Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

116: Clause 48, page 39, line 21, leave out “, (1F) or (1H)” and insert “or (1F)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Paddick’s amendment to page 40, line 14.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 116 and speak to my Amendments 117 to 121 inclusive in this group.

Clause 48 gives the police the power to compel people to have their photograph taken at a police station without their consent. It includes someone arrested for a recordable offence and released without being charged or otherwise being prosecuted for an offence, if they have not previously been photographed, the previous photograph is unavailable or inadequate, or a constable thinks that another photograph might be useful to assist in the prevention or detection of crime.

We have had concerns for some time about those not convicted of a criminal offence having their photographs retained by the police, but forcing a person to attend a police station and taking their photograph without their consent in such circumstances seems draconian. However, the clause goes further. It includes anyone who has been convicted abroad of an offence which would have been an offence if committed in England or Wales, if the police do not already have a useable photograph of the person so convicted or if a police officer thinks that it might be useful to have another one.

Aside from how the police would know about such a conviction, particularly since the UK has lost access to EU databases that record all convictions in EU countries, some countries are notorious for having legal systems that fall far short of what would be considered acceptable in the UK. Surely, at least in relation to overseas convictions, there should be some judicial safeguard to ensure that such a conviction is safe, rather than a constable being able to force someone to be photographed in such circumstances. My probing Amendment 117 removes the conditions associated with an overseas conviction, and the other amendments are consequential. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his amendment. I have a very brief comment for the Minister. The Explanatory Notes say:

“Section 64A of PACE confers a power on the police to take photographs from a person who has been detained in a police station and/or arrested. If a person is arrested, charged or convicted without a photograph being taken, there is no power to require them to attend a police station later for this to be done, although there is such a ‘recall’ power in … PACE relating to taking of fingerprints and DNA samples.”


There are so many important things in this Bill, and this is yet another. The noble Lord is quite right to point this out. Therefore, why was it thought not to be necessary to include the taking of photographs in the original legislation but now is thought to be necessary? What is the evidence for the change in legislation to include photographs?

Also, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the very important point about the extension of that power to overseas offences. Does that extension of power include not only photographs but fingerprints and DNA samples?

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am saying it was an omission. I am not saying it was a mistake, because I do not know whether it was, but it was an omission. I think there is a difference.

As things stand, opportunities to take photographs are being missed. This means that matches to crimes the person may have committed in the past or may commit in the future are not made. As the noble Lord explained, these amendments specifically intend to probe the necessity and proportionality of the provisions in proposed new subsections (1H) and (1I) of Section 64A of PACE. These provisions cover occasions when the police have been notified of a conviction in another country that has an equivalent offence in England and Wales. Where there is no photograph on file, or it is of poor quality, police will now be able to ask an individual to attend a police station to have one taken for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime. To ensure appropriate oversight, this will require authorisation at the minimum rank of inspector.

As I said at the start, these provisions simply align the police’s ability to take photographs in certain circumstances with provisions that already exist for DNA and fingerprints. In that sense, we are therefore not breaking new ground. We are dealing here with individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offence, albeit in another country. In the interests of protecting people in this country, it is right that the police should be able to take and retain a photograph of a convicted person in these circumstances. I hope that the noble Lord agrees, particularly given the existing precedent in PACE, that this a necessary and proportionate power, and that he will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support. I have to say to the Minister that I am really none the wiser about the questions I asked. There is a catalogue of cases where people are convicted overseas and where it turns out that the convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory because of the inadequate legal systems that operate abroad. Yet this is a blanket power for the police to summon and photograph anybody on the basis of an overseas conviction. The noble Lord has not addressed how there could be any safeguard against such an unsafe and unsatisfactory conviction overseas.

The Minister talked about where the police have been notified of an overseas conviction, but I do not understand what the mechanism is by which the police would be notified. So my questions remain unanswered by what the Minister said and I hope that, between now and Report, the Government will be able to answer them, otherwise we will be having another debate on Report. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 116 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, briefly, I speak in support of Amendments 122 and 275 in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—who has already made an eloquent and erudite contribution, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said—and other noble Lords. I will also echo elements of the noble Lord’s contribution.

Amendment 122 encapsulates and incorporates precisely the advice that I would now want to give to my own two daughters and, in due time, my own grand-daughter, in the light of what we all know happened to Sarah Everard. There has been talk of flagging down buses or otherwise seeking assistance, in the case of a lone arresting officer seeking to require a person subject to arrest to enter a car or, as the amendment says

“premises other than a police station”.

I simply do not find such advice or suggestions helpful or sufficient. These suggestions would not, I am afraid, assuage the well-grounded fears of many women in the wake of recent events and revelations about the behaviour of some police officers. The amendment, however, sets reassuring and necessary parameters, and I am in full support of it. We must use this legislation to afford clarity and safety to women.

With regard to Amendment 275, again, I believe that action taken hitherto by Her Majesty’s Government is insufficient and that a statutory inquiry, for all the reasons advanced already in this debate, is needed. It is needed to learn lessons but also to give a signal that we will now begin to restore the faith and trust in the police which has been so manifestly and extensively damaged.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have to tell the Committee that I find these debates very difficult. I was a police officer for over 30 years and, for part of that time, a senior police officer. Like the overwhelming majority of hard-working, decent and honest police officers in this country, I find it very difficult to hear this sort of debate and to say the sorts of things that I will say now. I do not have the same sympathy for senior police officers who are failing in their leadership. I recall speaking privately to a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and asking that individual, “What on earth is going on at the moment?”. He said, “Well, Brian, I think when the police come under pressure, diversity goes out of the window”. The police have been under a lot of pressure because their resources have been reduced, because knife crime has become an epidemic and because of the horrific situations we find ourselves in.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said earlier, it is not just about Sarah Everard. In the last two weeks we have had a Metropolitan Police officer charged with rape and another with indecent images of children. There were a whole series of cases that point to a real issue with the culture in the police service, and in the Metropolitan Police in particular. So I completely understand and support the principles behind the amendments, and I have indicated my support for Amendment 122 by adding my name to it.

I want to bring some real-world practicality to bear on the amendments. Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, suggests that a police officer

“may not require or ask the person under arrest to enter a vehicle or premises other than a police station unless at least one other constable is present in the vehicle or when entering the premises”.

Not only does that go to the heart of the Sarah Everard scenario, but it is entirely consistent with best practice for the protection of the person arrested and the arresting officer. I should explain that in the police a person who has been arrested is called a prisoner, and I will do the same.

First, it does not specify that the provision should apply only to a woman or a child, as Amendment 123 does. The noble Baroness pointed out how there might be legal difficulties with that but, as she said, what if the arresting officer is gay or the person arrested is a gay man? Where would the protection be for the arresting officer against allegations of inappropriate behaviour in those circumstances, or the protection for the arrested person, if we restricted it only to a woman or a child? As the noble Baroness said, a black person may also have fears about getting into a vehicle when there was only one officer present. From my own professional experience, I have lost count of the number of reports of black people who have been beaten up on the way to the police station. The issue that we need to address here is male violence perpetrated by police officers, whether directed at a male or a female prisoner, although women may understandably feel more threatened with a lone male arresting officer than a male prisoner would. Amendment 122 would provide protection for the police officer and for the person arrested, whatever sex or sexuality they may be.

Secondly, it is very dangerous for a lone police officer to drive with a prisoner in the car. The prisoner could attack the officer while driving even if handcuffed, as we saw with the tragic death of police Sergeant Matt Ratana, who was shot in Croydon police station by a handcuffed prisoner. Ideally, police officers should patrol and respond in pairs wherever possible, and at least one of those police officers should be female, but that is not always possible. Ensuring that two police officers are present is an important and almost always adequate safeguard.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, and as the Minister said in answer to an Oral Question on Thursday, only about one-third of police officers are female—even fewer, I believe, in the Metropolitan Police—so the practicality of requiring a female officer to be present, as Amendment 123 demands, may not always be possible, and in some cases it would not be appropriate to release the prisoner if a female officer could not attend the scene.

I turn to the other aspects of Amendment 123. Giving the person arrested

“an immediate and reasonable opportunity to contact another person”

could have serious officer-safety implications. I myself have been subject to attempts to rescue a person that I had arrested, albeit that it was in Brixton a few months before the Brixton riots. There is a real danger that the arrested person could summon people to effect her escape from police custody. And, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, alluded to, the problem with the arresting officer providing a telephone number purporting to be the number of a police station or control room, were he to have criminal intent, is that he may have an accomplice on the telephone number given to the prisoner.

Long delays between arrest and arrival at the police station, in my professional experience, expose both the arresting officer and the person arrested to danger. It may not always be possible, for example if the prisoner is violently resisting arrest, either to explain her rights to her or to provide them in writing. Again, in my professional experience, people do not want to be arrested by the police and are unlikely to attend a police station if allowed to go free. I completely understand the sentiments behind both these amendments. I have serious reservations about the practicality of Amendment 123, but I have no hesitation in commending Amendment 122 to the Committee.

I also strongly support Amendment 275, which calls for a Macpherson-type inquiry, under the Inquiries Act 2005, into the Sarah Everard atrocity and all the surrounding issues. This is something akin to the issues of public trust and confidence around racism that came out of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence and that the Macpherson inquiry looked to address. We are facing an equivalent situation here in terms of misogyny and violence against women and girls. It is absolutely appropriate that we have a similar inquiry to the Macpherson inquiry to deal with that. I prefer Amendment 275, for that reason, to Amendment 281.

I also support Amendment 282: mandatory training for all officers, not just recruits, on violence against women and girls. Of course, culture is the most difficult thing to change, but training is an important part of changing that culture. I also support Amendment 283, with the caveat that I believe the vetting procedures used in the recruitment of all police officers need to be urgently reviewed, not just for officers transferring between forces.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about the Sarah Everard vigil. I will refer to this at length when we come to the public order parts of the Bill, but I was an advanced, trained senior police officer in public order. I read the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services report into the Sarah Everard vigil. How HMIC came to the conclusions that the police did everything right, on the basis of what it wrote before it got to that conclusion, I have no idea. The evidence in that report is completely contrary to that conclusion, in my professional judgment. So, there is something seriously wrong here: how can we change the culture if we have that sort of whitewashing by HMIC?

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, raised issues around police leadership and police culture and what I have described before as a culture of cover-up rather than own-up. I have always believed the way to build public trust and confidence is, when there is misconduct, to show you are ruthlessly dealing with it rather than trying to cover it up to protect the reputation of the force. I will say more about that when we come to a later group on the duty of candour. The noble Lord is absolutely right: there is a failure of leadership at the top of the police service. It makes me very uncomfortable to stand here and say that, but it is something I felt when I was in the police service and continue to feel now. I absolutely support these amendments.

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In conclusion, I welcome the opportunity afforded by these amendments—I know that noble Lords are not in amendment competition—to debate the implications of this horrendous case. We need to rebuild public confidence in the police. We think that the inquiry announced by the Home Secretary will play an important part in that process, including by making recommendations in relation to police vetting and training. These issues, and the question of how the police exercise their powers of arrest, are being addressed in the meantime and, on that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I realise the hour is late, but there are two things I would like to mention. First, I am very interested in what the Deputy Commissioner Sir Steve House said. I do not know when he said it, but it does not seem to chime with the fact that, two weeks ago, I was challenged by a lone officer in plain clothes. That seems to be completely contrary to what the Minister said he announced.

Secondly, the Minister says there should not be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 because we need to move at speed. I can tell noble Lords that the Metropolitan Police never moved quicker on racism than when it was announced that there would be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act. It was not when the inquiry reported that the Metropolitan Police swung into action to deal with racism. It was absolutely ready with an answer as soon as that inquiry reported, because it knew what the problems were and realising that this was all going to become public in an inquiry galvanised it into action.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I note the noble Lord’s points and I do not disagree with him. I ask the Committee to understand the commitment of the Home Secretary. She is deadly serious about ensuring that the inquiry moves at pace and, if necessary, converting it to a statutory inquiry if it is not meeting its commitments.

I will get the date for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the Committee. The announcement from Dame Cressida Dick was on 20 October, some 11 days ago, but I will get the date on which Sir Stephen House made those comments.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

123A: After Clause 49, insert the following new Clause—
“Post-charge detention of children
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.(2) In section 38, for subsection (1)(b) substitute—“(b) if the arrested person is a child, the grounds inserted into the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 by section (Youth remand) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021 apply;”.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would bring the PACE criteria for police remand of children into closer alignment with the court remand criteria.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 123A in my name. I apologise to the Committee. If I had had my wits about me, I would have grouped it with the previous police bail amendments. I am grateful to Transform Justice for bringing this issue to my attention and for its help and support in drafting this amendment.

The Government continue to place tighter restrictions on when courts can remand children in custody. Those are much stronger than the restrictions currently placed on the police when they decide whether to remand a child in custody to court. Court criteria, most of which do not apply to the police, include that: the child must be between 12 and 17 years of age and be legally represented, other than in exceptional circumstances; they must have been charged with a violent or sexual offence or have been charged with an offence where an adult would have received a custodial sentence of 14 or more years; or they have a recent history of absconding while remanded; or they have a history of committing imprisonable offences while on bail; and there is a real prospect of a custodial sentence for the offence in question. In addition, remand in custody must be necessary to protect the public from death or personal injury or to prevent the child from committing further imprisonable offences.

The police remand many more children in custody than the courts. In 2019, the year with the most recent data available, over 4,500 children were remanded in police custody compared with 884 children remanded in custody by the courts. Some 60% of children remanded in custody by the police had been charged with non-violent offences and only 12% of those remanded in custody by the police went on to be remanded in custody by the courts. Two-thirds of children remanded in custody by the police do not receive a custodial sentence.

In Clause 132, the Bill suggests further strengthening the restrictions on courts remanding children in custody, including that the history of breaching bail or offending on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. If detention is being considered for the child’s own safety, this would be possible only if the risk cannot be safely managed in the community. It would have to be “very likely” that the child would receive a custodial sentence rather than a “real prospect”. Courts would also be under a statutory duty to record their reasons for imposing custodial remand, including a statement that they have considered the welfare of the child in their decision and that they have considered alternatives.

The Bill as drafted does nothing to tighten the restrictions on the police remanding children in custody, or even to bring them into line with existing court restrictions. Amendment 123A intends to bring the Police and Criminal Evidence Act criteria for police remand of children into closer alignment with the court remand criteria. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his amendment. As the Committee might be aware, I sit as a youth magistrate, usually at Highbury magistrates’ court. I have to say that I was not aware of the difference in the remand criteria; I should have known but I did not. I also thank Transform Justice for bringing this to my attention. The noble Lord has very thoroughly explored the differences in the number of youths remanded by the police versus those remanded by the courts. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising this important issue of children remanded in custody. I quite agree that police custody is not a suitable environment for children and that they should not be detained there unless it is absolutely necessary.

