part of that individual’s life from then on contributes, one way or another, to the terrorist aims, death and destruction—criminality of the highest order. Becoming a CHIS cannot change that much. However, the outcomes of their provision of intelligence saved many lives.

I shall give a true example of a small event. An agent turned up at a meeting of his IRA ASU—active service unit—in the county where I live. He was told to deliver a car bomb immediately. He could not refuse. He delivered the car and, luckily, the TPU—the timer power unit—gave him time to call his handler from a call box before the bomb was to blow up, thereby avoiding loss of life. If I may say so, that is not the most extreme case.

Of course it is right that CHIS activity should be regulated and the Bill does just that. There are protections in place such as the Human Rights Act. However, there may be times when participation in serious crime is necessary and at short notice. Any refusal to be involved would result in the loss of an agent, and no further information from that source. It may have taken years for him to become so deeply involved. This is real life in that terrifying world. The running of the protection of such people is vital and complex. There has to be a way in which to manage them. Inserting increasingly tight legal limits on what they can and cannot do is not the way forward, as those limits may be largely unenforceable in those circumstances.

I will not go into examples of the protection. However, there is an analogy which shows the value of sources. The Enigma was a provider of intelligence, albeit a machine, rather than a person. When the code was broken, the first signal referred to an immediate attack on a convoy by U-boats. It struck me that that was a similar situation to those of some agents. Turing’s colleagues said quickly, “We must warn the convoy.” He said, “No. We cannot risk such a valuable source for the future, or that will be the end of it.” That is one of the problems for the CHIS.

Terrorism is—[Inaudible]—operations alone. The use of many long-term, deep-intelligence CHIS creates a cancer within the terrorist organisations that does so much damage to them that, although they do not admit defeat, they begin to realise that they cannot win. That turning point is sought after by Governments worldwide, and very much due to CHIS.

In the months prior to the ceasefire in Northern Ireland, over 90% of planned terrorist operations failed or did not take place, largely as a result of long-term deep CHIS. I and my family were among the beneficiaries of such intelligence. I believe that this and some of the other amendments will inhibit the fight against the worldwide terrorist threat.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen. I have added my name to it.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seems to have blown the Government’s reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights out of the water. Even if he was wrong, which I very much doubt, I fail to understand the difference between a list of offences that can be deduced from the convention and an offence listed in the Bill. The Government’s argument seems to be solely based on the danger of the CHIS being tested by asking them to perform prohibited acts. Yet as the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Cormack, have said—the amendment being based on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985—the Canadians seem to have had no such qualms or difficulties.

In any event, is the cat not out of the bag already? Do criminals read Hansard? That is about as likely as they are to read primary legislation, in my experience. We have the list of prohibited offences published as a proposed amendment. The Minister is saying that those offences would be prohibited anyway under the ECHR, so what is to be lost? I understand the reservations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, about the wording of the amendment, but if the Government do not give an undertaking to bring this matter back at Third Reading, it can be approved on ping-pong, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

17: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“(8A) Where a criminal conduct authorisation has been granted, the covert human intelligence source so authorised cannot be deployed unless the conditions under subsection (8B) have been fulfilled.(8B) The conditions are that—(a) notification has been given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of—(i) the purpose and extent of the deployment, and(ii) the type of criminal activity it is anticipated the covert human intelligence source would participate in, and(b) the Commissioner has considered the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects, including the potential for collateral damage or injury, and has approved the deployment.(8C) In the event of urgency, prior approval is not required but notification must be given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event not later than seven days after the deployment.(8D) A notification under subsection (8B) or (8C) must be given in writing or transmitted by electronic means.”

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I beg to move and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick [V]]

36: Schedule 1, page 7, line 9, after “is” insert “reasonably”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would insert a requirement that belief in the necessity and proportionality of a criminal conduct authorisation, and in the existence of satisfactory arrangements, be reasonably held.

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[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord, Lord Mann, has scratched. Accordingly, I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her kind remarks about my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I can assure her that my noble friend will be watching and listening intently as we come to the end of this Report stage.

We support Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Clark of Kilwinning. The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, ably and comprehensively explained the amendment, which means that I can be brief.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Finally, Amendment 32 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would make it explicit in RIPA that a person harmed by conduct under an authorisation—I believe the word used in RIPA is “aggrieved”—would have the right to seek redress from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. We first raised the issue of victims having redress through the tribunal in the House of Commons and we will support the amendment if it is taken to a vote. I await with interest the Minister’s response, not least to the assurances that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, seeks.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and to hear him speak in positive terms about his noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Before I address the main issues raised by Amendments 1 and 2, let me will clear the decks. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 32 in this group, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned, and my noble friend will deal that amendment later in the group. I have put my name to Amendments 1, 2, 21, and 22.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, proposes Amendments 21 and 22, which seek to clarify the legal extent of immunity that the Bill confers, because, despite debates in Second Reading and Committee, and numerous meetings and email exchanges between Members of your Lordships’ House, the Minister and the Bill team, it is still not clear to me and to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, exactly what the Bill seeks to achieve in terms of immunity. At the very least it shows how complex the Government’s proposals are. We support the noble Lord’s amendments.

Amendments 3 and 4 seek to limit the legal immunity provided by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, seeks to limit it to criminal liability. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, wants to ensure that criminals do not profit from the crimes they are asked to commit. We will support these amendments if the House divides on them, but they are both about damage limitation and will, I hope, be pre-empted by Amendments 1 and 2.

All these amendments, and those in the following groups, simply highlight the can of worms that the Government are opening by going way beyond the status quo by giving public authorities the power to grant legal immunity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, Amendments 1 and 2 would remove the ability of public authorities to grant legal immunity to covert human intelligence sources prior to the criminal activity they are being asked to participate in. This would maintain the status quo, where the actions of agents or informants who are properly tasked by public authorities to commit crime are referred to the relevant prosecuting authority, which invariably rules that it is not in the public interest to prosecute them.

We on these Benches accept that that it is undesirable but necessary to use covert human intelligence sources and that, on occasion, these agents or informants need to be tasked to commit crime. We accept that, because of a legal challenge, it is necessary to put the tasking of covert human intelligence sources to commit crime on a statutory footing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, set out the dangers of the changes the Government propose. I will take a slightly different angle. A reason often used by Governments for not accepting attempts to change existing law is that they are not necessary. We suggest that the Government have been unable to provide any evidence that a change in the law to provide covert human intelligence sources with legal immunity prior to their being tasked to commit crime is necessary.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland said that

“noble Lords have accepted—and they have not needed to be persuaded—our position is that it is grossly unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and dangerous work to frustrate serious crimes while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for that very same conduct”.

Will the Minister today admit from the Dispatch Box that her noble and learned friend was wrong to say what he did? I, along with many other noble Lords, have said explicitly and openly before the Minister made those remarks that we do not accept the Government’s position that this it is “grossly unfair and unreasonable” to leave open the possibility of prosecuting covert human intelligence sources in such circumstances.

The noble and learned Lord went on to say that covert human intelligence sources operate “in the public interest”. Many police informants act out of self-interest and for financial gain. I have, as a senior police officer, reluctantly handed brown envelopes stuffed full of £20 notes to criminals to pay them for acting as covert human intelligence sources. They were paid an amount agreed in advance for acting on police instructions. What these informants did undoubtedly was in the public interest, but that was not their primary motivation, as the Minister has suggested.

The noble and learned Lord went on to say that

“we must accept that we have lost intelligence and failed to recruit undercover operatives because we have not been able hitherto to give them confidence that the state will not prosecute them for the things that the state has asked them to do.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 171.]

Why must we accept this? Because the Minister said so? Because he has been told by operational partners who have a vested interested that this is the case? Parliament set a very useful precedent on 9 November 2005 when operational partners, backed by the then Labour Government, said that they needed to detain terrorist suspects for up to 90 days without charge. Large numbers of Labour MPs rebelled and joined a united opposition to reject what operational partners, backed by the Labour Government, were asking for. We should do the same today.

We have asked the Government for evidence of how much intelligence has been lost, as the Minister claims; we are told that they cannot produce any evidence. We have asked how many times operational partners have failed to recruit undercover operatives as a result of the status quo; we are told that the Government cannot produce any evidence. We have asked how many times a properly authorised agent or informant has been prosecuted for doing exactly what they were asked to do; we are told they cannot produce such evidence. We have said, “Okay then, just give us one example of where a properly authorised CHIS has been prosecuted for doing exactly what they were asked to do. If it is sensitive, redact the sensitive detail and show us in private if necessary.” They cannot even do that.

I suggest that, if we are to make such a monumental legal change, we should have evidence to support that decision. So, what evidence is there to support the Government’s case for so dramatically changing the law, so that a police officer can tell an informant to commit a crime, and for that criminal activity to no longer even be a crime—for that informant not to have legally done anything wrong at all, even if innocent people are hurt in the process? The Government’s case is simply their assertion, “It’s not fair.” Seriously? Do the Government think we should so radically change the law because it’s “not fair”?

I will quote the Minister again, who said that

“my respectful conclusion is to say that the continuation of the status quo is not desirable.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 173.]

Not desirable? Police officers have to secure the prior authority of both an Investigatory Powers Commissioner and a Secretary of State before they can listen to someone’s telephone conversation—and then only if the target is suspected of the most serious criminality. This Bill allows police officers to give an informant total legal immunity to commit any type of crime, with no prior independent authority or oversight, to combat even minor offences. That is the definition of “undesirable”.

Parliament rejected the unsubstantiated claims of operational partners in November 2005 and we should reject them now. We support Amendments 1 and 2.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

What a pleasure it is to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who has demolished the Government’s case for handing out immunity like sweeties to criminals. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not call these people covert human intelligence sources; they are police spies, and we have to be clear about that when we use this language, so that people outside your Lordships’ Chamber can understand what we are talking about.

I shall speak in support of Amendments 1 and 2, which I have signed, but quite honestly, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, all the amendments here are simply damage limitation. I am staggered that the government lawyers have actually allowed this legislation to be presented to your Lordships’ House. It is appalling. I liked the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Her stance on this is not factionalism; it is a principled stance by a lawyer who understands civil liberties and human rights, and we could all learn from that.