The provisions introduced by this Bill will amend the “tests” set out by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, also known as LASPO, which must be satisfied before the court remands a child to custody. These are intended to ensure that custodial remand is used only as a last resort, where there are no other options and it is necessary to protect the public.

Before the courts get involved, if a child is charged with an offence, Section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that the police must release them either on bail or without bail pending their appearance at court, unless one or more specified conditions apply. These conditions are that the child’s name or address are not known or are not believed to be genuine; there are reasonable grounds to believe the child will not appear in court to answer bail; the detention is believed to be necessary to prevent the child committing an offence, causing physical injury, loss or damage to property, or interfering with the investigation of offences; or the detention after charge is believed to be necessary for the child’s own protection or in their own interests.

I would like to reassure the Committee that there is already a degree of alignment between police bail and court bail, and the police custody officer must have regard to the same considerations as those that apply when a court is considering whether to grant bail under the Bail Act 1976.

I acknowledge the concern that many more children are remanded post charge by the police than are remanded by the courts while awaiting trial, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, and that this may give rise to consideration of risk-averse decision-making by the police. I do not necessarily believe this to be the case. It is important to remember that post-charge detention by the police serves a different purpose from youth remand in the courts, so it is unrealistic to expect an exact alignment of the conditions required to make decisions.

With this in mind, it is perfectly possible for the police to make a decision to remand a child post charge and for the courts to make a decision not to remand the same child to custody, and for both these decisions to be reasonable based on the evidence and circumstances before each party. In the overwhelming majority of cases, a child remanded by the police will be held for no more than 24 hours.

I also acknowledge the concern that police remand is a driver of custodial remand—that is, for example, that a court is more likely to view a child remanded by the police as dangerous. I am not aware of any data showing a causal link between police remand and custodial remand. A comprehensive evidence base comparing the circumstances whereby police bail after charge decisions are made under Section 38 of PACE would be needed, giving consideration to the threshold for grounds to refuse bail and whether custody officers have access to and apply all relevant information when making a bail decision.

Before I conclude, I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks and the Home Office’s gratitude to Brian Roberts, who was the department’s expert on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Sadly, he died last month after 50 years of public service as a police officer and then an official in the department. He is greatly missed by his colleagues.

On the basis of my remarks, I hope the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for his support.

I am afraid that there is a bit of a pattern developing here in the Government’s responses. On the one hand, the Minister said there is “a degree of alignment” between police remand in custody of children and court remand in custody. Some 4,500 children being remanded by the police and only 884 by the courts does not sound to me like alignment.

The Minister also said a child would never be remanded in police custody for more than 24 hours. Do courts sit on a Sunday? What happens to a child arrested on a Saturday afternoon? They are going to be in custody a lot longer than 24 hours.

Unfortunately, as I say, it is becoming a bit of a theme that the Government’s responses to amendments do not appear to be factually accurate. We need to review that. I am afraid I do not find the Minister’s response satisfactory, and no doubt we will return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 123A withdrawn.

Police: Recruits

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 28th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right to ask that question, which has already been raised this week. New recruits are subject to a rigorous vetting and assessment process to assess suitability for the role of police officer, including testing against core behaviours and values. The College of Policing sets the standard through the vetting statutory code of practice. We utterly recognise some of the anxieties around vetting and have commissioned HMICFRS to carry out an urgent thematic inspection of force vetting arrangements, which will help to identify any areas to address.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, two weeks ago, Policy Exchange criticised the Metropolitan Police for its “unusual and unjustified strategy” of using stop and search in the face of the spike in knife crime. Compared with other metropolitan forces, such as Merseyside, it had the highest rate of stop and search and the lowest rate for apprehending drug dealers. Crucially, the Met also had the second lowest rate of officers involved in neighbourhood policing. Police community support officers form the backbone of community policing, playing a vital role in building trust and confidence and securing community intelligence, which is vital in fighting knife crime, but since 2010 their numbers have been decimated. What plans do the Government have to recruit more PCSOs, particularly in London? They have mandated recruitment of police officers; why not PCSOs?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

In general terms, PCSOs will be recruited according to local need. The noble Lord is absolutely right that they are a very valuable resource for policing. They are very good at community engagement and deliver more than just that visible police presence. Prevention, problem solving and safeguarding the vulnerable remain key and PCSOs are most definitely at the forefront of this.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps we should leave the reorganisation of the police to another occasion. The first attraction of Amendment 55 is its utter simplicity and simple, clear language. You have no idea how anybody who has had to spend a lifetime looking at criminal justice legislation greets with acclaim a simple piece of legislation, which this is. There is no misunderstanding about it. It does what it says on the tin. Nobody can reconstruct it afterwards or say Parliament had a different intention—it is there.

More importantly, the argument is irrefutable. I had prepared quite a long speech to make today—long by my standards—but I will not make it. We have heard the arguments. This is a special, national problem—full stop. The best solution to a special, national problem is for it to be dealt with nationally. I therefore support this amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, first, I have absolutely no doubt about the Minister’s commitment to dealing with the sorts of offences we are talking about today, particularly violence against women and girls. I also have absolutely no doubt about the Government’s commitment to tackling those issues. This makes the Bill even more puzzling. We support all the amendments in this group, but I want to look at this from a slightly different angle.

This group of amendments is intended to ensure that certain categories of crime are always included in the serious violence duty. It raises the wider issue of what this whole chapter of the Bill is about. Crime and disorder partnerships—noble Lords will know from previous debates that I am quite keen on these—have for many years been responsible for a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling crime and disorder in their areas, including serious violence. They have the advantage of being able to assess what local needs are and prioritise the crime and disorder that is a particular problem in their areas.

In light of these well-established existing partnerships, one must ask why there is a need for an additional serious violence duty. There has been much concern about knife crime in recent years and Scotland has demonstrated how successful a public health approach to the problem can be, where police enforcement is just part of a multiagency, multipronged approach to tackling knife crime. There may be characteristics of the knife crime problem in Scotland and solutions tailored to tackle them there that may not be completely transferrable to other parts of the UK, but the general principle is sound: law enforcement is only one of many approaches that need to be brought to bear on a problem.

If the Government were focusing solely on this type of serious violence, one could understand, in the face of the growing public concern, that a public health approach to knife crime might be mandated—but that is not what the Bill says. However, there are clues in other parts of the Bill that that is what the Government were initially thinking. For example, we will shortly come on to offensive weapon homicide reviews and serious violence prevention orders, which are all about knife crime.

The Bill talks about serious violence generally, including threats of serious violence but excluding terrorism. It goes on to talk—in Clause 12(4)—about a list of factors that must be taken into account, such as: the maximum penalty that a court could impose; the impact on the victim; the prevalence of the violence in the area, and the impact on the community. Presumably, other factors could be considered when the local area is considering its own serious violence. This effectively makes any violence serious—for example, hate crime. Hate crime should be considered serious violence because, by definition, it has a serious impact on the victim.

Amendment 55, from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, says that domestic abuse, domestic homicides and sexual offences should always be included in the serious violence duty. As the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, how can any of these offences not be considered serious violence? If the Government do not accept this amendment, can the Minister say what types of domestic abuse, domestic murder or sexual offence are not serious, or in what areas they are not far too prevalent? Amendment 56 also includes stalking, for the reasons that my noble friend Lady Brinton so powerfully argued.

Amendment 57, from the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, includes all violence that results in emergency hospital treatment, or GBH—for very good reasons. As I mentioned in discussion on an earlier group, as the noble Lord did just now, the Cardiff model—that of sharing depersonalised accident and emergency information on knife and gun crime with the police—has proved invaluable. Furthermore, as the definition of serious violence includes threats of serious violence, my noble friend Lady Hamwee is quite right to point out that social media and other electronic communication—the impact of which may go beyond the geographic area for which the authorities that have a serious violence duty have responsibility—require a duty that goes beyond a single area.

In defining serious violence in such a wide way, the Government must either accept that all violence has the potential to be serious, or risk being accused of saying that violence associated with hate crime, violence against women and girls, domestic violence, and almost any other form of violence, is not serious, or should not be treated as serious in every police area.

What the Government should have done, and what they should do now, is go back and look at crime and disorder partnerships, which are already established and responsible for preventing and tackling all forms of crime and disorder—as their consultation on this issue said they should. They should look at where crime and disorder partnerships need to be strengthened —whether, perhaps, to include partners not currently involved—or where legislation needs to be changed to facilitate co-operation and the exchange of information, instead of mandating others to provide information to the police to enable a police-led enforcement approach to tackling serious violence—whatever that means. Of course, we will support all the amendments in this group for as long as the Government continue with such a broad definition of serious violence.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, like other noble Lords I await with interest the Government’s response to all the amendments in this group. My name also appears on Amendment 55, which, at the beginning of this debate, was so ably and comprehensively moved, as we knew it would be, by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. This issue was raised by the shadow Minister for Policing in the House of Commons, and I only hope it receives a more enthusiastic hearing from the Government in this House, given that it is being presented with such strong cross-party support across the House.

The serious violence duty introduced by this Bill, as we know, requires local authorities, the police, fire and rescue authorities, specified criminal justice agencies and health authorities to work together to formulate an evidence-based analysis of the problems associated with serious violence in a local area and then produce and implement a strategy detailing how they will respond to those particular issues. Prison, youth custody and education authorities may also need to work with these core partners.

As more than one noble Lord has said, the amendment is clear and straightforward in its intention, which is to make clear in the Bill that the definition of serious violence for the purpose of the serious violence prevention duty includes domestic abuse, domestic homicide and sexual offences. That begs the question of why this amendment is necessary. As the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, and he was not the only one, is it not obvious that domestic abuse, homicide and sexual offences must come within the definition of serious violence? Apparently it is not. Despite domestic abuse representing one-third of violent crime recorded by the police and despite 20% of all adult homicides and 50% of adult homicides where the victim is female being domestic homicides, the Government’s serious violence strategy does not recognise domestic abuse and sexual violence as forms of serious violence.

No doubt, that is one explanation why between April 2014 and March 2020 the annual number of domestic abuse-flagged cases referred to the Crown Prosecution Service by the police fell by 37%, with similar declines in prosecutions and convictions. No doubt, it is also one explanation why over the same period of time the annual number of prosecutions in rape-flagged cases fell by 55% and the annual number of convictions fell by 44%. No doubt, also, it is one explanation why in the year ended March 2020 only 9% of domestic abuse-related crimes and 1.4% of rape-flagged cases recorded by the police led to a charge or summons.

This Bill’s proposed serious violence prevention duty places a requirement on public authorities to collate and plan to prevent and reduce serious violence. While Clause 12 explicitly includes some named forms of violence, such as violence against property and threats of violence, to ensure that they are regarded as a form of violent crime across the board, violence against women and girls is not put in the same category, even though rates of domestic abuse and sexual violence, as so many other noble Lords have said, are consistent across England and Wales and do not vary greatly from one area to another.

Instead, intended Home Office guidance simply says that local areas can consider violence against women and girls as part of the new duty if they choose to and not that it is expected. Clearly, the Home Office is not too fussed one way or the other what areas decide on this very serious issue. There are attacks on statutes, and the Home Office gets very troubled. There are violent domestic attacks on human beings, particularly women, and the Home Office, however different the reality may be, appears so laid back that it wants to leave it to other people to make their own decisions on whether to regard these attacks as serious violence. It appears to want to leave it to other people to decide whether these dreadful attacks come within the scope of the serious violence prevention duty and the requirement on a range of public bodies, including local statutory agencies and the police, to work together to prevent and tackle serious violence with the aim of reducing the numbers of victims and perpetrators of such dreadful crimes.

Explicitly including domestic abuse, domestic homicide and sexual violence in the sexual violence reduction duty and its multi-agency approach would send a clear message to the police, prosecutors and a range of statutory agencies, including local agencies, that violence against women and girls is just not acceptable and that they all have to play a crucial role in tackling it.

At the moment there appears to be a distinction within the criminal justice system so that violence that takes place in the home or at the hands of an intimate partner is regarded as less serious than violence perpetrated in the public sphere. Only around one-half of police forces, as I understand it, have opted to take up Women’s Aid’s Domestic Abuse Matters specialised training on domestic abuse. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, said, only eight of the 18 violence reduction units established in police force areas, which are funded by the Home Office and considered forerunners to the new violence prevention duty, name domestic abuse in their strategies.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches want to probe whether Clause 13 needs to stand part of the Bill. Can the Minister explain to the Committee why there is a need for legislation to allow a local policing body, presumably a directly elected mayor or a police and crime commissioner, to assist in preventing or tackling serious violence?

I could understand if the clause stated that local policing bodies must assist or monitor what specified responsible authorities were doing and must report their findings to the Home Secretary, but that is not what it says. It says that such assistance, monitoring and reporting are voluntary, in that these bodies “may” assist, “may” monitor and “may” report.

Subsection (4) states:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision conferring functions on a local policing body”.


Does that mean that, although in primary legislation—the Bill—all this is voluntary, the Secretary of State can by regulation make it compulsory?

Subsection (5) states that the functions contained in regulations

“may include provision ... for a local policing body to arrange for meetings”.

Why does the Secretary of State need to pass regulations for a directly elected mayor to hold a meeting? Can the Minister explain why Clause 13 needs to be part of the Bill at all? We on these Benches are struggling to understand why.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for this stand part debate. If the Committee will forgive me, I will say, as quickly as I can, a word or two about how I perceive the role of police and crime commissioners up until now.

Clause 13 is clearly an important element in establishing, from the Government’s point of view, a serious violence reduction duty on a more statutory basis—if I can put it that way—than exists presently. This obviously involves police and crime commissioners in particular. It is important to remember—I think this is what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was getting at, in part—that police and crime commissioners have, in their nine-year existence, voluntarily worked hard to establish partnership working and commission partnership services. In many cases, they have taken a lead in those partnerships.

There is a fundamental misunderstanding—not, I am sure, in this Committee—that, somehow, the only real role for police and crime commissioners is to hold their police force, and the chief constable in particular, to account. That is a crucial part of their duties, but I point out—the Committee does not need this pointing out—that they are not just police commissioners but crime commissioners as well. At the very least, they should have a significant duty to find ways to prevent crime and its effects on victims and society, working alongside partners, of course.

This is not about dealing with crime that has taken place, whether it is antisocial behaviour or serious violence. It means dealing with what has become a hackneyed phrase but is crucial here: the causes of crime, going back to early childhood development and early intervention. It is always about poverty and its effect on crime. It is about bad and lousy living conditions, and it always involves looking after the vulnerable, whoever they may be—we are all vulnerable at some stage or other in our lives. Above all, it is about preventing lives being thrown away, whether they are those of victims or perpetrators. I have to confess—noble Lords may have already realised that this is what I am about to say—that this kind of work or duty, as I call it, gave me and many other police and crime commissioners the greatest buzz of all.

It was crucial to achieving anything that one worked with partners, local and national, very much including government. To their credit, the Government set up violence reduction units, changed their support—I do not mean that in any bad way—and became very keen on the public health approach to dealing with these matters. That was a huge and important change, and many of us were convinced by the work that we did and seeing what happened in Scotland that this was the right course to take.

Where I was police and crime commissioner, we have what we call a violence reduction network, rather than a unit. I argue that it has achieved quite a large amount already, with great projects. My predecessor as police and crime commissioner for Leicestershire ran and started an office of the police and crime commissioner-run strategic partnership board, or SPB, which, by the time I left office, included all—I mean all—of the main public services in the area covered by the force, from local government to health, education, the police, fire and ambulance services and more.

The other example I give is that I was the chairman of the East Midlands criminal justice board. Other police and crime commissioners were chairs of their local boards or whatever they chose to call it. Clearly, if Clause 13 and other parts of this chapter pass into law, there will be—I am guessing that this is how the Government will put it—more statutory backing for this way of approaching the serious violence reduction duty. I am not against that in principle, but my one concern is that, in my experience, police and crime commissioners are a little bit like elected mayors: if they are good, they are very good, and they can make a huge difference, but if they are not so good, they can make a huge difference the other way.

I was lucky in that I had a brilliant team working for me in my office. As it happens, it has been decimated by my successor, but that is for another day, certainly not for today. Also, when I was there, other police and crime commissioners, whatever their party politics or lack of it, seemed to me to be able people who wanted to do the right thing and were very committed. As the noble Baroness and the Committee will know, many new police and crime commissioners were elected in May this year, which is no doubt a good thing, and many more of them were women—it is about time, too. It is too early to say whether they will grab these extra opportunities, but I hope that they will.

There are two big issues as far as the future is concerned in the real world. One, of course, is data sharing, which the Bill is very concerned about, and so it should be. So often, people of good will get together on behalf of organisations that are not prepared to share data. That has to change in this area, otherwise there will be no achievement. The second issue—I hate to mention it but it is the usual one—is funding. If we are going to fund all these exciting proposals, it will require government to take a leading step in that.

I am grateful to the Committee for listening to my speech. I thought it might be useful in terms of this clause.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Clause 13 provides a power for a local policing body—namely, a PCC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, or the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a police authority—to assist authorities in meeting the requirements of the serious violence duty. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was absolutely correct, as was the noble Lord, Lord Bach—as I always say, we are immensely lucky to have Parliament’s only PCC in our place; the benefit of his experience is incredibly useful.

Local policing bodies have an important part to play in convening partner agencies. PCCs and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, as elected local policing bodies, are the voice of the local community in relation to policing and crime. This is reflected in their current functions in relation to community safety partnerships. Local policing bodies are responsible for the totality of policing in their force area—the noble Lord, Lord Bach, pointed out some of the things that they get involved with—as well as for services for victims of crime. They will therefore have shared objectives in relation to the prevention and reduction of serious violence. That is why this clause provides local policing bodies with a discretionary role in supporting specified authorities with the preparation and implementation of their strategies, as well as monitoring their effectiveness and impact on local serious violence levels. I underline that the PCC role is discretionary and that it cannot be mandated through regulations.

The PCC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the Common Council of the City of London will not be subject to the serious violence duty as specified authorities. However, as with the existing functions of these local policing bodies in relation to community safety partnerships, they may choose to collaborate with local partnerships. They may also take a convening role to support effective multiagency working.

Regulations made by the Secretary of State may provide further detail on the ways in which local policing bodies may assist specified authorities, including convening and chairing meetings, requiring certain persons to attend such meetings and providing funding to a specified authority to support the implementation of the local serious violence strategy. They will also have a power to require information for this purpose, as set out in Clause 16. In undertaking their monitoring functions, local policing bodies may report their findings to the Secretary of State to ensure compliance with the duty.

Specified authorities will have a duty to co-operate with local policing bodies when requested to do so. However, we have made clear in the draft support guidance the need for the relevant local policing body to consider the proportionality of additional requests and anticipated costs to specified authorities before making any such requests.

The overall objective is to provide additional support and leadership, if and when required, and not to place additional burdens on those authorities subject to the duty. The approach is very similar to arrangements in place for CSPs. There has been a mutual duty on PCCs and CSPs to reduce offending since the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. I am sure noble Lords will agree that, to engender an effective multiagency approach to preventing and reducing serious violence, we must ensure that all relevant parts of the system play their part and have sufficient support in place to enable them to do so. We believe that local policing bodies, including PCCs, are best placed to provide that support. I take also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about funding.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I have just a couple of questions. First, what aspects of Clause 13 are local policing bodies currently not allowed to do that the clause allows them to do? Secondly—and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for articulating what is in the guidance—my understanding is that crime and disorder partnerships could be the mechanism chosen to deliver on the serious violence duties in a particular area, or it could be a different mechanism, and the police and crime commissioner might want to be part of that or might not. That does not appear to provide the clarity of leadership and accountability necessary to deliver a serious violence strategy. Perhaps the Minister can explain how this all works.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I shall try to. At the moment, PCCs and other local policing bodies have the powers to work with the specified authorities to support multiagency working. The serious violence duty is a new duty, and the legislation clarifies how it will fit together. PCCs are the elected bodies; they work with local forces. The multiagency working can be through the CSPs, or there is flexibility around how the local partnerships are constituted. Because it is a new duty, it is definitely worth clarifying in legislation how it might work out.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I have to support what I have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for reasons we began to articulate on Monday evening. Noble Lords will remember we began to have a discussion about what is to be shared and in what circumstances existing duties of confidence and existing professional duties need to be overtaken in the public interest. But who decides? The Minister kindly gave me a very specific answer at one point in our discussion, when she said that it will be decided by the person who holds the data, but, obviously, that can be subject to challenge. That of course is my traditional understanding of professional confidence.

Way before this, and way before the Crime and Disorder Act, that was the traditional position: if the doctor, the teacher or whoever is not minded to hand over to the police the data about a specific person, or more general data, the police will have to go to the courts and try to get a warrant. That is the place for those hopefully rare disputes between professionals and the police, who are coming at this from different positions, to be decided, rather than being decided by direction from the Secretary of State.

Of course, normally, we want the health professionals, the policing professionals and the educational professionals to be working in discussion and collaboration, but, where there is a rare dispute because of their different professional angles and ethics, it really is for a judge to decide and not for the Secretary of State to trump all those existing ethics and duties. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is nodding at me. That is the concern I hope the Minister can address in her explanation and defence of Clause 17.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, taking us back to very late on Monday night, if the Minister remembers, when we were discussing Clause 15, on the disclosure of information. The Minister—I think, from memory, although it was late—implied that the disclosure of information was voluntary and that the clause was there simply to facilitate the disclosure of information. In challenging the Minister in that, I quoted from Clause 17.

I can be brief. Clause 17 enables the Secretary of State, if satisfied that a specified authority, educational authority or youth custody authority has failed to comply with the duties to collaborate or disclose information—including, presumably, sensitive personal information and information covered by a duty of confidentiality—to direct the authority to comply and enforce her direction through a mandatory order. That is what Clause 17 says.

I have already explained at length why professionals should use their professional judgment—as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, just said—within existing policies, procedures, practices and protocols, rather than being forced to divulge sensitive personal information when it is not, on balance, in the public interest to do so. For example, there will often be a greater good to be derived from maintaining a relationship between, say, a youth worker and a young person at risk of becoming involved in serious violence than from divulging sensitive information to the police. All authorities dealing with these issues are committed to preventing and tackling serious violence. They may, from time to time, have a different perspective on the problem, or a different view on the best way to achieve what we all are desperately seeking to do.

This clause is one of the reasons why so many organisations believe that the Bill is really about a police-led enforcement approach, because it is the Home Secretary who can force them to comply, rather than the public health, multiagency, multifaceted approach that has been so successful in preventing and tackling knife crime in Scotland. Can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is this clause necessary? We believe that Clause 17 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group starts with government Amendment 72, which I will say a brief word about. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of Welsh Ministers—not just consult them—before giving a direction under Clause 17 to a devolved Welsh authority. I understand that the change was requested by the Welsh Government, and we support it on this side of the House.

I turn to the debate on whether Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who introduced it, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Their explanatory statement says that:

“The purpose of this amendment is to explore the extent of the Secretary of State’s powers to issue directions under this section and the consequences of failure to comply with such a direction.”


A number of very searching questions have been raised, and I have a few questions myself. It would be helpful if the Minister could give some more information on what a “direction” might be and what it might consist of under this clause. The central point made by both the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was about the context of police-led enforcement rather than a more equal arrangement between other agencies such as education and the National Health Service.

In the House of Commons, the Minister said that it is envisaged that this power will be used extremely rarely. Nevertheless, could the Minister give an example of when this power might be used and what checks might be in place when it is used? What would the prior steps be before a direction is considered? How would an authority’s progress in acting upon a direction be measured? Further, can the Minister say something about how the Government see this power working in practice?

I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, raised a particularly interesting question about what the sanction might be if a public servant fails to comply with an order to disclose information. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti also spoke of the rare disputes between professionals and how these may be resolved by direction from the Secretary of State, rather than through the courts. She gave a historical context, if you like, to that status of professionals making their own judgments.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right about data protection but there are exemptions. One is the detection, prevention and reduction of crime.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister. I think I need to read what she said and compare it with what is in other clauses in the Bill because, although it is difficult to hold everything in one’s head, I am not sure that everything she said is consistent with what is in the Bill.

However, there are two specific questions that the Minister did not answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked what the sanction would be for failure to comply. Is it right that a mandatory order is an order of the Administrative Court to comply with a legal duty, and therefore failure to comply with a mandatory order would be in contempt of court? The second question, which I asked, was: can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed the efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is the clause necessary? I do not expect the Minister to have examples at her fingertips but perhaps she could write.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

I thank the Minister for her response on Clause 17. However, I wish to express a bit of concern. Although she assured the Committee that an individual doctor or youth worker would not be required to provide information, nevertheless an authority might well provide information, without consulting the individual doctor or youth worker, that would identify individuals who were receiving services in that authority. After the Minister’s response, I am not at all clear that we can be completely sure that this will not happen; I believe that there should be some wording in these clauses to specify that information from authorities about individuals would not be accepted if they provided it. This is an incredibly dangerous situation if individuals find that their authority has been divulging information to the police; it could destroy the efficacy of our public services—it is that serious.

I am not trying to be awkward; I just feel that we need some assurances in these clauses that individuals will not need to be concerned about the disclosure of information about them. Various subsections in Clauses 15 and 16 and so on indicate that, in looking at data protection, you must take account of the regulations in this Act. It is quite complex but it is not reassuring, if I may say so.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, before the noble Baroness withdraws her objection to the clause standing part, I remind noble Lords that we are in Committee and can speak as many times as we like.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I have had enough.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, it might be helpful to the Committee if I clarify what may be a slight confusion. The group was led by Amendment 72 but noble Lords will recall that Amendment 72 was agreed to in its place. The question that the Committee now has before is that Clause 17, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

73: Clause 18, page 17, line 17, at end insert “and contained in regulations”
Member’s explanatory statement
The aim of this amendment is to ensure that the guidance under this Clause is able to be scrutinised by Parliament

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 73, I will speak also to Amendment 74 in my name.

Clause 18 states that those authorities that are, under this chapter of the Bill, under a duty to prevent and tackle serious violence

“must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State”.

However, in the Bill, the only people the Secretary of State must consult are Welsh Ministers. As we will see in a later group, when it comes to similar guidance in relation to offensive weapons homicide reviews, Clause 31 requires the Secretary of State to consult

“persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent review partners”

and

“such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

That is in addition to Welsh Ministers.

We on these Benches believe that the Secretary of State should also consult representatives of the authorities that will be subject to the guidance, and such other persons as may be appropriate to consult. That is the intention of Amendment 74. We also believe that such guidance should be statutory—that is, contained in regulations—to enable Parliament to scrutinise the guidance before those involved become subject to it, as set out in Amendment 73. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. On Amendment 74, we believe it is vital that the Government should consult front-line organisations on the content of the guidance. They are the ones who know how this will, or will not, work in practice and their expertise is the driving force behind the duty. The Government have of course published draft guidance on this, and I ask the Minister whether this guidance is being consulted on.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, that was quick for a Committee debate. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the power to issue guidance in relation to the serious violence duty. I am sure we all agree that legislation works far better, in practice, when it is implemented alongside clear guidance. In the case of the serious violence duty, we want to ensure that the guidance is clear on the expectations of all specified authorities, that it provides sufficient advice in meeting them and that it highlights best practice from across England and Wales. It is also crucial that such guidance is developed in collaboration with and with input from those who will be subject to the legislation and those who represent them to ensure that it is fit for purpose.

That is why, prior to the implementation of Chapter 1 of Part 2, we will publicly consult on the guidance to support the duty. As a first step, we have published the guidance in draft to assist the scrutiny of these provisions. I have a copy of it here. We welcome feedback on the draft and will take that into account when preparing an updated draft for consultation following Royal Assent to the Bill.

Clause 18 already expressly requires consultation with Welsh Ministers, as the noble Lord said, in so far as the guidance relates to the exercise of functions under this chapter by a devolved Welsh authority. But we are committed to going further and, as part of the public consultation on the statutory guidance, we intend to invite views from key representative bodies and other relevant persons, such as the Children’s Commissioner and the domestic abuse commissioner. Given this commitment, I do not think it would be appropriate, at this point, to include a broader duty to consult in the Bill.