I will focus specifically on my Amendment 4. It might seem a little less powerful or important than the other amendments that we are coming to today and on Wednesday, but I think it is quite important. We will be authorising criminals—or officers, or police spies, or whoever they are—to make money by criminal activities and then keep that money. I would like those profits to be recoverable through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I would like a proper, clear answer from the Minister on this. I have asked multiple times since Second Reading but have not yet had an answer on how the Government will recover the profits made by a police spy under a criminal conduct authorisation, or CCA.

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The amendments we are supporting provide for effective pre-judicial and post-judicial scrutiny of criminal conduct authorisations while still enabling such authorisations to be given when the degree of urgency precludes prior judicial authorisation. In so doing, the amendments provide the balance between the need for flexibility over the procedure for giving authorisations and the importance of prior judicial authorisation to minimise the prospect—in what is otherwise self-authorisation by an agency or other body—of a potentially ill-judged or incorrect authorisation of criminal conduct by a covert human intelligence source, with all the consequences that might have.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is again a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. We agree with the arguments he put forward for the need for additional safeguards, beyond what is contained in the Bill. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 17 and 43 in this group.

Amendment 43 provides for a senior judge to undertake a review of the use of informants and agents and their participation in crime; in other words, to get answers to the questions, “Why do we need this Bill?” and “How far should it go?”, questions the Government have been unable to provide any evidence for. Contrary to what the Minister claimed in Committee, this review would not duplicate the oversight that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides in his annual review of the current use of the powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Instead, it would answer the questions we have been asking at every stage of this Bill that the Government have been unable to answer.

How widespread is the practice of using agents or informants who have been tasked to participate in crime? Who has been involved? Have they been brave men and women whose sole motivation is the public interest, or have they been people who lack civil responsibility, who do it for money and who have been engaged in very questionable activity—or is it both? The evidence we have heard on this point, arguably from equally reliable sources, has apparently been contradictory. To what extent has immunity from prosecution been a factor in the loss of intelligence and in potential covert human intelligence sources being deterred from helping public authorities? The Government have been unable to tell us, but this review would be able to answer the question—fundamental to the provisions of this Bill—of whether they are all needed. It would also answer the other crucial question: are the safeguards adequate?

That brings me to our Amendment 17. We have heard from Members of your Lordships’ House who have had hands-on, practical, operational experience of the issues covered by the Bill, of whom I am only one. I hesitate to use the word “expert” after I was once described as an expert on drugs—a rather dubious accolade—so I shall use the term “practitioners”. What we have heard from practitioners are the operational difficulties of prior judicial or ministerial authorisation. Practitioners have highlighted the differences between the existing provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act—which relate to the interception of communications—and the new provisions, which relate to the use of covert human intelligence sources tasked to commit crime; I will refer to them as “participating informants”.

The former usually involve the use of technology, such as the planting of a listening device or corrupting the software of a mobile telephone or a computer. The stream of information can be turned on and off remotely, without the target even knowing. The latter involves placing someone in an uncontrolled, unpredictable, often volatile situation, where the participating informant often interacts with dangerous criminals and often must use their own initiative to deal with rapidly changing and unpredicted scenarios with no real-time contact with their handlers or authorising officers. The former is passive and controllable intrusion. The latter is interactive and often uncontrollable.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, told us in Committee that he had been

“converted to the idea of prior judicial approval”

in the case of communications interception—as he has just restated—but that, again, tasking a CHIS

“requires decisions of a quite different nature based on immersion in the human complexities of fast-changing situations. Those decisions depend on close personal knowledge of a person’s character, which will often be unreliable and volatile, and on assessments of the underworld group in which that person is embedded. The authorisation of criminality is simply one part of that complex human relationship.”

The noble Lord also said that judges were good at assessing

“the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects”.—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 198.]

Our Amendment 17 is the result of listening to practitioners—and to those like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who has experience of being an Investigatory Powers Commissioner—and coming up with a compromise. The amendment allows the practitioners to do what they are good at: use the close personal knowledge of the participating informant’s character, assess the underworld group in which that person is to be embedded and define the crimes that the participating informant is to be authorised to commit.

However, once the informant has been granted a criminal conduct authority by the authorising officer, that now participating informant cannot be used or deployed unless the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has authorised use or deployment. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must consider the purpose and extent of the deployment and the type of criminality, in general terms, that it is anticipated the informant will be participating in. If the informant is not to be used to commit crime, IPC authority is not required. It is only once the informant is authorised to commit crime that IPC authority is needed.

If I may use this analogy, if you want to deploy a missile, you need one level of authority—in this case, the authorising officer. If you want to arm the missile with a warhead, you need another level of authority—in this case, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the purpose or extent of the deployment changes, or the type of criminal activity in general terms changes, the IPC has to re-authorise the use of the participating informant. Contrary to what some critics have said, it would not be the case that, once given, IPC authority would give the authorising public authority carte blanche to use the participating informant at will.

The amendment allows judges, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his judicial commissioners, who must hold or have held high judicial office, to do what they are good at: consider the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects, including the potential for collateral damage or injury. If it is necessary to deploy the participating informant urgently, prior approval is not required but notification must be given as soon as reasonably practicable and, in any event, not less than seven days after deployment.

Our amendment attempts to square the circle. How can you have prior judicial authorisation without getting the Investigatory Powers Commissioner involved in the sordid details of participating informants but at the same time safeguarding against the kind of malpractice we have seen in the past, such as that described by the noble Lord, Lord Hain: infiltrating anti-apartheid groups, the Lawrence family support group, legitimate environmental groups and trade unions?

I believe that Amendment 17 provides prior authority by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in a way that would be more practical in an operational setting. Amendments 22 and 33 lack the power to stop a CCA without Amendment 34; in any event, they do not amount to prior judicial authorisation, which is what many noble Lords have been calling for. As Amendment 17 authorises the deployment once the CCA has been granted, and not the criminal conduct authority itself, I believe that it is consistent with Amendments 5 and 16—that these amendments, if passed, would not pre-empt Amendment 17, which would also not pre-empt any other amendments in this group.

In Committee, the Minister said:

“We have been consistently clear that we want this important legislation to command the confidence of Parliament and the public and are thus willing to consider proposals which provide greater reassurance on oversight but do not impact operational effectiveness.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 651.]


As a former police officer, I can say that this amendment fits the Bill. I intend to test the opinion of the House when we get to Amendment 17.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

7: Clause 1, page 2, line 27, after “detecting” insert “serious”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will limit the crime whose prevention or detection is the basis of a criminal conduct authorisation to serious crime.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 7, I will speak also to Amendments 8, 9 and 10 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The primary force of this Bill comes from inserting a new clause into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 deals with the interception of communication warrants that have to be issued by a Secretary of State. It states that the Secretary of State shall not issue an interception warrant unless she believes it is necessary, and it goes on to define “necessary” in subsection (3):

“Subject to the following provisions of this section, a warrant is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is necessary—(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.


There is a paragraph (d), but it is not relevant today. This definition of “necessary” appears at other places in the 2000 Act, including Section 32, on the “Authorisation of intrusive surveillance”.

Section 81 deals with general interpretations and subsection (3) sets out the tests, either of which need to be satisfied if a crime is to be considered a “serious” crime, and they are:

“(a) that the offence or one of the offences that is or would be constituted by the conduct is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of twenty-one and has no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more; (b) that the conduct involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose.”


In previous groups, we have set out why we believe covert human intelligence sources committing crimes is more serious than other forms of intrusive surveillance. Agents or informants are difficult to pull out of a situation if it suddenly changes, whereas listening devices can be switched off. Agents or informants are often placed at continuing personal risk in a way that technicians deploying listening devices are not. Listening devices are deployed against serious criminals, but innocent bystanders are more likely to be caught up in the criminal activity of agents or informants.

The list goes on, and yet this Bill allows criminal conduct authorisations to be granted in order to tackle any sort of crime and any level of disorder. Of course, CCAs have to be necessary and proportionate, but so does the deployment of listening devices, the interception of communication and the interference of equipment as set out in the other parts of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. But in those cases, in addition to being necessary and proportionate, they also have to target “serious” crime.

The Government make great play of the fact that these new provisions should be consistent with existing provisions in this area. In that case, they should agree to our Amendments 7 and 10, which limit the granting of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime as defined by the 2000 Act. Preventing disorder is not mentioned in any of the existing provisions of the 2000 Act. We believe that a clear distinction needs to be made between, say, lawful protests, marches and demonstrations, and serious disorder. Our Amendment 8 seeks to achieve this.

Amendment 9 takes a slightly different approach, as things have moved on from when the 2000 Act was drafted. The issue of the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom has been considered by this House more recently. In the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, in various places—including subsection (2)(c) of Section 20, which deals with the grounds on which targeted interception warrants are granted—the necessary grounds include it being

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.

The same definition applies to obtaining communications data, bulk interception warrants, bulk equipment interference warrants and, in fact, every provision for the granting of authorisations in the 2016 Act.

This House considered the same issue in relation to the powers granted to border security officers to stop, question and detain under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Under part 1 of Schedule 3, an “act” is defined in paragraph 1(6) as hostile if, among other things, it

“threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in a way relevant to the interests of national security”.

The same definition, including the additional phrase

“in a way relevant to the interests of national security”,

appears in relation to the power to make and retain copies of articles.

We had exactly the same discussions when it came to those Bills, which post-date the 2000 Act, as we are having now: that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom needs to be qualified to include where that is relevant to the interests of national security. In relation to the 2016 and 2019 Acts, the Government accepted those arguments and changed the legislation. In case the Minister raises it, the definition of “serious” crime in the 2016 and 2019 Acts is almost identical to that in the 2000 Act.

The Minister will have to come up with a convincing argument as to why this Bill is different from both the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Quite clearly, consistency with the 2000 Act was not accepted as a good enough reason when it came to the 2016 and 2019 Acts. If the Minister fails to produce a compelling reason not to accept our Amendment 9, I intend to test the opinion of the House.

On Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I simply repeat what I said in Committee. For as long as I can remember, the use of an agent provocateur was explicitly prohibited in police guidance on participating informants, and yet it appears nowhere in this Bill, nor in the draft statutory codes of practice.

The only argument that the Minister came up with against this amendment in Committee was that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to a fair trial, an existing principle of English and Scottish law, and that the use of agents provocateurs could affect a fair trial. He also pointed out that Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows a court to consider and exclude such evidence. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, convincingly responded to the Minister in Committee, agents provocateurs may be used in circumstances where there is no trial. For example, agents provocateurs may provoke a legitimate organisation to do or say something that undermines its credibility in the eyes of the public, short of a criminal offence, or they may provoke criminal offences that would otherwise not have been committed where no one is arrested or charged. The Government’s argument appears to be that agents provocateurs are acceptable provided that no one faces trial.

Amendment 11 is necessary, and we will support it if the noble Baroness divides the House. I beg to move Amendment 7.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for putting the argument for my Amendment 11, which is supported by him and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I intend to press that amendment.

Forgive me, but I am not being rhetorical here: I do not think this amendment should be controversial in substance. I think the only difference between the Minister and me on this issue will be on whether the amendment is necessary to deliver my intention or whether the protection already exists in the legislation.

I shall briefly make the argument to the Minister. One of the grounds for authorising criminal conduct in what will become Section 29B is

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

We have just said that that belief must now be reasonable. Let us say that I work for one of the security agencies or indeed a police force, and I take the view that a particular environmental movement proposes the most extreme measures in the fight against climate change and that the agenda promoted by this organisation—perhaps not today but in five years’ time—is so extreme a green position that it will severely damage the economic interests of the United Kingdom. I also perhaps believe that, while that movement is yet to become extreme in its direct action, that may well happen in future, and I believe that it is in the economic and possibly even the national security interests of the United Kingdom to head this movement off at the pass and discredit it in the public eye before the damage is done.

Therefore I authorise an agent—a CHIS—to commit crime, not because it is necessary to keep their cover but to discredit the organisation, which to date has not been involved in violence or anything that is actually criminal. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, I then authorise a crime. The agent commits a crime, and the undercover agent is the only person in that group who has committed a crime, but the crime has such consequences that it discredits that peaceful protest movement in the eyes of the media, the public and the Government. It possibly justifies if not a criminal prosecution then perhaps the banning of that organisation. Article 6, and criminal court rules against entrapment and so on, will not help because there is no trial.

It seems to me that currently in the Bill there is nothing to prevent an agent provocateur who is used to incriminate peaceful protest. This is not an academic issue; it is an issue of grave concern to trade unions, the environmental movement, the Black Lives Matter movement and others involved in peaceful dissent. This has been a problem in our country and elsewhere in the world throughout the history of peaceful protest, so I urge the Minister to consider accepting the amendment. It would do no violence to the stated intentions of her policy or the legislative scheme that she is intending to pass.

Finally, I echo the kind words of my noble friend Lord Rosser towards James Brokenshire, who may be in the other House but whom I have experience of being in very heated debates with for the media. He is a kind and gentle man worthy of this House who could teach a lot of us a few things about tone and civility. I am sure that I join the whole House, remote and present, in sending thoughts and prayers and every possible good wish for his speedy and complete recovery.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

Does the Minister wish to reply? No? Okay—I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions, but, first, I send my best wishes to the right honourable James Brokenshire. James and I have known each other for a very long time—since my policing days—and he is such a lovely guy. I really hope that he recovers completely from the terrible situation that he is in.

I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble Lord, Lord Judd, for their support. The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, gave no reason why the ISC did not want these powers limited to serious crime, when so many other aspects of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act are limited to serious crime, and arguably this is more serious than those powers.

I was a little confused by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who gave two examples of very serious criminal offences, which are of course covered by those aspects of the power that refer to the prevention and detection of crime. We are talking here about something that has an impact on the economic well-being of the UK that is not a crime, because if it was a crime it would be covered by that other aspect. I am sure that they were very important cases, but they were cases of crime, not simply impacting the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.

It sounded as though the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, was talking about the deployment of covert human intelligence sources, rather than authorising those CHIS to commit crime. I do not understand this from what anyone has said, including the Minister: if something threatens the economic well-being of the UK but is not a crime—if it was it would be covered by one of the criteria of preventing or detecting crime—how can it be necessary and proportionate, unless it also involves an issue of national security, to authorise somebody to commit a crime to deal with something that is not a crime?

On that basis, because there has not been a satisfactory response, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 7.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 30, at end insert “so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would allow a criminal conduct authorisation to be granted on economic grounds only if it is also relevant to the interests of national security, reflecting equivalent provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we live in a patriarchal, male-dominated society where, on average, men are physically stronger and have higher incomes. On average, men are more able to physically abuse and economically dominate a relationship, but that does not mean that domestic abuse is exclusively or overwhelmingly perpetrated by men on women. Some women are physically stronger than some men. Some women are the main income earners, both in same-sex and in opposite-sex relationships. There is little evidence that men are psychologically stronger than women, stronger willed or more emotionally resilient, for example.

According to ONS data, although domestic abuse is prevalent, it is often hidden and therefore difficult to quantify. Although there is a reluctance to report all types of domestic abuse, half of male victims fail to tell anyone that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and male victims are almost three times less likely to tell anyone than female victims. Domestic abuse against men is likely to be even less visible than domestic abuse against women.

There also appears to be a reluctance on the part of victims to report same-sex domestic abuse. Male victims of domestic violence are more likely to report that the perpetrator was female than male: 61% compared with only 1%. Female victims are more likely to report that the perpetrator was male rather than female: 56% compared with 2%. But these figures need to be treated with caution. One third of male victims and 40% of female victims in these surveys stated that they did not know the sex of the perpetrator or did not wish to answer the question.

To use a personal example, I was earning eight times more than my abusive partner, but he was physically and psychologically stronger than me, enabling his coercive and controlling behaviour. I was a senior police officer at the time, but I did not tell anyone about the abuse for years, until it became physically dangerous. Even then, I did not report it to the police, despite being beaten up in the street. When I finally managed to leave, he threatened to kill me and said that he would get his revenge. Eighteen months later, he collaborated with a Sunday tabloid newspaper, making false criminal allegations and describing intimate details of our relationship in a kiss and tell story, which the newspaper eventually admitted was libellous. The threat of revenge and abuse after separation can continue for years.

Domestic abuse in all its forms can be perpetrated by both men and women on both men and women. The true picture of the levels of abuse is unclear, in part because of the pressure to conform to the traditional, socially accepted norm of male-dominated heterosexual relationships. According to ONS figures, one third of victims of domestic abuse are men, but only 4% of victims being supported by local domestic violence services are men. We must make it absolutely clear throughout this Bill, and throughout the statutory guidance, that the provisions apply equally to all victims of domestic abuse, and the services provided should be proportional to the needs of all victims, whatever their gender or sexuality. Domestic abuse is domestic abuse, whoever the perpetrator is and whoever the survivor is. Not feeling safe in your own home is one of the worst positions anyone can find themselves in. We have an opportunity here to help.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]]

My Lords, unlike, I think, every other speaker to these amendments so far, I do not support them. I see in them, once again, attempts to impose yet more conditions that may affect the effectiveness of the operation of undercover support and sources doing what I thought was generally agreed to be vital work in the interests of enforcement and the life of people in our country. I say at the start that a number of these things, and the worry about how these powers may be exercised, do not pay respect to the fact of the code of practice, which many have said should be required reading for everybody taking part in these debates. The importance of that code of practice is that it is going to have to be approved by both Houses of Parliament. That will be a very important protection, because it is under that code of practice that authorising officers issuing CCAs, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, will obviously be required to act.

I make no apology for repeating what I said on an earlier amendment in quoting James Brokenshire, the Minister for Security, when he gave the astonishing figures for a single year in London alone. The use of undercover sources resulted in 3,500 arrests, the recovery of more than 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, the seizure of more than 400 kilograms of class A drugs and the recovery of more than £2.5 million in cash. It also enabled, which I did not mention, the National Crime Agency to safeguard several hundred victims of crime, including from child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those figures alone, just from London in one year, surely leave nobody in any doubt of the importance of this vital source of support for preserving an orderly and law-abiding society. I make this point because, under the code of practice, which includes this question, others are seeking to add the word “serious” to “crime”. How does an authorising officer react when an informant comes and says, “There is a group of people who are starting to get together, I am not quite sure what they are up to, but I think there is a real risk that it could turn, later on, into something much nastier”?

When one looks at those figures I quoted from James Brokenshire, how many lives have been saved; how many people’s lives have not been disrupted; how much misery and poverty that might otherwise have entailed has been prevented? For these reasons, I am not persuaded of the need to add “serious” to crime; I think it might inhibit the operation of a properly authorised issuer of a CCA, who obviously has to use his judgment, and has to persuade the IPC as well that his judgment is correct and is in line with the code of practice.

I should also say a word about preventing disorder. We are living in extremely difficult and dangerous times at the moment. We know that the power of social media now makes it possible, in an instant, practically, to organise major demonstrations which may, in fact, be based on that new and horrid ingredient “fake news”. These may disrupt many people’s lives and may cost people’s lives. Although there are many very worthy causes—whether it is Black Lives Matter or Extinction Rebellion—pursuing very understandable and admirable objectives, none the less we also know that around the fringes of those organisations, or in the confusion that some of their demonstrations cause, other sources of crime can easily emerge and it often makes opportunities for gangs to commit many more crimes as well. So I would not delete “preventing disorder”, provided it is properly covered within the code of practice.

The other thing I would just add is about economic well-being. I totally support trade unions—I always have done and, as Secretary of State for Employment, I was obviously closely involved—and legitimate trade union activity. However, we all know that, within our lifetime, we have had one or two instances where that has not been the case. One instance was the miners’ strike, when Mr Arthur Scargill said that one of his objectives was to bring down the Government, and he was not averse, in the process, to accepting money from the Soviet Union in pursuit of that objective. It is to the credit of Neil Kinnock, now the noble Lord, Lord Kinnock, if I may say so, that he would not support him at that time, because Mr Scargill had not put the issue to a vote of the whole trade union movement.