The stated aim of Amendment 73 is to enable the guidance to be scrutinised by Parliament. In principle, I have no difficulty with that at all; it is open to Parliament to scrutinise guidance at any time. However, the effect of this amendment, when read with the provisions in Clause 21, would be to make the guidance subject to the affirmative procedure. I am not persuaded that this level of scrutiny is necessary—and nor, for that matter, was the DPRRC, which recommended that the negative procedure should apply in this case. We are carefully considering that committee’s report and will respond ahead of the next stage. In light of the commitments I have given, would the noble Lord be happy to withdraw his amendment?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, but it was actually me who proposed these amendments.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I do apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My ventriloquism skills are not so good that the Minister would think I was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. But I am glad that the Minister is going to consider the regulations again. I am not sure that the intention of my amendment was to ensure that guidance would be approved through the affirmative procedure. Any procedure would be better than no procedure at all, and it does not look like there is any provision in the Bill for parliamentary scrutiny of guidance, so I am grateful for that undertaking. I will go back and look again at a later part of the Bill, which includes the need to consult on guidance. I may need to come back on Report and again challenge why, in that part of the Bill, guidance has to be consulted on, but not in this part. Having said that, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 73 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

75: Clause 23, page 22, line 7, at end insert—
“(c) no other mechanism is available to review or hold an investigation or inquiry into the death”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the reviews conducted under Clause 23 do not duplicate any other review taking place into the same death, for example a Coroner's inquest.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 75 I will speak also to Amendments 76 and 77 in this group, all in my name. We now come to offensive weapons homicide reviews and there are two points I will make initially. The first is to point to the evidence that the provisions on this in the Bill were probably, quite rightly and properly, about knife crime. Chapter 2 is about offensive weapons homicide reviews and, predominantly if not almost exclusively, homicides involving offensive weapons are knife crime offences.

Secondly, as with Chapter 1, the primary motive of the Government is to produce the illusion of doing something when the changes in the Bill have little practical beneficial effect. As we argued in Chapter 1, the Government’s approach potentially does more harm than good. Amendment 75 is a probing amendment to ask the Government why, just as Chapter 1 should have strengthened existing crime and disorder partnerships, this chapter should not strengthen the already considerable and comprehensive powers of coroners, if this were necessary, rather than creating a new and separate legal duty to conduct offensive weapons reviews—other than the obvious explanation that the Government could point to it and say they had done something about knife crime.

For every death where the cause of death is still unknown, where the person might have died a violent or unnatural death or might have died in prison or police custody, a coroner must hold an inquest. Clearly every qualifying homicide, as identified by Clause 23, and every potential qualifying homicide, even if the Secretary of State changed the definition by regulations, as subsection (7) allows, would be subject to a coroner’s inquest. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides coroners with a duty to make reports to a person, organisation, local authority, or government department or agency, where the coroner believes that action should be taken to prevent future deaths. All reports, formerly known as rule 43 reports, and responses must be sent to the Chief Coroner. In most cases, the Chief Coroner will publish the reports and responses on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website. Coroners are very powerful members of the judiciary. Attendance at a coroner’s court takes precedence over an appearance at any other court, if a witness is required to attend more than one court at one time, for example.

Can the Minister tell the Committee what consultation took place with coroners before this chapter was drafted? What was their response? What additional benefit would an offensive weapons homicide review have over a coroner’s report? If benefits were identified, what consideration was given to the coroner, rather than a review partner, being given the power to order a homicide review? Can the Minister also explain what happens if one of the review partners considers that none of the conditions in Clause 23(1) is satisfied, but another review partner considers that the conditions are met? Does the review take place despite the review partner’s objection, and, if it does, does the review partner that objected have to participate if it does not believe the conditions are met? Is there a hierarchy of review partners? So, if the police believe the conditions are met, must the review go ahead? And if a clinical commissioning group believes that a review should go ahead, but the police do not believe the conditions are met, does the review take place and do the police have to participate?

The Government may say that all this will be set out in regulations, but the existing provisions in the Bill are a shell of an idea, where this Committee is left to guess what actually happens in practice; what a qualifying homicide is, because that can be changed by regulation; who the review partners will be, because that will be set out in regulations; and what happens if there is disagreement among review partners about whether the conditions are met.

We already have child death reviews, domestic homicide reviews—on which more in a subsequent group—safeguarding adult reviews, and, now, offensive weapons homicide reviews. With the Bill as drafted, how many of the sadly too many knife crime deaths a year will be subject to a review? According to the Bill, factors that decide whether a review is necessary may include, for example, the circumstances surrounding the death, the circumstances or the history of the person who died, or the circumstances or history of other persons with a connection with the death, or any other condition the Secretary of State sets out in regulations. How many reviews do the Government believe will have to be conducted each year by our overstretched police, local authority and health services? I ask the Minister to not give the answer: “It depends what conditions are contained in the regulations”.

Amendment 76 is intended to ensure, as with the serious violence duty, that professionals, including doctors and counsellors, are not forced to disclose sensitive personal information that is subject to a duty of confidentiality, unless, in exceptional circumstances, it is in the public interest to do so, and in accordance with existing policies and practices, although I accept that these may be less stringent in the case of information regarding the deceased.

As before, Clause 31 says that review partners must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State, but there is no mention of parliamentary scrutiny of such guidance. My Amendment 77 requires the guidance to be laid before Parliament to ensure parliamentary scrutiny. I beg to move Amendment 75.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to support my noble friend in questioning whether the processes outlined in this clause should be altered so that they protect the procedures that we already have and have had for a thousand years, to use the system of coroners to investigate unexplained deaths of a wide variety of types. Instead, we have the offensive weapons homicide review added to the system. It is unclear how this will relate to the coroner’s duties in a situation where such a death has occurred, because the coroner’s duties do not disappear because we have legislated this system into existence. I hope the Minister will clarify this point.

There was a time when the Government might have felt that the system of coroners was not quite up to the job in some areas. We had problems over the years with inconsistencies in standards of coroner, but considerable attention has been given to that in recent years and I think the system now has much more consistency about it. We are not subject to some of the problems of particular localities which existed in the past. The creation of a Chief Coroner, although in a more limited way than originally envisaged, I think has helped in that process.

It seems to me that the Government are not saying that the coroner system cannot handle this, they are simply legislating for an additional mechanism, because that seems to be a good, visible response to a problem that we all acknowledge is a serious one. But serious problems are not solved by creating more structures and processes, particularly in the circumstance where what is a qualified homicide appears to be so uncertain that the Government have to keep to themselves powers to change the meaning of qualified homicide while the legislation remains in force.

I am very unpersuaded about this system and certainly would like to know what coroners are supposed to do when they find themselves presented with the likelihood of such an inquiry taking place and may have their own duties in respect of the death that has taken place.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. As I understand it, yes it does. I expect I will be corrected by my officials later.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. It cannot possibly be right that a coroner’s inquest is not held if a criminal trial answers the statutory questions. Why is a coroner’s inquest into the Manchester Arena bombing currently taking place after two people have been convicted in criminal trials? I cannot believe that what the Minister just said is true.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not in a position to answer that question, I am afraid. I shall have to write to the noble Lord.

I can now confirm that coroners’ inquests will not preclude an offensive weapons homicide review.

In homicide cases where there is an inquest, its purpose would not be to provide the same in-depth review as an offensive weapons homicide review, which will identify points of failure, lessons learned and opportunities to intervene, which will help partners tackle homicide locally and nationally. Due to this, we do not consider that the amendment is necessary. I may have already said that, in which case I apologise. In fact, I have said that; I shall move on to Amendment 76.

Amendment 76 relates to information sharing in relation to confidentiality obligations and data protection in Clause 29. To review the circumstances leading up to a homicide involving an offensive weapon, to identify lessons and produce recommendations that will have a meaningful impact and save lives, the review will undeniably need to be able to access and consider information and material relevant to the homicide. Such information may include information about the victim or the alleged perpetrators or perpetrator. It may relate to their interactions with police forces, social services, health practitioners, educational institutions, employers or third-sector organisations. It may relate to information about their known associates.

It is not for the Government to determine what information is relevant. That will be for the review partners. I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about the High Court proceedings. That issue is dealt with in Clause 29, which sets the terms on which disclosures of information required or authorised by Clauses 26 to 28 may be made. I do not have precise details on the High Court proceedings but I will come back to the noble Lord, if that is all right. Clause 28 includes a power enabling review partners to provide information to another review partner for the purpose of enabling or assisting the review partners to arrange and carry out an offensive weapons homicide review.

I have mentioned review partners a number of times and it is worth digressing briefly to attempt to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the backstop, effectively—what happens if there is no review partner? That is not possible because in cases where there is no relevant review partner, the regulations also allow for the Secretary of State to be given the power to direct which partners are the relevant ones. I hope that answers his specific question.

Clause 28 also includes a power for review partners to require information from other persons. However, review partners may request information under this power only for the purposes of enabling or assisting review partners to arrange and carry out an offensive weapons homicide review, and the request may be made only to a person whom the review partner considers likely to have such information. The scope of the information that might be requested, and who it might be requested from, is therefore limited.

This power does not, however, affect the availability of any other duties or powers to share information such as existing lawful routes for information to be shared for safeguarding purposes or for the purposes of the detection and prevention of crime. As currently drafted, the provisions in the Bill ensure that relevant information may be disclosed, and such disclosure would not breach existing obligations of confidence, but any disclosure must still abide by the data protection legislation—that is, the Data Protection Act 2018 and regulations made under that Act, the UK General Data Protection Regulation, regulations implementing the GDPR and the law enforcement directive—and must not be prohibited by specified provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act. For example, where personal data is subject to the UK General Data Protection Regulation, that regulation sets out the principles, rights and obligations that apply to the processing of personal data, including exemptions from particular provisions that can apply in certain circumstances, as set out in Schedules 2 to 4 to the Data Protection Act 2018—for example, in the prevention and detection of crime.

Additionally, Clause 29 provides that a person cannot be required by Clause 28 to disclose information that they could not be compelled to disclose in proceedings before the High Court, meaning that information that is subject to legal professional privilege cannot be required to be disclosed. Due to those safeguards, we do not feel that Amendment 76 is necessary.

I should also like to confirm that we have consulted the Information Commissioner’s Office throughout the development of these provisions and will continue to engage with it as we develop guidance and prepare to pilot these reviews. We consider the information-sharing provisions in Chapter 2 of Part 2 necessary to facilitate an effective multiagency approach to preventing and reducing homicide and serious violence.

Amendment 77 would ensure that guidance under Clause 31 is laid before Parliament. The statutory guidance provided for in Clause 31 will assist the review partners in understanding the statutory responsibilities placed on them, as well as providing best practice on how to fulfil those responsibilities. Among other things, the guidance will provide further information on the notification requirements, the conduct of reviews, the content of the final report and information sharing. We intend to publish an outline draft of the guidance document to allow time for further development before consulting on the guidance, as required by Clause 31. The guidance document will be finalised and published ahead of the pilot commencing.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. I thought that I had made it clear, and I apologise for obviously not having done so, but no, OWHRs are not precluded by a coroner’s inquest.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for attempting to answer my questions. I am very grateful for his undertaking to write to me on any questions that were not answered. I just add one question to that.

One of my big regrets in life is not taking shorthand, so I must paraphrase what the Minister said. It was something along the lines of there being no existing legal duty to review the circumstances surrounding an offensive weapon homicide to prevent future deaths. I appreciate that the Minister is behind the curve, as he relies on a brief that is given to him before the contents of what I say immediately beforehand are known. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides coroners with a duty to make reports where the coroner believes that action should be taken to prevent future deaths. How is that not a legal duty to review the circumstances surrounding an offensive weapon homicide to prevent future deaths? If the Minister can add that to the unanswered questions, then, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75.

Amendment 75 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. My noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb signed this amendment but is, unfortunately, unable to be in the House tonight and I speak in her place.

Essentially, I agree with everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said. I will add just a couple of points. It is worth noting that the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing produced a report on domestic homicide in August, which described it as

“an entrenched and enduring problem.”

The report makes very disturbing reading. It records that just over half of suspects were previously known to police from domestic abuse cases, and another 10% were known for other offences, while 44% of households not covered by those categories were known to some other agency in some way. There is clearly an issue, therefore, with lessons learned.

It is good to have a report such as this: it is very useful and informative. But what is being proposed here is a register—something ongoing that can be a continual source of information and learning. We should make a couple of comparisons here. One is with air safety, where there is an assumption that whenever anything goes wrong every possible lesson will be learned and every piece of information will be extracted from it. We should be looking at domestic homicides in the same way.

Another parallel is with the Vision Zero approach to road crashes which many nations are increasingly adopting. We should be among them, and we should be looking to have zero serious injuries or deaths on the road. We know from the report that in nearly all cases of domestic homicide there has been an opportunity for someone to intervene. We should be looking towards a Vision Zero for domestic homicides.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I listened very carefully to the arguments put forward by the noble and learned lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, but I am not sure that there needs to be a domestic homicide review in every case—or whether that is not already the situation.

In my experience, some cases of domestic homicide are very straightforward, and I remind the Committee of my remarks on the previous group: that coroners—rather than, for example, the Secretary of State—should perhaps have the power to order such a review if they believe it is in the public interest.

We support the need to ensure that lessons are learned from domestic homicide reviews, that they are regularly published, and that these offences are treated with utmost seriousness. Being attacked and killed in your own home, a place where everyone should feel safe, is far more serious than being attacked and killed on the street. That is why it is so important that any lesson that can be learned from any domestic homicide should be learned, and why the courts need to take these offences far more seriously than a random attack or a gang-related attack on the street.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 80, 90A, 94, 96, and 97 in this group. I was hoping that this group might be an example of this House at its best, where reasonable and reasoned amendments have been tabled, the Government have seen and responded positively to them and the Bill could be improved as a result. We clearly do not all agree on everything yet, but what all sides of the House—including the Government —appear to agree on is that the Bill as drafted and passed by the other place in respect of Chapter 3 on the extraction of information from electronic devices is not fit for purpose.

I shall take my amendments first. The House of Lords Constitution Committee raised concerns about victims of crime not coming forward or withdrawing from the criminal justice process because they may have to hand over personal and sensitive data, particularly victims and survivors of violence against women and girls, including rape. Although the draft code of practice published by the Government includes guidance that suggests refusal to provide a device or to agree to the extraction of information from it should not automatically result in the closure of any inquiry or complaint—particularly in light of the dramatic reduction in charges and prosecutions for rape over the past five years—the committee recommended that safeguards that protect victims’ rights to privacy and guard against digital extraction as a condition for continuing an investigation or prosecution should appear in the Bill rather than in a non-binding code of practice. Amendment 80 addresses the issue raised by the Constitution Committee. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in her powerful and compelling contribution.