I think we have seen here, and I understood at the beginning of this, that virtually all noble Lords recognise the vital importance of undercover source information and for there to be a proper system, a statutory system, under which they would operate. That is what I wish to see. I wish to see a thoroughly effective code of practice, thoroughly trained issuing officers and rapid and close contact with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as they carry out their work.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I accept that it is difficult to separate these issues, but I will leave discussion of economic well-being and the activities of trade unions and trade unionists until the relevant groups.

As drafted, the Bill defines very broadly when a criminal conduct authorisation is necessary, and this group of amendments focuses on the new Section 29B(5)(b) inserted into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by Clause 1(5) of this Bill. It states:

“A criminal conduct authorisation is necessary … if it is necessary … for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder”.


Crime and disorder have very wide definitions, as noble Lords have set out in this debate.

As we have already debated, tasking a CHIS to participate in crime is a very serious step for any authority to take, with all the implications for the rule of law and the potential for abuse that we have already debated, and because of the potential danger it places the CHIS in, about which we will discuss more in a later group. In many situations it could have far more negative consequences for innocent people than the interception of communications, and we should not forget that we are amending legislation that was originally intended to cover, when drafted, only the interception of communications.

The legislation covering such interception limits the use of its powers to cases of serious crime. Even in my limited seven years in this House, I have lost count of the definitions of serious crime in different pieces of legislation. It could be argued that, if we wanted to limit the power to grant a CCA to cases of serious criminality, we could choose whatever definition of serious crime we liked.

The noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Hain, have decided in their Amendment 22 to define serious crime as indictable offences only, but I am glad to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is attracted to our definition rather than the one in his own amendment.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has clearly articulated, we have gone with the definition already used in RIPA—for the sake of consistency, at least within the Act itself. The principle, however, is the same: that this power to grant a criminal conduct authorisation should be limited to serious crime.

The Government may say that, in addition to being necessary, the granting of a CCA must also be proportionate, and it would not be proportionate to deploy CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. The same argument applies, however, to the interception of communications in RIPA, where “necessity” is already limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31.

The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, talked about the code of practice. There is, however, a definition of serious crime in RIPA despite the existence of the code of practice for the interception of communications. The noble Lord also talked about the impressive array of offences that had been detected as a result of the deployment of CHIS, including those relating to firearms, drug-dealing and child sexual exploitation. All those examples would fall within our definition of serious crime.

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, even though geese and ganders are different in some important respects. RIPA limits the interception of communications to serious crime, so this Bill should limit the issuing of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime using the same definition.

The second issue is more difficult and more controversial, starting with the fact that the prevention of disorder is not one of the necessary grounds for the interception of communications. The Government are already on the back foot here, in that large-scale disruptive disorder can have very serious consequences for society yet there is no power to intercept the communications of organisers of disorder in order to prevent it. None the less, there is an argument for both the interception of such communications and the deployment of CHIS into groups that are planning to cause widespread disruption that could seriously affect public order, cause damage to property and the economy, prevent people going about their day-to-day business, and create fear among innocent bystanders.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for what the Minister has said and appreciate that she has to stick to her script, but it gives the impression on occasion that there is no point in making contributions to debate because what I have said appears, from what she has said, to have been completely ignored. I will repeat exactly what I said. I said that of course the Government may say that in addition to being necessary the granting of a CCA must be proportionate—the issue that she mentioned—and it would not be proportionate to deploy a CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. That is almost word for word what she said. However, I went on to say that the same argument applies to the interception of communications in RIPA, where necessity is limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31. That second point seems to have been completely ignored by the Minister. I accept that that is probably because she has, understandably, just stuck to her script. It comes back to the point that I made, which is: what is the point of making speeches in debates if what noble Lords say is ignored by the Minister?

The Minister said that these amendments would limit how CHIS could lawfully be deployed and seek to restrict their deployment, and authorities would be less able to investigate crime. This Bill is about criminal conduct by CHIS, not their deployment. It is about giving authority to agents and informants to commit crime, and grant complete legal immunity to CHIS in those circumstances. There is a world of difference between deploying a CHIS and authorising them to commit crime, and then granting them immunity from prosecution. Yet the whole basis of her argument, from what I understood her to say, is that there is no difference between the two. In which case, what is the purpose of the Bill?

I say again: why is the interception of communications limited to serious crime if there is no need to limit the deployment of CHIS, who are going to be authorised to commit crime? Why should they not be limited to serious crime? That is a question that the Minister has failed to answer.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord, with whom I am actually good friends, makes a valid point: what is the point in making speeches if points are ignored? I often find that I make the same points over and again, and they are completely ignored because such is the will of people to make their opposite points. However, on this occasion, he is absolutely right. I did not address his point about RIPA and it being confined to serious crime. In the interception of communications, we are dealing with machines. In the deployment of humans, we are dealing with something else. I apologise to him for not answering his point.

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Many in this House are here only because of their involvement in politics, which is a fundamental right in a free society. The legislation before us is an inadequate framework that includes few safeguards. The backdrop is a history of recent police abuse and failure to respect human rights. Legislation is required to create a framework and this Bill is an opportunity to do that. However, as currently framed, it is inadequate and provides few safeguards. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Government could outline the circumstances in which they believe it is acceptable to undertake surveillance of those involved in political activities.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start by making it absolutely clear that I do not blame the Minister or those who have written her brief. All I am saying to the House is that Members of this House involved in this debate have hands-on experience of these issues. I include the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, in that. I ask the Government to listen very carefully to those with that experience; that is all. I can confirm that the Minister and I are friends.

The amendments in this group seek to prevent the use of criminal conduct authorisations in connection with the activities of trade unions or legitimate political activity, or to compile lists to exclude people from employment because of their involvement with trade unions or their activities. Others seek to ensure that they are not used disproportionately against minorities and to find out how the Government intend to respond to the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

There are difficulties with Amendments 28 and 29. What happens if a trade union, or its members, is involved in criminal or seditious activity, such as, as was suggested earlier, the activities of Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers? Who defines what political activity is legitimate? If members of a trade union have been involved in criminal activity, are there not circumstances where they could legitimately be discriminated against by employers?

We have sought to take a more general approach. In an earlier group, I mentioned our Amendment 56A in this group. It might have been better in the group where we discussed prior judicial authorisation, but the amendment did not come to me until midway through that debate. That is why it is in this group. However, it addresses exactly the issues that the noble Baroness just spoke about. Therefore, it is legitimate for it to be in this group.

I believe there is consensus around the House that agents of the state, in particular the police, should not be able to authorise covert human intelligence sources—an informant or agent—to participate in crime, granting everyone involved legal immunity in the process, without more rigorous and independent oversight. Otherwise, the sort of activity that the amendments in this group seek to prevent could take place.

As we have already debated, the problem with the prior judicial authorisation of a criminal conduct authorisation, which has to define very precisely what exactly the CHIS is or is not allowed to do, is that the agent or informant is often being sent into an uncertain, rapidly changing scenario in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. Straitjacketing the agent into an exact set of actions, stepping outside of which would remove his legal immunity, is not practical, not least if the CCA has to be referred back to a judge, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or even a Secretary of State before the criminal conduct authorisation can be changed. These are often fast-moving situations, involving complex human interactions that cannot be paused while a decision is made.

It is essential that covert human intelligence sources are not tasked to commit crime in a way that is not legitimate, whether by mistake or corruptly. The draft revised code of practice is not reassuring on this point. For clarity, I will set out what could happen in practice: a handler, who is in in contact with the informant and wants him to participate in crime, makes an application to an authorising officer—in urgent cases, a police inspector or equivalent and, otherwise, a superintendent. Paragraph 5.8 of the draft code of practice says:

“authorising officers should, where possible, be independent of the investigation. However, it is recognised that this is not always possible”.

There could be a situation where a drugs squad sergeant investigating a drugs gang gets urgent authority from his own drugs squad inspector to authorise an undercover drugs squad officer to engage in a drug deal in which the sergeant, the undercover officer and, arguably, the authorising officer are all immune from legal action. It is not difficult to see the potential for abuse in such situations. Noble Lords will be able to imagine a similar scenario, where the target of the operation is a legitimate peaceful protest or the proper activities of a trade union.

Amendment 56A in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee seeks to resolve this conundrum. It seeks to ensure that, if it is intended that an agent or informant is to participate in crime, the

“nature and extent of the deployment have been approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner”

in advance, not the precise details of the criminal conduct authorisation. It is pre-approval, if you will: a CCA cannot be granted unless and until the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has agreed to the mission, in general terms, on which the CHIS is about to embark.

The amendment does not require the prior approval of the exact and precise terms of the criminal conduct authorisation. Instead,

“the purpose and extent of the deployment, and … the type of criminal activity”

likely to be involved must be explained, in general terms, to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who must approve the use of the agent or informant in the intended way. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner could, for example, approve the deployment of an agent into a terrorist organisation, but would, in all likelihood, refuse the use of a CHIS to spy on the legitimate activities of a trade union.

We suggest that this would provide the reassurance that many noble Lords seek by ensuring that a covert human intelligence source should not participate in crime without prior judicial approval, but without the Investigatory Powers Commissioner becoming involved in trying to understand the personality of the CHIS and those he will interact with, or becoming involved in the exact detail of the criminal conduct authorisation prior to the event. It would give the handler the flexibility he needs, but ensure that the CHIS is deployed only for a legitimate purpose. Such prior approval of deployment would apply only where it is intended that the agent or informant will be authorised to commit crime.

Clearly, there needs to be provision for urgent cases, which the amendment attempts to give, but what constitutes an urgent case also needs to be defined—although there is guidance in the draft code of practice about this. The question of legal immunity needs to be dealt with separately, but I urge the Government to seriously consider this compromise, and I hope that the Minister will undertake to discuss this amendment with me before Report.