This issue is partially addressed by government Amendment 93, which states that a person must not have been placed under undue pressure to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it and that a written notice must be provided which states that the person may refuse and that the investigation or inquiry will not be brought to an end merely because of that refusal. As well as being given the information in writing, the person should be told this orally and be reassured by the investigating officer. The government amendment does not go far enough.

I would go further and say that what people store on their electronic devices and share with each other has changed dramatically over the years. In particular, those from older generations may not be aware of the degree of openness with which explicit images, for example, are routinely shared using electronic devices, potentially leading prosecutors and jurors to draw unjustified conclusions about the behaviour of victims of rape or sexual assault in particular, whether they be male or female. Thankfully, most right-minded people no longer think a woman wearing a short skirt is “asking for it”, but there may be a way to go before the sharing of intimate photographs, for example, is dismissed in a similar way. That is why it is essential that victims are reassured in the way these amendments are intended to provide.

Amendment 90A makes a slightly different point and covers a similar area to that provided by Amendment 92 from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in relation to the extraction of information from devices used by children and adults without capacity. In relation to both groups of users, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests that a “registered social worker” give authority for the extraction of information, in the absence of a parent or guardian, whereas, in Clause 37(3)(b), the Government suggest that

“any responsible person who is aged 18 or over other than a relevant authorised person”

can give authority. Although police constables and members of staff appointed as authorised persons by chief constables would be excluded, police members of staff not authorised would not be excluded.

From my own professional experience, I know that it is often difficult to get hold of parents or guardians or to get them to co-operate, for example by attending a police station when their child is in custody. Equally, it is difficult to get hold of a social worker, particularly outside office hours, where there may be only one or a few social workers on call, dealing with the whole range of social work responsibilities—hence the “appropriate adults” scheme was established to look after the interests of children and vulnerable adults in custody. Appropriate adults are volunteers, recruited through local schemes, who are selected for their ability to act with independence from the police. Schemes take into account volunteers’ attitudes and motivations and any other roles that they may hold. They undergo training in the appropriate adults role and undergo a criminal record—DBS—check, although a criminal record will not necessarily act as an automatic bar.

Amendment 90A seeks to find a compromise between allowing any responsible person aged 18 or over, including potentially those employed by the police, to give authority for the handing over and extraction of data from a child’s or vulnerable adult’s electronic device and the registered social worker who is not always readily available, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his Amendment 89.

I apologise—this is a long group. Amendment 96 seeks to increase the authority level for the extraction of information to a senior officer—at a rank where someone of that rank is normally on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and readily available—who is independent of the investigation and can objectively assess whether the conditions that allow for the extraction of information have been met. There are precedents across policing: for example, custody officers or those authorising the deployment of covert surveillance, where someone independent of the investigation makes these kinds of decisions.

Amendment 97 is again intended to provide parliamentary scrutiny of guidance, as is Amendment 102, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which I have added my name. I agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend Lord Beith’s Amendment 103 that the restrictions on the exercise of power to extract information in relation to confidential information must be in the Bill and not simply contained in regulations. I understand the reasons for wanting to exclude immigration officers from the list of authorised persons who can extract information from electronic devices, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his Amendment 107.

On immigration officers, we share the belief that there should be a firewall between criminal investigations and immigration enforcement, to the extent that details about the immigration status of victims should not be passed to the immigration authorities but should be dealt with elsewhere. I can envisage circumstances where immigration officers may need to download information from electronic devices—for example, to tackle people smuggling—although I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, which was that that should perhaps be a matter for the police rather than immigration officers.

I also accept the very important point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol about the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers and their lack of knowledge of what the law allows and does not allow immigration officers to do, and how we need many more safeguards for asylum seekers in this provision. We also wholeheartedly agree with Amendment 106A regarding requests for third-party material. If I had not been overwhelmed by the volume of amendments added to the Bill every day, I would have added my name to that amendment.

We all in different ways have attempted to provide a more robust but workable regime around the extraction of information from mobile devices. The best way forward would be for all noble Lords, including the Minister, to withdraw their amendments, for the Minister and officials to meet with us before Report, and for officials to take the best from each of these amendments and those discussions, to produce a single set of amendments to which hopefully we can agree, rather than having to put down amendments on Report to the government amendments agreed in Committee. Taking the debate offline will save time on the Floor of the House on Report, when the agreed amendments could simply be nodded through. However, it appears that the Labour Opposition are content to allow the government amendments to be agreed at this stage, despite the clear differences between what they are proposing and the government amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Hayward, made the important point, as we did on these Benches when this House debated the Domestic Abuse Bill, that these issues also affect men. The noble Lord also praised the police, who are in a very difficult position, which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, alluded to, where they find themselves under pressure from the Crown Prosecution Service to go further than maybe even police officers may be comfortable going in terms of accessing personal information from victims’ phones. I repeat the question asked by the noble Lord: who speaks for the Crown Prosecution Service in this debate?

I studied politics at university, I was a very senior police officer for years, I ran for Mayor of London twice and I have been a member of your Lordships’ House for over eight years, but I still do not understand politics. Suffice it to say that, without Labour support, there is no point in dividing the Committee if the Government move their amendments formally at this stage.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, in apologising to the House for the length of my comments. It might assist the Committee if I begin with a brief overview of the provisions in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Bill. These provisions will establish, for the first time, a clear statutory basis for the extraction of information from digital devices with the agreement of the device user, and introduce safeguards to protect the privacy of victims, witnesses and others. I echo the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that it is a vast intrusion. People’s lives are on their digital devices and I understand the sensitivity of that.

The current approach to the extraction of information from digital devices has been criticised as inconsistent and, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, as being tantamount to a digital strip search, where devices were taken as a matter of course and where, in many cases, all the sensitive personal data belonging to a device user was extracted and processed, even when it was not relevant to the offence under investigation. Clearly, that is unacceptable. This resulted in privacy and victims’ groups opposing this practice, particularly in cases where the device belongs to a victim or witness.

A consistent approach is clearly needed to ensure that requests for information are made with the victim’s right to privacy in mind and to ensure that all those agreeing to provide their sensitive personal data have all the information that they need to make that decision, including details on why their information is needed, how it will be used and their right to refuse to share that information without any negative consequences. This lack of consistency is of particular concern where the offences under investigation are those such as rape and serious sexual assault, where the victim is likely to be extremely distressed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, and where rates of reporting and conviction are far too low.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I will do my damnedest. I will take back the noble and learned Lord’s comments and see what is in the art of the possible. I can do no more than promise that, if he is happy with that—or rather, if he will accept it.

I will move on swiftly to Amendment 107, which seeks to remove immigration officers from Schedule 3, so that they can no longer exercise the powers in this Bill. Immigration officers play a vital role in protecting vulnerable people, in particular those who may be victims of trafficking, and it is important that they are able to obtain information that may be vital to these and other investigations. I therefore do not accept that immigration officers should not have access to these powers, subject to the same safeguards that apply to other authorised persons.

Finally, Amendment 106A relates to third-party material, an issue highlighted not just by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Anderson, this evening, but by the Victims’ Commissioner, Dame Vera Baird. The amendment highlights a very important issue around the proportionality of requests for third-party material relevant to a victim. This material can be highly sensitive—for example, medical records. We agree that such material should only ever be sought where there is a reasonable line of inquiry, but we are aware that this is not always the case. There are examples where such requests cannot be justified, and this has a detrimental impact on the confidence of victims.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also talked about written information given to victims. The police forces will use the digital processing notices developed by the NPCC for this purpose. The DPN, in layman’s terms, explains how the police extract the information, which information might be extracted, for how long it might be retained—that question was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and answered in part by my noble friend Lord Hayward—and what happens to irrelevant material found on the device. The DPN makes clear that investigators must respect individual rights to privacy and must not go beyond reasonable lines of inquiry.

The Government wholeheartedly agree that there needs to be a consistent approach to ensure that requests for third-party material are made with the victim’s right to privacy in mind and to ensure that the victim is fully informed. This principle is key to a number of actions in the Government’s end-to-end rape review, which we published in June.

Moving on to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on Amendment 106A, our understanding is that the NPCC agrees in principle to the need for legislation but has not taken a view on a particular legislative solution. As I have indicated, this issue requires further examination, so I thank the noble Lord. I understand that the CPS similarly accepts the need for appropriate controls on access to third-party material.

The police and the CPS are working on new guidance for the investigators and victims which can be finalised after the Information Commissioner’s Office publishes its report on data in rape cases, which is due imminently. We will also consider whether a change is required to the Attorney-General’s guidelines. This will give us an opportunity to consider the broader landscape with regards to proportionality in requests for evidence from victims and whether further steps should then be taken. In terms of DPNs and involvement of the Victims’ Commissioner: yes, she has been involved with the development of the digital processing notices.

I apologise again for the length of my remarks to the Committee. The Committee has raised important issues in respect of the privacy of victims and witnesses, and it is very important we get the framework in the Bill right. I hope noble Lords will agree that we have listened to the concerns that additional safeguards should be set out in the Bill and will be content to agree the government amendments in lieu of their own. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, that we will consider further their Amendments 97 and 103, and to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are very alive to the issues around third-party material. For now, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to withdraw Amendment 79.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly: I really am grateful to the Minister. It is a very big group, and it is difficult to take in everything she said. But we have to be very careful. People will be reading the record of this debate. I think I heard the Minister say that the authorised person must explain that the investigation or inquiry will not be brought to an end if they refuse to hand over their device. That is not what it says on the face of the Bill. It says the person must be given a written notice.

These might have been many decades ago, but I know of situations where police officers shoved a piece of paper in front of somebody who was either a victim or a suspect—even somebody who could not read—and said something different from what was on the piece of paper. So I think we have to make it absolutely clear in the Bill, not just in the guidance or the codes of practice, that this must be explained, which was the meaning of one of my amendments.

The other thing I think I heard the Minister say—it is late—is that the authorised person must explain to the victim that refusal would have no negative consequences. That cannot possibly be right. For example, in a rape case where consent is an issue—where, perhaps, the defence argued that there were exchanges of messages or some such things that go to the heart of whether consent is an issue—and the victim refuses to hand over their device, there could be negative consequences when it comes to trial. Again, I understand that the Minister wants to be helpful and reassuring to victims, but we have to be absolutely clear what we are promising here, if it is being said on the record in this Committee.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The hour is late. Because these things are so important, I will reiterate them in a letter to the noble Lord.

Sexual Misconduct in the Police

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 26th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I must join the noble Lord in expressing my disgust. Every one of those numbers represents a person who has been the victim of sexual misconduct by a serving police officer. On the one hand, any number is too many but, on the other hand, we should look to the legislation that we introduced last year to give additional powers to the IOPC. That includes the power of initiative, which allows it to bring forward and investigate allegations without requiring referral from the police. In addition, forces must refer all allegations of serious sexual offences or of police officers abusing their position for a sexual purpose to the IOPC. For the first time now, the Home Office will be able to collect and publish data on internal sexual misconduct by officers, and we aim to publish the first tranche in the new year.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I was a police officer for over 30 years, and I want to be proud of that fact. We do not need working groups, inquiries, inspections and a task force to reassure the public. When will the Home Secretary give the Independent Office for Police Conduct the additional resources that it needs to effectively investigate sexual abuse by police officers? As a former Home Secretary did with racism after the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence, when will she tell police chiefs: “Misogyny is a problem and you must address it now”? That is not just what we want. It is what every decent, honest, hard-working police officer wants.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I repeat my response to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that every report or allegation of police misconduct for a sexual purpose must be referred to the IOPC. It will be up to individual force chiefs to decide but if it is sexual misconduct it must be referred to the IOPC. We have that additional layer in that the IOPC now has the power of initiative. Decisions on whether officers have committed sexual misconduct, and, if so, what sanctions there ought to be, are for misconduct panels led by the independent, legally qualified chairs.

Additionally, following the recommendations of the Zoë Billingham report, we will be working closely with the new national police lead for tackling VAWG, DCC Maggie Blyth, who took up the post recently to address the report’s findings and drive forward improvements in policing’s response to VAWG.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 25th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thought there was no such thing as disorderly interventions in Committee. Everyone is free to speak as many times as they wish at any point in the debate, so I am very pleased that the noble Lord used that opportunity.

In this group we return to the issue, which I raised last Wednesday, of what the new legal duty is really about—a police-led enforcement approach to preventing and tackling serious violence rather than a public health approach. Many and various specified authorities come under this new legal duty, and there are various reasons why these authorities should not be forced to divulge personal information to the police, of which the pre-eminent, and perhaps most readily understood example, is patient confidentiality.

In addition to the excellent points made by my noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, I should also mention the joint briefing that noble Lords will have received from mental health professionals represented by the British Psychological Society, the representative body for psychology and psychologists, and the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy. They believe that the Bill as drafted allows the police to override the duty of medical confidentiality, eroding trust and confidence in clinical psychologists, counsellors and psychotherapists with the associated threat to public health, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Patel, who also believes that it will undermine the relationship between him as a doctor and his patients.

Like medical doctors, these health professionals are able to share confidential information on public-interest grounds already, on a case-by-case basis, if that is necessary for the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime or where there is an imminent risk of serious harm to an individual. There is already a system in place, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said. As the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, has said, we support what the amendments seek to achieve, which is to prevent the Bill undermining patient confidentiality.

Whether we are talking about doctors in general practice or psychiatrists, psychologists or counsellors, there are already well-established, well-understood policies and procedures, practices and protocols to deal with the balance between patient confidentiality and the police being able to access confidential information in the exceptional circumstances where it is necessary for public safety. Perhaps the duty of confidentiality for those in other fields is less well established and accepted, and we will come to those in another group, but, at least when it comes to patients’ and clients’ health and well-being, surely there can be little argument that the existing provisions are adequate, work well and should not be overridden.

Having said that, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who pointed out that there is a balance to be achieved and that in the past medical practitioners have got that balance wrong where they perhaps should have passed information to the police. Surely, however, that is an argument for enhancing or reviewing the current system rather than arguably going much too far in the other direction and making it a legal duty that doctors breach medical confidentiality.

We on these Benches say that what the Bill tries to do in terms of compelling health professionals, in this case, to divulge information to the police goes too far. What needs to be done is simply going back and looking at any examples that the Government can give, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has done, where current practice does not work effectively.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanations and for the promise of further meetings. It might help those further meetings if I raise the issues I have now. I am concerned at her saying that approaches cannot be made directly to medical practitioners but only through these other bodies. If the result was the same—that confidential medical information about individuals was divulged—that is not much of a reassurance. I am grateful for the information that officials met with the GMC and that it agreed to help with statutory guidance. Perhaps the Minister can meet with the GMC and it can help with amending the Bill.

The Minister said that the issue with some of the amendments is that they weaken the duties in the Bill. That is the whole purpose of the amendments. Regarding the draft guidance and its emphasis on a public health approach, that is not what is on the face of the Bill. The perception of all those I have spoken to—we will come to this issue when considering further groups—is that this is all about providing information to the police. To be fair, the Minister said so in her response. The belief among many authorities is that this is all about providing information to the police and is not a two-way process.

The Minister talked about the Care Act and said that there is already a duty to pass over confidential medical information if there is an overriding public interest. Where in the Bill does it say that there must be an overriding public interest before information is passed over?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The detection and prevention of serious violence would be the relevant part, which also reads across to the Care Act 2014. There would have to be a public interest assessment and as I said, there is no mandation. But the body or doctor in question would, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, have to balance the importance of the prevention, detection, and reduction of serious violence with the disclosure of that information.

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[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I support these amendments absolutely; they are practical and in the real world. From my experience as a police and crime commissioner over five years, it is quite clear that serious violence has a huge amount to do with place and a lot to do with housing in those places. If we are to have the partnership that is presumably behind the Government’s proposals on serious violence, it is absolutely essential that housing and those who control it have a vital role; without them, all sorts of disasters will occur.

When I was a police and crime commissioner, I would hear from police officers or citizens day by day about the problems in areas where they lived and the mismatch, sometimes, between those responsible for housing and their ability to talk to the police and get things done, on either side, as quickly as possible. These are very important amendments, and I hope that the Government will listen carefully to them.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support these amendments. It is not just victims of domestic violence who need help and support from housing authorities in escaping serious violence. Young people groomed and exploited by criminal gangs also need and deserve to be urgently rehoused in certain circumstances, as the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, so clearly set out.

Again, this needs to be a truly multiagency approach to reducing serious violence and not a police-led enforcement approach. The police need to provide information to housing authorities where they believe that someone is being coerced into criminal activity and is threatened with serious violence if they do not comply, and that taking that person out of that scenario by rehousing them can reduce the risk of serious violence.

I repeat that option 2 of the Government’s consultation on the serious violence duty is the best option and the one preferred by the greatest proportion of respondents to the Government’s own consultation—that of enhancing existing crime and disorder partnerships. These are the existing and well-established mechanism, where local authorities and police forces work together to prevent and tackle crime and disorder and where the local police chief and the local authority chief executive are equal partners in doing whatever each partner and others can do to reduce crime and disorder.

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Therefore, for ensuring that the statutory guidance on the serious violence duty will work in tandem with the homelessness code of guidance, I think there is already sufficient guidance in place for housing authorities to protect this cohort and adapt their service delivery models as necessary. I do not want to duplicate by adding another code of practice, which may lead to confusion. So I hope that, in the light of the assurances I have given in relation to the guidance and the relevant existing legislation on the matter, my noble friend will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, can I ask the Minister to clarify something? I think the noble Baroness said that this additional duty was not necessary, as it was with domestic violence, because the violence does not happen in the home. In the example I gave, where a drug dealer owed money harasses and threatens a family to get their money back, surely you could say that that violence is happening on the doorstep, or perhaps inside the home if the drug dealer breaks the door down. Surely there is a need in those circumstances for that family to be rehoused to reduce serious violence and get them out of the way in a similar way to a victim of domestic violence.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think what I said to the House was that households containing dependent children have a priority need and that a person may be assessed as having priority need if they were considered to be significantly more vulnerable than an ordinary person would be if they became homeless as a result of ceasing to occupy accommodation by reason of violence from another person or threats of violence that are likely to be carried out. In terms of domestic abuse, it is widely acknowledged that domestic abuse crimes are committed inside the home, out of the view of the public, by household members. The changes made to the Domestic Abuse Act to extend priority need to people who are homeless as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse reflected that.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 25th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

28: Clause 7, page 8, line 31, at end insert—
“(d) each NHS body in the area.”Member’s explanatory statement
This is to ensure that the local health sector is consulted when a a local plan is being prepared to prevent and reduce serious violence in that local area.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 28 in my name, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group.

Those under the new legal obligation to collaborate with each other to prevent and reduce serious violence are set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill and include clinical commissioning groups and local health boards, but they do not, for example, include hospital trusts. We will come to what should be included in serious violence in a later group, but in that group, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, has an amendment to include violence that results in the victim receiving injury that requires emergency hospital treatment, or where the injury amounts to grievous bodily harm.

Leaving the definition of serious violence to one side until we reach that group, we know from the work of Professor Jonathan Shepherd of Cardiff University how important information about knife crime, for example, is to the police in tackling that type of serious violence. It therefore seems to be a serious omission that not all NHS bodies in the area are listed as bodies that must be consulted as provided for in Clause 7(4), particularly hospital trusts. This omission leads one to question again to what extent this is really a public health approach to tackling and reducing serious violence. I have suggested that hospital trusts, for example, are included as bodies that must be consulted, rather than specified authorities, to avoid hospital trusts being compelled to divulge sensitive personal patient information under the other provisions of this chapter.

Hospital trusts can also play an important role in allowing charities such as Redthread to engage with victims of knife crime at “teachable moments” when victims involved in gangs are at their most receptive to being approached to discuss a way out of their violent lifestyles, particularly when they have been seriously injured or their injuries are life-threatening. I have personally heard powerful testimony from a young father, the mother of whose child had committed suicide, realising when in A&E with a serious knife wound that his child might have to grow up without either of his parents if he did not turn his back on his violent past. This is an example of a truly multiagency, public health approach to serious violence, where those involved in violent gangs are not necessarily imprisoned—where they may be further brutalised—but are supported to turn their lives around.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, suggests that young people’s groups and religious and cultural groups must also be consulted. In these cases, such groups can have a crucial role to play in providing a safe alternative to the sense of belonging that many young people desperately seek and that criminal gangs appear to provide.

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In conclusion, I reiterate my commitment to consider further the two amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra about the publication of strategies. As for the other amendments, I hope that, in light of my explanations, I have been able to satisfy the Committee and that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, particularly my noble friend Lady Brinton for her support for my Amendment 28 and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and my noble friend Lord Beith for powerfully explaining their amendments calling for the publication of strategies, despite my noble friend’s scepticism about having statutory strategies.

Other parts of the Delegated Powers Committee’s report criticise the fact that there is no indication that guidance issued to the Government will be published. There is also no requirement in the Bill to publish the serious violence reduction strategies; that is the main criticism in this group, as that clearly cannot be right.

The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, talked about drug-related homicides; I was not sure whether he was talking just about drug-fuelled perpetrators or other deaths associated with drug misuse. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, graphically illustrated the alarming increases in serious violence, particularly knife crime—there has been an 88% increase in recent years. He asked a very important question: how will this part of the Bill, and the strategies associated with it, succeed where previous strategies have failed? I am not sure we have heard the answer to that.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that we need to do whatever it takes to make sure that we succeed this time, because we have not succeeded up until now—provided that whatever that is, is effective. Clearly, there is a need for national co-ordination, for the very good reasons she explained.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, highlighted the need for smart objectives in strategies—specific, measurable, achievable and realistic objectives which have a timeframe. That is what effective strategies contain, and they do not appear to be present in the Bill. I thank the Minister for her comprehensive answers to the issues raised. She appeared to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, but it is not simply about sharing trends and monitoring; crucially, it is about setting smart objectives.

The Minister talked about clinical commissioning groups and local health boards; I have been told by my noble friend Lady Brinton, our health spokesperson, that these bodies do not include NHS hospital trusts, which at least should be included as bodies that must be consulted in developing these strategies. Accident and emergency hospital data is even mentioned in the guidance referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as a crucial measure of serious violence, yet accident and emergency hospitals are not even required to be consulted, according to the Bill. So we need to have further discussions on these issues.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was absolutely right to introduce this group of amendments by focusing on the full range of public services that will be drawn into the demands by this Government, and by police and other bodies, to have access to the personal information of individuals. As she rightly pointed out, this includes health services. Although I will not repeat the point that I made on the group starting with Amendment 22 earlier today, it sets the picture for the overall complexities and contradictions that other noble Lords have been discussing all evening on this Bill.

The data protection guardian has said that there are concerns that these likely breaches contravene the Data Protection Act. As I mentioned earlier, so have the GMC, the BMA and other health bodies. It is extremely concerning that we now must think about confidentiality in other areas too. I have no doubt at all that there are times when the balance of when information should be passed back is vital. That is what the serious violence strategy is all about. The problem is that there are no safeguards set out and no clear boundaries. I do not understand why that is the case.

While we have been talking about bodies and specific authorities during the course of these amendments, I am equally concerned about whether this debate is happening for the wider public, to tell them that in this Bill their personal data may well not be kept confidential. We do not even have the guidance on the point at which the police will start to get that information. So can the Minister identify any such consultation or debate in the wider media and social media about these rules, which will change citizens’ private data confidentiality for ever? I also echo the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, about this undermining trust in the bodies that have the data.

Amendment 65 makes the wider point that I referred to at length in the first group of amendments about the use of depersonalised information, but it sets out some guidelines and I strongly support this amendment too.

In closing, I say that the worry that many noble Lords have spoken of in various groups this evening is now becoming abundantly clear; it is just not clear where the rules and boundaries are, and I hope that the Minister will be able to help the House in this area.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 35, 45, and 47 in this group. This is a very large group of amendments covering a range of issues and I apologise in advance for the length of my comments.

Noble Lords will forgive me for sounding like a broken record, but I go back again to the Government response to the consultation on the new legal duty to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence, which supports my own consultation with relevant stakeholders, which revealed universal concern that the Bill as drafted actually facilitates a police-led enforcement approach and not a genuine public health approach—a genuine multiagency approach to these issues.

The Government set out three proposals in that consultation: the one in the Bill, a new duty through legislation to revise community safety partnerships, and a voluntary approach. More responses were in favour of revising crime and disorder partnerships than the Government’s preferred approach set out in this Bill. Can the Minister tell the Committee what the purpose of the consultation was if the Government had already made up their mind?

The revising of crime and disorder partnerships was supported by 40% of respondents, including half of all police responses, compared with 37% in favour of the approach in the Bill. It is not too late to accept the result of the consultation and to revise crime and disorder partnerships. Amendment 35 is a probing amendment giving an example of how this might be done: for example, by adding authorities to existing crime and disorder partnerships.

Amendment 45 raises the concern that sensitive personal information, which this Bill forces public authorities and even doctors and counsellors to disclose, may be disclosed to private sector or third sector organisations that the Home Office, police forces or others may subcontract work to, to tackle or prevent serious violence, whose data security and personnel vetting procedures may not be as good as that of public sector organisations, and that this may result in sensitive personal information leaking into the public domain.

What assurances can the Government provide that such data, if public authorities are forced to share it, will be kept confidential? Cybercrime experts tell us that no database is secure and that data holders need to work on the basis that their security will be breached and that they need to have back-up plans. The more sensitive personal information about individuals is shared, the greater the risk that confidential information will end up in unauthorised hands, potentially used for illegal purposes such as blackmail, and ultimately end up in the public domain. Amendment 47 removes any requirement to disclose information that would breach an obligation of confidentiality.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, of course I would be glad to be updated, but I think that the Minister will recognise that, as the Bill stands, the position I spelled out would be possible: information could be shared with immigration authorities—and, of course, the Data Protection Act has an exemption in that regard.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation. I did not quite understand when she seemed to suggest that this was all facilitation and to enable different authorities to share information—and that there was no compulsion to do so. Could she therefore explain Clause 17, where it says that,

“if the Secretary of State is satisfied that … a specified authority has failed to discharge a duty imposed on it by section 7, 13(6), 14(3) or 16(4), or … an educational authority, prison authority or youth custody authority has failed to discharge a duty imposed on it by section 14(3), (4) or (5)(b) or 16(4)”,

then

“The Secretary of State may give directions to the authority for the purpose of securing compliance with the duty”


and can enforce that requirement by a mandatory order? In what way is that voluntarily facilitating the exchange of information? Clause 17 is all about the Secretary of State forcing authorities to share information.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, the hour is late. Might the noble Lord permit me to discuss, perhaps in the next few days, the seeming contradiction between those two things?

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

12: Before Clause 3, insert the following new Clause—
“Meaning of special constables
In all legislation in force applying to England and Wales (including legislation enacted after the coming into force of this section)— (a) the term “members of police forces” shall be deemed to include special constables, and(b) the term “constable” shall be deemed to include a special constable.”Member’s explanatory statement
The aim of this amendment is to ensure that special constables are considered to be members of the police service, as they are in Scotland.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 3 enables special constables to be represented by the Police Federation, which is an important and welcome acknowledgment of the role played by specials in police forces—but it does not go far enough. I have been surprised at the lack of knowledge among those I have discussed the amendment with surrounding the role of special constables, who are sworn servants of the Crown with all the powers and responsibilities of a regular police officer. The only difference is that special constables are unpaid volunteers whose only recompense is to be paid expenses. I have also been surprised to learn how widely special constables are now used across a range of policing duties.

When I was a serving police officer, specials were generally treated quite badly by regular officers, who referred to them as “hobby bobbies”. It was almost seen as a punishment for a regular officer to be paired with a special constable on patrol—a liability rather than an asset. Such attitudes were unfair and, in most cases, unjustified. As the devastating cuts to policing continued at the end of the coalition Government, special constables came to be increasingly relied on to perform an extensive range of duties, including being trained in public order to be used in the front line on potentially violent demonstrations. Special constables carry warrant cards, handcuffs and CS spray, can exercise force and make arrests, unlike police community support officers, who are unable to do any of those things. Their uniforms have evolved over time so that today they are barely distinguishable from a regular police officer.

To all intents and purposes, and as far as the law and the public are concerned, special constables are in every way the same as regular police officers, except they are unpaid volunteers. That equivalence has been recognised in Scotland, where they are considered to be members of the police force, but it is not the case in England and Wales. While I welcome the recognition that this Bill proposes to give special constables in allowing them to be represented by the Police Federation, I am at a loss to understand why they are not also to be considered members of police forces to which they belong in England and Wales, as they are in Scotland.

Special constables have a vital and increasingly important role to play. In many places, the visible policing presence on our streets has all but disappeared; specials could help to fill that gap. The nature of policing is changing, with increasingly complex and technical crime being committed, such as online fraud. While police forces cannot compete with tech giants in terms of salaries for those technically qualified and experienced, there are opportunities for those with technical expertise to devote some of their spare time to serving their fellow citizens by becoming special constables dedicated to cybercrime, for example.