As with all activity by the state and its actors, the impact on minorities should be monitored, and we support Amendment 78. However, we feel that it is too early to expect the Government to set out how they will respond to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, as this will depend on its findings.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave a very graceful explanation of his previous intervention. Perhaps I should do the same and at the same time apologise to civil servants. If we accept what the Minister has said —that such actions as sleeping with campaigners to infiltrate those campaigns was illegal then and is illegal now—that still means that four Met commissioners sat in front of the body holding them to account and refused to commit to that. What does that say about our senior officers? We always have to bear this in mind, and I have been involved in this struggle for the past 20 years.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I have just one question. She said that the scenario I suggested could not happen because police forces had dedicated source units. Can she point to where in the Bill or in the codes of practice it says that that has to be the case? If not, the Bill or the code of practice is defective.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord will appreciate that not every Bill contains every minute detail of issues such as this, but I hope that, with my having made the statement on the Floor of the House, the noble Lord is satisfied that there cannot be conflict. However, I would be very happy to speak to him about this before Report.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about seeking clarity as to who is covered not just because a criminal conduct authorisation authorises somebody to commit a crime, but because they have, as a consequence, both civil and criminal legal immunity. As we and other noble Lords have argued, immunity from prosecution should be decided after the event by the independent prosecuting authority—disagreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. However, these amendments raise important questions, not least about legal immunity.

The first person covered, without doubt, is the agent or informant—the covert human intelligence source. If the CHIS is asked or ordered to participate in crime then if anyone is to be given legal immunity, it should be him. The question then becomes: is a handler who asks or orders a CHIS to commit crime, whether or not the request or order is legitimate, also covered by legal immunity? This arises from the fact that he can request or order a CHIS to commit crime only if he, in turn, has been given authority to issue such a request or order by the authorising officer. If the authorising officer has told the handler that he is permitted to request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the handler also have legal immunity, in that it is then the authorising officer’s decision, not that of the handler? Then, if the authorising officer has agreed that the handler can request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the authorising officer too not be covered by legal immunity?

What the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was aiming at with his amendment came as something of a surprise. I do not understand how, under the terms of the Bill, a corporation can be authorised to carry out crime. Surely, it has to be an individual—the covert human intelligence source himself or herself—who is authorised, not a corporation. While I accept that some work of the police service, for example, or the security services may be outsourced, surely that corporation would have to be listed as an authorising authority in the Bill if that were the case.

There would be unintended consequences of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, if the only person who can be authorised to commit a crime is an undercover police officer or a James Bond-type character in the security services, and not a criminal who is helping the police or, indeed, somebody in a foreign country who is simply an employee of an organisation that interests the security services and who passes information back, not an employee of the security services. That would surely leave a big hole in what the Bill attempts to achieve. We cannot support Amendment 53. However, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response to my question, and that of other noble Lords: who is covered by the CCA? Is it the CHIS who commits the crime, the handler who tells him to commit the crime, the officer who authorises the handler to tell the CHIS to commit the crime, or all three?

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in the names of my noble friends Lady Massey of Darwen and Lord Dubs removes from the definition in the Bill of authorised criminal conduct the words

“by or in relation to”

the specified covert human intelligence source. It replaces those words with a more detailed definition; namely, that it is conduct by

“the covert human intelligence source”

or by a person who holds a rank, office, or position in the public authority that is granting the authorisation and is assisting in the behaviour of the covert human intelligence source. As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, this amendment was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Under the terms of the Bill, authorised conduct is not limited to the conduct of the covert human intelligence source. The code of practice says that a criminal conduct authorisation may also authorise conduct by someone else in relation to a covert human intelligence source, with that someone else being those within a public authority involved in or affected by the authorisation.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 39, they need to set out in their response the reasons why they consider it necessary to provide for the authorisation of criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source; the parameters of that criminal conduct by someone other than the CHIS that can be so authorised; and the safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the person authorised to commit criminal conduct—who is someone other than the covert human intelligence source—is not also involved in any way in the authorisation process to which that criminal conduct relates.

I shall listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 39 and to the pertinent questions raised by my noble friend Lord Sikka in speaking to his amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister, and hand signals suggest it may be the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation. I am not sure I explained myself well enough to her in terms of who is covered by legal immunity. It is not if the CHIS goes beyond the CCA, but if the CHIS remains within the CCA. So, if the CHIS operates exactly in the way the handler has told them to, and the handler tells them only what the authorising officer has authorised them to, but it is not necessary or proportionate, it is corrupt or a mistake, who is covered by the CCA? Who is covered by the immunity, even though the CHIS has not gone beyond what they were asked to do?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I say again that each situation will be different, but I understand the noble Lord’s point that if the CHIS is acting as instructed, but the handler has gone beyond where they should have gone, it would be the handler’s authorising officer who would be liable for that activity. There would be an investigation, but at that point, we are talking about a theoretical case. If it was the handler who had acted beyond their purview, the handler would be liable for that handling activity, or the authorising officer. It is late, I am tired, and I have suddenly forgotten my thread.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, is not participating in this debate, so I call the next speaker, who is the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too signed the amendment, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has very adequately introduced. When I think back to my experience in the Metropolitan Police Service and the instructions that we had, acting as an agent provocateur was clearly and explicitly prohibited as that relates to covert human intelligence sources committing crime. However, unless I have missed it, I cannot find in the Bill or in the draft code of practice any explicit reference to “agent provocateur”.

To repeat what the noble Baroness said in different terms, an agent provocateur is someone who commits a crime or encourages others to commit a crime that would not have been committed had it not been for the actions of the CHIS, or it relates to a situation in which the CHIS commits a crime and then blames the organisation for that crime, which members of the organisation had no intention of committing. In other words, the crime would never have taken place had it not been for the presence of the CHIS.

I look forward to hearing from the Minister where I have missed that explicit instruction, either in the Bill or in the codes of practice. I stress to her that, although I understand that this scenario could not happen under existing guidelines in the police service, we in this House want reassurance either in the Bill or in the codes of practice that it is prohibited.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, my contribution on this amendment will be fairly short. I hear the point that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti makes and I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this issue is not mentioned in the Bill. Therefore, I am not quite clear whether the amendment is necessary. It would help us if, when the Minister responds, she could say something about the detail of the authorisations in a CCA.

Behind all the amendments today are concerns and worries about what may or may not have happened in the past. People want reassurance going forward, but they are not seeing it. I see that theme across all our discussions today. At some point, the Government will probably have to go a bit further to provide that reassurance, although I do not know how they will do that.

All these issues have been raised because of concerns that people have had in the past. As my noble friend said, we do not know whether we can stop this in the future, but I hope that the Minister can go a bit further. I cannot see any particular issue but, if I am right, the reason behind an authorisation would have to be recorded and shared with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That is the issue on which we need reassurance, as we move forward and give people new powers.

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[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank unreservedly the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, for the way in which he introduced this amendment. It was a challenge to us all. In protecting the values of our society, of which we like to speak so often, and in protecting the young and the vulnerable, there have to be some absolutes. I am glad that some of the other amendments have drawn attention to other vulnerable people who have been through nightmare experiences, and to whom the damage from being used in this way can be quite incredible.

We have to take seriously—again—the point that I have made several times this afternoon. I am afraid that we could be giving those who seek to undermine our society a victory, because they have provoked us into a situation in which we have acted against what we know to be essential. Nobody can calculate the damage to young people of being used in this way. Very few can really understand or analyse the damage done to other vulnerable people by being used in this way.

So, if we are going to stand firm for the society in which we believe, we must not allow ourselves to give in on these things; we must have absolutes. I therefore counsel those who have moved important amendments raising very serious points about “exceptional circumstances” to consider that probably, in this situation, there are no exceptions. We have to make our stand absolute and, in that way, we can win the battle for humanity that we are determined to win. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young, for having challenged us so clearly.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee will not welcome me trying to summarise what has been said, and I could not do justice to the excellent contributions that we have heard, not least from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who completely summed up the position with a very compelling argument, using the analogy with torture that the ends do not justify the means—in the case of this Bill, using children as CHISs and authorising them to commit crimes.

A number of noble Lords said—and the Minister may be about to tell us—that it is a very small number of children who are actually involved in this sort of activity. But the whole reason for using child CHISs that the Government use to try to justify it is that the growth in child sexual exploitation, the growth in county lines drug dealing and the growth in human trafficking mean that they need to use more children as CHISs. These are not going to be small numbers for very long—that is the point I am trying to make.

The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, in her excellent speech, asked us to consider placing one of our own 15 year-old or 16 year-old sons or daughters into such a situation. But I ask the Minister to imagine being put herself—let alone a child—into a criminal gang and being asked to try to carry off an act where she was pretending to be part of a gang and at the same time passing information to the police, or being asked to commit a criminal offence.

Many of these children, as other noble Lords have said, are vulnerable, either because they have substance misuse problems, because they are looked-after children or simply because their decision-making is immature because of the physiology of the brain, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, said. This is a horrifying situation in which to place anybody, let alone a child. As my noble friends Lady Doocey and Lady Hamwee said, this should not apply just to children who are vulnerable; there are many vulnerable adults who, arguably, are more vulnerable than some streetwise teenagers. We are, again, very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, in that respect.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

49: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“( ) A criminal conduct authorisation must be reviewed monthly by the person by whom it is granted.( ) A criminal conduct authorisation ceases to have effect on the date it provides, which must be no later than four calendar months after the date it is granted.”Member’s explanatory statement
Under this amendment a criminal conduct authorisation would be reviewed monthly and expire after four months.

[Lord Paddick (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have debated at length, authorising a CHIS to commit crime and granting immunity to that CHIS and maybe others involved is a far more serious thing to do than simply deploying a CHIS. We felt that to expect such an authorisation to last for 12 months—and, in the code of practice, with no mandatory review within that 12-month period but purely at the discretion of the authorising officer—was too much; it is far too long for a criminal conduct authorisation to be in place and not be reviewed.