If I recall correctly, the Labour Party would seek to recruit significant numbers of special constables, were it to be in government—but that requires more than a statement of intent. Being a special constable has to be an attractive proposition to potential recruits, and recognising them as full members of police forces would send a clear message as to how important and valued they are. Can the Minister explain to the Committee why special constables cannot be members of police forces in England and Wales when they are in Scotland? I beg to move.

[Baroness Harris of Richmond (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this amendment, proposed by my noble friend Lord Paddick, is one that I wholeheartedly support. Many years ago, when I was a magistrate, it was one of my happiest duties to swear in the new special constables. It was fascinating to hear their reasons for wanting to serve their communities voluntarily and to learn about their day jobs. Whatever motivated them, whatever their background, they shared the same driving commitment to help to keep us safe. They put themselves in as much danger as a full-time officer, and they do it voluntarily.

For many years, as my noble friend Lord Paddick, has said, full-time officers derided them. Fortunately, they began to see their worth and special constables are now, almost, fully integrated into the workforce and finally treated properly. I am delighted that my noble friend has brought forward this amendment and I support it totally.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining his amendment. Before I get on to dealing with this amendment, I want to say that I was very moved by the noble Lord’s earlier comments. In the interests of full disclosure, I should declare that I was an inspector in the Royal Hong Kong Police. That is where I started out; I can confirm that one never forgets the smell of a mortuary.

Amendment 12 effectively seeks to dispense with the need for Clause 3 by ensuring that, for all purposes, special constables are treated in law as members of a police force. Our professional and dedicated special constables increasingly carry out a range of specialised and front-line roles in their mission to keep us and our communities safe, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, noted. He also made some very relevant points about the technical skills that they can bring. They often face the same risks as regular officers while on duty; they deserve the same protection and support as regular officers where appropriate. That is why, through the Bill, we are enabling special constables to become members of the Police Federation, should they wish to do so.

Having been subject to long-standing separate regulation in England and Wales, the distinct nature of special constables is recognised in law with clearly defined benefits that result directly from this separate status. In contrast, legislation in Scotland has long included special constables as “members of police forces” and has been drafted to take this into account. It would not be appropriate for special constables to have access to the same conditions of service, or indeed face the same restrictions, that legislation confers on regular officers. Including special constables in the existing definition of “members of police forces” would have that effect. Legislation on the pay and pensions of “members of police forces”, for example, is not relevant to special constables, who are unpaid volunteers, choosing to give up their free time to help strengthen our police forces. As warranted officers, special constables in England and Wales hold the office of constable and are therefore already included in the term “constable”. This means that, where legislation confers powers on a constable, they will also be exercisable by a special constable.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned how we value special constables, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Harris. I will digress briefly to set out what the Home Office is doing to recognise and support the special constabulary. The Home Office has raised the profile and status of the annual Lord Ferrers Awards, which recognise the outstanding contribution of volunteers in policing. We have consulted on proposals to extend the eligibility of the Queen’s Police Medal to special constables, along with proposals to lower the service threshold for bars to the Special Constabulary Long Service Medal from 10 to five years. Those proposals could support the retention of highly committed volunteers who may, for example, be incentivised by an award that recognises more realistically the length of service volunteers are able to provide and their ongoing commitment to public service. I hope that this also answers something of the question from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, about recruitment.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to John Apter, chair of the Police Federation. I note that he started out as a special constable, which I suppose, by implication, suggests that that is a route into becoming a regular police officer.

For those reasons, we consider that this amendment is not necessary and could cause confusion to the status of special constables, which the law recognises as distinct from regular officers. Further, this amendment could have unwelcome, unintended consequences, for example by applying pay provisions to volunteers. I hope that, in light of my explanation and assurance, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her support and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his inquisitiveness and his recognition of the value of specials. I warmly welcome the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, to the Dispatch Box. I am not sure whether this was his first outing, but it was a very, very good one. As he will find out, we work collaboratively in this House and it is good to work with such a wonderful Home Office spokesman—if that is not too over-the-top.

However, I did not actually hear—or if I did, I did not understand—why special constables are included as members of police forces in Scotland, and how all the objections the Minister raised, in terms of why they could not be members in England and Wales, have been got around in Scotland. As this is the Minister’s first outing, I would not press him to give me an answer now if he would prefer to write. But something tells me he may have the answer in his hands, in which case I shall allow him to respond.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will try. The noble Lord is asking why specials are treated as members of the police force in Scotland but not in England and Wales. Special constables in England and Wales have been subject to long-standing separate regulation for members of police forces, and their distinct nature is recognised in law, with clearly defined benefits that result from this separate status. By contrast, legislation in Scotland has long included special constables as members of police forces, and it has been drafted to take that into account. I hope that goes some way to answering the noble Lord’s question.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

It was a good try, but it quite clearly does not answer the question at all. Specials in Scotland have always been considered to be members of police forces; they are not paid, but if that happened in England and Wales, they would have to be paid like regular officers. I would like, if possible, for the noble Lord to write to me with a fuller explanation, rather than just stating what the facts are; an explanation of why the facts are as they are would be extremely helpful. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

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[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 14 and 17 in this group. I hope—in fact I am confident—that my noble friend the Minister will give a full explanation of the purpose of these clauses in the Bill, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson. My concern is the inclusion of staff members in these new tests of dangerous and careless driving. I can understand the need to include civilian police driving instructors, but what I do not understand is the inclusion of other staff members. I hope that the Minister can explain why they need to be included.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this is a difficult and contentious part of the Bill. There has been much debate for decades about the police approach to vehicle pursuit in particular, and the ability of emergency service drivers to disregard traffic signs and speed limits in an emergency. There have been tragedies where emergency vehicles on their way to serious and urgent incidents have ignored traffic lights or give way signs, or driven on the wrong side of the road, often in an attempt to save or protect lives, and tragically they have been involved in collisions with innocent members of the public, causing serious injury and sometimes loss of life, as my noble friend Lady Randerson has so graphically illustrated from her own personal experience.

This is perhaps the less contentious of the two areas. But even here, for police control room staff—I am sure the same happens with the fire brigade and the ambulance service—calls are graded as follows: emergencies, with arrival as soon as possible; immediate, with arrival within an hour; or routine. This is to ensure that police vehicles are not driven at speed unnecessarily.

I declare an interest as a former police officer who, although in possession of a full driving licence, attended a six-week, full-time police driving course just to become a standard police driver. I was not authorised to drive high-powered cars designed for use in responding to emergency calls and I was not allowed to become involved in vehicle pursuit of criminals, but simply to be a police driver answering routine calls. Of course, it is possible to become inadvertently involved in a chase, when a car that is asked to pull over refuses to stop, as happened to me on occasion, but as soon as a qualified driver was behind, I dropped out of the pursuit. Being an advanced trained driver involved many more weeks of intensive training; from memory, two six-week courses, with a very high failure rate. The courses were highly sought after and awarded to only the most experienced officers. Police drivers are trained to some of the highest driver standards in the world.

In addition, police control room staff have the authority to direct police vehicles to withdraw from pursuits where the driver of the police vehicle involved is not suitable to conduct the pursuit, where the seriousness of the offence alleged does not justify the risks associated with a high-speed chase, or where the driving conditions —the type of road, the time of the day or any other factor; my noble friend mentioned the presence of pedestrians, for example—present an unreasonable risk to the public and the officers who are involved in the pursuit.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I undertake to write to my noble friend.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, with my 30 years’ experience in the police service, I am having some difficulty in understanding some of the Minister’s explanations, for example about when surveillance becomes a pursuit. We are talking about a situation where an officer is potentially facing a prosecution for careless or dangerous driving. In the ordinary course of surveillance, the people who are being followed will not know that they are being followed. That is what surveillance is. It becomes a chase when the people being surveilled recognise that they have a police vehicle behind them and try to escape. It then becomes a pursuit. So, with the greatest respect, I think that the Government need to sharpen their reasoning for dismissing amendments which, if my noble friend Lady Randerson does not pursue them on Report, I am very likely to.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. I think I gave some other examples, though, of things that do not necessarily qualify as police pursuit but are still none the less covered by this: emergency response, armed vehicle interventions and so on. I thought those would cover most of the noble Lord’s points. I take his point, obviously, that if you are under surveillance, you do not necessarily know that anybody is there—that is the whole point. At some point, that could turn into a pursuit; I suppose it depends on the specific circumstances. But I do take his point.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

19: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“National standards of competent and careful constable
For the purposes of sections 4 and 5 the Secretary of State shall, after consultation with such persons as they consider appropriate, publish national standards expected of designated persons.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish national standards of what would be expected of a competent and careful constable under sections 4 and 5, against which their driving should be judged.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 19 is supported by my noble friend Lady Randerson and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Amendment 20 is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham. I asked for these two amendments to be degrouped from the group we have just debated because that group was about the principle of police officers being given dispensation from the usual tests applied in cases of dangerous and careless driving. These amendments are about a separate issue—the consistency of the likelihood of police officers being prosecuted on not.

The changes proposed by the Government in Clauses 4 and 5 are problematic in that they define the threshold for prosecution or conviction for dangerous or careless driving, set against,

“what would be expected of a competent and careful constable who has undertaken the prescribed training.”

The Police Federation, which provided a draft of this amendment, has reminded me that, while groups of forces tend to pool their resources in police driver training, none the less, there is no national standard. What would be expected of a competent and careful constable who has undertaken the prescribed training can vary from police force to police force. A tactic, such as physical contact by a police vehicle with a stolen motorbike, or a motorbike being driven by a suspect involved in an armed robbery, causing the driver of the motorcycle to crash, might be trained for and practised in some police forces but not in others. To be clear about what I mean, the police driver knocks the criminal off the motorbike by colliding with it—a tactic used by the Metropolitan Police Service.

This could result in a police driver, who was driving in exactly the same way as another police driver in a different police force, being prosecuted and potentially convicted; while the other officer in almost identical circumstances would not face any sanction, if that police driver had been trained in that technique and it was part of the policy of that officer’s police force. Amendment 19 proposes that a national standard be established to ensure consistency in the application of the law, and certainty for police drivers.

Amendment 20, proposed by the Police Federation and based on its wealth of experience in this area, offers an alternative approach by providing a reasonable excuse defence to an allegation of dangerous or careless driving. Instead of adhering to the standard of a careful and competent driver, a police driver could avoid prosecution or conviction, provided the departure from the standard was necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances. This would take account of the relevant driver policy and training, the split-second decisions faced in real time by the driver and the honestly held belief of the driver at the time. This is similar to the dispensation allowed to armed officers who have to make split-second decisions to use their firearms.

I am not a lawyer and I cannot elaborate on whether such a reasonable cause defence is accepted in other similar scenarios. I beg to move Amendment 19.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, we are extraordinarily lucky to have the expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I have just one anxiety about a national standard: conditions in the Metropolitan Police area are different from those facing, say, Devon and Cornwall Police. Devon and Cornwall Police might not have to dismount someone riding a motorbike illegally very often, whereas I suspect it is something the Metropolitan Police has to do quite often. On the one hand, I can see the benefit of national police standards, but I have an anxiety that they might not meet the different needs of different types of police force.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Earl for his intervention. I think national standards would say that the tactic of colliding with a stolen motorbike was an acceptable tactic that officers could be compared against whether or not it was actually used by particular forces, bearing in mind the circumstances faced by different forces. So, legally, officers in Devon and Cornwall could use that tactic according to the national standard, but it would be very rare for them to use it—if ever at all.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My noble friend has raised the issue of national standards. I want to approach this issue in a slightly different way. I have added my name to the amendment because I have concerns about clarity. The existing standards are set out in the 1988 Act, and we as drivers are all familiar with them. We passed our driving tests however long ago, but on an almost daily basis we practise following those standards—fairly rigorously, I hope.

According to this legislation, we are now moving to a set of standards based on a format for training of which we, with the exception of my noble friend, have no real concept. We do not understand exactly what is involved in this training and what is expected of police drivers. Indeed, I am sure this debate has been very instructive for us all in finding out a bit more about it.

Add that issue to the fact that standards are different from one part of the country to another and we have a difficult situation for the Government in applying this new approach. Good law has to be easily understandable. Publicising the details of these standards—making sure that the public, as well as police officers, understand them—is essential for acceptance by the general public. That will be essential if cases brought under this legislation are to succeed in court.

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I hope that I have been able to go some way to persuading the noble Lord that the issue of national standards has already been addressed through the Bill and elsewhere, and that a reasonableness defence would not be appropriate. I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. To my noble friend Lady Randerson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I say that I have just started cycling in London again and it is terrifying; we need more traffic police.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, particularly for the way he absolutely hit the nail on the head with his example of a police van driver who is not an advanced driver who is told by a member of the public that, 100 yards down the road, somebody is being murdered, but who has not received the level of training that they will be judged against. In the debate on the previous group, the Minister said that if they have not had the training, they will be judged like an ordinary driver; he also said that the legislation provides the protection that they need. But the example from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, shows how they will not get protection under the law as proposed and drafted by the Government in the Bill.

The Minister said that these changes have been made in consultation. Dare I suggest that they were not made in consultation with the Police Federation? They have not been made in consultation with the officers who will be directly affected by the legislation, because it was the Police Federation that asked me to propose these amendments to the Bill. Again, I am afraid I must suggest that the Minister has been rather let down by his brief in not being able to address the very real concerns that noble Lords around the House have expressed. We will clearly come back to this on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I agree very much with the concerns that have been expressed this evening, and I would because I have an interest which I should declare as a trustee of Safer London whose work is directed to deterring young people from becoming involved in crime. Giving young people the tools they need to resist being pulled into crime is a very wide agenda. As is obvious from the name, the work is confined to London, but it is needed all over.

As well as that, I remember the debates during the passage of the Modern Slavery Bill on what is meant by “exploitation”. I take the point about people—it is not just children—who may be perceived as criminals but who are actually victims, so I understand the calls for much better understanding of child criminal exploitation. I hope that what I am about to say is understood to be support for, not opposition to, the thrust of what is being proposed.

Amendment 52, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, on training is absolutely to the point. If all agencies and authorities were trained to recognise what they are seeing but not recognising, in a way that would answer all the other points that have been made. If the prevention and reduction of crime, which is what these clauses are about, means anything, surely it must include safeguarding. That is prevention. Safeguarding is not defined, which does not surprise me because it is comprised of an awful lot of component parts and is different in different circumstances. I would be interested to know whether the Minister call tell us what is already on the statute book in this area. Are we talking about bringing together provisions that should be brought together that are scattered, as can be the case, or are we talking about something new in statutory terms?