We cast around for what a reasonable period might be and went back to what I referred to before: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000, amended by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) (Amendment) Order 2018. The initial order changed the period for authorising a juvenile CHIS from one year to one month. The 2018 order amended that to four months with a monthly review, recognising how much more serious it is to deploy a juvenile CHIS than an adult CHIS. Therefore, bearing in mind how serious a CCA is compared with the deployment of a CHIS in other circumstances, we felt that a four-month cut-off for a CCA with monthly reviews was the appropriate limitation to be placed on a CCA in line with the authorisation for juvenile CHISs. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

I will speak briefly in full-blooded support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and an amendment that seems to me like a no-brainer. The worst abuses of undercover policing, as are emerging in the inquiry, have related to people who have been embedded for a long time without adequate review, and obviously the risk of abuse is greater the longer a person builds their legend and is embedded without proper review.

Given that all time limits are arbitrary, it is right that we look for something relatively short, given the gravity of the line that is being crossed with this legislation for criminal conduct. The noble Lord has come to a very decent compromise with the monthly review and the four-month maximum on licensing people to commit crime.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I hope to provide the clarity that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, seeks and persuade the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this is not necessary in the Bill. The current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities listed in the Bill.

In the updated CHIS code of practice that accompanies the Bill, it is clear that a criminal conduct authorisation should be relied upon for as short a duration as possible. There is also a requirement on authorising officers to undertake regular reviews to assess whether the authorisation remains necessary and proportionate, and is justified. An authorisation must be cancelled when that is no longer the case.

Authorisations will be specifically and narrowly drafted and, in many cases, the specificity of the authorisation will mean that the criminal conduct authorised is in effect narrowly time-limited. However, there will be occasions when this conduct necessarily extends longer than a four-month period; CHIS who are members of proscribed organisations is a good example of this.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for what she just said and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support. I do not quite understand the position of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. If 12 months is specified as the length of a CCA in the Bill then why, if we want to change it to four months, should it not be in the Bill? The Minister is saying it is consistent with the period for authorising CHIS, but not the period for authorising juvenile CHIS. It is a much more serious issue than simply authorising CHIS, as we have discussed. Authorising someone to commit a crime and giving them immunity from prosecution is far more serious than simply deploying CHIS.

To say that it makes it easier if the length of time is the same for one as it is for the other is to ignore the seriousness of this deployment—authorising CHIS to commit crime. If you were to follow the noble Baroness’s argument to its logical conclusion, you would not need the Bill to authorise CHIS to commit crime, as it would be just the same as deploying CHIS. No doubt we will return to this on Report but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a lengthy and complex debate, and I blame the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for that; we tried to split this group to make it more manageable, but his will prevailed.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, amendments in this group are on prior authorisation by a judge; by an investigatory powers commissioner; by an investigatory powers commissioner unless it is urgent; by an investigatory powers commissioner if a criminal conduct authority is to be used to identify a journalistic source; and by a Secretary of State. Another amendment requires that an investigatory powers commissioner be notified

“as soon as … practicable, and in any event within seven days”

and that the police authority be involved in holding the chief constable to account as a result of the investigatory powers commissioner’s annual report on the use of CCAs.

It is understandable that noble Lords want prior notification—and why the police should not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, mark their own homework. On the advice of one noble Lord, I read the code of practice that goes with this Bill. I have held both ranks that could grant a criminal conduct authority under this Bill. In urgent cases, that is an inspector, who can not only grant a criminal conduct authority but also grant immunity from prosecution. I was an inspector at the age of 24. I was also, subsequently, a controller of covert human intelligence sources. I spent 18 years as a uniformed officer. On the Friday I left the office as a uniformed chief inspector and on the Monday morning I was a detective chief inspector in the role of a controller. The Government may say that all the people involved in the matters considered by this Bill will be experienced and highly trained, but that is not always the case in my experience.

We should listen very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated why prior authorisation is not practical, a point also made by the Minister for Security in another place and by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. From my experience I agree, although the description of MI5 handlers and agents as beyond reproach is not, in my experience, universally applicable to police handlers and informants.

Any prior authorisation would instruct CHIS to operate within strict parameters, which may no longer be necessary or proportionate once they are deployed, or may not be adequate once they are deployed, because they are being deployed into rapidly changing scenarios in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. The most common use of CHIS in policing, for example, is to counter drug dealing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has said, you cannot turn an agent on and off like you can a listening device.

Even the most experienced undercover officer may have to necessarily and proportionately go beyond the strict parameters of a CCA because the situation has dramatically changed in ways unforeseen by the handler. If he were to strictly adhere precisely to a CCA, he could put himself in danger of losing his life. As we will hear in later groups, children are increasingly being used as covert human intelligence sources, some of whom have chaotic lifestyles. Sometimes they are drug users or drug dealers. To expect such people to operate within the strict and precise boundaries of a CCA in such turbulent situations is not only unfair and unreasonable but completely unrealistic. To determine the strict parameters of a CCA to cover every possible scenario, in the middle of a rapidly changing situation, and when the legal immunity of both handler and CHIS depends on it, is unfair and unreasonable to both handler and CHIS.

Those proposing prior authorisation by judges, Investigatory Powers Commissioners and government Ministers may say that any conduct outside the strict parameters of a CCA will be looked at by the prosecuting authorities and a decision made whether to prosecute using the public interest test. In that case, why can the prosecuting authorities not look at all the actions of the CHIS and the handler and decide whether to prosecute?

Amendment 46, for which there seems to be a good deal of support around the House, suggests that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be given notice where a person grants a criminal conduct authorisation as soon as practicable and, in any event, within seven days—but, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, so what? What power does the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have to intervene? What happens if the handler corruptly tasks an informant to commit crime? As the authority has already been granted, both CHIS and handler have legal immunity, even if the handler informs the Investigatory Powers Commissioner six days later. A wronged party may be able to claim compensation from an Investigatory Powers Tribunal but criminal offences may have been committed for which the perpetrators should be prosecuted. That is why we have added to Amendment 46, to the effect that legal immunity is dependent on the CCA being approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the actions of the handler or the CHIS are not within the limits set out in the Bill, neither are immune from criminal prosecution or from being sued.

I understand completely why noble Lords do not want a criminal conduct authority to be granted without prior judicial or ministerial authorisation because of the potential for abuse. However, as others have said, it is not practical. We believe there is a way to prevent abuse without prior authorisation of a CCA, including protecting journalistic sources, which we will come to in a future group. We have listened very carefully to this debate and have come up with a new amendment; because we were part way through this debate we cannot debate that amendment in this group, but we will come to it in a couple of groups’ time. What must not happen in any circumstances is the granting of legal immunity without judicial oversight. That is what our Amendment 47 attempts to do.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendments 14 and 75 in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark provide that authorisations may not be granted under this section until a warrant has been issued by a judge. An application to a judge must be made in writing and provide details, including the reasons why it is required, who it covers, the length of time it will be active for, and previous applications covering the same individual. Our amendments also provide that a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. We seek to strengthen both prior and post-authorisation oversight.

Amendment 77 in the name of my noble friends Lady Clark of Kilwinning and Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, calls for prior judicial approval before an authorisation can be granted

“for the purposes of identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information”,

and is in line with our amendment providing that authorisations may not be granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Butler of Brockwell, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is very similar to our Amendment 75 requiring a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. However, all the amendments we have been discussing in this group reflect a strong feeling that the oversight arrangements set out in the Bill for the statutory power by public authorities to grant criminal conduct authorisations are inadequate and do not provide reassurance that the likelihood of this power being misused or exceeded is reduced to a minimum.

What exactly has been happening under the present arrangements is far from clear, although we are assured that they have enabled threatened terrorist atrocities and other serious crimes to be thwarted and our safety to be secured. We have no reason at all to doubt that. However, we do not know the extent to which powers have or have not been misused or exceeded since there is no means of that information consistently coming to light. Without proper oversight to act as a firm check there is a risk that some may become somewhat overzealous in how they exercise and interpret the powers they are given under the Bill, including what might be regarded as acceptable covert human intelligence activity, and against what and whom.

We believe there should be prior judicial authorisation, with authorisations not being granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Having to obtain a warrant before action can be taken is nothing new. Bearing in mind the potential gravity of the decision to authorise criminal conduct, the necessity to obtain a warrant beforehand seems even greater than it is in relation to other existing actions or activities requiring a warrant at present. It is a prior safeguard and check to minimise the likelihood, in what is self-authorisation by an agency or other body, of a potentially ill-judged or just plain wrong authorisation of criminal conduct, with all the consequences that might have.

Objections have been raised that sometimes authorisations are needed in a hurry but equally, access to a judge, as happens in some other spheres, can be arranged in a hurry—a point made by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Urgency can arise because of a rapidly developing situation that could not have reasonably been foreseen, but it can also arise because a public authority has left things later than it should have done before seeking the criminal conduct authorisation. Perhaps the Government can, in their response, give some indication of roughly how many such authorisations are currently granted on average each year, how many are needed urgently and what the definition is of urgently. Can the Government also give a general indication of the extent to which authority to commit criminal conduct is given, in a typical year, to those who have been previously involved in or who are currently engaged in unauthorised—[Inaudible]—said that all authorisations

“are granted by an experienced and highly trained authorising officer, who will ensure that the authorisation has strict parameters and is clearly communicated to the”,—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1045.]

covert human intelligence source. The phrase “experienced and highly trained” sounds fine, but what do the Government intend it to mean in practice in relation to the granting of criminal conduct authorisations under the Bill? What is the definition of an

“experienced and highly trained authorising officer”,

a description the Government were happy to use at Second Reading? How much experience is meant, and in what? How much training is meant, and in what? How many experienced and highly trained authorising officers will there be in each authority that will have the power to grant criminal conduct authorisations, and how frequently are they likely to determine whether to grant such authorisations?

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am very happy either to write to the noble Baroness and outline what I said in more detail or meet with her before Report.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for what she has said. I accept what she and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said about it being a senior officer. In urgent cases, however, the police officer who actually grants the criminal conduct authority would be only at inspector level, which is not very senior. Criminal or civil liability would probably rest with the handler because the handler is the one who made the request to the senior officer—but I am glad that that has been clarified.