I do not think that we can leave the issue without referring to resources. If there were the resources to extend the excellent work being done by various organisations far more widely, both in the voluntary sector and to statutory authorities, I do not think we would be talking about all this. But I am quite convinced that it comes back to training to recognise what should really be in front of people’s eyes. I know it is easy for us, standing up in the Chamber, to say that, and I would not like to do the job that some police officers, teachers, health workers and so on do. But the training should support the achievement of everything that noble Lords are seeking this evening.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there are a number of general points I need to make about the new legal duties to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence. I will try to make them in the appropriate group of amendments, but I hope the Committee will accept that there is a great deal of overlap.

The overwhelming response of the non-governmental organisations I have met with which have concerns about this part of the Bill is that, as drafted, it is actually about forcing agencies to support a police-led enforcement approach to serious violence—not a public health approach, or even a multiagency approach, to preventing and tackling serious violence. The Government’s own consultation on this issue gave three options: a new legal duty on specific organisations to effectively share information with the police; a new legal duty to revise community safety partnerships, the existing and well-established mechanism where local authorities and police forces work together to prevent and tackle crime, and where the local police chief and local authority chief executive are equal partners in doing whatever each partner and others can do to reduce crime and disorder; and a voluntary non-legislative approach. There was more support for a legislative approach than a voluntary one, but more respondents favoured enhancing community safety partnerships—40%—compared with a new legal duty to provide information to the police—37%—and, tellingly, the police supported equally options one and two.

Even the police, the sector most likely to benefit from a police-led enforcement approach, were ambivalent as to whether it should be a truly multiagency approach by enhancing community safety partnerships or a police-led enforcement approach. So why did the Government opt for the latter and not the former? A police-led enforcement approach was the Government’s preferred option from the beginning. These amendments, which we support, are the first manifestation of challenging that police-led enforcement approach, in that the legal duty does not sufficiently recognise that many young people, particularly those involved in county lines, are victims of criminal exploitation rather than free-acting criminals. Henry Blake is a former youth worker who draws on his personal experiences of working with at-risk young people in his powerful film, “County Lines”—a drama about one young man who is drawn into county lines drug dealing. I would highly recommend this film to any noble Lord who is unaware of the realities of county lines.

Many young people lacking family support and living in poverty find themselves groomed by adults who appear to show them the love and concern they desperately seek, and who treat them to meals in burger restaurants and buy them new trainers—something their often lone parent cannot afford. They promise them money, not just so they can afford the latest designer clothing that they need if they are not to be bullied by gangs, who see those who do not wear designer labels—even Nike and Adidas—as targets. It is not just so they can go to McDonald’s whenever they want, but so that they can help their mum put food on the table and make sure their younger sister has decent clothes to wear. I hope noble Lords can see how easily vulnerable young people are drawn into criminality, not just for pecuniary advantage but for the sense of belonging and the sense that someone is at last paying them some attention. For many, it is as much an emotional need as a financial one.

Of course, the reality is very different. The adults exploiting these young people take the vast majority of the profits of the drug dealing in which they are involving these young people whom they have groomed, and the youngsters take all the risks, often ending in violence from rival drug dealers. These young people are victims of criminal exploitation, and each one of us is to blame—not them. It is our fault that their single mothers have to do three minimum wage jobs to pay the rent and put food on the table and so, through no fault of their own, can rarely be there for their kids as most wish they could be. It is our fault that too many people do not have a decent place to live, because they cannot afford private rents for an appropriately sized home in a good state of repair, and that there is a shocking shortage of social housing and much of what exists is in an appalling state of repair. It is our fault that, as the cost of living spirals upwards, we take away £20 a week in universal credit from those most in need. The Government’s response is to force other agencies to divulge information that makes it easier for them to prosecute these victims of criminal exploitation.

That is why the Bill needs to radically change from a police-led enforcement approach to preventing and tackling serious violence to a truly public health and multiagency approach, starting with—although this is only the beginning of the changes needed—putting the safeguarding of children involved in serious violence in the Bill. That must include, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests in his Amendment 50, and as both Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society have suggested, including a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation in the meaning of exploitation in Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, suggests in her Amendment 52, training for police officers in particular, to ensure that they are aware of child criminal exploitation and actively seeking evidence of such exploitation.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out the case for these amendments. I wholeheartedly agree that nothing is more important than safeguarding children at risk of harm. That is why we introduced reforms to safeguarding in 2017, which led to the establishment of multiagency safeguarding arrangements in 2019. The statutory safeguarding partners responsible for safeguarding—that is, local authorities, clinical commissioning groups and chief officers of police—are also named as specified authorities under the serious violence duty, so I would argue that it is truly a multiagency approach. This demonstrates the importance of safeguarding in protecting children and young people from involvement in serious violence. We expect that existing work to safeguard vulnerable children will link very closely with local efforts to prevent and reduce serious violence. Therefore, we do not believe that it is necessary to include a separate safeguarding requirement in this part of the Bill, and it would not be possible to do so without duplicating existing safeguarding legislation.

On Amendment 25, which would require specified authorities to prepare and implement an early help strategy, the noble Lord is absolutely right to highlight the importance of prevention and early intervention and this, of course, is the key aim of the serious violence duty. We recognise that early intervention and prevention are essential to reducing serious violence. The duty requires partners to work collaboratively to develop a strategy to reduce serious violence in their local area. We expect partners to work with upstream organisations, such as education providers and children’s social care, when developing this strategy to ensure that it covers actions that relate to early help and considers risks that occur before a young person becomes involved in serious violence. This ensures that any strategy will include early help for this cohort. We believe that it would be less effective to separate this out into an additional strategy.

Metal Theft

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

We talked about cash payments being outlawed some years ago, and in fact they have been. Some of the innovations like marking and tracing are now in place to make theft of things like railway tracks much more difficult. It is in working together through the various agencies that the various industries will help to beat this type of crime.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad that the Minister mentioned marking. From over 30 years’ experience in the police service, I can tell the House that longer prison sentences rarely deter criminals, whereas the higher chance of being caught does. Why do the Government not invest in technologies such as SmartWater, rather than building more prisons?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The British Transport Police has plans whereby SmartWater would cover any shortfall in the funding required to stamp out this theft. There are a number of different innovations that are helping, and clearly the overall driving-down of theft is very helpful.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Criminal Conduct Authorisations) (Amendment) Order 2021

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 12th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful that some noble Lords are still here. That is very nice. I make no apologies for returning to the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which was so thoroughly debated and amended in this House earlier this year. As I said while the Bill was passing through this House, I am truly happy that a previously secret process has been put on a statutory footing. That said, I also wish to have it on record that there remain serious gaps which would allow authorised agents to commit serious crimes with impunity. These gaps have not been adequately addressed in this regulation of investigatory powers statutory instrument and for this reason I have tabled this Motion.

The statutory instrument concerns requirements on the level of seniority for MI5 officers and those of other bodies who are authorised to sanction CHIS participation in crime and to record the criminal conduct authorised. The SI includes the crucial phrase

“including any parameters of the conduct authorised.”

I understand that these parameters will reflect only the conduct being authorised and will not include substantive limits on the crimes which may be committed. This, theoretically at least, enables involvement in serious abuses such as murder and/or torture.

The Government claim that, by introducing the requirement of recording any criminal authorisations, limits are effectively set on the crimes in which the CHIS Act may be involved. However, without hard limits there is nothing to ensure that the criminal conduct authorised does not itself involve abuses. As such, the SI is to my mind incomplete.

The point was argued at several stages during the passage of the CHIS Bill. Despite earnest pleas to tighten up the named crimes, as happens in countries such as Canada and the USA, the Government declined to do so. The argument put forward by the Government that defining more closely forbidden criminal actions, including murder and torture, would represent a risk of exposure to those working under deep cover is one that many other countries have rejected.

The Government are therefore asked once again to reconsider this SI and to include within it express statutory limits on the kind of criminal action that can be authorised. It is of course accepted that the mandatory application of finer points of the law in the potential context of immediate and present danger is a step too far. However, murder and torture are extremely serious crimes and as such need to be expressly forbidden. Furthermore, the fact that the phrase in question in this statutory instrument is left open, without express limits in the main Act, surely conveys the message that both murder and torture are, under certain circumstances, acceptable.

I welcomed the CHIS Act in so far as it placed the process of authorising criminal conduct on a statutory footing, as I said. However, a clearly stated prohibition under any circumstances of murder and/or torture would further assist in clarifying the operational environment and ensure that the UK upholds human rights laws. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support the Motion to Regret moved by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to the extent that we too believe that this statutory instrument does not provide adequate safeguards on the actions of covert agents. However, we believe that the reason given by the noble Baroness in her Motion is not within the scope of the order. However, we feel that this House should regret the order because the authority level for authorising criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources is not sufficiently high. Indeed, as was made clear in the Explanatory Memorandum, it is only at the same level as it would be if the CHIS were not participating in crime.

As we made clear during the passage of the Bill—now the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which made the main part of this order necessary—we agree completely that there should be stronger safeguards surrounding the deployment of agents or informants in circumstances where they are permitted to commit crime. Agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, we argued that there should be limitations on the crimes that covert agents can commit beyond the implicit Human Rights Act limitations. However, that issue was debated and decided on when this House considered the primary legislation. We did not win the argument. This statutory instrument does not impact on the types of criminal activity that an agent or informant can commit. We therefore consider that the noble Baroness’s justified concerns are not within the scope of the instrument.

We also maintain that there needs to be clear judicial oversight of such deployments to the extent that judicial commissioners should have the authority to prevent the deployment of—or, in urgent cases, to withdraw safely from deployment—agents or informants authorised by the police, the security services and other authorities to commit crime. Currently, there is a duty only to inform judicial commissioners within seven days of deployment, with no statutory mechanism for judicial commissioners to revoke the authority. Again, we debated this at length during the passage of the then Bill. We did not prevail in our insistence on these safeguards and the issue is not within the scope of this statutory instrument, but we feel that it is important to restate our position in this regard.

What is within the scope of this order, and what we do regret, is the authority level of the officer—particularly in the police—who can authorise an agent or informant to commit crime. In urgent cases this can be a police inspector. I was a police inspector at the age of 24. The Government may say that only specially trained inspectors can authorise the deployment of CHISs and that this will be written into the CHIS code of practice, but my understanding is that that is not contained in either primary or secondary legislation. Can the Minister confirm that it would not be unlawful for any police inspector to grant such an authority, even if it were against the code of practice? On that, the Explanatory Memorandum says that

“the formal process to update the Code is under way.”

Can the Minister confirm that, as this statutory instrument is already in force, these changes have already come into effect but the code of practice that underpins it is not yet in place?

The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say:

“The updated Code will be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny upon the laying of an additional SI in due course”.


Can the Minister confirm whether this has happened, or when it is likely to take place? Will it be subject to the negative or affirmative procedure?

There is a world of difference between deploying an agent or informant benignly into a scenario and authorising that agent or informant to commit a crime; it is a degree of magnitude more serious, no matter what the crime is, yet the authority levels set out in this statutory instrument are the same as for a simple deployment with no authority to commit crime.

I refer back to the debates that we had during the passage of the original Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, referred to the impeccable and courageous agents deployed by the security services, perhaps conjuring up the image of James Bond in the public imagination. I contrasted this characterisation with the fact that most informants employed by the police are criminals. I would go further, and refer to the activities of undercover police officers that have recently been the subject of both a public inquiry and successful action in the courts.

The Government will say—indeed, the Minister said during debates on the Bill—that undercover officers would never be authorised to have sexual relations with activists. In an action brought against the Metropolitan Police Service and the National Police Chiefs’ Council, where the claimant successfully argued that her human rights—her right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, her right to privacy and her right to freedom of expression—had been infringed, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal at the Royal Courts of Justice found:

“We are driven to the conclusion that either senior officers were quite extraordinarily naive, totally unquestioning or chose to turn a blind eye to conduct”—


sexual relationships—

“which was ... useful to the operation”.

According to the BBC report of the case dated 30 September, the tribunal also found that the failure of the Met and the NPCC to guard against the risk of undercover officers entering into sexual relationships with women amounted to unlawful discrimination against women. The tribunal concluded:

“Our findings that the authorisations”—


under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—

“were fatally flawed and the undercover operation could not be justified as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ revealed disturbing and lamentable failings at the most fundamental levels.”

This was not in the era of “Life on Mars”, when I joined the Metropolitan Police in the mid-1970s; this was this century. The officer concerned was not deployed undercover in connection with this case until 2003. This is not ancient history but at a time when the current commissioner and I were both senior Metropolitan Police officers, although neither of us had anything whatever to do with the case that I am describing. I am simply making the point that the senior officer in charge of the Metropolitan Police today was a senior officer in the Metropolitan Police when this happened, in terms of temporal proximity. The Government cannot say with confidence that that was a long time ago and the officers around at that time, who oversaw undercover officers and allowed that sort of thing to happen, are no longer serving.

Trust and confidence in the police have been severely undermined by recent events, as the Government have themselves admitted, yet here we are, allowing relatively junior police officers to authorise criminals and undercover police officers to commit crime with ineffective judicial oversight. The authority levels, as set out in this statutory instrument, are too low, the range of offences that agents and informants can commit is too wide, and the judicial oversight is not stringent enough. The Government are asking us to trust the police to authorise criminals to commit crime by passing this statutory instrument into law, while at the same time telling the public not to trust police officers, particularly lone male officers in plain clothes. We regret this statutory instrument for the reasons that I have set out.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I take the opportunity to confirm to noble Lords, as I committed to during the passage of the Act, that the Government will shortly be consulting on that revised code of practice, which will further set out the processes underpinning the activity. I encourage all noble Lords to contribute to that process. The Government will approach the consultation in the collaborative manner in which I hope all noble Lords can agree that we approached the passage of the Act and I hope I have approached the debate today.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the noble Baroness address the question that I raised of whether it would be unlawful for an inspector who was not trained to authorise a CHIS to commit crime? If she is unable to do that this evening from the Dispatch Box, perhaps she could write to me.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

As I said during my response to the debate, the officers who authorise are trained but the noble Lord is now getting into the area of rank and asking whether the authorising officer would have to be an inspector or above as well as trained. Rather than guess what the right answer might be, I shall write to him on that point of clarification.