The Minister dismissed our Amendment 47 on the basis that it looked like prior judicial approval. It is not prior judicial approval at all and it deserves to be looked at. The Minister said that retrospective oversight is the best solution, but once a criminal conduct authority has been granted, so has legal immunity. So what if the CHIS has been corruptly tasked to commit a crime and commits a crime that should not have been committed? With only retrospective oversight, that CHIS and that handler are still immune from prosecution. How can that be right?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

If I understand the point from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the CHIS is authorised to commit something that is later deemed unlawful, my understanding of it—I will stand corrected if officials tell me differently—is that the person who authorised the unlawful conduct would themselves be liable for the deployment of the CHIS. Clearly, what the CHIS did would also be looked into post facto, but the person who authorised the deployment would be liable for that conduct in the deployment, I think.

Law Enforcement and Security (Separation Issues etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 26th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations.

The stream of worrying statutory instruments dealing with our final severing of links with the EU at the end of the transition period continues. We have already debated regulations that will weaken UK border security; now, we have regulations that deal with the end of co-operation with the EU on a whole range of criminal law, investigatory powers, policing and criminal justice issues. When a similar raft of regulations, which these regulations amend, was debated, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, as it put it,

“published a critical report because the 2019 Regulations bundled together a large number of topics without adequate information on any of them.”

Here we are again, with one SI containing 50 regulations relating to a wide range of law enforcement and security issues.

The regulations cover extremely important issues, such as cross-border surveillance, extradition, the exchange of information and intelligence, Eurojust and Europol, and security databases such as the Schengen Information System—SIS II—and the European Criminal Records Information System, or ECRIS.

The Minister explained the purposes of these regulations and the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, repeated them so I see no point in repeating them again. However, I share the concerns expressed by many other noble Lords this afternoon. It is 36 days until the end of the transition period. Let me remind the House what these regulations are about. At the moment, there are arrangements in place to allow law enforcement and security services to follow dangerous criminals, including terrorists, across borders. So if the National Crime Agency has undercover officers following a gang involved in people smuggling, for example, they can pursue them across the channel and across the EU. As things stand, that ability will end on 31 December.

At the moment, rapid extradition from the EU to the UK, including of a country’s own nationals, can be achieved using the European arrest warrant. As things stand, that will end on 31 December.

At the moment, information and intelligence can be shared between law enforcement authorities in the UK and those in the EU. This includes the Prüm database, which allows rapid electronic matching of fingerprints and DNA samples found at any crime scene in the UK with those in databases of criminals held across the EU. As things stand, we will no longer have access to these databases come 31 December.

At the moment, the SIS II database is in place, which triggers an alert when someone travelling across an EU border is wanted or of interest to the police or security services. It also provides information about what action border security officials should take. As things stand, we will lose access to that database from 1 January.

At the moment, Eurojust co-ordinates investigations and prosecutions involving more than one country by helping to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction, for example. As things stand, we will no longer be a member of Eurojust on 1 January.

Finally, Europol co-ordinates law enforcement activity across the EU to deal with serious and organised crime, such as drug and people trafficking, terrorism and cybercrime. Crucially, it produces threat assessments in these areas, which pose the most serious criminal threats to the EU and the UK. These are used to prioritise law enforcement activity. As things stand, the UK will go from being one of the agenda-setting countries in Europol to having observer status. I say, “as things stand”, but we have only 35 days to prevent these things.

Can the Minister give us a detailed account of which, if any, of these measures, which are vital to the security of the UK, are likely to still be in place on 1 January? Let me help her a little. The BBC reported last week that the UK wanted to maintain the same access to Prüm, SIS II and the other EU databases that are vital to our security, but that the EU says that those are not on offer to non-EU members. We know from the experience of Norway and Iceland that non-EU members cannot be part of the European arrest warrant, and the second-class alternative they have does not allow extradition of a country’s own nationals. Even that took over a decade to negotiate and come into force. So can the Minister confirm that whatever security treaty the UK is able to negotiate with the EU will not include access to EU databases or the European arrest warrant?

Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, Britain’s top counterterrorism officer, told the BBC last week that the UK will be less safe without an EU security deal in place. Is it not the case that the UK will be less safe whatever security deal is agreed, or if no security deal is agreed, as it will not include access to EU databases and the European arrest warrant? I am sure these regulations—all 50 of them—are necessary, but they provide a stark reminder of what we are losing as a result of leaving the European Union.

Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Order 2020

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this draft order. Its main purpose is, to quote from the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanies it, to

“ensure that the UK can continue to utilise electronic passport gates (e-Gates), a secure and efficient mechanism for travellers to cross the border, to process the arrival of citizens of current EU and EEA member states and Switzerland entering the UK as visitors after the end of the transition period”.

I want to draw the Committee’s attention to the hypocrisy of a Government who campaigned to leave the European Union on the back of the slogan “Taking Back Control”—a phrase that they continue to use to this day, particularly in relation to our borders. The only way this order can be described as taking back control of our borders is that the decision to keep them open with the same level of control, or lack of it, as when we were members of the EU is going to be taken by the UK Government, rather than that decision being a consequence of being a member of the European Union.

What is more, in a vain attempt to avoid being accused of hypocrisy in the face of their promise not to treat EU citizens more favourably than those from outside the EU, the Government have weakened the UK border in relation to citizens of the B5JSSK countries—Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the USA—by allowing citizens from those countries to use e-gates. Not only are the Government not taking back control of their borders; they admit in their own documentation that e-gates are not secure, or at least do not deliver an acceptable level of security. Let me explain. The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say that, with the end of free movement, EEA citizens will require leave to enter and remain in the UK

“but those coming as visitors will be able, like other non-visa nationals, to obtain leave to enter at the border for six months”

and that this instrument will

“allow EEA citizen visitors to obtain leave by going through an e-Gate. This leave will be granted for six months in the same way as it is granted to … B5JSSK nationals … who have been able to obtain leave”

by entering through the e-gate since 2019. I think the Minister explained that this happened in May 2019.

Cynics will accuse the Government of extending e-gate access to B5JSSK nationals, which was done only last year, only to avoid being accused of treating EU citizens more favourably after Brexit. The Government have previously said that the decision was made to “better manage the queues” at the UK border, but the point of the border is to keep undesirable people out of the UK—not to make it easier for everyone, including undesirable people, to pass through it. Until the changes were made, B5JSSK nationals had to hand a boarding card to a Border Force officer at the UK border, explain the purpose of their visit and how long they were staying, and prove that they had somewhere to stay and sufficient funds to sustain them during their time in the UK. I am told—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that approximately 3,000 USA nationals were turned away at the border annually when these checks were in place. Now there are no checks.

In the chapter entitled “The border of the future” in the Government’s published plans for a points-based immigration system, they outline an idea for “Electronic Travel Authorisations” to be introduced at some unspecified time in the future. The Government claim that these

“will allow security checks to be conducted and more informed decisions taken on information obtained at an earlier stage, as to whether individuals should be allowed to travel to the UK.”

Presumably, these checks and “more informed decisions” will be similar to the checks and informed decisions that Border Force officers used to undertake at the UK border, resulting in 3,000 American citizens a year not being allowed to enter the UK, and before the B5JSSK citizens were allowed to use e-gates. But what happens to UK border security in the meantime? Are the Government now saying that we will take back control of our border eventually?

Continued access to EU databases is also in doubt, particularly the electronic system that allows UK authorities to check whether an EU citizen has been convicted of a criminal offence in any EU country. Not only will allowing EU citizens to use e-gates not be taking back control of our borders; we are less likely to be able to identify criminals entering the UK.

The Government have published advice for UK citizens seeking to visit the EU next year. It states that UK citizens must have at least six months left on their passport, show an onward or return ticket, have enough money for their stay, use separate lanes from EU, EEA and Swiss nationals, and be limited to visits of 90 days in any 180 days. Meanwhile, EU, EEA and Swiss nationals visiting the UK will continue to use the e-gates and be able to stay for six months, take a day trip to Lille on the Eurostar and come back for another six months—not that there will be any way in which to check whether they have overstayed their six-month leave to remain.

Only the EU is taking back control of its borders. This Government are significantly, albeit voluntarily, giving up control of the UK border, thereby making it easier for criminals and those who want to stay in the UK illegally to enter and remain. To use an often-used government phrase, that is not what the British people voted for. I may table a Motion of Regret when this order comes before the House for approval.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome the noble and learned Lord to this House and congratulate him on his maiden speech and appointment as Advocate-General for Scotland. If noble Lords think that he has been put into bat a little early, I can reassure him that I made my maiden speech the day after my introduction; needs must when the devil drives.

First, I should perhaps explain my experience on these issues. When I was in the police, we used to call most covert human intelligence sources “informants”, who were mainly criminals recruited and run by “handlers”. The way in which handlers used, rewarded and authorised informants to participate in crime was controlled by “controllers”. I used to be a controller. I also had the enormous privilege of visiting MI6 and GCHQ to be briefed on the work of all the security services as part of this House’s consideration of the then Investigatory Powers Bill, including examples of who their CHIS were and how they were recruited and used.

Secondly, I came to my own conclusions about this Bill, having read the Investigatory Powers Tribunal judgment dated 20 December 2019 that prompted it. I am grateful for the briefings from Justice, Reprieve and the NUJ, among others, some of which I agree with and other aspects I do not.

There are two fundamental issues in the Bill on which the Government have, to date, not been as clear as they could be. The first is that it is not just about one issue, and it certainly does not simply maintain the status quo, as the Government have suggested. The reason for the Bill is to give absolute legal clarity that handlers can authorise their covert human intelligence sources to participate in crime. They have been doing that with little difficulty for decades but the Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s split decision called into question whether there was any legal authority for the police and the security services to authorise CHIS to commit crime. If providing that legal authority was all that the Bill did, it would maintain the status quo and I would have no argument with it.

Of course there are peripheral issues that the Bill provides an opportunity for us to address, but on providing legal authority for participating informants, as we used to call them, or criminal conduct authorities as they are now called, there is no argument and I will support the Bill in that respect.

The Bill, however, goes much further—unacceptably far—and makes everything that the covert human intelligence source is authorised to do by the criminal conduct authority “lawful for all purposes”, including immunity from civil liability, and including any conduct that is incidental to what CHIS are authorised to do. For example, had the Bill been in force at the time, the undercover police officer who was authorised to form a relationship with an environmental activist could have argued that sleeping with her was “incidental to” what he had been authorised to do, and that he therefore could not be sued.

The status quo is the following: the Crown Prosecution Service examines what happens in such cases after the event, and independently decides whether a crime has been committed, whether there is a 51% or more chance of conviction, and whether prosecution is in the public interest. Rarely—the Government’s position is never—does the Director of Public Prosecutions grant immunity to a CHIS prior to the event. To date, the status quo has rarely, if ever, caused any problems. It has been put to me that the status quo does cause problems, in that sometimes, when a handler asks an informant to participate in crime, the criminal concerned backs away because they want a promise of immunity in writing, and the handler cannot give it. We need to examine carefully and in detail whether such a cast-iron guarantee is necessary or desirable.

This Bill as drafted would allow a police officer or member of the security services, with no independent judicial oversight, to grant total immunity to a criminal to participate in an armed robbery, for example. Rarely, if ever, would immunity not be given prior to the CHIS being asked to participate in crime—a complete reversal of the status quo. At the moment, the CPS almost always decides that it is not in the public interest to prosecute in such cases, but the Bill makes anything done in accordance with a criminal conduct authority not a crime. What is in law a criminal act becomes a lawful act for the person authorised that would no longer rest on the public interest test. This is not preserving the status quo by any stretch of the imagination.

The Government will tell us that that is akin to granting immunity to those involved in the interception of communications and, indeed, immunity is to be provided by the same section of the same Act that makes properly authorised communications interception “legal for all purposes”. However, interception of communications has to be authorised by a Minister of State in advance, having already been approved by an Investigatory Powers Commissioner against someone suspected of the most serious criminality.

However, under this Act, authorising a criminal to take part in an armed robbery, in which innocent people could be seriously injured, will not be done in advance by anyone outside the police. Even officials in the Home Office, potentially on instruction from government Ministers, could otherwise grant immunity to someone to commit crime, with no prior judicial oversight and little post-event scrutiny. Is that what we want?

The second major issue about which the Government have not been clear is who these covert human intelligence sources are. In their briefings, the Government have placed the emphasis on CHIS being undercover police officers or officers of the security services working undercover. The majority of covert human intelligence sources are criminals, members of terrorist organisations and drug gangs, or those inside other organisations that the police or security services have a legitimate interest in. This legislation, as drafted, will predominantly protect criminals, not undercover cops.

Other safeguards are needed, such as to prevent CHIS from acting as agent provocateurs and to protect child CHIS. We must carefully scrutinise which authorities can grant immunity. Other matters, considered in the other place and recommended by NGOs, such as prior authorisation and limitations on what crimes can be authorised, would be necessary only if the immunity provision remains part of the Bill. It should not remain part of the Bill. This is not a party-political issue; this is a rule of law issue. We have a lot of work to do.

UK Terrorism Threat Level

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

We extend our condolences to the families of the victims of the recent horrific attacks in France and Austria and our sympathy and hopes for a recovery to those who were injured. It is these attacks that have prompted the decision by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre to raise the threat level for terrorism to “severe”—the second highest level—indicating an attack is highly likely. This is a decision we support since we have a shared responsibility to keep this country, our people and our communities safe. We extend our appreciation to our security services and those involved in counterterrorism policing for the vital work they do to keep us safe.

Could the Minister say what impact raising the threat level from substantial to severe will have as far as the daily lives of our citizens are concerned, both while we are in lockdown and when we come out of lockdown? Does the raising of the threat level require greater use of resources by our security services and counterterrorism policing? If so, were those additional resources already available or have they now been made available? Does the raising of the threat level apply across the United Kingdom? Is there uniformity of approach and practice across the United Kingdom in moving to the higher threat level? If not, what are the differences and where? Where do we now stand in relation to the independent review of the Prevent strategy? The raising of the threat level makes this more not less important.

The raising of the threat level from international terrorism reminds us of the importance of international co-operation. Do the Government accept that agreements must be concluded to ensure continued co-operation with the EU in combating terrorism after the end of the transition period?

In the Commons last week, the Minister said that he and the Home Secretary had

“asked officials to review with partners existing and proposed powers in the light of the horrific attacks in France and Austria to consider what more, if anything, might be needed.”—[Official Report, Commons, 5/11/20; col. 529.]

When is that review likely to be completed? I would like to know what kind of things come under the description of

“what more, if anything, might be needed.”—[Official Report, Commons, 5/11/20; col. 529.]

I conclude by reiterating our support for the decision to raise the threat level, and stress the need for our citizens to remain vigilant and steadfast. Combating terrorism and international terrorism is not, as some would like to suggest, a fight between different faiths, or people of different faiths. Our enemies are terrorists. It is a fight, as the Austrian chancellor said, “between civilisation and barbarity”.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I want to start by paying tribute to Lords Sacks—Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. He may no longer be able to speak to us directly, but what he said lives on. In 2013, he wrote an article for the Spectator entitled “Atheism has failed. Only religion can defeat the new barbarians”—by whom he meant those who threaten western freedom by religious fundamentalism, combining hatred of the other, the pursuit of power and contempt for human rights. He was in effect saying that moderate religion is the answer to religious fundamentalism, not anti-religious campaigning.

There is no justification for violence. The horrific terrorist attacks we have seen on mainland Europe and here in the UK in recent years I condemn unequivocally. My thoughts are with all those affected.

Can the Minister set out the UK Government’s position on free speech? Is free speech to be at any cost, no matter what the impacts on others? Because we condemn violence, no matter that it is unjustified, that does not mean we should not try to understand why people are drawn into it. Terrorism cannot be condoned under any circumstances, but if we are to counter it effectively we need to understand what motivates it. To that end, can the Minster say what research has been conducted into the impact of lockdown on the spread of extremism, particularly using the internet? What is the likely impact on vulnerable individuals—with no moderating interaction from others—and on their mental health? What are the Government doing to encourage, promote and ensure access to a moderate religious counternarrative to violent extremism allegedly based on religion?

The Home Secretary’s Statement talks about the increased threat level being used by the police to determine the level of their overall protective security activity. This includes additional police officers deployed to “certain places”. Can the Minister explain which places or what type of places these additional police officers are being deployed to?

The police are already stretched because of the Covid pandemic. It is at times like these that the importance of resilience in the police service is brought into sharp focus. Not only are the police having to enforce lockdown restrictions, police demonstrations against Covid regulations and deal with an enhanced UK threat level; they also have to do the day job of fighting crime and responding to calls for assistance. Many of these calls have nothing to do with crime, and include having to help increasing numbers in mental health crisis. This Government continued to reduce police numbers long after police leaders told them the cuts had gone far enough. Can the Minister explain where the additional police officers the Home Secretary refers to in her Statement will come from?

No doubt the Minister will be keen to tell the House about the additional police officers currently being recruited and the progress towards the government target of recruiting an additional 20,000 police officers, but can the Minister say what is the net increase, if any, in the number of police officers has been since the initiative was announced? What is the total number of police officers now compared with the 143,800 full-time equivalent officers in England and Wales police forces in 2010?

An essential part of combating terrorism, particularly the forms of terrorism we have seen in recent years, is community intelligence, intelligence built on trust and confidence created by police community support officers and local community police officers. What is the current number of police community support officers compared with 2010, and what proportion of police officers are currently employed as local community officers?

I have the utmost respect for our police and security services, and I am confident they do all that they possibly can to counter terrorism within the resource restraints they have been forced to operate under. I pay tribute to their skill and dedication. It is not, as the Home Secretary maintains, just about passing legislation. It is about properly resourcing the police and security services to give them the resilience they need to be able to respond to crises such as these.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their comments and questions. I join them in expressing solidarity with France and Vienna in the tough times they have had, as well our sympathies with the families affected. I echo the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in paying tribute to Rabbi Sacks, who was a great asset to this House and who always spoke with such wisdom on these matters.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how the raised threat level would affect daily life. This matter is under continuous operational review by JTAC. Deployments of police in certain areas of our daily lives will be changed according to threats. In terms of the resources needed, my predecessor—way back when—the right honourable Sajid Javid recognised the changing demand on the police. Under his successor, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, the 20,000 police officer uplift was made; it was, in fact, a manifesto commitment. I understand that we are almost at the 6,000 level. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the number of PCSOs. I do not know exactly how many we have in this country. That is a matter for local forces and chief constables, in collaboration with their PCCs. The number is decided according to the needs of the local area. However, I will try and get that number, if it is available. He asked for some other details, which I shall also try to get for him.

Both noble Lords asked where the additional resources would come from when the threat level went up. Deployment will be a matter for operational decision. Of course we recognise that additional police demand is there. Both noble Lords mentioned crisis. Police grant can be applied for and, no matter what it is for, it will be given if the case is made.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked if the threat was UK-wide. Yes, it is. There is separate consideration for Northern Ireland in relation to threats within it. He asked about the Prevent review. We are in the final stages of interviewing for our independent reviewer of Prevent and it is anticipated that the review will be done promptly. I deliberately did not give a timescale because we did not want to be where were last time, with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, having to step away. We did not want to create too much time pressure.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also talked about international co-operation and what more we can do. He and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will know that, particularly in relation to the EU, we remain absolutely committed to that co-operation on law enforcement.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined the necessity for free speech but with limits, of course. If it impinges on the threat to the individual, it crosses the line. He talked about terrorist and extremists’ use of the internet. I could not agree with him more. I hope that the online harms White Paper will become a Bill very soon and deal with some of those issues, particularly the duty on internet providers to their users. He also asked which places had benefited from protective security. He will know that I cannot talk about that, for the benefit of those places. He mentioned the police having to do their day job and police numbers. I hope that I went through that in sufficient detail but I will top it up with additional information for him.